Wildlife & Landmines: The Lasting Legacy of Passive Weapons

by Christopher Bancroft | May 22, 2026 |

Horrifically deadly and widely implemented on a global scale, landmines continue to speckle the landscape of current and past battlefields. And while effective in a passive sense, the hardware planted beneath the soil persists long after the inevitable conclusion of war. Innocents and combatants who survive the barrage of bullets and bombs are left with a sadistic game of whack-a-mole – including the wild and domesticated animals.

Rudimentary explosives first appeared in China as early as the Song Dynasty. Continued development eventually gave rise to the modern pressure-activated landmine, which appeared on the battlefields of the American Civil War. Seen as a cowardly method of waging war at the time, the improvised explosive devices continued to gain popularity.

Since the Vietnam War, many variants of mines have been concocted and deployed in the field. This includes the proliferation of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives. For the purposes of this piece, we will focus on anti-personnel mines due to their sensitivity and tendency to detonate with less pressure applied.

​The production, transfer, and use of anti-personnel landmines have been greatly reduced, notably following the signing of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, which specifically addresses the use of mines, foreign and domestic. Many nations agreed to the treaty, though it excludes the signatures of China, Russia, and the U.S.

​However, mines continue to be used in modern theaters of war, and the historic placement of mines predates 1997, meaning an unknown number of AP mines patiently wait across the planet for a specific amount of pressure to be applied. And these explosives do not discriminate – hoof or foot, they are ready to go.

​Post-conflict wildlife interactions with landmines have largely remained unstudied, but specific negative interactions have been documented. Famously, in the case of “Mosha,” the Thai elephant that stepped on a mine following their use during a conflict between Myanmar and Thailand. The mine blew half of her front leg off while walking through the jungle on the border of the two nations. Mosha found refuge at a Thai sanctuary, where a prosthetic leg was built for her.

​In a short BBC video, host Michael Portillo describes the border between Myanmar and Thailand as “littered with landmines.” Few elephants are as fortunate as Mosha; many die immediately or succumb to infection.

​According to the Conflict and Environmental Observatory, for the 20 years that followed the conclusion of the Vietnam War, “At least 40,000 animals were killed by unexploded landmines.”

Liberally used in many conflicts and notoriously untracked, these weapons strike fear into the communities near them and continue to kill and maim, long after the guns have been put down. Their indiscriminate nature was reported on by the New York Times in 2001.

​Author Seth Mydans wrote, “Suffering is shared by injured animals of all sorts, in many countries. According to press reports, land mines have killed camels in western China, tigers in Cambodia, water buffalo in Vietnam, elephants in Sri Lanka and gazelles in Libya. Snow leopards have reportedly been killed in Afghanistan; bears, deer and foxes in Croatia; blue sheep and musk deer in Kashmir.

​Ironically, in some circumstances, the placement of mines has arguably benefited certain ecosystems. A noted reduction in human encroachment and poaching has occurred since the hardening of the border between South and North Korea.

​According to a piece published by The Guardian, “the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, is home to thousands of species that are extinct or endangered elsewhere on the peninsula. It is the last haven for many of these plants and animals and the center of attention for those intent on preserving Korea’s rich ecological heritage.”

​Millions of mines remain as a relic of the Saddam Hussein regime in the Zagros Mountains, which divides Iraq and Iran. Again, paradoxically, these weapons of war have arguably helped wildlife.

​Peter Schwartzstein, writing for National Geographic reports, “The market for leopard pelts has mostly dried up, but there is still a certain cache associated with ensnaring such an exotic creature. As a result, the harsh penalties attached to killing leopards haven’t done much to dissuade determined trophy hunters.”

​Continuing with, “The land mines, though, do a good job of keeping people off certain peaks, and these have become the leopard’s favorite haunts.”

​And while some conservationists scratch their heads in these paradoxical situations, the predominant opinion remains negative towards the use of mines. Beyond animals, the persistent presence of fields filled with explosives tortures humans psychologically and economically.

​Once fertile ground quickly becomes a “no-go” zone and a distant memory of past prosperity. Active de-mining operations continue, though the sheer number of mines in use makes that effort an uphill battle. War seems to inevitably target the innocent, regardless of species.

Christopher Bancroft is a Wyoming native, writer, and photographer specializing in hunting, fishing, and conservation stories. Passionate about the outdoors and the natural world, Bancroft seeks to highlight the human and environmental impacts of critical issues through authentic storytelling. Many of his previous works can be found on the MeatEater website.

India’s strategic $9 bn megaport plan for pristine island


By AFP
May 18, 2026


Local residents sit o Old Shastri Nagaram Beach on the outskirts of Campbell Bay on Great Nicobar Island - Copyright AFP Shubham KOUL

Bhuvan BAGGA

On a remote island in the Andaman Sea, bulldozers are tearing into pristine forests that are home to one of Earth’s most isolated people — part of India’s ambition for a $9 billion megaport, airport and city.

