SYRIAN-KURDISTAN:

 ‘We cannot hand over our weapons while attacks on women and our territories continue’ — An interview with YPJ Commander-in-Chief Rohilat Afrin

By Rohilat Afrin & Rojava Information Centre

Published 12 January, 2025

MastodonFacebookTwitterEmail

First published at Rojava Information Center.

As all eyes were on the Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led forces sweeping across Syria with Assad crumbling, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched an attack on North and East Syria (NES), seizing Shehba and Manbij from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Now, Turkey is threatening an invasion into the Kurdish city of Kobane. The SNA meanwhile, is attempting to cross the Euphrates River and further encroach into NES, with fierce clashes underway in the Manbij countryside. The all-female YPJ units – that shot to prominence during their fight against ISIS in Kobane in 2014 — are on the frontlines as part of the SDF.

YPJ Commander-in-Chief, Rohilat Afrin, talked to RIC about the state of the war in Manbij, the ceasefire that never was, the possibility of a Turkish invasion in Kobane, HTS-SDF relations and the potential for the YPJ to be integrated into the Syrian army.

The current situation on the frontlines seems to have been more or less unchanging in recent days. Can you shortly explain the state of the fighting?

It is evident that there is a war being waged against our region — this is in the context of the ongoing fighting here, particularly at the Tishreen Dam and Qereqozak Bridge. This situation of war has been a constant since the collapse of the Baath regime and subsequent rise of the al-Jolani government. Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA have sought to exploit a power vacuum and initiate an attack on our region. This is in staunch opposition to our achievements here. These attacks are not simply military actions — they are a deliberate attempt to destroy what we have built up here. Turkey and its mercenaries are pursuing a policy of destruction and subjugation through these attacks.

Tishreen and Qereqozak are the two main gateways to enter NES. They are strategically important to protect Kobane, Tabqa, Raqqa and the rest of NES in general. Targeting these gateways is connected to Turkey’s aim of targeting our achievements in the region. In our region, people have been brought together. A collective mentality has united its populace. Years of work have been invested in building this mentality amongst people. They are determined to wipe it out. This war aims to dismantle the values established in this region.

Our fighters are currently engaged in combat with the SNA, fighting strongly. What people really should notice is that Turkey has been using drones and warplanes unceasingly, encouraging the SNA to attack. Our fighters’ resilience has not been deterred. If it wasn’t for Turkey’s aerial power, the SNA would be easily defeated. Actually, the number of fatalities and injuries within their ranks is already high. They have withdrawn from certain points. In these circumstances, a major confrontation is underway.

Supposedly, a ceasefire was called in Manbij some weeks ago. Everyday there is fighting however – so was there never any ceasefire?

We cannot call it a ceasefire. In talk there was a ceasefire. In practice we witnessed nothing like this. When the ceasefire was announced in Manbij it was on the basis that we evacuate people wishing to flee, the bodies of our fallen fighters and our wounded who were in their hands. However no such ceasefire materialized due to the attacks the SNA launched. The ceasefire was nothing on the ground. It was just talk.

Then, as the YPJ, YPG and SDF, we wanted to move forwards from the Tishreen Dam and Qereqozak, to advance a bit, because we were under heavy fire. There were a lot of attacks both on the Tishreen and from the Deir Hafir axis. So we took back some villages. This was because we wanted to protect the Dam and the Bridge. With this as our situation, a ceasefire cannot be spoken of.

The SNA were drunk from success in Syria, as they participated in the advance from Idlib to Damascus. City after city was falling. They thought it would be the same with Qereqozak Bridge and the Tishreen Dam. Now they are both psychologically and materially facing losses having been confronted with the resistance of our fighters. On both fronts, our fighters have been steadfast.

And what is the current threat to Kobane?

What I said before connects to the issue of Kobane. There are a lot of threats against Kobane. As a city, Kobane does not just concern NES. It is the world’s city, as expressed by the establishment of ‘World Kobane Day’ in solidarity. The struggle that took place in Kobane saw a force like ISIS defeated. It has been around 10 years since this massive victory. At the time, Erdogan was observing the situation day after day, saying ‘Kobane will fall today’ or ‘Kobane will fall tomorrow’. But Kobane was liberated, through will, resistance and determination. Through this, Kobane became globally famous.

The danger Kobane is facing is serious. When we say this, it means that there is a danger to the whole of NES. Turkey sees that Kobane was a reason behind what has been achieved in NES. Turkey wants to spread its influence in Syria. In this context it threatens the city and wants to occupy it. Actually the danger posed to Kobane never ended. There have always been threats. These threats in turn were met by responses of solidarity — politicians, human rights activists and the global public, even the Coalition, made statements opposing war against the city.

If Turkey were to take over the Tishreen Dam and Qereqozak bridge, Tabqa, Raqqa, Kobane, and all regions of NES would be threatened. The politics — war and victory — in Kobane concern the whole world, not just NES. We are confident that Kobane will receive external support and solidarity. We will be able to protect it. But Turkey is determined to realize its goals. Against this stands the SDF and YPJ. The fight they waged in Kobane [in 2014] shocked the world. In the current period, we will show the same stance against Turkey and the SNA.

How do you see the diplomatic flurry around Damascus, with many delegations coming to meet al-Jolani, including from Turkey?

Many states have been seeking to establish relations with HTS now al-Jolani’s new government has emerged. Turkish officials have also come to Damascus, such as Hakan Fidan. He demonstrates a certain mentality — in which the primary aim is to wipe out the Autonomous Administration. Turkey wants to organize Syria as its own province; to control it, to have influence on Syria. Hakan Fidan’s arrival in Damascus made this clear. He wants to influence HTS.

Are the Americans still in Kobane? And if Turkey attacks Kobane do you expect American assistance?

Throughout the last phase until the latest developments began, the Russians were present in Manbij, Ayn Issa and Kobane. The Americans were not present there. With the recent withdrawal of the Russians, American patrols started to take place, but there are no bases there. Through these patrols, America was saying ‘we are here, we will help protect the city’, sending a message that they are present. Our cooperation with the Coalition began with the fight against ISIS. If the US-led Coalition don’t fulfil their role, they will face accusations of double-standards. If Turkey attacks Kobane, do we expect that the US will help? Materially, no. But in general, with the support they exhibit and through them meeting with Turkey, they have shown that their position is that the issue must be peacefully resolved.

