Friday, September 04, 2020

The ‘Gemeinwesen’ Has Always Been Here: An Engagement with the Ideas of Jacques Camatte


THEORY. UTOPIA. EMPATHY. EPHEMERAL ARTS –
 EST. 1990 – ATHENS LONDON NEW YORK



The ‘Gemeinwesen’ Has Always Been Here: An Engagement with the Ideas of Jacques Camatte
Published on July 16, 2020 in Theory


The following article (re-published here by Void Network) was sent to Ill Will Editions by ex-Monsieur Dupont co-author Peter Harrison. In addition to offering a wide-reaching analysis of many central motifs in Camatte’s thought (‘inversion’, the ‘wandering’ of the species, the eclipse of the classical horizon of revolution, and the overcoming of the politics of ‘enmity’) the text may also be read as a confession or testament concerning the author’s own journey with the Dupont writing project, of which Nihilist Communism remains the most well-known result. While certain conceptual or logical leaps made here might strike some readers as hasty or willful (are there no non-millenarian and non-workerist concepts of war or conflict?…no non-voluntarist understandings of action?) we admire the author’s uncompromising spirit of polemic and hope this text invites discussion and debate among our readers.

-Ill Will Editions


The ‘Gemeinwesen’ Has Always Been Here: An Engagement with the Ideas of Jacques Camatte- by Peter Harrison

The less you are, the less you express your own life, the more you have, the more pronounced is your alienated life, the greater is the aggregate of your alienated being.

-Karl Marx, Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, 1844 [1]

Jacques Camatte’s writings, which are regularly added to, can be found on the site Invariance. Born in 1935, he was a prominent radical Marxist theoretician in European left-communist circles during the fifties and sixties. However, the events around 1968, particularly in France, caused him to gradually shed his left-communist affiliations. He saw that humanity was now caught in an impasse. There could no longer be any overthrowing of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat because all of humanity had now become ‘domesticated’ by capital. Therefore, any organised revolt against capital now only helped it develop. His proposal is that instead of fighting capital – a strategy that, if ‘successful,’ only returns capital to us in a stronger form – we must, somehow, abandon it. The taking leave of this capitalist world entails recreating connections with the natural world… it does not mean going to war against capital in order to topple it.

The abandonment of ‘this world’ (This World We Must Leave) and all it stands for, including the human enmity for all things (other animals, other things, other humans) – something that has become embedded in the modern human psyche and which causes us to repeatedly create situations of ‘battle’ or discontinuity – will, he argues, begin a process that leads to the formation of a genuinely human community, one that is continuous with nature and itself. It will transform Homo sapiens (literal meaning: ‘wise man’) into a new species: Homo Gemeinwesen. This process, Camatte insists, is always already begun, and perpetually re-emerges.

Camatte takes the term Gemeinwesen from Marx. Gemeinwesen translates as ‘community’ but Marx insists that the true essence of individual humans is their immutable existence as social beings, and this confers another significance to the word. As he wrote, following Feuerbach: “The individual is the social being” [2] Gemein translates as ‘common,’ and wesen as ‘being,’ or ‘essence’. So, it can also be read as ‘common essence,’ or ‘common being’ and it is via these avenues that Camatte uses the term Gemeinwesen to mean the true human community, or the immediate, or unmediated community… in other words, the true goal of communism as envisaged by Marx.

Marx writes:

“This communism is humanism as a perfect naturalism and naturalism as a perfect humanism [it is important to recognise that Marx understands that this can only be achieved through empiricism, or ‘the scientific method,’ see here, and here]. It is the genuine dissolution of the conflict between man [sic] and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between reification and identity, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution” [3].

Marx asserts that, “The human being is the true community of humankind.” Camatte has utilised this particular phrase throughout his work as a touchstone for his ideas (although, as he wrote in 2010, he has tried to mitigate the anthropocentric and humanist connotations associated with the term ‘human being’ by stressing that it is the particular species’ ‘life form,’ or the individual itself, that is, at one and the same time, the true community of humankind).

To better understand this phrase – which is another version of ‘the individual is the social being’ – it is useful to know that Marx is here using it in the context of revolts against “dehumanized life” – whether they be in France in 1789, or across the USA in 2020. He is arguing that such revolts against things as they are, constitute a deep psychological attempt by people to reconnect to the original human community that most of us lost long generations ago. They are attempting to reverse the conditions of their lives, which are marked by an ever-increasing separation from a human life, from human nature, from themselves, in fact. These regular expressions of discontent and revolt occur because humans are separated from the community that enables them to be fully, or properly human. The discontent of even one small district – “because it starts from the standpoint of the single, real individual” – is enough, he asserts, to expose the tragedy of our separation from the communal essence of human nature. Camatte clarifies the nature of these kinds of revolts by stating that such “rebellion is largely a rebellion of bodies,” they are, “an act of understanding that takes place not only on an intellectual level, but also sensorially.”

Indeed, Camatte used the original longer quote containing these ideas (from The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and which is interpreted in the above paragraph) in a leaflet distributed during the French strikes in May 1968.

What Marx is arguing, and what Camatte pursues in his own theory, is that humanity has lost its own community. The community of humans has been replaced, for example, with the community of money, or the community of capital and, because of this, humans have become wretched and lost, and not even properly human… and they sense this loss. Camatte argues that the loss was initiated when humans first began to separate themselves from nature, millennia ago. From that time, they have become increasingly detached from the world and from themselves – since their own nature is as a social being – and this has led to an incessant wandering.

The concept of a ‘wandering’ humanity was explored by Emil Cioran in 1949, in Précis de Décomposition [4] (A Short History of Decay). What Marx refers to as a sense within the species of the loss of community, Cioran refers to as nostalgia, by which he means a yearning for a place and a home, a ‘homesickness.’ Cioran writes:

“Since Adam all the endeavour of mankind [sic] has been to modify the man. […] While all beings have their place in nature, man [sic] remains a metaphysically wandering [5] creature, lost in Life, peculiar in Creation. No one has found a valid goal for history, but everyone has proposed one, and in the abundance of such a plethora of disparate and fanciful goals the idea of purpose is cancelled out and vanishes like a ridiculous product of the mind.”

Cioran asks how humanity can find a compromise between the unremitting, interior longing, or nostalgia – he uses the words, “Sehnsucht, yearning, saudade” – for a home, or a place, and the rootless, peripatetic condition of our existence. His answer is that there is no compromise – there is no remedy for the affliction:

“On the one hand we have the yearning to be immersed in the indivisibility of the heart and hearth, while on the other we absorb space in a never-satiated hunger. And the space we consume offers no limits since it only generates new wanderings, though the goal recedes ever further as we move forward. […] There is no solution to the tension between the Heimat [home/homeland] and the Infinite: it is to be rooted and uprooted at one and the same time.”

While, probably unknowingly, echoing Marx, Cioran also prefigures Camatte’s depiction of the trauma – “the founding trauma of discontinuity” – embedded in the human psyche when they separated from, or became discontinuous with, nature, when he writes:

“To be torn from the earth, enduring in exile, cut off from one’s immediate roots… is to yearn for a rehabilitation with the originary source, to yearn for a return to the time before the rupture of separation.”

Camatte has expanded and re-articulated this notion of separation and wandering. By ‘wandering’ Camatte insists that, since their separation from nature, humans have felt the need to justify their existence: they are constantly searching for a meaning to their lives and a purpose for their existence. For Camatte, the dilemma revolves around the centuries-old question of whether humans are part of nature or outside of it. The ‘wandering,’ as both Cioran and Camatte affirm, is an expression of the profound identity crisis that afflicts the species: if humans are part of nature then how are they part of it, and if they are above or beyond nature then where exactly is humanity located? (The content of wandering, by-the-way, can be understood effectively and usefully, as I have written previously, as history.)

Whereas Cioran sees no hope of an escape from the current human condition, Camatte, now having abandoned his Marxist and ‘revolutionary’ credentials, sees the possibility of the emergence of a new type of human being. Camatte envisages that Homo Gemeinwesen will be “the successor species to Homo sapiens. It will be in continuity with nature and the cosmos. Its processual knowledge [its becoming or, crudely, its consciousness], will not have a justificatory function, as it will operate solely within the dynamics of enjoyment.”

In ‘The Wandering of Humanity’ (1973), Camatte goes into a little more detail as to what the new society of the Homo Gemeinwesen will look like, although, since he hadn’t properly formulated the concept of the Homo Gemeinwesen at that time, he simply refers to the new society as ‘communism’:

“Communism puts an end to castes, classes, and the division of labor (onto which was grafted the movement of value, which in turn animates and exalts this division). Communism is, first of all, union. It is not domination of nature but reconciliation, and thus regeneration of nature: human beings no longer treat nature simply as an object for their development, as a useful thing, but as a subject (not in the philosophic sense) not separate from them, if only because nature is in them. The naturalization of man [sic] and the humanization of nature (Marx) are realized; the dialectic of subject and object ends. What follows is the destruction of urbanization and the formation of a multitude of communities distributed over the earth. […] Only a communal (communitarian) mode of life can allow the human being to rule his reproduction, to limit the (at present mad) growth of population without resorting to despicable practices (such as destroying men and women).”

He continues…

“It is obvious that this cannot be a return to the type of nomadism practised by our distant ancestors who were gatherers. Men and women will acquire a new mode of being beyond nomadism and sedentarism. Sedentary lives compounded by corporeal inactivity are the root cause of almost all the somatic and psychological illnesses of present-day human beings. An active and unfixed life will cure all these problems without medicine or psychiatry.” [6]

Writing in 2020, it is clear that Camatte sees this process of leaving the world of capital and arriving at the destination of a new species – the Homo Gemeinwesen, or the true human community – as taking “thousands of years.” So, one should not make the mistake of thinking that Camatte is proposing any kind of ‘forced’ population reduction.

It is also useful to be reminded that he is not proposing any kind of confrontation with the world as it is. He explicitly states that constructing an ‘enmity’ to capital in order to topple it will merely make it stronger. This was the conception he formed on reflection of the events around 1968: “The more we fight against capital, the more we strengthen it.

So, the key is to begin, somehow, to create new ways of living: “The problem is to create other lives.” [7] Indeed, Camatte appears to find interesting any new social experiments that indicate a different way to live, or which contain a refusal of aspects of this society, such as the hippie movement [8], or alternative agricultural methods, although he is, of course, aware how these movements can become re-incorporated into capital. But there is also an urgency attached to this abandonment of things as they are, since the choice is now hurtling toward that between “communism or the destruction of the human species” [9] And these refusals or revolts are always susceptible to recuperation by capital: “Capital can still profit from the creativity of human beings, regenerating and resubstantializing itself by plundering their imaginations” [10].

The impulse to begin a regeneration of community and nature is not a simple or straightforward one for Camatte though. As it is not a ‘political’ alternative, it is not a toppling of the old regime and a replacement with a new one, it is not a revolution as commonly understood. More recently, Camatte uses the term ‘inversion’ to describe the leaving of this world. This concept is not meant to imply a simple reversal of things as they are, nor does it mean a return to a time prior to our dehumanisation. It is the accessing of the seed of naturalness inside us, which has long been repressed and concealed, and helping it to germinate. In this way, the new species of Homo Gemeinwesen will begin to emerge. One can see how this idea is closely linked to the way Marx described the essence of revolt above, but in Camatte’s conception all ‘politics’ is removed. As Camatte insists: “Inversion is not a strategy, it is totally outside of politics, which is the dynamic of organizing people, of controlling them. We must abandon everything that is part of its world.”
A Millenarian Residue?

Jacques Camatte has come from the modern revolutionary tradition encompassed by Marxism that Yuri Slezkine describes, in his monumental work, The House of Government, as millenarian [11]. Millenarianism, which can be religious or secular, is the belief that human society is in need of a great transformation and that after this transformation people will live in peace and harmony. It is the eternal recurring impulse of those who live within exploitative and hierarchical societies, by which is meant, of course, a State.

The conditions of life within a State – work, exploitation, hierarchy, ennui, poverty, wealth, despair – are the causes of millenarianism and, as the anthropologist Pierre Clastres has suggested with the social movement of the karai prophets in the Amazon, even the threat of a burgeoning State can produce millenarianism [12].

