Former EU foreign policy chief Mogherini detained in corruption case

Belgian police arrested three people, including former foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, and raided EU offices in a corruption probe that names her as a suspect.


Issued on: 04/12/2025 - RFI

Former EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, was taken into custody on Tuesday, 2 December in Belgium as part of an investigation into the fraudulent use of European funds. © John Thys / AFP

On Tuesday, Belgian authorities arrested the trio after searching the EU diplomatic service’s headquarters in Brussels and the College of Europe, a prestigious training institute for future policymakers, in Bruges.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) said on Wednesday that Mogherini, now rector of the College of Europe, was among those detained, along with a senior college staff member and an official from the European Commission.

The EPPO said the Belgian Federal Judicial Police questioned all three before formally notifying them of the accusations. These relate to suspected procurement fraud and corruption, conflict of interest and breaches of professional secrecy.

All three were released afterwards, with investigators saying they were unlikely to flee.

High-profile investigation

Mogherini led the EU’s external action service from 2014 to 2019 and was involved in some of the bloc’s most delicate diplomatic efforts, including the Iran nuclear talks and efforts to ease tensions between Serbia and Kosovo.

The EPPO said police had searched the suspects’ homes as well as several college buildings and the headquarters of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s foreign policy body.

The EEAS sits in central Brussels, close to other major EU institutions.

Investigators have not linked any outside actor or foreign government to the case. The probe focuses instead on what the EPPO described as “strong suspicions" of fraud in awarding a tender to run a training programme for junior diplomats at the EU Diplomatic Academy during the 2021-2022 academic year.

The EEAS was then overseen by Josep Borrell, who served as Vice President of the European Commission

Blow for EU integrity efforts

The accusations against Mogherini come as the EU tries to move past several corruption and influence-peddling scandals.

The largest, known as Qatargate, emerged in late 2022 and involved lawmakers, parliamentary aides, lobbyists and relatives.

Belgian prosecutors said Qatari and Moroccan officials paid cash to shape EU decisions, though both countries denied wrongdoing.

There have been no convictions and the prospects for a trial remain unclear.

Earlier this year, several people were arrested in a probe involving Chinese tech giant Huawei, suspected of bribing members of the European Parliament.

In 2023, a former aide to far-right German MEP Maximilian Krah was detained over allegations of spying for China. Krah, now in Germany’s federal parliament, said he had no knowledge of the suspicions involving his former staffer.

(with newswires)

‘I Have Full Confidence In The Justice System’, Mogherini Says Amid EEAS-Gate

File photo of Federica Mogherini. Photo Credit: Federica Mogherini, Facebook


December 4, 2025 
 EurActiv
By Eddy Wax and Elisa Braun

(EurActiv) — Former EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini is “very serene” about the ongoing fraud investigation in which she has been named a suspect, her lawyer said on Wednesday, a day after Belgian authorities questioned her for several hours and searched her Brussels residence.

Mogherini’s status as a suspect is part of a wider probe first reported by Euractiv, which led to the arrests and subsequent release of Mogherini and senior European Commission official Stefano Sannino.

Belgian police also raided the EU’s diplomatic service as investigators examine allegations of improperly shared confidential information linked to an EU-funded tender involving the College of Europe.

“I have full confidence in the justice system, and I trust that the correctness of the College’s action will be ascertained,” Mogherini said in a statement, adding she would offer “full collaboration to the authorities.”

Mogherini was interrogated from 2 p.m. until shortly after midnight on Tuesday, her lawyer Mariapaola Cherchi of Cherchi & De Vos told Euractiv.

“Mrs Mogherini has answered with total transparency, she is very serene despite the very heavy ordeal for someone like her, who has been very devoted towards the European institutions, as her track record shows,” Cherchi said.

She described the questioning as polite and focused, with investigators pressing for detailed explanations about the public tender at the centre of the case.

Mogherini’s release without any restriction on her movements was “a positive sign,” she added.

Following the hearing, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) confirmed that Mogherini had been formally notified of her status as a suspect – meaning the investigation remains open as prosecutors assess whether she is cleared or further implicated.

EPPO said she was released because she is not considered a flight risk and remains presumed innocent.

