To Penalize Iran, Azerbaijan Could Interdict its Caspian Sea Trade

Iranian-flagged cargo ship Caspian Shiva (Port of Makhachkala)

Published Mar 8, 2026 10:00 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

On March 6, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that ‘There will be no further attacks or missile launches towards neighbouring countries, unless attacks against Iran originate from those countries.  President Pezeshkian’s influence over the decentralised IRGC command structure which appears to running Iran’s war is unclear, but it should be noted that both the Armed Forces General Staff (separate from the IRGC) and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi have been denying that Iran has been attacking Gulf countries, despite ample evidence to the contrary, but indicative of the IRGC’s unwillingness to accept political coordination.

Whether Gulf countries accept Pezeshkian's implicit apology, notwithstanding the impact that the attacks will have on the GCC economic model in the long-term, is one matter. What may be even more challenging is whether Azerbaijan will accept Iran’s U-turn, after Iran launched an Arash-2 drone attack on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan International Airport, which caused damage to a terminal building and injured two civilians. Azerbaijan responded immediately by closing its land border with Iran, in advance of deciding what other retaliatory measures might be appropriate.

Iran and Azerbaijan have had a fraught relationship in recent years – friendly in a formal sense, but with barely-concealed bitterness beneath the surface. Iran treats Azerbaijan with some arrogance, as if it is within its sphere of influence and should obey orders. It occasionally threatens or issues Azerbaijan instructions, which are ignored, or makes policy announcements affecting both countries without coordination beforehand – as when Iran announced that road and rail routes to Russia were to be opened, without noting they would need to pass through Azeri territory. 

There have been two particular incidents – an attack in January 2023 on the Azeri Embassy in Tehran which killed a member of staff, and thwarted attempts to set up a Hezbollah-type organization in Azerbaijan. The Azeris suffer these insults stoically, borne of nationalist sentiment and confidence, particularly boosted since the successful war in 2023 to re-integrate Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh.  Nor has Azerbaijan sought to inflame tensions amongst the Azeri ethnic minority – Iran’s largest – in Northern Iran.

More generally, Iran is worried that Azerbaijan may impede its truck route through the Lachin Corridor in Armenia, and that Azerbaijan enjoys good relations with Israel – which is one reason why they won their war against Armenia.

Why should the maritime community have an interest in this Caucasian tale of intrigue and fraught relationships? Firstly, Azerbaijan may decide enough is enough, and actively support the Azeri separatist cause in Iran. This could be highly dangerous for Iran.

The other possibility is that Azerbaijan will extend the closure of its land borders with Iran to include the right of Iranian shipping to pass through Azeri territorial waters, disrupting Iran’s main means of transport with Russia – both for arms and ammunition, and other crisis-essentials which will soon run short in an Iran where maritime trade via the Gulf is at a standstill.

There has never hitherto been a major dispute interrupting good relations between the five countries bordering the Caspian Sea. But should Azerbaijan decide on this course of action, Israel might see an opportunity to take an active part in enforcing it. Ukraine as well would certainly like to interdict the flow of Iranian weaponry to Russia, as it has done previously. But Azerbaijan has means of its own to interrupt traffic. Its American and Turkish-trained navy has Osa-class missile boats, a modernized Petya-class corvette – and four Triton-class midget submarines. The air force has MiG 29s, attack helicopters and Israeli drones, which proved decisive in the 2023 war with Armenia. 

Collectively, Azeri force are more than a match for a depleted and otherwise preoccupied Iranian Northern Fleet.

Video: U.S. Forces Hit Iranian Drone Carrier

Debris cascades off the stern of IRIS Shahid Bagheri after a direct hit, March 5 (US Central Command)

Published Mar 5, 2026 9:14 PM by The Maritime Executive

U.S. forces have released new footage of a strike on one of Iran's "drone carriers," the converted merchant vessels that Iranian forces have rebuilt to launch ballistic missiles, suicide drones and other unmanned munitions. The vessel's appearance matches IRIS Shahid Bagheri, which U.S. Central Command previously claimed to have struck on the first day of the conflict.  

An accompanying statement by CENTCOM appears to confirm that an attack occurred on March 5. The footage released by U.S. Central Command shows that one of Iran's flat-deck conversions was hit twice - once amidships on the port side, and once again on the port quarter. The ship was hit Thursday and continued to burn as of Thursday night (EST), according to Central Command. 

The vessel can be identified as the Bagheri thanks to its ski-jump ramp, unique among Iran's drone-carrier fleet. Other comparable vessels in Iran's arsenal - IRIS Shahid Roudaki and IRIS Shahid Madhavi - have unmodified, conventional bows, limiting them to vertical takeoff and landing operations. Base ship IRIS Makran, a larger multipurpose vessel constructed on the hull of a tanker and fitted with a helideck, was hit in the deckhouse in a previous round of strikes. 

Adm. Brad Cooper, commanding officer of Central Command, said Thursday that the U.S. has now eliminated more than 30 Iranian warships. The tally includes IRIS Dena, the frigate torpedoed by a U.S. Navy attack submarine off the coast of Sri Lanka earlier this week. 

Iran Claims to Strike Tanker for Running Strait of Hormuz Blockade

NASA file image

Published Mar 8, 2026 1:43 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

On Saturday morning, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have struck an oil tanker for failing to abide by Iran's "closure" of the Strait of Hormuz. 

Iran declared the strait to be shut more than a week ago, and has repeatedly attacked vessels that attempt to operate it, including one boxship and one rescue tug. Eight seafarers aboard the tug may have lost their lives, though the outcome of the attack has not been confirmed. 

Industry sources confirm that a small number of tankers continue to continue to transit the strait with transponders off, though the waterway looks entirely empty on AIS tracking. War risk insurance is available, if exceptionally expensive, and day rates for tankers are high enough for some owners to justify the risk to their crewmembers and their tonnage. 

That risk appeared to be confirmed Friday when the IRGC Navy claimed to have used a drone to attack the tanker Prima, "due to its disregard for repeated warnings . . . regarding the prohibition of passage." Other IRGC-linked sources have identified the target vessel as the Louis P, a product tanker currently located near Al Jubail. 

The attack has not been confirmed by official sources, but at about the same time, UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported a drone strike on an unnamed vessel at a position about 10 nautical miles to the north of Jubail, Saudi Arabia. The majority of the crew was safely evacuated, and a small number of personnel remain on board. An investigation into the circumstances of the attack is under way. 

The U.S. Maritime Administration has advised vessels to "keep clear" of the strait for now, given the hazard. Most other industry and government bodies have given a less stringent advisory, recommending that owners should make a thorough risk assessment and take appropriate precautions. 

Salvage Tug Reported Attacked Near Straits of Hormuz with Crew Feared Dead

Tug was reported heading to the disable containership Safeen Prestige (Oman News Agency)

Published Mar 6, 2026 11:24 AM by The Maritime Executive

A salvage tug sent to aid one of the vessels that had been attacked in the area around the Straits of Hormuz has apparently been attacked as well. At least several of the crewmembers from the tug were feared killed in a missile attack.

UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said it received a report from a third party of an apparent attack on a tug six nautical miles to the north of Oman. They reported the incident was being investigated.