Very significantly, Clastres further suggests that the karai millenarians – who “mobilized” more than 10,000 people to migrate toward the Land Without Evil, in the direction of the setting sun – accomplished “that impossible thing in primitive society: to unify, in the religious migration, the multifarious variety of the tribes. They managed to carry out the whole [unifying] program of the chiefs with a single stroke” [13]. Clastres’ startling and profound observation is that millenarianism – the revolutionary overthrow, or escaping, of existing conditions – contrary to what it pretends to be, is actually the most efficient way to homogenise people, to unify them for a cause external to themselves. Revolutionaries then, and one can glean it from history if one looks properly, are the State-builders par excellence.

Millenarianism, therefore, is a recurring response, in various forms, to the State, which is a society that is deeply unsatisfactory. When historian Christopher Hill assessed contemporary historical analysis in 1972, in The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution, he wrote: “we now see millenarianism as a natural and rational product of the assumptions of this society.” Millenarianism – another term for ‘revolutionism’ – is then, objectively, a function of the State. Millenarianism also, invariably, has some kind of relationship to the idea of a ‘fall from grace,’ or a loss of naturalness and community… and so one can see that the millenarian impulse comes from the same standpoint as that of those whom Marx describes above as rebelling – because they sense that they are dehumanised or, at least, bereft of the community that makes them human. We all contain the germ of millenarianism inside us, it is a facet of our response to an unsatisfactory life… Albert Camus, in The Rebel, advises us not to “unleash” it [14].

Perhaps the first evidence of millenarianism we have in history is from Iran with the arrival of Zoroaster, some three thousand years ago. As Karl Jaspers argued, this era in the development of civilisation – which he termed ‘the axial age’ – was one of flux and uncertainty, in which there was a proliferation of radical thinking and the expression of discontent. Slezkine writes:

“Zoroaster made history – literally as well as figuratively – by prophesying the absolute end of the world. There was going to be one final battle between the forces of light and darkness and one last judgement of all human beings who had ever lived – and there would be nothing but an all-encompassing, everlasting perfection: no hunger, no thirst, no disagreement, no childbirth, and no death. The hero would defeat the serpent one last time; chaos would be vanquished for good; only the good would remain – forever” (Slezkine: 76-77) [15].

“Millenarianism,” Slezkine affirms, “is the vengeful fantasy of the disposed, the hope for a great awakening” (Slezkine: 99). This vengeful fantasy, of course, is entirely understandable, and probably inevitable, and therefore impossible to prevent from returning in new forms… but the problem with it is that it never leads to peace on earth, and usually makes things far worse. Slezkine continues the history:

“Most millenarian sects died as sects. Some survived as sects, but stopped being millenarian. Some remained millenarian until the end because the end came before they had a chance to create stable states. Christianity survived as a sect, stopped being millenarian, and was adopted by Babylon as an official creed. The Hebrews and Mormons survived their trek through the desert and traded milk and honey for stable states before being absorbed into larger empires. The Muslims created their own large empires bound by routinized millenarianism and threatened by repeated ‘fundamentalist’ reformations. The Münster Anabaptists and the Jacobins took over existing polities and reformed them in the image of future perfection before losing out to more moderate reformers. Only the Bolsheviks destroyed ‘the prison of the peoples,’ vanquished the ‘appeasers,’ outlawed traditional marriage, banned private property, and found themselves firmly in charge of Babylon while still expecting the millennium in their lifetimes. Never before had an apocalyptic sect succeeded in taking control of an existing heathen empire (unless one counts the Safavids, whose millennial agenda seems to have been much less radical). It was as if the Fifth Monarchists had won the English Civil War, ‘reformed all places and all callings,’ contemplated an island overgrown with plants that the heavenly father had not planted, and stood poised to pull up every one of them, ‘root and branch, every plant, and every whit of every plant.’ [16] The fact that Russia was not an island made the challenge all the more formidable” (Slezkine: 180).

All serious movements that seek to radically alter, abolish, or escape State societies are millenarian movements. Millenarianism is a product of the critique of the State in which the masses are perceived to be the dupes of evil. The remedy necessitates the sweeping away of all the mechanisms of evil – the laws, the norms, the traditions – along with all those who, through pure malice, weakness, or sloth, facilitate or maintain the evil. Only the good in heart – that is, the most loyal to the cause – will arrive safely at the other side of the revolution.

But less dramatic versions of millenarianism also exist: some religious sects insist on simply waiting – and being ready – for the apocalypse, which will be delivered when God decides. This strategy mirrors the belief of far-left communists, or ultra-left revolutionaries, or anarchists who wait in readiness – remaining close to ‘the cause’ and engaging others, perhaps to convince them – for the confluence of events that will give them the opportunity to become the midwives of communism.

This strategy of far-left communist groups is (equivocally) endorsed by, for example, the group Endnotes [17], in 2019, who describe the apparent, but false – as they regard it – choice for contemporary ultra-left, far-left communist, or left-communists, etc. [18], as being between “‘revolutionary intervention’ or attentism (wait-and-see-ism).” That is, “there is either a revolutionary communist way of relating to struggles or one should not be involved at all.” They solve the false choice by referring back to Marx and Engels’ notion of communism as ‘the real movement’ [19] and stating that, “it is not we but class struggle that produces theory [understanding].” But Endnotes do not seem to recognise that there is no such thing as being able to ‘not be involved at all.’ Even the dead are involved in our present life, as Marx noted: “Le mort saisit le vif!” (The dead seize the living!) [20]

In practice, of course, both quietist millenarians and non-party, anti-‘political,’ or anti-vanguard revolutionaries (like Endnotes) are always involved in events whether it be in preparing themselves by learning how to be closer to God, or by getting closer in understanding to, as Marx put it, ‘the real [concrete] movement [becoming] that abolishes the current conditions’ [21] – or in simply attempting to attract others to one’s point of view in order to increase the number of the blessed… so that at the appointed hour – when either God appears in His fury, or the Proletariat rise in Theirs – there will be enough believers to get those who are worthy to the other side.

I should note that, as one half of the producers of the book – or “archaeological artefact,” [22] – Nihilist Communism, I too have been millenarian. Our advice to those who, like us (we called ourselves Monsieur Dupont), wanted the great transformation that will bring peace and harmony but saw its arrival as coming from the class struggle and the intervention of ‘revolutionaries,’ rather than God, was to: “be ready for a long wait, to have no great expectations, to be ready for failure, and to keep going for decades.” [23]

Compare this last instruction, or appeal, with the Parable of the Sower, from The King James Bible: “Now the parable is this: The seed is the word of God… [and it is deemed to have fallen on good ground when those that hear the word] keep it, and bring forth fruit with patience.” Or this from the Book of Revelation (Apokálypsi), in which God writes letters to ‘seven churches’ through visions given to a prophet, probably in 95CE: “I know thy works, and thy labour, and thy patience… And [how thou] hast borne, and hast patience, and for my name’s sake hast laboured, and hast not fainted.” Perhaps the unconscious repeating of such a directive, almost 2000 years later, is an example of eternal recurrence…

The State – or that which oppresses us, whatever it is – will always be critiqued. The State necessarily, or naturally, creates the conditions for this critique, and, therefore, millenarians – that is, revolutionaries – are functions of the State. They do not appear where there is no State. They do not appear in non-State societies. But, counter-intuitively, the critique of the State or ‘present conditions’ is not harmful to the State (though it may prove so for particular elements in the State hierarchy). In fact, it is necessary to its objective development, as recorded examples beginning with the English Civil War at least, attest.

Wherever there has been a revolution the State has become stronger, and the exploitation of the working classes has been escalated, become more brutal, and made more efficient, for a short time at least. The English and French Revolutions enabled the institutional ascendency of the bourgeoisie: the new ruling class, as well as the new middle class, the bureaucrats. Both revolutions enabled both countries to maintain and expand their position as a world power. The Russian Revolution is easily recognisable as the revolution of the children of the emergent middle-classes – the bureaucrats – and they introduced industrialisation at an unprecedented speed and on an unprecedented scale. The Chinese Communists also introduced industrial capitalism at breakneck speed – don’t be deceived by the fact that they called themselves ‘communist.’ The same can be said for those ‘developing’ countries, such as Cuba, where industrialism was introduced to a rural region under the banner of communism or socialism. Revolutionaries then, in the grander scheme, are not counter-functions of the State and capital, they are just functions – they aid the development of the economy and the control of the labouring classes.

Camatte, observing the history of the twentieth century, discovered that in this period the nature of capitalism changed so that, as noted above, ‘the more we fight against capital, the more we strengthen it,’ but one could also have made that observation from all the revolutions in the capitalist era, beginning with the English one. So perhaps it is more correct, or at least universal, to say: the more we fight against the State, the more we strengthen it. Of course, in our era there is no clear dividing line between State and economy – or State and capital, indeed, in capitalism the State found its perfect marriage – and the all-consuming, global, and ubiquitous nature of our economic system means that the imagining of a State existing in the world that is not capitalist constitutes a laughable and ridiculous whimsy.

Camatte has certainly tried, consciously or otherwise, to shy away from the millenarian bases of his original political adherences. This is demonstrated by his absolute refusal to be part of any ‘organisation,’ and his insistence that what he is now arguing for is not a politics of any kind. Yet still, in his vision of the arrival of a new human species he fulfils the millenarian criterion: millenarianism, which can be religious or secular, is the belief that human society is in need of a great transformation and that after this transformation people will live in peace and harmony. And he still engages his vision with people, he still produces texts, and informs others of a better way to think [24]. His millenarianism though, like that of Endnotes, as well as Monsieur Dupont, is a quietist one.
A Contradiction?

Camatte argues that the class struggle is long finished because, as those involved in the ‘revolutionary’ events around WW1 demonstrated, the only thing the working class is now able to achieve is not communism but self-managed capitalism, since its aims are ‘full employment and self-management.’ Therefore, he is claiming that any revolutionary struggle against capital that is based on the (now-defunct-as-a-potential-creator-of-communism) working class will only return capital to us, after the glorious deception of the revolutionary moment, in a stronger and more vicious form.

But it is worse than this. Just as there is no genuine working class anymore – it has been absorbed into capital – there are no classes at all, society is no longer organised on the basis of a living social relationship (bad though it was)… capital has ‘run away’ from the control of the bourgeoisie and is now operating as an autonomous system. All humans, are now capitalised, that is, they are all hanging desperately off the coat-tails of the “automated monster” of capital that proceeds – robot-like, or zombie-like (because it is a dead thing, it is no longer a social relation) – on its own course.

How to stop the monster? Camatte has already discounted opposing it, since that will just strengthen it – because in our opposition we are acting within its terrain, that is, on its own terms. Camatte therefore argues that to stop the monster we have to abandon it, and not in an organised political way – because that would be an immediate creation of an opposition: an enmity. We all have to begin abandoning ‘this world as it is,’ somehow organically, by choosing to live different lives. If we do this then not only will zombie-capital die of starvation, but after a few thousand years the new species will have fully emerged, and humans will live in community with nature and themselves.

But if people are already capitalised (Camatte describes it as their madness), meaning that if they fight the system they only bring it back stronger, then would not that also imply that if they left the system they would just take their capitalist brains with them, even though, like the oppositionists, they do not intend to?

Is it not the case that every escape from capital or the State, or things as they are, every sect, or movement – from the Vikings who escaped the burgeoning power of Harald Finehair’s expanding kingdom by settling in Iceland, to the tragedy of Jonestown – that has gone somewhere else to found a new world has just brought the sickness with them?

The problem is centered on whether one can will a genuine change in one’s life, as an individual or as a group. If one is willing the change then it is logical to assume that the imagining of the change emerges from the very circumstances of the thing one is opposing – the desired change is bound by the parameters of the original thing one is trying to escape. We are social beings, we are socially constructed, we can only see the world through our own perspective, though we can recognise that there may be other perspectives.

It is useful here, in order to explain what I mean, to think about how the concept of time is perceived in two different eras: the modern era (capitalism), and the European Middle Ages (feudalism).

We can, for example, understand when someone tells us that medieval peasants lived by a cyclical calendar derived from agrarian existence but, despite this, we are unable to view time as a rotation because we cannot look up from this page and comfortably accept, or throw out the notion, that time is not linear. As the historian A. J. Gurevich writes of the transition from feudal to urban capitalist conceptions of time: “The alienation of time from its concrete content raised the possibility of viewing it as a pure categorical form, as duration unburdened by matter.” It was the success of the modern economy, which needed coordination to operate efficiently, that changed our conception of time. It was the introduction of supply chains, distribution, and factory work, culminating in railway timetables, that led to the abandonment of any sense that time was ‘cyclical,’ ‘seasonal,’ or connected to the earth. This linear expression of time is now hard-wired into our brains.

