Review of No Neutrals There: US Labor, Zionism, and the Struggle for Palestine

by Joseph Nevins / December 4th, 2025

In author Jeff Schuhrke’s own words:

This book tells the story of why and how US labor became one of Israel’s most stalwart defenders and generous benefactors through the Zionist State’s tumultuous and controversial history. Importantly,  this is also the story of  Palestinian trade unionists and various  rank-and-file union members – including Arab-Americans, anti-Zionist Jews, Black radicals, and anti-imperialists who, despite the odds, courageously organized in support of Palestinian freedom and dignity over the years and to whom today’s pro-Palestine labor activists can look for inspiration.¹

Schuhrke’s main thesis in No Neutrals There: US Labor, Zionism, and the Struggle for Palestine (Haymarket Books, 2025) is that the U.S. labor movement has never been a neutral observer in the conflict over Palestine—contrary to the common claim that labor unions “should stay out of foreign policy.” Rather, Schuhrke argues, U.S. unions have been deeply complicit for well over a century: backing Zionist settler-colonialism, helping build and sustain the state of Israel, and supporting U.S. foreign-policy alignments tied to Israel—thereby undermining Palestinian rights and working-class solidarity.

The book aims not just to expose this history, but to offer a corrective: Schuhrke invites today’s labor activists to re-think union internationalism and stand in solidarity with Palestinian workers and unions, as part of a broader working-class internationalism. The book’s title refers to a line from the mineworkers’ ballad “Which Side Are You On?” “They say in Harlan County, there are no neutrals there. You’ll either be a union man, or a thug for J. H. Blair.”

No Neutrals There appeared in October 2025 as a marked upswing in support for the Palestinian cause, in the US and internationally, developed in a world shocked as never before by two years of the televised savagery of the Israeli assault on Gaza. Similarly, much of the Jewish community in the US, hitherto Israel’s reliable bulwark of support, was also shaken by rubble-strewn scenes of genocide in Gaza. Jewish organizations such as Jewish Voice for Peace have staged large public demonstrations against US support for Israel’s war in Gaza. Perhaps the latest sign of this shift in Jewish sentiment was the November 2025 New York City Mayoral contest where fully 33% of Jewish voters cast their ballots for the victor, Assemblyman Zohran Mamdani, a Muslim, the most progressive candidate in the race who has made no secret of his support for Palestinian rights.

In Chapter 1, “Laying the Foundations” Schuhrke tells the story of two different meetings in 1897 in Eastern and Central Europe that were to have historic implications.  In October 1897, thirteen working-class men and women representing Jewish socialist groups met clandestinely in Vilnius, Lithuania to form the General Jewish Labor Bund (“Bund” means union). It was a revolutionary organization with a connection to the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Lenin’s party, though he often criticized the Bund for its separatism and other ideological deviations).  Nevertheless, the Bund would be at the center of anti-Tsarist rebellion in the early 20th century. A month earlier,  a very different public meeting took place in Basel, Switzerland attended by more than two hundred middle-  and upper class Jews from across Europe, to found the Zionist Organization whose chief aim as stated in the platform they approved at the gathering was to establish a legally protected home for the Jewish people in the Middle East, specifically in Palestine. Schuhrke writes,

“The Bund and the Zionist Organization embodied different answers to antisemitic oppression.  The former represented a proletarian Jewish movement  dedicated to liberation through class struggle and socialism; the latter was a more bourgeois configuration  that sought Jewish emancipation through nationalism and settler colonialism.”²

He adds: “eventually an attempt would be made to reconcile these competing movements in the form of Labor Zionism which would have an important influence on labor officialdom in the US, right as they started, coincidentally, seeing themselves as partners in realizing Washington’s foreign policy objectives.”

Schuhrke contends that one of the multiple factors that led to the alliance between the top US labor leadership and Zionism was the AFL-CIO’s “traditional ideological commitment to Labor Zionism, the particular current within the wider Zionist project that centers the role of Jewish workers in laying the economic foundations for building and maintaining the Israeli state.”³ Long before 1948, Labor Zionist leaders in Palestine intentionally cultivated personal relationships with US union officials, Jewish and non-Jewish.

Moreover, Labor Zionism appealed to both major sectors of the US labor movement. It appealed to the craft unions of the AFL and their non-radical, “pure and simple” trade unionism, and loyalty to American capitalism in exchange for limited gains and protections for skilled workers. It appealed to the CIO industrial unions whose social vision sought to create a more humane economy and more egalitarian society.

Labor Zionism also struck a chord with the American origin myth of the westward moving pioneers who plowed up virgin soil, transformed empty lands into a modern economy, and made the prairies and deserts bloom.  As the Cold War (1946-1989) intensified, Israel became a US ally in staving off Soviet influence in the Mideast. AFL-CIO Cold Warriors believed Israel offered a non-communist model for countries in the Third World. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, instead of being described as a bulwark against communism, Israel was celebrated as a rampart against Arab dictators and Islamic fundamentalism.

In Schuhrke’s narrative the forms of US labor support for Israel have been many and varied. Political support came early. A week after the Balfour Declaration⁴ (1917) became public, AFL President Samuel Gompers at the AFL convention in Buffalo promoted and successfully passed a jingoist platform calling for US participation in the European war, and it included a plank calling for the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine.⁵

Direct material support from US unions to Histadrut, the Israeli labor federation, was all-important. This took the form, often enough, of the sale of Israel Bonds to unions. In 1994 the Development Corporation for Israel  reported that US labor had purchased over one billion dollars in bonds over the previous four decades.⁶ Schurke does his best to estimate the amounts raised by such sales. Cleverly, the sales figures have ceased to be published, lest they become a target of criticism.

Turning Point

In the chapter “Labor for  Palestine,” Schuhrke recounts the turning point where the decades-long alliance between top union leadership  and Zionism — with little or no input from rank-and-file members — began to be questioned and challenged. In the wake of the Oslo Accords (1993) and  Second Intifada (1995-2005), and in the context of the end of the Cold War (1989) and the declining power of unions, high-ranking US trade union officials “increasingly  found themselves having to react to a more assertive and racially diverse rank and file demanding that US labor stand in solidarity with Palestinians.”⁷

This new era really began in 2002, the author maintains, in the tense atmosphere after the 9/11 attacks and during the Second Intifada, when new organizations such as NYCLAW (New York City Labor against the War) and similar committees on the West Coast began protesting President George W. Bush’s war in Iraq and championing Palestinian rights. These groups in 2004 created Labor for Palestine whose founding statement  demanded US unionists and labor bodies give full support for Palestinian rights including the right of return, an end to US economic and military support for Israel, and divestment of US labor investments in Israeli apartheid.⁸

An even more important development occurred a year later. Inspired by the South African example, in 2005 a coalition of more than 170 Palestinian civil society groups launched the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.  They called on allies around the world to boycott, divest from, and sanction the State of Israel. BDS demanded an end to the occupation and colonization of Arab lands since 1967, full equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel and respect for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. The AFL-CIO leadership, alarmed by the quickly growing support for the BDS movement, mobilized against it. Many local union officials and rank and file members continue to support it. BDS has made significant headway in parts of Europe but in the US it remains highly controversial.

To tell the story in the six chapters⁹ of No Neutrals There Schuhrke had to summarize a vast amount of  history: the history of Zionism from its birth in the late 19th century; the growth of Labor Zionism; the emergence of Histadrut¹⁰ and its developing connections to US union officialdom; the Second World War and the Holocaust; the birth of Israel in 1948 as a settler-colonial state implanted in the Arab world  and the resulting expulsion of hundreds of thousands of  Palestinians from their homes and farms; the Cold War; the 1956 Suez crisis;¹¹ Israel’s multiple wars; Palestinian resistance including two Intifadas, failed “peace processes” and peace “accords;” the slow decline of  US unions and of  Labor Zionism; and in recent years, especially since the war in Gaza, the growth of rank and file opposition in US unions to US labor’s alliance with Zionism.

Why is this history important? Schuhrke declares,

…studying this history can therefore help today’s US unionists  understand why it is imperative that they and their organizations not try to remain neutral  (or worse) on Palestine but rather take a bold and principled stand  especially amid the Gaza genocide. The systematic eliminationist violence inflicted on Palestinians today—not by Israel alone, but also by the US, the UK, Germany and other western countries—at once serves as a horrifying reminder of the worst atrocities carried out by the racist and colonial regimes of the 20^th century…¹²

Schuhrke is a careful writer. Indeed he has to be, in dealing with so sensitive a subject. The US right is determined to promote the bogus equation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism. He writes,

Although it asserts the supposed right of Jews to control Palestine, Zionism is by no means driven exclusively by Jewish people, nor should the term “Zionist” be taken as a synonym for “Jew.” Indeed, throughout the history of Zionism, Jews have been among its most vocal and dedicated opponents. What’s more, non-Jews particularly Christians have been essential players in the Zionist movement. European Protestants were issuing apocalyptic calls for the Jewish “restoration” of Palestine centuries before Jews themselves began advocating Zionism. The largest Zionist organization in the modern US is Christians United for Israel, an Evangelical group boasting approximately ten million members, which is more than the total number of Jewish Americans. President Biden, a Catholic, repeatedly referred to himself as a Zionist during his time in the White House.¹³

No Neutrals There does not take up all questions, for example, the debate about a two-state versus a one-state solution.  Schuhrke notes that the Palestine Liberation Organization adopted a one-state solution in the late 1960s, “calling for the establishment of a single, secular state for both Arabs and Jews,”¹⁴ but Schuhrke leaves the debate to the Palestinians themselves.