The tug is being identified by multiple security consultants as the UAE-flagged Mussafah 2. Built in 2012, it is reported to be 134 gross tons with a length of 26 meters (85 feet). The vessel’s AIS has been dark since departing the Mina Zayed port in the United Arab Emirates yesterday.

The tug was believed to be heading to the disabled UAE-controlled containership Safeen Prestige. The vessel was struck on Wednesday and reported an engine room fire while off the coast of Oman.

Vanguard Tech is reporting that the tug was struck by two missiles today while approximately 18 nautical miles from Khasab, Oman. The report says there were eight crew aboard the tug and they are feared killed in the attack. Later in the day, the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization, Arsenio Dominguez, issued a statement that said that "at least four seafarers have reportedly lost their lives and three severely injured," without providing details on the incident. Dominguez called the situation "unacceptable and unsustainable," while noting that "Around 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Persian Gulf, onboard ships under heightened risk and considerable mental strain."

There is no official confirmation or statement from the Oman News Agency regarding the incident. On Wednesday, it confirmed that the Omani navy had organized the evacuation of the crew from the Safeen Prestige.

Reports indicate that the tug was also owned by AD Ports, which owns the containership. Dubai has been one of the areas heavily attacked by the Iranians in their revenge efforts in the Gulf.

This was one of several salvage efforts believed to be underway after the Iranians had struck approximately 10 large commercial ships in the Gulf region. VShips, which managed the product tanker MKD Vyom that was attacked earlier in the week, also reported that a salvage tug had been sent to the vessel. It said the tug assisted in putting out the fires, and efforts were underway to move the vessel to a port of refuge. 

Iran's Azeris fear ethnic strife, sucking Turkey and Azerbaijan into the war


With ethnic brethren in northern Iran and a US outreach to Iran’s Kurds following the launch of Operation Epic Fury, Turkey and Azerbaijan are at risk of being drawn into the war. For Iran’s Azeris, the largest minority group in a multi-ethnic country, it could mean trouble as ethnic fault lines threaten to rip apart the South Caucasus region.


Issued on: 06/03/2026 

FRANCE24
By: Leela JACINTO

FIle photo of the Armenian Monastery of Saint Stepanos in Jolfa, northern Iran near the Azerbaijani border taken on September 18, 2025. © Atta Kenare, AFP

Over the past few months, Ehsan Hosseinzadeh, like many Iranians in the diaspora, had come to believe a foreign military intervention was necessary to help his people oust an Islamic regime that was oppressing and massacring innocent civilians. But a week after Israel and the US launched a war in his home country, the 38-year-old refugee in France is worried about the conflict dragging in regional powers – to the detriment of Iran and its citizens.

Hosseinzadeh has every reason to fear a conflagration erupting along ethnic, religious and civilizational fault lines that could rip open the wounds of history in an ancient land.

Born in Urmia – a city in the northwestern extremity of Iran that shares borders with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iraq – Hosseinzadeh understands a thing or two about the explosive mix of identity and grievance.

An ethnic Azeri (also called Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani-Turkish in Iran) Hosseinzadeh belongs to the largest minority community, constituting around 24% of Iran’s 93 million population. His birthplace is also home to a significant Kurdish population, as well as Armenians and other minorities that have lived in lands where the borders of empires and republics have shifted with the times. The tangle of history can sometimes make the region a diplomatic tripwire for political leaders.

So, on Thursday, when Azerbaijan accused Iran of a drone attack on its territory that injured four civilians and vowed to retaliate, Hosseinzadeh was on high alert. The drone hit an airport building in Nakhchivan, a landlocked exclave of ⁠Azerbaijan bordering Iran, Turkey and Armenia. It was an ominous development.

READ MOREAzerbaijan's Aliyev vows retaliation after 'terrorist' drone strike blamed on Iran

“You can see the tension is increasing. And there’s also the ethnicity factor. I’m not sure, but I can predict that if an ethnic conflict arises in that region between Turkish people and Kurdish people, both Baku and Ankara will have a tendency to intervene, to play their cards there,” he said, referring to the Azeris, a Turkic people, as “Turkish people” in a telling sign of the complex linguistic-identity mix in the region.

Turkey – which shares a nearly 500-kilometre border with Iran that was drawn in 1639, making it the oldest continuously managed frontier in the Middle East – is at high risk in a regional conflagration. A shared border, an ethnic group straddling a frontier, infrastructure and business interests on either side – all could see Turkey facing refugee and economic crises.

On Wednesday, a ballistic missile launched from Iran and heading towards Turkish airspace was destroyed by NATO air defence systems. Turkey, NATO’s only Muslim-majority member, is home to the Incirlik base, which is believed to have US nuclear weapons. The next day, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a televised speech, warned that the Iran war had taken tensions in the region to a "terrifying level".
‘Ankara's nightmare scenario’

Turkey and Iran have a long history of rivalry, competition and have at times supported opposing proxies, especially in Syria and Iraq. But bilateral relations between Ankara and Tehran have held firm, based on mutual economic interests and domestic imperatives to contain the Kurds. Like Turkey, Iran also has an oppressed Kurdish minority comprising around 10 to 17% of the population living in areas also inhabited by Azeris.

But after Operation Epic Fury exposed the Trump administration’s epic failure to calculate the fallout of the war, Washington made a high-profile outreach to Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in the Iraqi semi-autonomous zone. The Kurds, who have a long experience of being “hung out to dry” by Washington, have so far not bitten the US bait. But they are aware that President Donald Trump has provided them a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in their historic resistance to regimes in Tehran.

If that opportunity is seized, it could draw Turkey into the Iran war, experts warn. “Turkey is in a bind,” explained Guney Yildiz, senior adviser on geopolitics and strategic insights at the Anthesis-Wallbrook Group. “It just resolved its own 40-year Kurdish war,” he explained, referring to the decision last year by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disband, disarm and engage in a peace process. “And now a CIA-backed Kurdish uprising is emerging on its eastern border involving the PJAK [Kurdistan Free Life Party], which is linked to the PKK network. That's Ankara's nightmare scenario.”

In the weeks before the launch of the Iran war, as Trump’s US military “armada” was deploying to the region, Turkey engaged in a frantic diplomatic effort to avert a conflict. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reached out to the US, Iran, Oman and other Gulf countries, as well as Turkey’s other Western allies, in a bid to explain the high-stakes fallout of a conflict for Ankara. The effort failed.

The US making an outreach to the Kurds, Ankara has been put on alert, explained Shukriya Bradost, a Middle East security expert and doctoral researcher at Virginia Tech's School of Public and International Affairs. “Erdogan is going to be watching this closely. He obviously does not want a Kurdistan in Iran,” similar to the Kurdish semi-autonomous zone in Iraq, Bradost explained. “He could obviously reach out to the [Iranian] Azeris and he's very close to Baku as well,” she added.

Transit corridors, pipelines, competition and cooperation

Turkey and Azerbaijan share close ties rooted in common linguistic and cultural foundations that have deepened with economic and military cooperation.

During the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, Turkish drones and military advisers were critical in handing Baku a victory. Iran, a country that has cordial relations and an open border with Armenia, has traditionally used its relations with Yerevan to contain Azerbaijani-Turkish ambitions in the South Caucasus region. But with Armenia defeat, Tehran emerged from the conflict diplomatically weakened.