We cannot see through the eyes of a person inhabiting a different mode of living. Our consciousness is determined by the daily life we live, and the principles and values generated by and acting upon this actual daily existence. Once a society is established, then that society becomes an organic whole, a mode of living (not necessarily an ‘economy’). A twenty-first century Parisian can as little decide to understand time as cyclical as a medieval European peasant could decide to understand time as a separate linear category of the universe [25].

One can also see how change in oneself is often impossible through simple willing. Genuine, grief, over the death of a loved one, for example, cannot just be wished away, it slowly lessens over time, or is forgotten in other pursuits (as long as those pursuits are not taken up specifically to forget about one’s grief, in which case the pursuit itself is a constant reminder). Therefore, it would be true to say that the solution to disabling grief does not come from our thinking about it and putting it into perspective, but from time. Genuine changes – or solutions – are always delivered to us on levels other than our conscious willing.

In an articulation, or extension, of Marx’s historical materialist proposition – “People make their own history, but they do not make it freely, and not in circumstances of their choosing, but under circumstances that are proximate, pre-existing , and handed-down” – the Marxist scholar Ernest Mandel formulated the term parametric determinism. This is a useful concept to utilise when thinking about the limits of our possible understandings of other eras, or other cultures… or other animals. He argues:

“Most, if not all, historical crises have several possible outcomes, not innumerable fortuitous or arbitrary ones; that is why we use the expression ‘parametric determinism’ indicating several possibilities within a given set of parameters.”

We could substitute the words ‘historical crises’ with ‘situations,’ or even ‘imaginings.’ The point being that we are products of the society we are born into. We cannot simply will ourselves to be the products or functions (or reproducers) of another society (for example, ‘a truly communist’ society), no matter how close we feel to understanding the particular social organisation we are observing or considering. Radical changes in society – such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism – do not happen via human will, they happen on other levels. The revolutions that made capitalism official – such as the English, French, and Russian – were the institutionalising, or ratifying, of an economic force that had already achieved actual predominance. Of course, Camatte does stipulate that the emergence of the new human being will take thousands of years and perhaps, therefore, he is recognising the problem involved in changing one’s perspective or changing one’s entire way of living. And perhaps he is arguing that if we just make certain changes now – changes that are connected to the ‘naturalness’ that still lingers inside us – then we will set ourselves on the way to becoming the new species… I am not so certain in my ‘resistance’ to Camatte’s particular ideas here, and am reminded of Voltaire’s solution in Candide, which I will come to below.

In the end, there is still a ‘problem’ in Camatte’s urging of us to leave this world… the logic of his writings compel us to wonder how, in ‘leaving the world’, we will not just take the world with us. If we can’t fight it without making it stronger, then maybe we can’t leave it without making it stronger either. Capital is, after all, the recuperator par excellence. Even détournement became a means for making money.
The Already Existing Human Community

Camatte proposes that all rebellion that is linked to a yearning for human community, that is, those rebellions, or movements, that called for ‘universal brotherhood [sic]’ or mutual aid in the past, for example – since these calls are a connection to the lost Gemeinwesen – are beginnings of the inversion: the process of regaining a true human community. The problem is that capital has developed so much that most of these beginnings are now completely useless if they exist as organised political projects. For such beginnings – as we have seen with the mutual aid and solidarity in the recent events around covid-19 and the Black Lives Matter movement – to be effective and unrecuperable they must develop into situations where ordinary people no longer appeal to or confront the system in order to change it. People must instead start living different lives, lives that embrace these human values. Inversion can only be begun when there is no feeling of enmity, and when there is no feeling that some ideological prop, such as ‘the working class,’ or ‘justice,’ is needed to justify one’s actions. If we dispense with the damaging notions and images of enemy and friend – for example, the bosses and the working class – we can get on with trying to live. Camatte’s hope is that there will be a mass abandonment of our current way of living when people realise the madness they have had to endure.

As already noted, Camatte predicts that the new human species will take thousands of years to come fully into being. To assist with the emergence of the new being Camatte suggests a number of practical measures that need to be somehow implemented as soon as possible. In Emergence and Dissolution, Camatte lists some of these changes, which include: “The immediate cessation of the construction of roads, highways, airfields, ports, and cities;” the abolition of tourism, “the most elaborate form of the destruction of men, women and nature;” and the abolition of sport, “an absurd activity, a theatrical form of capitalist competition, and a fundamental support for advertising.”

When one reads Camatte’s ‘list of demands’ from this 1989 article it is difficult not perceive them as potentially authoritarian measures to be put in place for the good of the planet, and in a footnote added in 2008 Camatte notes this: “It would have been better to have [only] written ‘cessation,’ because ‘prohibition’[as well as cessation, in the list, he uses the term ‘prohibit’ or ‘ban’] inevitably evokes and calls for repression.” Still, one has to wonder how we can stop things like construction projects, tourism, and sport without either becoming part of a government, or without fighting against these phenomena. Unless all the construction workers, tourists and sports fans stay at home to tend their vegetable gardens and allotments, and don’t turn on their televisions… causing those industries to collapse.

There is a strangely powerful allure in this vision of a mass of humanity just ‘leaving the world’ to tend their own gardens, a phenomenon that would, of course, require a collective effort, or communal cooperation. Maybe the essence of the beginning of Camatte’s ‘inversion’ – as a ‘leaving of this world’ – can be understood in practical terms by reference to Candide’s advice at the end of Voltaire’s novel of the same name – which is that while we can wonder about the world all we like, the most useful thing is to ‘cultivate one’s own garden.’ Candide says this after he and his ‘petite société’ have withdrawn from worldly pursuits and are concentrating on sustaining themselves by their own means, learning all sorts of skills, and being useful to one another. As one of them remarks: “Let us work without calculation (travaillons sans raisonner), for that is the only way to make life bearable.” If one decides to follow Camatte, is one also following Candide?

Returning to the notion that it will take thousands of years for this new communal species of human being to grow to maturity, one must perhaps – despite Camatte’s indicating that the species will form a true human community – sense that we cannot really know what this new community will truly be like. I think Camatte would agree with this. The new community – the new species – he predicts is something impossible to describe beyond partial indications, and this has profound implications once one remembers the societies of ‘tribes’ around the world who have little or no contact with the global economy: it is impossible for us to fully understand these peoples either. These are the societies that, as Pierre Clastres has shown, are ‘against the State‘ [26].

Camatte does refer to the work of Pierre Clastres a couple of times, but only briefly. In The Integrated Revolution (1978), Camatte appears to recognise the centrifugal social organisation of ‘primitive’ (non-State) societies, described by Clastres, as valuable in resisting the threat of homogeneity and the loss of diversity between communities – which is carried out through ‘violence,’ or ‘war’- but he does not think that this is an appropriate strategy ‘for us’ since society has already been homogenised and any recourse to a diversity-amplifying violence would simply be a “blind” violence without any proper context. It is unfortunate that Camatte only considers Clastres’ observations and theories as a tool for rectifying the ills of civilised society, therefore rejecting them quickly, rather than exploring them further. Clastres himself never suggested that the social organisation of the non-State societies he encountered in the Amazon should be taken up by radicals in civilisation. He merely noted that ‘the savages’ had resisted the State – somehow – for a long time, and that they effectively represented the last real humans.

What might one learn – using a Camattian lens – from the ethnography of those peoples who live beyond the State?

Clastres suggests that the goal of these societies is not ‘peace and harmony,’ it is not unification. The ‘community’ that exists within groups and between groups is operational on different levels to the ones we might understand. Their ‘enemies’ are closer to them than our ‘friends’ ever will be, enmity is bound up in their conception of the relations with themselves, and others, even the dead [27]. This is one indication of the problem in Camatte’s defining of what a true human community will look like… he cannot know. The foundation of his notions of true human community come from the Enlightenment and the ideas of democracy. He, like all of us, is an inheritor of the ideas of Spinoza and Marx, who reflected the radical implications of the Enlightenment, a phenomenon that itself reflected the growth of capitalism as a form of society. ‘The savages,’ as Clastres has observed, do not want peace.

Peace, since the establishment of the first State, has always been the prize of slaves. As subjects of a State this is, naturally, what both Camatte and I want too. But one should keep this aim for oneself, and not bring it to non-State peoples.

The other thing one might discover, if we extend Camatte’s, or Cioran’s, analysis – which concludes that humans are discontinuous with nature and therefore psychologically traumatised, and now even obsolete – to the ‘uncontacted tribes,’ is that there are two types of ‘human being’ on the planet… but only one type can truly call itself ‘human.’
The Second Type

The ‘human beings’ who cannot truly call themselves human, according to Camatte, include myself and all the others who are products and functions – not of the earth from which we originate – but of the economy we know as capitalism… whether they reap the benefits of the demented ‘wealth’ that capitalism generates, or whether they struggle to survive in the depths of the madness that is the flipside of the madness of progress and technological advance. I agree whole-heartedly with Camatte here, these so-called humans (you and I) are fictions, or creations – or the hollowed-out drones – of an uncontrollable and autonomous economy that has severed all their links – beyond romantic fancies and false claims – to other animals and the earth itself [28].

How did this human come into existence? Since I am talking about the kind of human who lives in a State I must then ask why and how the State emerged. There is a lot of mystification from all sectors of the political and academic spectrum on this but, as I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, while we cannot know the specific circumstances by which original – ‘pristine,’ they are called – States came about, we can understand why: the State is a managerial solution for the problem of a population that has become too large for the maintenance of traditional ways of living.

Most narratives of the emergence of the State begin with the rise of a chief who bullies people, which leads to a Royal Family, which leads to a retinue that eventually forms a bureaucracy. It is this bureaucracy that then wields the real power. The bureaucracy spreads out over the land and becomes a kind of closed proto-democracy. Eventually there are so many people helping to run the State directly through supervisory – the nascent ‘middle class’ – and entrepreneurial means that it becomes clear to them that the real power is in their hands and that they should have that power recognised. They begin a movement based on the new circumstances. Oliver Cromwell was landed gentry. Gerrard Winstanley – the leader of the Diggers, the far left of the revolutionists of the ‘English Civil War’ – was a middle-class businessman. Robespierre was a lawyer. Lenin was famously middle-class. Castro was born into a prosperous farming family and studied law at university. Guevara was a doctor. The workers and peasants get behind them because they also like this new ‘democratic’ idea and because they need some improvement in their lives – in fact, of course, the vocational revolutionaries can only appear, and fulfil their function, if the workers and peasants are already at some level of revolt. Then there is a revolution (we are not talking about ‘revolts’ here), sometimes it is bloody. The new leaders realise that the workers and peasants had a slightly different idea about how things should proceed and begin a clampdown. Often the first leaders of the revolution are kicked out, and new people, with a more reasonable agenda step in.

I agree with the whole of this narrative except for the very first part. My research into how peoples prior to the rise of a State (including present-day ‘uncontacted tribes’) organised themselves socially shows how one of the priorities was to keep group numbers small, and if numbers did start to escalate these groups would ‘fission’ – they split. Robin Dunbar has famously done work on optimal group sizes and he argues that for humans to operate successfully without coercion they must be able to have regular face-to-face interactions – everyone must know everyone else. Once the group becomes too numerous for everyone to know each other it becomes necessary for laws to be laid down.

My research suggests that the key element in the emergence of a new State – Mesopotamia, the Indus, Mesoamerica, etc – was not agriculture or alluvial valleys but the fact there was a rise in the population and for some unknowable reason the group was unable to split.



The classic narrative for the rise of a chiefdom/State is that a rapacious thug organises a group and takes over the tribe. But the anthropological record suggests that humans were able to resist vainglorious thugs for thousands of years. And how come there are ‘egalitarian’ tribes outside of States right now? There must be something else. Many anthropologists and historians suggest that advances in technology – for example, irrigation – led the way for numbers to rise and for people to become enslaved. But how come modern ‘uncontacted tribes’ haven’t invented modern farming techniques, increased their numbers and set up a ruthless dictatorship to serve under? Are they just stupid?

The reason powerful Chiefs emerged was because the populace reluctantly agreed that the new circumstances demanded a new way of organising things. Everyone did not know everyone else anymore and so people could get away with things, cliques could form, ‘crimes’ could be committed. Laws had to be made and people had to follow them – but the people who didn’t like the laws just ignored them. Finally, and this probably happened very quickly, a charismatic person seized the chance for self-aggrandisement… and in the end the populace agreed. A strong leader backed up by thugs would at least keep some peace.