Even if they are purely following their own interests, it has prevented the doors to a Turkish invasion into Kobane from being opened. It is evident from certain things within their diplomatic efforts that they have attempted to help us. However, we see that the Coalition has a responsibility to put a halt to the current fighting and aerial attacks. So in general, we do not expect that there will be any type of concrete blocking of a ground invasion, but in the diplomatic context there are efforts to prevent this, even if they are not enough.

What about international assistance more generally, aside from America? The last time Kobane saw war was in 2014 when ISIS attacked. At that time, the international solidarity was significant. This time the threat is from Turkey rather than ISIS. Do you expect similar global support?

During ISIS’ siege on Kobane, the actions of YPJ as a women’s force resonated globally. Through Kobane — and with the July 19 Revolution here — silent and defenceless women found their voice, their strength and came to the forefront as leaders. The attitude of the YPJ in 2014 made them an example to follow in the world. We have learned from all the experiences and challenges we have gone through for years, in terms of strengthening tactics and methods. We have confidence that the YPJ — and YPG and SDF — will be able to stand strong against whatever may come. As women’s units, we have faith in this. We were victorious in Kobane. This also demonstrated to women worldwide that a women’s army is a necessity to protect women. Through this protection, we are able to organize ourselves. Fighting to protect our territories has continued like this. As I already stated, we believe that the war in Kobane was a war for humanity; a war to protect all women and land. We are confident that a state of public alert on a global scale will be raised and solidarity will be provided should Kobane be attacked again.

There are some now saying the SDF should surrender its weapons to a central Syrian army and integrate. What does this mean for the YPJ?

The new government’s intention — I am not speaking of the general populace, but specifically the government — to do this is shown through the content of its approach towards the SDF. They want a centralized state based on the unification of the army, institutions and also mentality. What they circulate to the press and media as well as the interviews they make, suggests that the SDF will not be accepted in its current form and as it is.

We are under attack. This makes it impossible for us to lay down our arms. The SDF is a force with ten years of experience fighting ISIS. At the international level, it is supported by the Coalition.

Turkey refuses to accept the Autonomous Administration as a model and idea. Turkey also does not accept the SDF as an army. It is imposing this on the new government. This also means the YPJ is not accepted — the YPJ, which fought against ISIS, achieved significant gains, and is at the core of the Autonomous Administration.

With the incoming government, women will have to heighten their struggle in order to defend themselves. We cannot hand over our weapons while attacks on us and our territories continue. Such a thing can only occur through agreements and talks that formalize a democratic Syria in which the rights of all women, nationalities and peoples are guaranteed and realized. If these conditions are met, then we can discuss the issue of weapons.

The mindset entrenched within the new government makes it clear that there is no place for women there — or only a place where women must accept to cover their heads and adopt a patriarchal mindset. Avoiding the above will require a great deal of organization and struggle. This is a serious danger that we need to recognize. The new government’s standards for women are a threat to the existence, role and culture of women.

On a global level, we have women forming an army, protecting themselves and fighting, for the first time. This independent, armed force has inspired many women — Arab, Kurd, Assyrian and international.

Would the YPJ accept being part of the Syrian army?

As this juncture, it remains unclear what the eventual outcome of the situation will be. There are a multitude of factors that are as of yet unclear. The situation is complex. The new government is in serious chaos, both in terms of its institutions and its ability to govern the entire country. The future remains uncertain. If — as the population wishes for and as we wish for — Syria truly becomes a democratic Syria, politically, socially, legally; if all the effort given and achievements gained in NES through the past 12 years are recognized, then of course YPJ can become a part of this army [the Syrian army]. In fact, YPJ can serve as a model for Syrian women, setting an example of women’s autonomy and self-defence. However, as previously stated, the precise nature of the situation remains uncertain. It is imperative to comprehend that the scope of this matter is wide. Our objectives, positions and approach will be formulated on this foundation I have explained. Not following the current way of thinking exhibited by HTS — that everything must be centralized. If an approach is adopted that embraces diversity and is democratic, then the role of YPJ can be discussed. The composition of a Syrian women’s army can be shaped by the YPJ. This is what I can say at this point.

Syrian Kurdish fighter's selfie video leads to allegations of massacre

A video posted online on January 22 shows a Kurdish fighter posing selfie-style in front of 21 lifeless bodies following the evacuation of a prison in Kobane, Syria. While the Syrian Democratic Forces said the footage is authentic, they maintain the bodies were those of armed combatants – a claim contradicted by our Observer, who was released from the same prison.


Issued on: 11/02/2026 - 
The FRANCE 24 Observers/
Ahmed ALMASSALMAH

A man who appears to be part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) filmed this video selfie-style while standing in front of a row of lifeless bodies laid out on the ground. He’s smiling and has a rifle slung over his shoulder. © Facebook

Warning: readers may be disturbed by the content of this article.

The chilling video was posted on Facebook on January 22 by an account based in Germany which has since been shut down. The video is filmed by a man who appears to be part of the majority-Kurdish group the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), posing selfie-style in front of a row of bodies on the ground. He’s smiling broadly and has a rifle slung over his arm.

In the video, he claims that one of the fighters with the SDF – who are thought to have committed this massacre – joked that they should blow the bodies up. A second video shows bullets being fired at the bodies, though it is unclear who is shooting.

This footage documents a massacre that took place on January 22 near Kobane in northwestern Syria. A local Facebook group Radar Sarine reported that the SDF had carried out extrajudicial killings of at least 21 young men. The SDF had allegedly just released the victims from Yeddi Qawi Prison near Kobane.

Fifteen bodies recovered

The massacre documented in the video took place against a complicated backdrop. January 2026 saw significant numbers of SDF forces retreating from the Syrian cities of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa towards Kobane. On January 19, clashes broke out between these fighters and the Syrian Army near the Tishrin Dam south of Kobane.

Sometime after that, in circumstances that are still unclear, doors were opened at Yeddi Qawi, a prison located south of Kobane, resulting in the flight of many of the people who had been imprisoned there. Sometime after that, the massacre documented in the video posted online on January 22 took place.

A Facebook page dedicated to local news reported that members of the Syrian Civil Defence had recovered the bodies of 15 victims of a massacre they said took place near Kobane and handed them over to local authorities. The bodies were then transferred to Manbij National Hospital, where the families could collect them.

Mukhtar (not his real name) says he was incarcerated in the prison in the village of Yeddi Qawi. He shared with us a copy of the documents he received upon leaving the prison which were issued by the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, confirming that he was imprisoned in Yeddi Qawi.

