It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
President Donald Trump’s persistent boasts about tactical victories against Iran’ s military ignore the fundamental strategic fact that Trump has lost the Iran war.
High gas prices are displayed at a gas station after Democratic gubernatorial candidate Tom Steyer spoke at a news conference outside the gas station amid the war in Iran on April 9, 2026 in Los Angeles, California. (Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images)
When he declared war on Iran in violation of international law and the US Constitution, President Donald Trump announced several objectives. He claims to have won the war, but Iran is emerging as the long-term victor.
Let’s count the ways.
“Regime Change”
No one doubted the capacity of the US armed forces to decimate Iran’s far inferior military force. But to what end?
Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuconvinced Trump that launching the attack would prompt a popular uprising that would lead to the overthrow of Iran’s theocracy. Listening to Netanyahu’s assertion, CIA Director John Ratcliffe called it “farcical.” Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio translated that word into language Trump would understand, “In other words, it’s bullshit.”
Trump’s bluster isn’t working with Iranian leaders. His threats to commit war crimes dominate news cycles, but they merely reveal to Iran Trump’s desperation to extricate himself from the mess he created.
Trump chose to believe Netanyahu. Announcing the US-Israeli assault, Trump told Iranians that this was their opportunity to reclaim their country. To win the war on Trump’s terms, the Iranian theocracy needed only to survive.
The attack killed the Supreme Leader of Iran and top members of the government. But immediately, the serpent grew another head—the Supreme Leader’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who had lost his wife and teenage son in the bombing. The new leader is known for deep, long-standing ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) security establishment. His appointment signaled a transition to a more heavily militarized, hard-line, and anti-Western regime.
Trump calls this “regime change.” By his definition, Admiral Karl Dönitz succeeding Adolf Hitler as head of the German state near the end of World War II constituted regime change too.
The Iran theocracy survived in an even more militant form.
Score: Iran 1, Trump 0 “Contain Iran”
Trump boasted that the war would restrain Iran’s ability to project power:
“We are systematically dismantling the regime’s ability to threaten America or project power outside of their borders,” he said.
Trump then described the destruction of Iran’s navy, air force, missile facilities, and defense industrial base. Those were tactical successes, but the war itself has been a strategic failure.
Iran’s response included attacks on neighboring countries. Even more troubling, it discovered and deployed a powerful new weapon: blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Notwithstanding its decimated navy, Iran now has a choke hold on the global economy.
Netanyahu had assured Trump that the regime would be so weakened from the US-Israeli assault that it would be unable to block the waterway through which one-fifth of the world’s oil flowed. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine flagged the enormous difficulty of securing the strait and the risks of Iran blocking it. But Trump dismissed that possibility on the assumption that the regime would capitulate before that could happen.
With the price of oil skyrocketing, Trump has created a new problem for the entire world and powerful leverage for Iran.
Score: Iran 2, Trump 0 “No Nuclear Weapons”
In his June 2025 attack on Iran, Trump claimed to have “obliterated” its nuclear facilities. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth went further, saying that not only were the facilities obliterated, but so too were Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Subsequently, Trump took repeated victory laps over the mission:“It knocked out their entire potential nuclear capacity.” (July 16) “It’s been obliterated.” (July 31) “We obliterated… the future nuclear capability of Iran.” (August 18) “But I also obliterated Iran’s nuclear hopes, by totally annihilating their enriched uranium.” (September 20) “Well, they don’t have a nuclear program. It was obliterated.” (October 13) “…completely obliterated Iran’s nuclear capability.” (November 11) “It was called Iran and its nuclear capability, and we obliterated that very quickly and strongly and powerfully.” (November 19) “We obliterated their nuclear capability.” (December 11) “We knocked out the Iran nuclear threat, and it was obliterated.” (January 8) “…obliterated Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability.” (January 20) “…achieving total obliteration of the Iran nuclear potential capability—totally obliterated.” (February 13)
In defending the launch of the war on February 28, 2026, Trump acknowledged that Iran’s nuclear program had not been obliterated after all. Rather, the country was now “right at the doorstep” of having a nuclear bomb. Trump has no strategy for solving that problem either.
Trump’s tactics—bombing—won’t work. Knowledgeable experts believe that a key Iranian nuclear facility is Pickaxe Mountain, where some of its uranium may be stored. That facility is so far below the ground that even America’s 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs can’t reach its inner chamber.
Trump talks about “going in” and taking the nuclear material out. But a ground operation to retrieve the material or destroy the facility would entail tremendous risk to those attempting it while providing, at best, an uncertain outcome.
The threat of a nuclear Iran remains.
Score: Iran 3, Trump 0 False Declarations of Victory That Backfire
Trump’s bluster isn’t working with Iranian leaders. His threats to commit war crimes dominate news cycles, but they merely reveal to Iran Trump’s desperation to extricate himself from the mess he created. As a negotiating strategy, it’s counterproductive.
Trump’s persistent boasts about tactical victories against Iran’ s military ignore the fundamental strategic fact that Trump has lost the Iran war. If a deal emerges from discussions between Iran’s experienced negotiators and Trump’s collection of amateurs, America and the world will pay a big price for a long time.
(FPRI) — Vladimir Putin, 73, has been Russia’s leader for over a quarter of a century and the driving force behind Moscow’s efforts to reassert control over its former Soviet and Tsarist empire. His eventual departure from the world stage will bring hope that a new Russian leader will end these imperial impulses and behavior. However, a review of Russian history, political culture, and elite and public opinion provides a clear warning that such hopes are unlikely to be realized. Russia after Putin is likely to be very similar to Russia under Putin.
As either president or prime minister, Putin’s 27 years in power are the second-longest period of post-Tsarist rule in Russian history after Joseph Stalin’s. Should Putin remain in office, he will surpass Stalin’s record of being in power for 30 years and 11 months in July 2030. There are no indications that, as long as he lives, Putin will give up power voluntarily.
But give up power he eventually shall, if only due to actuarial realities. The average Russian male born in Putin’s birth year of 1952 has been dead for 21 years. Granted, Putin has access to superior health care and has led an active and healthy lifestyle compared to many Russian men. An apparent germophobe, he takes exceedingly strict precautions regarding his health. Yet the day will come when Russian television programming is interrupted to play Swan Lake, the warning sign of death within the Kremlin’s walls. What then for Russia?
Exact scenarios are difficult to predict due to the uncertainty of the when and how of Putin’s demise. However, based on patterns of Russian history, the realities of its political system, the correlation of international and economic forces, and social norms including a general consensus of Russia’s national identity, a broad outline can be drawn to suggest which future is more likely than others. This article proposes that there is little hope of change in a post-Putin Russia absent revolutionary change from within the Kremlin or forced on it from without. Those scenarios are unlikely barring a major geopolitical event that transforms both how Russia is governed and how its elites and society identify themselves.
Russia’s Troubled History of Political Transitions
For the past quarter of a millennium, transitions from one Russian ruler to the next have been marked with various coups, attempted coups, and assassinations or poisonings. A peaceful transition from one ruler to the next has not been the norm.
However, another regular feature of Russian political transitions is that they do bring change in governing style, oscillating between harsher and lighter forms of rule, but always within the confines of some form of autocracy and dictatorship. Assassins (impatient with the pace of reform) ended Tsar Alexander II’s liberal era, to which Alexander III’s reaction was the consolidation of a police state. This was tempered by a more progressive domestic policy under Nicholas II, if only due to the revolution of 1905. Stalin’s terror was followed by Nikita Khruschev’s de-Stalinization and efforts at domestic reforms. When these proved unsuccessful and his foreign policy became too erratic, Khruschev was overthrown in a bloodless coup by Leonid Brezhnev. The Brezhnev years brought stability as well as stagnation. This was countered by Yuri Andropov who sought to bring discipline, energy, and a revitalized belief in Communism back into Soviet society. Only in the transition between Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko was the status quo maintained, if just because Chernenko lived for less than 13 months before being replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev. Putin ended the anarchy of the Boris Yeltsin years but also Russia’s nascent democracy.
