Showing posts sorted by date for query PAKISTAN TALIBAN. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query PAKISTAN TALIBAN. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Tuesday, September 10, 2024

THEY NEED A  FEMINIST REVOLUTION

‘Nothing Resembling An Adequate Response To The Crisis Of Afghan Women’: Heather Barr Of Human Rights Watch

The Taliban’s morality laws have severely constrained women’s fundamental human rights in Afghanistan. Heather Barr, Interim Deputy Women's Rights Director, Human Rights Watch, speaks to Outlook on what this means for women and girls in the country, and for the world


Avantika Mehta
Updated on: 10 September 2024


Life In Kabul On First Anniversary Of Taliban Takeover Photo: Getty Images
Q

How is HRW monitoring the situation in Afghanistan now?


A


In 2007- 2021, I lived in the country, in Kabul, when I first worked with the HRW. We were a team of two people; but now we have no one based in the country because it's not safe—we wouldn't be able to protect our staff or the people they interview. We also have seen that the United Nations (UN) is under an enormous amount of pressure, which makes it challenging for them to do their reporting although they still do reporting on human rights. We've just seen that the UN Rapporteur Richard Bennett was barred by the Taliban and we know that the media—both Afghan media and international media—have been under enormous pressure over the last three years, and the pressure keeps worsening.

Q

What sort of pressure are journalists, particularly female journalists, facing under the Taliban regime?
A


The Taliban has expelled a lot of international journalists from Afghanistan or blocked them from getting visas to return. I think it has disproportionately been women who report on women's rights and mostly journalists.

In the local media, Afghan journalists are under constant scrutiny and pressure and know that they have colleagues who have been arrested and tortured for covering topics that the Taliban didn't like or covering them in a way that the Taliban didn't like. This means that if you're an Afghan journalist, your options are that you work in a public way, but you have to be incredibly careful all the time that you end up really constrained in terms of what you can write. Or you operate secretly for an outlet that's based out of the country and that's obviously very dangerous. 

In terms of the gender of the journalists, there are still some female journalists who are working; but they are doing so under incredible constraints that really make it impossible for them to fully do the job of reporting. I think some media outlets still have women working for them, but those women, for example must work from home, and may not be able to go out and do most of the reporting. There are also women who are working secretly—you can see reports particularly in these two outlets called Rukhshana and Zan, but I can't even imagine what sort of care and precautions they must have to take, and the fear they live under. 


Q

The Guardian has recently published a report in collaboration with Rukhshana media, where they’ve confirmed with video evidence that the Taliban is using gang-rape as a torture method for women’s rights activists. How does the HRW view this?
A


It's incredibly disturbing and shocking. But, in a way, we shouldn't be shocked. One of the first thing the Taliban did was remove any structure that could provide any kind of accountability for human rights violations. They dismantled the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the Ministry of Women's Affairs. There is nowhere left to go if you're being abused or your human rights are being violated. That means people who are in position of power—people who are running jails, running prisons, arresting people, detaining people—have total impunity. 

Q

There had been some talk from the UN and Western countries particularly, that the Taliban would be obliged to behave under international law if they wanted to be a recognised government on the global stage. How has that played out?
A



That the Taliban were somehow going to be different and were going to abide by international law and Afghanistan's international obligations, was a hope that diplomats had because it saved their face—particularly American diplomats who had signed up for the Doha Agreements. I think you'd be hard pressed to find Afghan women who ever believed that for a moment.

The reason Afghan women didn't believe it is that they knew from their personal experience, from their families' experience, how the Taliban had behaved from 1996 to 2001 when they were in power the first time.

Not just that, they also knew what life was like for women and girls in parts of the country that were controlled by the Taliban when the Doha agreements were being signed. Life in those parts of the country was pretty much the same as it had been in 1996 to 2001.

It was really ‘magical thinking’ to believe that a new, different Taliban had come that was going to yield to international pressure and abide by human rights conventions. That was always a myth, which Afghan women did not swallow. And, here we are now, three years later; now, no one can really deny that the Taliban are as abusive as they ever were. 