Brussels In Shock As Ex-EU Diplomat Mogherini Arrested In Tender-Rigging Probe

December 3, 2025 
EurActiv
By Eddy Wax and Elisa Braun

(EurActiv) — Belgian police arrested the EU’s former top diplomat Federica Mogherini and senior Commission official Stefano Sannino as part a sweeping fraud investigation that is renewing fears about corruption in the highest ranks of the European bureaucracy.

The arrests came amid dawn raids, first reported by Euractiv, on the EU diplomatic service in Brussels and the College of Europe in Bruges, where Mogherini, who previously served as Italy’s foreign minister, is the rector. The ongoing probe involves alleged misuse of EU funds, according to people familiar with the investigation and witnesses.

In addition to Mogherini, a socialist who headed the EU’s foreign service between 2014 and 2019, and Sannino, a fellow Italian diplomat who heads the Commission’s directorate general for the Middle East and Northern Africa (DG-MENA), a third person, who works in the executive education department of the College of Europe, was also detained.

All three were questioned on suspicion of procurement fraud, corruption, and criminal conflict of interest. Sannino and Mogherini did not immediately respond to requests for comment. A spokesperson for the EEAS said he had no information.

The criminal probe began after allegations that the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic arm, and the College of Europe colluded to misuse EU public money in 2021 and 2022 to start a new diplomatic academy, according to four people with knowledge of the investigation.



The affair the latest major scandal to hit the EU in the wake of the Huawei and ‘Qatargate‘ investigations and raises serious concerns about the integrity of the senior leadership of the institutions at the core of the European ‘project’.
In Bruges

At the core of the investigation is a suspicion that the College of Europe or its representatives had prior knowledge of a public tender launched by the EEAS to host a new EU diplomatic academy. The tender, which was awarded to the College of Europe in 2022, was open to institutions of higher education across Europe.

Founded in 1949, the College of Europe is regarded as the premier finishing school for aspiring European civil servants, with alumni including top politicians and officials in the European institutions. Though it is closely affiliated with the EU, which helps fund it, the college is nominally independent.

Investigators have focused on the circumstances surrounding the college’s €3.2 million purchase of a building on Spanjaardstraat in Bruges, which now houses a dormitory for diplomats who attend the academy, the four people with knowledge of the probe said. The competition to host the academy required bidders to propose plans for housing.

The College of Europe purchased the building in 2022 during a period of financial strain for the institution, two people with knowledge of the probe said. Shortly thereafter, the EEAS awarded the college €654,000 in funding.

Authorities suspect the College of Europe and its representatives had privileged access to confidential information about the tender, giving them an unfair advantage over other bidders. During the period in question, Mogherini was rector of the College of Europe and Sannino, who had worked for Mogherini in the Italian foreign ministry, was secretary-general of the EU’s foreign service, a position that may have given him sway over the tender.

Whatever happened behind the scenes, there’s no doubt that the tender ended in Mogherini’s favour. In addition to running the College of Europe, she now also oversees the new EU Diplomatic Academy, which was launched in 2022. She began a second five-year term in Bruges this year.

During the period under scrutiny, the EEAS was led by another socialist former foreign minister, Spain’s Josep Borrell. Spokespeople for Borrell and the College of Europe declined to comment.
Early morning raids

Tuesday’s police raids, which included private residences, took place across Belgium in the early hours of the morning, with police seizing documents. Around 10 officers dressed in civilian clothes entered the EEAS headquarters at 7:30 am on Tuesday, one eyewitness said. Another EU official from the EU’s diplomatic service confirmed the raid.

Belgian federal police from West Flanders, and the EU’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, took part in the operation as part of a criminal probe led by the EU’s Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).

Spokespersons from EPPO and OLAF declined to comment.

OLAF, which has administrative powers to pursue suspected fraud involving EU money, interviewed several individuals before passing its findings to EPPO, tasked with investigating and prosecuting serious crimes against the EU’s interests.

There is no indication that OLAF or EPPO have reached conclusions of wrongdoing, and no one has been formally charged yet.

 Trump's obsession with Saudi Arabia 'backfiring' on US oil companies: report

U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman during a welcoming ceremony in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2025. Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court/Handout via REUTERS

Adam Lynch

November 22, 2025

ALTERNET

New York Times reporter Noah Shachtman says Trump made a “corrosive pact” with the U.S. oil industry, and today that pact is “wiping out jobs at home and strangling what little hope was left of avoiding a climate disaster.”