This is a photo of the document issued by the Kurdish autonomous administration to someone leaving prison. We masked the name of the formerly incarcerated person. The document reads, “To whom it may concern. He was released from the Kobane prison.” It is affixed with the seal of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Kobane reform centre. This photo was given to us by our Observer. © Mukhtar


According to Mukhtar, the massacre and the events leading up to it took place between January 19 and 22, 2026.

He describes the prison where he was being held as overcrowded, with hundreds of men being held. He says a majority of the prisoners there were Arab, with a small Kurdish minority.


"They were speaking to us about a general amnesty. But only the Kurdish detainees were being released. About a hundred of them. Meanwhile, they were telling us Arabs, ‘Your turn will come.’ Many believed it.”

The situation became increasingly tense and, on January 21, prisoners started burning sheets, mattresses and beds. There was smoke everywhere.


"We were choking. People were screaming. At one point, the SDF opened the doors. Not to let us out but to keep everyone inside from dying. I would say that between 300 and 400 prisoners, including me, left the prison and headed into the nearby fields. From there, we separated and dispersed. Some of us headed in the direction of Sarrin, and others – maybe about 30 people – headed towards Kobane."

These two screenshots were taken from two videos filmed on January 21. The image on the left shows people leaving the prison, while the image on the right shows people alongside the road. The videos were posted on Facebook on January 22, 2026. © Facebook

‘They fell right in front of me’

Mukhtar says that when the fleeing prisoners had made it about 1.5km from the prison, they were intercepted by several vehicles carrying SDF fighters. Mukhtar then went on to describe extrajudicial killings that occurred before those documented in the video.

"They begin by firing shots in the air. People were running in every direction. Then, they started shooting at us. I saw men fall in front of me. They were carrying nothing – no weapons, not even cell phones.

They fell right in front of me. Four or five people died immediately, while others were injured. Everyone was panicking. I managed to hide in a field, but was later stopped at an SDF roadblock. They tied my hands and made all of us survivors lie face down on the asphalt. Some of the soldiers wanted to execute us then and there."

Mukhtar says that some of the female SDF soldiers intervened on their behalf and dissuaded the men from executing his group. He and his group were taken back to Yaddi Mawa prison. Others seem to have been sent elsewhere.

‘It was revenge and ethnic discrimination’


"I was finally released again on the evening of January 22, 2026. After we were released, I headed towards Ain al-Arab [also known as Kobane] while another group of about 27 people went towards the Sarrin region.

Members of the Autonomous Administration [Editor’s note: the civilian branch of the SDF] had them get into vehicles. They were going to drive them to the last point under Kurdish control before reaching territory under the control of the Syrian regime.

Most of those in the group of 27 people were killed. I was at a checkpoint at the south entrance to Kobane when I heard the news. I saw some of the injured people arrive. I recognised some of the people in the video.

These murders weren’t to prevent people from escaping. It was revenge and ethnic discrimination. The soldiers were insulting the victims and saying to the prisoners, 'In any case, you’ll die.'

I survived along with four other people. We made it to a service station alongside the road, and the owner let us in and gave us shelter. Three days later, he brought us to an area outside of Kurdish control."

Mukhtar thinks that between 40 and 45 people were executed on January 22.

“The number is much higher than the 21 bodies that you can see in the video because there were other executions elsewhere,” he explained.

The yellow indicates the area that was still under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces on January 22, 2026, the date when the video was filmed. The massacre took place in this area. © FMM graphics studio


The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) said that the images were authentic, though they claimed that the bodies were those of armed fighters killed during clashes. Our Observer’s account casts doubt on this claim, as do the videos themselves. The bodies are lined up neatly, and there are no weapons to be seen. They are also all wearing civilian clothing.

Adnan Al-Hussein, a journalist based in the region, says that the videos provide evidence.

"Everything in the video indicates that the area has been secured. If there had been fighting, we would see the remnants. Here, you see men who have been gathered here, restrained and killed.”

‘I am telling my story for those who died’

Mukhtar says that speaking out comes with risks.


"I hesitated. But if I remain silent, then they die a second time. I am not asking for international justice. I’m asking for the truth to be spoken. I am telling my story for those who died.”

People in Manbij are still working to identify the bodies. However, the number of casualties remains unknown.

Tributes to two young men thought to have been killed in the massacre were published on the Radar Sarin Facebook page. One man, Ismail Al-Hassani, known as Abu Halab, was from the village of Al-Qubba. The second, Abbas Muhammad Al-Hussein, was from the village of Al-Abdkliya in Sarin district. Our Observer also spoke of the death of these two men.

This Facebook post features a photo of Ismail Al-Hassani alive alongside a screengrab of the video believed to show his body. © Facebook

This Facebook post features a photo of Mohammed Al-Hussein alive alongside a screengrab taken from the video believed to show his body.

This article has been translated from the original in French by Brenna Daldorph.

Turkey blocks aid convoy to Syria's Kurdish town of Kobane: NGOs

Turkish authorities have blocked a convoy carrying aid to Kobane, a predominantly Kurdish town in northern Syria encircled by the Syrian army

The New Arab Staff & Agencies
31 January, 2026

Turkish authorities have blocked a convoy carrying aid to Kobane, a predominantly Kurdish town in northern Syria encircled by the Syrian army, NGOs and a Turkish MP said on Saturday.

They said the aid was blocked before it reached the Turkey-Syria border, despite an agreement announced on Friday between the Syrian government and the country's Kurdish minority to gradually integrate the Kurds' military and civilian institutions into the state.

Twenty-five lorries containing water, milk, baby formula and blankets collected in Diyarbakir, the main city in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast, "were prevented from crossing the border", said the Diyarbakir Solidarity and Protection Platform, which organised the aid campaign.

"Blocking humanitarian aid trucks carrying basic necessities is unacceptable, both from the point of view of humanitarian law and from the point of view of moral responsibility," said the platform, which brings together several NGOs.

Earlier this week, residents of Kobane told AFP they were running out of food, water and electricity because the city was overwhelmed with people fleeing the advance of the Syrian army.

Kurdish forces accused the Syrian army of imposing a siege on Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab in Arabic.

"The trucks are still waiting in a depot on the highway," said Adalet Kaya, an MP from Turkey's pro-Kurdish DEM party who was accompanying the convoy.

"We will continue negotiations today. We hope they will be able to cross at the Mursitpinar border post," he told AFP.

Mursitpinar is located on the Turkish side of the border, across from Kobane.

Turkish authorities have kept the border crossing closed since 2016, while occasionally opening it briefly to allow humanitarian aid to pass through.

Turkey bans protests in province bordering Syria

DEM and Turkey's main opposition CHP called this week for Mursitpinar to be opened "to avoid a humanitarian tragedy".