Heather Barr Photo: HRW website

Q

As a person watching the situation closely, and who has lived experience in the country, what do you think of the international community’s response to the crisis faced by Afghan women and girls at this point?
A


We still don't see anything resembling an adequate response to that crisis from the international community. We see States issuing statements. We saw the statement issued at the Security Council a few days ago, and some statements by individual states. These are valuable, but obviously they're not enough because they don't accomplish anything. 

We've been really trying to talk to States and the UN about the fact that it's time for concrete steps to hold the Taliban accountable for the fact that their abuses are crimes and violations of Afghanistan's obligations under international law, not just bad behaviour. 

Q

What sort of concrete steps can the international community take?
A


So, I'll talk about five concrete steps the international community could take:

The first is the International Criminal Court; which can bring charges for crimes including a crime that's called gender persecution. It's completely clear that Taliban leaders are engaging in the crime of gender persecution. Afghans have been waiting since 2006 for the ICC to act—that's how long international criminal court prosecutor has been looking into the situation in Afghanistan. That's too long. States who are members of the Rome statutes should be pushing ICC and saying: seriously, how much longer? When are you going to bring indictments? When are we going see arrest warrants for Taliban leaders? That would be an important step towards accountability.

The second measure is to approach the International Court of Justice. This court doesn't bring criminal charges, but States can bring cases against each other. One of the treaties under which States can bring a case against another is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

There are 149 countries that could bring a case against the Taliban over its violations of (CEDAW); there are lawyers who have been looking for almost three years now for one or more States that would bring such a case and it's very frustrating that they haven't yet found one. 

The third is the massive campaign by Afghan women's rights defenders for gender apartheid to be recognised as a crime under international law. There's a unique and time-bound opportunity to do that because States at the General Assembly are in the middle of considering a new potential treaty on crimes against humanity, and apartheid is already included in that draft treaty. Adding gender would just be amending the language that's already in the treaty. 

The fourth thing I want to mention is that all the above suggestions—ICC, ICJ—are dependent on you having evidence of what's actually happening in the country, and it's become so difficult to capture that information. To be admissible in court as evidence, you have to gather information in very specific ways and there isn't anyone doing that right now in a systematic way. The Human Rights Council is convening again starting on September 9 in Geneva, and we've been asking, along with other human rights organisations (Afghan and international) for three and a half years now, for the UN to set up a new mechanism to collect and preserve evidence of crimes committed in Afghanistan.

This has been an ask for ours since the 2021 attack on the girls' school in Kabul happened. And, we will be making that ask again, this week in the human rights convention, and throughout the session, which is a month long (September 9 to October 11).

The fifth, is about refugees. 

We saw this burst of activity of helping Afghans, and helping people to flee right after the Taliban took over. But it feels like a lot of countries are behaving asif they did their bit and now it's over. That's not the case, at all.

As this crackdown continues, there is a steady flow of women and girls who are reaching the conclusion that they cannot live in Afghanistan, that their only option to stay alive and continue their lives is to flee. There has to be pathways for them to be able to flee and reach safety, to be able to resettle. We've seen a growing number of countries that have said that they will automatically consider Afghan women and girls as a category of people who are facing persecution for the purposes of asylum claims, and that's a good thing.

But it's not enough because women and girls can't easily escape. To get help to those who need to escape there, there needs to be help for those who have made it out of Afghanistan but have not made it further than Pakistan or Iran. We know that they can't resettle safely in Pakistan or Iran because there are mass deportations happening in both countries, as well as abuses against Afghans who are just trying to live their lives in those countries. There needs to be a response that is much stronger and more compassionate and more respectful of the 1951 Refugees Convention. 

Q

What do you see as India’s role in helping Afghanistan?
A


I've heard from lots of Afghan people who were students in India at the time of the takeover, who weren't able to get visas to come back to India so there's certainly more it can do. India has been a destination for a long time for Afghans who are looking for medical care, educational opportunities. I hope that people see that Afghans have enriched your society and contributed and so there's certainly room for India to be a place to receive lots of women and girls, particularly women and girls who are seeking education. 

I hope that India's government is welcoming of Afghans. For most countries, there's much more they could be doing and I'm sure that's the case for India too. 




Monday, September 09, 2024

‘It’s crucial to fight the far right in Pakistan and the region

Sunday 8 September 2024, by Farooq Tariq, Israel Dutra



Though it is one of the most dynamic regions of world capitalism, the Brazilian public knows little about South Asia. But the recent student rebellion in Bangladesh has brought to the fore this region marked by instability, which includes populous countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and India.