Meanwhile, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been patching up ties after the 2020 war. A recent agreement between the two countries for a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave – called the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” – has further sidelined Iran in the region.

The economic stakes in Iran’s northwestern region are also high for Turkey, which receives more than 15% of its natural gas from Iran through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline.

But the US-Israeli war on Iran threatens to rattle the intricate web of interests and critical economic corridors that maintain stability in the South Caucasus region.

If Azerbaijan, emboldened by its ally Turkey, attempts to mobilise Iranian Azeris, it could touch a particularly sensitive ethnic fault line in northwestern Iran, experts warn. “The risk is that Iran's western provinces become a proxy space where Turkey backs Azeris and the US backs Kurds, which fragments the Iranian opposition further at exactly the moment it needs cohesion,” said Yildiz.

Hopes fading – but not completely

Iran’s West Azerbaijan province – of which Urmia is the capital – has long been home to a mixed population of mainly Shiite Azeris and Sunni Kurds.

The Azeris, the Turkic group that produced the Safavid and Qajar dynasties before the Pahlavi dynasty came to power, were an influential group that was integrated with Iran’s majority Persians. Their fortunes dipped with the Pahlavis, a regime reviled by ethnic minorities as Persian supremacists.

With the 1979 revolution and takeover of the Islamic regime, the Azeris were back in the national mainstream. Under the Shiite Islamic regime in Tehran, the Azeris are a highly integrated ethnic group in Iranian society. The late supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was Azeri, and the community is regarded as the Shiite brethren of Iran’s majority ethnic Persians, who make up more than 50% of the population. “They have international support from neighbouring Turkey and Azerbaijan, and inside Iran, they’re powerful too, because they've been part of the system – the political, economic and security structures,” explained Bradost.

The Kurds, in comparison, have fared poorly under the Shiite authorities. But they are the most mobilized ethnic group in Iran, with many Kurdish parties having armed groups based in neighbouring Iraq.

A collapse of central authority could ignite an ethnic tinderbox between the two communities who have historic territorial disputes.

For Hosseinzadeh, who has family in the region, it’s a nightmare scenario. “I'm very worried about a very big ethnic conflict there, because there is, as I understand it, little or no dialogue between the two ethnic groups. And there are very extreme people on both sides. In the Kurdish camp, there are people who say the whole Azerbaijan [region of Iran] is our territory and this is part of Kurdistan. And there are also people in Azerbaijani [or Iranian Azeri] camp saying that we have to join Azerbaijan or Turkey,” explained Hosseinzadeh.

For nearly half-a-century, the Islamic regime in Tehran maintained that it was the only guarantor of stability in the country. Hosseinzadeh, an Iranian lawyer and fervent defender of democratic rights, is at pains to note that he is not echoing Islamic regime propaganda. “The regime warns people of chaos. They say if the regime falls, we will fall. I'm not repeating that perspective,” he stressed. “The Islamist regime has to go. We’ve had 47 years of it, that’s enough. But there are very big and serious concerns in Iran and we have to be careful of those rising conflicts.”

After years of championing human rights and hoping for foreign help to make his vision for Iran come true, Hosseinzadeh today sounds anxious after sleepless days trying to reach his loved ones back home and following the news. “My wish was, and is...but it's getting a bit pale,” he trails with worry and exhaustion before starting again. “My wish was bringing democracy, a federal democratic government based on human rights for all the people of Iran – not for the supremacy of the Persian people, for all ethnicities,” he emphasises. “And now we’re getting far from that, with the danger with bombardment, ethnic conflict, foreign actors…it's pity and it's worrying. But let's see what will happen in the future.”

HUBRIS

With Iran war, US goes it alone like never before

Washington (United States) (AFP) – When the United States fought the 1991 Gulf War, president George H.W. Bush boasted of building a broad coalition unseen in decades. When his son attacked Iraq in 2003, he faced wide criticism but secured several steadfast US allies.


Issued on: 05/03/2026 - FRANCE24

Demonstrators against the war in Iran trample on a portrait of US President Donald Trump during a protest as they march toward the US embassy in Baghdad © AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP

Now, a generation later, President Donald Trump has attacked Iran, and he is barely even trying to make friends.

Trump launched the war alongside Israel, which had long pressed the United States to strike Iran's ruling clerics.

Trump's strategy toward other countries has been focused on intensely pressuring them to cooperate and loudly complaining when they say no.

Trump berated crucial ally Britain as "very, very uncooperative" and said of Prime Minister Keir Starmer: "This is not Winston Churchill we're dealing with."

The center-left prime minister had restricted US warplanes to using two British bases and only for "defensive" purposes, saying he did not believe in "regime change from the skies."

Trump threatened to cut off all trade with Spain after left-wing Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez refused to let US forces use bases.

The United States and Israel made no pretense of going through the United Nations before launching the war that quickly killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader.

"It essentially sends the message to the world that Trump's United States sees itself above the law and doesn't even think it needs to claim otherwise," said Kristina Kausch, a deputy managing director at the German Marshall Fund.

She said the war only reinforced European perceptions of Trump, who has stunned the continent by threatening to seize Greenland from NATO ally Denmark.

"The degree to which there is US isolation or loss of soft power will depend on how disastrous the consequences of this decision," she said of the Iran attack.

Refocusing on nation-state

Trump has withdrawn the United States from numerous international bodies, vowing to go it alone in an "America First" foreign policy and to re-emphasize the centrality of the nation-state.

Nadia Schadlow, who was deputy national security advisor in Trump's first term, said the war showed how countries cannot rely on the United Nations when they believe security interests are at stake.

A plume of smoke rises after a strike on Tehran © ATTA KENARE / AFP


"I believe that the UN has value for collaboration, for discussion, for debate. But I don't believe it can prevent wars, especially when one country is determined, and feels that it must act in the interests of its national security," said Schadlow, now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

"It seems that the decision-makers made a determination that security and surprise were critical and were more important than consultation."

Rare unambiguous statements of support for the war came from the right-wing leaders of Argentina and Paraguay as well as from Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, which has fought alongside the US in every major war.

Albanese backed action "to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon." Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney voiced similar support, although he soon called for de-escalation.

French President Emmanuel Macron opposed the attack as running counter to international law, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz voiced hope for an end to the Islamic republic while hoping the war will be short.

Washington has shown little interest in sensitivities of friendly countries.

The United States torpedoed an Iranian warship that had just paid a goodwill visit to India, a frequent US partner, killing at least 84 sailors off Sri Lanka, after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vowed to reject "stupid rules of engagement."

Strategic benefit for China?

Iran, like Venezuela where Trump removed the president in January, had a privileged relationship with both Russia and China -- which were unwilling or unable to defend their allies against US firepower.

China has also relied on the two countries for oil, although it had reduced its dependence.

But the war could also benefit China. US forces are rapidly using up bombs, missiles and other resources that could be used in a theoretical defense of Taiwan, which Beijing claims, and Beijing is able to observe US war operations in Iran, said Jacob Stokes, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Chinese strategists had described the first two decades of the century as a time of opportunity with the United States preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, Stokes said.