Therefore, history suggests that a post-Putin Russian leader may bring some change compared to his predecessor. However, it also indicates that any change will be within the context of measures believed necessary to maintain the current system and not replace it. This should be understood so that in the future Western observers do not misunderstand cosmetic changes for structural ones. We should not forget past misjudgments such as the initial optimistic (and false) reports that Andropov was a closet liberal who met with dissidents to discuss their differences. Russian tsars, general secretaries, and presidents have a history of tactical changes and strategic continuity. The only exception was Gorbachev, whose reforms destroyed the ruling system by a complete misunderstanding of that system. Major changes to Russia’s current system are unlikely due to the nationwide antipathy toward Gorbachev’s tenure that led to collapse and chaos. Both the Russian people and their elites will recoil from any post-Putin leader that could be considered another Gorbachev because his legacy of catastrophic failure still permeates today.
The Structure of Putin’s Russia
Putin’s successor will have to operate, at least initially, within Russia’s present political system. He will also be influenced by international factors, economic realities, and social norms of Russia’s ruling class and society, which have been heavily affected by almost three decades of Putin’s rule including at least four years of war in Ukraine. This article will examine these factors, analyze the limits they impose on Russia’s next ruler, and describe why they are likely to result in continuity or, at best, change only around the margins in a post-Putin Russia.
Russia’s constitution states that in the event of a president’s death, resignation, or incapacitation, he will be replaced by the prime minister until elections are held in ninety days. In reality, Putin has no designated successor because it is too dangerous for any dictator to name a successor and allow opposition forces to accumulate around him. Instead, Putin balances between the leaders of various elite groups who operate the levers of coercion and oversee the sources of wealth within Russia. This balancing keeps possible successors under control by not allowing them to gain too much power. A culture of corruption adds to this internal balance of power because corruption makes all political players controllable by being compromisable.
Described as a “vertical of power,” this system is maximized to maintain Putin’s control over Russia but not transfer that control. Russia’s constitution gives this system just three months to hold elections after a president’s sudden departure. Since Russia’s electoral system is controlled by the Kremlin and will only produce results predetermined by the Kremlin, there will be little time for Kremlin elites to decide upon a new leader and arrange for the façade of an election intended to signify national approval and legitimacy.
The first challenge for any future leader after Putin will be to control a system that is both centrifugal and fragmented with reins of power emanating from the Kremlin but not touching each other. While all lines of authority center on the Kremlin, none are connected, and each are designed to balance, if not challenge, the other. The strength of each major political figure has been purposefully constrained so they cannot gain power with their resources (military or financial) alone and cannot trust those with whom they would have to coordinate to do so.
Kremlin elites live under a surveillance system maintained by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Federal Protective Service (FSO). The FSB, FSO, and other internal security organs such as the National Guard (Rosgvardia) are the primary guarantors of Putin’s system. They can also serve as a springboard for whoever wishes to gain power after Putin, and will be the new guarantors of power for whoever achieves it. Russia’s political structure is unlikely to evolve differently from the system Putin has created while these forces remain or remain unchanged.
Under these conditions, it will be difficult for a reformist leader to emerge. Since the system is not designed for shared power, the next leader will likely be someone who can move quickly to consolidate power and protect himself from competitors. This will limit his freedom of action since he cannot alienate too many Kremlin factions. As Otto von Bismarck once observed, “politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best.” While facing this internal political reality, Putin’s eventual successor will face other limiting factors.
International Factors
International factors for a new Russian leader will include the war with Ukraine (or its immediate legacy), uneasy relations with the West, and economic reliance on China. By illegally annexing Crimea, seizing the Donbas in 2014, and attacking Ukraine in 2022, Putin turned Ukraine into an implacable foe. Whether the war is ongoing when Putin leaves the political scene or there is a ceasefire, his successor will face a perpetually hostile Ukraine intent on recovering lost territories. Even with a ceasefire, Russia will have to maintain a sizeable army in its occupied lands and a war economy sufficient to support it. As long as Russia occupies Ukrainian territory, the European Union, the United Kingdom, most other industrial powers, and probably the United States will continue economic sanctions. Foreign investors will avoid Russia due to these sanctions and an investment climate that was deteriorating even before 2014.
Chinese oil and natural gas purchases and sales of dual-use technology for drones, missiles, and other weapons have provided Russia an economic and military lifeline. However, this aid has its limits. China purchased less Russian oil in 2025 than in previous years and overall trade fell as well from 2024. Chinese oil purchases are likely to decline further as Beijing implements an energy policy designed to boost energy self-sufficiency and diversify foreign sources of oil and gas. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has cost Russia its lucrative European market for natural gas. This market cannot be replaced by a pivot to Asia due to sanctions and the limitations of Russia’s energy infrastructure, which is primarily oriented west and not east. While North Korea may provide weapons and ammunition, and India purchases its share of oil, war with Ukraine has left Russia with few trading partners. Additionally, Russia’s position in the Caucasus and Central Asia continues to decline and even historic, if minor, partners such as Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba are either no more or could soon be lost.
This means as long as Ukraine is a permanent enemy, a post-Putin ruler will have limited options to improve Russia’s economy by attracting international trade and investments. The amount of economic relief China will provide has probably been reached. This leads to the next challenge for a post-Putin ruler: improving the economy.
Economic Realities
Russia’s economy is beset by high inflation, high interest rates, and low to non-existent growth, but has low unemployment due to a labor shortage. The labor shortage ameliorates some of the other poor economic trends by allowing workers to find employment, but it also inhibits economic growth. What growth there has been in the economy has been war-related, creating items that will be soon destroyed or designed to explode after production. They neither improve Russia’s infrastructure nor help the economy create wealth. Alexandra Prokopenko best described Russia’s economic situation when she wrote that the economy is busier but poorer with each passing year of the war.
With the exhaustion of savings in the National Wealth Fund, Russia’s government is challenged to fund both its operations and the war. Income and business taxes increased in 2025 but oil revenues were less than expected due to falling world prices. This trend continued into 2026 until the war in Iran radically reversed oil prices. How long this windfall will last is unknown. It provides a welcome if temporary safety valve for Russia’s troubled economy, but no fix to many inherent problems. It may also be counterbalanced by Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil exports.
Because of sanctions, Russia cannot borrow on the international bond markets as most countries do to finance budget deficits. VAT increased from 20 to 22 percent on January 1, 2026, which is supposed to generate $14.3 billion (approximately what a seven-dollar drop in world oil prices costs the government’s budget). Moscow also plans to reduce by sixfold the level at which businesses must begin paying VAT.
Putin’s successor will need to choose between guns or butter since the economy cannot provide both. However, even with a ceasefire, any transition from a war economy to a peacetime economy could threaten the regime. A ceasefire with Ukraine will raise expectations in Russia that wartime economic sacrifices can end. These expectations are unlikely to be met.
As stated above, the requirement to keep a large Russian army on occupied Ukrainian territory means that Russia cannot fully move from a war economy to a peacetime one. Furthermore, even a limited transition is fraught with political peril for the Kremlin. The cancellation of defense contracts, the main agent of limited growth in the economy, and the resulting layoffs of defense workers will raise unemployment at the same time a number of men will be demobilized and looking for civilian jobs. A decrease in defense expenditures will also threaten many banks who have been coerced into providing unsecured credits to the military-industrial complex. High interest rates will make it hard for companies to find the capital to retool their industries back to producing consumer goods.
All of these factors point to a major recession, a normal occurrence in industrial economies once a war ends. For Russia today, even a partial transition to a peacetime economy could lead to bank failures, increased unemployment, continued inflation and high taxes, and negative growth. The Kremlin could face social unrest sparked by the realization that the end of the fighting has not brought an end to sacrifices.
Based on international and economic realities, it would be reasonable for Putin’s successor to attempt to improve international relations, especially vis-à-vis Ukraine, so as to end Western sanctions, remove the need for an army of occupation, and attract foreign investment to buffer the transition from a wartime to peacetime economy to improve life for the average Russian.