To find out more about politics in the region, Israel Dutra interviewed veteran leader Farooq Tariq, one of the biggest names on the Pakistani left. Tariq is also a leader of the Fourth International with whom the Socialist Left Movement (MES/PSOL) have maintained fraternal relations for many years, with leading members such as Pedro Fuentes and Luciana Genro taking part in events in Pakistan.

Can you tell us a bit about the current political situation in Pakistan?

Pakistan today presents a picture of a bubbling cauldron marked by a deepening economic crisis, on the one hand, and social and political uprisings in its peripheries, on the other hand. This is further exacerbated by issues of climate change that present an existential threat to the country. While the overall political situation presents a bleak picture marked by the military’s complete control over the state and society, it is encouraging to see that social and political movements in its peripheries, such as in Balochistan province, give a glimmer of hope for change. The political movement in Pakistan’s Balochistan province is directed against the authoritarian control and elite capture of the Pakistani state used against the ethnic Baloch population. Despite heavy repression and a complete black out of these protests by mainstream media, the political movement in Balochistan has attracted a lot of attention from young people and continues to inspire other ethnicities in the rest of the provinces.

Pakistan’s 12th general elections, held on February 8, 2024, resulted in a right-wing coalition government supported by the powerful military-intelligence establishment, which may offer temporary political stability amid ongoing crises. Independent candidates affiliated with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan won the most directly elected seats, but failed to secure a majority or form a coalition. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won fewer seats, but were bolstered by reserved seats under constitutional quotas. Shehbaz Sharif of the PML-N was selected as prime minister, while Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP became president. The coalition faces tough economic decisions, including expanding tax collection and cutting fuel subsidies to secure an IMF bailout.

The new coalition government in Pakistan will require significant support from the military and intelligence services to manage the challenges posed by Khan’s supporters and the country’s deep economic troubles. Despite calls for the military to stay out of politics, it remains the most powerful institution in Pakistan, with a strong influence on governance, foreign policy, and national security. Khan’s criticism has weakened public support for the military, even among previously pro-military groups, pushing the armed forces to work more closely with politicians to preserve their dominance. The military’s historical interference has contributed to economic stagnation. But this time, the threat from Khan’s movement may deter the military from toppling the new Sharif government, which could prove resilient in the face of such attempts.

The country faces a substantial external debt of $123 billion and must repay $78 billion by 2026. Pakistan’s economy suffers from chronic budget and trade deficits, low tax revenues, and insufficient export growth, with foreign currency reserves barely covering a few months of imports. The country has relied heavily on IMF loans, borrowing 23 times since 1958, primarily to cover past debts rather than to invest in economic development.

Jihadist terrorist groups, initially tolerated for use in conflicts with India, have become a major security threat within Pakistan. Since 2000, the country has endured over 16,600 terrorist attacks, resulting in nearly 68,000 deaths, with 1080 fatalities in 2023 alone. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is currently the most significant threat, exacerbated by the return of the Afghan Taliban to power, who continue to support al-Qaeda and shelter the TTP. Pakistan’s new government has pledged to implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism plan targeting all extremist groups, though past efforts have fallen short. This time, the need for economic progress might drive more decisive action, potentially opening the door to improved relations and trade with India, which could help mitigate Pakistan’s economic challenges.

Could you elaborate on how the phenomenon of the far right manifests itself in Pakistan and the region?

The far-right in Pakistan manifests itself in the form of religious extremist and Islamist groups, including the TTP — a far-right religious group wielding enormous influence, socially and politically. It is important to understand that right and far-right forces in Pakistan have always been in cahoots with Pakistan’s powerful military establishment since the Afghan Jihad of the 1980’s. It was Pakistan’s third notorious dictator, General Zia ul Haq, who mainstreamed far-right forces through particular legislation and giving them political and social platforms. Zia’s policies, as various scholars have noted, resulted in the Deobandization of state — the Deoband sect being one of the radical and literalist offshoots of mainstream Islam. This is why Deobandi factions wield enormous influence through religious rhetoric, focusing on issues such as blasphemy laws and anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment. These groups have at times demonstrated their power by mobilising large protests. Some of these factions have also been used by the military establishment to drum up political opposition against specific mainstream political parties. An example of this occurred in the 2018 election, when the PML-N had a falling out with the military establishment and the latter used the TTP to divide voters in Punjab province, which was the main centre of PML-N voters.

Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims is also a major manifestation of the far-right in Pakistan. Groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) have long targeted Shia communities, leading to cycles of violence and retaliation. These sectarian tensions are often exacerbated by regional dynamics, particularly the rivalry between Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shia-majority Iran.

In neighbouring India, the situation is not dissimilar. The far-right is closely associated with Hindu nationalism, particularly the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This movement promotes Hindutva ideology, advocates for a Hindu state and often targets religious minorities, especially Muslims and Christians.

What has been the impact of the student uprising in Bangladesh?

While attention has largely focused on the quota protests, a litany of grievances had piled up against the Hasina Wajid government in Bangladesh. Under Hasina’s rule, Bangladesh has seen GDP growth — but this has not translated into economic well-being for many Bangladeshis. Lack of opportunities, high unemployment rates among youth and soaring inflation have been ongoing sources of tension. Meanwhile, despite the Awami League espousing a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption, money laundering, bribery and nepotism, scandals have dogged government ministers. Since its landslide victory in 2008, the Awami League has eroded the country’s democracy. For example, in 2011 the government ended an arrangement that allowed a 90-day caretaker administration, consisting of technocrats, to organise elections and oversee transfers of power. Suppression of dissent has also grown. The harassment and detention of activists, opposition figures and human rights defenders have become more frequent. Meanwhile, there has been criminalisation of any criticism of the government, including satire and social media posts.

In my assessment, overthrowing Hasina’s government has resulted in a significant vacuum in Bangladesh, which is likely to be filled by the military establishment and religious forces. It is important to remember that the student protests in Bangladesh were not organised; they were spontaneous student uprisings that did not have the backing of any political party. The two organised forces in Bangladesh in the aftermath of the protests remain the military and religious political parties. It is highly likely that the political landscape will be controlled by both. It is very akin to what happened in Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The protests saw the end of decades of dictatorial rule by Hosni Mubarak, but once he was done away with the right-wing al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood) came to power, which was later overthrown by the military. The cycle was then completed. The people protested and staged a revolution against the Mubarak dictatorship but ended up under dictatorial rule again because the only organised forces were either religious parties or the military establishment.

What is your assessment of the Nahendra Modi government in India?

The recent election results in India marked a significant shift in the country’s political landscape. Narendra Modi’s BJP lost its outright majority for the first time in a decade, with the opposition making a strong comeback. Despite Modi’s re-election as prime minister, his power is perceived to have diminished as he now relies on coalition partners to form government. This election was seen as pushback against Modi’s authoritarian style of governance, which has been criticised for undermining democracy, stifling dissent and concentrating power.

To understand Modi and his BJP, it is important to understand its parent organisation, the RSS. The RSS has followed a methodical and strategic approach to its long-term vision since its early days, particularly in Gujarat. By the 1940s, the RSS had expanded significantly in the state, with membership growing rapidly. In the 1960s, RSS leaders began promoting a narrative of aggressive Hindu masculinity, which contributed to growing Hindu-Muslim tensions. This culminated in violent riots in 1969, marked by large-scale violence against Muslims and sexual assaults against Muslim women. Modi, who joined the RSS as a young boy, was heavily influenced by its hardline religious nationalism. By the late 1980s, he had become an important figure in bridging the RSS and the BJP, and played key roles in promoting Hindu nationalist causes, including the campaign to build a temple on the site of the Babri Mosque, which was eventually destroyed by Hindu extremists in 1992.

In recent decades, the RSS has increasingly influenced mainstream Indian politics, particularly through its close association with the BJP. The RSS has leveraged its extensive network to mobilize Hindu voters and impact key political and educational decisions. Under BJP leadership since 2014, the RSS has appointed university leaders, revised textbooks to reflect Hindu majoritarian views, and been consulted on significant policy matters. Despite recent attempts by the BJP to distance itself from the RSS, the latter’s grassroots network remains crucial. The future of India’s democracy, with its multicultural and secular traditions, faces challenges from this dominant Hindu nationalist agenda.