Turkish authorities said aid convoys should use the Oncupinar border crossing, 180 kilometres (110 miles) away.

"It's not just a question of distance. We want to be sure the aid reaches Kobane and is not redirected elsewhere by Damascus, which has imposed a siege," said Kaya.

After months of deadlock and fighting, Damascus and the Syrian Kurds announced an agreement on Friday that would see the forces and administration of Syria's Kurdish autonomous region gradually integrated into the Syrian state.

Kobane is around 200 kilometres from the Kurds' stronghold in Syria's far northeast.

Kurdish forces liberated the city from a lengthy siege by the Islamic State group in 2015 and it took on symbolic value as their first major victory against the militants.

Kobane is hemmed in by the Turkish border to the north and government forces on all sides, pending the entry into the force of Friday's agreement.


Reshaping Syria's northeast: What now for the SDF?



The government's push into the northeast is reshaping Syria's balance of power, leaving the SDF's future and the country's reunification hanging in the balance

Analysis
Cian Ward
29 January, 2026



Deir Az-Zour, Syria - Two nail-biting hours after the deadline for last week's ceasefire in northeast Syria expired on Saturday, Syria’s Ministry of Defence announced that they had decided to extend the truce for an additional 15 days.

The announcement came following a major conflagration in Syria since mid-January, when the government launched an offensive against the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria’s northeast.

It followed a week of clashes in Aleppo’s Kurdish neighbourhoods of Achrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, and a government offensive in SDF positions in eastern Aleppo.

Just under a week into the operation in northeast Syria, tribes in the largely Arab provinces of Raqqa and Deir Az-Zour, who had been allies with the SDF for years, defected to the side of the government. This forced the SDF to retreat to Kobani, Qamishli, and Hasakah, where larger populations of Kurds are situated.

On 18 January, a 14-point peace deal was agreed between the two sides that stipulated the SDF’s integration, but it was never effectively implemented on the ground as both sides kept fighting.


A second deal was then announced that provided the SDF with four days for “internal consultations” to develop a concrete plan on how they could integrate. On Saturday, the deadline expired without response, and for two hours the country held its breath, not knowing if the northeast was about to be plunged back into war. At the 11th hour, the ceasefire was eventually extended, and is now due to expire on 8 February.

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi was in Damascus on Tuesday for further talks as part of efforts to reach a new security arrangement in the northeast.

A source close to the Kurdish side told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, The New Arab's sister site, that the government’s internal security forces are expected to enter Hasakah city alongside the SDF’s internal security - perhaps as soon as the next 48 hours.

After Aleppo: What SDF-Damascus clashes mean for Syria's future

Post-Assad Syria

Cian Ward

Washington's shifting loyalties

The US announced plans last week to transfer 7,000 Islamic State (IS) prisoners from detention facilities under the control of the SDF to Iraq. The 15-day ceasefire extension was ostensibly to provide the US military time to achieve this.

Washington’s decision could signal a degree of pessimism about the ability of the SDF and the government to agree on an integration deal, alongside its diminished trust in the SDF’s capacity to guarantee the security of its prisons in the face of continued fighting.

According to Reuters, the US had reportedly given Damascus the tacit green light to launch the recent operation against its erstwhile ally.

The SDF have lost significant amounts of territory that they held in northeastern Syria following the government's recent offensive. [Getty]

The US played a role in the very formation of the SDF in 2015 by pushing a collection of left-leaning Kurdish-dominated groups - the largest of which was the YPG - into forming a more coherent military and political structure.

The SDF became Washington’s preferred security partner and was provided with large amounts of US weapons, training, and military support to pursue its fight against IS in Syria.

It is clear that Washington still hopes for a deal between the two sides, with Tom Barrack, US Special Envoy to Syria, posting on X that, “the ceasefire represents a pivotal inflection point, where former adversaries embrace partnership over division”.

However, what is also evident is that the US has switched its allegiance and now views Damascus as its primary partner in Syria moving forward - ultimately deeming that its interests lie in the SDF’s complete integration, rather than Syria’s continued fragmentation.

For many on the SDF side, however, this has come as an abject betrayal of years of blood, sweat, and tears that they have spent fighting IS on Washington’s behalf.

At the same time, the US administration was reportedly angry that Syrian forces had encircled Kurdish-majority cities despite the 18 January truce, with officials considering reimposing sanctions if mass violence against Kurds takes place and fighting continues.

How Syria's tribes turned the tide against the SDF

Post-Assad Syria

Shelly Kittleson

The SDF's next move

One of the biggest questions is what comes next. Will the SDF lay down its weapons or will it continue its fight for a decentralised Syria? Could internal disagreements cause a split within the movement itself?

Following the 20 January ceasefire, decisions about the future now rest with the SDF. This period of internal consultation is due to them “hypothetically trying to get everyone who has power within the movement on board with the deal,” Alexander McKeever, researcher and author of the This Week in Northern Syria newsletter, told The New Arab.

He notes that whilst the SDF and their civilian government have official transparent hierarchies, “it is unclear if that has any bearing on how decisions are made. Instead, decision making is made by a number of senior cadres,” whose influence isn't necessarily reflected in their position.

There is a common line given by the pro-government side that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi is a moderate who is seeking a deal, but is being spoiled by others, perhaps with PKK ties, behind the scenes. However, according to McKeever such claims are entirely unsubstantiated.

The US has switched its allegiance and now views Damascus as its primary partner in Syria moving forward. [Getty]

In reality, it is notoriously difficult to assess the internal divisions within this shadowy network of cadres as they are extremely effective at showing a united front publicly.

“At the end of the day, this is a well-disciplined guerilla movement in which every major decisionmaker has spent years in the mountains socialised within the organisation [fighting the Turks,]” he adds.

This makes it “quite hard to predict whether or not they could be a split,” he explained to TNA. The SDF has no track record of public splits, however, the government's offensive represents the single gravest existential threat it has ever faced, and so the possibility can’t be ruled out.

Islamic State prisoners

The government’s offensive caused several IS prisons to be abandoned by the SDF as it withdrew, with a number of IS detainees and family members escaping over the last week.

At al-Shaddadi prison in Hasakah province, 120 IS members escaped after Arab tribal elements reportedly seized the facility and released those inside. According to the government, 83 of those have since been recaptured.

Despite this, it remains unclear how many of those accused of IS affiliation inside the SDF’s prison network are actually members of the group. Large families gathered outside al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa province last week demanding the release of their relatives, as a component of SDF fighters holed up inside negotiated their safe transfer to SDF territory.

