India looks to increase its unmanned warfare capabilities

/ Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt - PDFacebook

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By IntelliNews June 23, 2026

The Indian military is on a long and arduous journey to modernise its capabilities and force structure. Under its new direction, the Indian Ministry of Defence, in all three services is pivoting away from traditional methods of human surveillance and toward autonomous systems across all domains.

However autonomous and semi-autonomous platforms are not the only driving factor, as localised production and sourcing under India’s flagship “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” initiative as well as wider insights gained from contemporary international conflicts are also driving the agenda.

While New Delhi frames it as a framework and calculus to establish native supply chains, it isn’t about autarkic backsliding into a pre globalisation paradigm of limited capability. In a pragmatic world of complex value and supply chains, the shift represents a transition from exclusively importing to structured, multi-tiered domestic production. Furthermore, India’s own operational lessons from past conflicts and skirmishes including Operation Sindoor and the hostilities with Pakistan in May 2025 which have been absorbed into the guiding principles.

Largely beginning with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite existing for decades before, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)s signalled a special strategic and tactical importance in modern warfare. Similarly, due to the effective employment of sem-autonomous unmanned naval surface craft by Ukraine against the Russian Navy, this has elevated what was once seen mainly as a surveillance and Search And Rescue (SAR) tool to a strike role against capital warships.

According to a report by DW, the cornerstone of this structural change is going to be a large procurement order to the tune of $2bn. While the amount is noteworthy, the suppliers being exclusively India’s own private defence firms including Adani Group (NSE:ADANIENT), Tata Advanced Systems, and Larsen & Toubro (NSE:LT), the timelines are also reportedly relatively short, spanning around 18 to 24 months.

While India’s state owned defence structure including Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (NSE:HAL) have their own armed UAV designs, and some have even passed trial, none have received large procurement orders with any plans for induction into the inventories and arsenals of any of India’s defence forces as of June 2026.

The three main categories of unmanned vehicles that are likely to be part of the $2bn order are likely to be, High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE), Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP), Electronic Warfare (EW) suite platforms especially in a companion configuration aimed at operating in conjunction with a manned multirole fighter aircraft and its pilot, and loitering munitions especially those intended for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).

India has also pursued procurement of foreign origin platforms such as Israel’s IAI industries's series of Heron UAVs procured between 2000-2016, and the US General Atomic’s MQ9 between 2020-2026.

The US supplied MQ9 platforms have been a capability boost with their high endurance and combat radius, as well as the ability to be fitted out for modular mission profiles ranging from surveillance over vast swathes of ocean, to strike any surface cruising maritime or land based threats.

These contracts for foreign origin platforms have cost over $10bn in the past 26 years. However, as things shift into a decisively indigenous direction for procurement, India is looking for greater utility for a fraction of the price. This would include leveraging the economies of scale and not having to pay a premium for foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) profit margins, currency exchange rate related costs, as well as much more scalable and available after sales support, as well as overhauls and retirement costs over the system and platform’s life cycle.

However, these expectations and specifications are not easily fulfilled as the consistent pattern of underinvestment in Research and Development (R&D) by both state owned entities and the private sector has been the proverbial achilles heel of India’s defence industrial complex.

Even when a programme which has produced a solid product for a replacement or upgrade of a capability away from a foreign vendor, India’s procurement agencies have repeatedly changed the specifications and demanded constant iterative changes without paying for the now inflated costs owing to these value additions.

This approach of shifting goalposts and in some cases even using defence procurement as a tool to court favour with geopolitical partners such as the US and Russia, has inevitably downgraded capability as a second priority over relationship building.

While this approach has its own merits, the negatives when weighed against the fundamental goal of developing its own defence industrial base, leaves New Delhi few options but to continue dependence on historical suppliers and partners as a strategic necessity.

Nevertheless, the awareness that future military conflicts will involve highly sophisticated, yet fast produced and equally fast depleted stockpiles of cheap, disposable unmanned platforms with an attrition rate in the hundreds of thousands in a given month is resonating with New Delhi and its strategic planners just as soundly as those in any other consequential state with a military.

However, the delicate dance of balancing, ambition, autonomy, and technology and diplomacy with budgetary concerns may be what makes or breaks India’s push for unmanned systems in all domains.

Armenia And The Disappearing Mountain – Analysis



Khor Virap Monastery, with Mount Ararat, known in Turkish as Mount Agri, in the background Photo: Amos Chapple, RFE/RL


June 7, 2026
RFE RL
By Amos Chapple

(RFE/RL) — Something seems to be missing from Armenia’s new biometric passport. That’s according to many in the country, who have flagged an unusual image in the document.

Among pages showcasing Armenia’s heritage and culture is a picture of Khor Virap. The 17th century monastery is famous largely for its spectacular backdrop of Mount Ararat. In the passport, however, the monastery is depicted from an angle showing only nondescript mountains on the horizon. Critics have called the unusual image a “ploy” to avoid including Ararat in the official document

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Pages 24-25 of the new Armenian passport


Mount Ararat is situated inside Turkey and officially known by its Turkish name Mount Agri, but the landmark rises prominently above Yerevan on clear days.

The 5,100 meter mountain was a part of ancient kingdoms of Armenia, but ethnic Armenians were driven from settlements around Ararat amid the Ottoman state-led killings, which have been recognized as genocide by dozens of countries including the United States. When borders in the region were redrawn following World War I, Ararat’s twin peaks were included within the eastern edge of modern Turkey.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian recently hinted at the controversy over the passport depiction of Khor Virap, saying during a live stream with Interior Minister Arpine Sargsian that, “we’ve chosen such a perspective to suit our policies and what we have discussed for a long time.”