“Trump promised them he would do them so many favors that a billion dollars in donations would feel like a ‘deal.’ The executives gave him only a fraction of the money he sought. Mr. Trump, on the other hand, has given them more than they asked for,” said Shachtman.

As predicted, Trump scaled back regulations and encouraged more drilling. He’s also worked to crush the industry’s green competition, pulling the plug on the largest solar project in North America, which was on track to supply enough power for nearly two million homes. Trump also put a $5 billion wind farm project in New York temporarily on hold, threatening thousands of jobs until the state approved a new gas pipeline. And he’s killed incentives for electric vehicles, sales of which had more than doubled since his first term.

It's all outdated political instinct from the 1970s, said Shachtman, back when Saudi Arabia and the rest of the OPEC cartel cut production and brought the world economy to its knees. For decades afterward, Trump expressed a mixture of admiration and resentment of the kingdom’s resource wealth.

But now, Trump is taking on damaging OPEC-like maneuvers, trying to dominate the international market, warning the world to buy more fossil fuels — or else. Now America is the planet’s leading producer of oil and natural gas, but his America First energy goals have their contradictions.

“In his total commitment to a hydrocarbon-heavy world, he has pushed not only domestic producers but also Saudi Arabia and the rest of the OPEC nations to keep pumping out more, more, more cheap oil,” said Shachtman. “That might be good news for consumers, offsetting some of these high electric rates. But with oil prices down to around $60 per barrel, American companies say they can’t afford to open up new wells, especially now that [Trump’s] tariffs have made drilling equipment so expensive. The total number of active rigs is down year over year.”

Meanwhile the combo of more data centers and fewer renewables is spiking average Americans’ electric bills. Natural gas prices are up, thanks to Trump’s export deals.

“If you gave me a piece of paper and asked me to think about the most creative way, the most effective way, to raise electricity prices in the United States, it would look a lot like what they’ve done,” said Ethan Zindler, a former climate counselor in the Biden Treasury Department who works on policy at Bloomberg New Energy Finance.

The U.S. oil and gas business would probably be thrilled were Trump’s “capricious attacks on renewables and the big swings in energy policy” not also a liability for an industry forced by the nature of its complex engineering projects to plan years, or even decades, ahead.

“Ever-changing policy, particularly as administrations change, is not good for business. It’s not good for the economy and ultimately, it’s not good for people,” said Exxon Mobil’s chief executive, Darren Woods.

Energy executives are unhappy, but they can’t be surprised, said Shachtman. Trump’s favor was always transactional and he wanted to use his oil industry favor to make their energy a tool to leverage his own personal power.

“If they drill themselves out of business, I don’t give a damn,” Trump told voters at a rally last year.

Read the New York Times report at this link.

U.S. and Saudi Arabia Rebuild a Strategic Alliance

By Charles Kennedy - Nov 20, 2025

• Saudi Arabia pledged up to $1 trillion in U.S. investments, strengthening ties with Washington across energy, defense, and technology.
• 
  
• Aramco signed $30 billion in new deals with U.S. firms, including major LNG investments in Energy Transfer’s Lake Charles and Commonwealth LNG projects.
• 
  
• The partnership also includes nuclear technology sharing and critical minerals projects, such as a rare earth processing plant by MP Materials and Ma’aden.

• 
  

Saudi Arabia made investment commitments of as much as $1 trillion during the visit of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the United States. The sum is a substantial increase on an original pledge of $600 billion, but it is also a sign that the relationship between two of the world’s largest oil producers is back on track.

The relationship, dating back to the early 20^th century, was rather damaged during the Biden administration, in part due to its focus on the energy transition, which put it at odds with Saudi Arabia as an economy heavily dependent on oil revenues. Another part of the reason for the worsened bilateral relations was the issue of human rights and the murder of a dissident Saudi journalist, which included President Biden at one point calling the kingdom a pariah state. On top of those complications, President Biden at one point threatened to punish Saudi Arabia if Riyadh did not ramp up oil production to lower prices. In short, the Biden administration did not play well with the Saudis.

President Trump changed all that, bringing relations back to the friend zone and extracting massive investment commitments across industries, but notably in LNG, defense, and critical minerals. The two also made progress on nuclear energy, with the U.S. agreeing to share its nuclear power technology with the Saudis on the condition that it would not be used for weapons-grade uranium enrichment.