This is unlikely to happen for three reasons. First, this is what Gorbachev tried in the 1980s. That gambit cost Moscow its empire and the Communist Party its power. It is not a strategy likely to receive warm approval in the Kremlin. Second, it would require Moscow to give up territories considered to be Russian soil taken or “recovered” at a tremendous cost of human life. This would fly in the face of social norms accepted by most Russians today: elites and average citizens. Third, tension with the West provides the Kremlin with a useful scapegoat to justify economic sacrifices that cannot end.
Russia’s Social Norms
Social norms, the written and unwritten rules that govern acceptable behavior within a group, are a major influence on what is and is not possible within Russia’s body politic. The main norms applicable to a post-Putin Russia are how both Russia’s elites and society view who they are and what they want. This is often expressed in terms of a national idea or a national identity.
Per Ilya Prizel in his book National Identity and Foreign Policy, “a polity’s national identity is very much a result of how it interprets its history.” It can have an enormous impact on not just how a society sees itself but how its government conducts foreign policy based on that image. Russia’s current national identity is not just based on the past few decades of propaganda from Putin’s regime but on centuries of Russian history and political culture. It consists of a mix of Messianism, Imperialism, Eurasianism, and Re-Stalinization to create an image of a Russia oppressed by the West but also morally superior and distinct from it. The result is a national identity with a strong anti-Western animus, which is reinforced by the cult of the Great Patriotic War cultivated by Putin and memories of economic and national weakness during the 1990s. This mindset leaves little room for compromise over Ukraine or détente with the West.
Russian Messianism, the myth of Moscow being the Third Rome, implies both a civilizing mission for Russia and an accompanying need for a sphere of not just influence but control around its periphery. It also implies that its neighbors have a lack of agency to decide their own fates independent of Moscow. This is reinforced by Russian imperialism or at least nostalgia for Russian imperial power when, in the living memory of many Russians, Moscow exerted control from the Elbe River to Vladivostok and from the Arctic to the Oxus. Memories of empire are also memories of lost greatness that feed an identity wishing to return to that greatness.
Eurasianism, the belief that Russia is a unique civilization, neither Western nor Eastern, provides a distinct identity that rejects Western standards rooted in respect for the individual. Instead, Eurasianism emphasizes the importance of the “collective” over the individual and the uniqueness of the Russian soul. This is a message the Russian Orthodox Church also reinforces. While Eurasianism is not accepted by all Russians, it is consistent with a political culture that never experienced the influences of the Renaissance, Reformation, or the Enlightenment but did experience Mongol rule, centuries of autocracy, and Stalinism. Finally, the rehabilitation of Stalin’s image, the greatest mass murderer in Russian history, reinforces aspects of Russia’s national identity regarding the validity of autocracy, imperial rule, dehumanizing enemies, and mass violence to achieve social or political goals. Today, almost two-thirds of Russian citizens have a positive image of Stalin and many Russian politicians are inclined to speak of him in terms of a charismatic leader and strong statesman while hanging portraits of him in their offices.
This identity is reflected in such actions as constant conflict with the West including the use of assassinations, arson, subversion, and economic warfare; war in Ukraine that unapologetically features massive war crimes against civilians and massive casualties for Russia’s own citizens; and acceptance of economic hardships and a lack of personal liberties if in exchange citizens can still perceive themselves to be members of a great international power.
Per a 2014 Pew Research Center poll, nine out of 10 Russians supported the seizure of Crimea, believed Kyiv should accept its loss, and believed that there were parts of other neighboring states that should also belong to Russia. Even those who oppose the Kremlin can hold deep beliefs of Russian nationalism or chauvinism. This included the dissident Alexei Navalny who had espoused Russian nationalist themesregarding Central Asians and varied at times in his outlook on Crimea’s annexation. Alexander Solzhenitsyn resisted Communism but, just before his death, recommended annexing northern Kazakhstan into Russia and creating a Slavic union of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine led by Moscow. Even further back in Russian history, the great poet Alexander Pushkin opposed Tsarist autocracy but was quick to pick up his pen to support Russian imperialism in Poland as evidenced by his 1831 poem, To the Slanderers of Russia.
More recent polling indicates that while most Russians would like to see the war end, they are not willing to compromise to do so. In January 2025, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Center pollindicated that three-quarters of Russians expected Russia to prevail in this war. The same poll indicated that 55 percent would like to see Russia as a great power feared and respected by other countries, rather than a country with a higher standard of living (41 percent). At the end of the year, a poll by VTsIOM reported that 70 percent of Russians expected victory in 2026. In January 2026, Levada Center sociologist Lev Gudkov reported that most Russians believe the war in Ukraine was imposed by the West and that Russia would eventually prevail. Gudkov spoke of a “militarization of consciousness” in Russia since it has experienced only six years of peace since the fall of the Soviet Union. He also highlighted a 2024 Levada Center poll that found that 65 percent of Russians agreed with the statement that, “Russia had never been an aggressor or initiator of conflicts with other nations,” up from 36 percent who believed that in 1998.
While caution should be attached to any polling done in a dictatorship, these polls, other studies, and the content of Russian state television warn that there may not be much of a gap in how ordinary Russians and the ruling elites see their national idea. Additionally, support for the war and a “my country right or wrong” attitude towards it among ethnic Russians is easier to sustain when the brunt of the war’s casualties are borne by other ethnicities and society’s outcasts.
Putin’s inner circle, from whom a successor will be drawn, is aware of these public sentiments. That group is also relatively homogenous regarding its worldview, which for most developed in Soviet times while serving in the security services or military. The one member of Putin’s inner circle who showed the slightest concern about the effects of the war in Ukraine on Russia, Dmitry Kozak, was replaced by Kremlin political chief, Sergei Kiriyenko, whose domestic portfolio now includes Russia’s relations with its so-called Near Abroad. Putin, it seems, is culling the herd so after his death there will not be a repeat of the mistake the Soviet Politburo made when they appointed from their midst a successor who destroyed them.
Whoever succeeds Putin will come from a very finite pool of candidates who have similar backgrounds and beliefs and have been together in power for years. They likely have a classic Groupthink mindset. That mindset was best expressed several years ago in an article, Putin’s Long State, by then Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov. In his article Surkov wrote that the current political order had passed its “stress tests” and “will be an effective means of survival and exaltation of the Russian nation for not only years, but also decades, and most likely the whole century.” For the inner circle, it is crucial that Putin’s death or removal means only a leadership change and not a regime change that threatens their own power, wealth, and lives.
Conclusion
Whoever replaces Putin will have limited options to improve Russia’s international and economic situations because to do so requires compromises that are unacceptable to most Russians, could threaten the stability of the regime, and would be incompatible with Russia’s self-image as a superpower. These factors are likely to take precedence over either world peace or a better economy.
Why cannot a new leader decide to end the war, blame it on Putin, and make major territorial concessions, hoping that propaganda and force would maintain his rule? One reason a future Russian leader might not make this decision is that he truly believes in the Russian national idea himself. Another reason is that he would immediately be accused of surrendering sacred Russian lands. This would provide the pretext for rivals to overthrow him. This action would have wide support from Russia’s veterans, military leadership, relatives of those killed in action, Orthodox clergy, ultranationalists, and ordinary citizens imbued with the belief that wherever the Russian flag is planted, it should never be taken down. The coup makers would gain legitimacy as patriots for doing so. Compromise over Ukraine is more likely to lead to a coup than peace.
Economic problems, unless they surpass those of the 1990s (which were bad, but most Russians can also remember surviving), will not force a post-Putin leader to take steps detrimental to his hold on power and contrary to the beliefs of most Russians. Whoever occupies the Kremlin next can never be seen as being dictated to by the West. He is therefore likely to stay on a path first trodden by Putin. This means policies that will continue to have the Russian people sacrifice, and be sacrificed, for the sake of national greatness. Russia’s future is most likely to be a real-world parallel to the perpetual war between Oceania and Eurasia in Orwell’s novel 1984.
