After Taliban Opium Ban, New Global Hub Emerges In Afghan Borderlands With Iran, Pakistan – Analysis

Cultivating poppies in Afghanistan for opium. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency.


October 25, 2026
 RFE RL
By Frud Bezhan and Daud Khattak

Key Takeaways:

Afghanistan’s opium production has dropped under the Taliban’s 2022 ban, but cultivation has shifted into Pakistan’s Balochistan and Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan, forming a new regional production center.

Satellite imagery found over 9,000 hectares of poppy in Balochistan, with Afghan farmers bringing expertise and capital for expanded, often monoculture plots also reported across parts of Iran.

Experts warn of further rises in 2027 that could increase heroin supply and fund armed groups, while limited rebounds inside Afghanistan suggest Taliban enforcement may be easing under economic strain.

Afghanistan’s opium output, long the world’s largest, has plunged since the Taliban imposed a sweeping ban on illicit narcotics in 2022.

But the militant Islamist group has failed to eradicate cultivation completely, while production appears to have increasingly shifted to neighboring Pakistan and Iran.


Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan and Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan, both bordering Afghanistan, have seen a sharp rise in poppy cultivation in recent years, according to satellite imagery and interviews with local farmers.

“The Taliban drugs ban, combined with growing instability in the tri-border area, has created the conditions for widespread poppy cultivation in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province and parts of Iran,” said David Mansfield, a leading UK-based expert on Afghanistan’s illicit drugs industry.

As a result, the remote and volatile borderlands of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran have become “a global center for opium production,” added Mansfield, author of A State Built On Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan.

Experts warn of higher levels of poppy cultivation in the region in 2027, which they say could increase the supply of heroin on the international market, generate revenue for armed groups, and fuel violence.

Pakistan At The ‘Core’

Balochistan Province appears to have become the main hub of opium cultivation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran border region.

Pakistan’s largest and poorest province, Balochistan has endured a decades-long insurgency by separatist groups and other militants drawn largely from the ethnic Baluch minority. Violence has escalated in recent years as armed groups intensify their campaign against the state.

Islamabad has denied reports of opium cultivation in the country and maintained that any poppy crops discovered have been eradicated. Pakistan’s Interior Ministry and the Balochistan provincial government did not respond to RFE/RL’s requests for comment.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has estimated that opium production in Pakistan remains marginal.

“UNODC has said in the past that there were indications of displacement of poppy to countries around Afghanistan,” the agency said in a statement sent to RFE/RL.

“What we currently observe is that data from countries around Afghanistan is still scarce, as only two countries report on eradication. And while eradication figures do not directly reflect cultivation patterns, the sharp increases in recent years point towards a certain degree of spillover effects.”

But satellite imagery from Alcis, a British firm specializing in satellite analysis, along with interviews with local farmers suggests that opium cultivation is widespread across the province and is expanding.


“Satellite imagery assessments identified more than 9,000 hectares of poppy cultivation in Balochistan alone,” said Mansfield, who authored an August report for Alcis.

Most of the opium cultivation appears to be concentrated in the districts of Loralai and Killa Abdullah in Balochistan.

Abdul Qahar Wadan, a former member of Pakistan’s National Assembly representing Balochistan’s Killa Abdullah district, told RFE/RL that poppy cultivation is rampant in the province, allegedly with the backing of senior military officials and local pro-government power brokers who collect commissions from growers.

Monawar Hussain, the chief administrative officer in Killa Abdullah, rejected the allegation, telling RFE/RL that poppy cultivation had declined following an eradication campaign last year. However, Alcis’s 2026 satellite imagery shows no clear evidence of eradication.

A farmer in Killa Abdullah who spoke to RFE/RL on condition of anonymity said poppy growers pay bribes to local authorities through influential intermediaries, who collect commissions and pass on a share to officials.

The farmer alleged that when media reports trigger pressure from higher authorities, growers and their backers sometimes agree to cultivate poppies on barren land so officials can destroy the crop and publicize the eradication effort.

For years, Lala Jan Kakar resisted the lure of poppy cultivation, but mounting insecurity, drought, and flash floods have devastated traditional fruit farming.

“It’s not possible to resist it anymore. The demand for poppies is much more than fruits, and so is the income,” Kakar, who lives in Killa Abdullah, told RFE/RL.

The surge in production in Pakistan, experts say, has been driven by a growing number of Afghan opium farmers crossing the border to lease land and cultivate poppy.

Since the Taliban banned poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, growers from neighboring Kandahar and Helmand provinces have brought their expertise across the border, striking deals with local farmers.

“The Afghan poppy growers have both money and expertise,” Kakar said, explaining that they invest millions of Pakistani rupees in solar-powered wells and share profits with landowners.

With groundwater scarce and conventional crops less profitable, poppies offer a quicker return and can be harvested twice a year, he said.

“Many farmers have doubled the land they cultivated in 2026 — a stark indication of the scale and pace of this expansion and that we should expect much higher levels of poppy cultivation in 2027,” said Mansfield.

Cultivation Spreading In Iran

A similar pattern has emerged in Iran, where Afghan farmers have crossed the border to cultivate poppies as tenants and sharecroppers, drawing on family ties and local contacts.

Opium cultivation has been reported across a growing number of Iranian provinces in recent years, including Razavi Khorasan in the east, Kermanshah and Lorestan in the west, and Fars in the south.

Sistan-Baluchistan, one of Iran’s largest and poorest provinces, remains the country’s main opium-producing region. Satellite imagery from 2026 appears to show extensive poppy cultivation across parts of the province, with large fields often devoted exclusively to the crop.

Some farms also appear to use drip irrigation for poppy cultivation. Given the substantial upfront cost of installing these systems, their use suggests that farmers who planted in late 2025 expected a low risk of eradication.

“Unlike in Afghanistan, where they cultivated a variety of crops, these farmers are increasingly devoting large plots in Pakistan and Iran entirely to poppy,” said Mansfield. “The shift is not just across borders; it is from mixed farming to large-scale poppy monoculture.”

Iranian authorities, preoccupied with the war against the United States and Israel since late February, have been unable or unwilling to destroy the 2026 poppy crop, reinforcing growers’ confidence.

Sistan-Baluchistan has also been the site of an intensifying insurgency by separatists and militants who have exploited the longstanding grievances of the Baluch minority, which has faced disproportionate discrimination and violence at the hands of the authorities.

As the Iran war continues, the economy teeters on the brink of collapse, and the state’s attention remains focused elsewhere, poppy cultivation in Iran is expected to increase further in 2027, according to experts.

Experts say rising drug production in the border region of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan both reflects and fuels violence.

“Armed groups compete for tax revenues from the drugs trade and other cross-border activities, including people smuggling and trade in fuel, minerals and other goods,” said Mansfield.
Resurgence In Afghanistan

Opium cultivation also appears to be rebounding in Afghanistan despite the Taliban’s ban, underscoring the country’s continued importance in the global opium trade.


Production is concentrated in the northeastern province of Badakhshan, which is estimated to account for around a half of the country’s opium output, and several southwestern provinces.

Driven by drought, mounting debt, and economic hardship, farmers in Badakhshan and Helmand have protested and defied the ban even in the face of the Taliban’s forceful enforcement.

“In 2026, poppy cultivation remained widespread across Badakhshan’s rainfed and irrigated land,” said Mansfield. “In the southwest, cultivation almost doubled between 2025 and 2026, though it remained limited, concentrated in remote areas, and concealed within wheat fields and behind household compound walls.”

Hostile reactions to crop eradication suggest the Taliban is wary of provoking further unrest as Afghanistan’s economic crisis deepens.

A Taliban directive barring the authorities from searching homes for poppy or opium without a court order appears to be a significant concession.

“But there is a clear risk: Growing numbers of farmers in the southwest may read the concession as a signal that the authorities will tolerate cultivation beyond walled compounds,” said Mansfield. “If so, Afghanistan could see a dramatic rise in opium production in 2027.”

Frud Bezhan is Senior Regional Editor in the English-language Central Newsroom at RFE/RL, leading coverage of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. Previously, he was the Regional Desk Editor for the Near East, with a primary focus on Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. As a correspondent, he reported from Afghanistan, Turkey, Kosovo, and Western Europe.

Daud Khattak is a senior international correspondent covering the Near East in RFE/RL’s Central Newsroom. He was previously the managing editor of RFE/RL’s Radio Mashaal.


About RFE RL
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Iran Faces Rising Threat From Within as Baluch Insurgency Escalates

By RFE/RL staff - Oct 18, 2026

• Armed Baluch groups have intensified deadly attacks on Iranian security forces in Sistan-Baluchistan.
• 
  
• Militant factions are increasingly coordinating their operations as Tehran faces mounting military pressure.
• 
  
• Longstanding ethnic and religious grievances threaten to deepen Iran’s internal security crisis.

Iran's vast and restive southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan, located along the border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, has witnessed a deadly flare-up of violence in recent weeks.

Armed groups and Iranian security forces have clashed almost daily across the impoverished province, the site of a decades-long, low-level insurgency.

Separatist groups and Islamist militants in Sistan-Baluchistan, home to Iran's marginalized ethnic Baluch minority, are increasingly coordinating their efforts to challenge the Iranian state, experts say.

The intensifying insurgency has compounded the security threats facing Iran, which remains at war with the United States and Israel and braces for a possible resumption of major US combat operations.

"The renewed attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan come at a time when the Islamic Republic is facing unprecedented military and economic pressure," said Hamidreza Azizi, senior Iran analyst at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group.

"What makes the situation more concerning for Tehran is the possibility that localized insurgent activity could become part of a broader security challenge," he added.

Spate Of Attacks

Baluch armed groups have claimed responsibility for a series of hit-and-run attacks, deadly roadside bombs, and shootings targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite branch of Iran's armed forces, the Basij paramilitary force, and local police across the province in recent weeks.

On October 14, a police officer and local Basij commander were killed in separate attacks in the town of Mehrestan, Iranian media reported.

A day earlier, the IRGC said one of its members was killed after a hostage-taking attempt triggered clashes in Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan-Baluchistan. Also on October 13, gun battles between gunmen and the IRGC broke out in the town of Taftan.

In response, the authorities have stepped up security operations in the province, including preemptive raids on suspected insurgent cells, underscoring the growing threat.

Iran also executed a prominent Baluch militant on October 12. Omar Dorostaran had been convicted of armed rebellion, membership in a terrorist group, and complicity in an armed uprising.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei on October 12 claimed that "terrorist groups" operating in the area were acting on "plans devised by Israel and the United States to destabilize the country's borders."

Azizi of the International Crisis Group said Iranian officials increasingly fear that their adversaries may try to exploit existing ethnic and political grievances to open new fronts inside the country.

"Tehran appears determined to prevent a longstanding security problem from developing into a more serious vulnerability during a potential new war," he said.

Sistan-Baluchistan, Iran's second largest province and roughly the same size as Syria, is particularly strategic and sensitive.

It borders Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and Pakistan's Balochistan Province, which has also been the scene of a decades-long insurgency.

Sistan-Baluchistan is also home to Chabahar, Iran's only port with direct access to the open ocean. It allows Iran to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, a major flashpoint in the war with the United States and Israel.

Militants Merge

In December 2025, four separate armed Baluch groups joined forces under the Mobarizoun Popular Front, signaling closer coordination among militant factions.

The umbrella group includes Jaish al-Adl, a Baluch separatist militant group that is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran and the United States.

Believed to be operating out of Pakistan, Jaish al-Adl is the most potent Baluch armed group fighting Tehran. Iran has accused the United States and Israel of arming the group.

"The Iranian government is currently facing multiple pressures at home and abroad, and naturally, armed groups may have come to the conclusion that they have found a good opportunity to expand their operations," said Fatemeh Aman, a US-based Iran analyst.

"If these attacks become coordinated, sustained, and continuous, they could pose a more serious security challenge for the government," Aman told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.

Experts say armed groups are exploiting the longstanding grievances of the Baluch minority, many of whom are Sunni Muslims in Shi'a-majority Iran. The group has long faced disproportionate discrimination and violence at the hands of the authorities.

Baluch make up around 5 percent of Iran's population of some 90 million. But they account for around 20 percent of all executions in the country.

During the nationwide anti-establishment protests that rocked Iran in 2022, Sistan-Baluchistan was the scene of the deadliest government crackdown. On September 30 that year, referred to as "Bloody Friday," nearly 100 protesters were gunned down.

Poverty, religious and ethnic discrimination, and lack of political representation have "created a basis for deep dissatisfaction in the province," said Aman.

"The government's largely security-based approach to the demands of the Baloch people has also contributed to the spread of this distrust," she added.

By RFE/RL

Afghanistan Reduced Opium Production: What Was The Impact On Drug Trafficking? – Analysis

Cultivating poppies in Afghanistan for opium. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency.


September 28, 2026

By Geopolitical Monitor
By Damián Jacubovich

Key Takeaways:

UNODC figures show Afghan opium poppy area falling from ~232,000 ha (2022) after the Taliban ban to 10,200 ha in 2025 (~296 tonnes potential output; Alcis/EUDA ~414 tonnes). Farm sales income is estimated at $134 million in 2025, down 48% from 2024; drought also played a role.

The author says that does not prove the world heroin market shrank: EUDA cites ~12,000 tonnes of estimated Afghan stocks, Myanmar area up 17% (output ~flat), and ~9,116 ha of poppy reported in Balochistan—hectares are not proven replacement tonnes.

