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Saturday, September 26, 2026

France to send military to protect Saudi Arabia on Red Sea oil route

France will send troops and defence systems to Saudi Arabia to help protect the Red Sea port city of Yanbu, which is key for energy transport, French President Emmanuel Macron has said in a TV interview. He also denied a report by Spanish newspaper El Mundo that the US Central Intelligence Agency had warned European governments of possible Russian drone attacks from the Mediterranean.


Issued on: 25/09/2026 - RFI

"The situation is serious", President Emmanuel Macron said in an live interview on Thursday on the international situation. © LUDOVIC MARIN / AFP

"We are going to send military resources, that is to say, soldiers, radar systems and defence systems, to protect this site – not to get us involved in any conflicts, but to protect this site," Macron told TF1 and France 2 on Thursday in a wide-ranging primetime interview on the international situation.

Crude oil prices have surged recently as the main alternative route for Saudi oil exports through Yanbu has come under missile attacks from Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis.

Facing growing pressure at home over high fuel prices, Macron sought to reassure the French people that France has adequate gas and oil supplies as winter approaches.

He said Paris was actively working to ensure flows were not disrupted.


On the subject of a 90-day US ban on diesel exports, under consideration by the White House but which Washington denies, the president said it would be "catastrophic" both globally and for the US economy.

“I think all the experts around [President Donald Trump] and all the American refiners can only tell him the same thing: 'this decision would be a bad one – not just for the rest of the world, but for the US economy as well'," he said

No CIA warning


President Macron also talked about possible Russian attacks on French soil.

He denied a report in Spanish newspaper El Mundo that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had warned European governments about the threat of potential drone attacks from the Mediterranean.

"I can deny it. The CIA did not inform French services," he said.

Macron nonetheless said Russia is multiplying its hostile and criminal acts against European countries, and France could face strikes similar to the failed attack in Leipzig airport in August, which Germany has blamed on Russia.


Growing Russian threat

Macron gathered French party chiefs at the Elysée last week to brief them on the growing threat from Russia. He later said he had ordered his government to draw up a plan to protect critical infrastructure against drone and cyber attacks.

Macron said Moscow was seeking to intimidate Europe and break the continent's resolve in supporting Ukraine.

On Monday , rance's interior minister said the hybrid warfare threat being waged by Russia is "real and documented".

Russia says European allegations of hybrid attacks are baseless and the result of anti-Russian hysteria.

Macron's position on Russia was weakened this week after France persuaded EU members to get Russian-Uzbek metals tycoon Alisher Usmanov exempted from EU sanctions, citing national security concerns.

That prompted Azerbaijan to pardon a French national jailed for espionage.


What Washington’s Defense Pledge To Saudi Arabia Means As Houthi Attacks Intensify – Analysis

SWEET FUCK ALL!


September 25, 2026
Arab News
By Gabriele Malvisi

Key Takeaways:

Gulf Research Center chair Abdulaziz Sager tells Arab News that Rubio’s Wednesday pledge to honor the Nov. 2025 U.S.–Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement will be judged on kit, operational know-how, and intel—not an automatic U.S. fight on Riyadh’s behalf.

 Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Maliki: six ballistic missiles toward Taif and Yanbu intercepted Thursday; Houthis claimed strikes on Jazan sites without evidence.

Sager wants planning help, timely imagery, and treating Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb as one problem. Chatham House’s Neil Quilliam calls Rubio’s line a “sop”: reassurance without promising intervention if the waterways worsen. Tests he names: a major strike on energy/civilians, or a lasting Red Sea shipping campaign. 


CENTCOM’s Adm. Cooper (May): 6,000+ drones and 1,500+ ballistic missiles intercepted since the Feb. 28 war began; an Arab News tally had GCC states taking 83% of early Iranian missiles/drones vs. 17% at Israel.

Sept. 8–19: reported hits and intercepts from energy sites to Riyadh; East–West pipeline shut Sept. 11 (Saudi blame on Iraqi militias), restart reported this week. July civilian nuclear cooperation deal is background. Quilliam: “America First” and Gulf self-help.

From the perspective of Saudi Arabia, the value of Washington’s renewed defense assurances will lie in the support they deliver as Houthi attacks intensify, according to Abdulaziz Sager, founder and chairperson of the Gulf Research Center.

“For Riyadh, that support rests on three areas: military equipment, operational expertise and intelligence,” he told Arab News.

A partnership intended to strengthen deterrence is now being tested by attacks on Saudi territory and threats to the waterways on which regional trade depends. The immediate question, Sager said, was how Washington would put its commitments into practice.

On Thursday, the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen said Saudi air defenses had intercepted six ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis toward Taif and Yanbu. Damage or casualties were not immediately clear, Reuters reported.

“Escalations and violations by the terrorist Houthi militia will be dealt with firmly,” the coalition’s spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Maliki, said.

The Houthis separately claimed, without providing evidence, that they had used missiles and drones to attack military sites in Jazan.

The latest developments followed an assurance from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday that Washington would honor its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, and was closely monitoring the regional situation.


“We have a very strong defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, and we will live up to our commitments in that agreement,” Rubio said when asked whether President Donald Trump was prepared to take further action against the Houthis.

Rubio declined to specify what further military action Trump might take, while reiterating Washington’s commitments to Riyadh.