Is this the only scenario possible for the future? No, but it is the most likely one, barring a revolutionary change in Russia’s national identity and domestic politics. Russia is unlikely to change its behavior externally until it changes its political culture and national identity internally.
The only other political transition, besides Gorbachev’s, that led to structural changes in modern Russia’s political system and foreign policy was the revolution of October 1917. Real change is unlikely unless preceded by some disaster that requires the Kremlin and Russian society to rethink their national idea as happened to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan after World War II. Such an event would have to be a major catastrophe such as the loss of Asian territories to China in the event of a Sino-Russian war. This might make Russia identify more as a European state with Western values to counterbalance Chinese hegemony. However, losing the war with Ukraine could bring a different type of revolution. Since many Russians believe they are fighting the entire West and not Kyiv, losing the war could lead to political upheaval that reinforces an anti-Western national identity with a “stab in the back” excuse for losing similar to the myth propagated by Germany’s National Socialists after World War One. Therefore, barring an internal upheaval that orients Russia in a Western direction, a change in Russian national identity is unlikely. As the century moves forward, Russia will continue to be “Putin’s Russia,” which is patterned after 18th and 19th century Tsarist Russia or, as it is known to history, Imperial Russia.
This article was reviewed by CIA’s Prepublication Classified Review Board for classified information. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
About the author: Philip Wasielewski is the Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare and a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Eurasia Program. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
Founded in 1955, FPRI (http://www.fpri.org/) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.
A woman holds a poster reading "Long live our socialist revolution" during celebrations marking victory on the 65th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion - Copyright AFP YAMIL LAGE
Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel said Thursday his country was “ready” for a possible US attack on the communist island following months of mounting pressure from President Donald Trump.
“We don’t want that (confrontation) but it is our duty to be ready to avoid it, and if it were unavoidable, to win it,” Diaz-Canel told thousands of people attending a rally in Havana to mark the 65th anniversary of the failed US invasion of the island at the Bay of Pigs.
Cuba has been bracing for a possible attack following repeated warnings from Trump that Cuba is “next” after he toppled Venezuela’s leader Nicolas Maduro and went to war against Iran.
Washington and Havana have held talks on de-escalating tensions but the discussions between the arch-foes have failed to make significant headway, according to US media reports.
Mariela Castro, daughter of late president Raul Castro, said Cubans “want dialogue” with Washington but “without putting our political system up for debate.”
She said her 94-year-old father — who oversaw a historic 2015 rapprochement with the United States under Barack Obama that Trump later reversed — was indirectly involved in the talks.
Raul’s grandson Raul Rodriguez Castro, a colonel, is reportedly among the negotiators.
Diaz-Canel admitted that the current moment was “very grave” but stressed Cuba’s “socialist” nature, as proclaimed by Fidel Castro on April 16, 1961.
The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was launched two years after Castro’s revolutionaries took control of the island and began nationalizing US-owned properties and businesses.
Between April 15 and 19, around 1,400 anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami, trained and financed by the CIA, landed at the Bay of Pigs, about 250 kilometers (155 miles) south of Havana.
Cuban forces repelled the invaders, inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Americans.
Six decades later, Washington now has Cuba again in its sights.
After Maduro’s capture in Caracas Trump imposed an oil blockade of Cuba, aggravating the impoverished island’s worst economic and energy crisis in decades.
Diaz-Canel rejected what he referred to as a US portrayal of Cuba as a “failed state.”
Havana largely blames its woes on a US trade embargo imposed shortly after Castro’s arrival to power, still in place today, and the more recent oil blockade.
“Cuba is not a failed state, it’s a besieged state,” he said.
Maria Reguiero, an 82-year-old attending the rally, said that like in 1961, Cubans were “ready to defend their sovereignty, whatever the price.”
MS NOW unloads withering supercut of all the 'deals' Trump claims Iran wants to make
U.S. President Donald Trump gestures during a visit to Verst Logistics in Hebron, Kentucky, U.S., March 11, 2026. REUTERSKevin Lamarque
Critics say President Donald Trump is a walking example of projection. If so, the president’s description of Iran’s leaders over the course of his war with that nation may be telling, considering a steady rollout of claims recorded and presented for MS NOW’s The Weekend on Saturday.
“I think Iran looks like they want to make a deal very badly,” Trump said February 6, in the weeks leading up to the February 28 joint U.S./Israeli attacks.
“They want to make a deal,” he said March 16, weeks after the attacks. And then: “They want to make a deal very badly,” on March 23 in Palm Beach, Florida.
“They want to make a deal so badly. You have no idea how badly they want to make a deal,” he repeated on March 24 at the White House.
“They want to make a deal so badly, but they're afraid to say it because they figure they'll be killed by their own people,” Trump claimed on March 25.
“They are begging to make a deal — not me. They're begging to make a deal very badly,” he insisted yet again March 26.
“They want to make a deal,” he proclaimed on March 27, followed by: “They’re begging to make a deal. They’re begging to make a deal” that same day at a new location.
“They want to make a deal. They want to make a deal more than I want to make a deal,” he claimed in the Oval Office on March 31.
“They’d like to make a deal very badly,” he repeated yet again April 13 at the White House.
Former CIA Director John Brennan told Weekend anchors that he doubted Trump had any credibility left to squander at this point.
“I don't think he's ever had credibility on this issue because he has consistently misrepresented and lied about the situation. And the Iranians know that,” said Brennan. “And that's why when we're talking about the Strait [of Hormuz] right now, it's absurd to think that the Iranians would allow the strait to remain open if the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continues.”
“So, he's making all these claims about they've agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and, open up. And the Iranians know that he is lying. And why should they believe anything that he might be saying that has an element of truth in it?” Brennan added.
Inside the pattern of bungled decisions exposed in Trump's late-night screeds
U.S. President Donald Trump watches a match during the UFC 327 event at Kaseya Center in Miami, Florida, U.S., April 11, 2026. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
As bad as it is at home, Trump’s foreign policy blunders are even worse, setting us up for long term security consequences no one is talking about. In every bizarre late night social media post, Trump keeps modeling multi-faceted incompetence to explain his dastardly deeds. From threatening Greenland, to kidnapping Venezuela’s president and stealing their oil, to attacking the Pope, to exploding boats on the high seas then publishing snuff videos to brag about it, Trump has committed one hubristic, sophomoric, and dangerous act of aggression after another.
In Iran, Trump keeps mocking the old adage: when you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. Instead, he brandishes shinier shovels.
Frustrated by Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, which has strangled 20% of the world’s oil transport, Trump nonsensically decided to impose his own blockade on Iran’s blockade. Blockading their blockade will only worsen the problem he’s trying to solve.
Trying to educate the economically illiterate, the WSJ explained, “The U.S. blockade on ships entering or exiting Iranian ports is set to drain more oil from a tight market, prolong the squeeze on other key commodities flowing through the Strait of Hormuz and inject significant uncertainty into the global economy.” They assessed, “Trump’s naval blockade of Iran risks further upending a global economy already battered by weeks of (Trump’s) war, escalating a regional clash into a worldwide financial shock that could prove more devastating than the fighting itself.”
Trump’s war in Iran will end up costing American taxpayers over $1 trillion, without factoring in energy prices, lack of healthcare, inflation, or the long-term costs of global economic contraction. And for what? Middle East policy experts say the war has made Iran’s cabal of religious fanatics even more dangerous.
How stupid does he think Americans are?
Trump blames the media for widespread public opposition to his war, but seems incapable of considering why Americans are opposed. He needs to look no further than his own words and deeds.
After Trump bombed Iran last June, he claimed to have “completely obliterated” Iran’s enriched uranium supply. Strutting on the world stage with great bombast, he declared that Iran’s nuclear capacity had been annihilated. Eight months later, he’s using Iran’s nuclear capacity to justify a war, without explaining what changed. Even his most diehard supporter wonders: was he was lying then or is he lying now?
It’s bizarre that Trump thinks Americans can’t track such a major incongruity, demonstrating either his deep contempt for them, or his own mental infirmity.