“Given it is the passport of the Republic of Armenia,” Pashinian added, the passport reflects “the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”


The absence of the mountain in the passports, which are set to be rolled out in the fall of 2026, follows a government decision late last year to remove snow-capped icons of Mount Ararat from passport stamps. That decision led to an uproar in the country, including a lawsuit filed against the government.

Opposition politician Hayk Mamijanian condemned the removal of the mountain from passport stamps at the time, telling reporters “it never ceases to amaze how zealously Pashinian is ready to please Turkey or Azerbaijan.”

Since Azerbaijan’s military recapture of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2023, Armenia has sought to normalize relations with neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey, both historic foes of Armenia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace agreement in 2025 that includes a clause indefinitely forbidding either country from making territorial claims on the other. Turkey, a close ally of Baku, has long objected to Armenia’s use of Ararat as a national symbol, including in the coat of arms of the Soviet Republic of Armenia.

Joshua Kucera, a senior analyst for International Crisis Group, says the Khor Virap image appears to be, “part of the larger ‘real Armenia’ narrative that [Pashinian] is promoting, trying to refocus Armenians’ attentions to the issues within their own borders rather than ‘historical Armenia’ outside its borders.”

The Caucasus expert says that reframing effort also includes the recaptured Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.

Some fear a more consequential target for the Pashinian government could be the current Armenian coat of arms, which features Ararat as its centerpiece, topped with Noah’s Ark. The mythical vessel is believed by some Christians to have settled atop Mount Ararat following the biblical flood. In 2023, Pashinian criticized the emblem for representing “a dichotomy between historical Armenia and real Armenia.”

Edmon Marukian, a politician and former ally of the Armenian prime minister, called the 2025 erasure of Mount Ararat from passport stamps a potential precursor to Armenia’s coat of arms being remade. “Removing [Ararat] would require changing the constitution and the law,” the politician noted, adding, “are we, as citizens, ready to tolerate this?”

In April, RFE/RL’s Armenian Service asked Pashinian about the potential for Ararat to be removed from the coat of arms. The prime minister responded only that “I am not raising such a question.”Amos Chapple is a New Zealand-born writer and visual journalist with a particular interest in the former U.S.S.R.

Armenia Elections: Geopolitical Choice Takes Center Stage – Analysis

June 6, 2026 
By Geopolitical Monitor
By Saleh Salehov

As Armenia prepares for parliamentary elections on June 7, many observers view the vote as a potential turning point not only for the country’s domestic politics but also for its foreign policy trajectory. The elections could also prove decisive for the fate of the prospective peace treaty with Azerbaijan. The military and political consequences of the 2020 war, the subsequent peace process, and the deep-seated sense of security anxiety within Armenian society have increasingly linked Yerevan’s diplomatic maneuvering to domestic political dynamics and electoral calculations.

The impact of Armenia’s electoral climate on peace negotiations, border delimitation, and the unblocking of regional transport routes with its long-time adversary, Azerbaijan, demonstrates how internal political competition can shape broader regional stability. In the run-up to the elections, political debate has largely revolved around a contrast between the incumbent government’s self-proclaimed peace agenda and what its supporters describe as the revanchist rhetoric and populist discourse of the opposition.

In this context, the ballot box may ultimately determine the outcome of several critical questions: whether Armenia continues its gradual turn toward the West or reorients itself toward Russia, and whether the peace process with Azerbaijan advances or faces renewed uncertainty.

Geopolitical Choices at the Ballot Box: The West–Russia Divide

Electoral politics in Armenia have increasingly moved beyond conventional socio-economic debates, turning the domestic political arena into a contest over the country’s geopolitical future. At the heart of this struggle lies the growing polarization between advocates of closer ties with the West—the United States and the European Union—and supporters of maintaining Armenia’s traditional strategic partnership with Russia.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling team have pursued a policy of closer engagement with Western actors, presenting it as an effort to diversify Armenia’s security architecture. The suspension of Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the deployment of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) along the border with Azerbaijan, and the expansion of cooperation with Western institutions are frequently cited as evidence of this course. For government supporters, deeper engagement with the West is portrayed as the most viable path toward strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Yet Yerevan has shown no intention of withdrawing from other Russia-led structures, most notably the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), highlighting the pragmatic limits of its geopolitical reorientation.


On the other side of the political spectrum stand the principal opposition forces, including representatives of the former political establishment associated with former president Robert Kocharyan, influential figures within the Armenian Apostolic Church, business elites with strong ties to Russia, and nationalist groups. Separately, they advocate preserving Armenia’s close strategic relationship with Moscow and argue that distancing the country from Russia would have severe security consequences. Opposition leaders accuse Pashinyan of transforming Armenia into a vehicle for Western geopolitical interests and of weakening the country’s traditional security partnerships.

Public opinion surveys reveal a deeply divided society, with significant differences in attitudes toward Russia and the West. As a result, Armenian elections are increasingly becoming contests not merely between competing policy platforms but between rival geopolitical visions of the country’s future.

Ideological Polarization and the Peace Process

Under the banner of a “Real Armenia”—one that abandons aspirations tied to historical territorial claims—Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party are campaigning in support of a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Their objective is to bring an end to decades of conflict through the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the normalization of regional relations. Such an outcome could pave the way for the opening of borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally, while facilitating Armenia’s integration into emerging regional connectivity initiatives like the Middle Corridor.