"There is this potential for a grand strategic benefit, as Beijing is quite happy to see the United States get bogged down in the Middle East again," he added.

© 2026 AFP

Trump Says US To Play Role In Choosing Iran’s Next Leader As Conflict Widens

March 6, 2026 
By RFE RL


President Donald Trump said Washington will help choose the next leader of Iran as US and Israeli forces continued air strikes amid growing concerns of a broader conflict after drones launched from Iran struck Azerbaijan and Israel pushed into southern Lebanon.

With the United States and Israel currently engaged in a sixth day of war against Iran, the number of countries in the region to suffer Tehran’s retaliatory strikes, which have targeted both military and civilian infrastructure, grew again on March 5.

Trump, speaking to Reuters in a phone interview, said he wants to be involved in choosing Iran’s next leader, while ruling out Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – a hardliner who has been considered a favorite to succeed his father.

“We want to be involved in the process of choosing the person who is going to ⁠lead Iran into the future,” he was quoted by the agency as saying.

“We don’t have to go back every five years and do this again and again…Somebody that’s going to be great for the people, great for the country.”

The supreme leader was killed last weekend in air strikes as US and Israeli military operations pummeled the country.

Since then, a steady barrage of strikes have decimated Iran’s military, communications infrastructure, and other key facilities across the country.

Iran has retaliated with attacks on US military bases across the Middle East, dragging Arab Gulf states — and others such as Turkey and Azerbaijan — onto the frontlines of a war they have long tried to avoid.

Iran’s neighbor Azerbaijan, which has longstanding ties with Israel, reported attacks launched from Iranian territory on March 5.

Two people were injured after drones have struck Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan autonomous region, with one damaging the region’s airport and a second landing near a school, according to Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry.

President Ilham Aliyev said that “Iran committed an act of terror against the territory of Azerbaijan, against the state of Azerbaijan” with the attack, while the Foreign Ministry said Baku “reserves the right to respond.”

Later in the day, Iran’s Foreign Ministry denied that the country had targeted Azerbaijan.

Millions of ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Iran. Azerbaijan is also one of the main oil suppliers to Israel, while Israel has been a key defense partner for Baku for years.

Many in Azerbaijan see Israel’s military supplies as critical during country’s campaign to regain control of the Karabakh region from Armenia.

A day earlier, a ballistic missile launched from Iran was heading toward Turkish airspace and was intercepted by NATO air defense systems, according to Turkish officials.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte condemned Iran but said the incident does not provide immediate reason to trigger the alliance’s mutual defense clause, Article 5.

“The most important thing is that our adversaries have seen yesterday that NATO is so strong and ⁠so vigilant, and even ‌more vigilant, if possible, since Saturday,” Rutte said on March 5, referring to when the US-Israeli strikes began on February 28.

Earlier, a State Department spokesman said US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had spoken with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to discuss recent developments and had pledged “full support” for the NATO ally.

Ukraine To Provide Expertise Against Iran’s Drones

As air travel disruptions continued across the Middle East with Iran firing missiles and drones against Israel and other regional countries, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his offers to provide support in countering Tehran’s Shahed drones were accepted.


“We received a request from the United States for specific support in protection against Shaheds in the Middle East region,” Zelenskyy said on his social media on March 5.

Tehran has long been an ally of Russia, supplying it with military equipment and technology and fueling Moscow’s war effort against Ukraine. Zelenskyy said earlier that Russia’s military had used at least 57,000 Shahed drones in attacks on his country, including against its civilian and energy infrastructure.

Now, the Ukrainian president said Kyiv will help its partners with expertise: “I gave instructions to provide the necessary means and ensure the presence of Ukrainian specialists who can guarantee the required security.”

Ukraine, which has just entered the fifth year of repelling Russia’s full-scale invasion, has been suggesting to share its experience in defending against Iranian-made drones since the first Iranian attacks across the Gulf.

Asked on the matter, US President Donald Trump, who has previously criticized some of the European leaders for failing to provide enough support for US military actions said he’ll take “any assistance from ‌any country.”

Trump: US Holds ‘Strong Position’

Trump on March 4 vowed that there would be no let up with the joint air campaign that has killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other security, military, and political leaders.

He added that Tehran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles was being “wiped out rapidly.”

Trump has said he ordered the attack on Iran to prevent the country from developing a nuclear weapon but has also said he wanted Tehran to cease its ballistic missile program and to end violence against anti-government protesters, thousands of whom were killed in a brutal crackdown in recent weeks.

Seeking to counter concerns of American ‘”boots on the ground” in the war, the White House on March 4 said deployment of US ground troops in Iran is “not part of the plan for this operation at this time.”

Instead, Trump backed the Kurds in launching their own offensive, saying he thinks it’s “wonderful that they want to do that.” Asked by Reuters if the United States would offer air cover for such an operation, Trump refused to answer.

Earlier in the week, sources told Axios that the president spoke with Kurdish leaders, who sought consultation on whether and how to attack Tehran’s security forces.
Netanyahu Claims ‘Historic Gains’

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said the two allies had made “historic gains” in their war against Iran, which is in its sixth day.

“Israel and the United States have together made historic gains to protect our citizens and the civilized world,” government spokeswoman Shosh Bedrosian said in a video message.


As Bedrosian also claimed the attack on Iran was necessary as Tehran was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program in “new underground bunkers” and that there were signs it planned “to attack Israel and US forces in the region,” without providing details.

Separately, Israel stepped up its attacks on strongholds of Iran-allied Hezbollah forces in Lebanon after the group launched missiles into northern Israel. According to Israeli military, Tel Aviv’s goal was to create “a buffer…between our residents and any threat,”

French President Emmanuel Macron on March 4 said he urged Netanyahu to refrain from launching a ground offensive in Lebanon.

“I reiterated the necessity for Hezbollah to immediately cease its attacks on Israel and beyond. This escalatory strategy is a grave mistake that puts the entire region at risk,” Macron wrote on X.

“I also called on the Israeli Prime Minister to preserve the integrity of Lebanese territory and to refrain from launching a ground offensive. It is crucial for the parties to return to the ceasefire agreement,” Macron added.

Reports indicate that Israeli ground forces have already crossed the border into Lebanon, although details remain unclear.

On March 5, Israeli military warned residents in Beirut’s southern suburbs to evacuate immediately. “Save your lives and evacuate your residences immediately,” Israel’s military forces spokesman Avichay Adraee said on X. 

With reporting by RFE/RL’s Radio Farda, RFE/RL correspondent Alex Raufoglu in Washington

RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.

Middle East Conflict: Who Benefits? – Interview

March 6, 2026
By Gateway House


The conflict in West Asia is already having global reverberations. The firepower on display on all sides is formidable, increasing casualties and limiting travel, expatriate mobility and trade. The takedown of refineries and energy assets will severely impact the global energy flows. Prices of crude oil and natural gas have already increased as energy flows through the Straits of Hormuz have been affected. Countries across the world are watching nervously. Our experts, Security Fellow Lt. General Narasimhan and Energy Fellow Amit Bhandari, discuss the ongoing West Asian conflict, how it will pan out, and its implications for India.


Q: How will the conflict evolve from this point? How long is it likely to last?