Signaling more incompetence during negotiations
Trump, who proudly rules by his “gut” instead of intelligence reports, doesn’t recognize that he’s swimming in geopolitical complexities above his head. It’s no surprise that the first round of negotiations to end the war he started failed.
To resolve the highly complex quagmire he created, Trump needs negotiators steeped in Iran’s history, geography, culture, and technological capacities. But he’s relying on loyalists: VP Vance, real estate developer Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, all of whom lack the expertise and diplomatic experience needed to achieve an agreement. Two diplomats from the failed negotiations immediately identified Trump’s problem: choosing negotiators for personal loyalty instead of subject-matter expertise.
The results reflect the obvious, and it’s nothing new. Kushner and Witkoff failed in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and failed in talks between Israel and Hamas while Israel continued bombing Gaza. For his part, Vance seems to have failed at everything.
Three days later, the Pope warned that the world is “being ravaged by a handful of tyrants.” He reiterated Catholic teachings of peace— “Blessed are the peacemakers. But woe to those who manipulate religion and the very name of God for their own military, economic, and political gain, dragging that which is sacred into darkness and filth.” Looking at you, Hegseth.
Every member of Congress swore an oath to uphold the Constitution. Every one of them, except perhaps Lindsey Graham, knows that what Trump is doing is illegal, dangerous, and unconstitutional, but they have chosen power over honor.
President Donald Trump delivered the cap to the Turning Point USA event in Phoenix, Arizona, and he had a friendly audience to take his words. This might explain the absence of rolling eyes and questioning looks on a few claims that Trump inflated, played down or made a point not to mention at all due to their controversy.
1.The U.S. will march in and take the Iranian nukes that he claimed were obliterated.
Months ago, Trump claimed to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities — the lingering existence of which he then later cited as one of the reasons to attack Iran last month and blow-up global fuel prices. But at the Friday TPUSA event, Trump said Iran’s nuclear capabilities are still somehow both “obliterated” yet in need of collection.
“You'll be very happy. The USA will get all nuclear dust,” he told the cheering TPUSA crowd. “You know what the nuclear dust is? That was that white powdery substance created by our B-2 bombers, those great B-2 bombers. Late one evening seven months ago. … And you know how we're going to get the dust, right? We're going to take it anyway. But taking it, taking it that way is slightly more dangerous. But we were going to get it anyway. … They will never have a nuclear weapon.”
But this information was immediately fact-checked by CNN reporter Nick Robinson, who told CNN anchor Jake Tapper that Iran has agreed to no such plan.
“[W]e’re hearing from Iranian sources who say that is just not the case. So, the Iranians are pushing back on some of what the president is claiming,” said Robinson.
2. The U.S. is paying Iran no compensation for Trump’s unilateral war.
Trump must be hotly aware of critics accusing him of hypocrisy for agreeing to pay Iran $20 billion after criticizing former President Obama for giving the country $1.7 billion because he denied that very fact at TPUSA.
“No money will exchange hands in any way, shape or form,” Trump insisted, in defiance of news that the U.S. has tentatively agreed to unfreeze $20 billion in Iranian assets.
British ambassador to the United States, Christian Turner claimed to CNN that he was “not close enough to the detail of how that would work” to say whether or not the transaction counted as a gift, but he conceded that as part of U.S./Iran negotiations Iran and Syria is “asking for an economic lifeline” from the U.S.
Bulwark Editor Jonathan Last called the transaction of money for Iran’s nuclear arsenal “a purchase … to the tune of $20 billion, which would be something that Donald Trump criticized the Obama administration for doing, but at a much greater scale.”
3. Ten wars ended.
The number of wars Trump has allegedly singlehandedly put an end to appears to be creeping up. This apparently includes the ending of the war he voluntarily started himself with February airstrikes on Iran, that left the nation’s more combative leadership in charge of the country.
Trump called his second term “by far the most successful first year of any administration in the history of our country, acknowledged by everybody.”
“To begin with, I ended eight wars, and it may be a little early to say this, but if we add Iran and Lebanon, that will be ten wars ended and many, many millions of lives saved,” Trump said.
Critics rated much of that claim bogus, with various international leaders denying either Trump’s intervention, or that the wars really ended at all.
Friday, April 17, 2026
Trump Admission Proves ‘Saving the Iranians’ Was Never the Goal
The US and Israel’s indiscriminate bombing of schools, hospitals, universities, a synagogue shows the truth of the war’s aims. And it’s not to help the people of Iran.
In this picture obtained from Iran’s ISNA news agency, mourners attend the funeral of children killed in a reported strike on a primary school in Iran’s Hormozgan province, in Minab on March 3, 2026. (Photo by Amirhossein Khorgooei / ISNA / AFP via Getty Images)
Some right-wingers, centrist Democrats, and independents defend the Iran War by citing the Iranian regime’s mass killing of protesters in late 2025 and early 2026. But it doesn’t add up.
The most reliable numbers from the Human Rights Activists News Agency stand around 7,000 people killed, of which over 200 were security forces. The Western media salivated over these numbers, in contrast to the well-documented genocide in Gaza, with some claiming the death toll at 30,000. President Donald Trump has offered no evidence whatsoever to claim 45,000 people were killed. However, the media correctly note that this latest government clampdown was indeed the largest number of protesters killed in the history of the Islamic Republic.
Trump warned that if the Iranian government didn’t stop violence against the protesters, the US would attack Iran. Not too long after, when protests had somewhat died down, the United States launched a second war against Iran during peace negotiations. The stated reasons were all over the place but they can be summed up as follows:
a) Israel was going to attack Iran, Iran would therefore attack US positions, so US attacked first.
b) To diminish Iran nuclear and missile capabilities.
c) To protect Israel from future Iranian attacks.
Last, but not least, this one seemed to stick in people’s minds:
d) Protecting Iranians from their own government.
In the past few weeks, reports confirmed what many had already surmised, completely throwing the “saving Iranians” argument for war out the window. The US was involved in fueling the violence by sending weapons through Kurdish intermediaries to arm Iranian protesters.
The results bore fruit, as intended. The Iranian expert Trita Parsi explained on Democracy Now! that the organized armed elements within the protests attacked civilian infrastructure, mosques, and government forces. This resulted in hundreds of government forces being killed. In response, a far larger number of protesters were killed than in past Iranian protests. The Iranian government is repressive, but this level of violence against protesters indicated something else was at work.
It was the CIA with a tried-and-true method of overthrow and internal political machinations. It called to mind 1953, when Iran was a democracy under Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Due to his attempts to nationalize the country’s oil, the CIA’s Kermit Roosevelt hatched a plan for a successful coup d’etat after failing a first attempt days earlier.
The CIA paid Iranians to topple statues of the Shah. Pro-democratic Iranians joined in, creating a sense of anarchy. Mossadegh chose not to act against these actions for a day and pro-Shah elements, supported by the US, came into the street shouting “Death to Mossadegh!” Under this contrived sense of disorder, Iranian Colonel Nasiri placed Mossadegh under arrest and the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, took power. During the 1970s the Shah became increasingly oppressive (and staunchly backed by the US), leading to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It was a revolt against historic outside intervention in Iranian politics by the US and Great Britain.
In 1953, the CIA deposed a nationalist democratically elected leader that the US and Great Britain didn’t approve of to get the more pliable ruler. This winter, the US attempted to create a real-life stage play that depicted a fairly oppressive regime that suddenly appeared unrestrained in its use of mass violence against its citizens. The script showed this regime going off the deep end in killing protesters in the thousands within a relatively short period of time. But within this legitimate protest movement, the Kurds (at the behest of the US) distributed weapons that were used to shoot and kill government forces. Imagine, for a second, China arming a US protest movement and hundreds of US police, national guard officers, or ICE members were killed. How would the government respond?
With smile emojis?