Of course, the power would usually go to the Chief’s head and atrocities would be normalized, and if the people weren’t totally downtrodden they might support a rival Chief’s bid to topple the present one… and so history was written… right up to Representative Democracy.

The State itself is neither evil nor good, it is a managerial solution to the problem of a large population. Imagine the scene, two people sitting under a rockface discussing the future:

“Yeah, Enki and his gang reckon they can sort out all the problems as long as everyone does what he says and gives him a tribute by sending daughters and sons to work for him, and building him a really good place to sleep in. The whole place will be a lot easier to live in, less chaos, but we’ll have to stay where we are and work harder to make sure he gets enough recompense for his trouble. We don’t want him to put his thugs on us, but it will be good if he sorts out those lazy thieving bastards who live up by the chickpea bushes…”

The State is often viewed as an obstacle to the ideals of peace and love – and communism – but maybe there is no escaping an authoritarian State when there are so many people jammed together? Perhaps this is one of the many lessons of the Russian Revolution? (Anyone who suggests here that perhaps the way to peace, love, and communism is therefore to reduce the human population is – apart from articulating real evil – missing the point that as functions of capitalism they would merely be recreating capitalism in a new situation, just as the Bolsheviks did in 1918.)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau opined for the freedom had before the advent of the State and civilization, but he recognized that living in a society where everyone – no matter their place in the hierarchy – was dependent upon everyone else meant that humans could not go back.

He decided that we had to make the best of a bad job [29], and this was the message in his book ‘Of the Social Contract.’ Rousseau’s book, of course, was used by the Jacobins to justify their Parisian dictatorship in 1793-4, as David Wootton writes in his introduction to Rousseau’s ‘Basic Political Writings’: “Robespierre and the Jacobins admired him greatly, but they misunderstood him profoundly (their Rousseau was invented to serve their own purposes).” Rousseau’s practical and humane – and anti-millenarian – approach to being trapped, in what might be ironically termed, a less-than-satisfactory society has been echoed much later by writers who have witnessed or considered the millenarian outcomes of the Russian Revolution, such as Albert Camus.

In 1951, arguing in favour of rebellion – that is, an opposition to all forms of dictatorship – as opposed to revolution, he writes, “Instead of killing and dying in order to produce the being that we are not, we have to live and let live in order to create what we are.” He continues:

“The revolutionary is simultaneously a rebel or he [sic] is not a revolutionary, but a policeman, or a bureaucrat, who turns against rebellion. But there is absolutely no progress from one attitude to the other, but co-existence and endlessly increasing contradiction. Every revolutionary ends by becoming either an oppressor or a heretic. In the […] universe that they have chosen, rebellion and revolution end in the same dilemma: either police rule or insanity” [30].

Vasily Grossman, writing about Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror Famine in the Ukraine in 1932-3 through the character Anna Sergeyevna, in Everything Flows:

“When I look back now, I see the liquidation of the kulaks [31] very differently. I’m no longer under a spell… ‘They’re not human beings, they’re kulak trash!’ – that’s what I heard again and again, that’s what everyone kept repeating. And when I think about it all now, I wonder who first talked about kulak trash. Lenin? Was it really Lenin? How the kulaks suffered. In order to kill them, it was necessary to declare that kulaks are not human beings. Just as the Germans said that Yids [sic] are not human beings. That’s what Lenin and Stalin said too: The kulaks are not human beings. I can see now that we are all human beings” [32]
The First Type

The other type of human is the one that still lives in the forests, in the hills, or on the plains, avoiding the advances of civilization. But their existence is precarious and is becoming more fragile with each passing day. These peoples are the last humans.

We cannot know who these peoples really are because to go to them is to bring all our psychological and biological sicknesses to them. But what we can know, from the literature of anthropologists (and we have enough of that – there is no need for any other budding student of anthropology or professor of ‘the exotic’ to invade the space of these peoples), is that these peoples do not work; they do not have an economy; they do not have hierarchies; they do not have social control as we know it [33]; they do not have money; they do not have history, but they do have collective memory; they do not seek to conquer the world; they do not have books; they do not destroy nature; they do not treat each other with disrespect; they do not treat other animals with disrespect; they live for enjoyment…

On the Homo Gemeinwesen, the ‘successor species to Homo sapiens,’ Camatte writes, as noted above:

“It will be in continuity with nature and the cosmos. Its processual knowledge [its becoming or, crudely, its consciousness], will not have a justificatory function, as it will operate solely within the dynamics of enjoyment. […] It is obvious that this cannot be a return to the type of nomadism [34] practised by our distant ancestors who were gatherers. Men and women will acquire a new mode of being beyond nomadism and sedentarism. Sedentary lives compounded by corporeal inactivity are the root cause of almost all the somatic and psychological illnesses of present-day human beings. An active and unfixed life will cure all these problems without medicine or psychiatry.”

Camatte’s description is remarkable because it describes communities that already exist, present-day uncontacted tribes – these peoples are already here. They live alongside us.

The quote from Marx used at the beginning of this text is also usefully repeated here – “The less you are, the less you express your own life, the more you have, the more pronounced is your alienated life, the greater is the aggregate of your alienated being” – because the list above of what non-State peoples have can only be written by civilised people like ourselves as what they, in the main, do not have. This is an indication of how separate we are from them in all respects.

The uncontacted and Indigenous peoples (who are defended by the organisation Survival International) are the last humans. They are the revolution that has always been here. They have had no ‘fall from grace’ in the way we have. They have not embarked on a relentless wandering – or history – that has brought the world to the point of complete ecological collapse. They do not live in drudgery and empty despair; they have not had their spirit and humanity hollowed out of them.

As for us, we are trapped in a world that can never be made perfect because it will always need to be managed. And maybe we don’t really have much control over what we do, over the choices we can make… since we have no control over who we are. Perhaps the best one can do ‘politically’ is to keep trying to oppose ‘injustice,’ and oppression, to keep resisting dictatorship, even though it will inevitably keep returning. One could also try to help non-State peoples remain in their lands, separate from our world… even if everything has already gone too far… and the global ecological collapse – predicted to begin in earnest around 2040 – is going to take all of us with it.

-Peter Harrison

June 2020

Featured image: Lisa Brice, Wilderness (2005)
NOTES

[1] All translations of quotes are by the author, unless indicated by a footnote reference.

[2] See: Does the Theoretical Arrow… Also, Feuerbach, L. 2012, The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings, Zawar Hanfi (ed. and trans.), Verso, London, P98.

[3] “Dieser Kommunismus ist als vollendeter Naturalismus = Humanismus, als vollendeter Humanismus = Naturalismus, er ist die Wahrhafte Auflösung des Widerstreites zwischen dem Menschen mit der Natur und mit dem Menschen, die wahre Auflösung des Streits zwischen Existenz und Wesen, zwischen Vergegenständlichung und Selbstbestätigung, zwischen Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, zwischen Individuum und Gattung. Er ist das aufgelöste Rätsel der Geschichte und weiß sich als diese Lösung.” From: Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844.

[4] Emil Cioran, 1949, Précis de Décomposition, Éditions Gallimard (1978), Paris. Translations by Harrison. All quotes used are easily locatable in the book, in French or English, so I have refrained from adding even more footnotes.

[5] Cioran uses the word ‘divagante’ here, which is best translated as wandering, or straying. Elsewhere he uses the term divagation in a variety of contexts, all of which also translate as wandering, straying, rambling, etc. Divagation is also a word used in English, meaning digression, detour, tangent, etc. Camatte prefers the word, errance, which means wandering also, but can also mean vagrancy. Camatte does use the word divagation as the title for one text, in which he states that he is using it because of its old meaning: errer ça et là, ‘to wander here and there.’

[6] “The Wandering of Humanity”, in This World We Must Leave and Other Essays (1995), Alex Trotter (ed.), Fredy Perlman and Friends (trans.), Autonomedia, New York. Quotes are from P66 and 67 respectively. The simplicity of this last insight should not obscure its profound implications.

[7] Ibid., 56. [8] Ibid., 168. [9] Ibid., 34 [10] Ibid., 63.

[11] Yuri Slezkine, 2017, The House of Government, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

[12] Pierre Clastres, 1981, Archeology of Violence, Jeanine Herman (trans.), Semiotext (2010), P160-162.

[13] Pierre Clastres, 1974, Society Against the State, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein (trans.), Zone Books (2013), Brooklyn, P217-8.

[14] Albert Camus, The Rebel, (1951), Anthony Bower (trans.), Penguin, 1982, P265.

[15] For why religion is the child of politics, and not the other way around as many would have it, eg., philosopher John Gray, see, Religion is a Repeating Chapter in the History of Politics.

[16] Slezkine, Ibid., P180. Quotes are from Thomas Case, in addresses to the House of Commons, 1641. See also House of Government, p122. See also Bernard Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men: A Study in Seventeenth-Century English Millenarianism, Faber and Faber, 1972/2011.

[17] Endnotes is a group that has existed since 2005, with a prehistory (to 1992, in a UK group called Aufheben), which has become “increasingly international.” In their agonising over who they are and how they relate to “the class struggle” in the article We Unhappy Few, they have decided that they are theoreticians of current conditions and their abolition (not recruiters to a cause), and that the group should last “only so long as they feel they are contributing something useful” (P53). But how are they to know if they are contributing something ‘useful,’ even if it is just ‘a feeling,’ and useful to whom? What do they mean by ‘useful’? Are things only ‘important’ if they have ‘a use’? Their quietist millenarianism, though they insist they have never been a sect “in the normal sense,” (P21) is explained in this sentence: “A purpose that we have found that takes our interest[,] indeed to which we have found ourselves driven[,] is communist theory, the thinking about capitalism and its overcoming” (P53). This is the waiting, in studious and steadfast readiness, for the arrival of ‘God.’

Non-hyperlinked quotes from ‘We Unhappy Few,’ the first (unsigned – perhaps ‘group editorial’?) article, in Endnotes #5: ‘The Passions and the Interests,’ 2019, UK/USA.

[18] It is always difficult to make this kind of list for readers who may not already be ‘in the know’ as to the milieu I am referring to, which includes anarchists, councilists, left-councilists, situationists, Bordigists, and the libertarian left as well. The easiest way to imagine this milieu is to think of everyone that Lenin was attacking in his work of 1920, ‘Left Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder.

[19] One must understand the notion of ‘the real movement’ in the context of Marx and Engels’ whole-hearted support for ‘the scientific method,’ which is how they developed their notion of the dialectic as the driving force in ‘history.’ A famous line from Marx is rarely understood: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” This line was never a simple urging of philosophers to ‘get active’ for the good of things, it meant that philosophers had to abandon the world of ‘universal absolutes’ (think Plato’s theory of Forms) and work within the social and environmental processes that were actually in existence. If they did this, Marx believed, they would no longer be ‘idle philosophers,’ they would be scientists – in Marx’s era it was the scientists who were seen to be changing the world, and proletarians and philosophers would be able to do likewise if they became ‘scientists’ too or, more precisely, dialecticians of the materialist conception of history (historical materialism). See, for example, Engels’ explanation, from the paragraph beginning: “But what is true of nature…”

[20] Marx, K. 1867, Capital Volume 1, Penguin Books, 1976, P91.

[21] There are several references to ‘the real movement’ in We Unhappy Few. The quote from Marx is usually translated as something like: “the real movement which will abolish the present state of things,’ and is used frequently in the literature of ‘communization’ theory. The whole sentence from Marx is “Communism is for us the real movement which will abolish the present conditions.” Since the early 1970s the line, starting at ‘the real movement…,’ has become something of a magical incantation for left communists. The notion of ‘the real movement’ was referred to, but not referenced, in Eclipse and Re-Emergence of the Communist Movement, by the ultra-leftists, Gilles Dauvé (Jean Barrot) and François Martin, and it was here that the notion of communization first appeared. In 2000, Dauvé indicated that communization theory emerged from the Situationist International’s ‘critique of separation.’ Amusingly, in 1983, Camatte described ‘Dauvé and his companions’ as “the living dead” in response to their criticism of Camatte’s ‘optimism.’

[22] Preface to second edition of Nihilist Communism: A Critique of Optimism – the religious dogma that states there will be an ultimate triumph of good over evil – In the Far Left, Ardent Press, 2009, Page ix.