Criminal profits cannot be read off farm losses: revenue, cost, and margins differ by stage; groups may tap stocks, new sources, or other drugs. Relocation is a hypothesis to test, not a finding.

Afghanistan reduced the area devoted to opium poppy cultivation from approximately 232,000 hectares in 2022 to 10,200 in 2025. The scale of this decline raises three related questions that require different answers.

First, can state intervention drastically reduce a major source of drug production? In Afghanistan, the answer is yes. Second, has that reduction produced an effective contraction in the international opium and heroin market? Large accumulated stockpiles and the possible emergence of alternative suppliers make the answer less certain. And third, what consequences has the ban had for criminal organizations’ revenues and profitability, and what can we infer about drug trafficking globally?

Did the ban reduce opium production in Afghanistan?

In April 2022, the Taliban authorities banned opium poppy cultivation. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan cultivated approximately 232,000 hectares in 2022 and produced an estimated 6,200 tonnes of opium. Cultivated area fell to 10,800 hectares in 2023, rose to 12,800 in 2024 and declined again to 10,200 in 2025. UNODC estimated potential production at 296 tonnes in 2025. Drought and crop failures also contributed to the latest decline, so not every change can be attributed exclusively to the ban.

The contraction is unmistakable, although estimates differ. The European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) cites an Alcis estimate of 414 tonnes of Afghan opium production in 2025, compared with UNODC’s 296 tonnes. Comparisons over time should therefore use a consistent statistical series.

The economic consequences are also clear at farm level. UNODC estimates that farmers’ income from opium sales to traders fell from $260 million in 2024 to $134 million in 2025, a decline of 48 percent.


The answer to our first question is clear: following the ban, opium cultivation in Afghanistan fell dramatically. Afghan farmers also suffered a substantial loss of income. Yet their losses do not establish that international intermediaries and distributors experienced an equivalent decline. A smaller harvest does not necessarily mean that less opium is available on the market.
Did the fall in Afghan production contract the international opium and heroin market?

Cultivation is only the first link in a longer commercial chain involving traders, processors, transporters, intermediaries, and distributors. The market impact of lower harvests also depends on accumulated stocks, alternative suppliers, prices, and demand.

Stockpiles create a time lag between production and supply. The European Drug Report 2026 cites an Alcis estimate of approximately 12,000 tonnes of opium stored in Afghanistan in 2025. This is an estimate, not a physical inventory. EUDA reports that stockpiles, processing and adulteration practices, and supply management by trafficking networks have helped sustain heroin availability in Europe despite the decline in Afghan cultivation.

Stocks can sustain sales without equivalent new production, but they may eventually be depleted, become more expensive, or cease to be accessible to particular networks. The evolution of supply as these stocks diminish will be essential to evaluating the ban’s lasting market effects.

Alternative producers present a different question. UNODC reports that Myanmar’s cultivated area increased by 17 percent, from 45,200 hectares in 2024 to 53,100 in 2025. Its estimated opium output, however, rose by only 1 percent because yields fell. Internal conflict, displacement, and economic difficulties also affect cultivation there. These figures establish expansion in another country, not that the Afghan ban caused it or that Myanmar has replaced Afghan supply.


Pakistan offers a different kind of evidence. EUDA cites satellite analysis suggesting approximately 9,116 hectares of poppy cultivation in Balochistan in 2025, potentially rivaling Afghanistan’s 2025 output. This suggests a possible alternative source of supply, but hectares are not tonnes: neither the volume produced nor effective replacement of Afghan supply has been established.

We must distinguish three propositions: simultaneous expansion elsewhere, displacement causally linked to the Afghan ban, and actual replacement of supply. Each requires different evidence. The answer to the second question remains open: the production decline is established, but the extent and duration of its effects on the international opium and heroin market are not. Even if that market contracts, we still need to establish who bears the economic losses—and which activities, if any, take their place.
What happened to criminal organizations’ revenues and profitability—and what does this tell us about global drug trafficking?

This question brings me back to a hypothesis I began developing in 2014 while examining changes in Latin American drug trafficking and its expansion into Argentina. I borrowed a concept from the economics of globalization: relocation.

My hypothesis involved two mechanisms. State pressure—stronger controls, enforcement, and higher operating costs—could encourage certain activities to move to territories with lower risks. Expanding demand could also attract organizations, alter routes and draw previously peripheral territories into new consumer markets. Relocation could therefore reflect both a response to state intervention and the search for new commercial opportunities.

Afghanistan provides a case in which to investigate this hypothesis, but the available evidence does not yet confirm it. The central question is what happens to economic opportunities when a major source of production shrinks. Some may disappear permanently; others may be taken up by new suppliers, organizations, or activities. Relocation is one possible mechanism of that transformation, and its existence and scale must be demonstrated case by case.

Criminal organizations are not interchangeable with the markets in which they operate. An intervention may dismantle a network without eliminating consumer demand or the opportunities that attracted other actors. Some organizations may lose their business; others may draw on stockpiles, find suppliers, or diversify. There is no single global drug-trafficking organization making coordinated decisions.

The economic terms also matter. Revenue is the money received from sales; profit is what remains after costs; profitability relates profit to the resources required. Supply contraction can affect prices, costs, and margins differently at each stage. Prices and traded volumes may help estimate revenue, but profit also requires information on costs, and profitability requires relating profit to the resources employed. Higher heroin prices could increase an intermediary’s revenue without raising profit if procurement and operating costs also rise.

The documented fall in Afghan farmers’ income cannot simply be transferred to international traffickers’ accounts. Nor would a contraction in the heroin market and falling profits among organizations involved in it establish an equivalent decline in global drug-trafficking profits. Different organizations, substances, and markets may experience opposite outcomes; there is no single profitability figure for the entire illicit drug economy.


Testing the broader impact would require establishing which organizations lost income and profit, whether those losses persisted, whether other actors took their place, and whether activities shifted to other markets. Illicit markets do not provide conventional financial statements, but wholesale and retail prices, traded volumes, seizures interpreted alongside other indicators, estimated margins, financial flows, and changes in distribution may offer partial evidence.

Consumer behavior matters too. Reduced heroin availability could lead some people to consume less and others to turn to different substances. EUDA warns that synthetic opioids and stimulants warrant monitoring as possible market shifts; it does not establish that widespread substitution has already occurred because of the Afghan ban. A smaller heroin market could coexist with growth elsewhere, but that possibility remains to be tested.

The ban’s impact on the revenues and profitability of organizations involved in opium and heroin remains uncertain. Establishing its consequences for drug trafficking globally requires an even broader investigation.
Three Questions, Three Different Answers

The first question has a clear answer: state intervention can drastically reduce a major source of drug production. Afghanistan’s cultivation figures demonstrate this.

The second remains open. Stockpiles have cushioned the impact of smaller harvests, while alternative suppliers, prices, and consumption will help determine whether the international opium and heroin market undergoes a lasting contraction.

The third demands a wider inquiry. Even if that market contracts, we must establish which organizations lose revenue and profit, which adapt and whether those losses translate into a reduction in the illicit drug economy as a whole. The outcome could be lasting contraction, partial adaptation, or a transformation of criminal activities. Relocation is one mechanism to investigate, not a conclusion to assume.

Afghanistan has demonstrated that opium production can be drastically reduced. What remains to be demonstrated is whether that reduction also shrinks the market and, beyond it, the economic opportunities and profits of criminal organizations.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com


About Geopolitical Monitor
Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.
View all posts by Geopolitical Monitor →

 

Attacks on mining operations on the rise in Pakistan: report

Marina Meireles | September 20, 2026 | 

(Reference US Army photo by Pfc. Joshua Kruger | Flickr Commons.)

More than 30 mining operations have been attacked in Pakistan’s resource-rich Balochistan province in 2026, raising security risks as the country seeks investment to develop some of the world’s largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits. 

Balochistan recorded 38 attacks connected with extractive operations between January and September, bringing the total over the past three years to more than 130, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) report.  

“This risks undermining Pakistan’s drive to attract international investment and develop its mineral sector amid the global scramble for critical minerals,” ACLED South Asia assistant research manager Pooja George said in a news release. 

Balochistan is a region swarmed by conflict between separatists and the government especially around extraction of copper, gold, chromite, coal and natural gas. For separatists, extraction equals exploitation of the country’s wealth, causing them to target operations for what they signify. 

The attacks make it more difficult for Pakistan to leverage its untapped mineral and fossil fuel wealth, as well as find safety solutions for all parties involved in the conflicts.   

Transport targeted 

Balochistan has reported over 130 attacks in the last three years directly connected with extractive operations, with 38 being just between January and September 2026.  

Attacks on mineral projects occur predominantly during transportation, where militants can bypass the heavier security surrounding mine sites, according to ACLED. 

Flagship projects such as the Reko Diq copper mine and Saindak copper-gold mine involve foreign partners and receive protection from private and state security forces. 

Publicly-owned oil and gas operations face a different pattern. More than half of the attacks against those operations take place on extraction sites, a result of less security when compared to mineral projects. Coal operations have experienced most of its attacks during transportation and about a third on site. 

Nature of conflicts 

With less than 17% of attacks involving roadside bombs or landmines, ACLED suggests that the purpose of attacks is to disrupt operations by creating an insatiable atmosphere, rather than harming workers and civilians.  

Nearly 90% of separatist attacks against mineral projects happen on roads.  Gunmen typically fire at vehicle tires to disable trucks and sometimes set the vehicles ablaze after allowing drivers to leave, according to ACLED.  

“Most attacks impacting mining involve property destruction rather than fatalities. The aim appears to be disruption: creating and amplifying a sense of instability around mining operations and making the environment increasingly difficult for companies to operate in,” George said.  

Militants have also increased roadblocks and checkpoints in the region to facilitate attacks, aiming to show how the state’s authority has decreased and that fear is spreading especially along remote areas. ACLED data show that the number of such events in 2026 is on track to surpass 2025 levels.   

Attacks on extractions sites can carry greater human costs because militants are more likely to encounter security forces,  increasing the potential for lethal clashes. 

Source: ACLED.

Operations workers and companies have felt this increase in instability, with privately-owned mining operations warning about shutdowns or slower operations and workers going on strike. 

Impact on Pakistan’s mining future 

The stakes are rising as Pakistan courts international investment to develop Balochistan’s largely untapped mineral wealth.  

Lack of well-developed and secured transportation infrastructure and the need for state security bring more risks to foreign investors, as separatists are more likely to attack their operations as the government is their biggest adversary.   

ACLED also adds that another risk that comes with increased security, is the abuse of those forces, that can carry reputational costs for companies and impact local community engagement, which is key to safe operations. 

Continued attacks could also draw more international attention to the separatist insurgence, giving militants a larger platform while potentially exposing them to a stronger state crackdown.  

Pakistan has deployed additional security forces to Balochistan, but ACLED argues security measures alone are unlikely to resolve a conflict rooted partly in political disputes over resources, autonomy and the distribution of economic benefits. 

“Opposition to resource extraction lies at the heart of the Baloch separatist insurgency, meaning attacks may escalate further as Pakistan seeks to leverage its untapped mineral wealth,” George said. 

Iran

Our Support for the Open Letter: To Iran’s political prisoners, trapped ‘between two blades of a scissors’

Friday 28 August 2026, by Collective

The following open letter has been published online in Overland literary journal. To endorse, and add your name, collective or political group as a signatory, fill the form below or email anticolonialiran@proton.me or anticolonialiran@gmail.com The form contains our statement of support in both English and Spanish. A German translation of our letter can be found here. The names of signatories are at the very end of this text and will be updated as more names are added. If you have a language that you’d like to add to this form, email us!

Please share the form widely with individuals, collectives and political parties who support the sentiment of this letter. Also note, the below text is not the final version as it still requires copy editing and hyperlinks.

Our Support for the Open Letter: To Iran’s political prisoners

As migrants and refugees in diaspora and in exile from Iran, who have our loved ones suffering in the Iranian state’s prisons and facing its gallows, we salute the signatories of the open letter to “Iran’s political prisoners, trapped ‘between two blades of a scissors’”, published in The Guardian on 20 August 2026. With us stand comrades and organisations from across the world who see this struggle as bound up with their own.

The open letter was signed by a number of current and formerly incarcerated political prisoners, political organisers and scholars, including Angela Davis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Yasin al-Haj Saleh, Ricardo Jiménez, Michael Löwy, and Walden Bello, among others, who wrote to incarcerated people in Iran, “we stand in solidarity with you”. In response to the letter, some on the left have since called on signatories to withdraw, describing the letter as “imperialist-sympathetic”, and three names have been removed. We wanted to respond with an open letter, demonstrating the widespread support from people across the world for those who stand unapologetically with the incarcerated and formerly incarcerated political prisoners of Iran.

As collectives and individuals who have for years organised against western and zionist imperialist wars and occupations, as well as against the Islamic Republic’s state violence inside and outside Iran’s borders, we know how difficult it is to step outside mainstream geopolitical framings, familiar but dehumanising, and stand in solidarity with communities whose reality and struggle do not fit the binaries of “good vs evil”, “us vs them”, “west vs the rest”. Yet the communities across the globe who are oppressed by multiple local-global forces at once cannot afford the privilege of choosing between their oppressors as the “lesser evil”.

At a time when the historical struggle for collective liberation across Iran is besieged by the US imperialist zionist war and the Iranian government’s mass executions on one side, and pro-war Iranian monarchist zionism led by Reza Pahlavi on the other, the international solidarity articulated by the statement has brought an unexpected fresh breeze of hope and opened new horizons of liberation beyond borders, especially coming from current and formerly incarcerated political prisoners like Mumia Abu-Jamal, Yasin al-Haj Saleh and Ricardo Jiménez, among others.

As is to be expected, the open letter has led to a wave of condemnations from vanguards and gate keepers of “anti-imperialism” who have long abandoned the very basic principles of the anti-imperialist tradition: international solidarity in support of lives crushed under the hammer of global capitalism, colonialism and imperialism. Instead of calling for the abolition of capital punishment, these vanguards justify the mass imprisonment, torture and executions of our people.

In the midst of US military and economic war on Iran, the Iranian state has been intensifying the execution of prisoners as a matter of “national security”, by framing the imprisoned protestors as “foreign agents” and “spies” without providing any evidence except forced confessions under torture.

Meanwhile the real “foreign agents” and collaborators have been operating from within the top layers of the IRGC ruling class, providing US and Israel with intelligence regarding the location of assassinated officials and their meetings. This is not a conspiracy, it has been admitted publicly by high ranking officials such as Araghchi who framed it as an ongoing "security breach" within the system. In other words, in a classic scenario scripted by ruling classes, the wretched of the earth in Iran are being scapegoated and sacrificed as “foreign agents”, so a new arrangement of power in the region could be built on the blood of the oppressed and the colonised.

The minoritised communities in Iran bear the heaviest brunt of Iranian carceral and border violence. Nearly two million Afghan migrants and refugees have been deported from Iran since the 12-day zionist war on Iran. The government used the zionist war as a pretext to intensify the racist and xenophobic campaign of mass deportation against Afghans, committing to the ethnic cleansing of a people who have lived and moved on these lands long before the establishment of the Iranian nation-state and its borders.

While the prison system in Iran affects the poor and marginalised from all communities, prisoners from minoritised, racialised and internally colonised regions such as Kurdistan, Balochistan, Ahwaz, and Lurestan, are disproportionally targeted by the Iranian state’s system of mass incarceration and executions. In a manner that is not dissimilar to the US where Black, Latinx, Muslim and Indigenous communities are targeted disproportionally by the white supremacist settler colonial patriarchal dual system of mass incarceration and racial capitalism.

While our position against US imperialism and IRI executions may seem unusual to some, it is in fact a common position among labor unions, student collectives, feminist, racialised and minoritised groups inside Iran and in exile. The most recent statement by the Syndicate of Workers of Tehran and Suburbs Bus Company reads as follows:

Today, as our country struggles under the weight of devastating economic crises, runaway inflation, the collapse of rial, U.S. and Israeli military attacks, the continuation of a devastating war, economic sanctions, widespread and severe repression, and warmongering policies, the authorities are once again responding to people’s demands for bread, work, justice, freedom, and human dignity, with the most brutal instruments of terror and intimidation: the gallows.

The statement ends by declaring:

The death penalty must be abolished immediately! Political prisoners must be released! No to war, intervention, military aggression, and warmongering policies! The path forward for workers and the toiling people is unity and organisation.

A day doesn’t pass without the families and supporters of prisoners on death row risking safety to gather in front of prisons pleading to stop the execution of their loved ones. Mostly to no avail.

Between 13 to 28 July 2026, as US bombs were falling on the already racialised and marginalised southern regions of Iran, over 1,500 brave prisoners from Ghezelhesar prison held a mass hunger strike against executions of their fellow prisoners. This happened alongside the weekly prisoner strikes of the “No-To-Execution Tuesdays” campaign, which has been ongoing for 134 weeks across more than 60 prisons, demanding an end to all executions.

On 28 July, the site of public execution in Isfahan turned into a spontaneous popular protest by people who had gathered to prevent the execution. The protest was suppressed and the execution took place. Even though the executions have continued, the prisoner’s hunger strike together with the families brave resistance and spontaneous protests in Isfahan have empowered a fast growing movement for the abolition of the death sentence, as a unifying demand among different social and political movements inside and outside Iran even as US bombs fall.

The confidential information published by The Intercept regarding ICE and Iranian state collaboration on deportation in the midst of the war, reveals how police-states work together, and hold diplomatic talks behind closed doors to coordinate mass deportations of migrants and refugees, even as they wage war against each other. The same point holds for recent normalisations of relations between European powers and the Taliban and Al-Sharaa regimes, with the aim of deportations of Afghans and Syrians from fortress Europe.

Lastly we want to affirm the simple and universal truth that the collective liberation of all war torn, occupied and colonised communities of the MENA/SWANA region and beyond are interconnected.

From the Palestinian liberation struggle against genocidal Israeli settler-colonialism backed by western and US imperialism, to the Sudanese revolutionary struggle against the RSF’s genocidal and SAF’s counter-revolutionary war, backed by different regional and global imperial powers, to the Afghan liberation struggle against the Taliban put back in power by the US after 20 years of “war on terror”, to the Kurdish anti-colonial struggle for self-determination, to the Baloch anti-colonial struggle against Pakistani and Iranian colonial occupations, to the Ahwazi Arab anti-colonial struggle for self-determination, to Congo’s struggle against Rwanda’s military invasion and imperial extractivism, to Haiti’s historical struggle against slavery, debt, and terror backed by western colonialism and imperialism, to Venezuela’s struggle against US neocolonialism and state authoritarianism, to the Zapatista struggle against Mexican mal gobierno (bad government) and US imperialism, to Lebanon and Syria’s struggle against Israeli colonial expansion and sectarian political elites, to West Papua’s struggle against Indonesian colonialism backed by imperial powers, to the Saharawi struggle against Moroccan colonialism backed by Israel, to the Uyghur struggle against the Chinese state’s mass incarceration and surveillance, to the Rohingya struggle against Myanmar’s military genocide, to the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination against Indian and Pakistani military states, to the Ukrainian struggle against Russian imperialism and invasion, European self-serving hypocrisy, and the Ukrainian state’s anti-worker policies; these and all other struggles for collective liberation are inherently interconnected.

For us the popular slogan “Nobody’s free until everybody’s free” means forging, articulating and building solidarities that may seem to some confusing or unusual in a world where hegemonic and normative politics is defined by a multipolar, (neo)colonial and patriarchal capitalist nation-state system and its borders, borders that have been, and continue fragmenting, dividing, conquering, hierarchising the lands and the peoples of our planet.

Fannie Lou Hamer’s statement “Nobody’s free until everybody’s free” means rejecting hierarchies of liberation and selective solidarities, even when violent binaries present themselves as common sense. A new world requires new solidarities, rooted in revolutionary imagination and radical love beyond borders and prison walls!

We take up the demands of the Tehran Bus Drivers and of prisoners organising across Iran: an immediate end to the war and to sanctions, the abolition of the death penalty, and the release of every political prisoner. Each demand needs the other.

Long live peoples’ struggles everywhere against imperialism, colonialism, statism, capitalism, patriarchy and militarism of all colours!

Freedom for all prisoners facing tortures and executions in the prisons of Iran, Israel, US, China, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia!

Freedom for Mumia Abu Jamal, Fred “Muhammad” Burton, Veronza Bowers and all other Black and Indigenous prisoners in Turtle Island!

Freedom for Varisheh Moradi, Pakhshan Azizi, Zeinab Jalalian and all imprisoned revolutionary Kurdish women!

Freedom for Mahrang Baloch and other revolutionary Baloch prisoners in the colonial prisons of Pakistan and Iran!

Freedom for Dr Hussam Abu Safiya, Khalida Jarrar, Marwan Barghouti and all other Palestinian prisoners fighting for liberation from inside colonial zionist prisons!

Freedom for Saadia Mosbah and all other prisoners in Tunisia fighting against the Tunisian state’s anti-Black and anti-migrant policies dictated by European extractivism and border imperialism!

Freedom for all South Asian & Filipino migrant and domestic workers affected by the war in the region!

No to war! No to genocide!
No to executions! No to prisons!
No to militarism! No to imperialism!
No to zionism! No to patriarchy!
No to campism! No to statism!

No to imperialist regime change, yes to revolution from below!

Yes to international solidarity!
Yes to collective liberation!
Yes to peace, justice and self-determination for all colonised, oppressed and exploited people globally!
Yes to Land Back!

Jin Jiyan Azadi!

Further readings and statements against US zionist imperialism and Iran’s militarised authoritarianism

* EZLN statement on Iran and US imperialism
* Ward. Gaza. Queer
* Mobadara
* Sudanese Anarchists Gathering
* Priscillia Kounkou Hoveyda, Collective for Black Iranians, published on Africa is a Country

anti colonial iran

The above statement was written by anti colonial iran, a collective that seeks to translate, publish and circulate statements and political actions taken by marginalised, currently, and formerly incarcerated, colonised and revolutionary voices from inside Iran. These are voices which have been historically erased, censored and sidelined, internally by the Iranian state (first Pahlavist and later Khomeinist), and externally by the diaspora elite, as well as Western state and corporate media.

Our aims are to internationalise voices from below which reject statism, militarism, reformism, racism, patriarchy, capitalism, colonialism and borders in all their forms.

Our project began with the Jina Amini uprising under the title of "Translators4Jina" and, after a short break, we resumed our project as anti colonial iran. Statements we have translated over the years from @collective98, Roja Collective, @Sarkhatism, and many more, can be found at https://anticolonialirancom.wordpress.com/

Our statement is supported by: (names will be updated as responses are submitted so there will be a time delay with when names appear.)

1. anti colonial iran
2. Kamran Matin, University of Sussex
3. Priscillia Kounkou Hoveyda, Collective for Black Iranians
4. Prof. Abbas Vali
5. Assoc Prof Maryam Saeedi, Carnegie Mellon University
6. Shahrzad Arshadi, filmmaker & playwright
7. Prof. Nayereh Tohidi, California State University, Northridge
8. Prof. Fatemeh Shams, Professor of Persian Studies & Intersectional Feminist Collective
9. Samira Rashti, Health Not Punishment Collective, UCLA
10. Naeimeh Doostdar, Women Revolutionary Council & Amsterdam Vrij University
11. Amir Ahmadi Arian, Binghamton University
12. Nazan Üstündağ, Alice Salomon Hochschule
13. Zhaleh Sahand, former political prisoner
14. آناهیتا رحمانی ، زندانی سیاسی سابق و فعال زنان و علیه اعدام / Anahita Rahmani, former political prisoner, women’s rights and anti-execution activist, Toronto
15. Shokoufeh Sakhi, Ph.D, Adjunct faculty, University of Toronto
16. Shahrzad Mojab, Professor Emerita, University of Toronto
17. Haideh Moghissi, Emerita Professor, York University
18. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
19. Sina Zekavat
20. Prof. Saeed Rahnema, (rtd) York University, Canada
21. Farhad Nomani, Emeritus Professor of Economics, AUP, Paris
22. Dr Mohammad-Reza Nikfar, IranAcademia
23. Omid Shekari, University of Pittsburgh
24. Assoc Prof Manijeh Moradian, Barnard College, Columbia University
25. Darya Kharabi, Transnational Iranian Antifascist Collective
26. Azadeh Momeni, Toronto Metropolitan University
27. Fataneh Farahani, Professor in Ethnology, Stockholm University, Sweden
28. Dana Orkideh, Illustrator & Graphic Designer
29. Ozlem Goner, Central European University
30. Assist Prof Gulay Kilicaslan, Carleton University
31. Kazem Alamdari, California State University
32. Siyavash Shahabi, journalist and writer
33. Nima Sabouri
34. Sanaz Azimipour, Writer
35. Aso Javaheri, Simon Fraser University
36. Nastaran Saremy, Simon Fraser University
37. Gita Hashemi, Artist, T’karonto
38. Daria Jehani
39. Damoun Jehani, PhD Student and political activist
40. Nima Chalangar, "No To Execution Campaign”, Human Rights Activist
41. Babak Salari, Photographer, Montreal
42. Saeedeh Niktab Etaati, Curator, Canadian Museum of History
43. Arash Ghiassi
44. Muborak Sharif, Independent scholar
45. Mana Khosrowshahi, Development Studies PhD Candidate at University of Ottawa
46. Mina Mahmoudian
47. Suzan Karimi
48. Avishan Chanani
49. Yeganeh Khoie
50. Dr Maryam Palizban, Iméra – Institute for Advanced Study, Aix-Marseille Université, France
51. Mina Fakhravar, University of Ottawa
52. Elham Hoominfar, Northwestern University
53. Kiana Dashtbazi
54. Mona Hadisi, Iran Freedom Congress
55. Dr Mahdi Ghodsi, wiiw, WU, CMEG, Iran Freedom Congress
56. Dr Raha Sabet Sarvestany
57. Dr Zahra Khosroshahi, Lecturer in Film & Television Studies, University of Glasgow
58. Shahla Zendegani Feminist Social Activist
59. Negin Shiraghaei, Azadi Network
60. Hanieh Khosroshahi
61. Mitra Saffari, human rights activist
62. Shahrzad Roshan Zamir, student, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley
63. Ali Robaei
64. Mehrdad Samadzadeh, University of Toronto
65. Mahtab Mahboub, PhD candidate at Essen-Duisburg University
66. Hajar Moradi, Multidisciplinary Artist
67. Ashkan Hashemipour, University of Oxford
68. Dr Homa Fathi, PhD Candidate, McGill Faculty of Dental Medicine and Oral Health Sciences
69. Sepideh Shariati
70. Sahand Mehraeen, Vandad Educational Centre
71. Reza Akbari, Political Activist and Writer
72. Sedigheh Haj Mohsen, Political activist
73. Dr Azam Khatam, University of Toronto
74. Dr Ali Akbar Mahdi, Professor Emeritus, Ohio Wesleyan University, Retired Lecturer, California State University, Northridge
75. Negin Behkam, Women Revolutionary Council and journalist
76. Bahar Almasi, Independent Cultural Activist
77. Fouad Roueiha, Un Ponte Per, Rome, Italy
78. Ak-A
79. Prof. Homa Hoodfar, Emerita, Concordia University, Montreal
80. Prof. Azadeh Kian, Université Paris Cité, Paris, France
81. Houshang Sepehr, Solidarité Socialiste avec les Travailleurs d’Iran, France
82. Farkhondeh Ashena, former political prisoner
83. Nasrin Parvaz, writer and artist, former political prisoner, “One Woman’s Struggle in Iran, A Prison Memoir”
84. Roxanne Shalkouhi-Coutteure, Union Activist in the health sector, Gauche Anticapitaliste, Brussels, Belgium
85. Chowra Makaremi, researcher in Anthropology, CNRS Paris
86. Babak Kia, Solidarité Socialiste avec les Travailleurs d’Iran, France
87. Roya Rastegar, New Center for Research & Practice
88. Ali Sayyah, Simon Fraser University
89. Morteza Samanpour, Kingston University, CRMEP
90. Dr Roxana Khoshravesh (Toronto)
91. Mehran Esfandiari, Human Rights activist
92. M. Fard, Toronto-Canada Iranian Republican Association (TIRA)
93. Behnam Daraeizadeh, Journalist & Human Rights researcher, Ottawa, Canada
Collectives & organisations
1. No To Execution Campaign
2. Roud Collective
3. Voice of Iran Revolution
4. Osyan Women’s Collective
5. Kaargaah.net (تحریریه‌ی کارگاه دیالکتیک)
6. هم یاری Iran Solidarity - Toronto
7. Transnational Iranian Anti-Fascist Collective (TIAC)
8. Javaneh Verein
9. Global Prison Abolition Coalition
10. Judíxs Antisionistas contra la Ocupación y el Apartheid, Chile
11. Flüchtlingscafé Göttingen / Refugee Café Göttingen
12. AK Asyl Göttingen
13. Solidarité Socialiste avec les Travailleurs d’Iran (S.S.T.I-France)
14. New Bloom 破土, Taiwan
15. Burmese Atheists
16. Solidarity US
17. Editorial Board, New Politics
Signatures in solidarity
1. Prof. Gary Foley, Aboriginal History Archive, Victoria University
2. Prof. Tony Birch, The University of Melbourne
3. Dr Carlos Eduardo Morreo, Victoria University
4. Dr Tasnim Mahmoud Sammak, Victoria University
5. Prof. Juan Tauri, The University of Melbourne
6. Dr Shakira Hussein, The University of Melbourne
7. Assoc Prof Amanda Porter, The University of Melbourne
8. AOM Debbie Kilroy, Sisters Inside & National Network of Incarcerated & Formerly Incarcerated Women and Girls
9. Rebecca Ruth Gould, Distinguished Professor of Comparative Poetics and Global Politics, SOAS, University of London
10. Peter Bohmer, former political prisoner, faculty emeritus in political economy, The Evergreen State College, Economics for Everyone, USA
11. Prof. Gilbert Achcar, SOAS, University of London
12. Prof. Sean Purdy, Universidade de São Paulo
13. Federico Fuentes
14. Karim Safieddine
15. Ammar Abboud, researcher, Lebanon
16. Sara Abbas, City University of New York
17. Curtis Levy, filmmaker
18. Tania Melnick, Judíxs Antisionistas contra la Ocupación y el Apartheid, Chile
19. Robin Yassin-Kassab, writer
20. Michael Albert, RevolutionZ, United States
21. Joseph Daher, Independant Academic and Researcher
22. Paul Le Blanc, member of Solidarity, Tempest Collective, Democratic Socialists of America, Pittsburgh
23. Olivier Besancenot, NPA-l’Anticapitaliste, France
24. Christine Poupin, NPA-l’Anticapitaliste, France
25. Michael Rodríguez-Muñiz, UC Berkeley
26. Shuddhabrata Sengupta, artist & curator, Raqs Media Collective, Delhi, India
27. Vicki Nguen
28. Nancy Holmstrom, prof emerita, Rutgers University, USA
29. Balasingham Skanthakumar, co-editor Polity magazine / director Social Scientists’ Association of Sri Lanka
30. Dr David Barkin, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Mexico City, Mexico
31. Prof Ricardo Dominguez, UCSD, Visual Arts
32. Marco F. Navarro, Queens College, CUNY
33. Suraia Sahar
34. Howie Hawkins, Green Party, United States
35. Charles Post, City University of New York
36. David Finkel, managing editor of AGAINST THE CURRENT
37. Dr Aragorn Eloff, South Africa
38. Ashley Smith, Tempest Collective, United States
39. Stephen R. Shalom, Wm. Paterson University, USA
40. Mohammed Elnaiem
41. Gina Lee Robbins
42. Lazy Rosario, Musician & DJ
43. Ammu Abraham, Feminist & civil liberties, Forum against oppression of women
44. Mark LeVine, Department of History, UC irvine, California, USA
45. Rashmi Varma, University of Warwick
46. Armaan Singh
47. Brian B+ Cross, UCSD Vis Arts
48. Ceylan Hassan, PhD University of Kent, Decolonial Cypriot
49. Dr Scheherazade Bloul, Deakin University
50. Melissa Corbett, Socialist Alliance
51. Dr Benjamin H. Abbott, University of New Mexico
52. Juan Pachon, Latin American Solidarity Network (LASNET)
53. Joanna Wren, Archaeologist, Ireland
54. Wayne Heimbach
55. Doita Datta
56. Donovan Ward
57. Leila S. Taha, Human Rights Attorney
58. Hugo Le Gourrierec, director, assistant director cinéma, France
59. Dr Geoff Jordan
60. Sarah Sather, Assistant Editor, New York
61. Orla de Díez
62. Danisha, Sai University
63. Dr Christy Adeola Braham
64. Sam Wallman
65. Dr Elese Dowden
66. Marissa Walker
67. Jon Tjhia
68. Mitchell Plitnick, ReThinking Foreign Policy
69. Prof. Barbara Taylor, Queen Mary University of London
70. N Jayaram, People’s Union for Civil Liberties, India
71. Kerrigan Hayes
72. Dr Simone Jeger
73. Choo Chon Kai
74. Amina Ali, writer, New York, NY
75. Lea G
76. Simón Rodríguez, journalist, Venezuelanvoices.org
77. Dr Carolyn D’Cruz
78. Amaury Rodriguez, writer
79. John Michael Colón, Writer & Editor, Strange Matters Magazine
80. Dr S.N, UCL
81. Michael Karadjis, Western Sydney University
82. Nicholas Bray
83. Antonios Tiganis, Aarhus University
84. Wil Sahar Patrick, PhD Candidate, University of Victoria
85. Ian Parker, Anti-Capitalist Resistance Manchester
86. Simon Pearson, Anti Capitalist Musings & Anti Capitalist Resistance
87. Harald Etzbach, Journalist
88. Ian Townson, Anti Capitalist Resistance
89. Shaun Cohen, Leeds
90. George Gray, UCU
91. Prof. Matthew Klugman, Victoria University
92. Tori Ball, Durham University
93. María Paula Hernández, PhD Candidate, La Trobe University
94. Juan-Camilo Riano-Rodriguez, PhD Candidate, Victoria University
95. Imogen Lambert, University of Warwick
96. Caroline Carney Marxist Disability Network ACR
97. John Garvey, Brooklyn, NY
98. Clarice Kuhling, Wilfrid Laurier University
99. Michèle Hehn, Québec Solidaire, Montreal, Quebec
100. Andriy Movchan, International Network for Solidarity with Ukraine
101. Andy Richards - Anti Capitalist Resistance, England
102. Noémie Emmanuel, Sociologue, UCLouvain
103. Kelly Grotke, Writer
104. Vietnam Young Marxist, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
105. Assoc Prof Lucia Sorbera, The University of Sydney, Australia
106. Traven Leyshon, Solidarity U.S., Bread & Roses DSA
107. Sam Friedman, AIDS researcher, USA
108. Ted Zuur
109. Richard “Rick” Sklader, Disability Activist
110. J. Talmadge Wright, Sociology Professor Emeritus, Loyola University Chicago
111. Sam R, Unison/Greater Manchester Tenants Union
112. M. Andre Doucet, Montreal, Canada
113. Steve Ongerth
114. Richard Hornsby, Tempest Collective, United States
115. Dr Müge Akpinar
116. Shivam Chadha, antiwar and decolonial activist, هم یاری Iran Solidarity - Toronto
117. Dennis Kortheuer, emeritus CSULB, United States
118. Michael Sideris, writer and teacher, Naarm/Melbourne
119. Rodrigo Oliveira Fonseca, Universidade Federal do Sul da Bahia, Brasil
120. Kavita Krishnan, New Delhi, India
ٖ121. Farooq Sulehria, Beaconhouse National University, Lahore
122. Phil Gasper, Professor Emeritus, Notre Dame de Namur University, USA
123. Eric Toussaint, PhD, University Paris 8 and Liège Belgium
124. Steve Leigh, Red Spark, Seattle Revolutionary Socialists
125. Ugo Palheta, University of Lille, France
126. Siân Vate, Victoria University
127. Alex de Jong, IIRE Amsterdam
128. Tassos Anastassiadis, journalist, Athens, Greece
129. Kit Wainer, United Federation of Teachers
130. Jordy Cummings, York University, Toronto, Canada
131. Bong Fenis, Alyansa ng mga Mamamayan para sa Karapatang Pantao, Philippines
132. Hari Prasad, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
133. Dr Ruth Marshall, Political Science, University of Toronto
134. Ethan Young, moderator, Global Left Midweek @ Portside.org, Brooklyn, USA
135. Hein Htet Kyaw (Abu Bakr), Director of Australasia, Atheist Alliance International
136. Alip Moose, writer, Malaysia
137. Harsh Kapoor, Editor, Mainstream Weekly
138. Keith Michael Estrada
139. Dr Katharine Hodgkin, London, UK
140. Anita Dube, artist, India
141. Penelope Duggan, Editor International Viewpoint
142. Béa Whitaker, militante anti-raciste altermondialiste, France
143. Prof. Martin Gallié, UQAM, Québec
144. Bill Balderston, delegate, Alameda Labor Council, Oakland, USA
145. Fabrizio Burattini (refrattario.link), Italy
146. Marianne Ligou, France
147. Claudine Duplissy IV internationale France
148. Jon Bekken, Anarcho-Syndicalist Review, Philadelphia USA
149. Dianne Feeley, UAW Local 235 retired, Detroit, MI, USA
150. Athena Moss Sypsa, artist, Greece
151. Greg Williams, LFI, France
152. Thomas Harrison
153. Pete Dolack, New York City
154. Criage Lynnette Althage
155. Marco Fonseca, Independent Scholar
156. Kristofer Petersen-Overton, Brook Farm Institute for Critical Studies
157. Allie Levin
158. Kim Scipes, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Purdue University Northwest (affiliation listed for identification purposes only)
159. Guy Rundle, editor and writer
160. Peter Saxtrup Nielsen, Baker, Aarhus, Denmark
161. Dr Gerald Roche, La Trobe University
162. Joel Geier, Revolutionary Marxist, Evanston, Il, USA
163. Teacher, Ystads Municipality, Sweden
164. Elizabeth Lawrence, UCU activist and Anti-Capitalist Resistance, England
165. Tony Iltis, warehouse worker, Western Sydney
166. M. V. Ramana, University of British Columbia, Canada
167. Leigh Kendall, Asia Pacific Sub-Secretariat of the International Workers Association
168. Giannis Felekis, Greece
169. Elea Foster, Greece
170. Charlotte Valloe
171. Lily Fox, York
172. Franck Gaudichaud, Historian, Toulouse University, France
173. A.C. Bayran, Manila
174. Dr Simone Davis, retired, University of Toronto, Canada
175. Jason Pike, Poland
176. Dr Thomas Rieger, Historian, "Die Linke", Germany
177. Prof. Jean Batou, University of Lausanne
178. Stefanie Prezioso, former Swiss MP
179. Dan La Botz, Editorial Board member, New Politics
180. Wendy Thompson, retired former Pres., L. 235 UAW, Detroit, Michigan, USA
181. Helen Scott, Professor Emerita, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA
182. David McCullough, DSA, Atlanta, USA
183. Eric Feinblatt, co-chair Sullivan County Organizing Committee/Democratic Socialists of America, USA
184. Michael Mersereau, artist, United States
185. Alex Chis, East Bay DSA, Union City, CA
186. Claudette Bégin, Teamsters Local 2010, retired, Union City, CA
187. Jason Dawsey, Historian, Arizona State University
188. Alex Larsen, Denmark

Currently 298 signatures (30 August 2026)

Attached documents

• our-support-for-the-open-letter-to-iran-s-political_a9705.pdf (PDF - 1.1 MiB)
  Extraction PDF [->article9705]

Iran

• Resumption of Bombing and Internal Crisis in Iran
• A (temporary) calm before the storm in Iran
• Trump-Netanyahu Debacle: A World of Collateral Damage
• Iran’s shockwave in Asia
• The Reasons for the US-Israeli Aggression against Iran

• Collective