A: This conflict was a long time coming. First, the U.S. and Israel went after Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025, but it was clear that Iran had moved its nuclear infrastructure somewhere safe, and the attacks did not actually achieve what they had sought to. Second, there were already negotiations going on with Iran to sort out the issues of its nuclear programme – and no progress was made even in the last meeting, which was at the end of February. For the U.S. and Israel, it seems to have tilted the balance in favour of launching an offensive. But clearly the U.S. has been preparing for this conflict for almost two or three months now. This is visible by the fact that almost 50% of deployable fighter aircraft have been moved to this theatre, along with aircraft carrier groups and a number of other ships. So the conflict was expected.

Now that it has begun, what happens next? Iran has approximately 2,000 to 2,500 missiles – they have launched only a few so far, 70-100 missiles at the six or seven Gulf countries, which can beat the air defence of that country.

The initial U.S.-Israel attack has wiped out Iran’s leadership – but they had planned for this, and the plans have been implemented. In this case, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) gets split into 31 autonomous units – one for Tehran and the other 30 for each of the provinces. Each of these units can make their own decisions, pick their own targets and do what they have to do. This mosaic defence plan has multiple parts to it, including decentralised decision-making. In case of an attack on Iran, they are to adopt defence in depth, meaning layered defences.


The third part is survivability over winning. Finally, they will also go into asymmetric or guerrilla warfare in case of an invasion by the U.S. and Israel – something that has happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their objective is to cause as much damage as they can to the U.S. and Israel.

If the conflict stops at missiles and aerial bombing, it should end within a week or two. But if it goes into an invasion and asymmetric guerrilla warfare situation, there is no limit to how long it can go on for.

Q: Iran has used drones and missiles on a large scale in the conflict so far. Are there any lessons for India from this conflict, especially given our own experience during Operation Sindoor last year? Also, how is the evolution of armed conflicts in the drone era, as witnessed in the past three or four conflicts?

A: The large-scale use of drones started during the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict. It was then used in Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza, India-Pakistan, and now this West Asia war.

Q: What are the wider geopolitical implications of the conflict, especially for China and Russia? Are there any beneficiaries of this conflict?


A: The first beneficiary of this conflict is of course, Israel. The White House did not expect any kind of a threat from Iran over the next decade. If Iran gets weakened in some form, the first beneficiary is Israel. Second, the U.S. can always boast about regime change and having caused them damage. But they will not be able to take out Iran’s nuclear deterrent.

For China, Iran is a source of oil – China kept importing oil from Iran even during the sanctions period. Chinese ships would switch off their transponders while loading up on Iranian oil in the Gulf. They may have to source this oil from other areas such as Russia. So far, China has made just anodyne statements about a need to end violence.

China will just sit this conflict out, because in any case, either the U.S., Israel, or Iran will be weakened – China will benefit from any or all of this.

India, too, has made anodyne statements. While India seems to have picked a side in the conflict, there hasn’t been any physical support. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Israel just before the conflict began. There is a parallel to that – Russia’s President Putin went to China at the start of the Winter Olympics in February 2022 before the Ukraine conflict began.

Q: What has been the impact of this conflict on the energy space?

A: The perception in the energy markets is that this will be a short conflict, which may be over in two or four weeks. We know that 20% of the global oil supply passes through the Straits of Hormuz, and traffic has reduced considerably in the past few days. Hypothetically, if the traffic were to stop for two or four weeks, or longer, there would be widespread panic in the energy markets. That hasn’t happened – the price for Brent is still $78-79/barrel. If there is a serious concern about the stoppage of traffic in the straits, the price would be far higher.

Iran has started to target a number of energy installations – a Saudi refinery, a Kuwaiti refinery, and a UAE oil platform. The attacks on oil infrastructure are partly an attempt to create panic amongst other countries. Oil buyers don’t worry about where they import oil from – West Asia or somewhere else. If the price of oil goes up, it goes up for everyone. So it may be an attempt to induce a larger panic in the global community so that some kind of a negotiated settlement or off-ramp could be created.

Finally, Russia is going to be one of the beneficiaries of the conflict, as it is the second-largest exporter of oil in the world. At this point in time, when there is a concern around a large source of supply, the world economy cannot have another big supplier being pushed out of the marketplace completely.

About the author:

Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.

Amit Bhandari is the Senior Fellow on Energy, Investment and Connectivity.

Source: This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.


Gateway House

Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations is a foreign policy think-tank established in 2009, to engage India’s leading corporations and individuals in debate and scholarship on India’s foreign policy and its role in global affairs. Gateway House’s studies programme will be at the heart of the institute’s scholarship, with original research by global and local scholars in Geo-economics, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy analysis, Bilateral relations, Democracy and nation-building, National security, ethnic conflict and terrorism, Science, technology and innovation, and Energy and Environment.

How Europeans closed ranks to defend Greenland against Trump

Copyright Omar Havana/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved.

By Jorge Liboreiro

Published on 24/01/2026  EURONEWS

Donald Trump's shock threat to impose tariffs to seize Greenland prompted a frantic race against the clock to avert the collapse of the transatlantic alliance. Here's how Europeans came together to save it.

Though bruised and battered, the bond between Europe and the United States that has endured 80 uninterrupted years lives to see another day.

That was the message that visibly relieved European leaders conveyed at the end of an extraordinary week that brought the two sides of the Atlantic dangerously close to an all-out, calamitous trade war over the future of Greenland.

For a total of five days, Donald Trump kept the continent on tenterhooks with his shock threat to impose an additional 10% tariff on eight European countries, all NATO members, in an attempt to strong-arm the acquisition of the mineral-rich, semi-autonomous island that belongs to the Kingdom of Denmark.

"This Tariff will be due and payable until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland," Trump wrote in his now-infamous message.

The outrage was deafening. Presidents and prime ministers came forth in unison to support Denmark's sovereignty and denounce what they saw as blatant blackmail from a president intent on reshaping the global order according to his own vision.

"No intimidation nor threat will influence us," said French President Emmanuel Macron.

What followed that first wave of condemnations was a frantic race against the clock to convince Trump to abandon his annexationist agenda and salvage the transatlantic relationship – and to prepare to hit back should the worst come to pass.

EU ambassadors met on Sunday, the day after Trump's social media message, to begin preparations for 1 February, the day on which the 10% tariffs were due to take effect.

France took the lead by publicly calling for the activation of the Anti-Coercion Instrument, which would allow broad retaliation across multiple economic sectors. Originally designed with China in mind, the instrument has never been used – not even during last year's trade negotiations with the White House, when Trump continuously upped the ante to browbeat Europeans into wide-ranging concessions.

Donald Trump. Laurent Gillieron/ KEYSTONE / LAURENT GILLIERON

Back then, member states had been sharply split on how to respond, with France and Spain advocating an offensive, and Italy and Germany urging a compromise. But this time, it was different – drastically so.

Trump was no longer applying tariffs to rebalance trade flows and boost domestic manufacturing, the reasons he had cited on his "Liberation Day" in spring 2025. This time, he was seeking to apply tariffs to seize territory from an ally.

"Plunging us into a dangerous downward spiral would only aid the very adversaries we are both so committed to keeping out of our strategic landscape," Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, said in a speech in Davos. "So our response will be unflinching, united and proportional."