You are one of the major contemporary references of the Fourth International. Could you tell us a bit about your background?

I was a left-wing student activist at University of Punjab, where I was elected president of the students union in the Applied Psychology department. I help lead several battles against religious fanatics and had to leave the country after one of my article exposed the conspiracy between the right-wing leadership of PPP and the military general at the end of 1977. I spent 8 years in exile and then came back to Pakistan, despite having the option to stay in the Netherlands as a citizen. I became general secretary of the Labour Party Pakistan and later of the Awami Workers Party, from 1997 to 2019. I left AWP to form a new political party Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP, People’s Rights Party). I am the president of HKP. I am also the general secretary of the Pakistan Kissan Rabita Committee (PKRC, Peasants Coordination Committee). PKRC is the only organisation in Pakistan affiliated to La Via Campesina. I also head the Asia Europe People’s Forum Asia Team, and am involved in several other regional and international platforms.

30 August 2024

Source: first published in Revista Movimento. English translation Links.

Saturday, September 07, 2024


By 


Lure of Lucre

It was in the late seventies that CIA finalised its covert plan for waging proxy war against the then Soviet army in Afghanistan by using radicalised Islamic fighters [mujahideen]. Codenamed Operation Cyclone, this devious enterprise came as a windfall for Pakistan’s military dictator-turned-resident Gen Zia ul Haq as it led to a Faustian US-Pakistan bargain [or to put it more precisely, an unholy agreement between CIA and Pakistan army’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence or ISI].  


Operation Cyclone was a classic example of proxy war. While ISI was required to provide radicalised and trained manpower to fight the occupational Soviet army in Afghanistan, Washington would divert requisite military hardware to arm the fighters as well finances to sustain this venture through CIA. Since ISI physically distributed weapons, military equipment and funds received from CIA to mujahideen groups, substantial diversion of US weapons and money for Pakistan’s proxy war in J&K as well as for lining the pockets of Generals was no big deal for Rawalpindi. 

‘Poisoning’ Pakistani Society

The gains made by Pakistan in terms of extremely generous US military and financial aid packages were indeed enormous. In fact the lure for lucre was so compelling that Pakistan army’s leadership conveniently chose to disregard the inevitable negative consequences that its deeply flawed decision to host religiously indoctrinated Islamic fundamentalists on its soil portended for the hapless people of Pakistan. The saddest part is not Rawalpindi’s continuing state of denial but the pride with which Pakistan army Generals recall this abhorrent bargain that has claimed thousands of innocent lives.

During his 2010 interview given to Spiegel, Pakistan’s ex President and former army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf nonchalantly admitted that “We [Pakistan army] poisoned Pakistani civil society for 10 years when we fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.” He went on to boast that “It was jihad, and we brought in militants from all over the world, with the West and Pakistan together in the lead role.”  This revelation was neither an emotional outburst nor an unintended or accidental utterance.

In 2019, Pakistani politician Farhatullah Babar shared an undated interview clip in which Gen Musharraf can clearly be heard saying that “…In 1979, we had introduced religious militancy in Afghanistan to benefit Pakistan and to push [the] Soviet out of the country. We brought Mujahideen from all over the world, we trained them, supplied weapons. They were our heroes.” Not only this, he even admitted that “Haqqani was our hero. Osama bin Laden was our hero.” [Emphasis added].

What Musharraf euphemistically referred to as “religious militancy” actually preached intolerance, sanctified violence against innocents by brazenly misquoting/distorting Islamic teachings. However, thanks to its effective propagation in madrassas [Islamic seminaries], this fundamentalist interpretation found widespread traction amongst talibs [students] in an impressionable age. Religious extremism thus took root within Pakistani society and spread like wildfire and several terrorist groups espousing such repugnant ideology mushroomed.


One such fanatical terrorist group is Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] which shares Afghan Taliban’s skewed interpretation of Islam and wants to enforce it in Pakistan and therein lies the paradox- while Islamabad unconditionally endorses the regressive brand of Islam imposed by Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, it doesn’t want TTP to do likewise in Pakistan. However, many locals in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province [which was a major religious indoctrination center since the late seventies] approve of TTP’s aim to establish sharia [Islamic religious laws] in Pakistan.