“The US has made commitments to them. We will live up to those commitments. We are living up to those commitments now,” he said, adding that Trump had “many options available” without specifying what they might be.

The distinction between practical defense assistance and direct US intervention is central to understanding that pledge, Sager said.

“Rubio’s remarks should be understood as a commitment to continue the defense support Saudi Arabia expects from the US, rather than a promise that American forces would fight on its behalf,” he explained.

The US-Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement, signed in November 2025, built on more than eight decades of defense cooperation. The White House described its aims as a strengthening of the partnership, and reinforced deterrence across the Middle East.

According to Sager, the immediate question was not whether Washington would honor the agreement, but how it would do so, particularly in terms of strengthening readiness and coordinating defense capabilities.

“Saudi Arabia would expect assistance with planning and identifying threats, alongside timely intelligence and satellite imagery to help it defend its territory and critical infrastructure,” he said.


“Rubio’s words offer reassurance on those practical forms of cooperation, but they leave open the question of whether Washington would take a direct military role if the crises in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea escalate.”

Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, offered a slightly different reading of the scope of Washington’s assurances.

“Rubio’s remarks were essentially a sop to Riyadh, offering reassurance without removing the ambiguity that surrounds US support for Saudi Arabia,” he told Arab News.

“He reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the 2025 defense agreement, but avoided any promise of automatic military intervention should the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea crises intensify.”

Those questions have become more pressing as the war with Iran increasingly places Gulf states under sustained security and economic pressure, despite their efforts to contain the conflict through diplomacy.

The scale of the pressure was apparent even early in the war. An Arab News analysis published on March 26 found that Gulf Cooperation Council member states had faced 83 percent of the Iranian missile and drone attacks tallied since the conflict began on Feb. 28, compared with 17 percent directed at Israel.

The defensive response has also been substantial. Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, told Congress in May that regional missile defenses had intercepted more than 6,000 attack drones and more than 1,500 ballistic missiles targeting US and partner forces, according to reporting on a subsequent Pentagon inspector general’s review.

Houthi attacks have intensified over the past month, targeting Saudi cities and energy infrastructure. On Sept. 8, a wave of strikes wounded 73 people and caused fires that halted operations at some energy facilities, Saudi authorities said.

The following day, the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen reported further ballistic missile and drone attacks on Abha, Khamis Mushayt and Jazan.

By Sept. 19, the escalation had reached Riyadh, with the coalition reporting it intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at the capital, and thwarted attacks on Yanbu, Taif, Baish and Farasan.

The expanding geographic reach of the attacks underscored the challenge of protecting population centers and critical infrastructure while also safeguarding the Kingdom’s Red Sea export route.

The pressure on energy infrastructure has come from more than one direction; Saudi Arabia attributed a drone attack that forced its East-West Pipeline to close on Sept. 11 to Iraqi militias. Reuters reported on Tuesday that pipeline operations had restarted, citing sources briefed on the matter.

The pipeline provides an alternative delivery route to the Red Sea for Saudi crude when passage through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted. Protection of that route therefore requires security for both the infrastructure that carries the oil and the shipping lanes used to export it.


Rubio did not directly address media reports of requests to Trump for US intervention, but described attacks on regional energy infrastructure as “very disturbing.” His remarks came as a Houthi military adviser told news agency Agence France-Presse that the group would target US interests in the region if Washington intervened in the conflict in Yemen.

Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and the escalation in the Red Sea have underscored how closely interconnected are the Gulf’s territorial security and economic interests. Attacks on energy facilities or shipping can affect regional revenues, international supply chains and global markets.

Sager said a key test of the US-Saudi defense agreement would be whether Washington treated Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandab as parts of the same security challenge.

“If Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or shipping near Bab Al-Mandab intensify while Washington remains focused primarily on Hormuz, Rubio’s pledge will come under scrutiny,” he said.

Quilliam said there were several scenarios that could test the US commitment.

“The most immediate test would be a major Iranian or Houthi strike that causes substantial damage to energy infrastructure or results in significant civilian casualties,” he said.

“A second scenario would be a sustained campaign against shipping in the Red Sea that disrupts Saudi exports and impacts global energy markets.”

He suggested that Washington might act before either scenario fully materialized, although Rubio had announced no such decision.

“The US appears to be preparing for another round of escalation against Iran and may use that opportunity to intensify military operations against the Houthis,” Quilliam said.

“Rubio’s remarks may therefore have been intended to reassure Riyadh ahead of a possible expansion of US military activity in the region.”

The security debate is unfolding alongside broader bilateral collaboration. In July, Washington and Riyadh signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, providing a legal foundation for US participation in Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy program.

That expanding relationship provides context for Rubio’s assurances, but does not in itself define at what point Washington would commit forces to another military campaign. Quilliam said any such decision would be shaped by the administration’s approach.

“We should bear in mind that the Trump administration is focused on ‘America First’ and it will only intervene if to do so serves that interest,” he added.


According to Quilliam, Gulf “decision-makers have learned over the past decade — and even more so during the current Trump administration — that US policy is now unpredictable and poorly served by an overarching strategy, and so must plan for all eventualities and take regional security into its own hands and share the burden with regional partners.”

Sager said the most immediate measure of the partnership remains the practical support available to Saudi Arabia across the connected threats it faces.

“Riyadh would expect its defense partner to recognize the links between the threats and provide timely intelligence, equipment and operational support where they are needed,” he added.

“Protecting navigation in the Gulf while leaving the Red Sea exposed would address only part of the security challenge.”

The test, then, is how assurances from Washington translate into the capabilities Sager identified — and whether those capabilities help protect Saudi territory, critical infrastructure and access to both waterways.

America’s Arsenal: While Supplies Last

American imperial overstretch is coming home to roost in Saudi Arabia.

by | Sep 25, 2026

Smoke rose over Riyadh last week as Houthi forces launched strikes on the Saudi capital, as well as on crucial oil infrastructure in major coastal cities.

It has been a disastrous month for Saudi Arabia as Houthi forces have made substantial gains along the west coast of Yemen. The Yemeni group scored massive victories in early September, capturing the port city of Mocha along with other key islands in the Red Sea. This will allow the Houthis to more effectively restrict Saudi transit through the Bab Al-Mandeb strait, dealing a severe blow to the already battered global oil market.

The problems for Saudi Arabia don’t come solely from their south, however. Militia groups in Iraq have gotten involved, and they’ve begun launching missiles from Saudi Arabia’s north. Targets have included crucial oil infrastructure, most notably the East-West Pipeline – a crucial means of getting oil trapped in the Persian Gulf across the country to the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia is in a moment of serious peril. Pinched between militias from Yemen in the south and Iraq in the north, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has sought the assistance of President Donald Trump. MBS called Trump two times on September 10 urging him to take military action against the Houthis, a request Trump has refused thus far.

Mohammed bin Salman’s plea for help highlights a broader dynamic in his relationship with the U.S., one which places Saudi Arabia in the position of relying heavily on America for their military. This is not only true offensively for Saudi, but also defensively. Their ability to shoot down incoming missile fire is reliant on American-made defensive systems, such as Patriot interceptors. Their supply of these systems has been dramatically reduced in recent months due to the conflict in Iran.

With America being similarly low on crucial defensive systems, which are needed to protect U.S. bases, Saudi Arabia is now left unable to effectively defend key oil and military sites. Iran – which is aligned with the Yemeni and Iraqi militias in a coalition known as the Axis of Resistance – is able to watch as economic pressure builds on Saudi Arabia, and by extension the United States.

Conventional strategic thinking is being thrown into question due to this war. America’s military bases in the region have been a burden rather than an asset. They’ve served as easy targets for Iran to strike, helping them climb the escalation ladder at their own pace. The Gulf Arab nations – who were under the impression that these bases would deter Iranian attacks on their soil – are now reconsidering their close ties to the United States. The decision by these nations to become reliant on America for their defense is also being questioned. They’ve been battered by Iranian missiles and drones all throughout the conflict, and have been left largely defenseless due to the shortage of American-made interceptor systems.

America has served as the world’s arms salesman for decades. Our government has built up a long list of clients who rely on our country for their defense, as Patrick Buchanan pointed out in his book A Republic, Not an Empire. After going down a list of the many foreign entanglements Washington has roped us into, Buchanan pointed out that we have become, in effect, a global empire.

“Nothing can destroy this country except the overextension of our resources, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft once said. Indeed, it would be an understatement to describe the commitments above as an overextension of our resources. In their totality, they make the nineteenth-century British Empire look isolationist; truly, this is imperial overstretch.”

“Our situation is unsustainable. The steady expansion of global commitments, as relative national power declines, is a prescription for endless wars and eventual disaster.”

Buchanan’s decades-old assessment has been proven correct.

What has been made apparent by the shortage of defensive weapons is that we cannot maintain this posture of perpetually arming nations across the globe. Not only are we being tasked with ensuring the defense of nations in the Middle East amid the Iran war, but we also must protect our own troops – stationed at U.S. military bases – from incoming fire.

Of course, we must also supply Israel with the defensive systems necessary to strike at Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and elsewhere while enjoying protection guaranteed by the United States.

Escalation also continues in eastern Europe, as Ukraine’s provocative strikes on Moscow will undoubtedly lead to a Russian response. America will once again feel obligated to ensure Kyiv’s defense, not only by supplying them with weapons, but also intelligence assistance. In the Pacific, American weapons stationed in South Korea and Japan were relocated at the beginning of the Iran war due to the lack of defensive systems in the Middle East, further proving that American attempts to police the entire world are futile. The U.S. does not possess infinite resources.

American troops at bases across the Middle East have tragically been killed by Iranian strikes, as the military is forced to ration the remaining stockpile of defensive weapons. Just days into the war, America’s client-states in the Gulf were said to have depleted years worth of munitions. In the months of conflict that followed these dire reports, the effects of what Buchanan called “imperial overstretch” were being felt. Bases faced an onslaught of Iranian missiles and drones. Damage was so severe that many will likely not be returned to by the U.S. military. A chaotic withdrawal, of sorts.

The American regional order in the Middle East is collapsing in real time. In this period of chaos, there is the option to change course. Our leaders could realize the errors of their ways and bring the troops home.

This is not what Washington is known for, however.

My fear is that rather than acknowledge the failures of imperialism and chart a new path of restraint, the War Party will dig its heels in. The tendency of those at the helm of all failed government programs – especially war – is to blame every factor but themselves for the disaster. We often hear “if only we stayed longer,” or “we just needed more funds.” Many war hawks are more appalled at the act of leaving a war than they are at the decision to launch one unnecessarily. Take the neoconservative’s response to Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal or Trump’s attempts to leave Syria, for example.

If every crisis is met with another new foreign commitment, this cycle of imperial overstretch will never end. Eventually, something has to give. We can only hope that somebody in power can recognize that the empire is decaying, accept this reality, and guide us back to a sane foreign policy with grace.

It would be delusional and reckless of me, however, to tell you that I am hopeful. Our leaders possess no such humility.

Nolan Denaro is a political analyst, writer, and host of “The Quest For Clarity” podcast, available on YouTube and Spotify. He is a columnist at Antiwar.com, and his work has been published by Responsible Statecraft, the Libertarian Institute, The Daily Caller, and the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, economics, and current events, with a particular focus on war and imperialism. He maintains a personal Substack blog, and you can follow him on X @nolandenaro. Nolan can be reached for correspondence at nolansdenaro@icloud.com.



Monday, September 21, 2026

Is Russia going to war with Europe?

Is Russia going to war with Europe?
Europe has stopped simply paying for Ukraine's war and started manufacturing it, and the Kremlin is not happy. Whether that makes a wider war likelier is a separate question, and the analysts closest to the Russian order of battle say it does not. / bne IntelliNews
By Ben Aris in Berlin September 21, 2026

Is Russia about to launch an attack on Europe? In the last few weeks the rhetoric has rapidly escalated and the number of sabotage and arson incidents linked to Russia have escalated fanning the flames of fear. How close is the start of WWIII?

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told parliament on September 17 that allied intelligence pointed to Russian drones and missiles testing Europe’s eastern flank, entering Polish airspace and then being explained away afterwards as accidents. The design is to leave member states that Nato’s "Article 5 is more theoretical than practical". Poland scrambled fighter jets on September 17 as jet-powered drones crossed western Ukraine, and put ground-based air defence on high alert.

"In the Russian plan, according to intelligence assessments, there are also hybrid drone, and missile strikes on countries supporting Ukraine, including Poland," Tusk said. "The threat of provocations by Russia is real and could materialize at any moment."

French President Emmanuel Macron said the next day that Russian hybrid operations were now aimed directly at France and ordered new protection for critical infrastructure and defence-industry sites, Reuters reported.

When CIA Director John Ratcliffe made an unannounced trip to Moscow in August, reportedly to warn against a Russian attack on Nato. The last time the CIA director made an unannounced trip to Moscow was shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, after the trip Lithuanian and Estonian officials reported no increase in the military threat afterwards.

And countries along both sides of the border are making active preparations. Ukraine has already reinforced its border with Belarus. The Baltic states have put up fences and built defences, and Finland completed similar reinforcements this month. Poland's East Shield covers some 700 km of its borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad at a cost of about €2.4bn.

Russia recently built ten new missile launch-pad bases on its side of the Ukrainian and Belarusian borders that now put six Nato states inside Geran range. Behind them sit the powerful Oreshnik and the Iskanders ballistic missiles in Belarus and Kaliningrad that can hit any major capital in Europe.

More worryingly, Belarus ran tank and mechanised battalion exercises from September 15 to 18 at ranges roughly 15 km and 60 km from the Polish border and at Gozha on the Lithuanian frontier, beside the Suwalki Gap, the 104-km corridor that is the only land link between the Baltic states and the rest of the alliance – long seen as the favoured invasion point for Russian troops to take the Baltic states. Minsk called the drills "purely defensive", said they fell below the notification thresholds of the 2011 Vienna Convention and has not disclosed how many troops took part

Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko has also restarted radio relay stations used to guide Russian drones attacking targets in northern Ukraine, after he turned them off following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s threat to attack Belarus if they stayed in place.

"On his territory, along two regions bordering Ukraine, there is equipment directing fire at the Ukrainian population," Zelenskiy said in June. "Turn it off, take it down, and show us that it's been taken down. If they don't take it down, we'll take them down." Now the repeater stations are back on, there is a chance that Zelenskiy will follow through on his threat to strike them.

Fears of an invasion have risen to the point where Estonia has put in place plans to evacuate the entire population to Finland if Russia invades. Lithuania has published evacuation routes from Vilnius towards Poland. And both Russia and Germany have released plans to allow hospitals in the region to cope with a sudden surge of mass casualties should hostilities break out.

Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten said on September 18 that it was "no coincidence" Tusk was speaking so strongly and that the warning had to be taken "very seriously"; the Dutch defence ministry's own strategy, published in June, put a limited war against Nato members as possible within a year of the Ukraine war ending. But that timely appears to have been brought forward now.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sounded the alarm during her Strasbourg state of the nation speech on September 16, telling the European Parliament that the union was "now dealing with an openly hostile world" and that the EU is now “surrounded by enemies.”

Her list was hybrid rather than military: "cyberattacks and sabotage, arson and drone incursions. They are ramping up every day." She proposed a European version of Article 4 — an emergency security protocol for members that are threatened rather than attacked — and a European Security Council to sit above it.

As tensions escalate, Putin denied Russia has any plans to attack Europe: "We don't want to fight you, we want to cooperate with you… I want to say once again: Russia has no aggressive intentions toward Europe or European countries. We are ready for cooperation and for restoring relations with our European neighbours," Putin told his military-industrial commission on September 18 in televised comments. But then he denied Russia had any intention of invading Ukraine as well, right up to the day before Russians tanks rolled across the border on February 24, 2022.

Another “turning point"?

The “enemies at the gate” rhetoric is reminiscent of the talk of a “turning point” that swamped the airwaves in the run up to the Ankara Nato summit on July 8, where Bankova, Ukraine’s presidential administration, Nato and EU leaders hyped Ukrainian gains ahead of the meeting in an effort to raise a fresh €70bn in funding and more missiles supplies. That talk rapidly faded away after the summit was over that largely failed to meet any of these goals.

Now Ukraine has its back against the wall and the calls for money and missiles are louder than ever. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy revealed in his Independence Day speech earlier this month that the government had a $27bn hole in its defence budget it cannot fill just as it ran out of interceptor missiles completely.

The war in Ukraine has been through a phase change, switching from four and half years of a war of attrition to a full scale total war. This summer Zelenskiy has taken the fight to Russia using new medium- and long-range drones and missile targeting, first Russian oil refineries, and since the end of July Russia's retail sector.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded in kind, warning that Bankova had opened “Pandora’s box” and unleashed a brutal retaliation. That includes an effort to systematically destroy Ukraine’s retail infrastructure, taking out 90% of the country’s modern warehousing, hitting megamalls and petrol stations, and most recently targeting over 300 locomotives. The shelves in Ukraine’s supermarkets are emptying, and the country is anticipating the most brutal winter of the war when the heating season starts in November.

As the conflict expands it is now increasingly spilling over into Europe as Ukraine’s only remaining ally goes from funding the fighting to building its weapons. Moscow says that takes Europe from “supporting” Ukraine to become an “active participant” in the war and warns that European defence factors are now “legitimate military targets.”

Fresh interceptor missiles are coming in, in dribs and drabs, and Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance (MinFin) is asking for the second tranche of the €90bn loan, due next year, to be pulled forward to this year. Without it, Ukraine is again facing the same macroeconomic collapse it faced in April, before the €90bn was approved.

With a massive barrage of Russian ballistic missiles and the freezing subzero temperatures of winter looming, Bankova’s need for help is urgent and time is running out fast. Everyone knows what is coming.

Arms production

What has changed is the arms production. Ukraine has all but run out of the critical interceptor missiles it needs to bring down Russian ballistic missiles and the US has halted arms deliveries since US President Donald Trump took over. Ukraine has been reduced to hunting Russian launchers rather than shooting down what they fire. In recent months, Zelenskiy is starting to sound increasingly desperate.

Russia's missile production already vastly outpaces Ukraine's. This week Putin claimed a more than 22-fold increase in deliveries of ammunition and weapons, which has not been independently verified. European stockpiles have been run down to the bottom of the barrel, so to keep Kyiv supplied, dozens of joint ventures have been launched under the so-called Danish model to make weapons in European factories to which are then shipped to the frontline in the Donbas and elsewhere.

Particularly effective have been British-made Nyan drones which only carry a 20kg payload, but as they can fly thousands of kilometres and have state-of-the-art guidance systems, they can pinpoint the most sensitive parts of Russian refineries and put them out of action for months at a time. Previously Ukrainian drones did little more than cause superficial fires and refineries were back in action after only a few days. The Kremlin said the Callen-Lenz factory in Wiltshire that makes the Nyan is now a legitimate target, but has not suggested targeting it with Russia’s ICBMs yet.

In April the Russian defence ministry published the addresses of 21 facilities in 11 European countries making drones for Ukraine — sites in London, Munich, Riga, Vilnius, Prague, Madrid and Venice among them — and Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, called the list a “register of potential legitimate targets for the Russian armed forces.”

And European money is being poured into Ukraine’s defence sector.  The €90bn loan package agreed on in April earmarks €60bn for defence across 2026 and 2027, with the first €5.9bn tranche reserved for Ukrainian-made drones. In particular, Germany has begun series production of long-range drones for Ukraine, and a Ukrainian-European joint venture started building long-range strike drones on EU soil this month – standing on Euro Nato territory that should, in theory, give them Nato Article 5 protection. European leaders are now starting to question the validity of that theory.

Is Europe ready for war with Russia?

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told the Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv on September 11-12 that Europe enjoys "overwhelming air superiority", that its air forces could destroy what remains of Russia's refining industry "in six weeks".

“If Russia attacked us and we took our gloves off, I think we would defeat Russia quite quickly,” he said, arguing that Nato enjoys a large advantage in airpower.

“If after six months Ukraine can cause a fuel crisis in Russia with its limited airpower, we can do the same in six days,” said Sirkovsky, estimating that European Nato has some 2,500 more planes than Russia.

Those comments set off a debate on how effective Europe’s airpower is. Kremlin aide and former FSB head, Nikolai Patrushev replied that if Poland tried that, it would “lose its statehood within days.”

Russia has around 1,500 advanced jet fighters and bombers in its fleet that are under a single command and are veterans of a four and half war. Europe’s air forces are divided amongst 21 European commands with little hands-on experience. Eight fleets hold about three quarters of the total: Turkey around 300, France 260, Germany 220, Greece 215, Italy 190, Spain 180, the UK 150 as well as Poland with fewer than 70 planes. Currently, Europe’s air defences are coordinated by a US general based in Ramstein, but the Pentagon told Europe explicitly early this year it was withdrawing from this role next year as part of the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) released last December. If the US general withdraws from running Europe’s logistics, currently, the system requires all 32 Nato members to make logistic decisions by committee unless a new commander is appointed.

Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics has put it flatly. "We are not ready. That's absolutely clear," he said in an interview. "We can't keep simply hoping for a situation where the US remains much involved in Europe."

And there is a “Babel problem”: although these forces are supposed to be Nato-compatible, in reality there are 172 types of major weapons systems in European service across eleven categories, against 32 in American service, according to McKinsey. This problem has already come up on the Ukrainian battlefield where nominally identical EU-made 155mm artillery shells won’t work in guns made by another country due to local “refinements.”

Poland also has a formidable army with some 220,000 men under arms and the highest defence spending in Europe of 4.68% of GDP, with ambitions to create the largest conventional army in Europe. But its military is still dwarfed by Russia’s.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Douglas Barrie said in a report that Europe’s air force is more advanced, more capable and better trained than Russia’s but still doubts Nato could win air superiority over Russia. The obstacle is not Russian aircraft but Russian ground-based air defence — the advanced S-400, S-300, Pantsir and Tor batteries stacked across Russian territory, as well as the effective electronic warfare systems protecting them. Thanks to the thirty year “peace dividend” since the fall of the Soviet Union, Europe has not invested into anything similar.

The issue was put to the test during the Polish drone incursion last September when six unarmed Russian reconnaissance drones flew almost across the entire Polish territory unchallenged. Warsaw scrambled its air force, fired off $1.4bn of air defence missiles and eventually called in the Danish air force for help to eventually bring the Styrofoam drones costing about $10,000 each. Since then Russian drone incursions have become common over Poland, Romania and Moldova.

Clement Molin, the French open-source milblogger argues that Polish and Baltic border defences are patchy at best and ill-equipped to deal with 1,000-strong Russian drone swam. Russia has been investing heavily into both drone production and development. It is on course to make 10mn drones this year and has recently switched to the more advanced jet powered Geran-4 drone that can evade Ukraine’s best interceptor drones. In addition it has rolled out the Geran-5 drone, a lightweight and inexpensive cruise missile, and the Banderol light weight cruise missile.

European leaders have talked about setting up a “drone wall” to protect Europe’s eastern flank. Warsaw has since joined an anti-ballistic missile coalition with Ukraine and other allies, despite the fact that no one has enough ammo. Germany has a licence to make the Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles but won’t go into production until next year. The total European drone production is currently estimated to be on the order of 300,000-400,000 drones. Just how unprepared Nato is was shoved in Nato commanders face during the Hedgehog military exercises in Estonia this May, when a ten-man detachment of Ukrainian operators destroyed an entire battalion of Nato troops. Twice. Before the lunch break.

A 24-year-old Ukrainian operator at the exercise said: "They paused the exercises three times to determine how to improve, but if this had been real life, they would already be dead."

The Armed Forces of Russia (AFR) is just as well versed in drone warfare. It would take years of investment to catch up to where Russia is today, and Putin has already put the whole Russian economy on a full war footing.

"What we see is that air defence, drone defence, anti-ballistic defence has serious problems," Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, speaking in Washington on September 19, said. "Because if Russia decides to use a couple of missiles in that territory, I think that would be a serious challenge today for many countries to cope with that."

Hybrid attack

As von der Leyen pointed out, Russia’s attack, if any comes, is likely to be hybrid – enough to cause destruction, but not enough to trigger an unavoidable Article 5 collective response.

"I don't believe in the threat of a land operation, even a limited one, in Europe," Molin said. “Moscow would instead intensify what he called its "indirect war" against Europe.”

Those fears were stoked by the discovery of a bomb in a bag at the Leipzig-Halle airport next to a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane ferrying French ammunition to Kyiv that was linked to Russia by Germany’s intelligence services. Medvedev wrote on Telegram, "Germany deserves[s] a direct strike on all German military equipment production facilities for the Bandera clique. And quite possibly on several other locations in Berlin as well," after Russia was accused of planting the bomb.

The contradiction at the heart of the fearmongering amongst European leaders warning of an imminent Russian attack is on the one hand they point to a full scale invasion of the Nordic countries; on the other they scoff at Russia’s failure to take more than 20% of Ukrainian territory after four years of full scale war and its inability to even capture the small chunk of the Donbas Russia still does not control. Russia can’t attack Nato unless the AFU’s defence of Ukraine collapses and frees Russian troops for other duties.

"More than 90% of the Russian army is currently on the Ukrainian front," Molin wrote, with most of the air force, recruits and munitions committed there. "The Russian army has no major forces in Kaliningrad, which would make any offensive against an EU state suicidal for that strategic territory."

Ukraine’s shortage of men, money and missiles is acute, but Russia, while better off, is in the same boat. To raise the additional million men that an invasion of Europe would require, would mean a general mobilisation – something Putin has been very careful to avoid - and that could trigger wide scale protests in Russia.

"As long as the war in Ukraine continues, without a Ukrainian collapse, Europe is not at much risk", because "the Ukrainians have lined up more than 1mn men, which would be impossible to replace by European armies in a few months".

A land invasion remains off the cards for now, but a hybrid attack on the already weakened Europe economy is already underway. Analysts warn that critical infrastructure - refineries, ports, airports, power stations, rail networks and command centres – need to be prepared now.

Sunday, September 20, 2026

The Enemy the Alliance Needs

Watch closely, because Sweden is showing you how empire is administered.

by | Sep 18, 2026 | 

On the morning of August 6, near the coastal town of Furuvik, a Russian couple named Semyon Rusanov and Tatyana Milenina were declared a threat to the security of the Swedish state. They had lived in Spain for five years. They opposed the war in Ukraine. They had not set foot in Russia since 2022. They had a tent, fishing rods, and two tourist walkie-talkies, and they had camped within sight of the summer cottage used by the chief executive of an arms company. For this they were interrogated for seven hours, locked in a migration detention center, and ordered deported.

No espionage charge was filed. No charge of any kind was filed. Säpo, the Swedish security service, never took the case. The couple’s lawyer said they were never notified of any suspected crime. The evidence, entire, was that they spoke Russian, carried radios sold to hikers, and could not explain their choice of campsite to the satisfaction of a policeman. On that foundation the state moved against them.

An American reader might file this under European strangeness and move on. That would be a mistake. What happened at Furuvik is a small, clear demonstration of the machinery that Washington has spent three years installing across Europe – the machinery of the necessary enemy – and the wreckage at the center of the story lies at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, where it points not at Moscow, and not really at Stockholm, but at home.

The pipeline Washington promised to destroy

Begin with the pipeline, because everything else hangs from it.

On February 7, 2022 – seventeen days before Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine – President Joe Biden stood beside the German chancellor and made a promise about Nord Stream 2, the pipeline built to carry Russian gas to Germany. “If Russia invades,” Biden said, “there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it.” A reporter asked how, given the project lay under German control. “I promise you,” the president answered, “we will be able to do it.”

Seven months later, someone did. On September 26, 2022, four explosions ruptured the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic. In February 2023, Seymour Hersh – the reporter who exposed the My Lai massacre and the CIA’s domestic spying — published an account, sourced to a person with direct knowledge of the planning, of how the United States did it: Navy divers from the Diving and Salvage Center in Panama City, Florida, planting remotely triggered charges under cover of the NATO exercise BALTOPS 22, detonated three months later by a sonar buoy dropped from a Norwegian aircraft. Hersh reported that the operation was routed through Navy divers precisely because, unlike Special Operations Command, they are not required to report to Congress – that when the national-security bureaucracy debated the plan, CIA director William Burns came back and said, “Do it.” The purpose, Hersh’s source told him, was to lock Europe into the war at a moment when allies were wavering: destroy the pipeline, and you destroy the temptation to make peace and buy Russian gas again.

The White House and Norway denied it. Hersh’s account rests on a single anonymous source and has not been independently confirmed. I set it beside you not as proven fact but as the account Washington has never had to answer under oath – because, as we will see, the one country positioned to force that answer chose instead to look away. And whatever one makes of Hersh’s source, the hard facts around it are not in dispute: the president publicly vowed to end the pipeline, the pipeline was destroyed, and the United States was, as even Russia’s critics conceded, the principal beneficiary of its destruction.

The ally that agreed not to look

Two of the four explosions occurred inside Sweden’s own exclusive economic zone. This was the largest attack on civilian infrastructure in modern European history, and Sweden was sitting on the crime scene. It sent down divers. It recovered debris carrying explosive residue. It declared the case gross sabotage. And then, across sixteen months, it did everything within its power not to establish who was responsible.

When Denmark and Germany proposed a joint investigation team, Sweden refused to join, because doing so would require sharing material “subject to confidentiality directly linked to national security.” When it closed the investigation in February 2024, it claimed it lacked jurisdiction over an attack in international waters, and it passed its sealed findings to Germany, where secrecy laws kept them from the public. Sweden’s own state broadcaster described the outcome without a shred of illusion. It was, SVT’s analysts said, “a fairly convenient way out for Sweden,” because a real public reckoning carried “an obvious risk that authorities and senior politicians got involved and made an already bad security situation worse.”

There is no need to allege that Sweden destroyed evidence; the public record does not show it, and the charge is unnecessary. What Sweden did openly is the point. It held the physical wreckage of an attack that reshaped the energy map of the continent, and it decided not to look, in public, and it called the decision national security. An ally of the United States, sitting atop evidence that might have implicated the United States, elected to seal it and hand the box to Berlin. This is what alliance discipline looks like from the inside: not orders barked down a chain of command, but a smaller partner quietly declining to ask the question whose answer would embarrass the larger one.

The timing removes any doubt about the stakes. Sweden closed the Nord Stream file in February 2024. It joined NATO, abandoning two centuries of neutrality, on March 7 – one month later. A country does not embarrass the alliance it is in the act of joining.

The vote the Swedish people were denied

For an American audience, the next piece is the one that should land hardest, because it is the mechanism by which “the West” is manufactured and presented to you as spontaneous.

NATO expansion is sold at home as the free choice of frightened nations rushing under Washington’s umbrella. Sweden shows how that choice is actually produced. Its constitution provides for binding referendums on questions of national magnitude, and abandoning two hundred years of neutrality was such a question. When the Left Party moved to put NATO membership to a vote, Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson refused. A referendum, she said, was “a bad idea.” Her reasoning was the same phrase, worn smooth from use: “There is a lot of information about national security that is confidential, so there are important issues in such a referendum that cannot be discussed and important facts that cannot be put on the table.” The foreign minister added that a vote would only polarize the public and hand Russia an opening for disinformation – the citizenry itself reclassified as a security risk.