Pashinyan’s vision may be described as a model of “pragmatic peace.” It is based on acknowledging existing geopolitical and military realities, recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, and unblocking regional transport and communication links, including through Armenia’s proposed “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. Presented domestically under the concept of “Real Armenia,” this approach seeks to redefine Armenian statehood within its internationally recognized borders and move beyond longstanding territorial disputes with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.


Accordingly, the ruling party portrays the peace process as a strategic opportunity to secure stability, economic development, and regional integration. At the same time, government representatives warn that a victory by opposition forces could undermine ongoing negotiations and increase the risk of renewed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The opposition advances a markedly different understanding of peace. The predominantly pro-Russian opposition argues that any agreement reached with Azerbaijan and Turkey without a robust Russian security presence would jeopardize Armenia’s long-term security and sovereignty. In this view, stability is achieved not primarily through reconciliation and cooperation, but through the preservation of a favorable balance of power.

Yet despite sharply criticizing Pashinyan’s negotiations with Azerbaijan and accusing his government of making excessive concessions, opposition forces have struggled to articulate a coherent alternative strategy. While advocating what may be termed an “honorable peace,” they have provided few concrete details regarding the terms of such a settlement or the mechanisms through which it could realistically be achieved under current regional conditions.

Three Election Scenarios in Armenia

Against this backdrop, three broad scenarios can be envisioned regarding the impact of Armenia’s election outcome on the future of the peace process and regional stability:

Scenario 1: Pashinyan Secures a Constitutional Majority

A decisive victory by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party, resulting in a two-thirds parliamentary majority, would provide the government with the political capital necessary to advance its peace agenda. Most importantly, it could enable the authorities to initiate a constitutional referendum—an issue closely watched by Azerbaijan. Baku expects the removal or revision of constitutional provisions that it interprets as containing territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Widely regarded as one of the final major obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement, successful constitutional reform could significantly accelerate the normalization process and create more favorable conditions for lasting peace.

Scenario 2: Pashinyan Wins a Simple Majority

A second scenario would see the incumbent government retain power but without a constitutional majority. While such an outcome would preserve the current political course, it would leave the government with fewer instruments to address constitutional issues that have become central to negotiations with Azerbaijan. As a result, the future trajectory of the peace process, border delimitation, transport connectivity, and broader regional normalization would remain uncertain. Negotiations could continue, but progress might become slower and more politically contested.

Scenario 3: Opposition Victory and a Shift in Strategic Orientation

A victory by a coalition of the principal pro-Russian opposition forces could significantly alter the current trajectory of the peace process. Such a government might seek to reassess or suspend aspects of the existing negotiations while prioritizing closer security cooperation with Moscow. This could deepen mutual distrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan and increase tensions along the border. Efforts to restore a more traditional Russia-centered security framework could also lead to a prolonged stagnation of peace talks, raising the risk of periodic crises and localized confrontations.

The Risk of Post-Election Instability

Beyond these electoral outcomes, another possibility deserves consideration: a period of prolonged domestic instability. A fragmented election result, disputed outcomes, or dissatisfaction among political actors could trigger mass protests and political paralysis. Radical groups on the political margins may attempt to exploit uncertainty and social tensions. Reports and speculation regarding the possible mobilization of Armenian citizens residing abroad, particularly in Russia, have further contributed to concerns about potential post-election turbulence. While such scenarios remain speculative, they underscore the extent to which domestic political developments may influence not only Armenia’s internal stability but also the broader regional security environment.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Russia goes on the offensive against Armenian PM Pashinyan

Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract is expected to win the June 7 general election. / primeminister.amFacebook

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By Robert Ananyan in Yerevan June 4, 2026

Days before Armenia’s parliamentary elections on June 7, Russia is carrying out a full-scale offensive and campaign of pressure against the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which has the strongest chances of winning. 

Not only President Vladimir Putin, but also the leaders of the other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states have jointly demanded that Pashinyan hold a referendum on whether Armenia should join the European Union or remain in the EAEU. Pashinyan rejected the demand, arguing that such a referendum is currently impossible because Armenia has not submitted an application for EU membership. Simultaneously, Russia’s deputy prime minister warned Yerevan about the possibility of higher gas prices should Armenia leave the EAEU.

Russia has imposed restrictions on imports of several Armenian products, including at least five types of vegetables, fresh flowers and ornamental plants, fish and fish products, as well as Armenian brandy and wine. In addition, the sale of 64.5mn bottles of Jermuk mineral water has been banned.

Russia justifies these measures by citing product quality concerns. However, the political dimension is evident, particularly as pro-Russian political forces have actively accused Pashinyan of provoking an economic conflict with Russia. The core of their criticism is the adoption of legislation envisaging a process toward EU accession and the gradual transition of the country’s economic and state standards from Eurasian to European norms. In essence, pro-Russian forces are using the Kremlin’s sanctions and threats to argue that rapprochement with the EU is another mistake by Pashinyan following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The leader of the main opposition force, Strong Armenia, Samvel Karapetyan, has warned of a possible economic war with Russia should Pashinyan be re-elected. Another pro-Russian figure, Robert Kocharyan, who heads the second-largest opposition bloc, has stated that a rupture in relations with Moscow would be nothing short of a disaster for Yerevan. “The stakes are much higher than parliamentary elections alone. The issue is Armenia’s foreign policy course: is Armenia moving away from Russia, or is it maintaining a certain balanced policy?” Kocharyan said.

