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Thursday, November 21, 2024

 

Geopolitical conflicts, anti-imperialism and internationalism in times of ‘reactionary acceleration’


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Kicking over the table graphic

First published in Spanish at Viento Sur. Translation from Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières.

Within the general framework of the multidimensional crisis in which we find ourselves, now aggravated by the stimulus that Trump’s recent electoral victory represents for the rise of an extreme right on a global scale, it seems even more evident that we are witnessing a profound crisis of the international geopolitical (dis)order, as well as of the basic rules of International Law that have been established since the end of the Second World War. The most tragic manifestation of this crisis (which calls into question even the future of the UN) is found in the genocidal war against Gaza (Awad, 2024), to which are currently added around 56 wars across the planet.

In this context, the imperialist hierarchical system based on US hegemony is openly questioned and challenged by other major powers, such as China and Russia, as well as by others on a regional scale, such as Iran. This global geopolitical competition is clearly evident in certain war conflicts, the evolution of which will determine a new configuration of the balance of power within this system, as well as of the blocks present or in formation, such as the BRICS. In light of this new scenario, in this article I will focus on a summary description of the current panorama, then characterise the different positions that appear within the left in this new phase and insist on the need to build an internationalist left that is opposed to all imperialisms (main or secondary) and in solidarity with the struggles of the attacked peoples.

Polycrisis and authoritarian neoliberalisms

There is broad consensus on the left regarding the diagnosis we can make of the global crisis that the world is currently going through, with the eco-social and climate crisis as a backdrop. A polycrisis that we can define with Pierre Rousset as “multifaceted, the result of the combination of multiple specific crises. So we are not facing a simple sum of crises, but their interaction, which multiplies their dynamics, fueling a death spiral for the human species (and for a large part of living species)” (Pastor, 2024).

A situation that is closely related to the exhaustion of the neoliberal capitalist accumulation regime that began in the mid-1970s, which, after the fall of the bloc dominated by the USSR, took a leap forward towards its expansion on a global scale. A process that led to the Great Recession that began in 2008 (aggravated by austerity policies, the consequences of the pandemic crisis and the war in Ukraine), which ended up frustrating the expectations of social advancement and political stability that the promised happy globalization had generated, mainly among significant sectors of the new middle classes.

A globalization, it must be remembered, that was expanded under the new neoliberal cycle that throughout its different phases: combative, normative and punitive (Davies, 2016), has been building a new transnational economic constitutionalism at the service of global corporate tyranny and the destruction of the structural, associative and social power of the working class. And, what is more serious, it has turned into common sense the “ market civilization” as the only possible one, although this whole process has acquired different variants and forms of political regimes, generally based on strong States immune to democratic pressure (Gill, 2022; Slobodian, 2021). A neoliberalism that, however, is today showing its inability to offer a horizon of improvement for the majority of humanity on an increasingly inhospitable planet.

We are therefore in a period, both at the state and interstate level, full of uncertainties, under a financialized, digital, extractivist and rentier capitalism that makes our lives precarious and seeks at all costs to lay the foundations for a new stage of growth with an increasingly active role of the States at its service. To do so, it resorts to new forms of political domination functional to this project that, increasingly, tend to come into conflict not only with freedoms and rights won after long popular struggles, but also with liberal democracy. In this way, an increasingly authoritarian neoliberalism is spreading, not only in the South but increasingly in the North, with the threat of a “reactionary acceleration” (Castellani, 2024). A process now stimulated by a Trumpism that is becoming the master discursive framework of a rising far right, willing to constitute itself as an alternative to the crisis of global governance and the decomposition of the old political elites (Urbán, 2024; Camargo, 2024).

The imperialist hierarchical system in dispute

Within this context, succinctly explained here, we are witnessing a crisis of the imperialist hierarchical system that has predominated since the fall of the Soviet bloc, facilitated precisely by the effects generated by a process of globalization that has led to the displacement of the center of gravity of the world economy from the North Atlantic (Europe-USA) to the Pacific (USA, East and Southeast Asia).

Indeed, following the Great Recession that began in 2007-2008 and the subsequent crisis of neoliberal globalization, a new phase has begun in which a reconfiguration of the global geopolitical order is taking place, tending to be multipolar but at the same time asymmetrical, in which the United States remains the great hegemonic power (monetary, military and geopolitical), but is weakened and challenged by China, the great rising power, and Russia, as well as by other sub-imperial or secondary powers in different regions of the planet. Meanwhile, in many countries of the South, faced with the plundering of their resources, the increase in sovereign debt and popular revolts and wars of different kinds, the end of development as a goal to be achieved is giving way to reactionary populisms in the name of order and security.

