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Thursday, April 04, 2024

 

Hannover Messe: Virtual skin contact – Smart textiles are making remote hugs tangible



SAARLAND UNIVERSITY
Virtual skin contact: Smart textiles are making remote hugs tangible 

IMAGE: 

SMART TEXTILES ARE MAKING VIRTUAL REALITY MORE IMMERSIVE AND ENABLING WEARERS TO EXPERIENCE THE SENSATION OF PHYSICAL TOUCH. AN ULTRATHIN FILM THAT CAN TRANSMIT TOUCH SENSATIONS IS ABLE TO TURN TEXTILES INTO A VIRTUAL SECOND SKIN. AT THIS YEAR´S HANNOVER MESSE, THE RESEARCH TEAM LED BY PROFESSORS STEFAN SEELECKE AND PAUL MOTZKI FROM SAARLAND UNIVERSITY WILL BE DEMONSTRATING THEIR TECHNOLOGY WITH WATCHES THAT HAVE A SMART FILM APPLIED TO THEIR BACKS. PHD STUDENT SIPONTINA CROCE (LEFT) AND STUDENT LUKAS ROTH (RIGHT) ARE CONDUCTING RESEARCH INTO TEXTILES THAT INCORPORATE HIGH-TECH FILMS. IN RELATED PROJECTS, THE ENGINEERS HAVE USED THEIR TECHNOLOGY TO CREATE INTERACTIVE GLOVES FOR FUTURE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION PROCESSES.

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CREDIT: CREDIT: OLIVER DIETZE




Smart textiles are making virtual reality more immersive and enabling wearers to experience the sensation of physical touch. An ultrathin film that can transmit touch sensations is able to turn textiles into a virtual second skin. For seriously ill children in hospital isolation wards, this new technology offers them the chance to feel the physical closeness of their parents during computer-simulated visits and to experience again the feeling of being held, hugged or cuddled. The research team led by Professors Stefan Seelecke and Paul Motzki from Saarland University will be presenting the technology behind these smart textiles at Hannover Messe from 22 to 26 April (Hall 2, Stand B10).

A hand on a shoulder, the stroke of an arm or a simple hug. Human touch can bring calm, comfort and closeness, a sense of safety and of being protected. When the nerve cells in our skin are stimulated by touch, numerous parts of our brain are triggered, causing immediate changes in our body's biochemistry. Hormones and signalling molecules are released, including oxytocin, which creates a sense of well-being and bonding. Video calls, on the other hand, tend to leave us cold. We miss the closeness and emotional connection that in-person meetings produce. But what happens when physical closeness is essential, when children are seriously ill, but their parents are unable to visit? When physical contact is not possible due to a weakened immune system?

An interdisciplinary research team at Saarland University, htw saar University of Applied Sciences, the Centre for Mechatronics and Automation Technology (ZeMA) and the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI) is working on a technology that will enable children in hospital isolation wards to feel in a very natural way the close physical proximity of their parents during virtual visits. The 'Multi-Immerse' project is at the interface of engineering science, neurotechnology, medicine and computer science and the members of the research team are developing ways to realize multi-sensory virtual encounters between individuals. The aim is to create new technology that will allow young patients to see, hear and feel their parents and siblings in as realistic a manner as possible so that the children experience a strong sense of close physical interaction even though they are physically separated.

The research group led by Professors Stefan Seelecke and Paul Motzki at Saarland University and ZeMA in Saarbrücken is responsible for the tactile side of the project and for creating technical systems that deliver a realistic sense of touch. The Saarbrücken engineers are experts in using thin silicone films to impart novel capabilities to surfaces. They have developed films that are a mere 50 micrometres thick and that can be worn like a second skin. Just as our skin is our body's interface to the outside world, these ultrathin films are the body's interface to the virtual world. The goal is to create a lifelike sensation of touch from interactions between people in a virtual environment.

When incorporated into textiles, these high-tech films allow the child to experience being touched when the mother or father strokes a second smart textile elsewhere. 'The films, known as dielectric elastomers, act both as sensors – detecting the tactile input from mum or dad – and as actuators – that transmit these movements to the child,' explained Professor Seelecke, who heads the Intelligent Material Systems Lab at Saarland University. When functioning as a sensor, the film is able to recognize with very high precision how a hand or finger presses or stretches the film as it brushes over it. This physical deformation caused by the parent's hand is then reproduced exactly in a second textile that is in contact with the child's skin – giving the child the realistic impression of being stroked on the arm, for example.

‘A highly flexible electrically conducting layer is printed onto each side of the ultrathin film to create what is known as a dielectric elastomer. If we apply a voltage to the elastomer film, the electrodes attract each other, compressing the polymer and causing it to expand out sideways, thus increasing its surface area,' said Professor Paul Motzki, who holds a cross-institutional professorship in smart material systems for innovative production at Saarland University and at ZeMA. Even the slightest movement of the film alters its electrical capacitance, which is a physical quantity that can be precisely measured. When a finger runs over the film, the film deforms and an exact value of the electrical capacitance can be assigned to each individual position of the film. A sequence of these measured capacitance values represents the path taken by the finger as it moves. The film is therefore its own flexible sensor that can recognize how it is being deformed.

By knowing how capacitance values and film deformations correlate, the researchers can use the smart textile to transfer the stroking motion of a parent's hand to the child's arm. The research team is able to precisely control the motion of the elastomer film. By combining the capacitance data and intelligent algorithms, the team has developed a control unit that can predict and program motion sequences and thus precisely control how the elastomer film deforms. 'We can get the film to perform continuously controlled flexing motions so that it exerts increasing pressure on the skin, or we can get it to remain in a fixed position”, explained PhD student Sipontina Croce, who is carrying out doctoral research in the project. They can also create tapping movements at a specified frequency. The amplitude and frequency of the motion can be precisely regulated.

At this year's Hannover Messe, the team will be demonstrating their technology with a "watch" that has a smart film applied to its back. 'We can create chains of these smart components so that they can transmit long stroking motions. To do this, we interconnect the components so that they can communicate and cooperate collectively within a network,' explained Paul Motzki.

This smart-textile technology is inexpensive, lightweight, noiseless and energy-efficient. By providing a tactile element to computer gaming, the novel elastomer-film technology can also be used to make the gaming experience more realistic. In related projects, the engineers have used their technology to create interactive gloves for future industrial production processes, or to create the sensation of a tactile 'button' or 'slider' on flat glass display screens, which is literally bringing a new dimension to touchscreen interactions.

At this year's Hannover Messe, the experts for intelligent materials from Saarbrücken will be showcasing other developments that make use of dielectric elastomers, such as sensory shirts or shoe soles, or industrial components like pumps, vacuum pumps and high-performance actuators.

Background:
The ERDF project 'Multi-Immerse'
, which is headed by Professor Martina Lehser (htw saar University of Applied Sciences / ZeMA), is a collaboration involving the Center for Digital Neurotechnologies Saar (CDNS), which is based at Saarland University's medical campus in Homburg, htw saar and the Center for Mechatronics and Automation Technology (ZeMA). In addition to Professor Martina Lehser and Professors Stefan Seelecke and Paul Motzki, research is also being conducted by Professor Daniel Strauss (Director of the Systems Neuroscience & Neurotechnology Unit), Professor Michael Zemlin (Director of the Saarland University Children's Hospital), Professor Eva Möhler (Director of the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at Saarland University Medical Center) and computer scientists from Saarland University (Professor Jürgen Steimle) and the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI).

The dielectric elastomer technology continues to be developed by PhD students conducting research as part of their doctoral dissertation projects under the supervision of Professors Seelecke and Motzki. The results have been published as papers in a variety of scientific journals. The research work has also received support from numerous sources. Funding from the EU was provided through a Marie Curie research fellowship. The Saarland state government has provided financial support through the ERDF projects iSMAT and Multi-Immerse, and ME Saar (the Association of Metalworking and Electrical Industries in Saarland) has funded a doctoral research scheme. The team also wants to develop the results of its applied research for commercial and industrial applications, which is why the company ‘mateligent GmbH’ was spun off from Professor Seelecke's department.

Saturday, March 16, 2024

As a rabbi, philosopher and physician, Maimonides wrestled with religion and reason – the book he wrote to reconcile them, ‘Guide to the Perplexed,’ has sparked debate ever since

Faith and reason are often treated as opposites. But some philosophers believe they can only strengthen each other, including the Jewish sage Maimonides, who wrote the famous ‘Guide to the Perplexed.’


February 20, 2024
By  Randy L. Friedman

(The Conversation) — I teach a philosophy of religion seminar titled “Faith and Reason.” Most students who register arrive with a mistaken assumption: that the course explores the differences between the two.

“Faith” is often defined as belief in a supernatural God that transcends reason – and belief that science can only go so far to explain the fundamental mysteries of life. Reason, meanwhile, means inquiry that draws on logic and deductive reasoning.

It seems like a stark choice, an either-or – until we read Maimonides. For Maimonides, a 12th century theologian, philosopher, rabbi and physician, there is no true faith without reason.

Maimonides’ full name was Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, and he is often referred to by the abbreviation “Rambam.” His writings spurred centuries of conflict and were even banned in some Jewish communities. Yet he also penned one of the most famous guides to Jewish law and still stands as one of the most influential rabbis to have ever lived.

It is surprising for many students to learn that Maimonides, who lived in present-day Spain, Morocco and Egypt, embraced reason as the only way to make sense of faith. In this rabbi’s view, the idea of a battle between faith and reason sets boundaries where none need exist.

Faith must be grounded in reason, lest it become superstition. This synthesis is at the heart of Maimonides’ most famous philosophical work, “The Guide for the Perplexed.”
Jerusalem and Athens

Treating faith and reason as if they are at odds is nothing new. Some philosophers have described them as two different cities, as when University of Chicago professor Leo Strauss wrote of “Jerusalem and Athens.”

Both cities love wisdom, Strauss wrote, but attribute it to different things. In “Jerusalem,” where life is grounded by faith in God, “the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord,” Strauss wrote in 1967, quoting the biblical books of Proverbs and Job. In “Athens,” on the other hand, symbolized by the ancient Greek philosophers, “the beginning of wisdom is wonder” – the wonder of inquiry and reason.

Almost 800 years before, however, Maimonides was arguing that true religion, true wisdom, requires both.


A statue of Maimonides in Cordoba, Spain.
Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Rambam was deeply steeped in Jewish learning. As a doctor, astronomer and philosopher, however, he was just as knowledgeable about the science of his day. He ostensibly wrote “The Guide to the Perplexed” to help his student Joseph Ibn Aknin navigate between the truths of philosophy, natural science and revelation.

Maimonides’ understanding of God and the universe mostly agreed with Aristotle’s . In Part II of his “Guide,” Maimonides credits Aristotle with helping to prove three key principles about God: God is incorporeal, without a physical body; God is one; and God transcends the material world. Yet God created the world and set it in motion, Maimonides asserts, and everything in it depends on God for its existence.
Science and scripture

Throughout these chapters, the rabbi does not turn to scripture to prove or disprove philosophical propositions, although he notes that Aristotle’s opinion may be “in accordance with the words of our prophets and our theologians or Sages.”

This does not mean that Maimonides does not care about sacred texts – far from it. Rather, he argues that the truths of science and philosophy must inform how people interpret the Bible.

Many people of faith have read the Book of Genesis’ story of creation literally. For them, God’s creation of humanity “in our image and likeness” means both that God must have a body and that humanity shares much in common with God.

For Maimonides, however, language like these passages in Genesis was allegorical. If reason teaches that God is incorporeal, this means that God has no body; God does not physically see, nor do people see God. God does not speak, sit on a throne, stretch out an arm, rest or become angry. Reading these passages literally misunderstands the nature of God.

It is hard to overstate the significance of this claim. In Maimonides’ view, saying that God has a body is not just incorrect but blasphemous and idolatrous. He sees God as unique and transcendent, irreducible to anything human or material. And if God does not literally speak, then the Bible cannot be the literal word of God.


A letter Maimonides wrote around 1172, discovered in the late 1800s
.
Culture Club/Hulton Archive via Getty Images

Maimonides insists that the Bible be appreciated as an esoteric text. Any part of the revealed text that does not fit with a true understanding of God and the universe must be read allegorically.

Reason does not eliminate his faith in God, or the power of scripture. Instead, reason protects people from believing something incorrect about God’s nature. Maimonides insists that we have faith in reason and that reason ground our faith.

The palace of God

Maimonides’ philosophical writing is filled with debate and disagreement between him, fellow rabbis, Jewish philosophers and the Kalam, a medieval tradition of Islamic theology. Reason was the tool needed to make sense of sacred texts, and philosophical inquiry was the process needed to get it right. The goal was truth, not mere obedience.

Toward the end of his “Guide for the Perplexed,” Maimonides lays out what he believes are different levels of enlightenment. The allegory centers on a king’s palace: Only a select few, those who pursue truest wisdom grounded in philosophy and science, will reach the room where the king – God – resides. People guided by faith alone, who accept scripture literally and unquestioningly, and believe that faith transcends reason, on the other hand, “have their backs turned toward the king’s palace,” moving further and further away from God.

Maimonides is considered one of the greatest rabbinic authorities of all time. And his resolution to the debate between faith and reason could not have been clearer: There should be no true conflict. Both reason and revelation are our guides.

(Randy L. Friedman, Associate Professor of Judaic Studies, Binghamton University, State University of New York. The views expressed in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of Religion News Service.)

Sunday, March 10, 2024

 

Fake Peace, Real War, and the Road To “Plausible Genocide”


We will destroy everything not Jewish. 
— Theodore Herzl [1]

We have no solution, you shall continue to live like dogs, and whoever wishes may leave, and we will see where this process leads . . . . You Palestinians, as a nation, don’t want us today, but we’ll change your attitude by forcing our presence on you.
— Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan [2]

The common denominator amongst all the American peace efforts is their abysmal failure.
— Cheryl A. Rubenberg [3]

USrael’s disgraceful conduct in Gaza goes on, and on and on. Leveling hospitals, shooting children in the head; gunning down a surgeon at the operating table, using an emergency call from a little girl trapped in a car with the corpses of family members to lure two rescue workers to her, then killing all three; systematically killing Palestinian journalists reporting on the slaughter; promising to save three premature babies at a hospital under forced evacuation, then leaving them to slowly die and be devoured by dogs; singing in chorus of the joy of exterminating Arabs; cheering the blocking of food aid to starving Gazans; killing entire families, inducing a Palestinian boy to lay down in the road hoping someone would run over him and end his misery; this is but a small sampling of the consequences of trapping over a million Gazans in the southern half of a 125-square-mile concentration camp without food, shelter, or sanitation, then methodically shooting and bombing them while thousands of their relatives decompose under expanding mountains of rubble.

Depravity on this scale will not magically disappear by establishing a cease fire and holding peace talks, as urgently necessary as both those preliminaries are. Only relentless popular pressure on the U.S. government to force it to deny Israel the means to subjugate and murder Palestinians can even hope to lead to de-nazification of the Jewish state, without which real peace can never be achieved. Keep in mind that in the midst of the current wholesale slaughter a large majority of Israelis think Netanyahu isn’t using enough violence.

Cease fires we have had before, and peace agreements, too, but they didn’t solve the underlying conflict because addressing the absence of Palestinian national rights – the heart of the Palestine conflict – is taboo.

Because of this taboo, massacres of Palestinians are a feature, not a bug, of Zionist ideology, and have stained Israel’s history from before the state was even formed.

Only the scale of the current Gaza slaughter sets it apart.

In June of 1982, for example, Israel invaded Lebanon on a surge of Pentagon arms shipments, seeking to disperse the Palestine Liberation Organization (the Hamas of its day) and poison its relations with the local population while destroying its political and military structures. Tens of thousands of civilians died as the IDF carved up the country in alliance with Christian fascist militias.

While claiming to stand tall for human rights, Washington kept arms and money flowing in support of Israel’s occupation of not just Palestine, but Syria and Lebanon as well.

Lebanon was savagely pounded, leaving people roaming the wreckage of Beirut in clouds of flies, terror in their eyes, their clothes reduced to rags. Mothers howled, orphans sobbed, and the stench of rotting corpses filled the air.

Cluster bombs leveled whole blocks. White phosphorous burned people alive. Palestinian refugee camps were blasted to rubble, left pockmarked with blackened craters that filled with dead bodies and other debris. An officer in the U.N. peace-keeping force swept aside by the Israeli attack on Rashidiyeh said, “It was like shooting sparrows with a cannon.” Asked why houses containing women and children were being bombarded and bulldozed, an Israeli army officer explained that, “they are all terrorists.”

Surrounded by tanks, gunshots, and hysteria, one hundred thousand people were left without shelter or food, roaming through piles of wreckage. Blindfolded men, handcuffed with plastic bonds, were marched away to concentration camps where they were tortured, humiliated, and murdered. Their families were turned over to Phalangist patrols and Haddad forces (Israeli allies), who torched homes and beat people indiscriminately.

At the United Nations, the United States gave its customary blessing to Israeli savagery, vetoing a Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

Much impressed by Israel’s “purity of arms, The New York Times saluted the “liberation” of Lebanon.

But it was a macabre “liberation.” After three months of relentless attack, the southern half of the country lay in ruins. Even President Reagan, as ardent a fan of Israel as any of his predecessors in the Oval Office, couldn’t stomach more killing, and called Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to stop the “holocaust.” Offended at the president’s use of this word, Begin nevertheless halted the bombardment immediately.

An agreement between Israel, the U.S. and the PLO was signed with security guarantees for the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat and his PLO fighters left for Tunis. On September 16, in defiance of the cease fire, Ariel Sharon’s army circled the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Israeli soldiers set up checkpoints and allowed truckloads of their Phalange and Haddad allies into the Palestinian camps. The Phalangists came with old scores to settle and a long list of atrocities against Palestinians already to their credit. The Haddad forces acted as part of the Israeli Army and operated under its command.

Perched on rooftops, Israeli soldiers watched through binoculars during the day and lit up the sky with flares at night, guiding the soldiers as they moved from shelter to shelter in the camps slaughtering the defenseless refugees. In mid-massacre, Israeli Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan congratulated the Phalangist command for having “carried out good work,” offered a bulldozer for scooping up corpses, and authorized the killers to remain in the camp twelve more hours. [4]

On September 18 war correspondent Robert Fisk entered the camps and described what he found there:

Down every alleyway there were corpses – women, young men, babies and grandparents – lying together in lazy and terrible profusion where they had been killed or machine-gunned to death. . .  In the panic and hatred of battle, tens of thousands had been killed in this country. But these people, hundreds of them, had been shot down unarmed . . . these were women lying in houses with their skirts torn up to their waists and their legs wide apart, children with their throats cut, rows of young men shot in the back after being lined up at an execution wall. There were babies – blackened babies because they had been slaughtered more than 24 hours earlier and their small bodies were already in a state of decomposition – tossed into rubbish heaps alongside discarded U.S. Army ration tins, Israeli army medical equipment, and empty bottles of whiskey.

. . . Down a laneway to our right, no more than 50 yards from the entrance, there lay a pile of corpses. There were more than a dozen of them, young men whose arms and legs had been wrapped around each other in the agony of death. All had been shot at point-blank range  . . . One had been castrated . . .  The youngest was only 12 or 13 years old.”  [5]

Such were the results of Israel exercising its “right to self-defense,” just as the wholesale slaughter and starvation of Gazans forty-two years later is rationalized on the same grounds.

The moral of the story is that no matter how blindingly obvious its crimes are Israel is never guilty of anything because . . . the Holocaust.

Forty-seven years ago the London Sunday Times reported that Israel routinely tortures Palestinians, a devastating revelation at the time. The scope of the torture, said the Times, was so broad that it implicated “all of Israel’s security forces,” and was so “systematic that it [could not] be dismissed as a handful of ‘rogue cops’ exceeding orders.”

Among the prisoner experiences detailed by the Times’ Insight team were being beaten and kicked, being set upon by dogs, having one’s testicles squeezed, having a ball-point pen refill shoved into one’s penis, or being raped with a stick and left bleeding from the mouth and face and anus.

Israel categorically denied the charges, but refused to rebut, diverting to side issues and attacking Israeli lawyers who stooped so low as to defend Arabs. Seth Kaplan in the staunchly liberal The New Republic rose in defense of Israeli torture, arguing that how a government treats its people “is not susceptible to simple absolutism, such as the outright condemnation of torture. One may have to use extreme measures – call them ‘torture’ – to deal with a terrorist movement whose steady tactic is the taking of human life.”  [6] Of course, every state in the world practicing administrative torture routinely claimed it was fighting “terrorists,” an infinitely elastic designation in the hands of national security officials.

So what supposedly made Palestinians “terrorists”? Mainly, that they resisted Israel’s steady tactic of robbing, swindling, torturing, and murdering all those who had been living in Palestine long before Zionism even appeared on the scene. But Israel simply couldn’t publicly admit that Palestine was not what it told the world it was – a land without a people for a people without a land. It had to keep torturing and killing Palestinians to induce them to vacate the land, but it could never admit this. At the end of 1996, when the Israeli Supreme Court authorized the torture of Palestinian prisoners, the justices called it “moderate physical pressure,” which sounds more like massage than torture. [7]

Two major Middle East peace agreements have been negotiated entirely under the prejudiced assumption that Palestinians are terrorists to be neutralized, not an oppressed people entitled to its rights. In neither Camp David nor Oslo was there any indication that Palestinian grievances were to be seriously considered, much less honestly dealt with. Had the obvious issues been faced with courage then, Gazans wouldn’t be getting slaughtered now. But they weren’t, an outcome that could have been foreseen just by looking at the people who produced the agreements.

The Camp David Treaty was negotiated by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Sadat was a former Nazi collaborator whose idol was the Shah of Iran, a U.S. client then moving at break-neck speed to Westernize the country, in the process laying down a human rights record so appalling that Amnesty International characterized it as “beyond belief.” He was shortly overthrown by the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

The year before Camp David Sadat had made his “sacred mission” to Jerusalem to speak to the Knesset, opening the way for peace. But he complied with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan’s instructions to delete references to the PLO, and he never got off his knees after that. At Camp David he threw himself on the goodwill of the United States, striving for an agreement so good for Israel that Begin would invite condemnation should he dare to reject it.  Dismissed as a traitor and a fool throughout the Arab world, he was assassinated three years later.

Former head of the underground terrorist group Irgun, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was proud of his role in blowing up 95 British and Arabs in the King David Hotel in 1946, as well as the slaughter of over two-hundred Arab women, children and old men at Deir Yassin in 1948. In WWII, the Irgun had offered to support the Nazis against the British. One of Begin’s first acts when he became Israeli Prime Minister was to issue a postage stamp honoring Abraham Stern, whose group made the proposal. [8]

The last thing one could reasonably expect out of Prime Minister Begin’s cabinet was peace. His military junta included five generals who maintained cozy relations with apartheid South Africa and the blood-soaked dictators Augusto Pinochet and Anastasio Somoza.

As for Begin’s territorial ambitions, they were expansive, to say the least. The former Irgun commander had been elected on a platform calling for the annexation of the West Bank and the East Bank of the Jordan River, a goal that the Likud Party has never renounced. He regarded the West Bank and Gaza not as occupied but as liberated – from the indigenous Arabs to whom he felt they didn’t rightfully belong, and he called the land “Judea and Samaria,” Biblical names for God’s gift to the Jews. He openly regarded the Palestinians as Israel’s coolies, corralling them into Bantustans even as he promised them full autonomy, which he defined mystically as self-rule for people, but not for the land on which they lived. [9]

The key figure at Camp David, of course, was U.S. President Jimmy Carter, a fundamentalist Baptist and supposedly a neutral mediator between Begin and Sadat. He confessed to having an “affinity for Israel” based on its custodianship of the Holy Land, and regarded it as “compatible with the teachings of the Bible, hence ordained by God.” Ordained by God!  He had “no strong feelings about the Arab countries,” but condemned the “terrorist PLO.” Begin he described implausibly as a man of integrity and honor.

Carter instructed Sadat that unless his proposals were patently fair to Israel, which regarded Arabs as subhuman, Begin would justifiably reject them. When Egypt’s opening proposals requested compensation for Israeli use of land and oil wells in the occupied Sinai, free immigration to the West Bank, Israeli withdrawal from the illegally occupied territories (including East Jerusalem), and a Palestinian state, Carter was despondent at the “extremely harsh” recommendations. [10] Any treatment of Palestinians other than as anonymous refugees to be absorbed and pacified in colonial structures was apparently unimaginable extremism.

At the time, the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and its inclusion in negotiations was the only possible basis for establishing Palestinian national rights and reaching real peace. Nevertheless, Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski summed up the U.S. stance at Camp David as “bye-bye PLO.” The Palestinians’ nationalist aspirations were summarily dismissed, and a solution for the Occupied Territories was postponed until future “autonomy talks,” to which the PLO would not be invited. This doomed any prospect of peace.

Unsurprisingly, Camp David’s imagined Palestinian “autonomy” was a substitute for national liberation in the Accords, and was fundamentally colonial. Israel was allowed to retain economic and political power over the West Bank and Gaza, and the Israeli Defense Forces were permitted to indefinitely remain. The Palestinians were essentially granted municipal authority (to pick up the garbage?) provided it didn’t threaten Israeli “security.” Prime Minister Begin openly declared that he would never allow a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

It’s hard to improve upon the summation of Camp David provided by Fayez Sayegh, founder of the Palestine Research Center:

A fraction of the Palestinian people (under one-third of the whole) is promised a fraction of its rights (not including the national right to self-determination and statehood) in a fraction of its homeland (less than one-fifth of the area of the whole); and this promise is to be fulfilled several years from now, through a step-by-step process in which Israel is to exercise a decisive veto power over any agreement. Beyond that, the vast majority of Palestinians is condemned to permanent loss of its Palestinian national identity, to permanent exile and statelessness, to permanent separation from one another and from Palestine – to a life without national hope or meaning.  [11]

Nevertheless, the United States applauded what it somehow construed as the birth of peace in the Middle East, while Israel proceeded to “annex” Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, tattoo the Occupied Territories with Jewish settlements, carve up southern Lebanon, attack Iraq, and bomb Palestinian refugee camps. [12]

None of this was a surprise. According to Israeli strategic analyst Avner Yaniv, the effect of Camp David’s removing of Egypt from the Arab military alliance was that “Israel would be free to sustain military operations against the PLO in Lebanon as well as settlement activity on the West Bank.”  [13]

Five years after Israel had reduced southern Lebanon to rubble Gaza rose in rebellion (the first intifada), and six years after that came the Oslo Accords, with the White House announcing triumphantly for the second time that lasting Middle East peace was at hand. But once again there was no peace. In accordance with long-standing U.S.-Israeli rejectionism the Oslo Accords called for the incorporation of Palestinian lands in a permanent colonial structure administered by Israel.

In other words, after more than seventy years of sacrifice and popular struggle for their national rights, the Palestinians were triumphantly handed a micro-state with no power. A toothless “Palestinian Authority” was set up in the West Bank.

Once again, Israel remained in possession of everything that counted: East Jerusalem, the settlements, the economy, the land, water, sovereignty, and “security.” The Oslo settlement was based on UN Resolution 242, which only recognized Palestinians as stateless refugees, not as a people possessed of national rights.

Israel made no commitment to giving up its violence or compensating the Palestinians for 45 years of conquest and dispossession. Yasir Arafat renounced all nationalist aspirations and discarded Palestinian rights, including the right to resist oppression. He accepted responsibility for guaranteeing Israeli security, turning his people into police for their occupiers.

The Palestinians were granted nothing more than “limited autonomy,” with no guarantee of Palestinian security, no Palestinian sovereignty, and no autonomous economy. Israeli companies were to set up sweatshops in the Occupied Territories and Palestinians were to continue supplying the $6-a-day labor. After years of granting concessions to Israel, they were asked to wait three to five more years until “final status” talks could determine what Israel’s vague references to “improvements” actually meant.

For the majority of Palestinians living in the Diaspora, this represented the final act of robbery, nullifying years of promises from the UN, Arab governments, and the PLO itself.

At the celebration of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn, Arafat, the conquered, thanked everyone for the agreement suspending most of his people’s rights, and delivered an emotionally sterile speech as though he were reading out of a phone book. He barely mentioned the Palestinians.

Yitzak Rabin, the conqueror, gave a long speech detailing Israeli anguish, loss, and suffering involved in the conquest. He promised that Israel would concede nothing on sovereignty and would keep the River Jordan, the boundaries with Egypt and Jordan, the sea, the land between Gaza and Jericho, Jerusalem, the roads, and the settlements.  He did not concede that Israel was, or ever had been, an occupying power. He made no commitment to dismantling the maze of racist laws and repressive fixtures of the Occupation. He said nothing about the thousands of Palestinians rotting in Israeli jails. He expressed not a twinge of remorse for four-and-a-half decades of ethnic cleansing and lies.  [14]

So the occupation of Palestine continued for years more, severely restricting Palestinian movement, increasing Jewish colonization of Arab land, and intensifying bureaucratic harassment. On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon and a thousand Israeli soldiers touched off the second intifada by invading the Al Aqsa mosque site in Arab Jerusalem. The next day Prime Minister Ehud Barak ordered riot police to storm the compound where 20,000 Palestinians were praying. Rocks were thrown and the police opened fire, killing seven and wounding 220. Within days President Clinton dispatched the largest shipment of attack helicopters to Israel in a decade.

Though portrayed by Israel apologists as extraordinarily generous towards the Palestinians, Prime Minister Ehud Barak never dismantled a settlement or freed a Palestinian prisoner during his entire 18 months in office. Like his predecessors, he refused to compromise on settlements, borders, refugee rights, and Jerusalem. According to Robert Malley, special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs in the Clinton administration, it is a myth that Israel had offered to meet “most if not all of the Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations,” and equally a myth that the “Palestinians made no concession of their own.” In fact, Palestinians expressed willingness to accommodate Jewish settlements on the West Bank, Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and a limit on repatriation of Palestinian exiles, though all of them were entitled to return. Malley stated that “no other Arab party that has negotiated with Israel . . . ever came close to even considering such compromises.”

Meanwhile, Israel offered nothing and demanded surrender, just as it always had.

According to Israeli military analyst Ze’ev Schiff, the Palestinians were left with three options:  (1) agree to the expanding Occupation, (2) set up Bantustans, or (3) launch an uprising.

Palestinians chose to fight, and Israel pounded the nearly defenseless civilian population with helicopter gunships, F-16s, tanks, missiles, and machine guns. While systematically assassinating Palestinian leaders, Israel cried “immoral” when its victims turned their bodies into weapons in horrific suicide bombings at supermarkets, restaurants, pool halls, and discotheques. Israeli propaganda blamed “hate teaching” by the PLO, but the real hate teacher was the racist ideology that defined Palestinians as “beasts walking on two legs” and “cockroaches in a bottle,” among other terms of endearment popular with Israeli leaders. [15] This swelled the ranks of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade with volunteers who had lost close relatives to the Israeli military.

Amidst the firestorm of moral indignation occasioned by the suicide attacks, Israel never considered negotiating in good faith to resolve the longstanding conflict, and the United States applied no pressure to make them do so. Following in the footsteps of a long line of predecessors, President George W. Bush heaped arms and aid on Israel, vetoed UN resolutions calling for observers in the Occupied Territories, and continued funding the ever-expanding Jewish settlements. With the entire world recoiling in shocked outrage at Israel’s pulverizing of the West Bank, he declared Ariel Sharon “a man of peace.” [16]

Post-Oslo the stealing of land and dynamiting of Palestinian homes continued with the same justification as before: Jewish land was redeemed, Arab land was unredeemed. By the end of the twentieth-century, over 80% of Palestine no longer belonged to Palestinian Arabs. Under Clinton-Barak settlement construction had accelerated dramatically and Jews received nearly seven times as much water as Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, three hundred miles of Jews-only highways and bypass roads integrated the settlements into Israel proper while dividing Palestinian areas into enclaves of misery completely cut-off from the wider world.

Increasing numbers of Israeli Arabs joined with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to protest Jewish supremacy rooted in nationality rights granting Jews exclusive use of land, better access to jobs, special treatment in getting loans, and preferences for college admission, among other unearned advantages. Military service brought even more benefits, from which Palestinians were excluded.  [17]

Founded as a haven for Jews, Israel had become the most dangerous place in the world for them to live. The constant war on Palestinians that made this so was still described as self-defense, and the crushing of their national culture was still the goal of “peace.” Orwell would have felt like an amateur.

Whatever differences President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu may be having regarding tactics and media sound bites, the commitment they share is to preserving the festering boil of apartheid Israel, rooted in the conviction that Jews are a master race of chosen people destined to scrub the Holy Land of unsightly Arabs and rule over Greater Israel forever.

The stench of death is its constant gift to the world.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Joel Kovel, Overcoming Zionism, (Pluto, 2007) p. 224

[2] Noam Chomsky, Hopes and Prospects, (Haymarket, 2010), p. 160

[3] “American Efforts For Peace In The Middle East, 1919-1986“, quoted in Anti-Zionism: Analytical Reflections, Tekiner, Abed-Rabbo, Mezvinsky, eds. (Amana Books, 1988) p. 19509

[4] Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, (South End, 1983) pps. 155, 359-71, Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies, (Zed, 1994) pps. 117-121

[5] Robert Fisk is quoted from his book Pity The Nation in Susan Abulhawa, Mornings In Jenin, (Bloomsbury, 2010) pps. 224-6. Abulhawa is a novelist, but quotes verbatim passages from Pity The Nation.

[6] Noam Chomsky, Towards A New Cold War, (Pantheon, 1973-1982) p. 454n., Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, (Dodd Mead, 1978) pps. 178-84.

[7] Eduardo Galeano, Upside Down – A Primer For The Looking Glass World, (Henry Holt, 1998), p. 88.

[8] Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, (Dodd Mead, 1978) p. 153.

[9] Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, (Vintage, 1979) pps. 14-15, 44, 57, 138, 195, 204, 206-7; Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, (Dodd Mead, 1978) pps. 144, 191, 279, 351, 398, 683. Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, (South End, 1983), p. 95n.; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, (Bantam, 1982) pps. 334, 347)

[10]  Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, (Bantam, 1982) pps. 274-5, 338-40; Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, (Dodd Mead, 1978) p. 651.

[11] Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, (Vintage, 1979), p. 212

[12] Edward Said, The Politics of Dispossession, (Chatto and Windus, 1994), p. 244; Larry Shoup, The Carter Presidency and Beyond, (Ramparts, 1980) pps. 120-3)

[13] Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New, (Columbia, 1994) p. 213.

[14] Edward Said, The Pen and the Sword, (Common Courage, 1994) p. 110; Edward Said, The Politics of Dispossession, (Chatto and Windus, 1994) p. xxxiv, xxxv-xxxvii; Christopher Hitchens in Edward Said, Peace and Its Discontents, (Random House, 1993) p. 3.

[15] John Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 2007, p. 89)

[16] Stephen Shalom, “The Israel-Palestine Crisis,” Z Magazine, May 2002; Edward Said, “The Desertion of Arafat,” New Left Review, September-October 2001; Rezeq Faraj, “Israel and Hamas,” Covert Action Information Bulletin, Winter 2001; Rania Masri, “The Al Aqsa Intifada – The consequence of Israel’s 34-year occupation”; Noam ChomskyInternational Socialist Review, November-December 2001.

[17] Max Elbaum, interview with Phyllis Bennis, “For Jews Only: Racism Inside Israel,” ColorLines, December 15, 2000; Edward Herman, “Israel’s Approved Ethnic Cleansing,” Z Magazine, April 2001; Rene Backmann, A Wall In Palestine, (Picador, 2010), p. 170.


Michael Smith is the author of "Portraits of Empire." He co-blogs with Frank Scott at www.legalienate.blogspot.com   Read other articles by Michael.

Tuesday, February 27, 2024

French cinema has a sexual abuse problem. Why is it persisting?


Jean-Francois Fort/Hans Lucas/ReutersView caption

By Colette Davidson 
Special correspondent
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
@kolet_ink

February 26, 2024|PARIS

For many American filmgoers, actor Gérard Depardieu is one of the iconic faces of French cinema, known for his leading role in “Cyrano de Bergerac” or for playing Dominique Strauss-Kahn in the 2014 film “Welcome to New York.”

But Mr. Depardieu has more recently gained notoriety as a sexual predator. More than a dozen women have accused the actor of sexual assault or harassment, and he is accused of raping a woman in 2018.

In December, the actor’s fall from grace seemed complete after a television broadcast of the documentary “Depardieu: The Fall of an Ogre,” in which the actor was seen making sexist remarks while in North Korea in 2018.

WHY WE WROTE THIS
A story focused on TRUST

Auteurs and actors are held in high esteem in France. That may be in part why the country is still wrestling with sexual abuse scandals involving some of its cinematic leading lights.

But two weeks later, despite widespread condemnation, 56 stars of French cinema signed an open letter on his behalf. French President Emmanuel Macron defended the actor on national television, saying Mr. Depardieu had “made France proud” with his past cultural contributions. And Mr. Depardieu’s former agent called the actor “a monster, yes, but ... a sacred monster.”


Alessandro Bianchi/Reuters/FileView caption

It’s an issue not limited to Mr. Depardieu. The presentation of the César Awards, France’s top cinematic honors, on Friday were dominated by a speech by actor Judith Godrèche, in which she condemned the “level of impunity, denial, and privilege” in French cinema. Ms. Godrèche, now 51 years old, has accused two directors, Benoît Jacquot and Jacques Doillon, of sexually assaulting her while she was a teenager and they were both decades older. Both men have denied doing anything illegal, but it is only recently that their behavior has come under public scrutiny.

With all of the progress made by the #MeToo movement in allowing victims of sexual violence to be heard, why does it seem that French people are more willing to extend their trust to their cinematic icons instead of those who accuse them?

“The trend is moving towards listening to victims, but it still remains one person’s word over another,” says Bruno Pequignot, a sociologist and professor emeritus of arts and culture at the Sorbonne Nouvelle University in Paris. “Meanwhile, there is a feeling that cinema stars exist above the common man, that their behavior lies outside the norm.”
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“The artistic cult”

French actors have enjoyed a special star status since the 18th century. But starting in the 1950s and with the advent of the “film d’auteur” – films that reflected their director’s artistic personality – directors also began enjoying a unique place in the hearts and minds of the French.

Films themselves were soon granted “artistic legitimacy” and equated with intellectual creation – likened to works of art or literature – and their directors, usually men, elevated to the status of demigods, living outside checks and balances. That has endured and been extended to creative minds across the pond such as Woody Allen or Quentin Tarantino, as well as films’ leading men.

Petros Giannakouris/AP/FileView caption

“The religious cult in France has been replaced by the artistic cult,” says Geneviève Sellier, professor emeritus of film studies at Bordeaux Montaigne University. “There is a vision of the male genius who is given free rein to express himself, the artist who exists outside of the law.”

But some say that power has allowed French male film stars and directors to engage in borderline criminal behavior in the name of artistic creation. Industry insiders say there is often an element of seduction starting from the audition process and an expectation for young actresses to have physical relations with directors to accelerate their careers.

Thus, situations in which life imitates art – even when inappropriate – become more commonplace and thus tolerated, both on set and in the public eye.

“This is an industry that exists outside of societal norms,” says Fatima Benomar, the president of the women’s rights organization Coudes à Coudes. “A minor might kiss an older man in a film or have a nude scene, and it’s acceptable because it’s in the name of art, but obviously in real life, these things are illegal. So already they don’t obey the same rules.”

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What makes this situation uniquely French, says Dr. Sellier, is partly due to a controversial theory by historian Mona Ozouf that in France, men and women must obey a “code of seduction,” as opposed to America’s “war of the sexes.”

“This myth of seduction, which is widespread among France’s cultural elite, is without a doubt responsible for our refusal to realize that masculine domination is an integral part of social relations, even in the private sphere,” says Dr. Sellier, “and a reason why France was so late on #MeToo.”

Incremental change


Still, the 2017 #MeToo movement has had a positive effect in breaking the code of silence surrounding sexual abuse in the industry. Filmmaker Christophe Ruggia was indicted for 15 years on charges of sexual assault of a minor, following accusations by actor Adèle Haenel. And the industry has seen an increase in female directors and roles for strong female characters.

“There will always be narcissistic perverts in the industry, but we must be careful not to stigmatize all directors,” says Jonathan Broda, a film historian at the International Film & Television School of Paris. “I’m really in favor of education and respect. I always tell my female students to be on guard, keep their senses, and rise above.”


Christophe Ena/AP/FileView caption

But women’s rights groups point to roadblocks that have made trusting sexual assault victims over their accusers more difficult in France. In addition to the special status France’s cultural male elite enjoy in their ability to promote the country’s soft power, says Dr. Sellier, French celebrities can also count on an exceedingly slow legal system.

Around 80% of rape cases are dismissed, and fewer than 1% end in a conviction, according to France’s High Council on Equality Between Women and Men. Though a 2018 law has helped better punish sexual harassment, sexual violence, and sexism, President Macron has refused to define rape as nonconsensual sex, in line with 11 other European countries.

“It’s hugely important for the government to be behind [sexual harassment and abuse] laws in order to create new societal norms,” says Violaine de Filippis Abate, a lawyer and activist with the nonprofit Osez le Féminisme. “There is still far too much ordinary sexism, as well as this idea that when a woman complains, she’s just exaggerating, that ‘it’s not that bad.’”

Oftentimes, media investigations have been more successful in unofficially “trying” French celebrities accused of sexual abuse in the absence of a formal legal decision. Figures like acclaimed film director Luc Besson – accused of rape in 2018 – have escaped a public lynching. And only time will tell the long-term effect Ms. Godrèche’s comments at the César Awards had. But Mr. Depardieu’s latest comments seem to have been one offense too many

Several actors have since removed their signatures from the letter defending Mr. Depardieu. And though Mr. Macron did not retract his comments, he seemed to have realized their political toll, telling French journalists weeks later that he should have spoken up in the name of victims’ plight.

“In the case of Depardieu, the public has taken the law into its own hands, and he has been found guilty,” says Mr. Pequignot, the sociologist. “I think, if nothing else, going forward his case has strengthened the power of victims’ ability to be heard.

Saturday, February 17, 2024

Nike to cut two per cent of its workforce and reinvest in areas like health

February 17, 2024


NEW YORK (AP) – Nike is cutting two per cent of its global workforce, or little over 1,600 jobs, as the athletic wear giant aims to cut costs and reinvest its savings into what it sees as big growth areas like sport, health and wellness.

Nike, based in Beaverton, Oregon, United States joins a growing number of companies including Estee Lauder and Levi Strauss & Co that have announced job cuts in recent weeks.

“Nike’s always at our best when we’re on the offense,” Nike said in an emailed response confirming the layoffs. As of May 31, 2023, Nike employed roughly 84,000 workers, according to its annual report.

The Wall Street Journal’s website was first to report the cuts.

In December, Nike reduced its annual sales outlook for the fiscal year after reporting second-quarter sales results that fell short of company expectations.

The reduced outlook came as company executives told analysts that it has seen more cautious consumer behaviour worldwide in an “uneven macro environment”.

At the time, Nike said it would be cutting up to USD2 billion over the next three years as it aims to simplify product assortment and increase automation and use of technology. It said most of the savings would be used to accelerate innovation and drive speed and scale.

“We see an outstanding opportunity to drive long-term profitable growth,” said President and Chief Executive Officer John Donahoe in a statement in December.

“Today we are embracing a company-wide journey to invest in our areas of greatest potential, increase the pace of our innovation, and accelerate our agility and responsiveness.”

Thursday, January 18, 2024

 

Why Aren't the Red Sea Attacks Affecting the Oil Market?

The destroyer USS Gravely launches a Tomahawk missile in a counterstrike against Houthi targets in Yemen, Jan. 11 (USN)
The destroyer USS Gravely launches a Tomahawk missile in a counterstrike against Houthi targets in Yemen, Jan. 11 (USN)

PUBLISHED JAN 18, 2024 1:05 PM BY THE STRATEGIST

 

[By David Uren]

Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea have had almost no impact on the oil price, despite the volume of oil shipped through the waterway surging 80% over the last two years because of the war in Ukraine.

Markets more worried about a soft global economy and rising US and Brazilian oil production than by the prospect of interrupted oil flows, having already seen the global oil market adjust to the massive disruption caused by Russia’s invasion of its neighbor.

The oil market has fragmented over the last two years, with Russia now primarily supplying China and India while the Middle East and the United States have replaced Russia in Europe.

Flows of Russian oil traveling south through the Suez Canal rose from about 700,000 barrels a day in 2020 to 3.6 million in the first half of 2023. Flows of Middle East oil traveling north through the Suez Canal rose from 2 million to 3.5 million barrels a day in the same period, according to the US Department of Energy.

In total, oil tankers were ferrying about 9.2 million barrels a day up and down the Red Sea in the first half of 2023, up from 5.1 million barrels a day in 2021.

That translates to a lot more ‘oil-miles’, but there’s been little movement in the price. The Brent oil benchmark was at US81.63 a barrel at the beginning of November but has been below US$80 for most of the last two months.

There’s been some diversion of oil tankers since November, when Houthi militias based in Yemen started attacking ships traversing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the 25km-wide southern entrance to the Red Sea. BP announced that it was diverting its ships around the south of Africa, while the world’s fourth-largest tanker group, Frontline, said it would avoid the Suez Canal where possible.

However, the oil tanker business is ferociously competitive with a huge number of operators. The top 30 companies control less than half of total capacity, so tanker operators will continue to run the risk of sailing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, weighing both the relative costs of insurance versus sailing around the south of Africa and the importance of timely delivery. Diverting large oil tankers bound for Asia around the south of Africa adds 30 to 40 days to the voyage.

An assessment by the ship-tracking service, Mari-Trace, detected an average of 76 oil tankers a day in the south Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in December, only three fewer than the average for the first 11 months of the year.

The oil industry has seen off many previous attacks in the Persian Gulf, which is much more critical to global supplies than the Red Sea. While the Red Sea is mainly a transit channel, the Persian Gulf is the source of about 21 million barrels of oil a day, with ships having to traverse the vulnerable 40km-wide Strait of Hormuz.

Between 1984 and 1988, the war that had been raging between Iraq and Iran embroiled tankers traveling to each country. An assessment by the University of Texas Strauss Center found that although 239 ships were attacked of which 55 were sunk, the disruption to oil supplies to world markets from the Persian Gulf was less than 2%.

Oil tankers were harder to damage or sink than general cargo ships or dry bulk carriers. During the so-called ‘tanker war’, 23% of the oil tankers that were attacked were sunk, compared with 34% of general cargo ships and 39% of bulk carriers. Since the big oil tankers are many times larger than navy vessels, even anti-ship missiles like the French Exocet caused relatively little damage.

There was another spate of attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz in 2019, with responsibility variously attributed to Houthi militias, who were fighting Saudi Arabia at the time, or Iran, which was facing severe sanctions from the US on its oil shipments.

An analysis of those attacks by insurer, Allianz, helps explain why tanker operators are prepared to continue running the risk of missile attack.  A very large crude carrier could be carrying 2 million barrels of oil, which in 2019 would have been worth US$135 million.

A five-year-old ship was worth about $70 million.  Additional war insurance was between 0.2% and 0.5% of hull value, translating to between $140,000 and $350,000.  That amounts to only 0.1% to 0.25% of the cargo’s value, a sum that could readily be absorbed by suppliers or customers.

According to Mari-Trace, insurance premiums for ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Southern Red Sea have risen from 0.07% of hull value in early December to between 0.5% and 0.7% by early January.

The oil market’s reputation as a geopolitical bell-weather dates from the 1973 Yom Kippur war when OPEC put an embargo on oil deliveries to nations supporting Israel over about six months which led to oil prices tripling to US$60 a barrel and fuelling global inflation (although deficit funding of the Vietnam war also contributed).

The 1979 Iranian revolution sent oil prices rocketing to US$150 in 1979, but they then spent the next six years slowly declining, despite the ‘tanker war’.  Since then, geopolitics have lost much of their bite in the oil market.

There was a very brief spike, lasting a few months, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, but no reaction at all to the September 11 attacks in 2001 or to the attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in 2019.

The oil price did react to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, briefly reaching US$129 a barrel in March but were back below US$100 by August last year and have averaged about US$83 since then.

The declining sensitivity of the oil market to geopolitical events partly reflects the massive growth of US oil production, which rose from 5 million barrels a day in 2010 to 13 million barrels a day by the end of last year. This has almost eliminated the US dependence on Middle East oil and instead turned it into a significant exporter.

The US both imports and exports oil (reflecting the fact that many US refineries were built to accommodate imported crude), but the US ability to be a swing supplier helped minimize the impact of Europe slashing its purchases of Russian oil. It also means the US economy no longer reacts to passing instability in the Middle East.

The global economy has also become less dependent on oil. Oil’s share of total energy supply has dropped from about 50% in 1973 to 30% now. In 1973, the world consumed a barrel of oil for every US$1000 of GDP. By 2019, it was only consuming 0.4 of a barrel for the same (inflation-adjusted) level of output.

Still, you can’t be an economist if you don’t hedge your bets. For the moment, the rocket attacks on shipping are having negligible effect on the market. If the Gaza conflict escalates into regional war involving Iran and threatening the Persian Gulf, governments could be left revisiting their management of the 1973 crisis.

David Uren is an ASPI senior fellow. This article appears courtesy of ASPI and may be found in its original form here

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

Tuesday, December 19, 2023

The Straussian Character of Post-Soviet Russian Statecraft

The behaviour of post-Soviet Russian statecraft is poorly understood in the Western world. Long gone is the age of clever Kremlinologists.

BYJOSÉ MIGUEL ALONSO-TRABANCO
DECEMBER 19, 2023
Photo: Sergei Bobylev, TASS


The behaviour of post-Soviet Russian statecraft is poorly understood in the Western world. Long gone is the age of clever Kremlinologists —men like George Kennan— whose sober insights shaped Western strategies and policies in the second half of the twentieth century. In the post-Cold War era, it was expected that Russia would follow the path of Westernisation by embracing liberal democracy, free markets, human rights, the so-called “rules-based order” and even the most emblematic flagships of postmodernism. However, Russia has not become a post-historical state like much of North America and Western Europe. Instead, in the last couple of decades, it has acted as an increasingly assertive, revisionist and self-confident great power that does not seek to emulate Washington or Brussels or join the collective West as a junior partner. Since this course of action does not respond to the overzealous gospel of Western liberalism, Russia is often portrayed as a “rogue”, “backward”, “outdated”, “evil”, “un-European” or even “irrational” state. For those unable to transcend such narrow horizons, Russia will always remain a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

The prevalence of such oversimplistic and Manichean views reveals an overall lack of a genuine intellectual effort. Without this element, uncovering the reasons and perceptions which have influenced Moscow’s political trajectories in the last couple of decades is an exceedingly arduous undertaking. Far from being only a cognitive shortcoming, these limited opinions have been directing policymaking in much of the collective West. The results —including the eastward expansion of NATO, the invasion of Ukraine, the unprecedented level of intense antagonism between Russia and the West and the strategic reproachment between Russia and China— speak for themselves. Needless to say, Russia can hardly be described as a charitable or altruistic state. In fact, Moscow does not even bother hiding its predatory ruthlessness in contested theatres of engagement. Yet, as an imperial great power that has played a key role in the Eurasian geopolitical Grossraum for centuries, the sources of its conduct deserve to be examined from a more accurate perspective.

Few Western intellectuals have tried to explain contemporary Russia in accordance with a more nuanced and unjudgmental viewpoint. American representatives of political realism —such as Professor John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz and Henry Kissinger— have offered analytical assessments based on the logic of Realpolitik in order to understand Russian statecraft through the lens of national security, high politics and grand strategy. In turn, Canadian scholar Michael Millerman has highlighted the connection between Russian foreign policy and Russian philosophical thinking. Specifically, Millerman’s work has scrutinised the theories of Aleksander Dugin, the leading ideologue of Eurasianism as an alternative geopolitical project which intends to position Russia as civilisational and strategic counterweight to Atlanticism. These contributions represent valuable stepping-stones towards a better and deeper understanding. However, the development of a more in-depth scrutiny requires the integration of complementary perspectives. The purpose of this analysis is not to contradict the ideas of the aforementioned thinkers, but to offer additional elements than can sharpen, strengthen and calibrate the existing explanatory arsenal that is used to study the evolution of post-Soviet Russia. A more holistic guide for the perplexed is needed.

In this regard, this assessment holds that the teachings of German-American philosopher Leo Strausss provide an analytical framework that is helpful to interpret Russian statecraft. At first glance, Professor Strauss is an unlikely and maybe even counterintuitive candidate as a prophet of Kremlinology. First and foremost, Strauss was as a scholar of classical political philosophy. As such, his work seldom addressed the leading issues of the twentieth century. He had more to say about the lessons found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Xenophon, Maimonides, Al-Farabi and Machiavelli than about the Cold War’s geopolitical, strategic or ideological realities. Furthermore, his ideas are often maligned because of their supposed association with the militant neoconservative movement and its responsibility for disastrous endeavours like the Anglo-American of Iraq. However, said connection is inaccurate and, if anything, based on a distorted vision of his thought. Strauss believed in wisdom and moderation as cardinal virtues in statesmanship, not in a neo-Trotskyist permanent revolution inspired by a megalomaniac messianic fervour. In fact, his ideas were more influenced by the wisdom of the ancients and key authors who developed —directly or indirectly— the so-called ‘conservative revolution’ in Weimar Germany (Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, Spengler and Schmitt) than by the Kantian acolytes of Wilsonian idealism. Leo Strauss was hardly the herald of people like Annalena Baerbock, Anne Applebaum or Victoria Nuland. Furthermore, he never endorsed a worldwide crusade to remake the world’s political systems. In fact, he supported a plurality of political models rather than uniformity. For Strauss, the prospect of global homogeneity literally represented the end of man and the ultimate death of philosophy, understood as intellectual contemplation.

This analysis constitutes an attempt to understand Russia through a perspective that does not respond to the commonplace views of conventional Westernist ‘democratism’. This pursuit is pertinent, not just as an intellectual quest, but as necessity of pragmatic expediency. Relations between Russia and the collective West are likely to remain adversarial for the foreseeable future because their geopolitical imperatives are incompatible under the current status quo. Even the end of the Ukraine War will not diminish strategic competition in Eastern Europe and several corners of the post-Soviet space. However, perhaps this rivalry can be managed so that strategic stability within the international system can be preserved. Hence, Straussian thinking can be instrumental for the rise of a new school of Kremlinology that brings more clarity for policymaking. Specifically, there are four theoretical principles found in Straussian teachings that can enlighten emerging generations of Western Kremlinologists: 1) the reassertion of traditionalism; 2) elite rule; 3) the rejection of unipolar cosmopolitanism and 4) the dangerous nature of the human condition. The ensuing contents discuss why and how each of them is relevant for a serious reading of post-Soviet Russian statecraft. In each case, a summary of key Straussian philosophical teachings is followed by observations that explain their empirical reflection in today’s Russia.

The Reassertion of Traditionalism

Leo Strauss was an outspoken opponent of liberal modernity and everything it stands for. According to Straussian thinking, modernity is the vulgar age in which frivolity, entertainment, degradation, comfort, triviality, emptiness, permissiveness, leisure, commercialism, pacifism and complacency have triumphed. Therefore, the Nietzschean ‘last man’ —the quintessential avatar of modernity— is a contemptible creature in whose nihilistic existence there is nothing worth fighting for. Rather than the fulfilment of a grandiose promise of ‘progress’, modernity represents a major crisis that has brought the fall of man and eclipsed the wisdom of the ancients. Therefore, abandoning the metaphorical caves of liberalism requires the rediscovery of pre-modern wisdom. Specifically, Straussian teachings emphasise that relearning the philosophical lessons from classical antiquity is the key source of inspiration for the restoration of vitality, resolve, morale and purposefulness. Yet, this is not only an intellectual journey. The chains of modernity must be broken so that the Promethean pursuit of human excellence can flourish. Moreover, Straussian teachings underscore that the weight of history —and the scrutiny of its instructive lessons— matters as a navigational compass for statesmanship.

Likewise, Strauss is an opponent of the so-called ‘open society’, one of modernity’s most worshipped totems. The values of an open society impoverish the seriousness of political life and embracing them can only lead to terminal decline. In contrast, Strauss holds that a closed society encourages exceptional qualities that raise the strength of the human spirit, including loyalty, virtue, wisdom, discipline, patriotism, the nobility of effort and honour. Rather than seeking wealth or prosperity, a closed society is focused on the collective pursuit of political outcomes, even if that quest leads to sacrifices for the sake of the greater good. As the concept suggests, the existential horizon of a closed society is confined to the substance of a particular national state whose cultural heritage, unique identity, traditional values and historical sources of inspiration are to be cherished. A polity whose closedness is extinguished is headed in the corrosive direction of decay, weakness, dissolution or even external predation. Only the martial virtues of a closed society can nurture the Spartan-like warrior ethos that a polity needs to ensure its greatness.

If is debatable if Russia is a modern national state. A long-range appraisal reveals ambivalent answers. Russia has experimented with recipes derived from two ideologies born in the cradle of modernity: socialism during the decades of the Soviet era and liberalism in the late 20th century. However, the results of experiments based on both models turned out to be counterproductive. First, the implosion of the Soviet Union was not just a tectonic “geopolitical catastrophe” for Russian national interests. It also represented the death knell of a declining and decrepit system —anchored to the ideological prism of Marxist-Leninist socialism— whose contradictions, failures and bankruptcies had become impossible to overcome. Second, the ensuing liberal era of ‘Weimar Russia’ exacerbated existing problems like political turmoil, economic stagnancy, corruption, interethnic tensions, falling birth rates, substance abuse, disarray, organised crime and prostitution. In contrast, post-Cold War Russian statecraft has had favourable experiences with non-liberal aspects of modernity. In fact, the complex nature of the Kremlin’s geopolitical strategies in this period can be described as exceedingly modern. In the increasingly confrontational chessboard of strategic competition, Moscow relies on sophisticated policies which embrace technological change, adaptation to the changing Zeitgeist of international politics, and the weaponisation of various vectors of complex interdependence (such as energy, social media platforms, migratory flows, finance and money).

On the other hand, Russian policy no longer intends to remake the national character in accordance with the liberal ideological tenets preached by the high priests of modernity in Washington, Davos and Brussels. In fact, the Russian state is rejecting Western trends like secularism, technocratic policymaking, open borders, feminism, the LGBT movement and militant “wokeness”. Some of these are even regarded as instruments of political, propagandistic and ideological subversion ran by Western powers. From the Russian perspective, the Western world is akin to a fallen angel that —driven by intellectual pride— has forsaken its heritage, identity, traditions and religion, all of which have been sacrificed at the altar of ‘progress’. Russia is not interested in sharing the post-historical fate of Western ‘open societies’. In opposition to such creed, Russia has embraced a return to older traditions as sources of guidance, authority, inspiration, symbols and referential frameworks that can fuel the revitalisation of the Russian national state.

This emerging neo-traditionalist Weltanschauung —which seeks to emphasise the uniqueness of the country— encompasses a series of overlapping identitarian underpinnings. Russia is evoking its legacy as the heir to the Byzantine Empire, which outlived the Western Roman Empire for a millennium. With Moscow as the ‘third Rome’, the Russian Federation intends to position itself as an Eastern great power, bulwark of Orthodox Christianity and multi-ethnic empire. In addition, the doctrine of Eurasianism states that Russia is more than a national state. According to this vision, Russia is a natural conservative tellurocracy which operates as an organic civilisational pole whose historical development has blended European and Asian components. Likewise, Russia is also harnessing the strength of nationalism to encourage pride and morale. Such course of action includes the heroic portrayal of Russian historic achievements —such as military victories and acts of conquest— and the celebration of figures like Peter the Great.

Needless to say, these views are not merely ideological. They are consistent with the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’, the projection of Russian ‘soft power’ and its strategic opposition to the league of liberal Atlanticist thalassocracies. Ultimately, Russia aspires to emulate the triumph of Sparta —a militaristic and aristocratic monarchy— against Athenian cosmopolitan democracy in the Peloponnesian War. Therefore, a neo-traditionalist revival must be pragmatically read as an attempt to restore the status of Russia as a key player in international politics and to revert the strategic setbacks provoked by the dissolution of the USSR, but also to counter pressing societal problems such as an impeding demographic contraction. Furthermore, the worldview of Russian neo-traditionalism is also reflected in the implementation of domestic policies. In fact, the Russian state officially supports religiosity, family values and traditional gender roles.

Elite Rule

For Professor Leo Strauss, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian political mores is often a cartoonish oversimplification. According to Straussian thinking, everything that overzealous liberal democrats disapprove of is portrayed as ‘authoritarian’. Much like Plato, Leo Strauss revers the figure of philosopher kings as ruling elites. Their position is determined not by their privileged upbringing, heritage or wealth. Instead, philosopher kings are exceptional men who embody the traditional archetypes of both the warrior (action) and the ascetic (intellectual contemplation). As such, they are enlightened by their superior knowledge of greater truths that the vulgar are unable to grasp. Their profound understanding of complex matters, hidden realities, dangerous affairs, and harsh revelations that the uninitiated are not aware of gives them a worldly wisdom for the masterful practice of statesmanship. These rulers are able to gaze into the depth of abyss without losing their unperturbed stoic temper and to still perform diligently. Their rule does not seek to please the fluctuating whims of public opinion, but to do what is needed to satisfy the national interest of the state.

During the 90s, Russia tried to reform its system of political governance and the structure of its economy in accordance with Western standards. However, said experiment failed to deliver essential public goods like order and prosperity. Judging by their disappointing outcomes, such efforts were largely discredited. For all intents and purposes, Russia rejected liberal democracy as a model worth replicating because it was utterly dysfunctional for its geopolitical, historical, societal, idiosyncratic and strategic conditions. Russian scepticism about the universalisation of Western liberal political dogmas is unapologetic. Actually, it seems that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, the march towards ‘the end of history’ —championed by the so-called ‘Davos men’— is a sanctimonious “cocktail of ignorance, arrogance, vanity and hypocrisy”.

In this regard, the regime built by President Vladimir Putin and the Siloviki clan can be described as a neo-Caesarist securocracy. This hermetic ruling elite is integrated by former KGB spooks involved in foreign intelligence activities during the Cold War. The rise of these cadres to power in a moment of deep crisis is not surprising if once considers that they represented —by far— the most competent and better trained personnel of the Soviet regime. Unlike Commissars and Party apparatchiks, KGB operatives were pragmatists whose fierce performance responded to the necessities of raison d’état rather than to ideological abstractions or preferences. Their word-class expertise was also forged by fire in some of the world’s most challenging flashpoints. Accordingly, the esoteric tradecraft of these people includes the arcane arts of espionage, covert action (‘active measures’), duplicity, conspiratorial intrigues, unconventional warfare and psychological operations. In fact, their fateful takeover of the Russian government at the dawn of the 21st century can likely be explained not just as the result of impersonal forces, but as a political masterstroke orchestrated thanks to the clandestine operational dexterity of these men.

Moreover, an exegesis of the policies implemented by this ruling elite indicates a worldview shaped by the principles of hardcore political realism. The members of the Russian ‘deep state’ live in a Machiavellian intellectual universe in which malice, secrecy, ruthlessness, threats, Faustian pacts, amoral calculations, deception, skullduggery and all sorts of ‘dark arts’ are necessary ingredients of politics and statecraft. In contrast, self-righteousness is a recipe for disaster in such cloak-and-dagger world. Hence, the authority of this elite has not been justified through democratic processes or by political popularity. In fact, the willingness and ability of doing what it takes to secure order, retain control, pursue the national interest and confront enemies is perhaps the strongest source of legitimacy for the Siloviki cabal. As the spectre of Leo Strauss is haunting Moscow, the rule of the Russian spy kings is seemingly here to stay.

Rejection of Unipolar Cosmopolitanism

Contrary to what is commonly believed, Leo Strauss was not a supporter of Quixotic quests for global imperial domination by any regime. He never endorsed any crusade to remake all political systems in accordance with a homogeneous blueprint. In fact, he was fiercely opposed to the prospect of a supranational state populated by ‘citizens of the world’ that have been detached from any connections to particular polities. For Strauss, the hypothetical fulfilment of liberal or socialist cosmopolitanism as a model of world order would represent a dystopian tyrannical threat that could only exist under the ironclad control of a Soviet-like bureaucratic dictatorship. Even worse, according to Straussian thinking, such nightmare —seen as unnatural because it neglects key traits which define the human condition— would lead to the ultimate death of philosophy. Under such conditions, the pursuit of intellectual contemplation, the proliferation of inquiry and the discovery of greater truths would never be possible. In short, Straussian teachings are antithetical to the ideas pushed by the likes of Immanuel Kant, Karl Popper, George Soros, Klaus Shwab or Yuval Noah Harari.

Far from preserving diversity, the globalisation of the ‘open society’ would bring an enforced uniformity that abolishes distinctions, plurality, contrasts, the need for noble deeds and identities, as well as both history and politics. Once history has been buried by the tempting promise of everlasting universal happiness, there would be no need for political struggles under the grey rule of a global tyranny presenting itself as ‘benevolent’. However, Leo Strauss prophesises that plans fuelled by globalist aspirations will invariably elicit the backlash of those that refuse to submit. In fact, he anticipates the prospect that growing opposition to universalist schemes and their sophistry will eventually ensure their demise. Even if this project were to be launched by a democracy, that would not make it any better or sugarcoat its undesirability. Strauss himself acknowledged that even democracies can give birth to imperialistic projects. Together, these arguments convincingly show that Straussian teachings reject the convenience and feasibility of a unipolar hegemonic configuration.

In this regard, the Soviet Union was a superpower interested in the pursuit of global hegemony. In contrast, the Russian Federation does not intend to achieve world domination or even to recreate the USSR. However, Russia is trying to reassert itself as the leading power of the post-Soviet space, especially throughout the so-called “Russian world”. Although it is nowhere near the US and China in many fields of national power, Moscow has the strength, assets and influence to operate as a major player in the global geopolitical chessboard. As such, Russian statecraft has been incrementally challenging Washington’s attempts to establish a hegemonic unipolar order and to remake the world in its image and likeness. Russia does not seek to overtake the US, only to advance a multipolar correlation of forces under which it can act as one of the key epicentres. Interestingly, the Kremlin is willing to partner with anybody —including state and nonstate actors— interested in undercutting US power, regardless of their civilisational, ideological or religious affiliations. In this Schmittian rejection of Western Atlanticism and everything it stands for, the beliefs held by the regimes of states like Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey or Venezuela are inconsequential as long as they oppose unipolarity and its pretensions to freeze history. This course of action reveals not just the pragmatic calculations of traditional Realpolitik, but also a resolved struggle to rollback the influence of a project focused on the universal expansion of the ‘open society’.

Considering the bilateral balance of power, Moscow’s response to American hegemonic pretensions is asymmetric, but its intensity has grown. This is reflected in the reliance of the Kremlin’s revisionist schemes on an arsenal which includes covert means, a myriad of unconventional power projection vectors, military force and even nuclear sabre-rattling. In short, Russia is aggressively contesting the vision of a unipolar world order undergirded by cosmopolitan liberalism as its official missionary ideology. Accordingly, rather than adopting post-historical Western models as a follower, Russia’s ‘heretical’ attitude seems determined to overturn them. Yet, there is an important nuance that deserves to be highlighted. For Russia, this rivalry is no Apocalyptic crusade or kamikaze mission. Actually, Moscow has hinted that perhaps a deal for the redistribution of spheres of influence can be negotiated in order to achieve a reasonable accommodation with the West. Thus, from the Kremlin’s perspective, it would be preferable to deal with pragmatic Western nationalist forces rather than with the uncompromising apostles and inquisitors trying to convert barbarians to the “one true faith” of universalist liberalism.

The Dangerous Nature of the Human Condition

Leo Strauss was no scholar of contemporary international relations or geopolitics, let alone Kremlinology. Nevertheless, as a student of political philosophy, the exegesis of his teachings reveals a mindset that is close to what the so-called realist school has to say. Not unlike hardcore classical realists, Strauss acknowledges the existence of hierarchies, the subordination of the weak by the strong, the amoral character of statecraft, human baseness and the propensity for conflict as permanent features of politics. As a crypto-realist with a Nietzschean twist, Strauss supported the views of Thrasymachus, Thucydides and Machiavelli about the rule of the powerful as the natural order of things in the political sphere. In accordance with this logic, justice is little more than the advantage of the mighty. Under such conditions, political lifeforms have no choice but to fight in order to pursue their interests, enhance their preparedness, preserve their vitality and uphold what they believe is right. In other words, polities can either embrace danger or perish as a consequence of their folly and/or cowardice. As a result, the practice of statesmanship responds to the particular priorities and preferences of a polity, but not to universalistic expectations. Nevertheless, Strauss never glorified warmongering. He simply recognised politics as an intrinsically confrontational realm whose circumstances often require the decisive ability to overcome risk-aversion in matters of life and death. These perspectives are fully compatible with the philosophical underpinnings of what classical realist thinking is all about. Yet, unlike most realists, Strauss emphasised the importance of ideological motivation to strengthen national morale in engagements which demand a substantial mobilisation of effort.

Interestingly, there are other revealing connections between Straussian teachings and realism as a school of thought. Leo Strauss was an avid student of Thucydides’ writings about the Peloponnesian War. For the German-American philosopher, the work of Thucydides was more than a foundational treatise of realist theory. In his view, such source of ancient wisdom imparted timeless lessons about statecraft, history, human nature and the virtues of the warrior spirit, as well as the importance of attributes like prowess, resolve, and courage in the quest for greatness. In addition, Hans Morgenthau thanked Leo Strauss for his contribution to the introduction of Politics Among Nations, a seminal text which presents the theoretical principles of classical realism. The intellectual cornerstone which underwrites this specific branch of realism is an anthropologically pessimistic conception of human nature due the sinfulness of man and his quintessential condition as a political creature. As Carl Schmitt observed, “all serious political theories presuppose man to be evil”. Moreover, the quasi-Nietzschean concept of the ‘Animus Dominandi’ —put forward by Morgenthau and understood as the natural inclination of humans to subordinate their peers— is fully aligned with the spirit of Straussian teachings.

Post-Cold War Russian statecraft is a textbook example of Darwinian Realpolitik. This inclination is the natural consequence of Russian history, shaped by imperial traditions, intense geopolitical rivalries and the constant threat of invasions. Moscow’s foreign policy, national security and grand strategy are driven by the need to prepare for confrontation against hostile forces and to prevent an eventual encirclement of the motherland. As an assertive and self-confident player in the arena of high politics, the Kremlin believes that being feared is a wise course of action that will deter potential enemies. In turn, Russia intends to subordinate neighbouring weaker states by integrating them into its orbit in one way or another and, at the same time, it refuses to capitulate before stronger counterparts like the US. When Moscow’s arm-twisting tactics do not produce the expected outcomes, the Russians are willing to flirt with danger by embracing war as an instrument of statecraft. From Moscow’s perspective, it is preferable to fight in a vicious jungle as a predator than to assume a subservient role in a neo-Edenic garden in which rules made by others are selectively implemented. Better to reign in its own hell than to serve in the Westernist heaven. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of Russian citizens willing to fight for the country is way higher than in many Western European states. Rather than following the path of the ‘last man’, Russian wants to be amongst the last men standing.

In some cases —including Chechnya, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Syria— Russian military interventions have been successful. Concerning the invasion of Ukraine and its fallout, President Putin and his ruling elite made a risky gamble, but they are convinced that the conflict is worth fighting. The war offers a window of opportunity to remake the global balance of power and to achieve beneficial facts on the ground even if that comes with the risks and costs of challenging NATO. However, the Russians are not suicidal or megalomaniac. Moscow’s pragmatic aims are rather limited. The idea of Russian tanks overrunning Warsaw or even Lviv is out of touch with reality. Russians lack the appetite for an ominous conflict which might directly spark a nuclear Armageddon. Nonetheless, if necessary, they are prepared to fight to make sure their national interests prevail, especially in the so-called ‘near abroad’. As a neo-Spartan polity, Russia expects to prevail against Athen’s spiritual heirs in the West because the balance of resolve and its pool of resources favour the commitment of its war effort. Still, as is often the case in the art of war, only time will tell if this aggressive bid leads to glory or to ruin. If the war effort backfires or in the case of a pyrrhic victory, Vladimir Putin will have a lot to answer for, both politically and historically. But if Russia eventually manages to prevail in any meaningful way, he will be seen by posterity as a successful —and implacable— statesman that performed proficiently.

Conclusions

Understanding post-Cold War Russian statecraft under the Vladimir Putin is a challenging intellectual task whose complexity requires transgressing the myopic and self-righteous horizon of liberalism. In fact, an in-depth examination reveals that contemporary Russia has followed an increasingly Straussian trajectory in more than one respect. Certainly, that does not mean that Leo Strauss is somehow the posthumous sinister mastermind of Moscow’s behaviour. Strauss passed away nearly three decades before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Likewise, President Putin and his court of spy kings may not even be remotely familiar with Strauss’ obscure writings, especially considering his undeserved reputation as the patriarch of neoconservatism. Yet, there is a substantial degree of uncanny resemblance between key Straussian principles and the behaviour of the Russian state. Accordingly, the instructive insights found in the philosophical teachings of the German-American Professor offer a sharp referential framework whose interpretative merits can help decipher the underlying logic and qualities of the Kremlin’s strategic playbook. The Straussian philosophical worldview has turned out to be a powerful key which can unlock some of the cryptic matters of contemporary Kremlinology and perhaps also to recalibrate the examination of other illiberal states, including China and Iran. This usefulness highlights the relevance of the far-sighted lessons of Straussian thinking not just for scholars, but also for practitioners involved in foreign policy, intelligence analysis and national security. An increasingly illiberal world in which illiberal states are acting in accordance with illiberal rationales requires a profound knowledge of illiberal political science for analytical, predictive and prescriptive purposes.