Will the SDF's rollback lead to an Islamic State resurgence?

Paul Iddon

Those families denied that their imprisoned relatives were members of IS, instead claiming that they had been unjustly targeted by the SDF as part of a broader pattern of systematic discrimination against the Arab community in SDF-controlled territory.

Following the successful negotiation of the SDF fighters’ safe departure to Kobani province, it emerged that Syrian authorities had found and released 120 underage prisoners inside al-Aqtan, many of whom had been accused of being members of IS.

The government also took control of the infamous Al-Hol camp, and the government has since decided to bring these detention facilities under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, potentially signalling that it is seeking to resolve the file and free the prisoners from years of political limbo. What form that takes, however, is yet to be determined.

An existential war for Kurds

Many Kurds, meanwhile, consider the threat posed by Damascus’ new government to be existential.

“We don’t know what will happen to our families,” one man, Daher, told TNA in Kobani. The city is surrounded on three sides by the Syrian government and on the fourth by Turkey, who consider the SDF as an arm of the PKK - a group that has fought a decades-long insurgency against Ankara.

Under siege for at least a week, it was only on Sunday that the Syrian government opened two humanitarian corridors into the region.

“These are the same people who massacred thousands on the coast and in Suweida,” Daher told TNA. “We are terrified that if they come, there will be massacres.”

If there is no deal to be made, this fight-or-die mentality will certainly strengthen the resolve of the SDF and the Kurdish populations living under their control in the face of a renewed government offensive.

Last week, the SDF issued a general mobilisation, calling on “all segments of our people to arm themselves and prepare to confront any potential attack”. Daher says he witnessed hundreds of residents in Kobani bringing their weapons to enlistment centres to sign up with the SDF.

“These people are now our reserves; they are currently on standby in case the enemy attacks, after which they will join the fight,” he told TNA. “How can I live in peace with those terrorists? They are no better than IS.”

Many Kurds consider the threat posed by Damascus' new government to be existential. [Getty]

It is a common sentiment in some parts of Syria, from Alawite areas on the coast to Druze-majority Suweida, pointing to a broader disaffection among many minority communities as Damascus seeks to centralise authority by force under the rhetoric of national unity.

This pattern of using repeated coercion to bind the country together, without providing an effective sense of justice, has been criticised by many for papering over the cracks that ripped the country apart over a decade of civil war.

Damascus may be able to extend its authority to the northeastern borders of Syria, but that doesn't necessarily mean it will be able to bring the four corners of the country into the centralised authority’s fold.

Suweida, for example, remains an open wound, while on the coast, widespread dissatisfaction amongst Alawites triggered protests last December, with calls for federalism amid an ongoing low-level insurgency.

Even if the government does win a war against the SDF, it doesn’t necessarily mean the bloodshed will stop in Syria’s northeast.


Cian Ward is a journalist based in Damascus, covering conflict, migration, and humanitarian issues

Follow him on X: @CP__Ward

Supplies running out at Syria’s Al-Hol camp as clashes block aid deliveries

FILE PHOTO: Detainees gather at al-Hol camp after the Syrian government took control of it following the withdrawal of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in Hasaka, Syria, January 21, 2026. (Reuters)

AP
January 31, 2026

DAMASCUS: An international humanitarian organization has warned that supplies are running out at a camp in northeast Syria housing thousands of people linked to the Daesh group, as the country’s government fights to establish control over an area formerly controlled by Kurdish fighters.

The late Friday statement by Save the Children came a week after government forces captured Al-Hol camp, which is home to more than 24,000 people, mostly children and women, including many wives or widows of Daesh members.

The capture of the camp came after intense fighting earlier this month between government forces and members of the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces during which forces loyal to interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa captured wide areas in eastern and northeastern Syria.

The SDF signed a deal to end the fighting after suffering major defeats, but sporadic clashes between it and the government have continued.

Save the Children said that “critical supplies in Al-Hol camp are running dangerously low” as clashes are blocking the safe delivery of humanitarian aid.

It added that last week’s clashes around the camp forced aid agencies to temporarily suspend regular operations at Al-Hol. It added that the main road leading to the camp remains unsafe, which is preventing humanitarian workers from delivering food and water or running basic services for children and families.

“The situation in Al-Hol camp is rapidly deteriorating as food, water and medicines run dangerously low,” said Rasha Muhrez, Save the Children Syria country director. “If humanitarian organizations are unable to resume work, children will face still more risks in the camp, which was already extremely dangerous for them before this latest escalation.”

Muhrez added that all parties to the conflict must ensure a safe humanitarian corridor to Al-Hol so basic services can resume and children can be protected. “Lives depend on it,” she said.

The SDF announced a new agreement with the central government on Friday, aiming to stabilize a ceasefire that ended weeks of fighting and lay out steps toward integrating the US-backed force into the army and police forces.

Deal reached with Kurdish-led SDF is a ‘victory for all Syrians,’ Syrian ambassador to UN tells Arab News


Ephrem Kossaify
February 01, 2026
ARAB NEWS

SAUDI ARABIA


Ibrahim Olabi says ceasefire and phased integration agreement shows that Kurdish-led SDF’s “best success story” lies within the Syrian government
Lauds Saudi Arabia’s “consistent diplomatic role in encouraging de-escalation and supporting Syria’s reintegration into the regional and international system”


NEW YORK: A landmark ceasefire and phased integration agreement between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces was announced on Friday, a deal senior Syrian officials described as a major step toward national unity and stability following years of conflict and stalled negotiations.

Speaking with Arab News in New York, Ibrahim Olabi, the Syrian Arab Republic’s permanent representative to the UN, described the agreement as not only a military and administrative achievement but a symbolic victory for all Syrians, one that reflects the country’s collective aspirations for peace, reconstruction and international cooperation.

He said that stability, equitable resource distribution and internal security underpin the deal’s significance. He also highlighted broad international support and specific engagement from countries such as Saudi Arabia and the US.

He said that Saudi Arabia had played a consistent diplomatic role in encouraging de-escalation and supporting Syria’s reintegration into the regional and international system, including through calls to lift sanctions and back state institutions.

The Syrian Arab Republic's national flag. (AFP)

As for Washington, Olabi said, it had come to view a unified Syrian state as serving US and regional interests, and saw integration within the Syrian government as the SDF’s most viable long-term protection.