Thus, global and regional geopolitical competition is being accentuated by the different competing interests, not only on the economic and technological level, but also on the military and values level, with the consequent rise of state ethno-nationalisms against presumed internal and external enemies.

However, one must not forget the high degree of economic, energy and technological interdependence that has been developing across the planet in the context of neoliberal globalisation, as was clearly highlighted both during the global pandemic crisis and the lack of an effective energy blockade against Russia despite the agreed sanctions. Added to this are two new fundamental factors: on the one hand, the current possession of nuclear weapons by major powers (there are currently four nuclear hotspots: one in the Middle East (Israel) and three in Eurasia (Ukraine, India-Pakistan and the Korean peninsula); and, on the other, the climate, energy and materials crisis (we are in overtime!), which substantially differentiate this situation from that before 1914. These factors condition the geopolitical and economic transition underway, setting limits to a deglobalisation that is probably partial and which, of course, does not promise to be happy for the great majority of humanity. At the same time, these factors also warn of the increased risk of escalation in armed conflicts in which powers with nuclear weapons are directly or indirectly involved, as is the case in Ukraine or Palestine.

This specificity of the current historical stage leads us, according to Promise Li, to consider that the relationship between the main great powers (especially if we refer to that between the USA and China) is given through an unstable balance between an “antagonistic cooperation” and a growing “inter-imperialist rivalry”. A balance that could be broken in favour of the latter, but that could also be normalised within the common search for a way out of the secular stagnation of a global capitalism in which China (Rousset, 2021) and Russia (Serfati, 2022) have now been inserted, although with very different evolutions. A process, therefore, full of contradictions, which is extensible to other powers, such as India, which are part of the BRICS, in which the governments of its member countries have not so far questioned the central role of organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, which remain under US hegemony (Fuentes, 2023; Toussaint, 2024).

However, it is clear that the geopolitical weakening of the United States — especially after its total fiasco in Iraq and Afghanistan and, now, the crisis of legitimacy that is being caused by its unconditional support for the genocidal State of Israel — is allowing a greater potential margin of manoeuvre on the part of different global or regional powers, in particular those with nuclear weapons. For this reason I agree with Pierre Rousset’s description:

The relative decline of the United States and the incomplete rise of China have opened up a space in which secondary powers can play a significant role, at least in their own region (Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, etc.), although the limits of the BRICS are clear. In this situation, Russia has not failed to present China with a series of faits accomplis on Europe’s eastern borders. Acting in concert, Moscow and Beijing were largely the masters of the game on the Eurasian continent. However, there was no coordination between the invasion of Ukraine and an actual attack on Taiwan (Pastor, 2024).

This, undoubtedly facilitated by the greater or lesser weight of other factors related to the polycrisis, explains the outbreak of conflicts and wars in very different parts of the planet, but in particular those that occur in three very relevant current epicentres: Ukraine, Palestine and, although for now in terms of the cold war, Taiwan.

Against this backdrop, we have seen how the US took advantage of Russia’s unjust invasion of Ukraine as an excuse to relaunch the expansion of a NATO in crisis towards other countries in Eastern and Northern Europe. An objective closely associated with the reformulation of NATO’s “new strategic concept”, as we were able to see at the summit that this organisation held in Madrid in July 2022 (Pastor, 2022) and more recently at the one held in Washington in July of this year. At the latter, this strategy was reaffirmed, as well as the consideration of China as the main strategic competitor, while any criticism of the State of Israel was avoided. The latter is what is showing the double standards (Achcar, 2024) of the Western bloc with regard to its involvement in the war in Ukraine, on the one hand, and its complicity with the genocide that the colonial State of Israel is committing against the Palestinian people, on the other.

Again, we have also seen NATO’s growing interest in the Southern flank in order to pursue its racist necropolitics against illegal immigration while continuing to aspire to compete for control of basic resources in countries of the South, especially in Africa, where French and American imperialisms are losing weight against China and Russia.

In this way, the strategy of the Western bloc has been redefined, within which US hegemony has been strengthened on the military level (thanks, above all, to the Russian invasion of Ukraine) and to which a more divided European Union with its old German engine weakened is clearly subordinated. However, after Trump’s victory, the European Union seems determined to reinforce its military power in the name of the search for a false strategic autonomy, since it will continue to be linked to the framework of NATO. Meanwhile, many countries in the South are distancing themselves from this bloc, although with different interests among them, which differentiates the possible alliances that may be formed from the one that in the past characterized the Non-Aligned Movement.