One of the most interesting aspects of No Neutrals There is that it recounts how long many Jews of all social backgrounds resisted Zionism. For example, the only Jew in the UK War Cabinet when Balfour was foreign secretary, Edwin Montagu, advocated against creating a Jewish national home in Palestine.  Montagu thought it would exacerbate antisemitism around the world by causing governments to question the loyalty of Jewish citizens. He also believed that the present inhabitants of Palestine, Muslim and Christian, would have to be driven out and Jews put in a position of supremacy.¹⁵

Similarly, David Dubinsky (born 1892 in Russia), longtime head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, although often thought of as the epitome of a Jewish labor supporter of Israel, in fact, from his early days in the Bund, had a distaste for Zionism. As late as 1937 he was keeping his distance from it.¹⁶

The author, Jeff Schuhrke, is a labor historian and assistant professor at the Harry Van Arsdale School of Labor Studies, SUNY Empire State. He is also the author of Blue Collar Empire: The Untold Story of US Labor’s Global Anti-Communist Crusade (Verso: 2024, 352 p.).

Jeff Schuhrke is to be commended not only for writing a well-researched and timely book. In this time of genocide in Gaza when pro-Palestine voices are censored in the US mainstream media, when Palestinian activists on American campuses are threatened with deportation, when university administrations face pressure from pro-Israel donors on their boards of trustees determined to curb academic free speech, to write such a book as No Neutrals There took courage.

In his Conclusion, Schurke holds up as his ideal Harry Bridges, the renowned West Coast longshoremen’s leader. In the 1930s Bridges and his men had refused to load scrap iron bound for Japan while Imperial Japan’s armies were marauding through China. More than thirty years later, in an interview with journalist Bill Moyers, the retired Bridges defended his action from charges of “interfering with the foreign policy of your country.” Bridges boldly replied “We sure as hell were [interfering]. That’s our job. That’s our privilege. That’s our right. That’s our duty.”  Schuhrke is hoping that similar boldness can be found in this generation of US trade unionists.

• First published at Marxism-Leninism Today.

ENDNOTES:

• 1
  No Neutrals There p 11.
• 2
  Ibid. p 20.
• 3
  Ibid. p 6.
• 4
  The Balfour Declaration was a Nov. 2, 1917, letter by UK Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour stating that the UK government  “favored the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” promising Britain’s “best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this objective.”
• 5
  Ironically, Gompers’s platform met with its strongest opposition from the largely Jewish needle trades who opposed it on antiwar grounds. No Neutrals There, p 40.
• 6
  Ibid., p 111.
• 7
  No Neutrals There, p 213.
• 8
  Ibid., p 225.
• 9
  Chapter 1: Laying the Foundations; Chapter 2: Holocaust and Nakba; Chapter 3: Bonding with Israel; Chapter 4: Strained Friendship; Chapter 5: Intifada; Chapter 6: Labor for Palestine.
• 10
  The Histadrut was (and is) a federation of Israel’s Jewish trade unions, in some ways like the AFL in the US. But it was more; it would also drive and direct the construction of a Jewish-only economic sector. Besides the trade unions, the Histadrut also established kibbutzim and moshavim (cooperative villages), new industrial enterprises, housing and construction companies, a transportation network, a workers’ bank, and workers’ sick fund.  All of these would deliberately deny  job opportunities or social services to native Palestinian workers to further build up ‘Hebrew Labor’.  The paramilitary Haganah was also folded into the Histadrut.
• 11
  Schuhrke’s summary of so much historical material is ably done, but in this reviewer’s opinion there was an error when he wrote (p. 123) that in the Suez crisis “Moscow threatened to use nuclear weapons on the three aggressor nations,” namely Israel, Britain (already a nuclear power), and France. They had invaded Egypt after Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union which fought tooth and nail over its whole existence for arms control and nuclear disarmament would never have made such a threat. Soviet premier Bulganin’s letter to President Eisenhower (available to read on the Internet) was interpreted by some in the West as implying such a threat. It was a far-fetched interpretation.
• 12
  No Neutrals There, p 17.
• 13
  Ibid., p 5-6.
• 14
  Ibid., p 150.
• 15
  Ibid. p 38. He would later move toward Zionist views.
• 16
  Ibid. p 38.

FacebookTwitterRedditEmail

Joseph Nevins teaches geography at Vassar College. Among his books are Dying to Live: A Story of U.S. Immigration in an Age of Global Apartheid (City Lights Books, 2008), and Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: The War on “Illegals” and the Remaking of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary (Routledge, 2010). Follow him on Twitter @jonevins1 Read other articles by Joseph.

 

Worker Democracy (China): Preliminary theses on the Taiwan Strait Crisis and Taiwanese self-determination

By Worker Democracy

Published 30 November, 2025

First published at Worker Democracy. 

The historical rights of Taiwanese People

The history of Taiwan’s colonization from 1895 to the one-party rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) from 1945 to 1996 has solidified a Taiwanese identity and experience distinct from those of the Chinese on the mainland. This has also empowered the Taiwanese, who have been oppressed for more than a century (by the Japanese and mainland regimes), with the right to decide their own destiny democratically, including their relationship with mainland China.

The myth of “One China”

Even now, Taiwan’s official state name is still the “Republic of China” (ROC). In effect, there are two ‘Chinese’ governments today, though the government in Beijing — the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — refuses to recognize this reality. However, many benshengren (those with ancestors who came to Taiwan before Japanese colonization) have disagreements with the ROC name, and instead call for Taiwan’s independence. Thus, we believe that the people of Taiwan should also have the right to decide on their own country’s name.

As seen from the three joint communiqués between the United States and China on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty, neither side has respected the wishes of the people of Taiwan. Both sides have violated the most basic principles of democracy. China believes that both sides have agreed that “Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to the PRC.” However, from the text and the US’ subsequent elaborations, it is clear that the US is only “aware that both sides of the Taiwan Strait advocate that Taiwan is a part of China,” not “Taiwan belongs to the PRC.” The two positions are different. And after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US in 1979, the US acknowledged that the PRC represents “China.” Still, it did not fundamentally change its position on who should have sovereignty over Taiwan. So, the US and China have disagreed on who should have sovereignty over Taiwan. However, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the US has also severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, influencing other countries to sever ties with the ROC and instead establish ties with Beijing. Taiwan’s international relations have continued to shrink in the face of China’s rapid rise on the global stage. Today, Taiwan has diplomatic relations with only 11 small countries (that are members of the United Nations).

The historical development of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China

But we must first consider the status of “Taiwan” or “ROC” from the Taiwanese people’s point of view, not those of the Chinese, American, or other governments. Such a point of view must also be considered independently, in accordance with democratic principles, and in light of the history of political developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The PRC was founded in 1949, while the KMT, whose corrupt and authoritarian behavior is well-known, retreated to Taiwan. At that point, global anti-colonial and progressive movements saw the PRC as a symbol of revolutionary advancement. Thus, they largely dismissed Taipei’s regime, and sympathized with or supported the PRC’s reunification of Taiwan. However, the PRC’s treatment of its people has become increasingly reactionary, even before, but especially after 1979. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, one-party dictatorship has ended, and its people now enjoy basic democratic rights, especially the freedom to protest against the government’s injustices (which is not the case in mainland China at all). And so, cross-strait politics today is very different from what it was in the past. The KMT finally lost power in 2000 under the pressure of mass movements outside the party. And so, a military reunification of Taiwan under the PRC would only be a reactionary dictatorship conquering a representative democracy (even with its limitations), eliminating the Taiwanese people’s basic political rights, especially their right to social protest.

Historically, China under the Mao era appeared to be developing along an anti-capitalist course, in contrast to KMT rule in Taiwan, which evolved into an authoritarian capitalist regime heavily dependent on the West. But anti-capitalism does not always signal a continued path of socialist transformation. The PRC had already degenerated into governance by a privileged clique of bureaucrats, serving only itself and causing the death and suffering of tens of millions of people. By the time the PRC had completely restored capitalism since Deng Xiaoping’s reign, the regimes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait had become homogeneous in their class character, that is, capitalist. One can no longer say that China’s class character is more progressive than that of Taiwan. Coupled with the fact that the PRC has become even more totalitarian, there would not be the slightest ounce of progress if it conquered and ruled Taiwan through military invasion. This is not to mention that the PRC has ignored the wishes of the Taiwanese people, committing the cardinal sin of a large nation oppressing a smaller nation.

