Fascism, the acme of anti-politics

It should be obvious by now, in the wake of the steady growth
enjoyed by far-right parties in many European countries since
the start of the crisis, that the anti-political mood is fertile ground
for some rather nasty developments indeed.

From Hungary’s Jobbik, with its Magyar Garda (Hungarian
Guard) paramilitary association and their anti-Roma pogroms
and unashamed antisemitism, to the unreconstructed neo-Nazis
of Greece’s Golden Dawn (polling 14% at the time of writing)
whose gangs of black-shirted bruisers drag immigrants off public
transport and break up immigrant market stalls in full view of
a sympathetic police, Europe’s new far right is soaking up the
anger, cynicism, apathy and fear of people who have abandoned
all hope in the political class. Italy’s Lega Nord, France’s Front
National (whose 17.9% for Marine Le Pen in the 2012 presidential 

elections now seems like a solidified voting bloc and no longer
simply a protest vote), Denmark’s Folkparti, the Netherlands’

 far right “lite” of Geert Wilders – there are few countries left without
a far-right party now solidly part of the mainstream.

This is not to say that the rise of the far right is a simple function
of austerity, crisis and the anti-political mood. There are a range
of complications involved. Support is not consistent and the 

anti-political mood is a harsh mistress. With allegiances to political
parties that once went back multiple generations now lasting
less time than it takes a fresh internet meme to come and go,
voters will dump a far-right party with as little regret as any other.
Golden Dawn was not the first such party to profit from the Greek
cataclysm. Laos, a hard-right Greek Orthodox party historically
on the fringes of the country’s political scene, shot up like a rocket
but was wiped out following its support for the EU-IMF bail-out.
Similarly, Geert Wilders’ anti-austerity turn is a product of his
attempt to revive his fortunes after he was associated with the
cuts to social programmes of the liberal-conservative coalition
he had been holding up.

It is undeniable, however, that if the “Kick out all the bums”
attitude is not channelled in a progressive direction it can be
absorbed by the far right instead. The rise of this form of 
anti-establishment politics is inexorably linked to the incapacity
of traditional social democracy [14] to present a constructive
channel for fury at elites. 

The rise of the far right is the twin of the collapse of social democracy.
 Of course, it is not as simple to say that all blue collar voters 
have switched from social democracy to the far right. 
This is demonstrably false. With the (instructive) 

exception of Greece where Pasok, the country’s traditional
centre-left party, has been all but wiped out, a clear majority of
working people in almost every European country continue to
vote for social democrats.
But voter abstention is soaring, particularly amongst the working
poor, and the far right go fishing in these abstentionist waters.
Italy’s anti-immigrant and regionalist Lega Nord (Northern
League) has soaked up such support in areas that until the
1980s were strongholds of working class activity and 
mobilisation that its breakthrough in 2008 allowed then leader Umberto
Bossi to claim that his was “the new working class party.” [15]

Equally in France, the Front National does best in

 de-industrialised areas and peri-urban commuter belts among low-paid
private-sector workers, the unemployed and small shopkeepers
bankrupted by competition with the out-of-town hypermarkets.
“It is a vote that has taken root east of a line from Le Havre in the
north to Perpignan in the south, and is made up of the victims
of globalisation,” according to sociologist Sylvain Crepon who
specialises in the demographics of the Front National. “The Front
National scores well among people living in poverty, who have a
real fear about how to make ends meet.” [16] Consistently across
Europe, the empirical evidence supports the thesis that being in
the category of those viewed as surplus by the market economy
and abandoned by social democratic parties “significantly raises”
the probability of voting for the extreme right. [17]
A 2011 poll for Greece’s Kappa Institute found that 30% of
respondents wanted the country to be led by “a group of experts
and technocrats” and 22.7% wanted “a strongman” to resolve
the ongoing crisis. [18] In this case, we can see the anti-political
mood supporting both the technocratic and fascist routes. A more
recent survey in France for Le Monde made similar findings:
82% agreed that politicians act principally in their own interest,
72% said that “the democratic system in France does not work
well and no one represents my ideas,” and a full 87% of respondents

 expressed a desire for a “real leader to restore order.” [19]
It is transparent that post-democracy and anti-politics are mutually

 reinforcing. The anti-political mood is exploited by the
post-democratic elites to support the removal of great swathes
of legislative subjects (and in particular fiscal policy) from the
realm of democratic contest. At the same time, the deepening
social dislocation that the policies of austerity and structural

 adjustment have imposed in this post-democratic fashion alienate
electorates still further, deepening the anti-political sentiment.
For a growing number this has led to a desire for a strongman,
but it does not need to be this way. We’ve identified here that
anti-politics can push in two directions: support of post-democratic 

technocracy or support of fascism - a strongman or paramilitary 

force to “restore order.” 

The difference between the two lies primarily in their attitude to

 force, to minorities, and
their auras of “respectability.” But in terms of their relationship
to democracy – and their agreement on the need to curb the
excesses of democracy - the two are essentially identical. They
are both varieties of despotism.

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