[23] Ibid., 101. It should also be noted that M. Dupont, the collective name for the two people who produced NC, was never ‘a group.’ The book was assembled from correspondence between us (and with others who were generally hostile to us), it was an expression of a friendship, a kind of romance, now lost in time. See also: The Tyranny of the Consciousness-Raisers.

[24] It would seem that many of us, I include myself here, have an inbuilt urge to endlessly proselytise. Emil Cioran writes, in A Short History of Decay, that people “are the chatterboxes of the universe” and that many insist on speaking for others… they use the word ‘we, for example,’ to describe what they themselves think. Anyone, he continues, “who speaks in the name of others is an imposter.” But we can temper our proselytism by refusing the diktats of serious, political, or academic prose by writing I instead of we, and never starting sentences with phrases such as: “Our task is to…” or “We need to…”

[25] These two paragraphs are from an earlier article, which draws on The Freedom of Things: An Ethnology of Control, P. Harrison, 2017, TSI Press, where the issue is discussed in greater depth.

[26] For a detailed exploration of Clastres’ thought see The Freedom of Things.

[27] For a detailed review of the anthropological literature see the section, “Enemy Relations,” in The Freedom of Things.

[28] Much of this and the next section is taken from an earlier article that can be found here.

[29] See Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality for his analysis of civilisation as a society of centripetal dependence, from which we cannot escape. Discussed in The Freedom of Things.

[30] Quotes are from pages 215 and 218 respectively, from The Rebel by Albert Camus, Anthony Bower (trans.), Penguin, 1982.

[31] The kulaks were portrayed by the Bolsheviks as ‘rich’ peasants who were in the way of the socialisation of the land but, in reality, they were simply all peasants. The peasantry – and the relationship between the land and the city – has been a perennial problem for revolutionaries, as Marx wrote in 1875: “The peasant exists on a mass scale as a private land proprietor, where he even forms a more-or-less considerable majority as in all the countries of the West European continent, where he has not disappeared and been replaced by agricultural laborers, as in England – the following will take place: either the peasants will start to create obstacles and bring about the fall of any worker revolution, as he has done before in France, or else the proletariat (for the peasant proprietor does not belong to the proletariat; even when his situation places him in it, he thinks that he doesn’t belong to it) must, as the government, take steps as a result of which the situation of the peasant will directly improve and which will therefore bring him over to the side of the revolution.” (quote is from The Marx and Engels Reader, 1978, Robert Tucker, but can also be found here.)

The group, Théorie Communiste, who are close to the group Endnotes, wrote in 2011: “The essential question which we will have to solve is to understand how we extend communism… how we integrate agriculture so as not to have to exchange with farmers.” P58.

Maxim Gorky is reported as having once said: “You’ll pardon my saying so, but the peasant is not yet human… He’s our enemy, our enemy.”

[32] Vasily Grossman, Everything Flows, Robert and Elizabeth Chandler with Anna Aslanyan (trans.), Vintage, 2011, P128-9.

[33] The notion of ‘reverse-dominance hierarchy,’ for example, as expounded by Christopher Boehm, is contested in The Freedom of Things. There is also an in-depth examination of ‘the feud’ in non-State societies that shows why this phenomenon is/was also not an exercise in ‘social control.’

[34] While ‘hunter-gatherers’ (my, less pejorative, term is wild-fooders – see The Freedom of Things) were certainly not sedentary by our standards they also were not nomadic in the way this term is generally understood.

______

Source: Ill Will Editions


On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant

by David Graeber
Printed: Issue 3 The Summer Of... August 2013 Estimated Read Time: 9 minutes
John Riordan


In the year 1930, John Maynard Keynes predicted that, by century's end, technology would have advanced sufficiently that countries like Great Britain or the United States would have achieved a 15-hour work week. There's every reason to believe he was right. In technological terms, we are quite capable of this. And yet it didn't happen. Instead, technology has been marshaled, if anything, to figure out ways to make us all work more. In order to achieve this, jobs have had to be created that are, effectively, pointless. Huge swathes of people, in Europe and North America in particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they secretly believe do not really need to be performed. The moral and spiritual damage that comes from this situation is profound. It is a scar across our collective soul. Yet virtually no one talks about it.

Why did Keynes' promised utopia—still being eagerly awaited in the '60s—never materialise? The standard line today is that he didn't figure in the massive increase in consumerism. Given the choice between less hours and more toys and pleasures, we've collectively chosen the latter. This presents a nice morality tale, but even a moment's reflection shows it can't really be true. Yes, we have witnessed the creation of an endless variety of new jobs and industries since the '20s, but very few have anything to do with the production and distribution of sushi, iPhones, or fancy sneakers.

So what are these new jobs, precisely? A recent report comparing employment in the US between 1910 and 2000 gives us a clear picture (and I note, one pretty much exactly echoed in the UK). Over the course of the last century, the number of workers employed as domestic servants, in industry, and in the farm sector has collapsed dramatically. At the same time, ‘professional, managerial, clerical, sales, and service workers’ tripled, growing ‘from one-quarter to three-quarters of total employment.’ In other words, productive jobs have, just as predicted, been largely automated away (even if you count industrial workers globally, including the toiling masses in India and China, such workers are still not nearly so large a percentage of the world population as they used to be.)

But rather than allowing a massive reduction of working hours to free the world's population to pursue their own projects, pleasures, visions, and ideas, we have seen the ballooning of not even so much of the ‘service’ sector as of the administrative sector, up to and including the creation of whole new industries like financial services or telemarketing, or the unprecedented expansion of sectors like corporate law, academic and health administration, human resources, and public relations. And these numbers do not even reflect on all those people whose job is to provide administrative, technical, or security support for these industries, or for that matter the whole host of ancillary industries (dog-washers, all-night pizza delivery) that only exist because everyone else is spending so much of their time working in all the other ones.

These are what I propose to call ‘bullshit jobs’.

It's as if someone were out there making up pointless jobs just for the sake of keeping us all working. And here, precisely, lies the mystery. In capitalism, this is precisely what is not supposed to happen. Sure, in the old inefficient socialist states like the Soviet Union, where employment was considered both a right and a sacred duty, the system made up as many jobs as they had to (this is why in Soviet department stores it took three clerks to sell a piece of meat). But, of course, this is the sort of very problem market competition is supposed to fix. According to economic theory, at least, the last thing a profit-seeking firm is going to do is shell out money to workers they don't really need to employ. Still, somehow, it happens.

While corporations may engage in ruthless downsizing, the layoffs and speed-ups invariably fall on that class of people who are actually making, moving, fixing and maintaining things; through some strange alchemy no one can quite explain, the number of salaried paper-pushers ultimately seems to expand, and more and more employees find themselves, not unlike Soviet workers actually, working 40 or even 50 hour weeks on paper, but effectively working 15 hours just as Keynes predicted, since the rest of their time is spent organizing or attending motivational seminars, updating their facebook profiles or downloading TV box-sets.

The answer clearly isn't economic: it's moral and political. The ruling class has figured out that a happy and productive population with free time on their hands is a mortal danger (think of what started to happen when this even began to be approximated in the '60s). And, on the other hand, the feeling that work is a moral value in itself, and that anyone not willing to submit themselves to some kind of intense work discipline for most of their waking hours deserves nothing, is extraordinarily convenient for them.

Once, when contemplating the apparently endless growth of administrative responsibilities in British academic departments, I came up with one possible vision of hell. Hell is a collection of individuals who are spending the bulk of their time working on a task they don't like and are not especially good at. Say they were hired because they were excellent cabinet-makers, and then discover they are expected to spend a great deal of their time frying fish. Neither does the task really need to be done—at least, there's only a very limited number of fish that need to be fried. Yet somehow, they all become so obsessed with resentment at the thought that some of their co-workers might be spending more time making cabinets, and not doing their fair share of the fish-frying responsibilities, that before long there's endless piles of useless badly cooked fish piling up all over the workshop and it's all that anyone really does. I think this is actually a pretty accurate description of the moral dynamics of our own economy.

Now, I realise any such argument is going to run into immediate objections: ‘who are you to say what jobs are really “necessary”? What's necessary anyway? You're an anthropology professor, what's the “need” for that?’ (And indeed a lot of tabloid readers would take the existence of my job as the very definition of wasteful social expenditure.) And on one level, this is obviously true. There can be no objective measure of social value.

I would not presume to tell someone who is convinced they are making a meaningful contribution to the world that, really, they are not. But what about those people who are themselves convinced their jobs are meaningless? Not long ago I got back in touch with a school friend who I hadn't seen since I was 12. I was amazed to discover that in the interim, he had become first a poet, then the front man in an indie rock band. I'd heard some of his songs on the radio having no idea the singer was someone I actually knew. He was obviously brilliant, innovative, and his work had unquestionably brightened and improved the lives of people all over the world. Yet, after a couple of unsuccessful albums, he'd lost his contract, and plagued with debts and a newborn daughter, ended up, as he put it, ‘taking the default choice of so many directionless folk: law school.’ Now he's a corporate lawyer working in a prominent New York firm. He was the first to admit that his job was utterly meaningless, contributed nothing to the world, and, in his own estimation, should not really exist.

There's a lot of questions one could ask here, starting with, what does it say about our society that it seems to generate an extremely limited demand for talented poet-musicians, but an apparently infinite demand for specialists in corporate law? (Answer: if 1% of the population controls most of the disposable wealth, what we call ‘the market’ reflects what they think is useful or important, not anybody else.) But even more, it shows that most people in these jobs are ultimately aware of it. In fact, I'm not sure I've ever met a corporate lawyer who didn't think their job was bullshit. The same goes for almost all the new industries outlined above. There is a whole class of salaried professionals that, should you meet them at parties and admit that you do something that might be considered interesting (an anthropologist, for example), will want to avoid even discussing their line of work entirely (one or t'other?) Give them a few drinks, and they will launch into tirades about how pointless and stupid their job really is.

This is a profound psychological violence here. How can one even begin to speak of dignity in labour when one secretly feels one's job should not exist? How can it not create a sense of deep rage and resentment. Yet it is the peculiar genius of our society that its rulers have figured out a way, as in the case of the fish-fryers, to ensure that rage is directed precisely against those who actually do get to do meaningful work. For instance: in our society, there seems a general rule that, the more obviously one's work benefits other people, the less one is likely to be paid for it. Again, an objective measure is hard to find, but one easy way to get a sense is to ask: what would happen were this entire class of people to simply disappear? Say what you like about nurses, garbage collectors, or mechanics, it's obvious that were they to vanish in a puff of smoke, the results would be immediate and catastrophic. A world without teachers or dock-workers would soon be in trouble, and even one without science fiction writers or ska musicians would clearly be a lesser place. It's not entirely clear how humanity would suffer were all private equity CEOs, lobbyists, PR researchers, actuaries, telemarketers, bailiffs or legal consultants to similarly vanish. (Many suspect it might markedly improve.) Yet apart from a handful of well-touted exceptions (doctors), the rule holds surprisingly well.

Even more perverse, there seems to be a broad sense that this is the way things should be. This is one of the secret strengths of right-wing populism. You can see it when tabloids whip up resentment against tube workers for paralysing London during contract disputes: the very fact that tube workers can paralyse London shows that their work is actually necessary, but this seems to be precisely what annoys people. It's even clearer in the US, where Republicans have had remarkable success mobilizing resentment against school teachers, or auto workers (and not, significantly, against the school administrators or auto industry managers who actually cause the problems) for their supposedly bloated wages and benefits. It's as if they are being told ‘but you get to teach children! Or make cars! You get to have real jobs! And on top of that you have the nerve to also expect middle-class pensions and health care?’

If someone had designed a work regime perfectly suited to maintaining the power of finance capital, it's hard to see how they could have done a better job. Real, productive workers are relentlessly squeezed and exploited. The remainder are divided between a terrorised stratum of the, universally reviled, unemployed and a larger stratum who are basically paid to do nothing, in positions designed to make them identify with the perspectives and sensibilities of the ruling class (managers, administrators, etc.)—and particularly its financial avatars—but, at the same time, foster a simmering resentment against anyone whose work has clear and undeniable social value. Clearly, the system was never consciously designed. It emerged from almost a century of trial and error. But it is the only explanation for why, despite our technological capacities, we are not all working 3–4 hour days.

in Issue 3 The Summer Of...

Get it here
The Shock Of Victory
An Essay by David Graeber—and a Short Eulogy for Him


SEP 03 2020
anarchistnews.org
By the collective


via CrimethInc.