There is another view in the international community that the crisis in the Taiwan Strait is merely a proxy war in the struggle between the US and China for hegemony. In this consideration, Taiwan only matters in the context of geopolitics, just as an appetizer is only meaningful in relation to the main course of a meal, so Taiwan’s own wishes do not matter. This is an imperialistic perspective, not one that people should share, or else we would completely forfeit the legitimate rights of 23 million Taiwanese people.

The PRC’s understanding of the Chinese nation

The PRC’s chauvinist attitude towards Taiwan comes directly from its theory of the “Chinese nation”. The PRC has directly inherited the KMT’s claim that “the five ethnic groups are one” and does not recognize the right of self-determination of the ethnic minorities. Nor does it recognize the right of national minorities to secede from the “Chinese nation” if they are oppressed after joining it. Its chauvinistic arrogance manifests in its complete omission of the Indigenous residents of Taiwan in its official documents, who are not Han Chinese and were never part of any conception of a Chinese nation. This position thus betrays a founding principle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that existed until the 1930s, which “recognizes the right of self-determination of China’s minorities.” In fact, the Taiwanese Communist Party advocated Taiwanese independence before the KMT destroyed it. Today, the PRC no longer mentions this part of its history. This conception of the Chinese nation is as reactionary as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claim that “Russia and Ukraine are one and the same” (a principle that has justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine). Both must be opposed.

The PRC accuses Taiwanese people of harboring “separatist” sentiments. But the PRC has never ruled Taiwan, and Taiwan’s separation from China occurred long ago. It is also worth noting that the ROC preceded the PRC, which emerged 38 years later. Regardless of one’s perspective, the separation of Taiwan from China is a historical fact. If the PRC truly regards the Taiwanese as “compatriots,” it must first acknowledge this history and reality as a foundation for dialogue with the Taiwanese government, instead of dictating the myth that “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times” to the Taiwanese people.

Two types of peace movement

And so, we oppose the PRC’s armed reunification, and advocate cross-strait dialogue between the two governments. The people of Taiwan have elected the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration. Therefore, if the PRC respects public opinion at all, it should set aside its arrogance, prioritize diplomatic negotiations, and abandon the prospect of armed reunification. But, people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot expect the PRC to back down voluntarily, and must prepare accordingly. Mainland Chinese people must mobilize a peace movement in civil society, calling for cross-strait dialogue and pushing against armed reunification. Although space for collective action is limited in the mainland because of totalitarian rule, we must remember that there are many Chinese and Sinophone students and other communities living abroad. The diaspora can play a crucial role in developing such a peace movement: if these ideas can take root among these communities, it may break the PRC’s media blockade and spark ideas among those at home.

There is a kind of peace movement that focuses its attention on calling for Taiwanese people not to provoke the PRC and to reject arms from the US, telling them to sit and wait with the hope that peace will come. However, it pays little attention to how the PRC’s revanchism is not legitimate at its core. The whole concept of “the Chinese nation as a whole” is even more wrong, as it violates the basic principle that nationalities have the right to determine their own identity, or the right of national minorities to self-determination. This framework is not genuine peace, but an unprincipled accommodation of the PRC’s autocracy and expansionism.

Why Taiwan has the right to self-defense

An armed reunification of Taiwan by the PRC would be an unjust war — an invasion. And so, though we must support calls for peace in Taiwan now, we also recognize that Taiwan is a weaker nation threatened by a larger neighbor with force. So, if the Taiwanese people choose to prepare for war and decide to fight against it in the event of war, they have every right to do so. For the oppressed nation, there is no contradiction between calling for peace and preparing for resistance in principle. Taiwan has the right to buy arms from other countries, including rival imperialists like the US, to defend itself.

As people outside of Taiwan, we respect the democratic decision of the Taiwanese people, whether they want to prepare for war and/or resist. This is a natural extension of respecting Taiwan’s right to self-determination. This does not mean that we, as outsiders, should directly encourage Taiwan to prepare for war and resist: by recognizing that they have the right to do so in principle, we are also acknowledging that they have the freedom not to exercise that right (e.g., not to prepare for war or resist, and accept the PRC’s conditions). We can recognize Taiwan’s right to prepare for war, resist, or purchase arms, without necessarily agreeing that it is always prudent for Taiwan to exercise such a right. However, whether Taiwan’s decision is prudent or not, we can criticize it while being clear that the Taiwanese people should be empowered to make these decisions.

These basic democratic principles remain unchanged even if the ruling party changes. Whatever party comes to power after an election, as long as the election is truly fair and its behavior after coming to power does not violate the sovereignty and will of the Taiwanese people, the ruling party can be considered as more or less representative of the public opinion, and has the right to exercise the right of preparedness for war and self-determination, if necessary. This is not the same as recognizing that the ruling party’s decisions are always correct. “Electoral autocracy” is possible; as Thomas Paine once said, government is at best a “necessary evil.” The state, as a specialized institution of coercion and violence, can easily become a tyrannical force overriding the will of the people. It is even more frightening when state power could be combined with multinational consortia. This is why we need to guard against any abuse of power by the government, and emphasize that support for a ruling party’s preparedness for war against foreign invasion is not the same as political endorsement of that party. The two aspects should be handled separately.

For peace in East Asia; oppose US militarism

All things should have limits. First, at this stage, it may be appropriate for Taiwan to emphasize peace and unconditional dialogue, while preparing for resistance in a low-profile manner. Second, when it comes to national defense, the government must exercise restraint, avoiding excessive measures and respecting the people’s civil rights. It must also not foment exclusionary nationalism and vilify Chinese people, giving the PRC an excuse to demonize its struggle further. Lastly, the strategy to defend Taiwan should concern politics as much as it does military defense, not just the latter. The more Taiwan strengthens its democracy and protects people’s livelihood while preparing for war, the more it bolsters its soft power in the international arena. In China, there are many potential sympathizers of Taiwan within civil society, as well as within the party-state, including even the military. Winning over these elements, and not to mention, exploiting any fissures within the party caused by Xi Jinping’s personal dictatorship, would be advantageous for Taiwan’s allies at home and abroad.

Regarding international relations, being aware of our limits is even more important. We must oppose a US military landing on Taiwan or setting up a command center on Taiwan, and any efforts to use Taiwan’s war preparations as an excuse to justify the development of nuclear weapons (as Chiang Kai-shek once tried). Any preparation for atomic warfare could escalate any war of self-defense into a major war between the US and China. In a war of this scale, the damage to the island of Taiwan would be devastating. And so, Taiwan’s war preparations must have certain limits. We must be vigilant for any signs that a war of self-defense is escalating into more disastrous proportions. Otherwise, the impact will extend far beyond the Taiwan Strait and affect the people of East Asia as a whole, who also have the right to consider their own safety. For example, the residents of Okinawa in Japan, who, in addition to the bitter experience of World War II, have been suffering from eight decades of suffering brought about by American military bases. They have been mobilizing for peace in Asia, and also have every right to speak and act in the Taiwan Strait crisis. We also recognize that the US aggression against China builds on and stokes a long legacy of Sinophobia, which places a target on Chinese and other Asian communities. And so, it is all the more important to firmly oppose exclusionary sentiments toward Chinese people in Taiwan’s fight for self-determination.

The US-China rivalry and Taiwan’s right to self-defense

Some “pacifists” oppose Taiwan’s right to prepare for war and purchase arms from foreign countries. Their reasons can be broadly categorized into three types. The first is based on the desire to avoid escalating tensions between China and the US over Taiwan, which could lead to an escalation of inter-imperial rivalry, even to the point of war. The second is due to an absolute opposition to US hegemony and military competition. The third argues that only the US is imperialist, not China, thus opposing the US while supporting China. Each of these viewpoints has its own focus and areas of avoidance, but they all reach the same conclusion. We believe that, first and foremost, it is essential to distinguish between stronger and weaker nations. Confusing the two is inherently misleading. As a hegemon, China is asserting power against the weaker nation of Taiwan. China’s threat of armed unification is inherently an act of bullying the weak, and must be opposed. One cannot strip Taiwan of its right to self-defense just because of the threat of American intervention. Second, some argue that in the US-China rivalry, the US poses a greater threat than China, so to support Beijing, one cannot also support Taiwan’s existence as a political entity. However, China is a nuclear-armed state, the world’s largest trading nation, the second-largest economy, and the second-largest military spender. Who can convincingly claim that China’s threat to the world’s people will always be negligible in the future? China’s military may be inferior to the United States’, but its overall threat, especially for Taiwan, may not be smaller. There is also a political consideration: while Trump may be authoritarian and bellicose, there is still some room for social movements from below to check his power and defend various institutional and non-institutional checks and balances in place. In contrast, China has already established authoritarian rule, with little room for dissent, let alone organized resistance. If Xi were to launch a war, there would be no one to check him, and it would be far more difficult for anti-war movements to emerge and sustain themselves in China than in the United States.

The three viewpoints above all oppose Taiwan’s right to self-defense to varying degrees due to the possibility of US intervention. However, this simplistic approach is far too crude to capture the complex nuances of geopolitics, especially the relations between the world’s leading imperial power and the nearly 200 other nations. As advocates of democracy and peace, we oppose any hegemonic nation engaging in military competition. However, international relations are extraordinarily complex. At certain times and in certain places, the need for self-defense for smaller countries may overlap and intersect with the designs of different imperialists, which is not uncommon. In light of these limits, weaker nations purchasing arms from another imperialist may result in some profit for the latter. However, the survival of a weaker nation facing war from a rival imperialist is one gain that offsets this harm, in a sense. Of course, between the US and China, the US is a stronger imperialist than China. However, between China and Taiwan, China is stronger than Taiwan, and also treats various Southeast Asian countries with arrogance (not dissimilar to the US). The viewpoints above focus solely on the dangers of the US-China rivalry, while ignoring that China’s armed unification of Taiwan would also be disastrous for the world. If Beijing successfully unifies Taiwan by force, it will become even more emboldened to bully other small countries. It would further entrench its imperialist tendencies, competing with the US on the international stage, which would exacerbate the dangers of a world war rather than mitigate them. Instead, we should address both issues simultaneously. Regarding the US-China rivalry, we emphasize the need to oppose military competition between the two countries. However, regarding China’s dominance over Taiwan, we continue to support Taiwan’s right to self-defense.

During World War I, Lenin remarked that Tsarist Russia was at once subordinate to British and French imperialism on the global stage, just as it was the dominant threat to national minorities in its peripheries, like the Poles. At that time, peace movements challenged European hegemony, just as they combated any expressions of Great Russian chauvinism in Russia’s peripheries. Our two-pronged approach to the US-China rivalry and Taiwan’s self-defense serves the same purpose. This also means that we support all other local peace movements that oppose the US imperialists’ use of Taiwan as an excuse to intensify the military competition. We support grassroots anti-war and peace movements in Okinawa, South Korea, the Philippines, and mainland China. We also call on these anti-war and peace movements in East Asia to actively intervene and speak out against any bullying of small countries by large countries in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis.

De facto/de jure independence?

Taiwan is too small (only one-sixteenth the size of Ukraine) to initiate a major military war, let alone a long-term and/or nuclear one. However, one political maneuver would surely escalate the possibility of armed conflict: for Taiwan to renounce the ROC title and formally become independent as the Republic of Taiwan (de jure independence). Although we support the right of the Taiwanese people to self-determination, including the right to independence, it would be unwise to risk serious escalation by pursuing de jure independence, given the disparity in power between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. If the DPP maintains the ‘ROC’ state name, providing less justification for the PRC to pursue armed reunification, it would be more likely for Taiwan to win international support. Although the DPP’s party platform, the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” (1999), declared that the ROC had “in fact become a sovereign and independent democratic country,” this sovereignty does not include mainland China (except for the three small islands of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu). This position makes it clear that the DPP is not pursuing de jure independence of Taiwan, but rather maintaining its de facto independence. It also makes clear that, although the country’s name is the ROC, Taiwan’s territorial boundaries have already excluded mainland China; therefore, this “China” no longer has territorial disputes with the Beijing government.

Supporting Taiwan’s Self-Determination while opposing inter-imperialist rivalry

Although the US ostensibly defends Taiwan, it does not genuinely respect the Taiwanese people’s right to self-determination, which is why it has joined the PRC in suppressing Taiwan’s independence. After all, it protects Taiwan primarily for its own interests, not for the Taiwanese people. The US has also adopted the position of “strategic ambiguity”; in other words, it remains unclear whether it will actually come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a cross-strait war. This deceptive attitude maximizes its own flexibility, while at the same time deterring both sides from making any rash moves — thus killing two birds with one stone. In Trump’s second term, the fate of the Taiwan Strait has never been more uncertain and treacherous. The US-China rivalry is increasingly dominating the frontstage of geopolitics, with cross-strait relations being a key flashpoint. This situation is particularly unfavorable to Taiwan. In these conditions, there is a greater responsibility for all the East Asian countries outside Taiwan, the US, and different peace movements to speak out for Taiwan — which must begin on the foundation of recognizing Taiwan’s right to self-determination.

Taiwan is caught between the US and China, and even if it pursues the best course of action, it is difficult to ensure that the two nuclear-armed countries will not go to war with each other. Regardless of whether Taiwan exists or not, once inter-imperial rivalry reaches a certain level, the possibility of nuclear war would increase to some extent. This is why peace activists around the world must intensify our opposition to inter-imperial rivalry, advocate for global nuclear disarmament and global arms reduction, starting with the US, China, and Europe, which are the root causes of global rivalry.

Exit stage left: playwright Tom Stoppard is dead

Paris (AFP) – When it comes to the world of comic invention and linguistic pyrotechnics, few dramatists of the 20th century could match the scope and sustained success of British writer Tom Stoppard, who has died aged 88.


Issued on: 29/11/2025 - FRANCE24

Stoppard's writing was often philosophical or scientific, but consistently funny

 © Slaven Vlasic / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA/AFP

From his earliest hit "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead" in 1966, through to 1993's "Arcadia" and "Leopoldstadt" in 2020, Stoppard engaged and amused theatre-goers with a highly individual brand of intellect.

His writing was often philosophical or scientific, but consistently funny, a distinctive style that gave rise to the term Stoppardian.

"I want to demonstrate that I can make serious points by flinging a custard pie around the stage for a couple of hours," the Czech-born Stoppard said in a 1970s interview.

"Theatre is first and foremost a recreation. But it is not just a children's playground; it can be recreation for people who like to stretch their minds."


"He has no apparent animus towards anyone or anything," said film and theatre director Mike Nichols, who directed the Broadway premiere of Stoppard's tale of marriage and affairs "The Real Thing".

"He's very funny at no one's expense. That's not supposed to be possible."
Early escape

Stoppard left school at 17 and would go on to win numerous awards on both sides of the Atlantic.

In 2014, he was crowned "the greatest living playwright" by the London Evening Standard Theatre Awards.

To non-theatre-goers, he is best remembered for his work in cinema, which included the "Indiana Jones" and "Star Wars" franchises and an Oscar in 1999 for his screenplay for "Shakespeare in Love", which scooped a total of seven Academy Awards that year.

Stoppard was married three times and had four sons, one of whom Ed Stoppard, an actor, performed in "Leopoldstadt".

Stoppard was born Tomas Straussler to Jewish parents in Zlin in 1937 in what was then Czechoslovakia.

With the Nazi occupation, his parents escaped to Singapore, where his father died during World War II.

His mother's subsequent remarriage saw Tom and his brother take on their stepfather's name when they moved to Britain in 1946.

After leaving school, Stoppard became a journalist and later a playwright.

"Tom wrote short stories, and smoked to excess, and always worked at night," recalled fellow playwright Derek Marlowe, who lived in the same dilapidated house as Stoppard in early 1960s London.

"Every evening he would lay out a row of matches and say, 'Tonight I shall write 12 matches' -- meaning as much as he could churn out on 12 cigarettes."

Stoppard would remain a habitual smoker, describing it as "the dumb side of me".
From stage to screen

His breakthrough came with the overnight success at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe of "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead", a tragicomedy centred around two minor characters from Shakespeare's "Hamlet".

It moved to London's West End, before winning a Tony Award for best play in the United States.

Stoppard wrote several celebrated radio plays, then made his next big splash with "Jumpers" in 1972, a foray into the world of moral philosophy.

"Travesties" two years later, imagined a meeting between Lenin, James Joyce and poet and founder of the Dada movement Tristan Tzara, who all lived in Zurich in 1917.

More successes followed in the 1970s and 1980s, including "Arcadia", which in 2006 was one of four works shortlisted by the Royal Institution of Great Britain as the best book ever written about science.

Stoppard was knighted in 1997, a year before "Shakespeare in Love" took his name to a wider audience.

He was an uncredited writer on "Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade", "Star Wars: Episode III -- Revenge of the Sith" and Tim Burton's "Sleepy Hollow".
Jewish roots

Stoppard was not fully aware of his Jewish heritage until the 1990s, when a Czech relative told him all four of his grandparents and three aunts had been killed in Nazi concentration camps.

It was a theme that only entered his work with "Leopoldstadt", which stepped away from the comedy of his earlier plays as it traced a Jewish family in Austria over six decades.

At its London premiere before coronavirus closed the theatres, The Standard newspaper described it as a "late masterwork... wise, witty and devastatingly sad".

Stoppard made no bones, however, about the joy of writing comedy.

"I really enjoy the laughter created by what I write, and actors in it," he said in a 2003 interview.

"Should you ever write a play, a comedy, sitting there while it's being performed, it is a delicious feeling knowing that something is coming up which is going to be deliciously enjoyed by everyone around you."

© 2025 AFP

Ukraine Solidarity Network (US): Oppose Trump’s surrender plan for Ukraine

By Ukraine Solidarity Network-US

Published 27 November, 2025

First published at Ukraine Solidarity Network (US).

Imperialist bullying is rarely so open and brazen. Donald Trump demanded last week that Ukraine accept his surrender plan for Ukraine by Thanksgiving Day, November 27, or lose what little remains of U.S. support for Ukraine, which is the sharing of satellite intelligence about Russian military positions and the sale of arms to Ukraine via European buyers. Trump stopped all other military and economic aid to Ukraine when he returned to office in January.

Trump Always Chickens Out when it comes to threatened pressure on Russia. All the pressure has been on Ukraine to capitulate. Trump’s so-called “peace” plan gave him the excuse to not enact the secondary sanctions on countries buying oil from the Russian oil companies Lukoil and Rosneft that were scheduled to go into effect on November 21.

Trump’s new plan is the fourth iteration of basically the same so-called peace plan that Trump has proposed this year. The plan supports Russian war aims and withdraws all U.S. support from Ukraine. This version was negotiated between U.S. and Russian representatives without Ukrainians present. It is being presented to Ukraine as a take-it-or-leave-it done deal. Among the provisions in its 28 points are:

• Ukraine disarms. Its military forces are cut back to 600,000, or 40% of its current forces. Russian forces in the Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine have no limits.
• Ukraine can have no foreign troops on Ukrainian land. Russia’s deployment of North Korean and foreign mercenary forces in Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands is not restricted.
• Ukraine can receive no arms and military assistance from outside Ukraine. Russia’s continuing receipt of arms from Iran and North Korea and essential components for military equipment from China is not restricted.
• Russia’s war of aggression is rewarded with recognition by Ukraine and the United States as Russian territory of lands taken by force, plus a bonus reward of 2,500 square miles of Donbas lands that are now under Ukrainian control. Unacknowledged in the “peace” plan is that this land transfer will put an additional 250,000 Ukrainians under Russian occupation on top of the more than 3 million Ukrainians already under Russia’s repressive rule in the currently occupied territories.
• Russia gets amnesty for its war crimes, starting with the supreme war crime of aggression from which flows all other war crimes, as the Nuremberg Military Tribunal proclaimed in 1946 and became enshrined in international law, from the United Nations Charter of 1946 to the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court currently has arrest warrants out for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Children’s Rights Commissioner for the war crime of abducting of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia and for four top Russian military commanders for the war crimes of deliberately targeting bombs at civilians and civilian infrastructure far from the frontlines and for the detention, torture, rape, and execution of Ukrainian POWs and civilians loyal to Ukraine living in the occupied territories. The amnesty would cover the Russian FPV (First Person View) drone operators who conduct “human safaris” to murder Ukrainian civilians in cities and villages near the frontlines and boast about it in the snuff films they post in social media online.
• Rather than saying “Russia will not invade neighboring countries,” the plan says “Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further.” The so-called peace plan is full of such ambiguities and loopholes favorable to Russia.
• “A dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, will be held to address all security issues.” The supreme commander of NATO is American and the US is now allied with Russia. This “dialogue” would be one-sided with Ukraine excluded.
• Sanctions on Russia will be lifted and the U.S. and Russian oligarchs will resume business with each other.
• “US$100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led efforts for Ukraine’s reconstruction and investment. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this initiative.” It is all about the money with Trump, not social justice, human rights, or international law.
• “A joint U.S.-Russia security working group will be established to facilitate and ensure implementation of all provisions of this agreement.” Ukraine is again excluded, as are its European allies.
• “Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.” This appeals to Russia’s rhetoric about “denazification,” i.e. regime change to a Russian puppet. Free and fair elections in Russia are not part of the deal.
• No ceasefire until this final agreement is signed by Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine has been calling for a ceasefire to set the conditions for productive negotiations toward a sustainable peace settlement. Russia insists on a final settlement before a ceasefire. This peace plan affirms Russia’s position.
• The agreement’s “implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Donald J. Trump.” This provision is like the Board of Peace chaired by Trump for his Gaza “peace” plan.

Trump’s 28-point plan for Ukraine is much like his 20-point plan for Gaza. Neither enforces international law, protects the victims, or holds the perpetrators of colonial aggression and occupation accountable. Both punish the victims and reward the aggressors. Both exclude the colonized from governance in the occupied territories. With their failure to exercise their veto when the UN Security Council adopted the Gaza foreign occupation plan, Russia and China became complicit in the colonial occupation of Gaza. Now Russia, its silent partner China, and the US are carving up Ukraine among themselves for imperialist plunder. Both deals have characteristically Trumpian pre-occupations with real estate development and business deals. Palestine is slated to be developed as a new Riviera for affluent foreign tourists, not indigenous Palestinians. Ukraine is slated to become a source of cheap and ultra-exploited labor, minerals and fossil fuels extraction, and fuels pipeline transit while the US and Russian oligarchs make money in Russia in, as the Trump plans says, “the spheres of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, Arctic rare-earth mining projects, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.”

The Ukraine Solidarity Network (USN) denounces this attempt to impose a settlement that is not acceptable to the Ukrainian people. USN continues to support the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and to decide for themselves what are acceptable terms for a peace deal.

USN will continue to build moral, political, and material support for the people of Ukraine in their resistance to Russia’s invasion, to its occupation of Ukrainian lands, and to its brutal rule over people in the Russian-occupied territories. USN will continue to support Ukraine’s war of resistance, its right to determine the means and objectives of its own struggle, and its right to obtain the weapons it needs from any available source.

• We demand the full and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all of Ukraine.
• We support the armed and unarmed resistance of Ukrainians against the Russian invasion.
• We support economic sanctions against Russia’s war machinery, including its political, military, and economic elite, its access to the international financial system, its imports of weapons-related technology, and its exports of fossil fuels that fund and fuel Russia’s war machine.*
• We demand that all Russians incarcerated for war resistance and political dissent be freed.
• We demand that the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped to Russia and Belarus be returned to Ukraine.
• We demand that the tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians from Russian-occupied territories incarcerated for opposition to the occupation be released and returned to Ukraine.
• We support asylum in the United States for Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, Palestinians, Sudanese, Haitians, Venezuelans, Afghans, and all people seeking refuge from political repression and war.
• We oppose amnesty for Russian war criminals. We demand the cancellation of all of Ukraine’s illegitimate and unjust foreign debts.
• We demand the confiscation of Russian assets abroad to be used to support Ukraine’s military self-defense, social services, and post-war reconstruction.
• We demand that Russia pay reparations to fund a full post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.
• We oppose the U.S. policy of imposing a neoliberal economic agenda on Ukraine today and for its post-war reconstruction. The Ukrainians’ struggle for self-determination, democracy and social justice will continue. We support the political struggles of Ukrainian trade unions, women’s organizations, environmental initiatives, and progressive political organizations to reverse the neoliberal anti-labor and anti-social policies of the Ukrainian government, to expand social, labor, and democratic rights, to clean up public corruption, and to implement a just and ecological reconstruction of Ukraine.

We will continue to build material aid and public education campaigns linking trade unions, civic organizations, and progressive political organizations in the US with their counterparts in Ukraine.

We urge all opponents of imperialism to join us.

• *

  The question of sanctions is complicated and controversial among activists committed to Ukraine’s struggle. It’s especially important in the US that we do not accommodate to the predatory politics of the imperialist US state. The Ukraine Solidarity Network will be discussing these issues as the betrayal of Ukraine unfolds in collaboration with our Ukrainian comrades whose lives and national freedom are on the line.

Trump’s peace, Lenin’s test: Class, empire and the price of a deal

By Dmitry Pozhidaev

Published 27 November, 2025

In late November, the world woke up to a sudden and, for many, unwelcome “peace initiative” from United States President Donald Trump: a leaked 28-point draft circulating between US, Ukrainian and Russian interlocutors, as a framework to end the war. The document is not an official text and may change substantially, but its core logic is clear enough to analyse.

At its heart, the draft proposal would freeze the front roughly where it stands and entrench Russian control over Crimea and large parts of Donbas; neutralise Ukraine by constitutionalising a NATO renunciation and extracting parallel pledges that NATO never admit Ukraine; replace alliance membership with a US-style security guarantee subject to conditions; pair a phased sanctions rollback for Russia with economic cooperation (energy, mining, high tech) and channel frozen Russian assets into reconstruction; and wrap the whole package in a bespoke oversight body chaired by Trump. Everything else hangs off those pillars: troop caps, quick elections and broad amnesties, IAEA management at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and implementation timelines.

Reactions have been all over the map. European Union leaders publicly treated the draft as a starting point that “will require work,” signalling red lines on borders, force limits and any clauses that would bind EU or NATO processes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it an unprecedented challenge to Ukraine’s dignity, even while indicating a willingness to engage with Washington.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, by contrast, said it could serve as a basis “in principle” for settlement. Russian Marxist Boris Kagarlitsky noted from prison that the draft is vague on most points yet painstaking on the money. In its current form it reads like a template where Ukraine looks the loser, Russia not quite the winner, and the US the only clear beneficiary. Even so, any step that stops the killing would be a step worth taking.

Why Lenin? Why now?

Invoking Vladimir Lenin is not nostalgia; it is a way to keep analysis from collapsing into moral binaries or great-power fandom. His wartime polemics, succinctly distilled in the relatively little-known 1916 essay A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism, supply a compact toolkit for thinking about modern conflicts.

He forces us to focus on two disciplines that contemporary debate keeps evading: first, to read war as the continuation of class policy, not as a sudden meteor; and second, to hold together two planes at once, the inter-imperialist struggle for redivision and the national liberation struggle of oppressed peoples. That dual focus is exactly what the Ukraine war scrambles and what any externally brokered “peace” threatens to flatten.

Lenin is also relevant because he treated wars inside the stage of imperialism, and not as isolated clashes of flags. That premise is largely airbrushed out by mainstream commentary and openly debated within the left, which recognises the imperial dimension even as it disagrees over how much weight to give it against Ukraine’s national liberation struggle (see, for example, the exchange between Alex Callinicos and Gilbert Achcar).

Finally, Lenin links analysis to strategy: judge each belligerent by what its victory or defeat means for workers, and fight opportunism inside the labour movement while opposing imperialist war.

Lenin’s four tests for modern wars

1. War as the continuation of class policy

Clausewitz called war “the continuation of policy by other means.” Lenin keeps the sentence and changes the subject of the policy: not an abstract “state,” but a ruling class pursuing its accumulation strategy. So, the task is to reconstruct each side’s pre-war class policy — its profit model, external dependencies, regional ambitions, and domestic crises — and then read the outbreak of war as the switch from peaceful to violent instruments in pursuit of those same aims. Official slogans about defence, civilisation or democracy are evidence, not explanations.

2. Two planes in one war

On one plane, rival capitalist states (or blocs) fight to redraw hierarchies of extraction and control: an inter-imperialist war for redivision. On the other, a dominated people fights to secure or preserve sovereignty: a national liberation war. Lenin’s test is to identify which relation holds between which actors, and then refuse to collapse the two planes into a neutral “clash of states.” Supporting an oppressed nation’s right to resist does not require political endorsement of its bourgeois leadership, and recognising an inter-imperialist struggle does not erase the agency or rights of the dominated.

3. Judge each belligerent by class outcomes, not camp loyalties

Socialists do not pick sides the way chancelleries do. They ask, for each belligerent separately: What is the position of its ruling class in the world system? What would its victory or defeat mean for the capacity of workers and oppressed people — locally, regionally, internationally — to organise, win rights, break dependencies, etc? A predatory victory that consolidates chauvinism and repression is to be opposed; a defeat that opens space for democratic and labour struggles can be welcomed, even if it benefits no government you like. Conversely, a “friendly” victory that locks a country into new dependency or debt servitude is not a socialist gain. The metric is strategic empowerment of the working class, not diplomatic score keeping.

4. Fight opportunism inside the labour movement as part of fighting the war

Anti-imperialism is not real if it stops at criticising the enemy’s propaganda. Lenin’s last test turns inward: break with social-chauvinism (backing “our” bourgeoisie’s war under progressive pretexts) and with centrist evasions (condemning war in words while tailing ruling-class policy in practice). Apply the same discipline everywhere: in aggressor states, oppose annexations and chauvinism; in invaded states, defend the right to resist while resisting wartime assaults on labour and minority rights; in core states, reject both crusader liberalism and apologias for rival imperialisms, and fight the militarisation and austerity imposed at home. There is no durable anti-war politics without an internal struggle over the line of the movement itself.

Taken together, these four tests form a method, not a mantra. They compel analysis of prior class policies, insist on keeping two planes in view, replace campism with outcome-based judgment, and weld anti-war work to a fight against opportunism. That is why they remain usable for evaluating any “peace plan” offered by great powers today.

Trump’s peace through Lenin’s lens

Lenin’s third test — judge each belligerent by class outcomes — sharpens the agenda. Looking at the current “peace initiative”, Lenin would immediately note that the principal beneficiaries are the US and Russian imperialists, carving up Ukraine’s natural wealth and territory over the heads of the population. He would also read the draft’s call for US–Russia “cooperation” in energy and mining as the signature of subordinated imperialism on the Russian side, a return to the pre-2014 pattern in which Western majors were invited into hydrocarbons and extractives on privileged terms (Rosneft–Exxon tie-ups, BP’s equity in Rosneft, Sakhalin consortia).

At the same time, he would also see through European imperialism: prolonging the war without a clear, credible victory plan simply bleeds Ukrainian workers, while Ukrainian elites position themselves to profit from flows of aid, contracts and energy-sector rents, as the high-profile Energoatom ‘Operation Midas’ kickback probe suggests.

He would not chalk Ukraine’s mobilisation crisis up to some alleged lack of national identity, still less to the fiction that Ukrainians are an “artificial nation” as Putin claims; he would point to class suspicion — the reasonable fear among workers that their sacrifices will be appropriated by Ukrainian capital. Pressed to rank the imperialisms at play, he would refuse the game.

To adapt Josef Stalin’s famous quip from the 1925 XIV Party Congress on “right” and “left” deviations, “both are worse”, in this triangle all three are worse: the US and Russian imperialisms that bargain over Ukraine’s resources and territory, and a European strategy anchored in “support to Ukraine as long as it takes,” with a maximalist end-state (full withdrawal, reparations, prosecutions) but no credible route to get there and financed by Ukrainian blood and deepening EU dependency.

Lenin would also read the frozen-assets plank as open inter-imperialist rivalry: about €210 billion in Russian state funds are immobilised in the EU, yet the leaked draft channels $100 billion of those assets into US-led reconstruction vehicles, with the US taking a profit share and a further tranche parked in a joint US–Russia investment instrument, overseen within a bespoke “Peace Council” chaired by Trump. In Lenin’s terms, that is the core muscling the core: Brussels carries the legal risk of immobilisation while Washington positions itself to manage and monetise the pot.

Read strictly through Lenin’s tests, the draft “peace initiative” functions as an inter-imperialist bargain that subordinates Ukraine’s sovereignty to the interests of the core. A Russian-imposed partition would mark a defeat of an oppressed nation’s right to exist; yet a “victory” under the present Ukrainian leadership, on these terms, would likely be cashed out as deeper NATO tutelage and debt-driven restructuring. A tolerable outcome, in Lenin’s terms, would be a compelled halt to the killing that neither recognises annexations nor launders occupation plebiscites, and that avoids converting Ukraine’s dependence into a permanent settlement. Anything else reads as peace that sanctifies defeat.

Ukraine’s national question, without hagiography

A Leninist reading starts by naming the structure without mythmaking: vis-à-vis Russia, Ukraine is an oppressed nation whose right to exist has been denied, in word and deed, and whose territory has been seized under the alibi of “historical unity.” That diagnosis does not require airbrushing the past or canonising the present. It simply restores the basic asymmetry that any serious analysis must keep in view.

The Soviet layer complicates but does not erase that asymmetry. Ukraine was one of the principal centres of Soviet development: it received huge industrial investment, became home to advanced sectors (aerospace, armaments, research institutes), fostered a rich national culture, and even held a formal seat at the United Nations.

Economically, the picture is mixed in precisely the way ideologues hate: by contribution to all-Union Gross National Product Ukraine functioned as a net donor (as did Russia), while in narrow fiscal flows it was a modest net recipient; it also benefited from targeted investment and cheap energy. Politically, however, decisive power was centralised in Moscow, real statehood was off the table, and the Ukrainian language was subordinated in high administration and all-Union communication. Both truths sit together: material advance within a framework of national subordination.

Post-1991, Russia operates as a semi-peripheral empire: dependent on the core in finance and technology yet exercising regional domination over its “near abroad.” Toward Ukraine that has meant leverage through energy, currency and security ties, periodic territorial grabs, and now a full-scale war framed by open denial of Ukrainian nationhood. Semi-peripheral status does not mitigate the relation; vis-à-vis Ukraine, Russia is the oppressor.

None of this implies that internal relations inside Ukraine are harmonious. In Crimea and Donbas, genuine grievances about Kyiv’s policies, language laws and post-Maidan orientation pre-dated 2014, and should have been addressed as a minority/national question within Ukraine. Ukrainian language and education rules grant protections to EU-official languages that do not extend equivalently to Russian, and wartime cultural bans have deepened that divide; the result is a de facto narrowing of the public sphere for Russian language and identity.

But referenda under occupation and pseudo-republics organised by Moscow are imperial instruments built on those grievances. By an ironic twist of history, the Bolsheviks made exactly this point about Ukraine at Brest-Litovsk in 1918: “self-determination” staged under foreign bayonets by puppet authorities is annexation in costume. Acknowledging internal injustices does not convert Ukraine from oppressed to oppressor when a larger power is carving it up.

Today, the national question clarifies stakes rather than dictating tactics. Vis-à-vis Russia, Ukraine remains the oppressed side of an asymmetric relationship; acknowledging internal injustices and regional grievances does not invert that fact, nor does it legitimise partitions engineered under occupation. The analytical bottom line is simple: keep the asymmetry clear and the history honest; treat annexations and staged plebiscites as imperial instruments; and read any prospective settlement through what it means for the political equality of citizens and the durability of a common state.

The practical implications of that frame follow only after the guns fall silent.

After the deal: Anti-opportunism in practice

A brokered ceasefire will not end class struggle; it will simply change the field on which it is fought. Lenin’s last test makes the next steps into organisational questions rather than rhetorical ones.

Ukraine

From a Leninist angle, near-term priorities often identified by Ukrainian socialists include rebuilding independent unions and workplace organisation; rolling back wartime carve-outs that weakened collective bargaining; designing reconstruction to favour open contracting, public or worker control in strategic sectors, and local value added; resisting debt conditionality by pressing for grants, write-downs and ring-fenced social budgets; providing legal support for labour rights, demobilised soldiers and IDPs; and sustaining independent media and cross-regional organising.

It would also mean confronting neo-Nazism and ethnonationalist gatekeeping wherever it surfaces, defending minority and language rights as a condition for class unity, and systematically exposing the neo-colonial character of US deals over Ukraine’s minerals (see the Ukrainian socialist critique of the US–Ukraine minerals agreement), while developing practical ties with Russian workers and anti-war activists (joint union statements, prisoner support, safety funds, sector-to-sector links) on the simple premise that chauvinism on either side weakens workers on both.

Russia

From a Leninist angle, breaking social-chauvinism in practice would mean opposing annexations and Great-Russian chauvinism, sustaining anti-war organising, and offering legal support to conscripts, refuseniks and political prisoners. Proletarian solidarity here implies shedding the “Big Brother” reflex and engaging Ukrainian workers as equals; practical links with Ukrainian unions can be sector-to-sector and problem-focused rather than paternalist, as recently argued by Russian socialists Alexey Sakhnin and Liza Smirnova.

Any talk of demobilisation or a “peace dividend” is more credible if paired with releases of political prisoners, as urged in the July 4, 2025 open letter from 11 jailed Russian dissidents (including Kagarlitsky), visible withdrawal steps and protections for minorities, while conversion of the war economy under worker oversight could shift the post-war agenda toward social gains rather than imperial restoration.

Core states

In the core states, a Leninist emphasis falls on demilitarisation and de-rentierisation at home, rather than a generic “progressive support” package. In practice, that could mean treating war-time profits and lock-ins as the core problem and favouring measures that redirect capacity from arms to civil uses, keep procurement transparent, and keep financing grant-heavy rather than debt-heavy. Assistance to Ukraine would come with labour and open-contracting clauses rather than investor privileges, and with technology sharing/public options that reduce long-run dependency instead of vendor lock-ins.

On the domestic side, a peace settlement would be a moment to wind down emergency powers and surveillance, and to pair any residual security spending with matching social outlays so the “jobs from militarisation” logic does not quietly harden. None of this claims to be a master plan; it simply draws a line between “support” that feeds the security-industrial complex and support that preserves democratic space, labour strength, and fiscal room for the majority.

Common discipline

Across contexts, a few guardrails seem basic: no de jure recognition of annexations; no recognition of plebiscites conducted under occupation; no secret clauses on bases, minerals or debt; no convenient amnesia about war crimes. Wherever possible, translate policy stances into organisational capacity — membership growth, sectoral networks, cross-border union links — so that, after any deal, workers are more able to act independently of all ruling classes involved, not less.

Conclusion: Complexity against propaganda

Reading a Trump-style peace through Lenin’s method resists the flattening that propaganda demands. It keeps two planes in view at once: an inter-imperialist bargain over hierarchy and access, and a national liberation struggle against a regional oppressor. It replaces camp loyalties with a class test: what outcome enlarges the capacity of workers and oppressed people to act tomorrow? And it ties every anti-war stance to an internal fight against opportunism, so the labour movement is not dragged behind any ruling class’s settlement.

The result is unglamorous but usable: oppose annexations and the laundering of plebiscites held under occupation; refuse a “peace” that swaps aid for resources, contracts, and debt servitude; tolerate only a compelled truce that halts the killing without sanctifying the map; and use any respite to rebuild independent organisation, restore labour rights, protect minorities, and block new dependencies. If this position will not fit on a placard, that is the point. Analysis worthy of its subject should protect complexity from being sacrificed to someone else’s storyline.

In today’s Russia, Lenin’s legacy is officially inconvenient. The ruling narrative rehabilitates imperial cohesion and derides his nationalities policy as a “time bomb” under the state. Putin has repeatedly blamed Lenin for “inventing” or “artificially” creating Ukraine. Yet public opinion tells a different story. Elite hostility to Lenin’s nationalities policy helps explain his official unpopularity, but among the public a 2024 Levada poll shows 67% rating his role positively and a record 45% supporting leaving his body in the Mausoleum, with support highest among 18–24-year-olds. 

The gap between elite vilification and popular memory is not a program, but it is a resource, a reminder that the materials for a principled, anti-imperialist politics still exist beneath the state’s storyline.

Witkoff To Moscow, Zelenskyy Is Wary, A Phone Call Leaks: A Ukraine Peace Plan Coalesces – Analysis

November 27, 2025

 RFE RL
By Mike Eckel


The White House’s lead envoy is heading to Russia for a sixth time. Ukraine fears a peace that heavily favors Moscow. A leaked phone call shows the US envoy advising a Kremlin official on how to sweet talk the White House.

And Russia’s invasion — now in its 46th month — has pushed Ukraine’s beleaguered armed forces closer to the breaking point.

There’s a lot that happened in the six days since a US-drafted peace proposal first leaked – not to mention the circumstances under which it was drafted.

The 28-point plan jolted what until recently had been sputtering efforts to halt the Russian war, something that Trump had pledged to do within 24 hours of taking office in January.

Here’s what you need to know as of November 26, as diplomats and negotiators from Washington, Moscow, Kyiv, and many other European capitals wrangle over details over a concrete, and controversial plan.
The Main Sticking Points?

After the US plan leaked, and then was given to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian leader sent his chief of staff and other officials to Geneva for urgent talks with US officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Zelenskyy reportedly was blindsided by the plan, which echoed most of the hard-line positions that Russia has held before the invasion.

The Geneva talks, however, produced an “updated and refined” framework – a reworked 19-point plan — that would deliver a “sustainable and just peace,” both the White House and Zelenskyy’s office said.

But Zelenskyy’s comments suggested the thorniest issues might still be on the table. That includes the fate of a chunk of the Donetsk region that the Kremlin has been hellbent on seizing.

Moscow has repeatedly said it must control all of Donetsk, one of five Ukrainian regions Putin baselessly claims are Russian. Ceding land that Ukraine’s forces have kept out of Russia’s clutches, at great cost, would be a massive concession by Kyiv and could have political repercussions for Zelenskyy.

Other pitfalls include the Kremlin’s insistence that Ukraine be forever barred from joining NATO and a potential cap on the size of Kyiv’s military.

The US draft would require Ukraine to “enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO” and the alliance to formalize a pledge that Ukraine will never be admitted.

That approach may be unpalatable for Ukraine, which wants freedom to choose its geopolitical partners – and currently has its NATO aspirations codified in its constitution.

Ukraine also wants to be able to defend itself from any potential future Russian attack.

In previous negotiations, Russia called for Ukraine’s military to be under 100,000 personnel. The initial US draft would cap it at 600,000. A European counterproposal would raise that to 800,000 “in peacetime.”

Several top Republican senators have criticized the initial US plan, including former Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.

“A deal that rewards aggression wouldn’t be worth the paper it’s written on. America isn’t a neutral arbiter, and we shouldn’t act like one,” he said in a post to X.

White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt claimed there had been tangible progress, saying there were only “a few delicate, but not insurmountable, details that must be sorted out.”
Sixth Time’s A Charm?

A real estate developer with no diplomatic background, Steve Witkoff is the man tapped by Trump to lead efforts to find an end to Russia’s war. He’s met with Putin five times already, traveling to Moscow on his private jet.

Some of Witkoff’s prior actions have raised alarm bells to outside observers,who fear he is being manipulated or that he misunderstands the war’s deeply intractable historical contours.

Witkoff has relied on translators provided by the Kremlin for his conversations with Putin and other officials, rather than using translators authorized by the US Embassy.

After Witkoff’s last meeting with Putin in August, US and European officials said the envoy misunderstood the geography of Ukrainian territory Putin was claiming.

Representative Don Bacon, a Republican who has criticized the Trump administration’s engagement with Russia, called for Witkoff to be fired.

Sending Witkoff back to Moscow, a visit Kremlin foreign policy aide Yury Ushakov confirmed would happen next week, is a sign that the White House is eager to cement some or all of the points that were set in Geneva and Abu Dhabi.

Another wild-card: Trump mentioned his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, might accompany Witkoff, something neither Ushakov nor Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov commented on.

Kushner was reportedly present for previously undisclosed US meeting involving Witkoff and Russian who is also not a diplomat but who has played a starring, unconventional role in negotiations with the Americans: Kirill Dmitriev.
Wait, A Leaked Phone Call?

In late October, Dmitriev, a sharp-tongued, Harvard-trained businessman who heads Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, traveled to Miami, Florida. He met with Republican Representative Anna Luna, giving her what he said were undisclosed Russian files on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. He also gave her a box of chocolates and a book of Putin quotes.

Dmitriev had been blacklisted in 2022, along with other Russian officials, in punishment for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Trump’s Treasury secretary has called him a “Kremlin propagandist.”

It later emerged that Dmitriev, who was given an exemption by US authorities to travel, had secret meetings with Witkoff and Kushner while in Miami— reportedly leaving some White House and State Department officials in the dark.

After news of the US proposal emerged last week, several US senators said that Rubio told them the draft was Russian in nature, influenced by a Russian, though Dmitriev was not named.

Rubio, who was in Geneva, insisted it was a US draft.

On November 25, not long before Trump announced Witkoff would travel to Moscow, Bloomberg News published a transcript of what it said was telephone call between Witkoff and Ushakov.

The call took place on October 14, two days before Trump and Putin held their own call, on October 16 — and about two weeks before Witkoff met Dmitriev in Miami.

According to the transcript, Witkoff advised Ushakov on how to charm Trump on a possible peace deal.

“I would make the call and just reiterate that you congratulate the president on this achievement, that you supported it, you supported it, that you respect that he is a man of peace and you’re just, you’re really glad to have seen it happen. So I would say that,” Witkoff was quoted as saying.

“I know what it’s going to take to get a peace deal done: Donetsk and maybe a land swap somewhere,” Witkoff reportedly said.

Bloomberg did not say how it obtained the recording, which was likely made by US intelligence agencies who routinely monitor and eavesdrop on foreign officials’ conversations. RFE/RL could not independently verify the transcript.

Trump partially confirmed the fact of the call, though not its content: “He’s got to sell this to Ukraine. He’s going to sell Ukraine to Russia. That’s what a dealmaker does.”

Ushakov also appeared to confirm the fact of the call, telling a Russian state TV reporter that it was leaked to undermine the backchannel negotiations. He later told the newspaper Kommersant that his conversation with Witkoff had occurred via the WhatsApp messaging app.

“It is unlikely that such a leak could have come from the participants in the conversation,” he was quoted as saying.

RFE/RL Russia/Ukraine editor Steven Gutterman contributed to this report.Mike Eckel is a senior international correspondent reporting on political and economic developments in Russia, Ukraine, and around the former Soviet Union, as well as news involving cybercrime and espionage. He’s reported on the ground on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the wars in Chechnya and Georgia, and the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, as well as the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

RFE RL

RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.

Putin backs US peace plan as basis for Ukraine talks, demands recognition of Russian territorial gains

In comments at a press conference in Bishkek, Putin laid out in clear terms some of the Kremlin's positions on the current Ukraine peace plan talks. While he said the original version was largely acceptable to Russia, he redrew several of his red lines on what Russia would not accept. / bne IntelliNews

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Ben Aris in Berlin November 27, 2025

As the information frenzy surrounding the ongoing Ukraine peace deal talks intensifies, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a series of comments on November 27 designed to cut through some of the haze and lay Russia’s demands a bit more clearly.

Putin said that the US-backed 28-point peace plan (28PPP) for Ukraine could serve as a “foundation for future negotiations,” once again highlighting the Kremlin’s strong preference for this version – currently one of at least five other versions promoted variously by Europe and Trump among others. The most recent addition was a hard line principled European Parliament’s resolution on November 27.

Getting an agreement will be hard. While the EU resolution says that Europe will never recognise Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s territory, Putin expressly said any agreement must include international recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea and the four Ukrainian annexed regions.

Speaking at a press conference in Bishkek following the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) summit, Putin repeatedly outlined the conditions under which Moscow would consider ending hostilities, while casting doubt on the legitimacy of Ukraine's leadership.

“You are right, this is one of the key points,” Putin said, when asked whether recognition of Russia’s new regions should be addressed in peace talks. “This matters because it’s one thing when decisions are recognised, and, say, certain territories are under Russian sovereignty. If the agreement is violated, it will be considered an attack on the Russian Federation, with all the ensuing retaliatory measures.”

According to TASS, Putin confirmed that Russia had received the US proposal following a visit to Alaska, after which “negotiations took place in Geneva between the American delegation and the Ukrainian delegation.”

This confirms the information on the lead up to the appearance of the US plan revealed in leaked phone conversations between Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s top foreign policy advisor and separately Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, Kirill Dmitriev published by Bloomberg, as well as the timeline of events until the plan went public on November 18.

Putin dismissed the phone conversations as potentially fake, warning that unauthorised publication constitutes a criminal offence under Russian law.

Putin said the 28 points were later divided into four thematic blocks and conveyed to the Kremlin.

“In general, we agree that this can be the basis for future agreements,” Putin said. However, he added that a legal agreement with Ukraine remains “practically impossible” because of the Zelensky government’s decision to postpone presidential elections, which, according to Putin, rendered the Ukrainian president illegitimate. Putin has questioned Zelenskiy’s legitimacy on several occasions, arguing that after his presidential term expired in May, the Speaker of the Rada should have taken over as the interim war-time president. The Ukrainian constitution bars elections while the country is under martial law.

“Signing documents with the Ukrainian leadership is pointless,” Putin said, taking a hardline again after previously suggesting he was willing to negotiate directly with the Ukrainian president. “We need our decisions to be recognised by the major international players. This matters.”

The Russian leader also dismissed European concerns about further military escalation, while offering to codify Moscow’s intentions. Last week, the German intelligence service warned that Russia might attack Nato in 2029.

“We were never going to [attack Europe], but if they want to hear it from us — well, come on, we’ll put it on the record. No questions asked,” Putin said. “Nevertheless, if this is promoted in the public consciousness, if they have frightened their citizens and want to hear that we have no aggressive plans for Europe, please, we are ready to record this in any way.”

Putin claimed Moscow frequently receives informal offers of a ceasefire, but said that any pause would require Ukrainian withdrawal from occupied territories first. According to the latest EU resolution, Brussels has returned to its position that negotiations can only begin after a ceasefire is imposed. The Kremlin, reluctant to give up its momentum and allow the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to regroup and resupply, insists the fighting must continue and a ceasefire will come at the end of negotiations, not the beginning.

“If [Ukraine’s forces] don’t leave, we’ll achieve it militarily,” Putin said, citing what he described as positive momentum on the front lines for Russian forces and the recent capture of several more towns in eastern Ukraine.

He also rejected the offer of rejoining the G8 contained in Trump’s 28-point plan under current circumstances, saying, “I can’t even imagine how we’d attend a G8 summit now.”

Russia was ejected from the G8 following its invasion of Ukraine, but since then Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has called the body “irrelevant” and scoffed at the idea that Russia would like to return to it. The invasion of Ukraine means a permanent break with the Global North and Putin’s big beat on a Global South Century. Russia is now fully focused on building up new Global Emerging Markets Institutions (GEMIs), and the BRICS+ and G20 in particular.

Moscow expects a US delegation in Moscow in the first half of next week to continue talks. The Russian side will be represented by presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the talks that began in Riyadh in February.

“We are ready to work with the American administration to address all issues related to strategic stability,” Putin said, pointedly failing to include Europe in that comment.

BACKGROUND

A draft of the 28-point plan reviewed by AFP:

1. Ukraine's sovereignty will be confirmed.

2. A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.

3. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.


4. A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation.

5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

10. The US will receive compensation for the security guarantees it provides. If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated and recognition of its new territories and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will also be deemed invalid.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.

12. A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine will be established, including the creation of a Ukraine Development Fund, the rebuilding of Ukraine's gas infrastructure, the rehabilitation of war-affected areas, the development of new infrastructure and a resumption of the extraction of minerals and natural resources, all with a special finance package developed by the World Bank.

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy, with discussions on lifting sanctions, rejoining the G8 group and entering a long-term economic cooperation agreement with the United States.

14. Some $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine, with the US receiving 50 percent of the profits from the venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine's reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen, and the remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle.

15. A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.

16. Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine.

20. Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance.

21. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de-facto recognition along the line of contact. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, which will then be used to create a buffer zone.

22. After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.

23. Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve prisoner exchanges and the return of remains, hostages and civilian detainees, and a family reunification programme will be implemented.

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by US President Donald Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to the agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

SEE

'For a very long time, Ukrainians have suspected that Steve Witkoff was working for the Russians'

Trump admin crafted Russia-friendly peace plan with help from Kremlin in 'secret meetings'

Trump’s ‘Munich’ agreement is nothing but Russian demands. The world must reject it.

UKRAINE CAPITULATION PLAN

The Nestor Makhno Archive - index