In any case, it is likely that after his electoral victory, Donald Trump will make a significant shift in US foreign policy in order to implement his MAGA (Make America Great Again) project beyond the geoeconomic level (intensifying his competition with China and, although at a different level, with the EU), especially in relation to the three epicentres of conflicts mentioned above: with regard to Ukraine, by substantially reducing economic and military aid and seeking some form of agreement with Putin, at least on a ceasefire; with regard to Israel, by reinforcing his support for Netanyahu’s total war; and finally by reducing his military commitment to Taiwan.

What anti-imperialist internationalism from the left?

In this context of the rise of an authoritarian neoliberalism (in its different versions: the reactionary one of the extreme right and that of the extreme centre, mainly) and of various geopolitical conflicts, the great challenge for the left is how to reconstruct antagonistic social and political forces anchored in the working class and capable of forging an anti-imperialism and a solidarity internationalism that is not subordinated to one or another great power or regional capitalist bloc.

A task that will not be easy, because in the current phase we are witnessing deep divisions within the left in relation to the position to maintain in the face of some of the aforementioned conflicts. Trying to synthesize, with Ashley Smith (2024), we could distinguish four positions:

The first would be the one that aligns itself with the Western imperial bloc in the common defense of alleged democratic values against Russia, or with the State of Israel in its unjustifiable right to self-defense, as has been stated by a majority sector of the social-liberal left. A position that hides the true imperialist interests of that bloc, does not denounce its double standards and ignores the increasingly de-democratizing and racist drift that Western regimes are experiencing, as well as the colonial and occupying character of the Israeli State.

The second is what is often described as campism, which would align itself with states such as Russia or China, which it considers allies against US imperialism because it considers the latter to be the main enemy, ignoring the expansionist geopolitical interests of these two powers. A position that reminds us of the one that many communist parties held in the past during the Cold War in relation to the USSR, but which now becomes a caricature considering both the reactionary nature of Putin’s regime and the persistent state-bureaucratic despotism in China.

The third is that of a geopolitical reductionism , which is now reflected in the war in Ukraine, limiting itself to considering it to be only an inter-imperialist conflict. This attitude, adopted by a sector of pacifism and the left, implies denying the legitimacy of the dimension of national struggle against the occupying power that the Ukrainian resistance has, without ceasing to criticize the neoliberal and pro-Atlanticist character of the government that heads it.

Finally, there is the one that is against all imperialisms (whether major or minor) and against all double standards, showing itself ready to stand in solidarity with all attacked peoples, even if they may have the support of one or another imperial power (such as the US and the EU in relation to Ukraine) or regional power (such as Iran in relation to Hamas in Palestine). This is a position that does not accept respect for the spheres of influence that the various major powers aspire to protect or expand, and that stands in solidarity with the peoples who fight against foreign occupation and for the right to decide their future (in particular, with the leftist forces in these countries that are betting on an alternative to neoliberalism), and is not aligned with any political-military bloc.

This last position is the one that I consider to be the most coherent from an anti-capitalist left. In fact, keeping in mind the historical distance and recognizing the need to analyze the specificity of each case, it coincides with the criteria that Lenin tried to apply when analyzing the centrality that the struggle against national and colonial oppression was acquiring in the imperialist phase of the early twentieth century. This was reflected, in relation to conflicts that broke out then, in several of his articles such as, for example, in “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” written in January-February 1916, where he maintained that:

The fact that the struggle for national freedom against an imperialist power can be exploited, under certain conditions, by another ’great’ power to achieve equally imperialist ends cannot force social democracy to renounce recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, just as the repeated cases of the use of republican slogans by the bourgeoisie for the purposes of political fraud and financial plunder (for example, in Latin countries) cannot force social democrats to renounce their republicanism (Lenin, 1976).

An internationalist position that must be accompanied by mobilisation against the remilitarisation process underway by NATO and the EU, but also against that of other powers such as Russia or China. And which must commit to putting the fight for unilateral nuclear disarmament and the dissolution of military blocs back at the centre of the agenda, taking up the baton of the powerful peace movement that developed in Europe during the 1980s, with the feminist activists of Greenham Common and intellectuals such as Edward P. Thompson at the forefront. An orientation that must obviously be inserted within a global eco-socialist, feminist, anti-racist and anti-colonial project.

References

Achcar, Gilbert (2024) “Anti-fascism and the Fall of Atlantic Liberalism”, Viento Sur, 19/08/24.

Awad, Nada (2024) “International Law and Israeli Exceptionalism”, Viento Sur, 193, pp. 19-27.

Camargo, Laura (2024) Discursive Trumpism . Madrid: Verbum (in press).

Castellani, Lorenzo (2024) “With Trump, the Age of Reactionary Acceleration”, Le Grand Continent, 11/08/24.

Davies, William (2016) “Neoliberalism 3.0”, New Left Review , 101, pp. 129-143.

Fuentes, Federico (2023) “Interview with Promise Li: US-China Rivalry, ’Antagonistic Cooperation’ and Anti-Imperialism”, Viento Sur, 191, 5-18. Available in English at https://links.org.au/us-china-rivalry-antagonistic-cooperation-and-anti-imperialism-21st-century-interview-promise-li

Gill, Stephen (2002) “Globalization, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neoliberalism”. In Hovden, E. and Keene, E. (Eds.) The Globalization of Liberalism. London: Millennium. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lenin, Vladimir (1976) “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, Selected Works, Volume V, pp. 349-363. Moscow: Progreso.

Pastor, Jaime (2022) “NATO’s New Strategic Concept. Towards a New Permanent Global War?”Viento Sur, 07/02/22. Available in English at https://links.org.au/towards-new-permanent-global-war-natos-new-strategic-concept

— (2024) “Interview with Pierre Rousset: World Crisis and Wars: What Internationalism for the 21st Century?”, Viento Sur, 04/16/24. Available in English at https://links.org.au/global-crisis-conflict-and-war-what-internationalism-21st-century

Rousset, Pierre (2021) “China, the New Emerging Imperialism”, Viento Sur, 10/16/21. 

Serfati, Claude (2022) “The Age of Imperialism Continues: Putin Proves It”, Viento Sur, 04/21/22. 

Slobodian, Quinn (2021) Globalists. Madrid: Capitán Swing. 

Smith, Ashley (2024) “Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism Today”, Viento Sur, 06/04/24. Available in English at https://links.org.au/imperialism-and-anti-imperialism-today

Toussaint, Eric (2024) “The BRICS Summit in Russia Offered No Alternative”, Viento Sur, 10/30/24. 

Urbán, Miguel (2024) Trumpisms. Neoliberals and Authoritarians . Barcelona: Verso.

Monday, November 18, 2024

The US Election: How Can We Move Forward While Staring Negativity in Its Face?


International Marxist-Humanist Organization
November 8, 2024
Length:1172 words


Summary: Based on remarks at a panel on “Developing Revolutionary Perspectives at a Turning Point,” sponsored by the International Marxist-Humanist Organization on the eve of the Historical Materialism Conference, Conway Hall, London, November 6, 2024 – Editors


The second election of Donald Trump to the US presidency and of the Trumpist Republican Party on November 5 represents nothing less than a new era of fascism. We may not be in 1933, but we are certainly in something similar to the 1920s after Mussolini seized power and the concomitant rise of fascist movements at a global level. At present, the neofascist National Rally in France has been receiving over 30% of the vote, the further-to-the-right Alternative for Germany well over 20%, and even in places like Brazil, where the moderate left has won recent elections (or California in the US), a turn toward the right in public opinion is evident.

Many sectors of global capitalism are joining in or at least accommodating themselves to the fascist turn, as seen not only in individual figures like Elon Musk but in global phenomena like the surge in financial markets on the day Trump’s election became apparent. Over the months preceding the US election, many key players decided to remain neutral in the face of Trumpism, from media like Facebook, the LA Times, and the storied Washington Post, to universities like Harvard declaring themselves neutral in social justice matters,


Causes and Context

Since Trumpism’s rise in 2015, the US and global left have been discussing its causes, most of which have become too well known to detail too much here. But here is a basic list. First comes the wrenching economic crisis of 2008 and nearly 50 years of economic stagnation, which has left the working people in the broadest sense facing worsening conditions of life and labor. Second, comes the exhaustion of US imperialism and its allies after more than two decades of war in the Middle East with no end in sight, while on the other hand, some sectors are now under the illusion of an opening for Israel and the US against the Palestinians, Lebanon, and Iran that could spark a regional conflagration. Third, we have seen the rise, often manipulated by powerful forces, of anti-immigrant xenophobia, racist appeals over crime, and perceived disorder, all amid the demagoguery of Trump and his ilk.Fourth, we have witnessed the most virulent misogyny, both in political rhetoric and policy, from a stream of demeaning statements against women and sexual minorities to actions like abortion and transgender bans. Fifth, we are probably underestimating the ongoing effects of the COVID pandemic, not only in how its necessary “social distancing” tore at social solidarity, but also in how neofascists developed a whole new ideology of “freedom” around attacks on science in general, on vaccines in particular, and the closing down of schools and workplaces in the name of return to the “normal” capital accumulation regime as quickly as possible. These events have seemed to spur some leading capitalists (Musk et al.), public figures (Robert Kennedy, Jr.), and intellectuals (Giorgio Agamben, Carl Boggs) to shift way to the right on a “libertarian” basis. Sixth, we have experienced unprecedented attacks on environmental science and policy, as seen in expressions like “punitive ecology” even amid the floods and fires of the 2020s. Finally, the liberal and slightly anti-racist and anti-sexist wing of the dominant classes has over the past year forged a new type of unity with the far right in their joint and unstinting support for Israel’s genocide and, inside the US, repression of the student movement against that genocide.


Beyond Mere Causality: What to Do?

The dialectical concept of second negativity teaches us never to stop at the analysis of the gravity of a new form of reaction and retrogression, but to go also the subjective level, to the state of the forces of liberation and opposition, and how to move them forward.

First and foremost, here is to avoid denial, to stare negativity in the face as the young Hegel once articulated, and to consider with utmost soberness the gravity of our situation. The world’s largest economic and military power, to a great extent because of its relative decline, has embarked upon the reckless path of neofascism. It appears at this writing that the Trumpists will control not only the presidency but also both chambers of the legislative branch, while they will continue to control the third branch of government via the Supreme Court. We should also be under no illusions about “constitutionally” minded military officers being willing to carry out Trump’s orders.

But it is equally important to avoid despair and especially to forget that a real alternative to capitalism exists: a society based upon the elimination of value production and freely associated labor as articulated by Marx over a century ago and put forward as a core concept for the global left by Marxist-Humanists over the past decade. Such concepts of the alternative are deeply practical. As reported recently by the sociologist Edgar Morin, who joined the French resistance to the Nazi occupation in his youth, what was lacking above all in 1940 was not so much leftwing organization or support for resistance among some sectors of the population, but any sense that an alternative to the new fascist order existed. People would not risk their lives merely to restore the corrupt, Nazi-appeasing Third French Republic.

Thus, while we need to defend the democratic republic everywhere vs. neofascism, campism, and the like, and this is no small matter amid a plethora of ultra-leftist sects, we need to be utterly merciless in our critique of the centrist and slightly left-of-center forces that have brought us the Gaza genocide, larger military and police budgets, already draconian restrictions on immigration, burgeoning economic inequality, and now an ignominious defeat in the 2024 US election that has allowed a neofascist triumph.

To help us grasp what has happened and where to go from here, we need to reorganize our thinking at a theoretical and philosophical level. We need to dive once again and with new energy and creativity into the dialectic, into the concept of the alternative to capitalism, and into the dialectics of class, race, and gender in the form of an intersectional, liberationist, and humanist Marxism. Here we can of course draw on the writings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Frantz Fanon, Raya Dunayevskaya, and our own studies of their writings over the past decade, which have become widely recognized far outside our immediate circle as major contributions to revolutionary thought.

In the coming weeks, we must hit the streets to mount the largest and strongest popular resistance we can muster. To this end, we need also to form coalitions of the type of left that opposes all forms of capitalism, imperialism, and sub-imperialism, from the US to Russia to Israel, while also recognizing the racist, sexist, heteronormative, and climate-destructive nature of the present global capitalist order in ways that both unite with the working class while also opposing any form of class reductionism. Specifically, we need to defend both Palestine and Ukraine. Such a left pole can form a vital part of the anti-fascist resistance to Trumpism and its counterparts all over the world.

Sunday, November 17, 2024


Deconstructing State Capitalism


 November 15, 2024
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The term state capitalism does not have a single definition that is used with consistency and uniformity. The definitions that have been used depend on the context of the discussion, both historically and in terms of discipline or field, and the ideological commitments of the speaker or author. To understand state capitalism, it is necessary to survey the ways the state has shaped and participated in economic life within capitalist frameworks. Today, state actors around the world are adopting an aggressive economic strategy, investing heavily across sectors to position themselves optimally within the global capitalist system. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have proliferated dramatically in recent years, growing in number and increasingly occupying positions as some of the top companies in the world. In the twenty-first century, SOEs have “evolved from national monopolist[s] to global players,” expanding their reach and increasingly “operating in strategic sectors – such as energy, transport, infrastructure and logistics, banking and high-tech.” As just one example, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have grown significantly in recent years and are now some of the largest and most important investment funds in the world. “As of February 2023, assets under management of sovereign wealth funds globally stood at $11.3 trillion, up more than tenfold in the last decade.” Governments can generally mobilize much larger sums of capital than private companies—and more quickly and easily. Governments have a range of powers that make them unique among institutional investors; they can do things like tax people, control natural resources (like oil, gas, and minerals), print and disseminate money, adjust interest rates for the entire national financial system, and apply foreign exchange reserves. With their incredible masses of capital, states exert enormous and unmatched power as investors in the global market. Their actions can impact whole industry sectors and national economies. Within the current context, the term state capitalism has been deployed as a kind of smear against China and others, to differentiate their supposedly exotic, statist-authoritarian practice of capitalism from a purer and truer Western version. It is undoubtedly true that for cultural and political reasons, China does not feel the same need to obscure or euphemize its participation in the economy. But it has become necessary to mount a critical challenge to the reproduction of “extremely problematic Eurocentric imaginaries” that present a misleading picture of a supposed contest between the “vile, authoritarian state capitalism” of the East and “a more virtuous liberal-democratic form of free-market allegedly prevailing in the West.”

The idea of state capitalism has long been associated with Marxist discourse. Notably, for Vladimir Lenin, state capitalism was promoted as an intermediate phase in which the state would participate in the capitalist system under the supervision and control of the working class. Lenin believed that the consolidation associated with monopoly capitalism would prepare the way for the socialization of production through the state. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that under “[t]he objective process of development” it is “impossible to advance from monopolies (and the war has magnified their number, role and importance tenfold) without advancing towards socialism.” To Lenin, socialism must proceed directly from state-capitalist monopoly as the inevitable “next step forward.” “Or, in other words, socialism is merely state-capitalist monopoly which is made to serve the interests of the whole people and has to that extent ceased to be capitalist monopoly.” Ironically, then, were he alive today, Lenin could be expected to see current concentrations of wealth under global state capitalism as an auspicious indicator, the condition precedent to the advent of socialism under state administration. Many of Lenin’s socialist and communist contemporaries shared his conviction that capitalist monopolies were the path to state ownership and thus to an eventual full socialist state. At this point, some will ask: what are we to make of the fact that so many influential socialists saw socialism as monopoly capitalism perfected? At the very least, it shows that there were and are many visions of socialism—and of the paths thereto. During Lenin’s lifetime, several social, technological, and ideological developments contributed to his understanding of state monopoly capitalism as the immediate precursor to socialism. Whether or not they were actually implemented in the early Soviet Union, Lenin was influenced by ideas associated with Frederick Winslow Taylor and his Principles of Scientific Management. Taylorism emphasized the centralization and standardization of production processes, which Lenin believed would rationalize and optimize the allocation of labor resources. Lenin thought that under the control and direction of the state, these new methods and practices could be implemented to overcome the chaos and inefficiency of capitalism, creating a streamlined planned economy that would work for all. In line with the economic thinking of the time, Lenin saw gigantic scale as necessary for both attaining economies and making it possible for qualified experts in the state to manage the economy from the top down. It is important to understand Lenin’s point of view because it helps to explain the trajectory of twentieth century communism and to highlight, by contrast, some of the libertarian socialist and anarchist criticisms of state capitalism. Both the state capitalism of the West and the communism of the Soviet Union and China during the 20th century created morphologically similar structural and organizational patterns—centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and ruled from the top down. Lenin’s phased framework notwithstanding, the mere fact of its ownership by the state does not make a corporate entity less hierarchical or exploitative per se. Nor does state ownership, on its own, mean management and control resides in the hands of the workers. Conditions for the workers seem to depend much less on institutional names and formalities than they do on the embodied material facts of centralized power and rigid hierarchical control.

It is ahistorical to present the state as merely a neutral rule-giver and enforcer, refereeing fair play in the free market. The twenty-first century state is not passingly interested in the economy. Indeed, the state regards itself as responsible for fundamental measures of economic health such as the GDP, employment levels, inflation, and the balance of trade. The GDP is its GDP, etc. Sovereign states participate directly in the capitalist market in a wide variety of ways. They are much more active players in the capitalist “free market” than many suppose. States often compete in the market directly, with governments owning and operating firms in sectors ranging from airlines and oil and gas to telecommunications, investing, mining, agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure construction. Perhaps least surprisingly, some of the largest energy companies in the world belong to governments, including the largest in Saudi Aramco, one of the most valuable companies in the world, with a market cap of $1.9 trillion (just 6 companies have a market cap over $1 trillion). Russia owns the world’s largest natural gas company by production volume, Gazprom, “with a 10% worldwide share of the market in 2023, followed, just as in the previous year, by PetroChina.” Any real understanding of the way corporate power operates in the world today requires us to “understand the inextricable interrelation between the state and the corporation.” It is common for the mainstream conversation to treat corporate influence on policy making and the political process as a kind of breakdown of the system, a glitch or deviation. But as a historical and empirical matter, this is not at all accurate. The state is itself a corporation in the sense that it is a discrete legal entity, an artificial person separate from the group of people it represents. The first modern companies were created explicitly as the conduits of anti-competitive monopoly privileges and imperialism. The charters that created them were readily acknowledged as favors from sovereigns, granting special rights to particular spheres defined geographically and commercially. Abstract or philosophical notions about economic freedom and fair competition were of course not driving the creation of the proto-corporate economy.

Scholarly interest in the institutions, phenomena, and ideological systems often associated with state capitalism has increased over the past decade in response to aggressive government strategies to play an active and direct role within the global market. In their book The Spectre of State Capitalism, published earlier this year (the full book is available for free here), Ilias Alami and Adam D. Dixon provide a comprehensive and interdisciplinary picture of the “material, discursive, and ideological dimensions” of present-day state capitalism, with they discuss as “the new state capitalism.” Alami and Dixon hope to correct the record in part by pointing out that vigorous state intervention has been anything but an aberration in the history of capitalism:

First, we submit that state capitalism must not be seen as an anomaly or a deviance from liberal, market-based capitalism, but as a particular modality of expression of the capitalist state, including in its liberal form. State capitalism is an immanent potentiality, an impulse which is contained in the form of the capitalist state and built into its DNA.

Alami and Dixon stress that the modern state and capitalism arise together and evolve in a sophisticated and highly intertwined relationship with each other. And as they note, historically, there is no capitalism without deliberate and sustained state intervention to create it. Relatedly, in their analysis of the private sector, Alami and Dixon want to remove it from a privileged position whereby it is simply assumed a priori that private companies are necessarily more efficient, innovative, and driven. Their work encourages us to look behind a state-market, public-private dichotomy that does not accurately describe the real-world relationship between the state and the economy. The authors also want to understand the relationship between the rise of state capitalism and “secular capitalist trends of economic stagnation and the centralization and concentration of capital.” Today, global capital is extremely concentrated and centralized, with inequality soaring in recent years and a relatively small number of companies controlling each major sector. Among the major economic trends of the past several decades is “the unprecedented centralization and concentration of capital on a planetary scale.” In the United States, there are about 40 percent fewer companies today than there were 30 years ago. “In the mid-1990s, there were nearly 8,000 public companies listed in the U.S. Today, there are half as many, and at the current rate, we’ll see that number halved again by 2044.” This has led and will continue to lead to major crises. Among the fundamental contradictions of capitalism is that it expects growth in revenues and profits even as it concentrates the benefits of that growth—and all wealth—in fewer and fewer hands. Unsurprisingly, in capitalism, this phenomenon of wealth and power concentration also appears within the firm, as the size of the firm increases. Quite contrary to popular belief, the growth of state power and a modern state more willing to participate directly in economic competition have not translated to weaker corporations or a more diverse and competitive economy. Indeed, a more active and powerful state seems to lead almost ineluctably to a more centralized and oligopolistic political and economic system. Perhaps surprisingly, then, in a recent interview with Geoffrey Gordon for the New Books Network, Dixon notes that libertarian and classical liberal types could find themselves agreeing with many of the book’s core claims. The book shows that as a political and economic system, state capitalism depends on the active interventions of governments in market economies, the kinds of interventions libertarians frequently criticize. This is another of many areas of fruitful dialogue between libertarian and leftist modes of criticism.

Alami and Dixon note that quantifying state capitalism presents many practical difficulties, but using the example of the United States, we find enormous levels of government intervention and participation in the economy. Whether they admit it or not, the political establishment across both major parties in the U.S. has long been comfortable with strong and sustained federal government intervention in the economy. A certain level of positive intervention is taken for granted at the political level, and that level is extremely high under any plausible empirical approach. The United States is home to the top two state-owned enterprises by total assets, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are both currently under government conservatorship; though they are not technically owned by the U.S. government, they highlight one of the fundamental characteristics of the state capitalist paradigm: they were included in the list presumably because, formal ownership notwithstanding, the state holds the incidents of ownership, as is often the case in partnerships between the state and normally private corporations. The state is shrewd and sophisticated as a commercial actor and does not invest without holding the strings. Whatever its rhetorical pretensions, the United States has not adopted a light-touch approach to the economy. Over the past several years, the United States government’s interventions in the economy have totaled in the multiple trillions of dollars, far beyond the level of state involvement we would expect in a hypothetical free and competitive economic system (importantly, this is even without including spending associated with responses to the pandemic). Most such interventions were undertaken to benefit and prop up giant multinational companies, with, for example, several trillions going directly to defense contractors (read: war profiteers) over the past 5 years alone. As an insurance provider, the United States government manages millions of policies to the tune of trillions of dollars. The U.S. government provides grants and subsidies for domestic companies and industries, bails out banks and other financially troubled domestic industries, offers credit lines, and purchases billions of dollars worth of securities. Today, it is considered impolite to point out that the United States is an empire; it wants its vassals—particularly its first-tier ones—to feel that they are masters of their own destiny. But the United States has the power to dictate the parameters of their economic policy, and it is not at all shy about exercising this power. The United States also increasingly tries its best to police and control who can participate in the global market, through an ever-increasing list of sanctions. The idea that the United States should assume this role is asinine and would be hilarious were it not so costly in human terms: to show how serious it is about punishing its enemies and controlling the world economy, Washington will sentence millions of innocent people to entirely unnecessary death.

As observers have long acknowledged, the U.S. incarnation of state capitalism is a version of fascist political economy. In a fascist system, the economy is not centrally planned, but it is monitored, controlled, and directed toward the aims of the state, with any liberal notion of economic rights subordinated to the demands of national greatness and unity. Private ownership is permitted, but corporate power collaborates with the state as junior partner; corporations may operate and compete freely within limited commercial spheres, but they must operate as extensions of the state when called upon and must align their efforts with the goals of the state. Americans of many political stripes have begun to see such features in the visage of our government (if you’ll forgive our here). Though we are led to believe bigger is always better, large scale is integral to the systems of domination and human suffering we see around us. Capitalism has been able to absorb and overcome its critics— “it has become much more immune to social movements, much more immune to critique and judgment. A hundred years ago, it would’ve been probably a lot easier to overturn and topple the system than it is today; it’s so much more rooted in our everyday life, and the values are so taken for granted and a priori …” And speaking of absorbing its critics, just as there is no real free market in the United States, there isn’t much communism going on in China these days. From Mao’s 1938 call for the “Sinification of Marxism” to Deng’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to today, China has become comfortable with state capitalism. The Chinese Communist Party has long emphasized the distinctiveness of their socialist vision. And it is no doubt a distinctive form of socialism that unites the full state embrace of capitalism with promises of a return to national greatness, and that preserves the unquestioned political dominance of a single party.

As a social system, state capitalism is a dramatic failure, engendering a crisis of hopelessness, isolation, and dissociation, “because the society seems inalterable, unchangeable, unresponsive to our needs, and it’s crushingly—let’s be honest—meaningless.” If we were to caricature an oligarchical empire ruled by global finance capital, that system might look similar to the one we actually have in 2024. The existing system is a social illness. We have left behind our skepticism of the gargantuan and forgotten that what is giant must be dangerous—and hard to move from an ill course. We may not like the task and we may not be up to the task, but the task is clear: we must dramatically relocalize our political and economic institutions, cultivating active and direct resistance to the dominance of capital and the state over human life. We can only meaningfully counter their dominance by understanding their interrelatedness and history. The dominant system—choose your preferred name: state capitalism, monopoly capitalism, state monopoly capitalism, fascism—seems to us inevitable, but it is far from being so. Other ways of life exist, even now alongside our supposedly inevitable system, all around the world, at the still unreached boundaries of the state capitalist order. Even as the state and capital grow in power together, they have not dominated everything yet.

David S. D’Amato is an attorney, businessman, and independent researcher. He is a Policy Advisor to the Future of Freedom Foundation and a regular opinion contributor to The Hill. His writing has appeared in Forbes, Newsweek, Investor’s Business Daily, RealClearPolitics, The Washington Examiner, and many other publications, both popular and scholarly. His work has been cited by the ACLU and Human Rights Watch, among others.


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