The unprecedented dimension of the challenge weighed heavily on capitals, which swiftly came to terms with the prospect of actual retaliation. It was a stark contrast from the political divisions and reservations that plagued the 2025 talks.

Diplomats in Brussels spoke of a collective determination to endure economic pain for the sake of defending Greenland, Denmark and the sovereignty of the entire bloc. A detailed list of tit-for-tat measures worth €93 billion was put on the table to be introduced as soon as Trump's additional duties entered into force.

In parallel, the European Parliament, enraged by Trump's ultimatum, voted to indefinitely delay the ratification of the EU-US trade deal, blocking the zero-tariff benefits for American-made products that von der Leyen and Trump agreed on in July.

Push and pull

And yet, as European leaders closed ranks and pushed back against Trump's expansionism, they also made it clear to everyone who was listening that diplomacy was their preferred option to keep the transatlantic alliance alive.

"We want to avoid any escalation in this dispute if at all possible," said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. "We simply want to try to resolve this problem together."

Europeans began searching for an "off-ramp", as Finnish President Alexander Stubb aptly put it, to prevent a full-blown clash, safeguard Greenland and let Trump score a victory of sorts. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni suggested that Trump might have misunderstood the purpose of the reconnaissance mission sent to the island, which he cited in his social post as justification for threatening the 10% tariff.

At first, the diplomatic overtures fell flat. Von der Leyen and Merz attempted to meet Trump in Davos, but despite rampant speculation, the bilaterals never took place. Meanwhile, Trump leaked a text message from Macron in which the French leader told him, "I do not understand what you are doing on Greenland"

The text, confirmed as authentic by a source in the French president's entourage, also pitched a G7 summit with "the Russians in the margins", a proposal that immediately raised eyebrows given Europe's common strategy to isolate the Kremlin internationally.

As tensions rose ever higher, Trump took the stage at the World Economic Forum and doubled down on his desire to take over Greenland, which he at times referred to as "Iceland".

"We want a piece of ice for world protection, and they (Europeans) won't give it," he told the packed room in Davos. "They have a choice: you can say 'yes' and we'll be very appreciative, and you can say 'no' and we will remember."

Yet Trump also said he did not want to use military force to accomplish his territorial designs, something which he had previously refused to rule out. The Europeans quickly caught on to the nuance and hoped that an opening was about to emerge.

The speech paved the way for NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who had kept a low profile in the spiralling crisis, to meet with Trump in Davos and strike what the two men called a "framework deal" to enhance security in Greenland and the entire Arctic region.

Giorgia Meloni and Mette Frederiksen. Geert Vanden Wijngaert/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved.

The agreement, details of which have not yet been made public and are subject to further discussions, was the "off-ramp" that allies were desperately looking for: Trump confirmed he would no longer apply tariffs or pursue the ownership of Greenland.

By the time EU leaders met in Brussels on Thursday for an emergency summit convened in reaction to the showdown, the atmosphere had shifted

Prime ministers were seen shaking hands and patting each other's backs with wide smiles on their faces. Upon arrival, they told reporters the transatlantic bond was too valuable to be ditched in one week.

The respite in the room was palpable, despite a sense of restlessness and confusion hanging in the air – and lingering fears that Trump's Greenland fixation might return.

"We remain extremely vigilant and ready to use our tools if there are further threats," Macron said, praising Europe's display of unity.

The morning after the late-night summit, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen met with Mark Rutte in Brussels and later flew to Nuuk to dispel the impression that the framework deal would be written without Danish or Greenlandic consent.

Whiplash

In a way, the chain of events ended as it started, with Europeans calling the US their closest ally and vowing to work together to confront global challenges.

But beneath the surface, a painful reckoning was underway.

Europeans have spent the last year scrambling to contain Trump's mercurial foreign policy, watching in disbelief as he floated business ventures with the Kremlin, sanctioned judges of the International Criminal Court, removed Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela, and expanded the Board of Peace ostensibly set up to manage post-war Gaza into a rival of the United Nations.

While those disruptive actions were, to a greater or lesser extent, tolerated, Trump's heavy-handed pursuit of Greenland proved to be too much to bear. For many, the tariff threat crossed a line and set a precedent, even if it was eventually withdrawn.

The whiplash from this turbulent week will not disappear.

As von der Leyen said, it will only amplify calls for a more independent Europe with a wider net of partners to fall back on.

"Everybody has drawn the conclusion that the relationship is on a different footing," said a senior EU official. "And that requires decisions on our side."

NATO, The EU, And Greenland: Alliance And 

Security Implications In The Arctic – 

Analysis

January 25, 2026 
By Scott N. Romaniuk


US Focus Sharpens on Greenland

President Donald Trump’s renewed focus on Greenland, marked by escalating rhetoric and an increasingly assertive posture that challenges established norms of territorial sovereignty, has continued to thrust the Arctic into the centre of global politics. What initially seemed an offhand suggestion in August 2019—to purchase Greenland as a ‘large real estate deal’—has evolved into a major point of contention, exposing tensions among Washington’s ambitions, notions of American imperialism, alliance commitments, European security and sovereignty imperatives, and contours of great-power competition. Trump has framed Greenland as vital to US national security, citing concerns over Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Yet in doing so, he highlighted a paradox: the more aggressively the US administration seeks to secure its interests, the greater the risk of destabilising the region and straining the alliances that underpin its security.

Beyond the immediate diplomatic fallout, the Greenland debate raises a deeper and more uncomfortable question for Europe and the transatlantic alliance: what do European defence commitments and NATO’s collective-defence guarantees actually mean when pressure originates from within the alliance itself? Trump’s rhetoric forces allies to confront a theoretical but consequential dilemma—whether the political, legal, and normative assumptions underpinning NATO’s Article 5 and Europe’s own mutual-defence frameworks can withstand coercive behaviour by a leading ally. In doing so, Greenland becomes not merely an Arctic security issue, but a revealing measure for alliance cohesion, European strategic autonomy, and the credibility of collective defence in an era of intra-alliance tension rather than external attack.

Greenland and Iceland: Precedents in the North Atlantic

During the Second World War, the US established a presence on the island to prevent Nazi Germany from securing bases in the North Atlantic, thereby protecting critical shipping lanes. Greenland’s position, shaped by historical US military presence and enduring alliance frameworks, is therefore part of a broader pattern in North Atlantic security. A parallel precedent can be found in Iceland, where the US established diplomatic and military footholds during the Second World War after German forces occupied Denmark. Just as Greenland became critical during the Cold War and remains so today, Iceland shows how the US has balanced territorial sovereignty with alliance interests and Arctic security needs, illustrating the enduring tension between strategic necessity and multilateral cooperation in the North Atlantic.