So the most consequential foreign-policy decision in Sweden’s modern history was pushed through parliament in haste, and the people in whose name it was taken never cast a ballot. Sweden’s peace movement, one of the oldest in Europe, talked to an empty room. The umbrella did not descend on a nation that begged for it. It was raised over a nation that was not consulted, by a government that told its own people they could not be shown the reasons.

Every part of this is administered with the same key. The phrase that jailed two tourists, that sealed the pipeline, that removed a nation’s alignment from the reach of its own voters – national security – is not the description of a threat. It is the name of a locked door, and Washington has master keys to a great many of them across Europe now.

First Russia, then Ukraine, and the alliance safe either way

Here is the turn that exposes the whole apparatus.

For two years the working assumption in the American press was that Russia had blown up its own pipeline – a claim that never survived a moment’s scrutiny, since the blasts destroyed Moscow’s chief economic leverage over Europe, but which fit the mood and demanded no evidence. That story has collapsed, though not in Hersh’s direction. German prosecutors now allege the sabotage was carried out by a cell of Ukrainians who chartered a yacht in the German port of Rostock on forged documents and dove to plant the charges. One suspect, former Ukrainian officer Serhii Kuznetsov, was extradited from Italy and charged in July with coordinating the attack on behalf of Ukrainian state entities. A second, Volodymyr Zhuravlyov, was arrested in Croatia in August 2026 – on the set of a Hollywood film about the sabotage. When Poland was asked to extradite him, its court refused, ruling that destroying an enemy’s infrastructure in wartime “is not sabotage but denotes a military action.”

Two accounts, then, compete for the seabed: American divers acting on a presidential vow, or a Ukrainian cell acting for Kyiv. The accused deny it, the governments deny it, and the courts will argue it for years. But notice what both accounts share. Neither is Russia. Both point at Sweden’s own side of the war. And this is exactly why the Swedish seal was worth what it cost. A public verdict, reached in early 2024 on the threshold of accession, would have forced the alliance to admit that the party which bombed a pipeline in Sweden’s own waters was not the enemy the whole rearmament was built to fight. It was Washington, or it was Kyiv. Either way, the enemy at the bottom of the sea was a friend.

That is the logic of a war economy, and Americans have watched their own government run it for a generation. The enemy is not discovered by investigation; the enemy is fixed in advance by policy, and the facts are arranged around it or buried beneath it. When Russia could be blamed, the pipeline was proof of the Russian threat. When the evidence turned toward Washington and Kyiv, the pipeline became a German court’s problem and a Swedish silence. The threat is the product. Saab, whose executive’s cottage started this story, understood that better than anyone: since February 2022 its order backlog has climbed to 318 billion crowns and its shares rose 131 percent in seven months, and its chief executive tells investors plainly that Russia “is not interested in peace” and the rearmament “has only just begun.” The enemy the couple were mistaken for is the enemy that pays his salary, and the American taxpayer’s, and half of Europe’s now.

What the court said, before they made it forget

Semyon and Tatyana were released on August 11. A Stockholm migration court overturned their detention, and the Migration Agency soon cancelled the deportation order and the two-year Schengen ban. The agency’s finding was flat: the police had produced no evidence that the couple threatened internal security, public order, or safety. The court was plainer still. “The mere fact of Russian citizenship, and that they speak Russian,” it ruled, “cannot be grounds for a decision on detention.”

A judge in a NATO country in 2026 was obliged to state, as though announcing a discovery, that being Russian is not a crime – because the apparatus around her had already decided, on no evidence at all, that it was near enough. Even then the state would not release its grip: the couple remain under a separate preliminary investigation for trespass and, absurdly, “preparation for aggravated theft” – the flailing of a system that has seized someone and must now manufacture a reason.

The tourists were fortunate in the one way that matters. They were given a courtroom, and in a courtroom the evidence must be shown. When it was demanded, the phrase that had jailed them dissolved into a Russian accent and two hiking radios. The pipeline was never given a courtroom. The Swedish public was never given a ballot. Held to the ordinary standard of proof, the enemy Sweden needed – the enemy the whole alliance needs, and that your own government sells you in the same words – turned out to contain nothing at all. That is the point of an enemy. It is not there to be proven. It is there to keep the door locked, and to keep you from asking what Washington did on the other side of it.

A note on evidence. Seymour Hersh’s account of US responsibility for the Nord Stream attack rests on a single anonymous source and is denied by the US and Norwegian governments; it is presented here as a serious, unrefuted allegation, not as established fact. The competing German prosecution of Ukrainian suspects is ongoing, and those suspects deny involvement – responsibility remains legally unresolved. What is documented and undisputed: Biden’s public vow to “bring an end to” Nord Stream 2, the destruction of the pipelines, Sweden’s recovery of explosive-laden debris, its refusal of a joint investigation, its closure of the case on jurisdictional grounds one month before joining NATO, and the migration court’s ruling. The identification of Saab CEO Micael Johansson as the “protected person” is SVT Gävleborg’s, and includes his own on-record remarks. This article does not claim Sweden destroyed seabed evidence; the record shows selective secrecy, which is grave enough.

Thomas Karat writes investigative work published at karat.substack.com and the Libertarian Institute, drawing on a corporate career and academic training as a behavior analyst to examine how institutions manufacture consent and influence.