Last week, the rich, historic Iranian civilization that Donald Trump was supposedly at war to protect, he threatened to annihilate. Well before threatening war crimes against Iran, for Americans to believe that a brutal, unjust war was for the wellbeing of the Iranian people was wildly naïve. As if conducting mass violence and indiscriminate attacks against a people and their society would save them. The Secretary of War said as much, stating clearly that the US would not be concerned about “stupid rules of engagement,” which is pretty much a direct admission to war crimes subsequently committed.
The US and Israel’s indiscriminate bombing of schools, hospitals, universities, a synagogue shows the truth of the war’s aims: to crush any opposition to US empire and Israeli regional hegemony, regardless of civilian mass deaths and infrastructure damage incurred. Just as the 1953 coup of Mossadegh put perceived US imperial interests front and center, so did the fueling of violence in the Iranian protests to paint a picture of an Iranian regime gone mad in its violence towards civilians.
So, to the naïve among us, when your government tells you it is killing people to help them, maybe this time think twice.
Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.
Peter F. Crowley As a prolific author from the Boston area, Peter F. Crowley writes in various forms, including short fiction, op-eds, poetry, and academic essays. His writing can be found in Pif Magazine, New Verse News, Counterpunch, Middle East Monitor, Galway Review, Digging the Fat, Adelaide’s Short Story and Poetry Award anthologies (finalist in both), and The Opiate. He is the author of the poetry books Those Who Hold Up the Earth and Empire’s End, and the short fiction collection That Night and Other Stories. Full Bio >
Human Rights Groups Demand Ireland Stop Letting Trump Use Airport for ‘Unlawful’ ICE Flights
“If Ireland is facilitating the monstrous ICE project, then we fear the government has lost its way. Rather than cower and capitulate, it must show courage, compassion, and principle,” said the head of Amnesty International Ireland.
A group of detainees board an Eastern Air Express flight at Minneapolis-St Paul International Airport on January 11, 2026 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. At least five of these deportation flights have refueled at the Shannon Airport in Ireland. (Photo by Stephen Maturen/Getty Images)
A pair of human rights groups on Thursday called for the Irish government to stop letting the administration of US President Donald Trump use Shannon Airport as a refueling stop for Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s deportation flights.
In a joint letter to Ireland’s transport minister, Darragh O’Brien, and foreign affairs and trade minister, Helen McEntee, Amnesty International Ireland and Human Rights First urged the Irish government to stop cooperating with President Donald Trump’s efforts to deport migrants to third countries.
Using data from its ICE Flight Monitor, Human Rights First determined that Shannon Airport has been used to refuel deportation planes during at least five of these removal operations, which involved what the groups described as “transfers of individuals to countries... they have no ties to and where they have faced arbitrary and prolonged detention and other abuse.”
After one of the flights in May 2025, eight migrants from several countries, including Cuba, Mexico, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Sudan—some of whom had legally been resettled as refugees—were dropped in the East African nation of Djibouti. There, they were held in a shipping container at a US base for at least six weeks before being sent to war-torn South Sudan, where they were promptly detained by authorities. Six of them remain in detention today, with little ability to communicate with their lawyers.
Another group of five men from Cuba, Yemen, Vietnam, and Laos was taken to the southern African country of Eswatini in July. Four of them remain in state custody more than eight months later, despite the authorities giving no official reason for their ongoing detention.
Another flight stopped in Ireland on its way back from dumping eight Palestinian men, who were shackled for the entire journey, on the side of the road in the occupied West Bank. Some of the men had green cards in the United States, and several had wives and children from whom they had been forcibly separated, despite facing no accusations of having committed a crime. Two such flights have taken place.
In total, the groups found that at least 28 migrants had traveled through the Shannon Airport on their way to third countries.
About 300 migrants have been sent to third countries as part of the Trump administration’s “mass deportation” campaign, according to a February report by Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The administration has spent more than $40 million, part of which has gone to countries willing to take in deportees, including Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, El Salvador, Eswatini, and Palau, each of which has received multimillion-dollar lump sums.Most infamously, the administration last year secretly sent more than 280 young men, most without criminal records, to the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), a megaprison in El Salvador, where they were subjected to torture and cut off from communication with their families and lawyers for more than four months before a judge ordered most of them released.
Amnesty and Human Rights First have described this practice as a form of “enforced disappearance” under international law.
“To carry out its mass deportation campaign, the Trump administration is flouting international law and cutting deals with dictators. It is also endangering lives, through its opaque web of third country agreements to send people against their will to countries where they have no connection”, said Uzra Zeya, the CEO of Human Rights First.
“Beyond their cruelty, these agreements reflect a transactional foreign policy driven by xenophobia, and they undermine due process and human rights globally,” she said. “Ireland should play no part in facilitating these unlawful removals, including to third countries notorious for rights abuses.”
Shannon Airport has become a target of protest over its use as a hub for American military planes, which many in Ireland see as an affront to the country’s long history of military neutrality. It has previously come under scrutiny for helping transport detainees renditioned for torture by the CIA during the post-9/11 global War on Terror.
Last week, a man was arrested for allegedly breaking into the facility and damaging a US military plane that was en route to a bilateral military exercise in Poland, according to The New York Times. Though no motive has been made public, the incident evoked other acts of vandalism by anti-war activists opposed to the US military presence.
“People across Ireland and the world look on in horror as the Trump administration continues implementing its vile, racist, and xenophobic executive orders that dehumanize and criminalize people who are, or are perceived to be, migrants and refugees. The administration has brazenly violated the right to due process by unlawfully removing people and subjecting some to enforced disappearance,” said Stephen Bowen, the executive director of Amnesty International Ireland.
Following a request last month for it to stop US deportation flights from using Shannon to refuel, Ireland’s Department of Transport contended that under the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, US aircraft do not require permission to refuel at Shannon. Transport Minister O’Brien has said the US did not request authorization for the flights to land and that his department had no knowledge of them.
But Bowen says that even though states are not required to obtain permission to land, the convention still requires them to abide by international law, and that the Irish government ultimately has the power to decide how its sovereign airspace is used.
“The Department of Transport’s public responses are just not good enough,” he said. “There are depressing parallels with Ireland’s failure two decades ago to stop CIA-leased civil aircraft using Shannon as a stopover for rendition operations during the US ‘War on Terror’. Despite promises to ‘enforce the prohibition on the use of Irish airspace, airports, and related facilities for purposes not in line with the dictates of international law’, it appears that no concrete actions were ever taken.”
“The government’s timidity in its dealings with President Trump is already a cause for concern,” Bowen added. “If Ireland is facilitating the monstrous ICE project, then we fear the government has lost its way. Rather than cower and capitulate, it must show courage, compassion, and principle.”
Wednesday, April 15, 2026
One Step Away From The Trump-Netanyahu Black Hole, The Italian PM Stands Out – OpEd Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni with US President Donald Trump.
The electoral precipice for Giorgia Meloni was one step away. And the matrix was evidently all in the symbiotic alliance with Trump and Netanyahu, the two leaders who are shaking up the international political order with wars and disruptions. The resounding defeat in a constitutional referendum. The disjointed collapse in Hungary of the anti-Europe ally practically kicked out by the voters, had already shaken the electoral base of the PM. But Trump had the knockout blow in store: a frontal attack on the Pope and this would have been lethal for the PM if she had not decided to distance herself from the Trump-Netanyahu duo. But it is not certain that having changed course is enough
The Three Preparatory Blows To Meloni’s KO
1. The Jab-cross that opened the guard : The Constitutional Referendum lost
2. Jab-left hook. The resounding defeat in Hungary of Victor Orban, a symbol of anti-Europeanism disguised in the form of nationalism
3. Uppercut. The attack on the Pope by the American President
Three blows capable of transforming the next electoral experience into a historic KO capable of reserving the same fate for Meloni as the Hungarian leader. Cancellation.
The Italian political context is dominated by two women, PM Giorgia Meloni, and opposition leader Elly Shlein. And here Louisa May Alcott could be the inspiration for the post-Netanyahu-Trump in Italy. Her first successful book, “Little Women” was followed by a further success “Little Women Grow Up,” and Alcott’s second title fits singularly well with the politics of PM Giorgia Meloni, who on the brink of the precipice has decided that she politically wants to survive three blows received in less than a month, before they turn into a real KO.
