Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds International Community accountable for impunity of Israeli entity

Published: 31 Jul 2022


Ramallah: The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated Sunday in a statement that it holds the Israeli entity's government fully and directly responsible for the brutal mass executions committed against the Palestinian people, warning against considering the Palestinian victims as mere figures - hiding the true magnitude of the tragedy inflicted upon the Palestinian families due to the great losses that they suffer from.

The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the international community's abdication of responsibility over the violations and crimes perpetrated by the Israeli occupation forces and settlers would inevitably condone the Israeli occupation forces or their different organs to further indulge in their crimes, including settlement crimes, killing, demolition of homes, ethnic cleansing and practicing the most brutal racist forms against the Palestinian people.

The statement indicated that the absence or the existence of any potential serious Israeli investigations into the crimes against the Palestinians would only absorb the international reaction in a miserable, comical way, by manipulating the crime scene, as well as concealing evidence and formal arrests of some criminals, until they are released in no time, noting that this has been repeated with all cases of field executions

Israeli army kills Palestinian teenager in West Bank confrontation

Palestinian Foreign Ministry condemns the shooting as 'an execution'

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Palestinian dies in West Bank clashes with Israelis

The National

Jul 30, 2022

An Israeli soldier shot dead a Palestinian boy, 16, near a road leading to a Jewish settlement in the occupied West Bank on Friday, Palestinian officials said.

The Israeli military said troops had opened fire to protect motorists from rioters.

Witnesses said the incident, east of the hub city of Ramallah, had also involved face-offs in fields between settlers and Palestinians.

They said that at least one of the settlers was armed and that the opposing groups had thrown rocks at each other.

The Palestinian Foreign Ministry condemned the teenager's killing as “an execution”.

A second Palestinian was shot and wounded in the incident, health officials and witnesses said.

An Israeli soldier draws his weapon at mourners at a checkpoint in the West Bank village of Al Madiya, near Ramallah, in June. They were attending the funeral of Auda Sadaqa, 17, who was shot by Israeli forces. AP

The Israeli army said troops fired to disperse hundreds of Palestinians who had burnt tyres and hurled stones at a road leading to Kochav HaShachar settlement.

“We are aware of reports of a Palestinian that was killed,” the Israeli military said.

Israel's Channel 14 TV station said a settler was also injured and his dog killed.

But the army said it knew of no such incident during the confrontations outside Kochav HaShachar and that the report appeared to be referring to an incident elsewhere.

Most countries regard the settlements as illegal. They stand on land captured by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, where Palestinians want to build a future state.

World’s Largest Chemical Company to Produce Less Ammonia, a Key Fertilizer Ingredient

Mimi Nguyen Ly Jul 31, 2022

The logo of German chemical giant BASF is seen on flags fluttering in front of the company's headquarters in Ludwigshafen, western Germany, on Feb. 28, 2020. (Daniel Roland/AFP via Getty Images)

The world’s largest chemical company, Germany’s BASF, is set to further cut its production of ammonia—a key ingredient of fertilizer—amid soaring gas prices.

“We are reducing production at facilities that require large volumes of natural gas, such as ammonia plants,” BASF Chief Executive Martin Brudermueller said in a media call on July 27 after the release of the company’s results for the second quarter of 2022.

In September 2021, BASF cut ammonia production at its headquarters in Ludwigshafen, as well as at its large chemical complex in Antwerp, Belgium.

To fill gaps in supply, BASF would purchase some ammonia from external suppliers, Brudermueller said.

Ammonia is a key ingredient in fertilizer production. It also plays a key role in manufacturing engineering plastics and diesel exhaust fluid. Its production also yields high-purity carbon dioxide as a byproduct, which is needed by the meat and fizzy drinks industries.

Chemical companies are the biggest industrial natural gas users in Germany and ammonia is the single most gas-intensive product within that industry. The production of ammonia usually accounts for about 4.5 percent of the natural gas used by German industries.

Germany’s biggest ammonia maker, SKW Piesteritz, and number four Ineos have separately said they could not rule out production cuts amid disruption to Russian gas supplies.

Unlike many European countries, Germany has no liquefied natural gas port terminals to replace Russian pipeline gas. That means companies are under pressure to reduce gas intensive activities if gas deliveries are cut further.

Russian gas producer Gazprom on July 27 began reducing its gas supply to Europe via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, the major delivery route to Europe for Russian gas. Supplies were cut to a mere fifth, or 20 percent, of the pipeline’s total capacity. The drop comes after the pipeline restarted on July 21, following a scheduled 10-day maintenance outage.

In an effort to boost the region’s energy security, the European Union on July 26 announced a “voluntary reduction” of natural gas demand by 15 percent for the winter.

Brudermueller said that come 2023, farmers would see high fertilizer costs and fertilizer availability might be worse.