The latter had been a thorny issue for years, ever since talks about nuclear tech sharing began during the first Trump administration. At the time, the Saudis refused to sign off on the non-enrichment clause, which delayed the deal. Now, Chris Wright and Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a preliminary deal for the tech sharing, with specific steps forward presumably to follow.

Aramco, meanwhile, announced preliminary agreements with U.S. companies worth a total $30 billion, noting the prospective deals build on earlier investment commitments made this year, with a value of up to $90 billion. The areas that the deals cover span from LNG to advanced materials manufacturing and financial services, the company said.

In liquefied gas specifically, Aramco is looking into an investment in the Lake Charles project led by Energy Transfer, and an offtake deal for Commonwealth LNG.

The Lake Charles LNG project is fully permitted, uses existing infrastructure, and benefits from an abundant natural gas supply through existing connections to the Henry Hub and connectivity to Energy Transfer’s vast network of natural gas pipelines. It will have an annual capacity of some 15 million tons of liquefied natural gas once completed. Finding equity partners for 80% of the facility is the condition Energy Transfer has set for making the final investment decision for the project.

The Commonwealth LNG facility in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, will have an annual capacity of 9.5 million tons of liquefied gas. The construction of the first phase will cost $11 billion, according to Commonwealth LNG, and generate annual export revenues of some $3.5 billion. However, the company has yet to make the final investment decision on the project, just like Energy Transfer, after revising the timeline for the project’s completion, with commissioning moved from 2027 to 2031.

Critical minerals and metals were another area of interest for both. Saudi Arabia has considerable deposits of some of these minerals and metals. The United States needs them. That one was really a no-brainer, and only a matter of time. During the Saudi visit, U.S. MP Materials announced a deal with Saudi Maaden and the U.S. federal government for the construction of a rare earths processing plant in Saudi Arabia.

Nuclear, LNG, and critical minerals—this is more or less all the priority boxes ticked, plus weapons and military equipment supply deals to cement the mended fences. Now, the only question is how many of the preliminary commitments will progress to full deals.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

The Saudi F-35 Gambit: A High-End Arms Sale Meets Middle Eastern Geopolitics – Analysis

November 23, 2025

Hudson Institute
By Can Kasapoğlu


President Donald Trump’s announcement that the United States will sell F-35 combat aircraft to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a turning point for airpower dynamics in the Middle East, with broad geopolitical implications.

The Lockheed Martin F-35, a fifth-generation, multirole stealth aircraft with unrivaled information superiority features, represents the leading edge of American tactical military aviation. Its high-end capabilities, from providing deep battlespace awareness to enabling distributed, networked precision strikes in nonpermissive airspace, make it one of the rare assets that can single-handedly alter the outcome of a conflict.

The announcement that Saudi Arabia will be the first Arab nation to procure this system has severe implications for three key pillars of American engagement in the Middle East:Outcompeting China in the quest for long-term influence over the region’s militaries and weapons markets.
Boosting the capabilities of Washington’s Gulf Arab partners to counter Iran.
Preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) in a worsening threat landscape.
Geopolitical Importance: Preventing the Saudis from Hedging toward China

President Trump’s announcement, made on the eve of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s White House visit, is an important step for preventing Saudi Arabia from drifting further into China’s military orbit. The sale likely cleared a Pentagon review in advance of the president’s meeting with the de facto Saudi monarch. If it goes through, Saudi Arabia will acquire 48 F-35s, making it the first Arab nation to operate a fifth-generation combat aircraft.

The United States Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly warned Trump administration officials that, because of Riyadh’s defense partnership with Beijing, selling the F-35 to Saudi Arabia might give China access to the aircraft’s critical technologies. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s increasing ties with China were likely a key reason why President Trump decided to go through with the sale. Riyadh has signaled that it will not depend solely on the United States for its security—and that if Washington hesitates, the kingdom will pursue other avenues. Moreover, Riyadh’s recent strategic mutual defense agreement with Pakistan—a China-aligned Muslim-majority nation with a capable military and nuclear assets—sent an unmistakable message to the US about the House of Saud’s leverage.



Beijing has been deeply involved in supplying the kingdom with armaments, especially missile and drone warfare assets, for at least a decade. Geospatial analysis shows that Saudi Arabia has significantly expanded the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force in recent years while also seeking to expand its indigenous defense industrial base. The crown prince has also pressed for local production agreements as a condition of major defense acquisitions—especially missile programs. Saudi Arabia now has a solid-propellant motorproduction line at the al-Watah ballistic missile base, and US intelligence assesses that Riyadh is manufacturing an undisclosed slate of ballistic missiles with direct Chinese assistance.