Rawalpindi’s Ambivalent Anti-Terrorism Policy

The Pakistan army makes it a point to repeatedly announce its zero-tolerance for terrorism and keeps reminding the world that it has made the maximum sacrifices in its war against terrorism. While the Pakistan army has definitely suffered inordinately high casualties due to terrorist violence, this doesn’t prove that its famous “We are going after terrorists of all hue and colour” claim made in 2014 during Operation Zarb-e-Azb anti-terrorist campaign in North Waziristan.

While the Pakistan army claimed to have killed more than 3,500 terrorists, surprisingly not even a single  terrorist belonging to the Haqqani network was either killed or captured. That BBC South Asia correspondent Andrew North’s news report was aptly captioned “All hues or some shades in North Waziristan” and mentioned that “… many reports, as well as footage obtained by the BBC, suggest some militants at least got away and some shades of “terrorist” may still be safe.” [Emphasis added].

Rather than taking the menace of terrorism by its horns, Rawalpindi has been brokering peace agreements with various terrorist groups like the Shakai agreement [2004], Sararogha Peace Agreement [2005], Waziristan Accord [2006] and Swat Agreement [2008]. The Pakistan army has also facilitated several unwritten peace deals; some such agreements include those with terrorist leaders Hafiz Gul Bahadur [North Waziristan], Faqir Muhammad [Bajaur Agency] and Lashkar-i-Islami [Khyber Agency].

The fact that despite making several concessions to terrorist groups, none of these agreements endured just goes to prove that terrorists can never be trusted. However, despite being repeatedly backstabbed, Rawalpindi continued to appease TTP and in its desperate bid to make peace with this terrorist group [which was responsible for killing 134 school children in the gruesome 2014 Army School Peshawar massacre],  even unconditionally released more than a 100 TTP fighters in its custody convicted for killing Pakistan army soldiers as well as civilians. 

Prognosis

Pakistan army chief Gen Syed Asim Munir has been waxing eloquent on Rawalpindi’s zero tolerance towards terrorism and promising to slay this dragon- just like his predecessors did. And faithfully following the footsteps of previous army chiefs, he too is busy blaming all and sundry for the sorry state of affairs instead of taking timely and resolute action to tackle this scourge. 

So as far as Pakistan army’s war on terror is concerned, Gen Munir has little to boast about other than attempting to discredit TTP by challenging its Islamic credentials and referring to it as Fitna al-Khawarij [the first religious-political breakaway group in the history of Islam]. He has also provided quasi-legitimacy to suppression to freedom of expression by coining the phrase “digital terrorism” to encompass actions that aim to create a gulf between state institutions and the people of Pakistan- a master stroke to muzzle growing public criticism of Pakistan army’s continuing meddling in political affairs and judicial matters.  

Till now, both Islamabad and Rawalpindi have been primarily accusing foreign powers for fuelling terrorism in Pakistan. However, Gen Munir has taken his ‘digital terrorism’ argument to a different level by classifying inimical forces working acting against national interests into “malicious actors, subversive proxies, and the facilitators of Pakistan’s external and internal adversaries” changing the existing outlook on this issue and preventing constructive criticism of institutions by equating the same with treason!

It’s therefore most likely that Rawalpindi will continue with its reactive anti-terrorism strategy based on indiscriminate use of brute force and terrorising people through enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. That such an inhuman approach will only further aggravate the already precarious situation in Pakistan is obvious, but Rawalpindi doesn’t need to worry because l the blame can conveniently be apportioned on ‘digital terrorists’ and “malicious actors, subversive proxies, and the facilitators of Pakistan’s external and internal adversaries.” 

Tailpiece: Despite Rawalpindi’s bombastic rhetoric aimed at diverting public attention from reality, it’s abundantly clear that the people of Pakistan are suffering [and will unfortunately continue to do so], only because the Pakistan army failed to eschew its puerile ‘good Taliban’ philosophy. 

But Rawalpindi can’t complain that it wasn’t warned- in 2011, didn’t the then US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton during her Pakistan visit remind Pakistan army Generals that “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors… eventually those snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in the backyard”?



Nilesh Kunwar

Nilesh Kunwar is a retired Indian Army Officer who has served in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. He is a ‘Kashmir-Watcher,’ and now after retirement is pursuing his favorite hobby of writing for newspapers, journals and think tanks.