From Manufacturing Consent To Manufacturing Dissent
If the defeat in the referendum can be read as a national event, the election in Hungary is the sign of an epochal eclipse of a political approach that had two leading theorists in Noam Chomsky and Edward Barnays: the election of Peter Magyar at the expense of Orban certifies the crisis of consensus as a means to conquer power, replaced by dissent.
I continue to consider Noam Chomsky a master of political philosophy despite the recent Epstein injuries. Personally, I am not hunting for unblemished heroes, there are none, and if there were they would not belong to the human species, and in any case they would not interest me: perfect beings are boring. I look for and appreciate personalities who do important positive operations of political theory, and Chomsky has done many. Opposition to the Vietnam War, struggle for freedom of information, support for qualified liberal personalities. Criticism of the fascist right wing in Israel. The Israeli government even denied him a visa for a conference in Tel Aviv. All this cannot and must not be forgotten and it is worth remembering Chomsky with regard to the Hungarian political election, because there is one thing that the great linguist taught like few others, and can be found in Manufacturing Consent, along with the book Propaganda by Edward Barneys, another pillar of twentieth-century political communication. And let’s see why. Freud’s Nephew
Edward Barnays, Freud’s nephew, theorized the principle that government must be conquered with subliminal messages. He gave a practical demonstration of the potential of these messages in at least three sensational situations. One: launching the idea of the abundant “American breakfast”, (Eggs and Ham). Two: by favoring the coup d’état in Guatemala, by inventing, on behalf of United Fruit – from which Woody Allen would one day draw inspiration for his banana republics – the message that the president-elect was a communist, which was not true, but the subliminal message passed and there was a coup d’état favored by the CIA. Three: perhaps the most resounding success because it also concerns us, doubling the cigarette market with the brilliant idea of loading the image of the woman who smokes with positive messages. “Torches of Freedom” was the operation by which simultaneously a considerable number of women of American high society lit a cigarette in public, making it a symbol of female freedom. The cigarette, which was seen as a phallic symbol, became a manifestation of female sexual freedom. There were a few more cancers… but Barnays got a very high reward from the American Tobacco Association that had hired him, perhaps greater than that obtained by United Fruit.
Epochal Political Change: Power Conquered Not By Building Consensus But By Building Dissent – A Dangerous Political Change
But why were “Manufacturing Consent” and “Propaganda” put in the attic with the Hungarian election?
They go to the attic because it is now evident that electoral power is no longer won by “building consensus”, that is, by making positive proposals, while the vice versa of “building dissent” focuses on what is not good. On what goes wrong.
Péter Magyar, beat Victor Orbán not because he proposed an alternative program, but because he “disagreed”. Magyar does not come from the opposition, but from Orban’s own party from which he “disagrees”. His ex-wife, Judit Varga, was at one time Orbán’s Minister of Justice, is publicly accused of covering up regime scandals. And this is the winning lever. In Hungary, therefore, it was not the opposition that won, but dissent.
“Manufacturing Dissent” has a phenomenal lever in the spread of the Internet, and of the socials, which facilitate dissent in an endemic way, hyperbolically multiplying individual manifestations, favoring that state of social malaise that favors the seizure of power by the political producers of dissent, which is the media mechanism that has temporarily put Chomsky and Barneys in the attic.
But it is a very dangerous mechanism. Podemos has dissolved into thin air. The 5 Stars have had to give up all the most relevant reforms. Polls on Trump show his vertical fall. . The Uppercut That Prepares For The KO Of PM Meloni: Trump’s Brutal Attack On The Pope
Italy has essentially become a secular country, but there is no doubt that the Pope continues to have a role of great importance. A role that has increased considerably in recent years. Francis’ pontificate has produced enormous sympathy even on the left and has created cultural and political availability that was unthinkable 30 years ago, when the left recognized itself in a strong anticlericalism. But this is an international phenomenon. Pope Francis greatly increased the approval rating for the Vatican on the basis of principles and values that the left – including the American left – has always made its own. Respect for the different. Protection of humanistic values. And above all, peace as an indivisible unifying good. Leo XIV seems to be following in those footsteps. Brutally attacking the Pope without taking into account the scope of the spiritual values in which progressives from all over the world, including those in Italy, recognize themselves, not only means creating a new fracture in America, but also means disintegrating the electoral base of the PM in Italy.
The Pope very intelligently chose not to start a war, but in Italy Meloni basically had to choose between two Americas: to stay by the side of the American President or to defend the Pope’s America.
And the PM, in order not to fall into the black hole of anti-pope Trumpism, has chosen to govern, distancing herself from Trump and Netanyahu for the first time. And it was resoundingly appreciated by the leader of the opposition, also a woman.
Little women grow up, Louise Alcott would say. It is not necessarily enough for the PM to remain in power. It is clear in Italy as everywhere that dissent is used to conquer power, but not to govern. Maybe Trump will also soon also find out.
Prof. Umberto Sulpasso
Prof. Umberto Sulpasso has taught in many European and American universities. He is the author of the GDKP the Gross Domestic Knowledge Product, the first quantitative model in the world of Wealth of Nations in terms of knowledge produced, purchased and circulated. The Indian Government had officially appointed in 2019 Prof. Sulpasso as Director of GDKP INDIA. Among his recent publications there is, " Know Global, The Most Important Globalization"; "Darwinomics, The Economics Of Human Race Survival"; "New Enlightenment In Economics In The 21st Century"; and "Knowledge the new measure of Wealth of Nations." Prof. Sulpasso has launched “Knowledge the infrastructural information which will create the New Silk Road with Africa and Asia countries” in a recent international conference.
'I thought she was brave': Trump turns on Italian ally over Pope criticism
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has played host to a slew of foreign leaders, most recently Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, as he prepares to take office (Filippo ATTILI/AFP)
Donald Trump has turned on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, publicly denouncing her as "unacceptable" for defending Pope Leo XIV against the president's criticism of his unprovoked Iran war.
According to Politico, Trump spoke directly with Italian daily Corriere della Sera to express his fury with Meloni's refusal to join his attack on the first American-born Pope who resides in Vatican City.
"I was shocked by her. I thought she was brave, but I was wrong," Trump said in the phone interview, delivering a stinging personal rebuke to an ally he had publicly praised just a year earlier.
When confronted with Meloni's Monday statement calling Trump's criticism of Pope Leo "unacceptable," the president responded with characteristic vindictiveness:
"It's her who's unacceptable, because she doesn't care if Iran has a nuclear weapon and would blow up Italy in two minutes if it had the chance."
Trump's grievance extends beyond the Pope dispute. He complained that Meloni expected the United States to "do the work for her" by protecting Italy from nuclear threats and ensuring stable oil supplies — suggesting she should be grateful for American military protection rather than criticizing his policies.
The deterioration of their relationship is striking. Trump noted the two hadn't spoken "in a long time," a stark contrast to just last year when Meloni visited Mar-a-Lago as Trump's guest. At that dinner, he called her "a fantastic woman" who had "really taken Europe by storm."
The rupture exemplifies Trump's pattern of discarding allies the moment they show independence from his agenda — a warning sign for other world leaders considering whether solidarity with the American president is worth the political cost.
Trump and Meloni: From close relations to a transatlantic crisis
The relationship between Trump and Meloni was typified by warm handshakes and even warmer words until the US leader did something considered by most Italians to be unthinkable: he criticised the pope.
US President Donald Trump has turned on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, calling her "unacceptable" and claiming she lacks "courage" to back the US intervention in Iran after she condemned his attacks on Pope Leo XIV.
The unexpected public rift between the two leaders, who cultivated one of the closest transatlantic relationships over the past year, erupted after Trump criticised the pontiff for his anti-war stance on Iran.
"I thought she had courage, but I was wrong," Trump told Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera on Tuesday.