Today, we mourn the passing of our friend and comrade, David Graeber, a tireless, insightful, and wide-ranging thinker. In his honor, we present his essay, “The Shock of Victory,” which he composed for the fifth issue of our journal, Rolling Thunder, exploring how anarchists can set long-term goals so as not to be caught off guard by our victories.

David’s unexpected passing takes us by surprise. Only days ago, we were corresponding with him about Facebook’s decision to ban anarchist pages to placate the Trump administration. David was among the first to respond with a support statement, charging that “Nothing could conceivably be more violent than to tell us—and particularly our young people—we are forbidden to even dream of a peaceful, caring, world.”


This was in character for David. He was not just an intellectual—he was always eager to take a stand, putting himself in the thick of things. He participated in the Direct Action Network in New York City leading up to the massive demonstrations against the Free Trade Area of the Americas ministerial in Quebec City in April 2001 at the high point of the so-called “anti-globalization” movement. He was an instrumental participant in the founding of Occupy Wall Street and engaged in the debates about “violence” that followed, confronting the same self-righteous pundits that other anarchists did. He was one of the first to direct international attention to the revolutionary experiment in Rojava when it was threatened by the Islamic State, and joined us a year ago in calling for solidarity when Turkey invaded.

He put his body on the line along with his reputation, braving tear gas as well as academic retaliation. After Yale forced him out for his political beliefs, David was compelled to move overseas to find a university position commensurate with his abilities. He got a corporate publishing deal, yes, but he got it by refusing to compromise, not by watering down his politics.

David wrote—and thought, and said, and did—more than we could possibly summarize here. We hope that others will compose a proper eulogy to him, recounting all of his activities and contributions across a wide range of fields. Even when we disagreed—our analysis of democracy is in part a response to David’s account of democracy in essays such as “There Never Was a West“—we always learned from him. He was a stalwart friend and a worthy adversary.

In Graeber’s most transcendent work, such as the essay “What’s the Point If We Can’t Have Fun?”, he grapples with the basic ontological questions about freedom and the cosmos. This is how we remember him, weaving together different threads to present a vision of self-determination that extends from subatomic particles to entire societies and ecosystems:


“Is it meaningful to say an electron ‘chooses’ to jump the way it does? Obviously, there’s no way to prove it. The only evidence we could have (that we can’t predict what it’s going to do), we do have. But it’s hardly decisive. Still, if one wants a consistently materialist explanation of the world—that is, if one does not wish to treat the mind as some supernatural entity imposed on the material world, but rather as simply a more complex organization of processes that are already going on, at every level of material reality—then it makes sense that something at least a little like intentionality, something at least a little like experience, something at least a little like freedom, would have to exist on every level of physical reality as well.”

He passed away at the young age of 59. Our hearts go out to everyone who survives him. We mourn his passing and grieve for all the things that David had yet to share with us.






David Graeber, rest in peace.




The essay we share here emerged from a discussion about the legacy of anti-capitalist struggles at the turn of the century, during the protests against the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and proposed “free” trade initiatives such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Anarchists and other anti-capitalist protesters played a major role in delegitimizing the WTO and World Bank and even succeeded in blocking the passing of the FTAA agreement—yet afterwards, many of the participants in the movement were dejected, dismayed that we had not succeeded in abolishing capitalism entirely.

Following this discussion, we invited David to expand his thoughts in an essay for Rolling Thunder, and the result was the following essay, “The Shock of Victory.”

If anything, David’s argument that anarchists are often unprepared for our victories is more timely today than it was when it appeared at the beginning of 2008. In the past few years, anarchists and other proponents of the abolition of police, prisons, and the existing criminal justice system have succeeded in popularizing the notion that all of these are unjust institutions with no legitimacy to govern our lives. Unsurprisingly, authoritarians and police have lashed out with tremendous violence. Caught in a war of attrition involving nightly clashes, it’s easy for demonstrators to feel that we are losing—when on a historic level, we have already achieved some goals that seemed unthinkable only a few years ago. The question—in 2008 as today—is how we can strategize on a long enough timeframe to make the most of our victories, rather than collapsing in despair in the face of the desperate blows of the reaction.

We urge everyone to read David’s work and take up whichever of David’s projects resonate with you. He should be with us in our movements, speaking to us, continuing to live in the actions we take and the visions we share.



David as we knew and loved him.



THE SHOCK OF VICTORY

The biggest problem facing direct action movements is that we don’t know how to handle victory.

This might seem an odd thing to say because a lot of us haven’t been feeling particularly victorious of late. Most anarchists today feel the global justice movement was kind of a blip: inspiring, certainly, while it lasted, but not a movement that succeeded either in putting down lasting organizational roots or transforming the contours of power in the world. The antiwar movement was even more frustrating, since anarchists and anarchist tactics were largely marginalized. The war will end, of course, but that’s just because wars always do. No one is feeling they contributed much to it.

I want to suggest an alternative interpretation. Let me lay out three initial propositions here:

1. Odd though it may seem, the ruling classes live in fear of us. They appear to still be haunted by the possibility that, if average Americans really get wind of what they’re up to, they might all end up hanging from trees. I know it seems implausible, but it’s hard to come up with any other explanation for the way they go into panic mode the moment there is any sign of mass mobilization, and especially mass direct action, and usually try to start some kind of war to distract attention.

2. In a way, though, this panic is justified. Mass direct action—especially when organized on democratic lines—is incredibly effective. Over the last thirty years in America, there have been only two instances of mass action of this sort: the anti-nuclear movement in the late ’70s, and the so called “anti-globalization” movement from roughly 1999 to 2001. In each case, the movement’s main political goals were reached far more quickly than almost anyone involved imagined possible.

3. The real problem such movements face is that they always get taken by surprise by the speed of their initial success. We are never prepared for victory. It throws us into confusion. We start fighting each other. The ratcheting up of repression and appeals to nationalism that inevitably accompany some new war mobilization then play into the hands of authoritarians on every side of the political spectrum. As a result, by the time the full impact of our initial victory becomes clear, we’re usually too busy feeling like failures to even notice it.



A demonstrator throws a tear gas canister back to the police who shot it during demonstrations against the Free Trade Area of the Americas ministerial in Quebec City, April 20-21, during the high point of the so-called “anti-globalization” movement.

Let me take the two most prominent examples case by case:

I: THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT

The anti-nuclear movement of the late ’70s marked the first appearance in North America of what we now consider standard anarchist tactics and forms of organization: mass actions, affinity groups, spokes-councils, consensus process, jail solidarity, the very principle of decentralized direct democracy… It was all somewhat primitive, compared to now, and there were significant differences—notably much stricter, Gandhian-style conceptions of non-violence—but all the elements were there and it was the first time they had come together as a package. For two years, the movement grew with amazing speed and showed every sign of becoming a nation-wide phenomenon. Then almost as quickly, it disintegrated.

It all began when, in 1974, some veteran-peaceniks-turned-organic farmers in New England successfully blocked construction of a proposed nuclear power plant in Montague, Massachusetts. In 1976, they joined with other New England activists, inspired by the success of a year-long plant occupation in Germany, to create the Clamshell Alliance. Clamshell’s immediate goal was to stop construction of a proposed nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire. While the alliance never ended up managing an occupation so much as a series of dramatic mass-arrests, combined with jail solidarity, their actions—involving, at peak, tens of thousands of people organized on directly democratic lines—succeeded in throwing the very idea of nuclear power into question in a way it had never been before. Similar coalitions began springing up across the country: the Palmetto Alliance in South Carolina, Oystershell in Maryland, Sunflower in Kansas, and most famous of all, the Abalone Alliance in California, reacting originally to a completely insane plan to build a nuclear power plant at Diablo Canyon, almost directly on top of a major geographic fault line.

Clamshell’s first three mass actions, in 1976 and 1977, were wildly successful. But it soon fell into crisis over questions of democratic process. In May 1978, a newly created Coordinating Committee violated process to accept a last-minute government offer for a three-day legal rally at Seabrook instead of a planned fourth occupation (the excuse was reluctance to alienate the surrounding community). Acrimonious debates began about consensus and community relations, which then expanded to the role of non-violence (even cutting through fences, or defensive measures like gas masks, had originally been forbidden), gender bias, and so on. By 1979 the alliance split into two contending, and increasingly ineffective, factions, and after many delays, the Seabrook plant (or half of it anyway) did go into operation. The Abalone Alliance lasted longer, until 1985, in part because its strong core of anarcha-feminists, but in the end, Diablo Canyon too got its license and went into operation in December 1988.

On the surface this doesn’t sound too inspiring. But what was the movement really trying to achieve? It might be helpful here to map out its full range of goals:

1. Short-Term Goals: to block construction of the particular nuclear plant in question (Seabrook, Diablo Canyon…).

2. Medium-Term Goals: to block construction of all new nuclear plants, delegitimize the very idea of nuclear power and begin moving towards conservation and green power, and legitimate new forms of non-violent resistance and feminist-inspired direct democracy.

3. Long-Term Goals: (at least for the more radical elements) smash the state and destroy capitalism.

If so, the results are clear. Short-term goals were almost never reached. Despite numerous tactical victories (delays, utility company bankruptcies, legal injunctions), the plants that became the focus of mass action all ultimately went on line. Governments simply cannot allow themselves to be seen to lose such a battle. Long-term goals were also obviously not obtained. But one reason they weren’t is that the medium-term goals were all reached almost immediately. The actions did delegitimize the very idea of nuclear power—raising public awareness to the point that when Three Mile Island melted down in 1979, it doomed the industry forever. While plans for Seabrook and Diablo Canyon might not have been cancelled, just about every other then-pending plan to build a nuclear reactor was, and no new ones have been proposed for a quarter century. There was indeed a move towards conservation, green power, and a legitimizing of new democratic organizing techniques. All this happened much more quickly than anyone had really anticipated.

In retrospect, it’s easy to see most of the subsequent problems emerged directly from the very speed of the movement’s success. Radicals had hoped to make links between the nuclear industry and the very nature of the capitalist system that created it. As it turns out, the capitalist system proved more than willing to jettison the nuclear industry the moment it became a liability. Once giant utility companies began claiming they too wanted to promote green energy, effectively inviting what we’d now call the NGO types to a space at the table, there was an enormous temptation to jump ship. Especially because many of them only allied with more radical groups so as to win themselves a place at the table to begin with.

The inevitable result was a series of heated strategic debates. But it’s impossible to understand this without first understanding that strategic debates, within directly democratic movements, are rarely conducted as such. They almost always take the form of debates about something else. Take for instance the question of capitalism. Anti-capitalists are usually more than happy to discuss their position on the subject. Liberals, on the other hand, really don’t like to have to say, “actually, I am in favor of maintaining capitalism,” so whenever possible, they try to change the subject. Thus, debates that are actually about whether to directly challenge capitalism usually end up getting argued out as if they were short-term debates about tactics and non-violence. Authoritarian socialists or others who are suspicious of democracy itself don’t like to make that an issue either, and prefer to discuss the need to create the broadest possible coalitions. Those who do like democracy but feel a group is taking the wrong strategic direction often find it much more effective to challenge its decision-making process than to challenge its actual decisions.



Demonstrators dealing with the effects of tear gas during demonstrations against the Free Trade Area of the Americas ministerial in Quebec City, 2001.

There is another factor here that is even less remarked on, but I think equally important. Everyone knows that faced with a broad and potentially revolutionary coalition, any government’s first move will be to try to split it. Making concessions to placate the moderates while selectively criminalizing the radicals—this is Art of Governance 101. In addition, the US government is in possession of a global empire constantly mobilized for war, and this gives it another option that most governments don’t have. Those running it can ratchet up the level of violence overseas pretty much any time they like; this has proved a remarkably effective way to defuse social movements founded around domestic concerns. It seems no coincidence that the civil rights movement was followed by major political concessions and a rapid escalation of the war in Vietnam; that the anti-nuclear movement was followed by the abandonment of nuclear power and a ramping up of the Cold War, with Star Wars programs and proxy wars in Afghanistan and Central America; that the Global Justice Movement was followed by the collapse of the Washington Consensus and the War on Terror. As a result early SDS had to put aside its early emphasis on participatory democracy to become a mere anti-war movement; the anti-nuclear movement morphed into a nuclear freeze movement; the horizontal structures of DAN and PGA gave way to top-down mass organizations like ANSWER and UFPJ.