The US Consulate in Reykjavik, led by Consul Bertil Eric Kuniholm, was officially opened on July 8, 1940, following his arrival on May 24. That same year, British troops landed in Iceland to preempt a German invasion, and Iceland sought US protection under the Monroe Doctrine—an initiative initially met with American caution. At the height of the Allied presence in late 1940, over 25,000 British and Canadian troops were stationed on the island. Ultimately, at British urging and following discussions between President Roosevelt and Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann Jónasson, American forces arrived in July 1941 to reinforce and eventually replace the British-Canadian military presence, marking the beginning of a permanent US diplomatic and security foothold in the North Atlantic

During the Cold War, Greenland became a key node in US early-warning architecture, monitoring Soviet missile activity and controlling access to the GIUK Gap—the maritime corridor between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK through which Soviet submarines could enter the Atlantic. The legal framework for US military presence was formalised in the 1951 US-Denmark Defense Agreement, granting the US the right to establish and operate bases while recognising Danish sovereignty. Subsequent bilateral arrangements and the Self-Government Act of 2009 expanded Greenlandic autonomy but left the provisions of the 1951 agreement largely intact. In 2023, the US and Denmark signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), updating NATO frameworks for US forces in Denmark. As such, US operations in Greenland continue under a long-established legal and strategic framework, even as contemporary rhetoric can create the impression of extralegal ambition.


Today, Pituffik Space Base (renamed from Thule Air Base in 2023) is Greenland’s sole US military installation. Now staffed by 150 personnel—compared with roughly 10,000 American troops during the Cold War’s peak—the installation functions as a critical hub for missile warning, satellite surveillance, and Arctic monitoring on Greenland’s northwestern coast, across Baffin Bay from Nunavut, Canada. Sovereignty over Greenland remains unequivocally Danish, with all US military activity conducted under bilateral agreements that recognise Danish authority and regulate the construction and maintenance of facilities. Against this backdrop of established legal frameworks and alliance practice, Trump’s public musings about ‘taking’ Greenland represented a sharp departure from diplomatic convention and alliance norms.

The Security Dilemma at Play

Trump justified his interest in Greenland by invoking security threats from Russia and China, at times asserting that the island is heavily traversed by Russian and Chinese vessels—claims not supported by publicly available intelligence assessments—framing the issue in urgent terms and declaring, ‘Now it is time, and it will be done!!!’. These statements nonetheless reflect a familiar dynamic in international relations: the security dilemma. Actions taken by one state to enhance its own security can be perceived as threatening by others, prompting countermeasures that ultimately reduce overall stability.

Russia has expanded its Arctic capabilities, modernising northern bases, reinforcing its Northern Fleet, and asserting greater control over sea lanes. China, though not an Arctic state, has declared itself ‘Near-Arctic State’ and has invested in ports, research stations, and shipping infrastructure under its Polar Silk Road (PSR) initiative. A unilateral US move to assert control over Greenland could be interpreted in Moscow and Beijing as escalatory, accelerating militarisation rather than deterring it.

Allies and NATO: Tensions at the Core

Denmark responded firmly to Trump’s comments, reiterating that Greenland is Danish territory and that decisions regarding its future rest with Denmark and the people of Greenland. Danish officials also drew attention to a legal and political paradox within NATO. Article 5 obliges members to defend one another; in an extreme and highly unlikely scenario involving the use of force, alliance obligations could be thrown into contradiction.

While such a scenario remains theoretical, it points to a broader tension between unilateral ambition and alliance cohesion. European governments and international observers echoed concerns that the Arctic should remain a zone of co-operation rather than unilateral assertion, highlighting the fragility of trust even among close allies. This perspective was reflected decades earlier in his 1987 Murmansk speech, when Mikhail Gorbachev characterised the Arctic as a ‘peace and cooperation zone’, underscoring the long-standing emphasis on collaborative approaches in the region.

European and NATO Mutual-Defense Frameworks

European security is structured around overlapping mutual-defense obligations. The EU’s Mutual Defence Clause, introduced in 2009 under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty), obligates member states to provide ‘all the necessary aid and assistance’ if another member is the victim of armed aggression. It further specifies that Member States ‘shall act jointly in the spirit [emphasis added] of solidarity’, denoting a principle-based commitment rather than a rigid, legally prescribed obligation. This wording emphasises political and normative support while allowing flexibility in how assistance—military, humanitarian, logistical, or intelligence—is provided.

The clause also accommodates states with longstanding policies of neutrality, such as Austria and Ireland, which can participate in cooperative security measures without engaging directly in combat. Finland and Sweden, historically considered ‘neutral’ despite their contingent wartime alignments and Cold War security positions, joined NATO in April 2023 and March 2024, respectively, marking a shift in their security posture while maintaining engagement with EU cooperative frameworks. In practice, Article 42(7) has never been tested in a large-scale interstate conflict, leaving its operational scope and political consequences largely theoretical despite its symbolic and deterrent value.

NATO’s Article 5, in contrast, establishes that an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all, forming the bedrock of collective defence in the Euro-Atlantic area. Yet Article 5 has been formally invoked only once, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and has never been applied in response to a conventional armed attack on alliance territory. As a result, while both Article 5 and Article 42(7) function as powerful political messages intended to deter aggression, their precise legal and operational implications in a high-intensity conflict remain subject to interpretation and political discretion. These frameworks are complemented by initiatives such as the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which seeks to enhance interoperability and integrated planning among European militaries.

Within NATO’s own treaty framework—the North Atlantic Treaty, or Washington Treaty—the US’ stated threats regarding a potential Greenland takeover appear inconsistent with several core obligations. Article 1 commits members ‘to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means… and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force’, a standard that such rhetoric appears to undermine. Article 2 further requires that ‘The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations’, an obligation difficult to reconcile with coercive statements directed at allied territory. Article 6 makes clear that collective defence under Article 5 applies only to an ‘armed attack… on the territory of any of the Parties’, meaning Greenland cannot credibly be framed as a defensive trigger within NATO’s own legal definitions. Article 7 underscores that the US, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, carries a special responsibility ‘for the maintenance of international peace and security’, while Article 12 reiterates the obligation to pursue the ‘maintenance of international peace and security’, further highlighting the tension between treaty commitments and takeover threats.

In the context of Greenland, these arrangements introduce a complex legal and strategic judgement. Although Greenland is Danish territory, its international alignments differ from Denmark’s own: Greenland is institutionally part of NATO through Denmark’s membership and is part of the Council of Europe, covered by Denmark’s membership, but it is not part of the EU. As such, the extent of allied involvement in a crisis would depend on how a threat is defined, whether it falls within NATO or other institutional competencies, and the prevailing view that Greenland’s geographic distance means it remains primarily Denmark’s responsibility.

This ambiguity raises the question of whether Greenland can be considered an internal EU security matter. On one hand, Greenland’s constitutional link to an EU member state, its position in the Arctic, and its relevance to EU interests in areas such as resilience, critical infrastructure, climate security, and supply chains suggest that developments affecting Greenland may have indirect implications for the Union’s internal security environment. On the other hand, Greenland’s status outside the EU, its extensive autonomy, and the predominance of national and NATO competencies in defence and territorial security argue against classifying it as an internal EU security issue, instead situating it within the domain of external security and allied cooperation.