“We are viewing the milestone that was achieved today as a success for all Syrians and for Syria. All Syrians benefit from stability, from having security apparatus in their towns. All Syrians benefit from resources being under the control of the state because they can be equitably distributed. The same thing goes for borders. All Syrians benefit when there is calm, domestically, which then also has regional implications and reconstruction implications,” he said.

“So, we view it as a success, as a victory for all Syrians.”

He added that the agreement built on existing momentum generated by earlier understandings and international endorsements, as well as shifting political and military realities, creating conditions that made this phase more likely to hold.

The core of the Jan. 30 agreement is a phased integration of SDF military units and administrative bodies into Syrian state structures, beginning with security arrangements and progressing toward full institutional incorporation.

Soldiers stand guard as Syrian government forces make their way to the city of Hasakeh in northeastern Syria on January 20, 2026. (AFP)

This model, Olabi said, was intended to avoid abrupt shifts that could destabilize fragile local dynamics.

“The phased integration approach falls within the wider theme that the Syrian government has always been open to proposals, to ideas, to debate whatever really works in having a united, strong, stable Syria,” he said.

“It starts with the security component, then it goes to the administrative component, then it goes to state institutions. We thought one month would be a reasonable timeframe. The idea is not to rush things, but also not for things to take too long, all Syrians are interested in moving ahead to the future, putting the past 14 years of conflict and factionalism behind them.”

Under the agreement, SDF fighters will begin joining national security units and brigades, and Interior Ministry forces will be deployed in key Kurdish-held cities including Hasakah and Qamishli, where the Syrian government’s presence had been limited for years.

A new military formation, including three brigades drawn from SDF elements, will be part of the broader Syrian army structure, with Kurdish civil institutions integrated into the state’s administrative framework.

Members of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) queue to settle their status with Syrian government in Raqqa, Syria, on January 27, 2026. (REUTERS)

Olabi stressed that the accord gave time for orderly integration, not immediate absorption, and that this timeframe was agreed in consultation with the SDF to promote confidence and minimize friction.

Addressing concerns over the sincerity of guarantees for SDF members against reprisals or loss of status, Olabi pointed to the government’s longstanding overtures and previous interactions with the Kurdish leadership, and to the government’s conduct throughout negotiations as evidence of its approach.

“(SDF chief) Mazloum Abdi was welcomed in Damascus as a hero, not as a villain or as an enemy. The SDF as a whole were always welcomed in Damascus, and we were always engaging with them and always trying to find ways. They have seen that we have no interest in reprisals, no interest in the situation deteriorating. We would like to move forward. International partners have also noticed that the Syrian government has no interest in escalating a situation,” he said.
BIO

Ibrahim Abdulmalik Olabi was appointed the permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the UN on Aug. 19 last year. Before that, he served as special adviser on international legal affairs to Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates from Feb. 2025. He holds a master’s in public policy from the University of Oxford, an LLM in security and international law, and an LLB from the University of Manchester.

On the question of dispute resolution, Olabi made clear that all disputes would be addressed internally, through dialogue among Syrian factions, keeping the process fully within the country’s control.

“Any sort of disputes that may arise are things that we have to resolve together. The door has always been open. We didn’t want to resort to any military solutions, and the same will apply again. People have seen that we went into not one agreement, but four or five different versions of it. There is no judge or jury or adversarial group — it’s Syrian factions coming together to build the Syria they want.”

The agreement follows months of intense clashes between Syrian government forces and Kurdish armed groups in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah districts in December 2025 and January 2026. The fighting left dozens of fighters dead on both sides and forced thousands of civilians to flee their homes. Several ceasefire agreements collapsed before this latest deal, underscoring the fragility of trust and the risks of renewed escalation.

Detainees gather at al-Hol camp in Hasaka, Syria, on January 21, 2026, after the Syrian government took control of it following the withdrawal of Syrian Democratic Forces. (REUTERS)

Olabi said that the current deal differed because it advanced those earlier understandings into a more detailed, time-bound and technically defined agreement, shaped by new political and military realities and reinforced by international and UN backing

“We believe this agreement is the next step from the initial agreement. It has more technical details, more timeframes, and is more nuanced than the framework agreement signed a couple of days ago. International powers and the UN have welcomed it, and the new political and military realities all contribute to its success,” he said.

Saudi Arabia has welcomed the ceasefire and integration deal, lauding it as a step toward peace, national unity and stability. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement reaffirmed the Kingdom’s support for Syria’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. It said that the deal could help to advance security and stability, ease humanitarian suffering, and create conditions conducive to reconstruction and the return of displaced Syrians, while emphasizing the importance of a Syrian-led political process.

Olabi characterized Saudi support as consistent with the Kingdom’s long-standing backing for a sovereign, unified Syria.

Two women walk among tents at Roj camp, one of the detention facilities holding thousands of Daesh group members and their families, in the al-Malikiyah area of northeastern Syria, on Jan. 29, 2026. (AP)

“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a key partner and key ally of the Syrian people, first of all, for many, many, many years and of the new Syrian government and the new Syrian leadership. We’ve seen that since day one. We’ve seen that when President Trump met President Ahmad Al-Sharaa; it was the first time that happened in Riyadh,” he said.

“We’ve seen their support for calling for the ending of sanctions, the institutional support that they’re giving in terms of working with us to build our capacity so that we have a stable Syria. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been a key ally, and the fact that they are welcoming such a statement is in line with the policies that they’ve had in supporting a united, strong and stable Syria,” he said.

Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and special envoy for Syria, welcomed the agreement in a post on X on Friday. He described it “as a profound and historic milestone in Syria’s journey toward national reconciliation unity and enduring stability,” adding that it affirmed “the principle that Syria’s strength emerges from embracing diversity and addressing the legitimate aspirations of all its people.”

Olabi said that the US administration recognized the mutual benefits of a stable, unified Syria.

“The United States, under President Trump and his envoy to Syria, Ambassador Tom Barrack, have seen that it is in US interests to have a stable, unified Syria. They have also seen that the SDF’s best protection, best success story is within the Syrian government,” he said.


Barrack noted that this moment was of “particular significance” for the Kurdish people, whose “extraordinary sacrifices” and “steadfast resilience” have been crucial in defending Syria and protecting vulnerable populations.

The recent Presidential Decree No. 13 represents a “transformative stride” toward equality, restoring citizenship, recognizing Kurdish as a “national language,” and correcting “longstanding injustices” to affirm the Kurds’ place in a secure, inclusive Syria.

Earlier this month, President Al-Sharaa issued a decree formally recognizing and protecting Kurdish cultural and civil rights, including language and representation, as part of broader efforts to address longstanding grievances. The move was presented by the Syrian government as a state decision independent of ongoing negotiations with armed groups.

Olabi said: “That question should be separated from the rights of Kurds, because for us, the Kurds are a key component that live all across Syria — in Damascus, in Aleppo, in Afrin, in Idlib and elsewhere. As you know, the decree granting Kurdish rights was issued independent of the negotiation. It wasn’t an outcome of the negotiation, it wasn’t during the negotiation.”

Israel has continued military operations inside Syria over the past year following the removal of Bashar Assad from power, carrying out repeated airstrikes and ground incursions that Al-Sharaa’s government says have violated its sovereignty and killed Syrian civilians, even as it has signaled its openness to diplomatic engagement.

Members of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) queue to settle their status with Syrian government in Raqqa, Syria, on January 27, 2026. (REUTERS)

labi referred to a December 2025 tweet by President Trump after an Israeli incursion that killed 13 Syrians. “The Syrian government has said since day one that we will uphold the 1974 agreement between Syria and Israel, an agreement that withstood the test of time for over 50 years. We even engaged publicly and openly with Israel through US mediation,” he said.

“But Israel’s actions have been against Syrian interests. Syria is not going to be a threat to anyone. We are always open to diplomacy and constructive engagement. If there are legitimate security concerns, we can address them. But land grabs and destabilization are something we cannot tolerate. No government in Syria can give away Syrian rights.”

On how trust can be rebuilt after years of factional fighting, Olabi emphasized a distinction between the SDF as an armed faction and Syria’s Kurdish population at large, who have endured decades of discrimination. “The Kurds have seen our discipline in operations, the decree protecting their rights, and our openness to engage. That is why many chose to move from Aleppo to Afrin,” he said.

The Syrian government on Friday declared the Al-Hol and Roj camps northeast Syria, which house families linked to former Daesh fighters, as formal security zones. Security at the camp collapsed following the withdrawal of SDF amid intense fighting, with reports of escape by possibly 1,500 Daesh-linked individuals.

A boy eats bread as displaced Syrians take shelter in a mosque after clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian army, in Qamishli, Syria, on January 29, 2026. (REUTERS)



Humanitarian aid is now blocked. The camp holds roughly 24,000 people — mostly women and children — including about 14,500 Syrians, 3,000 Iraqis and 6,500 foreign nationals.

“The Syrian government inherited a very complicated situation at Al-Hol, with many families of former Daesh fighters. We have taken responsibility for both security and humanitarian management. We are also urging states whose nationals are detained there to take responsibility. The UNHCR and other UN agencies are engaged, and we hope to address this in a humane, just, and secure way over the coming weeks,” he said.

As Syria and the SDF embark on this integration phase, analysts caution that while the ceasefire provides a framework, deep-seated distrust, unresolved grievances and external pressures could destabilize progress.

Olabi, however, maintained that the focus remained on Syrian autonomy and the state’s responsibility to protect all citizens. “People have seen that we have no interest in reprisals. We would like to move forward,” he said.

Syria’s Kurds turn to UAE to ease tensions with Assad

Patriotic Union Of Kurdistan

2023-05-05 

Shafaq News/ The Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria is seeking the United Arab Emirates’ help to broker a deal with the Syrian regime amid fading confidence in the United States and Arab outreach to Damascus, Al-Monitor has learned.

Mazlum Kobane, commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the United States’ premier ally in the fight against the Islamic State (IS), recently traveled to the UAE, four well-informed sources and officials in the region speaking on condition of strict anonymity told Al-Monitor. Kobane met with UAE officials, two of the sources said, in order to seek Abu Dhabi’s help to press the Syrian Kurds’ case with the Assad regime. One of the regional sources said that Kobane met with the UAE’s national security adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan, who was named deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi on March 29.

The UAE denied that any such meeting had occurred.

"The claims referenced in your email are false and unfounded,” a UAE official said in an emailed response to Al-Monitor’s request for comment on the UAE's alleged mediation effort between the SDF and the regime.

The officials briefing Al-Monitor insisted that Kobane had indeed gone to the UAE between late March and early April. None provided specific dates. “It is one hundred percent true,” one of the officials said. Two of the officials briefing Al-Monitor said that Bafel Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second largest party in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq that shares power in the Kurdistan Regional Government, had traveled with him.

Talabani’s office did not respond to Al-Monitor’s request for comment.

Badran Ciya Kurd, the de facto foreign minister of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria, confirmed that the UAE had expressed interest in helping the Syrian Kurds strike an agreement with the Assad regime. “They said they are ready to help, but so far we do not have a program (roadmap) for this,” Kurd told Al-Monitor in an April 28 interview in Qamishli. "We want them to play a role in the talks with Damascus, Kurd added. He declined to comment on whether Kobane had recently traveled to the UAE.

Ankara strikes

Kobane’s alleged trip to the UAE capital came before he was targeted by a Turkish drone as he was traveling in a convoy from the PUK’s intelligence headquarters known as the Counter Terrorism Group, or CTG, in Sulaimaniyah on April 7. The officials briefing Al-Monitor said the drone strike took place following Kobane’s return from the UAE.

The convoy was headed toward Sulaimaniyah International Airport. Kobane was to fly back to northeast Syria on a plane operated by the US-led coalition against IS. The CTG chief, Wahab Halabji, and three US military personnel were in the motorcade, as was Ilham Ahmed, a top Syrian Kurdish official. The Turkish drone is widely believed to have deliberately missed the target, and Kobane made it home. The goal was to telegraph Ankara’s fury over the shuttling of Kobane by the PUK leader to the UAE, one of the officials briefing Al-Monitor speculated.

On April 5, Turkey announced that it had sealed its airspace to planes taking off from and landing at the Sulaimaniyah airport, ostensibly after hearing of Kobane's assignation in Abu Dhabi, the sources said. The Turkish Foreign Ministry said the measure stemmed from an alleged “intensification of the PKK terrorist organization’s activities in Sulaimaniyah [and] infiltration by the terrorist organization into the airport.” The PKK is the acronym for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the outlawed militant group that has been waging an armed campaign for Kurdish autonomy against the Turkish state since 1984. Ankara insists that the SDF and Kobane, who also goes by the surname “Abdi,” are all PKK “terrorists” because of his previous role in the PKK.

Turkey said it would reassess its decision on the airport on July 3 based on measures the PUK takes to curb the PKK’s activities in Sulaimaniyah. Turkey is the Kurdistan Region’s main gateway to Europe.