From the point of view of government, the military solution does have its risks. The whole thing can blow up in one’s face, as it did in Vietnam (hence the obsession, at least since the first Gulf War, with designing a war that is effectively protest-proof.) There is also always a small risk some miscalculation will accidentally trigger a nuclear Armageddon and destroy the planet. But these are risks politicians faced with civil unrest appear to have been more than willing to take—if only because directly democratic movements genuinely scare them, while anti-war movements are their preferred adversary. After all, states are ultimately forms of violence—it’s their native tongue. As soon as the argument shifts to violence versus non-violence, they’re back on their home turf, where they’re best equipped to justify and enforce themselves. Organizations designed either to wage or to oppose wars will always tend to be more hierarchically organized than those designed with almost anything else in mind. This is certainly what happened in the case of the anti-nuclear movement.

While the anti-war mobilizations of the ’80s turned out far larger numbers than Clamshell or Abalone ever had, they also marked a return to marching with signs, permitted rallies, and abandoning experiments with new forms of direct democracy.



Police behind a barrier during the demonstrations against the Free Trade Area of the Americas ministerial in Quebec City, 2001.

II: THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

I’ll assume our gentle reader is broadly familiar with the actions at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, the IMF-World Bank blockades six months later in Washington at A16, and so on.

In the US, the movement flared up so quickly and dramatically that even the media could not completely dismiss it. It also quickly started eating itself. Direct Action Networks were founded in almost every major city in America. While some of these (notably Seattle and Los Angeles DAN) were reformist, anti-corporate, and fans of strict non-violence codes, most (like New York and Chicago DAN) were overwhelmingly anarchist and anti-capitalist, and dedicated to diversity of tactics. Other cities (Montreal, Washington, D.C.) created even more explicitly anarchist Anti-Capitalist Convergences. The anti-corporate DANs dissolved almost immediately, but very few lasted more than a couple years. There were endless and bitter debates: about nonviolence, about summit-hopping, about racism and privilege issues, about the viability of the network model.

Then there was 9/11, followed by a huge increase of the level of repression and resultant paranoia, and the panicked flight of almost all our former allies among unions and NGOs. By Miami, in 2003, it seemed like we’d been put to rout, and a paralysis swept over the movement from which we’ve only recently started to recover.

September 11 was such a weird event, such a catastrophe, that it makes it almost impossible for us to perceive anything else around it. In its immediate aftermath, almost all of the structures created in the globalization movement collapsed. But one reason it was so easy for them to collapse was—not just that war seemed such an immediately more pressing concern—but that once again, in most of our immediate objectives, we’d already, unexpectedly, won.



The black bloc marching into the fray on April 21, 2001, during clashes outside the demonstrations against the Free Trade Area of the Americas ministerial in Quebec City.




Myself, I joined NYC DAN right around the time of A16. At the time DAN as a whole saw itself as a group with two major objectives. One was to help coordinate the North American wing of a vast global movement against neoliberalism, and what was then called the Washington Consensus, to destroy the hegemony of neoliberal ideas, stop all the new big trade agreements (WTO, FTAA), and to discredit and eventually destroy organizations like the IMF. The other was to replace old-fashioned activist organizing styles with their steering committees and ideological squabbles, to disseminate a (very much anarchist-inspired) model of direct democracy: decentralized, affinity-group structures, consensus process. At the time we sometimes called it “contaminationism,” the idea that all people really needed was to be exposed to the experience of direct action and direct democracy and they would want to start imitating it all by themselves. There was a general feeling that we weren’t trying to build a permanent structure; DAN was just a means to this end. When it had served its purpose, several founding members explained to me, there would be no further need for it. On the other hand these were pretty ambitious goals, so we also assumed even if we did attain them, it would probably take at least a decade.

As it turned out, it took about a year and a half.

Obviously we failed to spark a social revolution. But one reason we never got to the point of inspiring hundreds of thousands of people to rise up was, again, that we achieved our other goals so quickly. Take the question of organization. While the anti-war coalitions still operate, as anti-war coalitions always do, as top-down popular front groups, almost every small-scale radical group that isn’t dominated by Marxist sectarians of some sort or another—and this includes anything from organizations of Syrian immigrants in Montreal to community gardens in Detroit—now operates on largely anarchist principles—though they might not know it. Contaminationism worked. Alternately, take the domain of ideas. The Washington Consensus lies in ruins. So much so it’s hard now to remember what public discourse in this country was even like before Seattle.

Rarely have the media and political classes been so completely unanimous about anything—that “free trade,” “free markets,” and no-holds-barred supercharged capitalism were the only possible direction for human history; the only possible solution for any problem was so completely assumed that anyone who cast doubt on the proposition was treated as literally insane. Global justice activists, when they first forced themselves into the attention of CNN or Newsweek, were immediately written off as reactionary lunatics. A year or two later, CNN and Newsweek were saying we’d won the argument.



Anarchists and other demonstrators tear down the fence around the Free Trade Area of the Americas ministerial in Quebec City on April 20, 2001.

Usually when I make this point in front of anarchist crowds someone immediately objects: “well, sure, the rhetoric has changed, but the policies remain the same.” This is true in a manner of speaking. That is to say, it’s true that we didn’t destroy capitalism. But we (taking the “we” here as the horizontalist, direct-actionoriented wing of the planetary movement against neoliberalism) did arguably deal it a bigger blow in just two years than anyone since, say, the Russian Revolution. Let me take this point by point:


Free Trade Agreeements. All the ambitious free trade treaties planned since 1998 have failed. The MAI was routed; the FTAA, focus of the actions in Quebec City and Miami, stopped dead in its tracks. Most of us remember the 2003 FTAA summit mainly for introducing the “Miami model” of extreme police repression even against obviously non-violent civil resistance. It was that. But we forget this was more than anything the enraged flailings of a pack of extremely sore losers—Miami was the meeting where the FTAA was definitively killed. Now no one is even talking about broad, ambitious treaties on that scale. The US is reduced to pushing for minor country-to-country trade pacts with traditional allies like South Korea and Peru, or at best deals like CAFTA, uniting its remaining client states in Central America, and it’s not even clear it will manage to pull that off.


The World Trade Organization. After the catastrophe (for them) in Seattle, organizers moved the next meeting to the Persian Gulf island of Doha, apparently deciding they would rather run the risk of being blown up by Osama bin Laden than having to face another DAN blockade. For six years they hammered away at the “Doha round.” The problem was that, emboldened by the protest movement, Southern governments began insisting they would no longer agree to open their borders to agricultural imports from rich countries unless those rich countries at least stopped pouring billions of dollars of subsidies into their own agricultural industries to ensure Southern farmers couldn’t possibly compete. Since the US in particular had no intention of making any of the sort of sacrifices it demanded of the rest of the world, all deals were off. In July 2006, Pierre Lamy, head of the WTO, declared the Doha round dead and at this point no one is even talking about another WTO negotiation for at least two years—at which point the organization might very possibly not exist.


The International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This is the most amazing story of all. The IMF is rapidly approaching bankruptcy, and it is a direct result of the worldwide mobilization against them. To put the matter bluntly: we destroyed it. The World Bank is not doing all that much better. But by the time the full effects were felt, we weren’t even paying attention.

This last story is worth telling in some detail.

The IMF was always the arch-villain of the struggle. It is the most powerful, most arrogant, most pitiless instrument through which neoliberal policies have, for the last twenty-five years, been imposed on the poorer countries of the global South, basically by manipulating debt. In exchange for emergency refinancing, the IMF would demand “structural adjustment programs” that forced massive cuts in health and education, price supports on food, and endless privatization schemes that allowed foreign capitalists to buy up local resources at fire sale prices. Structural adjustment somehow never worked to get countries back on their feet economically, but that just meant they remained in crisis, and the solution was always to insist on yet another round of structural adjustment.

The IMF also had another, less celebrated, role: global enforcer. It was their job to ensure that no country (no matter how poor) could ever be allowed to default on loans to Western bankers (no matter how foolish). Even if a banker were to offer a corrupt dictator a billion dollar loan, and that dictator placed it directly in his Swiss bank account and fled the country, the IMF would ensure a billion dollars (plus generous interest) would be extracted from his former victims. If a country did default, for any reason, the IMF could impose a credit boycott whose economic effects were roughly comparable to that of a nuclear bomb. (All this flies in the face of even elementary economic theory, whereby those lending money are supposed to be accepting a certain degree of risk; but in the world of international politics, economic laws are only held to be binding on the poor.) This role was their downfall.

What happened was that Argentina defaulted and got away with it. In the ’90s, Argentina had been the IMF’s star pupil in Latin America—they had literally privatized every public facility except the customs bureau. Then in 2002, the economy crashed. The immediate results we all know: battles in the streets, popular assemblies, the overthrow of three governments in one month, road blockades, occupied factories. “Horizontalism”— broadly anarchist principles—was at the core of popular resistance. The political class was so completely discredited that politicians were obliged to put on wigs and phony mustaches to be able to eat in restaurants without being physically attacked. When Nestor Kirchner, a moderate social democrat, took power in 2003, he knew he had to do something dramatic in order to get most of the population to accept even the idea of having a government, let alone his own. So he did. He did, in fact, the one thing no one in that position is ever supposed to do. He defaulted on Argentina’s foreign debt.

Actually Kirchner was quite clever about it. He did not default on his IMF loans. He defaulted on Argentina’s private debt, announcing that for all outstanding loans, he would only pay 25 cents on the dollar. Citibank and Chase of course went to the IMF, their accustomed enforcer, to demand punishment. But for the first time in its history, the IMF balked. First of all, with Argentina’s economy already in ruins, even the economic equivalent of a nuclear bomb would do little more than make the rubble bounce. Second of all, just about everyone was aware it was the IMF’s disastrous advice that set the stage for Argentina’s crash in the first place. Third and most decisively, this was at the very height of the impact of the global justice movement: the IMF was already the most hated institution on the planet, and willfully destroying what little remained of the Argentine middle class would have been pushing things just a little bit too far.

So Argentina was allowed to get away with it. After that, everything changed. Brazil and Argentina together arranged to pay back their outstanding debt to the IMF itself. With a little help from Chavez, so did the rest of the continent. In 2003, Latin American IMF debt stood at $49 billion. Now it’s $694 million. To put that in perspective: that’s a decline of 98.6%. For every thousand dollars owed four years ago, Latin America now owes fourteen bucks. Asia followed. China and India now both have no outstanding debt to the IMF and refuse to take out new loans. The boycott now includes Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and pretty much every other significant regional economy. Also Russia. The Fund is reduced to lording it over the economies of Africa, and maybe some parts of the Middle East and former Soviet sphere (basically those without oil). As a result its revenues have plummeted by 80% in four years. In the irony of all possible ironies, it’s increasingly looking like the IMF will go bankrupt if they can’t find someone willing to bail them out, but it isn’t clear that anyone particularly wants to. With its reputation as fiscal enforcer in tatters, the IMF no longer serves any obvious purpose even for capitalists. There’s been a number of proposals at recent G8 meetings to make up a new mission for the organization—a kind of international bankruptcy court, perhaps—but all have ended up getting torpedoed for one reason or another. Even if the IMF does survive, it has already been reduced to a cardboard cut-out of its former self.

The World Bank, which early on took on the role of good cop, is in somewhat better shape. But emphasis here must be placed on the word “somewhat”—as in, its revenue has only fallen by 60%, not 80%, and there are few actual boycotts. On the other hand the Bank is currently being kept alive largely by the fact that India and China are still willing to deal with it, and both sides know that, so it is no longer in much of a position to dictate terms.

Obviously, all of this does not mean all the monsters have been slain. In Latin America, neoliberalism might be on the run, but China and India are carrying out devastating “reforms” within their own countries, European social protections are under attack, and most of Africa, despite much hypocritical posturing on the part of the Bonos and rich countries of the world, is still locked in debt, and now also facing a new colonization by China. The US, its economic power retreating in most of the world, is frantically trying to redouble its grip over Mexico and Central America. We’re not living in utopia. But we already knew that. The question is why we never noticed our victories.

Olivier de Marcellus, a PGA activist from Switzerland, points to one reason: whenever some element of the capitalist system takes a hit, whether it’s the nuclear industry or the IMF, some leftist journal will start explaining to us that really, this is all part of their plan—or maybe, an effect of the inexorable working out of the internal contradictions of capital, but certainly, nothing for which we ourselves are in any way responsible. Even more important, perhaps, is our reluctance to even say the word “we.” The Argentine default, wasn’t that really engineered by Nestor Kirchner? What does he have to do with the globalization movement? I mean, it’s not as if his hands were forced by thousands of citizens rising up, smashing banks, and replacing the government with popular assemblies coordinated by the IMC. Or, well, okay, maybe it was. Well, in that case, those citizens were People of Color in the Global South. How can “we” take responsibility for their actions? Never mind that they mostly saw themselves as part of the same global justice movement as us, espoused similar ideas, wore similar clothes, used similar tactics, in many cases even belonged to the same confederacies or organizations. Saying “we” here would imply the primal sin of speaking for others.