Canada: The Silent Arctic Stakeholder

For the most part, Canada’s response has been restrained, offering only that Ottawa is ‘concerned’ about Trump’s tariffs on European countries and growing assertiveness towards Greenland. In his recent Davos speech, Prime Minister Mark Carney stressed that Greenland’s future is a matter for Copenhagen and Nuuk alone, firmly backing Danish sovereignty and reiterating support for international norms regarding territorial integrity—a stance widely seen as a principled defence of alliance solidarity and the rules-based order in the Arctic. At the same time, Carney framed the broader international system as being in a state of ‘rupture,’ noting that middle powers must build new coalitions because great powers increasingly use economic and strategic influence as coercion. This implicit critique highlights the limits of existing alliance structures and Canada’s constrained leverage in shaping security outcomes around Greenland.

As European nations deploy small numbers of troops to Greenland, Carney has considered a similar, symbolic contribution—likely minimal. By comparison, Canada’s participation in Operation Prosperity Guardian in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea involved only a few staff officers and an intelligence analyst. As an Arctic nation, NATO member, and close US ally with northern security interests, Ottawa has largely adhered to general statements emphasising international law, sovereignty, and alliance commitments, without overt condemnation or visible diplomatic mobilisation.

This caution reflects Canada’s preference for quiet diplomacy, reinforced by deep integration with US defence structures through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), longstanding Arctic cooperation, and a desire not to upset its close relations with Washington. Yet Ottawa’s muted posture introduces ambiguity. Unlike Denmark’s clear stance, Canada’s restraint underscores the uneven ways allies show dissent or acquiescence within NATO, raising questions about collective messaging and cohesion in the Arctic.

The Risks of Greenlandic Independence

The issue of Greenland’s potential independence will also require revisitation once the outlines of alliance obligations are clearer. Trump’s statements questioning Denmark’s historical claim to the island suggest that he might similarly withhold recognition of an independent Greenland, creating a potential diplomatic and legal grey zone. Aside from recognition issues, a newly independent Greenland could be exposed to acute vulnerabilities: it lacks the military resources, infrastructure, and capacity to defend itself in a region increasingly militarised by great powers. Independence without reliable security guarantees can leave the island exposed to coercion, foreign influence, or opportunistic actions, meaning that sovereignty in the Arctic entails more than formal political status.

Possible Paths Forward

The Greenland debate can be framed through several broad, illustrative scenarios. Each scenario reflects not only geopolitical choices but also the constraints and uncertainties introduced by overlapping EU and NATO obligations, whose precise operational scope remains largely untested.Diplomatic Expansion of Access
In this scenario, the US seeks expanded military or infrastructural access through negotiation rather than sovereignty claims. Danish and Greenlandic authority remains intact, and objectives are partially met. NATO and EU frameworks—while largely theoretical in their application to Greenland—serve as political and legal cues, reinforcing alliance cohesion without triggering formal obligations. Russia and China would likely monitor developments closely but refrain from dramatic escalation.

Unilateral Annexation or Seizure

A hypothetical attempt to seize or annex Greenland represents the most destabilising outcome. Legal ambiguities under Article 5 NATO and Article 42(7) TEU could complicate allied responses: Article 5 has only been invoked once (post-9/11), while Article 42(7) remains theoretical in practice. Such a move would almost certainly strain NATO and EU political coordination, accelerate Russian and Chinese Arctic militarisation, and undermine global sovereignty norms.

Symbolic Threat Without Action

Even absent concrete measures, repeated rhetorical threats regarding Greenland can alter behaviour. Denmark may feel pressured to grant limited concessions, allies may grow uneasy, and external powers could justify expanding their Arctic initiatives in response. In this context, NATO and EU frameworks act more as political deterrents than legally enforceable guarantees, highlighting the distinction between formal obligations and their practical application.

Incremental Influence Through Investment

Rather than formal military access or annexation, influence could be pursued through economic, scientific, or infrastructure projects. Over time, these initiatives could shift local leverage and alignment without triggering formal alliance obligations, reflecting how legal frameworks serve as markers rather than strict operational mandates.

Multilateral Arctic Cooperation
Greenland’s role could evolve within a coordinated multilateral framework involving Denmark, the US, Canada, and other Arctic nations. EU and NATO instruments, while largely theoretical in application to Greenland, provide a reference point for cooperation, interoperability, and shared intent. Joint research, coordinated military presence, or climate and security initiatives could strengthen regional governance and reduce unilateral tensions.

Local-Led Autonomy or Policy Shift
Greenland might assert stronger self-determination, negotiating terms directly with multiple powers. This could involve partnerships with non-Western states or alternative defence arrangements, creating a more complex geopolitical environment. EU and NATO frameworks would remain largely advisory, offering political guidance but limited enforceable authority, emphasising Greenland’s primary reliance on Denmark and alliance consensus.

Crisis-Driven Escalation
A security incident, environmental disaster, or resource dispute could trigger rapid involvement by multiple powers. In such a scenario, the untested nature of Article 5 and Article 42(7) would leave allied responses uncertain, highlighting the gap between treaty obligations and practical coordination. Outcomes would depend on political will, diplomatic agility, and the ability of Denmark and allies to manage escalation while preserving broader alliance cohesion.

Greenland, Great-Power Competition, and Arctic Security

The Greenland dilemma illustrates the Arctic’s shifting power dynamics. Russia increasingly treats the region as central to its security and economic strategy, while China positions itself as a key Arctic stakeholder through investment and scientific engagement. US rhetoric hinting at unilateral control risks pushing Moscow and Beijing toward closer alignment, reinforcing rather than mitigating competitive pressures.

Public discussion of annexation by a major power carries implications beyond Greenland. History shows that claims of necessity have been used to justify violations of territorial sovereignty—from Crimea and Ukraine to maritime disputes in the South China Sea—and other contested territories, such as Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus, the Golan Heights, and Nagorno-Karabakh, demonstrate how unilateral control can persist despite legal challenges. Greenland differs fundamentally: it is peaceful, allied, and largely self-governing. Yet precedent matters.

Arctic Security: What Next?

Discussions of long-term Arctic security frequently focus on NATO integration, infrastructure investment, and multilateral exercises. As the Arctic becomes more contested, regional stability—and the wider international order—hinges on how states project intent, exercise influence, and respect cooperative frameworks. Greenland demonstrates that even among allies, misjudged displays of power can undermine trust, provoke countermeasures, and destabilise what should be a zone of managed, predictable security.

Trump’s assertive posture has now prompted European allies to shift from passive security dependence toward a more active, even proactive, approach regarding territory associated with a European state. Recent events highlight a paradox: Trump has portrayed Greenland as threatened by Russia and China and framed its security as a national imperative for Washington, yet European deployments—intended to bolster security—have done little to temper those claims. Crucially, deployments have strengthened Greenland’s defence not against Russia or China, but rather in a posture directed at their own ally.

At its core, Greenland’s wider importance shows just how tricky it is to balance national ambitions, alliance commitments, and working together with other countries in the Arctic—a region where strategic interests, cooperation, and rivalry all collide. US interest underscores the enduring geostrategic value of the island, yet NATO and EU frameworks—while providing important political and legal guidance—remain largely untested in practice, leaving response and coordination contingent on political will. Stability in the Arctic will hinge not on unilateral ambition, but on careful diplomacy, coordinated multilateral action, and respect for established norms — ensuring Greenland remains a secure and predictable cornerstone of transatlantic and Arctic security.

Scott N. Romaniuk
Dr. Scott N. Romaniuk is a Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary.