Myanmar military strike kills 14 people at a Buddhist monastery, opposition group says

BANGKOK (AP) — The attack is the latest in a series of frequent and deadly aerial strikes targeting armed pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed groups in the country. The strikes often cause civilian casualties.

Grant Peck

August 24, 2026 

AP

BANGKOK (AP) — An airstrike on Friday by Myanmar’s military on a Buddhist monastery in Myanmar ’s central Sagaing region killed 14 people who were taking part in a weeklong meditation retreat, an opposition group and a resident said.

The attack is the latest in a series of frequent and deadly aerial strikes targeting armed pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed groups in the country. The strikes often cause civilian casualties.

The attack occurred in Swel Le Oh village in Myaung township, about 75 kilometers (45 miles) west of Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city, according to Nway Oo, a spokesperson for the Civil Defense and Security Organization of Myaung Township, or CDSOM.

Nway Oo said that 14 people, including three women, were killed and 20 others were wounded when a fighter jet dropped a bomb in the compound of the village’s monastery.

A villager who spoke on condition of anonymity, because he feared for his safety, also confirmed the death toll to The Associated Press. The villager said that the fighter jet dropped two bombs 15 minutes apart, with the second bomb damaging a house near the monastery where more than 100 people were on a weeklong retreat during Buddhist Lent.

The villager, whose mother-in-law was killed in the airstrike, said that people fled to a nearby community after cremating bodies of the victims.

BBC’s Burmese-Language service and Myanmar’s media outlets, including Myanmar Now, reported the death toll at between 10 and 14. They also posted photos and videos showing what they said was the aftermath of the strike, with images of bodies.

The military didn’t immediately comment. In the past, the army has said that it only attacks legitimate targets of war, accusing the resistance forces of being terrorists.

Myanmar has been in turmoil since the army seized power from the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021, triggering a civil war. After peaceful demonstrations were put down with lethal force, many opponents of military rule took up arms, and large parts of the country are embroiled in conflict.

The military has increasingly used airstrikes to counter opposition forces, including the armed People’s Defense Forces in Sagaing region, a stronghold of armed resistance. The resistance has no effective defense against air attacks.

The monastery attack comes a week after the U.N.-established Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, or IIMM, said that it observed a notable escalation in aerial attacks by the military in the months preceding the elections held in December and January, and that they have continued unabated afterward.

Myanmar’s foreign ministry rejected the IIMM report on Sunday, saying that limited airstrikes and counterterrorism operations solely aim at military targets and were carried out in response to insurgents and terrorist groups in accordance with the rules of engagement, and that the security forces exercise maximum restraint to avoid civilian harm.

False Flag Ops Continue to Grow in Avoidance of Sanctions

Despite the crackdowns in Europe stopping and detaining false flagged tankers the number of false registries continue to grow (UK Royal Navy)

Published Aug 24, 2026 7:53 PM by The Maritime Executive

The challenge of false flag operations continues to spread as unscrupulous operators seek the latest techniques to avoid detection and sanctions enforcement. Maritime AI data analytics firm Windward released a new report detailing the growth of false flags and the challenges of tracking down the perpetrators.

In its Q2 analysis, Windward reports there are 22 distinct fraudulent ship registries that have been identified globally. It points out they generally fall into two categories: states that do not actually have an international ship registry, or false operators who mimic legitimate flags with false operations. There are also the ships that make false claims to a legitimate flag.

The latest false flags that are emerging, according to Windward, are Syria and Myanmar, which appeared for the first time last quarter. Neither state operates an international ship registry. It points out that these countries joined Nicaragua and Equatorial Guinea, which were newly used in the first quarter.

Windward tracked 275 internationally trading tankers during the second quarter that were broadcasting the flag of a fraudulent registry. It was down slightly from the first quarter when 290 were tracked, but Windward reports “the overall  universe of falsely flagged vessels has continued to grow.” The IMO currently lists 580 falsely flagged vessels, which was up from the 550 at the end of the first quarter of 2026 and 470 at the end of 2025.

Windward writes that the practice of flying false flags is centuries old, dating back to the romantic era of piracy in the 18th century and before. Then as now, legitimate nations struggled to fight the scourge of false flags and piracy.

“What has changed in 2026 is the operational scale of the practice and the specific commercial and geopolitical purposes it now serves,” writes Maya Romi, Maritime Intelligence Content Specialist at Windward. “The scale of false flag broadcasts in 2026 is a direct response to the sanctions environment.”

As an example, Windward calculates that there are approximately 430 tankers currently active in the Iranian trade. It says 62 percent are falsely flagged, and 87 percent are sanctioned. 