Myself, I think it’s reasonable for a global movement to consider its accomplishments in global terms. These are not inconsiderable. Yet just as with the antinuclear movement, they were almost all focused on the middle term. Let me map out a similar hierarchy of goals:

1) Short-Term Goals: blockade and shut down particular summit meetings (IMF, WTO, G8, etc.).

2 ) Medium-Term Goals: destroy the “Washington Consensus” around neoliberalism, block all new trade pacts, delegitimize and ultimately shut down institutions like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank; disseminate new models of direct democracy.

3) Long-Term Goals: (at least for the more radical elements) smash the state and destroy capitalism.

Here again, we find the same pattern. After the miracle of Seattle, short-term— tactical—goals were rarely achieved. But this was mainly because faced with such a movement, governments tend to dig in their heels and make it a matter of principle that they shouldn’t be visibly defeated. This was usually considered much more important, in fact, than the success of the summit in question. Most activists do not seem to be aware that in a lot of cases—the 2001 and 2002 IMF and World Bank meetings for example—police ended up enforcing security arrangements so elaborate that they came very close to shutting down the meetings themselves; ensuring that many events were cancelled, the ceremonies were ruined, and nobody really had a chance to talk to each other. But the point was not whether trade officials got to meet or not. The point was that the protestors could not be seen to win.

Here, too, the medium-term goals were achieved so quickly that it actually made the longer-term goals more difficult. NGOs, labor unions, authoritarian Marxists, and similar allies jumped ship almost immediately; strategic debates ensued, but they were carried out, as always, indirectly, as arguments about race, privilege, tactics, as almost anything but actual strategic debates. Here, too, everything was made infinitely more difficult by the state’s recourse to war.

It is hard, as I mentioned, for anarchists to take much direct responsibility for the inevitable end of the war in Iraq, or even for the very bloody nose the empire has already acquired there. But a case could well be made for indirect responsibility. Since the ’60s and the catastrophe of Vietnam, the US government has not abandoned its policy of answering any threat of democratic mass mobilizing by a return to war. But it has to be much more careful. Essentially, they have to design wars to be protest-proof. There is very good reason to believe that the first Gulf War was explicitly designed with this in mind. The approach taken to the invasion of Iraq—the insistence on a smaller, high-tech army, the extreme reliance on indiscriminate firepower, even against civilians, to protect against any Vietnam-like levels of American casualties—appears to have been developed, again, more with a mind to heading off any potential peace movement at home than for the sake of military effectiveness. This, anyway, would help explain why the most powerful army in the world has ended up being tied down and even defeated by an almost unimaginably ragtag group of guerillas with negligible access to outside safe-areas, funding, or military support. As in the trade summits, they are so obsessed with ensuring that the forces of civil resistance cannot be seen to win the battle at home that they would prefer to lose the actual war.




PERSPECTIVES (WITH A BRIEF RETURN TO 1930S SPAIN)

How, then, to cope with the perils of victory? I can’t claim to have any simple answers. Really I wrote this essay more to start a conversation, to put the problem on the table—to inspire a strategic debate.

Still, some implications are pretty obvious. The next time we plan a major action campaign, I think we would do well to at least take into account the possibility that we might obtain our mid-range strategic goals very quickly, and that when that happens, many of our allies will fall away. We have to recognize strategic debates for what they are, even when they seem to be about something else. Take one famous example: arguments about property destruction after Seattle. Most of these, I think, were really arguments about capitalism. Those who decried window-breaking did so mainly because they wished to appeal to middle-class consumers to move towards global-exchange style green consumerism, to ally with labor bureaucracies and social democrats abroad. This was not a path designed to create a direct confrontation with capitalism, and most of those who urged us to take this route were at least skeptical about the possibility that capitalism could ever really be defeated at all.

Those who did break windows didn’t care if they were offending suburban homeowners, because they didn’t see them as a potential element in a revolutionary anti-capitalist coalition. They were trying, in effect, to hijack the media to send a message that the system was vulnerable—hoping to inspire similar insurrectionary acts on the parts of those who might consider entering a genuinely revolutionary alliance: alienated teenagers, oppressed people of color, rank-and-file laborers impatient with union bureaucrats, the homeless, the criminalized, the radically discontent. If a militant anti-capitalist movement was to begin in America, it would have to start with people like these: people who don’t need to be convinced that the system is rotten, only that there’s something they can do about it. And at any rate, even if it were possible to have an anti-capitalist revolution without gun-battles in the streets—which most of us are hoping it is, since let’s face it, if we come up against the US army, we will lose—there’s no possible way we could have an anti-capitalist revolution while at the same time scrupulously respecting property rights.

The latter actually leads to an interesting question. What would it mean to win, not just our medium-term goals, but our long-term ones? At the moment no one is even clear how that would come about, for the very reason that none of us have much faith left in “the” revolution in the old 19th or 20th century sense of the term. After all, the total view of revolution, that there will be a single mass insurrection or general strike and then all walls will come tumbling down, is entirely premised on the old fantasy of capturing the state. That’s the only way victory could possibly be that absolute and complete—at least, if we are speaking of a whole country or meaningful territory.

In way of illustration, consider this: what would it have actually meant for the Spanish anarchists to have actually “won” in 1937? It’s amazing how rarely we ask ourselves such questions. We just imagine it would have been something like the Russian Revolution, which began in a similar way, with the melting away of the old army, the spontaneous creation of workers’ soviets. But that was in the major cities. The Russian Revolution was followed by years of civil war in which the Red Army gradually imposed the new state’s control on every part of the old Russian Empire, whether the communities in question wanted it or not. Let us imagine that anarchist militias in Spain had routed the fascist army, which then completely dissolved, and kicked the socialist Republican Government out of its offices in Barcelona and Madrid. That would certainly have been victory by anybody’s standards. But what would have happened next? Would they have established Spain as a non-Republic, an anti-state existing within the exact same international borders? Would they have imposed a regime of popular councils in every single village and municipality in the territory of what had formerly been Spain? How exactly?

We have to bear in mind here that there were many villages, towns, and even whole regions of Spain where anarchists were almost non-existent. In some, just about the entire population was made up of conservative Catholics or monarchists; in others (say, the Basque country), there was a militant and well-organized working class, but one that was overwhelmingly socialist or communist. Even at the height of revolutionary fervor, most of these would stay true to their old values and ideas. If the victorious FAI attempted to exterminate them all—a task which would have required killing millions of people—or chase them out of the country, or forcibly relocate them into anarchist communities, or send them off to reeducation camps—they would not only have been guilty of world-class atrocities, they would have had to give up on being anarchists. Democratic organizations simply cannot commit atrocities on that systematic scale: for that, you’d need Communist or Fascist-style top-down organization, since you can’t actually get thousands of human beings to systematically massacre helpless women and children and old people, destroy communities, or chase families from their ancestral homes unless they can at least say they were only following orders. There appear to have been only two possible solutions to the problem.

1. Let the Republic continue as the de facto government, controlled by the socialists; let them impose government control on the right-wing majority areas, while getting some kind of deal out of them that they would leave the anarchist-majority cities, towns, and villages alone to organize themselves as they wish… and hope that the government kept the deal.

2. Declare that everyone was to form their own local popular assemblies, and let them decide on their own mode of self-organization.

The latter seems the more fitting with anarchist principles, but the results wouldn’t have likely been much different. After all, if the inhabitants of, say, Bilbao collectively decided to create a local government, how exactly would one have stopped them? Municipalities where most people were still loyal to the church or local landlords would presumably put the same old right-wing authorities in charge; socialist or communist municipalities would put socialist or communist party bureaucrats in charge. Right and Left statists would then each form rival confederations that, even though they controlled only a fraction of the former Spanish territory, would each declare themselves the legitimate government of Spain. Foreign governments would recognize one or the other—since none would be willing to exchange ambassadors with a non-government like the FAI, even assuming the FAI wished to exchange ambassadors with them, which it wouldn’t.

In other words, the actual shooting war might end, but the political struggle would continue—and large parts of Spain would presumably end up looking like contemporary Chiapas, with each district or community divided between anarchist and anti-anarchist factions. Ultimate victory would have to be a long and arduous process. The only way to really win over the statist enclaves would be to win over their children, which could be accomplished by creating an obviously freer, more pleasurable, more beautiful, secure, relaxed, fulfilling life in the stateless sections. Foreign capitalist powers, on the other hand, even if they did not intervene militarily, would do everything possible to head off the notorious “threat of a good example” by economic boycotts and subversion, and by pouring resources into the statist zones. In the end, everything would probably depend on the degree to which anarchist victories in Spain inspired similar insurrections elsewhere.

The real point of this imaginative exercise is to point out that there are no clean breaks in history. The implication of the old idea of the clean break, the one moment when the state falls and capitalism is defeated, is that anything short of that is not really a victory at all. If capitalism is left standing, if it begins to market your once-subversive ideas, it shows that the capitalists really won. You’ve lost; you’ve been coopted. To me this is absurd. Can we say that feminism lost, that it achieved nothing, just because corporate culture felt obliged to pay lip service to condemning sexism and capitalist firms began marketing feminist books, movies, and other products? Of course not: unless you’ve managed to destroy capitalism and patriarchy in one fell blow, this is one of the clearest signs that you’ve gotten somewhere. Presumably any effective road to revolution will involve endless moments of cooptation, endless victorious campaigns, endless little insurrectionary moments or moments of flight and covert autonomy. I hesitate to even speculate as to what it might really be like. But to start in that direction, the first thing we need to do is to recognize that we do, in fact, win some.

Actually, recently, we’ve been winning quite a lot. The question is how to break the cycle of exaltation and despair and come up with some strategic visions (the more the merrier) about how these victories can build on each other, to create a cumulative movement towards a new society.



From 2001 to today—the struggle continues.
Tags:
obituary
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RIP
David Graeber
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WELL NO, DON'T DUMB DOWN OUR
Submitted by lewhine (not verified) on Thu, 09/03/2020 - 16:41
Well no, don't dumb down our lives just because you are an academic. I don't want a purely materialistic cosmos, nor gods, nor analogies about atoms and electrons to explain life! I want to regard intentionality and its dreams as a supernatural and beautiful thought.
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I DIDN'T ALWAYS AGREE WITH
Submitted by anon (not verified) on Fri, 09/04/2020 - 00:13
I didn't always agree with Graeber, but I think he had good instincts and insights. He certainly helped raise the profile of anarchism in a more positive way.
He was working on a large book project with archaeologist David Wengrow when he died. I think Wengrow will be carrying on with the book.
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HE HAD A CUSHY LIFE IN ACADEMIA. MASS
Submitted by anon (not verified) on Fri, 09/04/2020 - 08:23
Society requires the likes of Graeber to complicate life. I give a shit, so I posted this comment.
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MY NEGATIVE THOUGHTS ABOUT HIM ARE 100% IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS
Submitted by CalvinSmith (not verified) on Fri, 09/04/2020 - 09:18

Who needs all these goddamn words, mind games, lectures, in order to understand that wealthy people are essentially payed to hide how useless they are from society? How cringey is it that he rode around on a subway with a bag that said he might have bombs, guns, and drugs on it? How did he keep his job? Is this his ideas of making fun of "the normies", hence "making a statement" as "an activist"? Clearly a rebel with a very patented cause.

I say this not out of spite: but i'm largely apathetic about his death because i've never met him before.

HOWEVER, i will say that he did create some very useful critiques overall for people who have an issue with authority. "Debt and the first 5000 years" is a very interesting historical analysis, and i applaud his attempt to make leftists more comfortable with critiquing bureaucracy...it would sound a little more meaningful if he wasn't a bureaucrat himself. I hate universities. They're overpriced certification systems, and often their lists of degree requirements don't really make any sense. OH I'VE HEARD THAT there are universities that let you "design your own degree" for $40,000 a year, sad that the people who attend the wretched institutions didn't understand they probably have a print shop in their town that can do the exact same thing for them for a lot less money.

R.I.P., David Graeber