Trump previously called Meloni "one of the real leaders of the world" and "full of energy, fantastic", while Meloni said she was able to speak to him "frankly even when we disagree".
It all seemed to be going so well until Trump did something that, for many Italians, is regarded as sacrilege: he lambasted none other than the Holy Father.
Trump said he did not think Pope Leo XIV was "doing a very good job" because he was "weak on crime" and suggested the pontiff should "stop catering to the radical left," also stating, "We don't like a pope who says it's OK to have a nuclear weapon."
Pope Leo XIV celebrates a Mass in the Saint Augustine Basilica in Annaba, 14 April, 2026 AP Photo
Trump's comments came after Pope Leo XIV openly criticised the US intervention in Iran from day one, stating just this weekend that a "delusion of omnipotence" is fuelling it.
Wherever you sit on the political spectrum in Italy, the idea of questioning, much less criticising, the pontiff is a red line.
Meloni on Monday called Trump's criticism of the pope "unacceptable".
"The pope is the head of the Catholic Church, and it is right and normal for him to call for peace and to condemn all forms of war," Meloni said.
She added she would not feel comfortable living in a society where "religious leaders do as they are told by politicians".
Trump pushed back, telling the Italian daily, "She's unacceptable because she doesn't mind that Iran has a nuclear weapon and would blow up Italy in two minutes if they had the chance."
Parallel to this, it emerged that at the end of March, Italy had refused a request from the US military for aircraft to land at the Naval Air Station Sigonella on the island of Sicily, falling in line with countries like Spain and France that refused Washington's requests to overfly their territory before continuing towards the Middle East and fighting the war in Iran.
Relate
And in another move likely to annoy the White House, Meloni announced on Tuesday that Italy had suspended the automatic renewal of its defence agreement with Israel, which involves the exchange of military equipment and technology research.
But after Trump's jibes at the pope, can the relationship ever be repaired or will it be for conservative Meloni, dead and buried for good? Whatever happens from here, let's take a look at how one of the closest transatlantic relationships developed.
December 2024: First face-to-face in Paris
The first meaningful encounter between Trump and Meloni dates back to late 2024 and the reopening ceremony of Paris' Notre Dame Cathedral.
It was a brief meeting, in a very crowded multilateral context, but it was enough to leave an impression on the US president, who described the Italian premier as a "real live-wire".
Trump gushed that Meloni was "full of energy (and) fantastic" according to people who were present at the meeting and who saw the encounter as a sign of warmer ties to come as Trump was still at that point president-elect and had yet to start his second term.
Clergymen give the Eucharist during the first public mass in Notre Dame Cathedral since the 2019 fire, 8 December, 2024 AP Photo
The visit was brief, not preceded by any official announcement, and was interpreted as a strong political gesture at a time of heightened international tension.
According to sources close to the president, Trump was impressed and described Meloni as a leader who has "really taken Europe by storm".
“This is very exciting,” Trump told a group at Mar-a-Lago. “I’m here with a fantastic woman, the prime minister of Italy.”
In the days that followed, Trump publicly praised Meloni for flying all the way to the US just to spend a few hours with him.
An aerial view of President Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach, 31 August, 2022 AP Photo
January 2025: One of the few Europeans at the inauguration
Meloni was one of the few European leaders invited to Trump's inauguration in Washington. Her presence there was interpreted as having significant political weight, particularly given that so many other European leaders had been sidelined.
Just days later in Davos, Trump hinted at the possibility of a personal and political relationship with the Italian premier. "I like her a lot, let's see what happens," he said.
His praise for Meloni stood in stark contrast to his general belligerence towards the EU as a whole, slamming the 27-member bloc as treating "the United States very badly" against a backdrop of ongoing trade tensions.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni arrives before the 60th Presidential Inauguration in the Rotunda of the US Capitol in Washington, 20 January, 2025 AP Photo
April 2025: The political peak of the relationship?
An official visit to the White House represented, for some, the high point of the relationship between the two leaders, a meeting accompanied by a strong media presence and notably more personal tones.
Trump saved his warmest words for a social media post after the meeting: "She loves her country, and the impression she left on everyone was fantastic!"
During the White House talks, Meloni invited Trump to visit Italy and proposed an expanded format with European leaders to consolidate a direct political channel between Washington and Brussels.
Diplomatic sources described the meeting as "solid on the political level and surprisingly relaxed on the personal level" and generally harmonious.
US President Donald Trump meets with Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in the Oval Office of the White House, 17 April, 2025 AP Photo
April 2025: First informal talks at the Vatican
At the funeral of Pope Francis, the two meet briefly in the Vatican. The context was considered highly symbolic and significant, with numerous world leaders present.
Sources present reported a quick but significant exchange, in which international affairs were briefly touched upon, a fleeting meeting that appeared to confirm the continuity of the direct channel between the two.
Related
June 2025: The isolated bench talks at the G7
The G7 in Canada was one of the most significant meetings between the pair, with Trump and Meloni choosing to isolate themselves on a wooden bench on the sidelines of the summit in Kananaskis.
That conversation, according to diplomatic sources, was long and direct and helped to reconcile some tensions in the final drafting of the declaration on the then 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, which also saw US military involvement.
Just days later at a NATO summit, the two again sat side by side and had an informal discussion on the main security issues.
Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni arrives during the official welcome of the G7 Summit in Kananaskis, 16 June, 2025 AP Photo
August 2025: The Zelenskyy meeting
Meloni attended an international meeting convened by Trump at the White House with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in attendance, designed to discuss the future of Western support for Kyiv.
Trump hailed the meeting as a "big day" as Zelenskyy and his European allies all came to the US capital for a major discussion on how to end Russia's all-out war in Ukraine.
The US president then called Meloni "a great leader, an inspiration to all."
Trump also praised the Italian premier for leading her country at a young age and predicted she would be in office for a long time.
US President Donald Trump and Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in the East Room of the White House, 18 August, 2025 AP Photo
October 2025: The Gaza summit in Egypt
In Egypt, the two leaders meet at the peace summit for Gaza, amid the new plan promoted by Trump to end the Israel-Hamas war.
The US president, on stage, joked: "Who is this woman?" He then introduced Meloni to the international audience as "a very strong leader, she's doing a great job," and a "beautiful young woman".
The next day, on social media, Trump endorsed Meloni's autobiography and urged his followers to read it.
Early 2026: From the Nobel Prize to first tensions
On the US president's role in attempting to stop Russia's war in Ukraine, Meloni said on 23 January after a summit with Germany: "I hope we can give the Nobel Peace Prize to Trump and I trust that he can also make a difference on a just and lasting peace for Ukraine ... and then finally we too can nominate Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize."
The prize instead went to Venezuelan opposition politician María Corina Machado “for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy."
That decision did not go down well with Trump, who has long coveted the award, and he told Norway's Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre he no longer needed to think "purely of peace" after failing to win the prize.
"Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace," Trump said in a message.
By early 2026, Meloni reiterated her willingness to confront Trump even when she disagreed with his positions. At the same time, the first structural differences on NATO and the Middle East were beginning to emerge.
A man wearing a mask resembling US President Donald Trump holds a sign designed like a Nobel Peace Prize medal during a rally in Tel Aviv, 11 October, 2025 AP Photo
March 2026: Hormuz Strait, the first real operational rift
The crisis sparked by Iran's closure of the crucial Strait of Hormuz marked the first substantial point of friction between Washington and Rome.
Trump was getting increasingly vocal about his call for allies to assemble a naval force to open the strait going largely unanswered, with Italy among the most important countries which refused to become involved.
Relate
The European position was slammed by Trump, who called NATO a "paper tiger" and said he was considering withdrawing the US from the military alliance.
April 2026: The public rift
At the height of the crisis, some statements from Washington were interpreted in Rome as direct criticism of the Italian government's position.
Sources spoke of "uncoordinated tones through diplomatic channels," signalling a more formal communicative shift than had been previously used.
The government's response was firm: "Italy remains committed to international security, but every decisiontakes place within the NATO and multilateral framework."
.jpeg)
.jpg)