“The main application for ammonia is for fertilizers and that’s for producing food. For this year that’s not going to be a problem because all the farmers have already bought their fertilizers and have already used it on their field. The harvest is already taking place,” he said. “Next availability will be worse because the capacity is not going to be there and the next is price. Fertilizer prices are skyrocketing.”

“And then farmers will be forced to save money and will only use the minimum of fertilizers on their field. Might also mean that harvest is going to be minor. If there are weather problems, [it would result in] a shortage situation for important crops,” he added, noting that poorer countries at the end of the food supply chain would face significant challenges.

Study Finds Raccoon Dogs May Have Been Source Of COVID-19 Spread

By Dawn Geske on July 29 2022 

Wuhan's markets are bustling once again AFP / Hector RETAMAL

Scientists now believe that the cause of the global spread of COVID-19 may have been raccoon dogs that carried the virus and were sold at a Chinese market.

A new study from Oxford University published in Science suggests that raccoon dogs, which were sold for their fur and meat at the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, China, could have passed on the virus from bats to humans, scientists of the study said.

While the theory is not fully confirmed as the animals were not tested at the very start of the pandemic, scientists have found detection of COVID-19 in samples tested from cages and carts used to transport the raccoon dogs in late 2019.

Chris Newman, a biologist, ecologist, and research associate with Oxford University, and co-author of the study, told USA Today, “As far as the virologists are concerned, looking at the evolutionary strain of the virus itself, it's perfectly reasonable that (SARS-CoV-2) evolved in a bat and then spread through the raccoon dog as the primary intermediary.”

Sold at wet markets, raccoon dogs are kept in conditions that can promote the spread of disease, as bacteria and viruses pass through feces and urine. The animals are then slaughtered at purchase to provide the freshest meat possible, Newman told the news outlet. Wet markets in China have since been closed, but many are still in existence in other countries.

According to Newman, the spread of COVID from raccoon dogs is completely plausible as the animals don’t show signs of illness from the virus they are carrying.

Many people have speculated that COVID-19 originated from a lab in Wuhan, which the study’s co-author Dr. Angela Rasmussen, a virologist, disputed on Twitter, saying the all data suggested that the seafood market in Wuhan is the origination point.

While the study is unable to conclusively prove that raccoon dogs are the originating source of COVID-19, Rasmussen said that “environmental samples point to the animals,” adding in a tweet, “Zoonotic spillover at Huanan is the only emergence scenario that accounts for all these threads of evidence.”

Raccoon dogs are nocturnal like raccoons, and Thomas Müller, a veterinarian, who has also studied the possibility of these animals as a COVID-19 originating source, told USA Today, “They are not aggressive at all. You would hardly see them in nature.”

To date, about 40 million raccoon dogs are bred in China for their fur, about 99% of the animal’s global population, Müller said.

Raccoon dogs have also been illegal to sell in China, but it was a regulation that was not widely enforced prior to the start of the pandemic.

Poll: 66% of Americans Say US Is in Recession or Worse
THE RULING IDEAS ARE THE IDEAS OF THE RULING CLASS. MARX

TEHRAN (FNA)- While the White House refuses to say the United States is in recession, a clear majority of Americans said the country is in recession or something worse, according to a new poll.

A recent Suffolk University/USA TODAY opinion poll of 1,000 registered US voters conducted between July 22 and July 25, 2022, asked participants whether the US economy is in economic recovery, stagnation, recession or depression.

Over 50% of respondents said the US is in a recession, plus almost 16% who said the country was suffering from a depression. There was another 18% who felt the nation was experiencing stagnation. Only 9% believed the US was in an economic recovery.

The Joe Biden administration has been ridiculed for attempting to change the traditional definition of a recession – widely accepted as two consecutive quarters of contraction in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Even the left-leaning CNN mocked the Biden administration for trying to change the definition of a recession.

Brian Deese – director of the National Economic Council – was hit by his old definition of recession this week as he tried to protect the Biden administration.

The poll found that 58% of Americans said they ate out less because of inflation.

The stuttering economy has taken a toll on President Biden’s job listing.

Just 15% of voters “strongly approve” of President Biden’s job performance, while 55% of Americans “disapprove” or “strongly disapprove”.

There were 46% of Americans who said they want Congress to oppose President Biden versus 42% who want lawmakers working with the President.

With the midterm elections just 101 days away, Americans were asked which issues would influence their voting in November.

The top voter issue is the economy (20%), followed by abortion (15%), inflation and cost of living (10%) and immigration (4%).

Gun control, climate change and health care were all below 4%.

Voters were asked whether Democrats and Republicans competently represent Americans’ political views or whether a third party or multiple parties are required. There were 24% who said the two major parties were good enough, but there were 26% who said a third party was necessary and 33% who said multiple parties were necessary.

HEY EVERYONE, REMEMBER ME

Iran's Ahmadinejad Calls Putin 'A Tyrannical Narcissist'

Ahmadinejad supporters at a speech by the former president on May 6, 2022

Author: Mardo Soghom

Iran’s former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has expressed strong support for Ukraine, calling Russia’s Vladimir Putin a tyrannical narcissist pursuing glory.

The populist politician has written a letter to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky saying that the attack on his country unveils the brutal and anti-human face of people like Putin who symbolize concentration of power and wealth, pursuing self-glory with a spirit of narcissism and tyranny.

Ahmadinejad’s stance is in diametrical opposition to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his loyal supporters, as well as the official position of the government that calls Russia a strategic and close ally of the Islamic Republic.

During Putin’s recent visit to Tehran, Khamenei praised the Russian ruler’s “initiative” to attack Ukraine, saying that if he had not taken the “pre-emptive” strike, NATO was planning its own war in Ukraine.

Ahmadinejad has frequently criticized official policies and prevailing conditions in Iran since 2017, when he was barred from running for president. It remains a mystery as to how he has been able to raise bruising criticisms, at least once directly against Khamenei, without being punished.

Some analysts say that his popularity among some hardliners and ordinary people has convinced the regime not to arrest him, although others in his position have been persecuted without mercy.

Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad covered his tracks in the letter to an extent by also accusing the United States of seeking to maintain its primacy in the world by making some concessions to China and Russia, “in a new, tri-polar world order.”

While Iran’s hardliners say that a victory for Ukraine would be a win for the West and must be prevented, Ahmadinejad praised “the fortunate resistance of the people of Ukraine” that has garnered “the obvious support of various nations, freedom lovers and justice seekers of the world.” He expressed his satisfaction with widespread condemnation of Russia’s “violation of an independent country.”

Ahmadinejad accused China and Russia of seeking to be world powers and see the attack on Ukraine “as an opening of the path for the realization of their future plans.” He equated the attack on Ukraine and a possible invasion of Taiwan to “America’s domination over Iran.”

Ahmadinejad wrote to Zelensky, “I invite your excellency as a freedom-seeker and all free-spirited people to join the rest of humanity to establish that beautiful and lovable human world.”

Meanwhile, the government and Khamenei loyalists are presenting the deepening ties with Moscow as a master accomplishment. The government news website IRNA on Sunday published an article that Iran can become a conduit in marketing Russia’s natural gas in the Middle East. The article failed to mention that it would take years to build pipelines to bring Russia’s gas from western or eastern Siberia to Iran.

The United States warned in July that Iran might sell military drones to Russia for deployment in Ukraine, as Moscow has failed to establish an air superiority in the conflict

EXCERPT
China Is Doomed to Play a Significant Role in Afghanistan

Beijing is desperate to avoid being trapped in Kabul’s politics.

JULY 31, 2022, 
By Raffaello Pantucci, , and Alexandros Petersen

For decades, Beijing has worried about security in Afghanistan. During the Taliban’s first stint in power in the 1990s, Beijing worried about the possibility of Uyghur militants using camps in Afghanistan as a base to launch attacks against China. Then, in the early 2000s, Chinese workers were killed and kidnapped in the country. China also shares a remote but direct border with Afghanistan, and even before the Taliban takeover, increasing violence in the wider region gave China good reason to worry.

This article is adapted from Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire by Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen (Oxford University Press, 336 pp., .95, July 2022).

Despite this, China’s approach to its neighbor for a long time was, as prominent Central Asia analyst Zhao Huasheng aptly characterized it, essentially to act as an observer, leaving security questions to the United States and its allies. That changed in 2012, after then-U.S. President Barack Obama signaled he wanted to get Washington out of the conflict he had inherited. As the potential security vacuum left by Western withdrawal came into sharper relief, Beijing realized that it would have to play a role in encouraging a more stable and developed future for Afghanistan. Even then—and even after security concerns rose once again after the U.S. withdrawal in 2021—China never fully came to assume that role.

The Taliban takeover in 2021 came after we had concluded writing our book Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire. But many of the trends and patterns we observed continued to hold. Although China has undeniably stepped into a far more prominent role than ever before, it has continued to hedge its bets and refused to take on a leadership role in the country. China’s unwillingness to take on that role, even though it is increasingly being thrust into it, serves as a perfect example of the central concept our book: China is doomed to play a significant role in the country, but is studiously avoiding it.

China’s clear, yet gradual, shift from cultivated disinterest to growing engagement in Afghanistan took place over the past decade.

The most visible and significant element of China’s newfound attention on Afghanistan was Politburo member and security supremo Zhou Yongkang’s visit to Kabul in September 2012—the first visit by a Politburo-level Chinese official to Afghanistan since 1966.