For many countries, ballistic missile cooperation with China would end any hope of close military ties with the US—let alone an F-35 acquisition. But whenever Washington withholds a capability that Riyadh views as vital, the kingdom hedges further toward Beijing. When America withheld Pershing ballistic missiles from Riyadh in the 1980s, the Saudis sought DF-3 missiles from China. The eventual $3.5 billion deal between Riyadh and Beijing was the start of a pattern that endures today. It is therefore likely that the Trump administration believed that the crown prince’s major ask was more than mere posturing.

Beijing has publicly signaled that its ostensible fifth-generation competitor to the F-35, the J-20 stealth fighter, remains under strict export restrictions. But the strategic situation is fluid. If China’s leadership sees a chance to score a strategic victory over the United States, those export barriers could quickly fall. The United Arab Emirates—another Gulf state that Washington has thus far shut out from F-35 procurement over concerns about Chinese defense technology espionage through local Huawei 5G infrastructure—has reportedly shown interest in the J-20. If the right opportunity to erode US aerospace dominance in the Gulf presents itself, Beijing may decide to seize it.

Fortunately for the White House, providing Riyadh with the F-35 might serve multiple US strategic interests—if the political-military perspective holds and the diplomatic stars line up. As mentioned, it boosts America’s position as it competes with China for regional influence. F-35s would be an effective but American-dependent asset for the Saudis to operate. Second, Washington needs capable Gulf partners that can plug seamlessly into the US military’s regional architecture to help counter Iran. This architecture became even more critical when the US officially moved Israel from the European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility to Central Command (CENTCOM) in 2021. Having an allied F-35 detachment in the Gulf would allow CENTCOM to respond even more forcefully to future Iranian aggression, enhancing deterrence. Finally, Saudi Arabia, sitting at the nexus of the Red Sea and the Gulf, is a valuable geopolitical partner. Its critical role in global energy markets and its fast-growing portfolio of high-tech and defense industrial investments under its Vision 2030 further increase its importance. Militarily, the kingdom remains one of the few states capable of hosting large-scale US detachments to anchor American deterrence against Iran.

The Trump administration’s decision to sell the F-35 to Saudi Arabia reveals the strategic trust Washington is willing to extend to its longtime ally—and reinforces the alignment it expects from Riyadh in return. In the White House’s calculus, this deal benefits the US and its Saudi allies while harming China.
Stealth in the Gulf: The Potential Military Transformation behind Fifth-Gen Air Superiority

Saudi Arabia, thanks to its considerable wealth, is already one of the world’s top defense spenders. Between 2020 and 2024, the kingdom ranked fourth among the world’s arms importers and was the primary Middle Eastern recipient of US-made munitions. But Riyadh has, for years, viewed the acquisition of a fifth-generation combat aircraft as the capstone of its Vision 2030 defense transformation agenda—an ambitious program to rapidly advance its military capabilities.

The stealth-equipped F-35 is the backbone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s tactical aviation deterrent. According to Lockheed Martin, more than 600 F-35s will be stationed across NATO air bases in Europe by the 2030s. For reference, the French military has ordered just 234 of its indigenous Dassault Rafale combat aircraft as of November 2025. Beyond Europe, the F-35I has given the Israeli Air Force operational freedom in hostile Middle Eastern skies.

The F-35’s stealth and information superiority capabilities would dramatically shift the Saudi-Iranian balance of power. The aircraft’s ability to operate deep in nonpermissive airspace and overcome layered air defense architectures would allow Saudi Arabia to threaten the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ missile sites, drone nests, command hubs, and other critical infrastructure.

Moreover, the F-35 would serve as a force multiplier, enhancing the effectiveness of the rest of the kingdom’s air warfare posture. Fifth-generation platforms like the F-35 operate within smart battle networks, or systems of systems. In Israel’s recent 12-day war with Iran, F-35Is played a central role in the Israeli Air Force’s strike packages. The fifth-generation aircraft’s advanced computational systems and data fusion capabilities enhanced Israeli forces’ real-time awareness. Its high-end sensors, including the AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System and the AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, fed continuous targeting and threat information to fourth-generation F-15Is and F-16Is, supercharging their lethality and survivability. The F-35 would offer a similar boost to the Saudi Royal Air Force’s F-15s, giving Riyadh access to a realm of operational concepts that is unique among Arab militaries.
The Shifting Regional Balance: Saudi Ambitions Encroach on Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge

No Arab state has ever operated a platform that rivals, let alone matches, Israel’s prime air warfare asset. This is no accident. Israel has long insisted on maintaining its QME, undergirded by a US policy commitment to ensure the Israeli military’s regional superiority.