For its part, the European Union has stated: “As a sovereign, democratic and independent state, Armenia has the full right to choose its own path of development and its partners.” The EU further noted that Russia is attempting to damage Armenia’s economy and influence the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections, adding that “Brussels will continue supporting Armenia in overcoming such attempts at coercion.”

Government sources indicate that Armenia, together with the EU and the United States, has already developed contingency plans addressing the economic, energy, security and other risks that Russia could activate. Concrete solutions exist regarding alternative gas supplies in the event of a comprehensive Russian economic and energy war, mechanisms for subsidising higher gas prices, and support programs for exporters seeking access to new markets. In Moldova’s case, the EU allocated billions of euros to help counter similar Russian sanctions, and those efforts proved successful.

In Armenia’s case, however, the Kremlin has effectively delivered an ultimatum. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the declaration adopted by four EAEU member states — Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan — implies that all legal and economic details concerning a possible suspension of Armenia’s participation must be thoroughly prepared and discussed by December. In other words, EAEU countries, under Russia’s leadership, are threatening to suspend Armenia’s participation in the economic bloc. Simultaneously, Putin is demanding a referendum requiring Armenians to choose between the EU and the EAEU.

Clearly, this combination of Kremlin-organised threats is intended to steer Armenian voters away from supporting parties advocating closer integration with the EU and a pro-European political course. The leading force in this camp is Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.

In recent weeks, Armenian officials have repeatedly revisited potential countermeasures against Russian sanctions and reviewed the steps Armenia would need to take in the event of a comprehensive Russian economic offensive and import restrictions.

Pro-Russian political forces are attempting to monetise Russian threats as political dividends. However, this coordinated campaign is not translating into an effective anti-Pashinyan political technology. According to polling by the International Republican Institute (IRI), Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party improved its standing in May compared to February. In February, approximately 24-29% of respondents were prepared to vote for the party; by May, that figure had reached 38%, representing an increase of roughly 9-14 percentage points. Political parties must surpass a 4% electoral threshold, while alliances must secure 7-8%.

Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia has experienced a decline. In February, the alliance enjoyed support from approximately 9-11% of respondents, but by May this had fallen to 7%, a decrease of around 2-4 percentage points.

The rating of Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance has remained largely unchanged or has seen only marginal growth. It stood at approximately 3-4% in February and reached 4% in May. Another pro-Russian force, Prosperous Armenia, also recorded a slight decline, from around 3% in February to 2% in May.

The pro-European Meritocratic Party of Armenia has a small chance of entering parliament, making it unlikely that pro-Russian forces could come to power through such a scenario. Even if the votes of the 20% undecided respondents and the additional 23% who declined to answer are distributed proportionally, the pro-Russian opposition would still lack the numbers needed to remove Pashinyan. Nor are they likely to capture those votes disproportionately. Moreover, Russian threats may produce the opposite effect and mobilise support around Pashinyan.

According to the same survey, the proportion of citizens who perceive Russia as a threat increased by three percentage points — from 29% to 32% — compared to February. This rise coincided with the intensification of Russian threats and hybrid pressure. It is therefore reasonable to assume that roughly one-third of Armenia’s population is prepared to actively support efforts to resist Russian pressure, representing a potentially significant electoral resource for Pashinyan.

If credible polling is accurate, Pashinyan’s party will win the June 7 election, while the pro-Russian opposition will secure roughly 30% of parliamentary seats. Under Armenia’s constitution, one-third of parliament must consist of opposition forces, meaning that even opposition groups failing to cross the electoral threshold may ultimately gain representation.

Could these Russian-related risks evolve into post-election unrest?

It is unlikely that Russian sanctions will halt Armenia’s process of integration with the European Union. With support from Western partners, Yerevan is likely to receive assistance in mitigating the consequences of such measures. The Kremlin is also likely to lose in the political arena. Consequently, provoking unrest in Yerevan could theoretically be considered as a tool for regime change. The question is whether the Kremlin and Armenia’s pro-Russian political forces possess sufficient resources to pursue such a strategy.

Armenia’s political history demonstrates that citizens have taken to the streets to defend electoral rights when governments in power prior to 2018 manipulated presidential and parliamentary elections. By contrast, Pashinyan’s government is not visibly pursuing election fraud. There have been allegations regarding the use of administrative resources to bring citizens to campaign rallies, but even if proven, such actions would not necessarily amount to election falsification.

Therefore, large-scale unrest triggered by allegations of election fraud appears unlikely. Moreover, Armenia’s law enforcement institutions are operating quite effectively. Hardly a day passes without authorities releasing recordings or evidence of alleged attempts by supporters of Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia, or the Armenia Alliance to distribute vote-buying incentives or violate restrictions on charitable activities during the campaign. The decline in support for Karapetyan’s political force between February and May may partly be linked to the almost daily publication of alleged evidence concerning electoral violations. Searches have been conducted at regional offices of the main opposition force, dozens of individuals have been detained, and numerous others have been charged.

The opposition is not only unable to mobilise citizens over alleged electoral violations; it is itself accused of engaging in such practices. Consequently, the likelihood that the pro-Russian opposition could organise mass demonstrations demanding a halt to Armenia’s EU accession process — the very outcome Russia seeks — is low.

Supporters of EU membership outnumber opponents by at least three to one. According to the IRI survey, when respondents were asked, “If a referendum on Armenia’s accession to the European Union were held next Sunday, how would you vote?”, 52% said they would vote in favour, while only 13% said they would vote against. This suggests that the country’s pro-EU potential constitutes a stronger political resource for Pashinyan than for the opposition.

Furthermore, since the 2020 war, Armenia’s opposition has launched several major protest movements aimed at removing Pashinyan from power. Even Kocharyan, one of the initiators of these campaigns, has acknowledged that repeated unsuccessful protest efforts have “worn down” the opposition’s popularity. Opposition-minded segments of Armenian society have become disillusioned with ineffective street movements. This is reflected in the decline of the opposition’s combined vote share compared to the 2021 elections.

Nevertheless, Strong Armenia leader Karapetyan has explicitly stated that the opposition is prepared for street action and any other form of struggle. He declared: “I am not prepared for the status of opposition leader; we are going to take power.” His political force cites its own internal polling, claiming that it is poised to win the elections. However, polls published by political parties often face serious credibility concerns.

If this force loses in elections widely regarded as credible, attempting to seize power through unconstitutional means would not be a rational course of action, given that law enforcement institutions appear capable of managing risks associated with domestic unrest. Such movements would likely lack broad public support. Pashinyan’s government would possess legitimate grounds for preventing street violence. Indeed, unlawful behaviour by the opposition may even benefit the authorities, as it provides opportunities to weaken political rivals through legal mechanisms and damage their public standing.

The June 7 parliamentary elections have ceased to be merely a contest among domestic political actors. They have evolved into a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation and sovereignty. In our assessment, Russia’s hybrid pressure and economic coercion, intended to strengthen pro-Russian forces, are in fact producing the opposite effect by consolidating support for a Western-oriented course and the incumbent government. This is reflected both in the rise of support for Pashinyan’s party and in growing public backing for EU membership.

Absent extraordinary developments, the election results and the resilience of Armenia’s state institutions are likely to neutralise the risk of post-election turbulence and enable the country to continue what increasingly appears to be an irreversible path toward European integration and economic diversification.

Cities struggle to keep pace as war and climate define urban futures, WUF13 delegates warn

 By Jane Witherspoon & Toby Gregory and Euronews Baku bureau

Published on 19/05/2026 - 

Delegates at the World Urban Forum in Baku warned on day three that war and climate change are affecting cities faster than governments can respond, urging a shift away from standardised housing models.

War and climate change are reshaping cities faster than governments can rebuild them, delegates at the World Urban Forum in Azerbaijan's capital warned on Wednesday, as a Ukrainian official said his region alone had restored nearly 30,000 damaged or destroyed structures since Russia launched its full-scale invasion.

"When it comes to the Kyiv region, we have been leading the way in reconstruction," Mykola Kalashnik, head of the Kyiv Regional Administration, told Euronews in Baku.

"Thanks to our president, government, parliament, and international partners, we have managed to rebuild 80% of them. The total number of restored facilities now stands at 24,000."

Kalashnik said Azerbaijan had become a direct partner in that effort. "Azerbaijan is helping us rebuild the Kyiv region. Two projects have already been completed: a school in Irpin, as well as a hospital and a shelter, because our area is dangerous and we need safe underground spaces, which our partners helped us build."

Azerbaijan, with SOCAR among the partners, is involved in delivering a further four projects, he said, including a multi-unit residential building, an arts centre, a sports school for children and youth, and a social infrastructure project.

The cooperation extended beyond construction. Irpin, one of the most heavily damaged cities in the Kyiv region, has established a partnership with Lachin in Azerbaijan's Karabakh region — itself rebuilt after years of conflict. Kalashnik said 100 children from the Kyiv region would attend a health retreat in Azerbaijan this summer.

Climate change was the other dominant theme of the day. Dr Moges Tadesse, chief resilience officer for Addis Ababa, told Euronews the consequences for African cities were already severe.

"Climate change is a global challenge, but it doesn't affect only housing. It affects the economy, it affects also the human life, and it is very disastrous," he told Euronews, calling for greater international investment to help vulnerable countries absorb costs generated largely by wealthier nations.

“I think the global community should invest a lot in order to mitigate the impact of the climate change,” he said.

The demographic pressure arriving alongside the climate crisis is considerable, experts say.

Economist Jeffrey Sachs, president of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, warned delegates that "Africa will not be rural in 25 years."

Sub-Saharan Africa's urban population is forecast to double within a quarter-century, adding roughly 1 billion people to cities that are already struggling — a shift that will require massive investment in housing and jobs.

In Latin America, meanwhile, the dynamic is moving in the opposite direction: around 20% of households now consist of a single person, a figure that is changing the needs into a demand for smaller, more affordable urban units.

Related

• 'No society is immune' to housing crisis, UN chief warns at World Urban Forum in Baku
• World Urban Forum opens in Baku with warning on global housing divide

Saudi philanthropist Princess Lamia bint Majid Al Saud pushed back against uniform global housing models. "We don't have a one size fits all, because whatever suits in Saudi Arabia, it doesn't suit in India, it doesn't suit in Europe, it doesn't suit in America," she told Euronews, stating that cities needed to design communities around their own contexts rather than importing solutions developed elsewhere.

The European Union's own housing crisis drew sharp commentary from Matthew Robert Baldwin, the European Commission's deputy director-general leading its Affordable Housing Task Force. He noted that an estimated 20% of housing units across the 27-member bloc sit vacant while short-term rentals surge. "In all these overheated housing markets? That's a scandal," he said.

Baldwin said public investment alone would not be sufficient to address the shortfall.

"All the public money in the world would never be enough. We need to find a clever way to crowd in private finance, that patient and responsible capital not looking for a fast buck, to support affordable housing for everybody," he explained.

The task force has proposed an eight-point plan for improving affordable housing across the bloc.

He struck an optimistic note on the broader global picture, however. "There are many different arrows in our quiver, and for the first time, we've got housing as a priority issue," he said. "Let's take the bull by the horns and challenge it."

The discussions were organised around the launch of UN-Habitat's latest World Cities report, which found that nearly 3 billion people worldwide are affected by inadequate housing, unaffordable costs or lack of access to basic services, while more than 1.1 billion continue to live in slums and informal settlements.

The report said housing prices were rising faster than incomes across many regions, compounded by climate-related displacement and growing inequality.

"Housing problems in cities will increase even more by 2050," said Ben Arimah, head of UN-Habitat's Global Reports and Trends Unit. "Only 25% of the world's population can use mortgages to secure housing. This shows that the financial capacity of the majority of people is insufficient."

The forum continues in Baku through 22 May.

 

A call to stop the global housing crisis: World Urban Forum, why it matters?

By Nadira Tudor & Saida Rustamova

Published on 17/05/2026 - EURONEWS

More than 40,000 participants are set to gather in Baku for the UN's World Urban Forum as UN-Habitat warns that 3 billion people lack adequate housing and slum populations could triple by 2050.

At least 3 billion people do not have adequate homes, and over 1 billion are living in slums and informal settlements, according to UN-Habitat, which is calling for action in the midst of a "global crisis" in housing.

Most of those suffering reside in Asia and Africa, and the agency is urging decision-makers to recognise that without intervention as many as 3 billion could end up living in slum conditions by 2050 – a threefold jump.

To bring discussions and debates to the fore, more than 40,000 people from 182 countries are expected to gather in Azerbaijan's capital Baku for the 13th session of the World Urban Forum (WUF13), the United Nations’ leading global conference on sustainable urbanisation, to take place between 17 and 22 May.

The event, held every two years and organised by UN-Habitat, is now arguably one of the world’s most significant platforms for discussing the future of cities, housing and urban resilience. The theme this year is “Housing the world: Safe and resilient cities and communities.”

She noted that WUF13 matters because it offers a platform “where governments, mayors, urban planners, academia, businesses, civil society and communities can discuss and exchange practical solutions on how to build safer, more resilient and more inclusive cities.”

The scale of this crisis is increasingly viewed as an economic, political and environmental one, not only a humanitarian predicament.

Soave explained that the benefits for the host country lie in representing “far more than an international event.”

“It places the country at the centre of the global urban agenda at a time of rapid urban transformation and major investment in infrastructure, housing, connectivity, post-conflict reconstruction and territorial development," Soave said.

Why housing has become a global issue

The world reached a turning point in 2009, when urban dwellers made up the majority of the global population.

As a consequence, cities have been facing mounting pressure to better accommodate population growth, migration, climate change and rising living costs.

UN-Habitat has estimated that one in five households globally now spends more than 40% of its income on housing, while housing costs have quadrupled since 2010.

Its figures show that more than 300 million people are homeless worldwide, and over 100 million people are currently displaced by conflict, instability and climate-related crises.

In addition to the reasons mentioned, the COVID-19 pandemic has added to that pressure, reshaping national thinking around housing policy and once again joining the dots between public health, economic resilience and housing.

The UN has responded to these challenges by placing housing and urban development at the centre-stage of its sustainable development agenda – Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 focuses on making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.

Why Baku?

Azerbaijan has made significant efforts to promote urban redevelopment and infrastructure modernisation as a long-term strategy.

Hosting WUF13 represents an opportunity for it to engage and position itself within the broader international housing conversation on reconstruction, urban development and redevelopment and sustainability in the sector.

“Baku is a fitting host for WUF13, a city that embodies the opportunities and challenges faced by urban professionals around the world, such as rapid modernisation alongside heritage preservation, and innovation alongside cultural continuity,” said Dr Thomas Kovári, founding partner at the Swiss architecture and urban design company SA partners.

“What makes Azerbaijan particularly compelling is the wealth of experience it has to share. In the Karabakh region, for example, the country is developing genuine expertise in ‘building back better’ by combining sustainability, affordable housing and smart city principles in one of the world’s most ambitious reconstruction projects,” he added.

Kovári said the reconstruction efforts would be discussed during a dedicated WUF13 side event focused on post-conflict urban transformation and sustainable rebuilding models.

Speaking about the experience that Azerbaijan has gained in managing complex international operations and being chosen to host WUF13, CEO of the WUF13 Azerbaijan Operations Company Adil Mammadov said “it shows the level of trust placed in Azerbaijan by international partners such as UN-Habitat and highlights the country’s growing role as a regional hub for large-scale global gatherings."

“In other words, WUF13 brings legacy for future global-scale events that will take place in the country”, Mammadov added.

Solutions-based discussions

This year’s WUF is expected to focus on solutions through practical policy discussions on social housing, land rights, finance, and informal settlements. As cities continue to grow, urban policy is increasingly linked to wider debates around inequality, migration, governance and climate adaptation.

UN-Habitat said more than 41 million people have moved out of slum-like conditions through its programmes between 2020 and 2025, while millions more have gained access to clean water, safe public spaces and secure land tenure rights.

The organisation advocates what it describes as a “twin-track” approach: upgrading existing informal settlements while simultaneously expanding the supply of affordable housing.

Other priorities expected to dominate discussions in Baku include climate resilience, flood protection, digital urban planning, public transport integration and financing models for low-income households.

For many attending WUF13, the challenge facing governments is no longer simply how to build more homes, but how to create cities capable of remaining stable, inclusive and resilient in an era of mounting global pressure.

From Nairobi to Baku

Established by the UN General Assembly in 2001, alongside the creation of UN-Habitat, the World Urban Forum resides in a different city every two years.

The first forum took place in Nairobi in 2002 with around 1,200 participants.

Previous host cities have included Barcelona, Vancouver, Rio de Janeiro, Abu Dhabi, Katowice and Cairo.

Analysts say the focus on housing in 2026 reflects a growing recognition that access to affordable, safe housing is becoming central to long-term economic stability and social cohesion.

WUF13 in Baku is expected to become the largest edition of the forum to date.

Mass drone warfare is Europe’s rising security threat

Copyright Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

By Leticia Batista Cabanas & Elisabeth Heinz

Published on 14/04/2026 - EURONEWS

France has just announced an €8.5 billion investment to increase drone and missile stocks by 400 per cent before 2030. The move joins Germany’s decision to invest €10 billion in military drones and Poland’s recent “drone revolution” initiative.

Modern wars consume drones at a much higher rate than traditional ammunition. Ukraine uses approximately 9.000 drones per day, roughly 270.000 units monthly. Estimates suggest that Iran can produce approximately 400 Shahed drones per day, for a monthly capacity of up to 12.000 units.

This staggering churn is pushing the EU towards mass-scale industrial production, as existing drone stockpiles and manual manufacturing cannot keep pace with battlefield losses.

The bloc’s inability to scale production is creating a strategic dependency on external suppliers like the US or China, leaving its borders vulnerable to disposable, "cheap" warfare that the current industrial pace cannot sustain.

To counter this vulnerability, the EU has launched the 2026 European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI), to build a multi-layered, 360-degree shield of interoperable counter-drone systems by 2027.

Complementing the EDDI is the Drone Alliance with Ukraine, which leverages battlefield-tested expertise to co-produce millions of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Utmost strategic importance

Drones went from niche tools to key war instruments because of three advantages: low cost, constant surveillance, and precision strike capability.

In Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, both sides rely on drones for reconnaissance and targeting. Commercial quadcopters, which can cost just a few hundred euros, spot enemy positions and guide artillery in real time. This shortens the time between detection and destruction from hours to minutes. Larger systems, such as Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2, were used to destroy supply convoys and air defence systems early in the conflict, which set a new international war standard.

“Drones evolve technologically every three to six months. So, it's also challenging to buy millions of drones that will be obsolete in 12 months from now”, shared Nikolaus Lang, Global Leader at BCG Henderson Institute.

Drones are cheap to produce, but expensive to defend against. In traditional wars, destroying a target required expensive aircraft or missiles, until Ukraine showed that today, a cheap “kamikaze” drone can destroy equipment worth millions.

Russia used many Iranian Shahed drones, each relatively inexpensive, to strike Ukrainian infrastructure. But defending against them requires pricey air-defence missiles or fighter jets, which creates a strategic imbalance where the defender spends far more than the attacker.

“Europe needs cheaper and quicker solutions”, said Jamie Shea, former NATO official, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and Senior Advisor at the European Policy Centre in Brussels. “The EU uses very expensive means to neutralise drones. You've seen in Iran, where $3 million missiles are used to shoot down drones of just a couple of thousand dollars”, he said.

European drone investment over the last decade

Military analysts from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies describe drones as one of the most disruptive economic shifts in warfare in decades.

Drones also democratise air power. In earlier conflicts, only advanced dominated the air, but this changed during the Nagorno-Karabakh War as Azerbaijani forces used drones to systematically destroy Armenian tanks and artillery.

In the Gaza Strip, both state forces and non-state actors use modified commercial drones for surveillance and attacks. Now even relatively small or poorly equipped groups can carry out aerial operations, which lowers the barrier for effective military force.

Europe falls behind

For Europe, urgency stems from external threats and internal weaknesses. Drone incidents near critical infrastructure quadrupled between 2024 and 2025. In September, Copenhagen and Oslo closed airports after “several large drones” caused 109 cancellations and 51 reroutes. A month later, Munich Airport closed twice in 24 hours for the same reason.

The strategic concern is that the EU is not yet structured for a “drone-saturated” battlefield or security environment. Recent incidents forced costly responses: for example, in September of 2025, approximately 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, so NATO deployed F-35 fighter jets to neutralize the threat, which cost at least €1.2 million.

To avoid this, Shea explained that the EU should develop advanced sensor technology, including a 360-degree sensor aperture that shoots down malicious drones.

Ramping up production

The EU supplies less than 30 per cent of its own military drone needs. By comparison, China and Ukraine produce millions of units annually, while the US is scaling up to hundreds of thousands.

To address this, the Commission launched an industrial push to fundamentally restructure drone design, production, and deployment. The goal is scale: faster production cycles, higher volumes, and lower costs, because modern drone warfare is less about sophistication and more about quick, adaptable mass production.

Traditional European defence procurement is slow, often taking years from concept to deployment. This approach seeks to shorten timelines through modular designs, faster testing, and continuous upgrades, enabling rapid drone adaptation. So, the Commission introduced AGILE (fast-track funding), the EU Defence Innovation Scheme, and BraveTech EU.

Estimated percentage distribution of EU drone investments

Low-cost production is another pillar, with initiatives focused on affordability, scalability, and dual-use manufacturing. The EU is engaging civilian industries (e.g., automotive, electronics) and SMEs, which are more agile than large contractors and better suited to rapid prototyping and innovation. Funding tools will support efforts across member states.

Europe has massively levelled up its defence R&D investments, but it's still not enough, according to Lang. He pointed out that the “US invested more than $900 billion, Europe only $450 billion altogether”.

The EU will also rely on the Drone Alliance with Ukraine; a 2024 multinational military partnership created to secure Ukraine's UAV supply through constant deliveries of drones tailored to frontline requirements.

The Alliance allowed the EU to establish a network of factories for Ukrainian-designed drones on European soil. So European firms can bypass traditional bureaucracy by testing new prototypes on the front lines in weeks rather than years.

The alliance is boosted by billions from frozen Russian assets, specifically set to scale up production of low-cost autonomous systems. This collaboration wants to deliver over two million drones annually by 2030.

These initiatives should reduce dependence on non-European suppliers, alongside efforts to secure supply chains for critical drone components (like semiconductors, sensors, and communication systems) within EU borders and among trusted partners.

A key tool is the planned “EU trusted drone” label, to certify systems that meet security and reliability standards. It’s designed to guide procurement decisions, encourage the use of European-made technologies, and ultimately create a more self-sufficient and resilient drone ecosystem.

EU policy meets military drones

Russia’s violation of NATO airspace (37 times since 2022) and the war in Iran pushed the EU to start redefining its defence strategy, shifting from civil drone regulation to security measures and funding initiatives.

The Commission’s 2026 Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security addresses the use of drones in conflicts that target critical infrastructure, borders, and airspace. It targets the EU’s real-time detection capacities and develops a unified defence approach against malicious operations.

It also boosts member states’ industrial cooperation and drone markets to reduce dependence on non-EU suppliers. Investing in the small niche companies, where innovation lies, is key. “Europe needs to create greater risk, expand our venture capital market, and simplify procurement regulatory barriers”, Shea argued.

The roadmap focuses on four priorities: boosting resilience through industrial ramp-up, improving threat detection through stronger surveillance, responding and defending with a coordinated strategy, and strengthening the EU’s defence readiness.

Estimated annual drone production (EU versus Russia)

Detecting and tracking threats requires advanced AI-powered technological infrastructure. The Commission foresees accelerating technological development by using 5G networks to improve real-time threat detection.

The action plan is strong as “it identifies the problem and mobilises resources”, Shea said. Yet the EU needs to learn from Ukraine’s drone strategy: “Ukraine is doing 50 per cent of the work for us. It's developing the intelligence and offering to share sensitive data. It's also showing Europe how AI should be integrated into counter-drone technology”.

The EDDI is a key part of the action plan, and it acts as a shield for the bloc’s airspace. Through its multi-layered, interoperable system, the initiative detects, tracks and defends the EU from hybrid threats and drone incursions.

Running on AI-powered sensing and counter-drone technologies, the EDDI supports the Eastern Flank Watch, which is also part of the Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. It is an EU-NATO initiative to protect the EU's border with Russia and Belarus, using specialised counter-drone technologies and boosting air defence, surveillance, and rapid threat response while improving cooperation with NATO operations, such as Eastern Sentry and Baltic Air Policing.

Security and defence remain national

Though the EU is shifting towards scalable, networked, AI-driven, and mass-produced warfare equipment, defence and security remain national, meaning that member states have individual defence priorities and budgets. Fragmented national procurement practices, critical infrastructure protection, and different rules governing drone and counter-drone systems obstruct Europe’s new defence strategy.

Shea warned that Europe should establish a common legal framework so that all member states can develop and test drone technology equally.

“European states need to monitor the same airspace all the time, so that somebody in France is looking at the same air picture as somebody in Poland or Estonia”, he underlined.

Another issue? Fragmented national investments in drone innovation. “Some countries, like Denmark or Germany, have been much more upfront than others, also in forming joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers”, Shea said.

Likewise, 80 per cent of EU procurement is at national level. “We need many more of these initiatives to overcome the fragmentation of defence procurement”, warned Lang.

According to Shea, the EU should also eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to enable sensitive information sharing, such as drone threat intelligence and airspace monitoring, between member states.

“Drones are getting faster and sharing information is fundamental, but the EU needs to ensure safe security protocols to encourage countries to share data”.

 

Drone warfare: Europe’s new security threat

Copyright Euronews

By Evi Kiorri & Mert Can Yilmaz

Updated 16/04/2026 - 

Paris will quadruple its kamikaze drone arsenal by 2030, as the EU accelerates restocking efforts amid rapid advancements in drone technology. Watch the video

Ukraine forced a rewrite of Europe's defence. Drones costing a few hundred euros wiped out tanks worth millions. Iranian loitering munitions, piloted remotely and programmed to strike, broke through air defences. Missile reserves that seemed robust on paper evaporated in months.

France saw the warning signs up close. After launching air-defence missiles in the Gulf to counter Iranian drones, Paris discovered its own arsenal running critically low. In response, €8.5 billion is ringfenced for drones and missiles by 2030.

Under the Readiness 2030 plan, the European Drone Defence Initiative is deploying counter-drone systems, including electronic warfare, lasers, and mass interceptors, to neutralise low-cost threats without depleting expensive munitions.

A layered missile shield is under development to provide coverage across all ranges. MBDA has committed to increasing output by 40 percent this year. The EU's SAFE mechanism is co-financing production lines and joint procurement, with France eligible for €15 billion under the scheme.