The driver of false flag operations is sanctions evasion. Windward calculates that around 90 percent of tankers using fraudulent registries are Western-sanctioned. As the sanctions continue to grow, so too do the efforts at evasion and the use of fraudulent registries. 

Windward calculates that four registries, the Netherlands Antilles, Guyana, Guinea, and Madagascar, account for a large share of the falsely flagged tankers in early 2026.

“Detecting false flag vessels requires all-source intelligence that combines behavioral analysis, ownership tracing, and cross-referencing against verified maritime registry records rather than relying on the declared flag alone,” writes Romi.

Countries detect the operations and issue public notices, which discourages the fraudulent operators. For example, the landlocked Central Asian Kyrgyz Republic issued a warning to the IMO at the end of July and asked that the notification be widely distributed. Madagascar and landlocked Zimbabwe warned the IMO of illegal activity and the use of their flags, as did Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, and Tonga, while Cameroon, after seeing a massive spike in its legitimate registry and international pressure, began efforts to purge the fraudulent operators. In 2025, it was uninhabited Matthew Island east of New Caledonia that a shadowy operator was promoting as a host for a registry.

When the fraud is discovered, Windward reports some tankers shift to different fraudulent registries. Others move to legitimate flags known for weak enforcement, and it also tracked approximately 60 tankers in the first half of 2026 that, when discovered or when the pressure grew at the registries, moved to Russia’s flag. Famously, in January, the tanker Bella 1 attempted to change its name to Marinera and hide behind the Russian flag in the middle of the North Atlantic as it was being pursued by the U.S. Coast Guard. In the past, tankers have also suddenly claimed Iranian registry when they were being pursued.

Flag hopping overall, Windward says, however, has declined. It recorded a 26 percent decline in Q1 2026 compared to Q4 2025. It says seizure pressure pushed vessels toward more stable false-flag identities. There have also been efforts by many of the flags to specifically crack down on the hopping activities.

While the pressure continues to grow with sanctions and surveillance of the shadow fleet, the use of false flags persists. Even with the crackdowns such as those seen in France or Sweden, these operators continue to attempt to avoid the regulations through the use of false registries.

 

Hope Fades for Survivors as Indian Coast Guard Finds Lost Bulker's Lifeboat

Indian Coast Guard searched a damaged lifeboat from the bulker (ICGS)

Published Aug 25, 2026 1:32 PM by The Maritime Executive

The Indian Coast Guard, working with the Indian Navy, intensified the search for 22 crewmembers missing from a bulker that was believed to have sunk in the Bay of Bengal on Saturday. Additional resources have been deployed, but the Coast Guard said hope was fading after they searched a lifeboat from the vessel.

A reconnaissance aircraft from the Indian Navy picked up a distress signal from the Panama-flagged bulker Ocean Winner and visually spotted three lifeboats and rafts from the vessel. The aircraft supplied the coordinates to the Indian Coast Guard, and the patrol boat ICGS Varad reached the coordinates. It recovered the vessel’s emergency beacon and also searched a damaged lifeboat, but no one was aboard.

The Navy also reported seeing an oil slick believed to be coming from the lost bulker. The position is approximately 230 nautical miles off the Odisha coast. The Ocean Winner (72,928 dwt) had departed Paradip, India, on August 20, bound for Singapore. Built in 1998, the vessel is managed by a Chinese company. It was last inspected in June, with the reported deficiencies related to fire safety.

The Coast Guard said on Tuesday that additional resources were being deployed. Two merchant ships also joined the search. 

A good Samaritan vessel, the tanker Aisopos, reported late on Saturday that it had recovered two crewmembers from the bulker in life rafts. 

The crew told them that the ship had taken on a sudden list on Saturday morning. They said it was possibly just eight minutes until the vessel began sinking. The crew said the ship had been holding off Pradip since August 3 and had experienced significant heavy rain during that time. It then proceeded to load 72,200 tonnes of iron ore fines.

Suspicions are focusing on possible liquefaction of the cargo, but Coast Guard officials are emphasizing that no cause has been determined. They highlighted that there are prescribed transportable moisture limits for cargo and that wet loading of iron ore is prohibited. They will be investigating the conditions during loading.

The ship had a total of 24 crewmembers, including 20 Chinese nationals, three from Myanmar, and one from Bangladesh. The two rescued crewmembers are reported to be Chinese.

The Coast Guard vessels Anmol and Vijit joined the Varad and are all working the search area. 

Indian Coast Guard launches search and rescue operation after cargo vessel sinks in Bay of Bengal

Copyright Indian Coast Guard/X

By Nathan Rennolds

Published on 23/08/2026 -  EURONEWS

The crew consisted of 20 Chinese nationals, three Myanmar nationals, and one Bangladeshi, the Indian Coast Guard said.

The Indian Coast Guard has launched a search and rescue operation off the coast of eastern India after a cargo ship sank in the Bay of Bengal.

According to the Coast Guard, the MV Ocean Winner vessel issued a distress alert while southeast off the port of Paradip on Saturday before contact was lost.

Two of the 24-strong crew have been rescued from life rafts, while the Coast Guard has deployed three ships to carry out surface searches for the remaining crew members.

The crew consisted of 20 Chinese nationals, three Myanmar nationals, and one Bangladeshi, the agency said.

The cause of the sinking is not yet clear.

Sarbananda Sonowal, India's Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, said the Panama-flagged vessel had been carrying iron ore from the port of Paradip to China when it sank.

"All agencies are coordinating closely and actively doing search and rescue efforts. 2 survivors have been successfully rescued and are being given medical care; their rank and identity are currently being verified," he wrote in a post on X.

"My prayers for the safety of the remaining crew," he added.

 

Search continues for 22 after bulk carrier sinks off India

Reuters | August 23, 2026 |

Cargo terminal for unloading bulk cargo of iron ore by shore cranes and grabs. Huludao, China. Stock image.

India’s Coast Guard and Navy continued search-and-rescue operations off the eastern coast on Sunday after a Panama-flagged cargo vessel carrying 24 crew sank, with two Chinese nationals rescued, a senior official said.

The two rescued Chinese seafarers said the vessel developed a list on Friday and sank within eight minutes, forcing crew to abandon ship, Shyam Jagannathan, director general of India’s Maritime Administration, told Reuters.

Jagannathan said the chances of finding survivors generally fall sharply after 12 hours, but rescuers were continuing the search.

Twenty-two crew members remain missing from the Ocean Winner, including 18 Chinese nationals, three Myanmar nationals and one Bangladeshi, according to the Indian Coast Guard.

The Indian Navy is closely coordinating with the Coast Guard to locate the remaining crew, the Navy said in a post on X.

The Coast Guard has sent two vessels from Sri Vijaya Puram, formerly known as Port Blair, for the search-and-rescue operation, a Coast Guard spokesperson said.

The Ocean Winner was carrying iron ore bound for China after departing from India’s eastern Paradip port on Friday, according to an initial report prepared from India’s Maritime Administration.

The cargo ship sank about 240 nautical miles from the port, according to government sources.

The cause of the sinking was not immediately known.

(Additional reporting by Disha Mishra in Bengaluru; Writing by Mayank Bhardwaj; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)

 

China’s $303bn ‘shadow trade’ exposed as apparent Asia-wide tariff dodge network

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By Mark Buckton in New Taipei August 22, 2026

A White House report has identified more than 40 countries as presenting elevated risks of illegal transshipment of China-linked goods into the US, with a particular focus on manufacturing and logistics hubs across Asia.

The report, carrying the somewhat dramatic title of ‘The Great Transshipment Scam’ and headed by an image of a Trojan horse style graphic, says Chinese exporters increasingly routed goods through third countries after the US imposed Section 301 tariffs in 2018, using minor processing, relabelling, repackaging, re-invoicing or changes in documentation to create the appearance of a different country of origin.

Throughout, the report describes the resulting system as a global “Shadow Transshipment Network”. It argues that the network has developed around production hubs, logistics platforms, free zones, bonded warehouses and re-export centres that can allow China-linked goods to reach the US while reducing their own tariff exposure. It stresses, however, that the presence of a country in the network does not mean all trade from that country is illegal. Legitimate changes in production, investment and sourcing also contributed to the shift in US import patterns.

It would not be the first time such a network existed – although it would be by far the biggest if proven accurate.

A decade ago, Chinese solar manufacturers began shifting production and exports through other Asian countries after the US and EU imposed trade measures on Chinese photovoltaic products. The EU investigated allegations that Chinese solar equipment was being routed through Malaysia and Taiwan, and in 2016 extended its anti-dumping and countervailing duties to certain solar cells and modules shipped from the two countries. The investigation found a significant change in trade patterns after the duties were imposed, although it also concluded that many Malaysian and Taiwanese companies were genuine manufacturers rather than simply vehicles for tariff circumvention.

The practice became more widespread after the US-China trade war began in 2018, as Chinese-linked manufacturers expanded production across Southeast Asia. The US Department of Commerce later investigated Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, finding in 2023 that companies in all four countries had been used to circumvent US duties on Chinese solar products through limited processing before export. Commerce specifically found BYD Hong Kong and New East Solar in Cambodia, Canadian Solar and Trina Solar in Thailand, and Vina Solar in Vietnam had circumvented the duties.

The cases established a pattern that has since become familiar: Chinese solar manufacturers moved production into third countries to avoid trade barriers, making Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and, earlier, Taiwan important links in supply chains that came under US or EU anti-circumvention scrutiny.

Asia too remains central to the most recent report's assessment and places India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in its first tier of countries with large volumes of China-linked goods, diversified industrial bases and major US-bound export platforms. It puts Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam in a second tier, alongside Brazil and Turkey, because of their deeper integration into China-linked supply chains and their manufacturing, port and logistics capacity.

The report says Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have become major platforms for electronics, machinery, plastics, footwear, apparel and components incorporating China-origin inputs. Their role reflects their geographical and cultural proximity to China and their established manufacturing and logistics infrastructure. The report also identifies Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar as smaller, more opportunistic nodes, citing factors including low-cost labour, free zones, border corridors and weaker enforcement capacity.

India receives particular, and potentially unexpected attention given recent trade frictions with Beijing. The Commerce Department's Office of Trade and Economic Analysis, or OTEA, estimated that about $67bn of US-bound goods were transshipped from China through the three leading hubs of Mexico, India and Vietnam in 2025. The report says the estimate was based on exact product matching at HS8 level, with Chinese imports and US exports from the same local region in the same quarter. OTEA estimated that the activity resulted in about $28bn of lost US tariff revenue.

Vietnam on China’s southern border is also highlighted as a significant production and rerouting platform. The report cites Ho Chi Minh City as a corridor for electrical switching and circuit-protection apparatus. It says those flows correspond to US manufacturing centres in Chicago, Milwaukee and Rockford. Malaysia's Penang-Kulim cluster, meanwhile is cited for plastic articles, while Indonesia's Bekasi-Batam corridor is associated with plastic boxes, cases, crates and packing articles. Thailand's Ayutthaya-Samut Prakan corridor to the north and east of Bangkok is linked to thermostats.

The report distinguishes between production-side and logistics-side activity. Production-side nodes can involve light assembly, finishing, testing, labelling, packaging, inspection or component integration. Logistics-side nodes can instead provide routing, consolidation, warehousing, documentation changes, re-invoicing, relabelling or re-export. The report says the key question for US customs officials is whether processing amounts to genuine substantial transformation or merely changes the appearance of origin.

In the report, Cambodia is presented as an example of a production-side microhub, where China-origin inputs can undergo stitching, labelling, packaging or final inspection before being exported under Cambodian documentation. Malaysia on the other hand is described as capable of serving both as a microhub and maritime gateway, including through the Port Klang Free Zone. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are grouped as Southeast Asian microhubs, while Malaysia, Oman, Panama and the UAE are identified among maritime gateways offering free-zone re-export, port relay, container consolidation and re-invoicing capabilities.

Singapore, perhaps surprisingly given its international role as a regional financial hub appears in the report's third tier of smaller economies that can provide particular advantages for China-linked rerouting. The report also includes the Philippines and Sri Lanka in this group, alongside countries including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. It says such jurisdictions may be attractive because of factors such as port access, bonded warehousing, free zones, niche assembly capacity, preferential US market access or limited customs enforcement.

In all, the report estimates the scale of potential illegal transshipment at between about $40bn and $303bn a year, depending on the methodology. Goldman Sachs provides the narrowest estimate at $40bn. The White House Council of Economic Advisers estimates a range of $34.2bn to $89.6bn, while Exiger puts its central estimate at about $75bn. Commerce's broader trade-transfer benchmark is $109bn and Altana's upper-bound exposure estimate is $303bn. The report says these figures are not additive or directly comparable.

The claims made in the report say the tariff incentive is straightforward. Chinese goods facing higher US duties can be routed through countries where the applicable tariff is lower. The difference creates a financial incentive to move production, assembly and logistics through third countries – and it would not be the first time this has happened. It also says such arbitrage has helped finance light-assembly plants, repackaging operations and other facilities across Southeast Asia, India, Mexico and eastern Europe.

It goes on to estimate that average US tariffs on Chinese exports were close to 50% when it was published and uses illustrative tariff differentials of 25%, 35% and 45% to calculate potential losses. Under those assumptions, the estimated tariff losses range from $10bn to $18bn a year for the Goldman Sachs estimate, and from $19bn to $34bn for Exiger's $75bn estimate. Commerce's $109bn benchmark implies losses of about $27bn to $49bn.

And while the report also points to antidumping and countervailing duties as an additional incentive for circumvention, it cites Chinese solar products as an example – and as was proven ten years ago – noting later circumvention findings involving Chinese-origin inputs completed in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. It does, however, caution that this does not mean every illegally transshipped product carries such duties, but says the overlap between tariff-sensitive goods and products subject to additional duties can make the avoided cost substantially higher.

Trump ally cashing in on vape firm accused of targeting kids and a brutal junta

Kathleen Culliton
August 20, 2026 

RAW STORY

U.S. President Donald Trump holds a hat after signing an executive order in the Oval Office, at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S. February 25, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

A vape distributor accused of illegally peddling nicotine products to kids has found a champion in Washington, D.C., a former ally of President Donald Trump's who is raking in millions as a lobbyist.

His name is Roger Stone.

Mother Jones reported Thursday that Stone has earned more than $4 million as a lobbyist for firms such as vape-distributor Ecto World under the new administration.

"Trump’s return to the White House has been a tremendous boon to Stone, who not long ago was claiming he had been nearly bankrupted by legal fees," Mother Jones reported.

The report describes him as a "conspiracy theorist and political provocateur who was convicted of lying to Congress and witness tampering in the Trump–Russia investigation, sentenced to 40 months in prison, and subsequently pardoned by Trump."

Stone’s lobbying firm Drake Ventures has signed up a slew of clients that include the cryptocurrency investor “Bitcoin Jesus,” indicted last year on federal fraud charges, and the military junta in Myanmar, reportedly paying Stone $50,000 a month.

Crimes against humanity have spiked in the Junta since the military takeover in 2021, the report notes.

As for Ecto World, it stands accused in New York of trying to get people hooked on nicotine.

"New York State Attorney General Letitia James sued Ecto World and other vape companies for illegally distributing, marketing, and selling addictive candy- and fruit-flavored disposable nicotine products," the report states, "many produced in China, targeting sales to children and fueling the youth vaping epidemic."

 

Russia and Myanmar sign ten documents as Putin dangles LNG, nuclear power and a deep-water port

Min Aung Hlaing's first Moscow trip as president produced a long list of agreements, an anti-sanctions declaration and very little trade. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 19, 2026

Russia and Myanmar signed ten documents in the Kremlin on August 18, including a joint declaration on countering Western sanctions.

The talks between Vladimir Putin and Myanmar's president Min Aung Hlaing produced a package covering nuclear power, liquefied natural gas, a deep-water port and search-and-rescue satellites.

It was the former junta chief's first official visit to Russia since he took the presidency in April, and the fifth country he has visited in the role after India, China, Laos and Thailand. He has made four previous trips to Russia as junta leader, the first in June 2021, five months after seizing power.

The substance was almost entirely prospective. Behind a package covering everything from nuclear power to search-and-rescue satellites sits a bilateral trade relationship worth less than $75mn a year - roughly what Russia earns from crude oil exports in about three hours.

The signing was headed by the Declaration of the Russian Federation and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on Ways and Means to Counter, Mitigate and Redress the Adverse Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures - the standard Russian formulation for Western sanctions, and the clearest statement of what each side is getting from the other. Both are under sweeping Western restrictions; neither can do much about it except say so together.

The rest were interagency memoranda: electric power and oil and gas, the electronics industry, digital technologies, information and communication technologies, culture and the arts, satellite navigation and manned space exploration, the Cospas-Sarsat search and rescue system, and ASPOS, Russia's automated warning system for hazardous situations in near-Earth space. A memorandum was also signed between Russia's Federal Anti-Monopoly Service and Myanmar's Competition Commission.

The one item with a commercial mechanism attached was a set of protocols implementing an April 16, 2026 memorandum between Russia's RC-Investments Fund and Myanmar's Ministry of Electricity and Energy, covering long-term supplies of liquefied natural gas.

Energy was where Putin spent most of his statement. “Joint construction of a power plant and an oil refinery in southern Myanmar is under consideration,” he said, adding that Russian companies were “ready to participate in hydrocarbon exploration and production, including offshore”.

On gas he was more specific about the ambition than the timetable: “There are good prospects for exporting liquefied natural gas to Myanmar, both for domestic consumption and for transit to neighbouring countries.” Myanmar is a gas producer in long-term decline whose Yadana field is fading, and which has spent two years rationing fuel - the idea of it becoming an LNG transit route for Russian cargoes is a considerable stretch of the map.

The nuclear project got the strongest billing. “Last year, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the construction of a Russian-designed nuclear power plant in Myanmar,” Putin said. “This is truly a flagship bilateral project.” That agreement, signed in March 2025 by Rosatom director general Alexei Likhachev and Myanmar science and technology minister Myo Thein Kyaw, covers a 110MW small modular reactor with scope to expand to 330MW. Myanmar has no nuclear power, generated 24.3 TWh of electricity in 2019, and is a country where armed resistance groups control something close to a third of the territory.

Putin also listed “an ironworks and an organic fertiliser production facility” under construction, and plans “to build a deep-water seaport on the country's southern coast capable of handling large-capacity vessels”.

That last one is the Dawei project, and it is where the Russian corporate involvement is actually visible. Inter RAO (MOEX: IRAO) has been working up a coal-fired power plant, an oil refinery and an LNG terminal tied to the Dawei deep-sea port, and signed an agreement in June with the Launglon Economic Development Company. Gazprom (MOEX: GAZP) International has discussed the engineering for the Dawei refinery. RosGeo signed a memorandum in October 2025 to run an artificial-intelligence pilot extracting gas from thin sand layers at five wells in the Aphyauk field - Myanmar's first AI-based production enhancement project.

The most substantive economic disclosure was about plumbing rather than projects. “Reliable financial settlement mechanisms have been established,” Putin said, “with two-thirds of commercial transactions now conducted in Russian rubles.”

That is the real achievement here, and it is a sanctions-evasion achievement rather than a trade one. Mir cards are now accepted at Myanmar hotels and shops. Myanmar's central bank delegation went to Moscow in July to talk to Sberbank (MOEX: SBER) about cybersecurity, fraud prevention and its biometric Smile Pay system, and attended a St Petersburg forum on ruble-based digital payment platforms and cryptocurrency regulation.

Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov set out what Russia actually ships. “This year we began supplying large volumes of mineral fertilisers, previously only petroleum products,” he said, adding Russia was “ready to further increase our supplies of mineral fertilisers, petroleum products, engineering products and, of course, agricultural products” and to “increase imports of light industry and agricultural products from Myanmar”. He said the relationship was “now entering the investment phase”.

The base is very low. Bilateral trade ran at $34.45mn in the 2020-21 fiscal year and $74.73mn in 2023-24 - more than doubling, and still negligible. Myanmar sends Russia garments, socks, mango puree, footwear, bags and human hair. Russia is also raising labour quotas for Myanmar workers, of whom some 3.5mn are already employed across Southeast Asia.

On security Putin was brief but unambiguous. “Our countries have established close military and military-technical cooperation,” he said. “Bilateral naval exercises are regularly held off the coast of Myanmar, and Russian Navy ships also make port calls there.”

No new defence document was announced. A five-year military cooperation agreement was signed in February 2026 and its terms have not been published. The existing relationship runs through arms sales to a military blacklisted by Western governments, army training, and university scholarships for thousands of Myanmar soldiers. Russian is now taught at the universities of Yangon and Mandalay and at the Defence Services Academy; about 400 Myanmar students are at Russian universities and more than 7,000 have been educated there in total.

Min Aung Hlaing said the two had discussed cooperation in “defence, security, tourism, agriculture, healthcare, and a number of other fields”, and used his statement mainly to advertise. “Myanmar has a strategically advantageous geographical location. There are huge sales markets near our country. We have rich resources, a wonderful climate and a coastline of more than 1,300 miles,” he said. “That's why we want to invite investors from Russia to cooperate with our country. Dear Mr President, I ask you to support the arrival of investors in Myanmar.”

He also delivered the line the visit was designed around: “Myanmar is a reliable partner of Russia in Southeast Asia. Myanmar always stands ready.”

Putin's own framing leaned on history rather than commerce. “Russia and Myanmar are bound by truly strong, time-tested ties of friendship, partnership, and mutual support,” he said, noting Soviet support for Myanmar's nation-building in the 1950s and 1960s and that relations established in 1948 had become “especially trusting in recent years”. He thanked Min Aung Hlaing for “your assistance in promoting Russia's relations with ASEAN” - which is the other thing Moscow wants here, given Myanmar's seat in a bloc where Russia has limited traction.

He opened with condolences for the monsoon floods still running in Myanmar, and Min Aung Hlaing reciprocated by thanking Russia for sending rescue teams after last year's earthquakes: “Russia promptly dispatched rescue teams, and many of our people were rescued. I still remember this.”

The softer items were unusually prominent for a summit read-out, which tells you something about how much hard material there was. A Myanmar consulate general is to open in Vladivostok. Myanmar cultural and religious centres already operate in the Altai Territory and the Kaluga and Moscow regions. Min Aung Hlaing told Putin an agreement had been reached to build a Russian Orthodox church in Yangon. He goes on to the Republic of Tuva, a centre of Russian Buddhism, and to a Russia-Myanmar business forum at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics on August 19, organised by Myanmar's embassy and the Roscongress Foundation.

Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, whom Min Aung Hlaing also met, offered the same forward tense as everyone else: “We see excellent opportunities to boost our bilateral trade, economic, and investment potential,” and a readiness to share Russian work on “the digital economy, autonomous electronic systems, and artificial intelligence applications”.

What Min Aung Hlaing came for is not really the LNG or the reactor, neither of which is close to delivery. It is the photograph. He took the presidency in April after a general election held in only 102 of Myanmar's 330 townships, with a claimed 52% turnout, which UN experts and rights groups called neither free nor fair. Since then he has been collecting state visits. Russia, which needs friends in ASEAN and buyers who will settle in rubles, is the least demanding host available, and the one most willing to sign a joint declaration saying that sanctions are the problem.

How Myanmar’s SMEs Are Coping With An Economy Of Uncertainty – Analysis


Credit: The Sabai

August 20, 2026

Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

By Hsu Latt Phyu

Key Takeaways:

Myanmar’s SMEs are navigating an economy shaped by inflation, power shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and policy uncertainty, forcing many businesses to prioritise survival over growth.

Despite these challenges, SMEs have demonstrated resilience through practical adaptation strategies, including alternative energy use, flexible workforce arrangements, informal financing, and digital innovation.

Strengthening SME resilience through supportive policies, improved infrastructure, access to finance, and capacity-building initiatives will be critical for Myanmar’s long-term economic sustainability and recovery.

1. Introduction

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has faced a prolonged polycrisis characterised by political instability, inflation, currency depreciation, power shortages, trade disruptions, and labor migration. More recently, fuel supply disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict have further increased production and transportation costs, amplifying existing economic vulnerabilities. While large firms may possess greater financial capacity to absorb shocks, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been disproportionately affected. Yet despite operating in an environment where uncertainty has become the norm, many SMEs continue to adapt and survive. This article examines how Myanmar’s SMEs are coping with an economy of uncertainty.

2. Myanmar’s Current Economic Situation

Although Myanmar’s economy showed signs of a modest recovery in early 2026, the improvement remains fragile amid ongoing political instability and economic uncertainty. Inflation rose to 24.6 percent in April 2026, driven largely by higher fuel and transportation costs, while the depreciation of the kyat increased the price of imported goods and raw materials. At the same time, foreign exchange controls and import restrictions have made it more difficult for businesses to access essential inputs, while conflict-related disruptions continue to raise logistics costs and delay deliveries. Businesses also face persistent electricity shortages, forcing many to rely on generators and alternative energy sources, which increase operating costs. Meanwhile, labor migration, skills shortages, and compulsory military service have made recruitment increasingly difficult. Together, these challenges have pushed many SMEs to prioritize survival and adaptation over growth.

3. The Role of SMEs in Myanmar’s Economy

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are widely recognized as the backbone of Southeast Asian economies, accounting for over 90 percent of businesses and employing a large share of the workforce. In Myanmar, SMEs make up 94 percent of enterprises and between 52 and 97 percent of total employment. Beyond their economic contribution, SMEs play an important social role by creating livelihoods, supporting local communities, and generating income opportunities in both urban and rural areas.

However, despite their importance, SMEs continue to face significant structural challenges. Previous studies have highlighted constraints such as limited access to finance, outdated technology, low productivity, and poor market access. Moreover, formal policy support for SMEs remains limited, reducing their ability to reach their full economic potential.

4. Challenges Facing SMEs

Since 2021, Myanmar’s SMEs have faced overlapping economic, operational, workforce, and financial challenges. Unlike large corporations, SMEs are often more vulnerable to external shocks and have fewer resources to absorb rising costs.

Inflation, currency depreciation, and fuel price increases have significantly raised production and transportation costs, while weaker consumer purchasing powerhas reduced demand and squeezed profit margins. At the same time, frequent power outages, import restrictions, and supply chain disruptions continue to increase operational uncertainty and business expenses.

International sanctions have added further pressure on some SMEs. Although sanctions primarily target military-linked entities, Myanmar’s military-dominatedeconomy means that restrictions on financial transactions, trade, and supply chains can also create unintended spillover effects for civilian-led SMEs. These indirect impacts make it more difficult for businesses to access foreign currency, credit, imported inputs, and international markets, placing additional pressure on firms with limited financial resources.

Labor shortages have become another major challenge, driven by skills gaps, outward migration, and compulsory military service, resulting in higher recruitment and training costs. Access to finance also remains limited, as many SMEs face difficulties obtaining affordable credit and must cope with ongoing liquidity constraints.


Together, these challenges have created a business environment where many SMEs prioritise survival and continuity rather than growth and expansion.

5. Resilience of SMEs in Myanmar

Despite operating in an increasingly uncertain environment, many Myanmar SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience by adapting their business models and day-to-day operations. Rather than pursuing expansion, many firms have focused on maintaining continuity, preserving cash flow, and responding flexibly to changing circumstances.

5.1 Energy Adaptation

Frequent power outages have forced businesses to invest in alternative energy sources such as diesel generators and off-grid solar systems. In October 2025, approximately 42 percent of firms’ electricity consumption came from diesel generators and off-grid power sources. While these investments increase operating costs, they enable businesses to continue production and maintain essential services during prolonged outages.

5.2 Workforce Adaptation

To cope with labor shortages caused by outward migration, skills mismatches, and compulsory military service, many SMEs have adjusted how they manage their workforce. As the labor market shifts toward more informal, part-time, and casual employment, particularly in urban areas, firms have adapted by relying on more flexible labor arrangements to maintain business operations. Many businesses have also raised wages and provided short-term training to attract and retain workers, despite the additional costs involved. These workforce adjustments have enabled SMEs to sustain operations in an increasingly constrained labor market.

5.3 Financial Adaptation

Limited access to formal credit has encouraged SMEs to explore both formal and informal financing mechanisms. Following the 2025 earthquake, state-backed recovery loans and subsidised lending programs contributed to a significant increase in SME lending. At the same time, informal financing remains an important coping mechanism. Some firms rely on loans from friends and family, while many businesses facing cash-flow shortages use personal networks to sustain operations. These informal support systems often serve as an important source of resilience when formal financial channels are difficult to access.

5.4 Digital Adaptation


Myanmar’s digital economy has long been shaped by social commerce, with Facebook serving as a major platform for communication, marketing, and online sales. However, internet restrictions and the nationwide VPN block introduced in 2024 disrupted access to many digital platforms and reduced online business activity. In response, SMEs have diversified their digital presence by adopting alternative channels such as Telegram, Viber, and TikTok to reach customers and maintain sales. This ability to adapt to a rapidly changing digital environment highlights the flexibility and innovation that characterise many Myanmar SMEs.

Although these adaptive strategies have helped businesses survive, resilience should not be mistaken for recovery. Many firms continue to face significant constraints and remain focused on sustaining operations rather than pursuing long-term growth.

6. Recommendations

Strengthening the resilience of Myanmar’s SMEs requires coordinated efforts from businesses, policymakers, and development partners.

For SMEs

SMEs should continue investing in energy diversification through solar power and other alternative energy solutions to reduce vulnerability to electricity disruptions.
Businesses should also adopt digital tools such as e-commerce websites, chatbots, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled customer service, and digital payment systems to improve efficiency and expand market access.

Where possible, firms can strengthen local supply chains by sourcing raw materials domestically to reduce dependence on imports and foreign exchange volatility.
Developing workforce retention strategies, including employee training, flexible working arrangements, and career development opportunities, may also help address labor shortages.

For Policymakers

Policymakers should prioritise improving electricity infrastructure, facilitating access to affordable financing, and simplifying import and licensing procedures.
Expanding vocational training programs and workforce development initiatives can help address skills shortages.

In addition, targeted tax relief and regulatory support for SMEs could reduce operational burdens and encourage business investment.

For Development Partners and the International Community

Development partners can support SME resilience through renewable energy programs, digital literacy initiatives, business continuity training, and concessional financing schemes.

Technical assistance and capacity-building programs can also help SMEs strengthen their ability to adapt to future economic shocks while contributing to inclusive and sustainable economic development.

Governments imposing sanctions, such as the EU and the United States, should strengthen targeted sanctions while minimizing unintended impacts on civilian-led SMEs by maintaining access to essential financial services, trade, and humanitarian support.

7. Conclusion

Myanmar’s SMEs support SDG 8 and SDG 9 by creating employment, sustaining livelihoods, and demonstrating innovation in the face of economic challenges. SMEs are operating under extraordinary economic pressures arising from inflation, energy shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and political uncertainty. Despite these challenges, many businesses continue to survive through adaptation, flexibility, and innovation. From investing in alternative energy sources to adopting new digital platforms and informal financing mechanisms, SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of prolonged uncertainty.

However, resilience should not be viewed as a substitute for structural economic reform. The future of Myanmar’s economic sustainability will depend not only on macroeconomic stabilisation and improved infrastructure but also on strengthening the resilience of SMEs.

About the author: 

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

Source: This article was published at The Sabai


About Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

The Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is a hybrid think tank (non-partisan) and consultancy firm that advances sustainable governance, policy innovation, and sustainability literacy in Myanmar. Through its Sustainability Lab, SRIc conducts in-depth public policy research and analysis to promote sustainable development and guide Myanmar toward a more resilient, equitable, and environmentally conscious future. SRIc provides strategic policy advocacy, CSR consultation, and the development of sustainability roadmaps grounded in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. These services support public institutions and private sector actors in aligning their operations with the Sustainable Development Goals. By integrating rigorous research with actionable consultancy, SRIc supports responsible business practices, fosters innovative CSR strategies, and designs impactful sustainability pathways. SRIc contributes to local transformation & global sustainability efforts through this dual approach.
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