But even earlier that year, when we visited Afghanistan, China was seeking to advance diplomacy with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In February 2012, Beijing hosted the first Afghanistan-China-Pakistan trilateral dialogue. Then, in May 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. State Department initiated a joint training program for Afghan diplomats. The group of a dozen young diplomats would get a 15-day experience in Beijing, followed by another 15 days in Washington.

That June, as China was hosting the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Beijing, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a bilateral “strategic and cooperative partnership” agreement with then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai and welcomed the country as an official SCO observer state. Just over a month later, then-Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Gen. Guo Boxiong met with then-Afghan Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak to “enhance strategic communication and strengthen pragmatic cooperation in order to contribute to bilateral strategic cooperation.”

The signaling was clear. As Washington approached a drawdown, China was going to have to step in more, though the extent of it was unclear. Yet there were clearly dissenters in Beijing, and many of the security-focused Chinese officials and experts we met were quite clear that this was a problem of Washington’s making that China wanted little to do with.

All of this change in Chinese activity was, however, undermined by the fact that Washington did not leave. In the end, Obama did not withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Although its presence shrunk considerably, the United States retained a capability to launch attacks and kept bases in the country.

Meanwhile, within China, security concerns increased. In April 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang. This came after a tumultuous period where incidents linked to Xinjiang spread across the country—including a car and incendiary device attack on Tiananmen Square, a mass stabbing incident in Kunming, and escalating violence in Xinjiang itself. Just as Xi was leaving Xinjiang, attackers launched a knife and bomb attack on the train station in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital.

In his speeches about the threat in 2014, Xi made a clear link between what was going on in Afghanistan and Xinjiang. Beijing’s answer to this concern appears to have been to push a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, Beijing escalated its engagement with the Afghan authorities, building on what was already being done to create a wave of bilateral and multilateral formats with other partners in Afghanistan. On the other hand, it strengthened its contacts with the Taliban, making sure it was covering its bases for all eventualities. It seemed as though China was going to take on a more active role in the country, aware of the fact that no matter whether the United States stayed or left, it was likely to be an erratic partner Beijing could not rely on.

In July 2014, China appointed Sun Yuxi, a popular former ambassador to Kabul, as its first special envoy for Afghanistan. His role was to serve as a point of contact and a coordinator for China’s engagement with the Taliban, and after his arrival, there was a noticeable uptick in public engagement among China, the Taliban, and the Afghan government.

When Ashraf Ghani became Afghanistan’s president that September, he immediately signaled the importance he placed on the relationship with China by making Beijing the first capital he visited in his first formal trip abroad. During this visit, he laid the groundwork for formal peace talk negotiations with the Taliban at a meeting hosted by the Chinese government.

By early 2015, stories emerged that China was playing a more forward role in brokering peace talks and in conversations; officials we spoke to in Beijing said they were willing to act as hosts for any future peace talks. By May 2015, senior Taliban figures were meeting with representatives from the Afghan High Peace Council in Urumqi. In July, another round of talks was held in Pakistan, at which Chinese participants also played a role. This was followed by more multilateral engagements.

The Chinese-supported peace track seemed to be bearing fruit, until abruptly, in late July 2015, news leaked that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died back in 2013. This declaration scuttled the discussions and set the Taliban in disarray as an internal leadership struggle surfaced over his successor. It also complicated China’s role, since it was not clear whom Beijing would engage with on the Taliban side.

Accusations of blame were passed between Islamabad and Kabul, but the net result was an uptick in violence that made it harder for the Afghan government to negotiate with full confidence or for Beijing to feel like it could do much. Chinese officials we spoke to at the time almost immediately fell back into stating that it was up to the United States to step up and support the Afghan government and its national security forces. They further noted that until there was greater clarity about who the main Taliban negotiator was, talks were unlikely to bear much fruit.

But it seemed that China maintained its contacts with the Taliban. In fact, Beijing has had a long history of contacts with the Taliban, dating to when the group was in power in Kabul before September 2001. At the time, China was one of the few countries that engaged with them, though this was largely through China’s contacts in Islamabad.

In the early days, Beijing seemed to focus its discussions on ensuring that any trouble in Afghanistan did not spill into China and that the Taliban maintained control over Uyghur groups. Some Chinese experts who visited Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s told us they were surprised during their visit to learn of large numbers of Uyghur militants in the country. Taliban authorities reportedly sought to reassure Beijing that they would stop these individuals from launching attacks against China, though it was never clear whether the Uyghur groups adhered to this and did not launch attacks or use the territory to plot against China. We later met individuals who had been to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and al Qaeda-managed camps who told us stories—corroborated by others—of Uyghurs in the camps in large numbers.

In 2015, it seemed as though China decided to use its contacts with the Taliban to help protect its longer-term interests in the country. Aside from seeking to broker greater discussions among the Taliban, Pakistan, and the government in Kabul, China also sought to bring the United States into the discussions. Around this time, Beijing was engaged in numerous bilateral, multilateral, and minilateral engagements concerning Afghanistan.

One senior Afghan diplomat told us during a session in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that he was exhausted from running between these different events, though it was not clear to him how useful they were. Other Afghans we spoke to were far more scathing about Beijing’s engagement behind closed doors. One former senior defense official told us that they had been forced to dispose of most of the equipment that China had handed over, claiming “it was full of bugs.” Others said they had evidence that Beijing was paying off and providing military equipment to the Taliban to develop contacts and maintain influence, something that was partially confirmed to us by a Chinese contact who mentioned in passing being involved in handing over bags of money to Taliban contacts. We were never able to independently confirm this, but it did speak to a greater sense of confidence in Beijing about what China was doing in Afghanistan.

In March 2016, then-Chinese People’s Liberation Army Chief of Joint Staff Gen. Fang Fenghui visited Kabul, seemingly to help start a new minilateral regional organization. That organization, the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), brought together the chiefs of army staff of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan “to coordinate with and support each other in a range of areas, including study and judgment of counter terrorism situation, confirmation of clues, intelligence sharing, anti-terrorist capability building, joint anti-terrorist training and personnel training,” according to a statement by the Chinese defense ministry.

By bringing together senior security officials with all the countries that had a presence around the Wakhan Corridor, China was helping secure its own border and creating a format through which it could monitor it. The structure also formalized the People’s Liberation Army’s responsibilities in Afghanistan.

Alongside the creation of the QCCM, China started to make its security contributions to the other members of the group more public. In Afghanistan, Beijing revealed it had helped build a base and was providing funding for a mountain security force in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province. Locals reported seeing Chinese soldiers patrolling the region. Other reports highlighted how Afghan forces were being trained in China. In Tajikistan, China built around a dozen border posts for Tajik border guards as well as a base for its own forces in the country’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. China was, in essence, creating a security buffer to seal itself off from direct threats from its border regions with Afghanistan.

Although the China-Afghanistan relationship continued to stay relatively strong over the next few years, in the dying days of Afghanistan’s government under Ghani, there was growing turmoil between the two countries. The first loud signal of trouble was the U.S. decision in November 2020 to de-list the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement from its list of terrorist organizations. It was a decision Kabul reportedly did not agree with and one that caused friction with China.

Then, in December 2020, a spy scandal erupted with the Afghan National Directorate of Security detaining a network of 10 Chinese nationals who, it claimed, were spies undertaking covert activities against the government in Kabul. The Afghan and Chinese governments worked to keep the story out of the media and rushed to get the spies out on a private jet back to China, denying everything, though the story was leaked in considerable detail to the Indian media.

But the Afghan government was very careful about how it handled the scandal. Unlike the United States that was now heading for the door, Kabul recognized that it needed to maintain a working relationship with Beijing.

It was later revealed that their counterterrorism relationship had also come under strain, with Kabul apparently stopping its regular repatriation of Uyghur militants it caught on the battlefield. This was made public when in the wake of Kabul’s fall, news emerged that some 30 or so Uyghurs who had been in custody were released when the Taliban emptied the country’s prisons.

But this revelation cut both ways: On the one hand, it showed how the relationship between Kabul and Beijing had broken down, but it was also an early indication of the Taliban’s lack of capability or interest in managing the problem of militant Uyghurs in Afghanistan to Beijing’s desires (highlighted by the fact that they freed them).

In current Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, there is no denying that China is more prominent. The Chinese Embassy was one of the few that stayed during the Taliban takeover. A number of Chinese businessmen are reportedly showing up to try their fortune. China has engaged with, participated in, and hosted numerous regional formats on Afghanistan. It has also sponsored some limited bilateral trade efforts and provided aid of some substance across the country, and Chinese state-owned enterprises have started to talk about restarting their projects with Taliban authorities. China has done everything except formally acknowledge the Taliban as the rulers of Afghanistan—a step it is unlikely to take until it sees others in the international community do so first.

But talk to Chinese experts, and the picture is more circumspect. They hold little hope for the Taliban to create an inclusive government, see instability on the horizon, and worry about the worsening security situation in the broader region.

Although China has spoken of Afghanistan as part of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and some recent trade has started, in reality, the tangible economic links between China and Afghanistan amount to the export of Afghan pine nuts to China and the construction of a fiberoptic cable down the Wakhan Corridor to help Afghanistan get on the internet. Talk about the BRI in Kabul, and people will say good things and hope for greater engagement, but they are still waiting for it to materialize. Afghan businessmen still find it difficult to get visas into China, flights are irregular, and COVID-19 continues to make travel to China difficult.

China is still concerned about its security interests in Afghanistan, but, as in the past, its answer has been to largely seal itself off, hardening its own and nearby borders. Through a web of multilateral engagements, China has offered itself as a host and discussant but never a moderator—in other words, China is willing to be involved but does not want to take the key role of confronting actors and forcing them to resolve their issues. Beijing is certainly doing more than it did before, but it is clear that it is not going to step into a leadership role. China has all the trappings and potential to be a dominant player but has made a strategic decision to continue to watch from the sidelines.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute and a visiting senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the co-author of Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire, with Alexandros Petersen. Twitter: @raffpantucci

Dr. Alexandros Petersen was an academic, writer, and geopolitical energy expert. The author of three books and scores of articles and reports, Petersen’s work addressed the implications of the West withdrawing its engagement from the Caucasus and Central Asia, the expansion of Chinese influence, and Russia’s strategic interests. He taught at the American Universities of Afghanistan and Central Asia. He was killed in a Kabul restaurant bombing and shooting attack in 2014.

Xi Jinping Concerned Over National Security Situation, Says China’s Military Should Be Lead By Communist Party’s Reliable Men

China’s President Xi Jinping said the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation, adding that his country is ‘facing mounting instability and uncertainty in the national security situation’.

Chinese President Xi Jinping.(File photo) AP

UPDATED: 30 JUL 2022

China is facing mounting instability and uncertainty in the national security situation, President Xi Jinping has warned, asserting that the Chinese military should be led by "reliable people" loyal to the ruling Communist Party to ensure its "absolute leadership" over the world's largest armed forces.

Speaking at a study session on Thursday on further implementing the strategy of strengthening the military by training competent personnel in the new era, Xi greeted the service personnel before the 95th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, which falls on August 1.

The two-million-strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest military in the world.

"We must lay emphasis on political integrity when cultivating, evaluating and appointing personnel, so that the party's absolute leadership over the military is implemented in the whole process of personnel work,” he said

Xi emphasised that the “armed forces must always be led by reliable people who are loyal to the Party”, according to an official press release.

“Noting that the starting point and ultimate goal of personnel work is to build armed forces that are able to fight and win, Xi called for efforts to enhance the supply of personnel with strong combat readiness in close step with developments in the forms of war,” it said.

In his address, Xi said the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation, adding that China is "facing mounting instability and uncertainty in the national security situation."

His comments came as China has ratcheted up tensions with the US over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s planned visit to Taiwan, which Beijing claims as part of its mainland.

Xi told US President Joe Biden in their fifth virtual meeting on Thursday that “the position of the Chinese government and people on the Taiwan question is consistent, and resolutely safeguarding China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity is the firm will of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people”.

“The public opinion cannot be defied. Those who play with fire will perish by it. It is hoped that the US will be clear-eyed about this. The US should honour the one-China principle,” he said.

The PLA also announced military drills off Pingtan islands in its Fujian province close to Taiwan on Saturday in a bid to warn Pelosi from going ahead with her visit.

In his speech, Xi stressed further implementation of the strategy of strengthening armed forces by training competent personnel and called for efforts to give better play to the role of talent in spearheading and underpinning the cause of building a strong military.

The personnel strategy is of great significance to realising the Party's goal for military development in the new era and building the people's armed forces into a world-class military, Xi said.

In the coming five years, the key task for the country's military is to achieve the centenary objectives of the PLA. The work to foster military talent should be strengthened comprehensively, Xi said.

The communication and cooperation between military and civilian sectors should be enhanced to further integrate the military's talent-related work with the country's efforts in developing a quality workforce, he said.

Besides heading the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Presidency, Xi is also the Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), the overall high command of the PLA.

Since he took over the leadership in 2012, Xi has been regularly insisting on the PLA function under party leadership.

Xi completes 10 years in power this year and is widely expected to continue in power for an unprecedented third term and perhaps for life, unlike his predecessors who retired after two five-year terms.

Scores of high-ranking PLA officials have been sacked or punished under his massive anti-corruption drive which has helped him to firmly establish his leadership with military backing.

He also carried out massive reforms of the military at all levels including retrenching over three lakh troops to cut the size of the army and increasing the role of the navy, the air force, space and missile forces, enhancing the defence budget to over USD 230 billion.

(With PTI inputs)

Over 90% of Syrians in displacement camps fear water shortages amid scorching summer: survey

Over 90 percent of displaced persons in Syria's displacement camps are concerned about water supply, amid a 'severe lack of water security' in the region, according to a humanitarian response group.

Children, whose families were displaced due to the war in Syria, stand outside their shelter, in the north of the country.(UNOCHA)

Jul 31, 2022

Over 90 percent of displaced people in Northern Syria’s camps are concerned about access to water amid a scorching summer, according to a survey released on Thursday by the Syrian Response Coordination Group.

When highlighting their needs, 92 percent of displaced persons (IDPs) surveyed stated a need for “securing water subsidies inside the camps and increasing their quantities during the summer”.

In addition, 79 percent of IDPs were concerned about the prevalence of skin diseases in the camps as a result of “the severe lack of water security”.

Over 590 camps out of 1,489 in the northwest suffer from a complete lack of water supply, with an additional 269 camps not receiving sufficient quantities of water, according to the response group.

The humanitarian response group surveyed over 30,000 IDPs with the aim of highlighting their basic needs amid rising temperatures – which have reached 44 degrees Celsius as the heat is expected to continue, according to Syria TV.

The struggle of IDP’s – who are already living in difficult conditions amid an alarming shortage of basic needs and humanitarian aid – is exacerbated by the lack of water resource, as the vast majority of them depend mainly on humanitarian aid for survival.

“We urgently call on humanitarian organisations to take their responsibility towards the displaced in the camps in northwestern Syria, which is inhabited by more than a million and a half civilians, in the face of [rising] temperatures,” the Syrian Response Coordination Group said earlier this month.

The group called for humanitarian groups to provide water and firefighting equipment, and to cool the camps, so that IDP’s can be better prepared for the scorching season.

The IDP’s fled their homes over the course of the decade-long Syrian civil war, which has killed over 500,000 people, largely at the hands of the Syrian regime and its ally Russia.

The Syrians of Lebanon Are Not the Ones Threatening us with War!

Sunday, 31 July, 2022 -
Hazem Saghieh

And so, we are faced with the prospect of a war through which we retrieve our wealth and die. We could die without retrieving our wealth. We could die and others could retrieve the wealth. And we could die without there being any wealth to be retrieved.

In all cases, the specter of generalized death looms in Lebanon. With every sunrise, Hezbollah, through its top brass and talking heads, warns us that this is a very real and serious, indeed likely, prospect.

True, the contradictions commanding the lives of the Lebanese are infinite - economic and political as well as cultural and ethical. Nonetheless, in the face of the prospect of war, confronting generalized death becomes the mother of all contradictions that must be confronted, influencing and shaping all the others.

Let us imagine that we reformed our politics and economy, controlled pollution, achieved gender justice, developed the labor laws governing foreign workers, and then plunged into, or were plunged into, a war!

We know, with a swift reexamination of our modern history, that our sense of total powerlessness in the face of wars was established by two instances in which we were lax in confronting it.

After 2000, because of the Lebanese-Syrian security regime, those who had wanted to disarm Hezbollah were defeated. As for the result, it is that we were made to remain in an endless conflict because its objectives are ambiguous, and its decisions are in distant hands.

After that, with the Syrian revolution that later became a war, we were lax again. This time, our laxity was in deterring the Lebanese who had intervened and made several false claims about why they had gotten involved, ranging from the need to protect the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine to keeping the gates of the country closed to ISIS. Unfortunately, many believed these rumors; rather, they defended them with enthusiasm.

Naturally, these two instances of laxity can be explained. Some of the factors have to do with political authority, others with the domestic balance of military power, in addition to regional factors and pressures.

However, two degenerations activated these factors and reinforced them: the first time, it became apparent that we had not learned the lesson of the war that exploded in the mid-1970s after omens - the most pivotal of which was the transformation of the country into a battlefield - had begun appearing in the late 1960s.

Hezbollah thus maintained its arsenal in what was perpetuation of that theory, which was not foreign to an old body of literature and convictions prevalent throughout the region about confronting Israel regardless of the costs.

The second time, this degeneration in the majoritarian consciousness of the Sunnis was met with degeneration in the minoritarian consciousness of the Christians, taking the form of complicity in Hezbollah’s war against the majority of the Syrian people.

If theories about resisting imperialism, Zionism, and devils of every kind were at the forefront the first time, theories about an alliance of minorities and countering Sunni Islam, which was presented as countering Islamic extremism, were at the forefront the second time.

The fact is that the militarism that dragged us into wars that branched out into other even more horrifying wars was behind the implosions of our modern history.

This kind of “glory” was not achieved by the disputes between the Lebanese - which have always been there - about economic disparities, development, equity between the sects, cultural or generational issues, and others.

If we had been able to build some immunity and develop some form of consensus against militarism that crosses borders, all borders, in 1969 as in 2000 and 2013, we would not have seen the worst and darkest chapters of our history.

This is enough reason to say that opposing war and militarism are not a sectarian matter that forces for change can avoid or leap over. Indeed, it is a national issue at the forefront of any potential for positive change and a requisite for it.

There is no room for neutrality here; otherwise, we would be adding to the times we had been excessively lax and another episode of generalized death to the history of mass death in Lebanon.

Confronting the potential eruption of this war is perhaps searching for forms to take, and some among us may be looking to crystalize them. However, there is no doubt that the war against the Syrians residing in Lebanon is the most degenerate of those forms and the most cowardly.

More precisely, it is a falsification of the actual challenges facing the country and the threats they pose that chooses to run away from them. This is patently obvious in the escalating campaign backed by politicians, media outlets, and religious figures who suggest that it is the Syrians in Lebanon who threaten the brilliant economic, social, and political success that country has achieved!

We know that the blend of an economic crisis, broad sense of hopelessness, and a narrow, parochial consciousness is enough to elicit such revolting reactions. We have an abundance of all three today.

However, knowledge alone is not enough, especially since being satisfied with dead knowledge could coexist with all this ignorance about the real source of the danger and an even greater readiness to replace it with another alleged source.

The danger is not here. It is not in a few loaves of bread Syrians have obtained or in some of them breaking the curfew imposed on those who reside in towns ruled by ignorant municipalities.

The danger lies over there, where lie the missiles and the rhetoric about missiles, regional strategies, and a sacred cause that does not even promise to pray for us after we die, nor of another world that follows our forced expulsion from this planet.

NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIST GETS IT

Presidents Don’t Move Prices. So Why All the Tweets?

Sunday, 31 July, 2022 -
Jared Dillian

President Joe Biden, or his designated representative, is having a good time tweeting about gasoline prices lately. Just about every time that the national average goes down by a penny, the White House is tweeting about it. We reached peak panic about gas prices about a month ago, Biden pledged to bring them down, and they fell. For sure, the White House wants to take credit. That’s just politics.

Now, the drop is due to a confluence of factors, including weakening demand, falling crude prices and the continued release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. At some point the SPR will run out and have to be refilled — potentially at higher prices. Biden also tried some moral suasion over gas station owners, but most in the business community laughed at that — the profit margins on gasoline are tiny, and gas stations practically sell it at cost already. This represents a policy victory of sorts, though it may be short-lived.

Other presidents have sought credit for favorable moves in economic variables. Throughout most of President Donald Trump’s first term, he tweeted obsessively about the stock market, almost daily for some stretches of time. He thought that his pro-growth policies lifted stocks, and they probably did, at least initially. But as Trump took credit for the stock market again and again, it was inevitable it was going to end badly, and in 2020, it did. Biden’s attempt to take credit for the decline in gas prices could well suffer the same fate. Trump could blame the stock market crash on Covid, and Biden will probably point to Vladimir Putin or oil companies when gas prices reverse course.

I’m not sure why presidents do this. By taking credit for the drop in gas prices, which won’t fall in perpetuity — Biden leads the public to believe that the president has control over an economic variable that he truly has no real control over. There’s no planning or forethought about the messaging when that policy measure ceases to be effective. Gas prices will inevitably go up, blame will be shifted, and Biden will appear weak and ineffective — the exact opposite of what he intended. President Trump didn’t need a lot of help looking foolish at times, but his adversaries were quick to pounce when the stock market crashed.

The question is: Do presidents have the power to move markets at all? The answer is yes — on a very long lag. A president can create the conditions that are necessary for higher stock or lower oil prices, but they cannot actually push prices in one direction or the other for any length of time. For example, I am a big believer that President Ronald Reagan’s supply-side reforms led to stock market gains over the next 20 years. He created the conditions that were necessary for individuals and businesses to flourish. But crucially, the government did not buy stocks, and the rise in stocks wasn’t the ultimate goal of the reforms — just a nice byproduct. If he chose, Biden could create the conditions that are necessary for oil prices to go down, by allowing drilling on federal land, for example. This might not make prices drop immediately, but they could over a period of years. Unfortunately, few people think past the next election cycle.

President Barack Obama was guilty of this, too, though not as much as Trump and Biden. Obama was a bit obsessed with the unemployment rate and thought that there was some immediate nexus between his policies and unemployment, though he was inaugurated at the bottom of the financial crisis, and unemployment would have improved over time anyway as the economy healed. One could make the argument that a decline in the unemployment rate was actually delayed by offering 99 weeks of unemployment benefits, slowing the recovery.

I am fond of saying that for someone who has spent his entire career in politics, Biden is sometimes tremendously bad at politics. In this case, his tweets about gas prices are shortsighted. When the prices go up, this will create disillusionment and possibly even lower his already-sinking approval ratings. The temptation is great for presidents to take credit for positive economic moves out of their control. They seem to forget that they open themselves up for the blame when things go awry.

Bloomberg