The PKK was instrumental in the early days of the US-led coalition’s battle against IS, wresting thousands of Yazidis from the jihadis’ jaws in Iraq’s Sinjar region and training fighters for the SDF. However, it was listed as a terrorist entity by the State Department in 1997, hence Ankara’s ire over Washington’s effective collaboration with the group.

Washington insists that the SDF and the PKK are different and says some 900 US special forces stationed in northeast Syria as part of the anti-IS campaign will not be withdrawn. However, confidence in the United States is waning.

The first big shock came in 2019 when the Trump administration greenlighted a Turkish invasion of large swathes of Kurdish-controlled territory, including the key towns of Tell Abyad and Rais al-Ain, also known as Serekaniye. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan was another wake-up call, said Fawza al-Yusuf, a leading official in northeast Syria. “Our relations with the United States have been in decline since 2019. Serekaniye and Afghanistan provided lessons,” she told Al-Monitor in an April 27 interview in Hasakah.

Yusuf acknowledged that while the United States' presence gave the Syrian Kurds leverage in their relations with Damascus, there was also a flip side. The Syrian regime insists that the Kurds sever ties with Washington and tell the Americans to leave as a prerequisite to any deal.

“Thus, the presence of the US forces provides the regime with an excuse to not engage with us,” Yusuf explained.

She added that trust in the Russians, the regime’s main ally alongside Iran, was diminishing in parallel with the Kremlin’s deepening ties with Ankara. The Kurds needed to take matters into their own hands and not be reduced to “objects” in regional power games. Diversifying their partners is part of that strategy.

Bridge building

The UAE has taken a lead role in building bridges between the Assad regime and fellow Arab states in recent years after reopening its own embassy in Damascus in December 2018, part of a race for regional influence aimed in part at thinning Turkey's and Iran’s grips over Syria. Engagement with the Syrian Kurds is part of that calculus.

“The anti-Iran and the anti-Islamist agenda have been the driving force for Emirati normalization with Assad,” said Dareen Khalifa, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group who follows Syria. The UAE justifies the outreach on the grounds that “Assad isn’t going anywhere and we are going to have to deal with him in one way or another if we want to preserve our interests in Syria,” Khalifa told Al-Monitor.

Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and director of its Syria program, contended that the UAE is "trying to be ‘friends’ with everyone, playing mediator everywhere possible and getting into the door of troubling places before anyone else to secure the competitive advantage."

“Ultimately, the UAE’s forward-leaning role in normalizing Assad was initially promoted by a desire to counter Turkish influence, but it’s now principally about securing a competitive advantage — being the Sunni Arab actor with Assad's regime in its pocket and, it no doubt hopes, the first to win large-scale economic contracts if and when Western sanctions are dropped or fail to have their deterrent effect,” Lister told Al-Monitor.

While the UAE may justify its rapprochement with Damascus on the grounds that this will help counter Iranian influence in Syria, the two are top trading partners and Abu Dhabi has hosted top Iranian officials, including Iranian National Security Advisor Ali Shamkani in March.

It remains unclear whether the UAE's efforts to secure approval for Syria’s return to the Arab League during a May 19 summit in Riyadh will succeed. But the UAE is unlikely to give up the push to legitimize Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, it is also believed to be involved in back-channel diplomacy between Ankara and Damascus. UAE meddling apparently angered Tehran, which reportedly leaned on Russia and Turkey to drop the Emiratis from an April 4 meeting with Syrian officials that was held in Moscow. The Iranians took part instead.

In 2018, around the same time the Emiratis reopened its embassy in Damascus, the Syrian Kurds began seeking engagement with the Assad regime. The Russian-induced effort has proved fruitless so far. The regime has rebuffed all of the Kurds' demands for linguistic and political rights. The most the regime offered according to sources familiar with the talks was two hours of Kurdish-language instruction per week.

A fresh sense of urgency appears to have set in as Arab governments, including heavyweight Saudi Arabia, weigh normalization with the Assad regime. Worse, Assad’s longtime nemesis Turkey is also courting Damascus in the hope of reviving a security alliance targeting the Kurds.

On April 18, the Kurdish-led self-administration issued a nine-point declaration reiterating its intention to reach an agreement with the regime. This included an offer to host millions of Syrian refugees currently residing in neighboring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. “We need to reach out to the Syrian people wherever they are to erase negative feelings about our administration. This includes members of the Syrian opposition. We can build a new democratic Syria only if we are united,” a senior figure in the Kurdish movement told Al-Monitor on condition that he not be identified by name.

Kurd, the de facto foreign minister, said the Syrian Kurds would not compromise on two things. One was the administrative model that they had set up. “The regime has to recognize the self-administration,” he said. The second is the status of the SDF. While the Kurds are willing to fall under the overall command of the Syrian army, they insist on keeping their forces in their own region.

Seeds of an alliance

The UAE is part of the 85-member Global Coalition against IS. The sources briefing Al-Monitor said that formal contacts between the Kurdish-led self-administration and the UAE started in 2018 when Emirati officials traveled to northeast Syria to interrogate imprisoned UAE nationals who had joined IS. The ties were brokered in part by former PUK intelligence supremo Lahur Talabani, who was ousted in 2021 by his cousin, PUK leader Bafel, in a bloodless coup. Talabani lobbied the Emiratis to invest in Syria’s battered oil infrastructure that lies mainly in the Kurdish-controlled northeast, where most of the country’s oil is located. The top ask was an oil refinery. Talabani traveled to Abu Dhabi with Kobane a number of times to push his cause, sources familiar with the outreach said.

But the Emiratis were wary of upsetting Assad, the sources said. They would have been even more concerned about violating US sanctions on Syria.

The moves coincided with spiraling tensions between Turkey and the UAE over the conflict in Libya where they backed opposing sides. These have since subsided, and it remains unclear whether the Emiratis would be willing to support the Syrian Kurds at the expense of their newly repaired ties with Ankara. The stiff Emirati rebuttal over Kobane’s trip suggests they are not.

Syrian Kurdish officials, however, remain upbeat about the relationship. Yusuf praised the UAE for its “constructive and positive approach." “We have good cooperation with them in intelligence sharing, in combating drug trafficking,” she said.

She noted that the UAE was the Arab country with the fewest nationals to have joined IS. “There were only 15 of them, and the Emiratis were very helpful in the fight against DAESH,” she said, using the Arabic language acronym for the jihadis.

Yusuf added that the UAE’s own system of seven separate monarchies united under the same flag bore some resemblance to the decentralized model the Kurds are seeking for Syria. “We have some common traits,” she said.

Source: Al-Monitor