The Israeli strategic community is now wondering whether Washington will end Israel’s long-standing regional monopoly on stealth technology, or whether the Trump administration will give the Israeli Defense Forces a new, decisive warfighting advantage.

Israeli planners have seen this dynamic play out before. When Washington agreed to transfer F-15s and airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, Israeli diplomatic efforts convinced the Reagan administration to restrict the supplies Riyadh received. Washington thus withheld its most advanced jamming configurations and forbade Saudi AWACS aircraft from flying outside the nation’s borders. The Trump administration could place similar technical and operational limits on the F-35s it sells to Riyadh.

Yet even if Saudi Arabia receives fully capable F-35s, Israel’s advantage would not disappear overnight. Israel’s unmatched combat experience flying F-35s in hostile airspace and the modifications unique to the Israeli F-35I Adir, including its indigenous electronic warfare suite, would help the Israeli Air Force retain its edge.

Nonetheless, a strategic calculus will likely inform Israel’s response to the Saudi F-35 acquisition. Rather than citing the QME policy to oppose Riyadh’s fifth-generation airpower ambitions, the Israeli government will likely press Washington to make a normalization of Saudi-Israeli diplomatic relations a precondition of the F-35 sale.
Conclusion

The Trump administration’s decision to supply Saudi Arabia with F-35s could reshape airpower in the Middle East for a generation. A fifth-generation fleet in the kingdom could enhance deterrence against Iran, strengthen the US-led regional coalition, and anchor the US—rather than China—as Saudi Arabia’s main defense industrial partner.

Yet the move also challenges Israel’s long-standing stealth exclusivity and the long-standing QME framework. Israel’s position on the Saudi acquisition of the F-35—conditional openness tied to normalization of relations—reflects a recognition that outright rejection is no longer politically or militarily sustainable. But the Israeli defense establishment nonetheless realizes that safeguards, restrictions, and political reciprocity will best serve its qualitative edge privileges and strategic interests.

For the United States, the choice is clear. Anchoring Riyadh in the US-led security architecture by delivering a carefully designed F-35 deal that preserves Israel’s QME advances US military and economic interests and regional stability. On the other hand, if the White House balks at the deal, it risks ceding strategic ground to Beijing in the Gulf’s most strategically vital market.

How the Trump administration navigates this deal will be a key test of US statecraft in the Middle East, with major implications for great power competition against China. The sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia is fraught with risks—but charged with massive upside.About the author: Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions. He specializes in open-source defense intelligence, geopolitical assessments, international weapons market trends, as well as emerging defense technologies and related concepts of operations.

Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute

Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom.

Technology Empires And The Race To Cement Dominance – Analysis



November 4, 2025 

By John P. Ruehl

American and Chinese influence increasingly relies on technology services, and both powers are attempting to solidify their dominance even as other countries catch up.

The U.S.-UK technology deal announced in September 2025 promises to accelerate Britain’s AI sector, but critics warn it will happen at the expense of national tech sovereignty. It reflects the steady trend of U.S. government and private interests extending a technologically driven form of hegemony, employing communications, data, and AI systems to deepen dependence on American networks and weaponize against rivals.

China has built a parallel structure of influence through its own technology exports, manufacturing base, and integrated supply chains, challenging the American model without the costly global military footprint. And unlike earlier empires, Washington’s and Beijing’s systems increasingly overlap: Spain, long considered a reliable partner for American tech firms and data security, has faced U.S. pressure after contracting with Chinese company Huawei in July to store judicial wiretap data.

Yet both tech-driven networks face a growing diffusion of capability. Advances in manufacturing, resource mapping, and digital development are making it easier for smaller states to build industries that have until now been dominated by major powers—”Small countries like Taiwan and the Netherlands have curated specialized offerings in niche parts of the global AI supply chain,” stated an article in the digital law and policy journal Just Security. A more balanced and competitive order could emerge, though the U.S. and China still retain major leverage.

The U.S. has maintained a strong foreign presence for more than a century. When Elihu Root became Secretary of War in 1899, he had already spent decades cultivating the nation’s elites as a lawyer and once in office, he modernized the army for sustained overseas operations. Subsequent American expansion in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was framed as paternal administration—to spread the “civilizing mission” to those less fortunate in need of a long period of paternal tuition—rather than colonial conquest. Yet military power remained central to advancing government and private American interests.

After World War II, the collapse of European empires left the U.S. and the Soviet Union with competing spheres of influence. Unlike Moscow’s more militarized approach, “Washington’s forms of control were more in accordance with the will of the local populations,” creating what scholars called an “empire by invitation,” according to Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad. Military and subversive power were often used to promote U.S. interests, but many states partnered voluntarily to receive financial and technical assistance.



With the Soviet collapse in 1991, the U.S. entered a new phase of expansion. Technologies like GPS, which reached full global coverage in 1993, expanded American power as a “silent utility” providing an increasingly essential service. The rapid spread of the internet under U.S. oversight further extended American standards and control across global communications, while the rise of tech giants like Microsoft, Intel, and Google embedded U.S. software and hardware at the center of globalized technology systems.

Even as global military demobilization followed the Cold War, Washington demonstrated its continued combat and technological dominance through limited conflicts in the Persian Gulf and precision strikes in the Balkans. Dominating global arms exports, it deepened leverage by integrating more countries into U.S. weapons systems and defense supply chains.

Yet within years, the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq exposed the limits of invasions and occupation, which no longer guaranteed control over resources or populations. As of March 2025, America had 1.3 million personnel stationed abroad, reflecting an outdated emphasis on physical presence. With nearly 90 percent of corporate assets in advanced economies now intangible, such as software, patents, and intellectual property, the same logic applies to power projection. Digital networks and remote capabilities have replaced much of what permanent garrisons once represented.

Trump’s October 2025 suggestion to reclaim Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase to counter China, if genuine, reflects the durability of that older strategic thinking. Analysts noted that most of the surveillance and strike capabilities he referenced are already met through long-endurance drones, sensor arrays, and satellites. The vulnerability of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea to drones and missile strikes during the war with Ukraine further shows the new limits of fixed bases in contested regions.

Under the Obama administration, the U.S. had already adjusted military strategy toward targeted strikes, digital surveillance, cyber operations, and space-based surveillance, collectively known as “triple canopy.” These measures expanded under the Trump and Biden administrations, with the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) unveiling major advances in biometric drones that are capable of more effectively identifying and targeting individuals.

Space has regained its centrality to reducing the sprawling American military burden. In September 2025, the Space Development Agency launched the first phase of its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, a mesh of low-orbit satellites for global surveillance and communication.

Other programs like the Golden Dome, building on Reagan’s “Star Wars” and Obama’s triple canopy concepts, seek to fuse space, land, and cyber networks into an automated U.S. defense grid integrated with the private sector. AI and autonomous ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems have steadily outsourced more decision-making to code.

Much of this technological architecture extends beyond the military. Dual-use systems like Starlink and integrated AI tools have become indispensable to governments and populations alike. Many countries host their public data on American cloud servers, while their citizens communicate through WhatsApp and pay for services through Google Pay—daily dependencies maintained without a single U.S. soldier in sight.
China’s Challenge

China is also building counterspace weapons and satellite systems to resist U.S. orbital dominance, and its military capabilities are similarly matched by strategic and commercial components. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, and its digital extension, the Digital Silk Road, have grown to rival U.S. initiatives. For the first time, Washington faces a competitor able to offer countries comparable material benefits on a scale that not even the Soviet Union’s foreign infrastructure projects ever achieved.

Despite Western alarm over the security risks associated with Chinese technology, many developing and emerging countries continue to adoptChinese digital infrastructure. High-quality equipment, low costs, and state-backed financing have made Chinese systems indispensable even for governments aware of the surveillance and dependency potential, which is also true of U.S. technology.

China’s digital infrastructure is deliberately designed for interoperability with subsequent Chinese technologies, ensuring that upgrades and maintenance depend on continued Chinese support.

As economist Dev Nathan noted, one of the major ways 21st-century imperialism operates is through global value chains (GVCs) and global production networks. China’s specialization in production means its GVCs extract value without directly exporting capital. By flooding markets with essential technologies to undercut competitors in smartphones, power grids, payment apps, and communication technologies, it is creating layered dependencies across industries.

The manufacturing and logistics dimension of China’s overseas influence is evident across Europe, once the center of global industrial and imperial power. Belgium’s port of Zeebrugge is now 85.5 percent owned by China’s Cosco, which also holds stakes in nearby Antwerp, Rotterdam, and other European ports. Automated Chinese cranes unload Chinese cargo guided by Chinese logistics software and tracking platforms, giving Beijing a presence at every level of the supply chain.

U.S. influence remains entrenched, however, and Washington has pressured European allies to block Huawei infrastructure projects and restrict Chinese access to advanced technology sectors. American-based platforms, from social media to cloud infrastructure to software systems, continue to dominate Europe’s digital ecosystems, and under U.S. pressure, Denmark recently seized a China-owned chipmaker operating in the country, Nexperia, citing “serious governance shortcomings.”

While China has met strong resistance to expanding its technological footprint in Europe, it has emerged as the development partner of choice for much of the Global South. Companies such as Huawei and ZTE now dominate the global 5G market, supplying infrastructure and equipment to dozens of countries. “China is now a major force in the digital development of Global South countries, with important implications for their digital economies, societies, policies, etc.,” stated an article in the journal Information Society.

Chinese exports of electronics and electric vehicles have also surged, with more than half now going to non-OECD countries. In the first eight months of 2025, exports to Latin America and the Caribbean rose 11 percent compared to 2024, while shipments increased by 72 percent in the Middle East, 75 percent to ASEAN countries, and 287 percent to Africa compared to last year. In renewable energy, China leads in solar panel and wind turbine production, driving down global costs and accelerating green transitions.

These are emerging technologies where China is gaining an early lead, creating dependencies that could last for years.

While China maintains no formal military presence abroad, security measures nonetheless help support its aspirations. Its Global Development Initiative for infrastructure-led growth is complemented by the Global Security Initiativefor cooperative stability. Chinese policing programs also provide training and joint security patrols in partner countries, while private military companieshelp secure BRI infrastructure alongside local and national forces.
Diffusion of Tech Power

Breaking the U.S.-China tech infrastructure duopoly is a formidable challenge, and Russia’s war in Ukraine illustrates how dependent Moscow remains on the old paradigm of territorial control, spurred partly by its limited ability to compete through modern, networked influence.

Even so, Russia has experimented with tech services-based model of empire, achieving some success in providing tech surveillance in Belarus and Central Asia, and with its GLONASS global navigation service. In 2024, Russia also signed agreements with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to supply satellites and telecommunications systems, while Russian aerospace firm Bureau 1440 is attempting to develop a global broadband network.

Despite these efforts, Russia lags behind, and its window to expand influence may be closing as a wider flattening of technological capabilities takes hold. Factories, technologies, and resources have become easier to localize, eroding the advantages once held by major powers.

“Lights out” automated factories, for example, reduce the appeal of foreign labor, while factory construction has become more streamlined. During the Biden administration’s reshoring and friendshoring manufacturing initiatives, for example, China quickly established industrial plants in Mexico. While this demonstrated China’s manufacturing dominance, it also highlighted how easily industrial capacity could be replicated abroad. India and Southeast Asian countries have similarly scaled up their manufacturing in recent years, diffusing China’s previous concentration of power.

The same decentralizing trend is visible in financial technology. Brazil’s Pix system, unveiled in 2020, shows that middle-power countries can now develop independent digital payment networks without relying on Chinese or American financial infrastructure.

Resource control is likewise losing its traditional strategic weight. Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, for example, was once seen as a critical prize for conquest, but now matters less as renewable energy and advanced minerals mapping technologies have expanded supply. After years of focuson South American lithium reserves, Germany recently announced one of the world’s largest deposits, and it is unlikely to be the last breakthrough discovery.

As scarcity potentially declines and technology and manufacturing become more widely distributed, the competition for resources and the monopolies that once defined empire may finally begin to ease. Yet the collapse of technological empires means military force could once again become the main instrument of power, as Russia has demonstrated.

Another issue lies in American and Chinese entities simply consolidating their technological dominance, stifling or hijacking innovation, and blocking new systems from emerging. Even as capabilities begin to flatten globally, both powers remain invested in preserving their rivalry rather than allowing a more open order to emerge.

Credit Line: This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

John P. Ruehl  is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022.