Designed to rival China’s investments around the Indian Ocean, New Delhi’s colossal project will be built on Great Nicobar Island, a site offering a naval presence far closer to Southeast Asia than India’s mainland.

Authorities promise sweeping economic transformation at the entrance to one of the world’s busiest waterways — the Strait of Malacca, through which up to 30 percent of global trade passes.

But secretive military moves are also afoot, with plans for upgraded or new runways for both military and civilian use.

“The Great Nicobar Island Project, which is of strategic, defence and national importance, transforms the region into a major hub of maritime and air connectivity in the Indian Ocean region,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in September.

Access to parts of Great Nicobar requires special permits, particularly for any contact with Indigenous groups.

Roads, bridges and docks will be built on the island, opening it up for port activity and tourism, and serving expanded military installations.

But the project, nearly 3,000 kilometres (1,860 miles) from New Delhi, has also sparked opposition from residents and environmentalists.

Roughly 95 percent of the 910 square kilometre (351 square mile) island, encircled by lagoons and coral reefs, is biologically under-explored forest rich in unique species.

Nearly a fifth of the land will be cleared for the project.

Rights group Survival International warned that the island’s Indigenous groups face “genocide in the name of ‘mega-development'”.

Totalling around 1,200 people, these include the Nicobarese as well as the Shompen, hunter-gatherers who shun contact with outsiders, who Survival describes as “one of the most isolated peoples on Earth.”

– Strategic –

The government insists it has met all “green” requirements and has pledged to protect Great Nicobar’s peoples, communities, as well as its unique flora and fauna, by establishing protected zones.

India’s environmental court has said that it did “not find any good ground to interfere” with the plans.

“We have also noted… the area is located in China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy which is sought to be countered by Indian authorities under India’s ‘Act East’ policy,” the court added.

Beijing has long been accused of seeking to develop facilities around the Indian Ocean — a so-called “string of pearls” — to counter India’s rise and secure its own economic interests.

Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav has said that the project “poses no threat to the island’s tribal groups, does not come in the way of any species, and does not jeopardise the eco-sensitivity of the region”.

The first $4 billion phase on Great Nicobar — construction of a port at Galathea Bay and airport at Campbell Bay — should be completed within three years, according to the archipelago’s governor, former navy admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi.

Once finished, the container port will handle more than 20 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), making it one of India’s three largest ports.

“In the long run, it may well be competing to become the container handling hub in the entire Indo-Pacific region,” Joshi said, rivalling Singapore and Malaysia’s Port Klang.

The megaport may be the showpiece, but the new infrastructure on the southern tip of the 836-island archipelago is only part of a grand plan for the chain, stretching 800 kilometres (500 miles).

Government development plans envision the expansion of existing naval and air facilities across the islands.

Joshi has said two new airports will be built — in the archipelago’s capital Sri Vijayapuram and on Great Nicobar — and older runways expanded to three-kilometre strips, capable of handling heavy-lift cargo aeroplanes.

“All of them will be dual-use runways, used by military and for commercial flights,” Joshi said in February.

One already upgraded runway, on Car Nicobar island, was inaugurated in January by India’s Chief of Defence Staff, Anil Chauhan.

Beyond the runways, the military aspect of the project remains largely secret.

Yet the island’s strategic position has not escaped notice over the centuries, from India’s medieval Cholas to the British, all of whom stationed warships there, just 175 kilometres (110 miles) from Indonesia.

“Great Nicobar Island is like India’s unsinkable aircraft carrier,” said Nitin Gokhale, a New Delhi-based security expert.

“The fact that everyone, including the Chinese, can see our ability to keep a close watch, creates a new paradigm for us.”

– ‘Nonsense’ –

But environmentalists view the plans with dread.

Manish Chandi has been one of the few to regularly visit the small villages of the Nicobarese, which are off-limits except with special permission.

“I just don’t understand the rationale for the project,” Chandi said, noting that there was no clarity about how huge investments can be recovered economically.

Plans extend beyond the port to include a gas-solar power plant, hotels, and a town across 161 square kilometres — multiple times larger than the archipelago’s capital.

The island’s population is projected to grow, from 9,000 people today to 336,000 by 2055.

Tourism projections anticipate 98,000 visitors by 2029, and more than one million by 2055.

The government has promised to compensate for the swathes of trees cut down by planting seedlings in Haryana — a northern state next to New Delhi.

“It is all nonsense,” Chandi added. “We are removing crocodiles from their natural habitat, and saying we are going to conserve them.”

– ‘Duty’ –

Some islanders warn that the isolated Indigenous populations’ millennia-old culture risks being bulldozed away.

“If we lose control of these lands, our culture too will be lost,” said the Nicobarese’s most senior leader, 54-year-old Barnabas Manju.

The Indians who arrived from the mainland are also sceptical.

The first families from outside the islands only settled in 1969, encouraged by the government who feared losing control of the sparsely populated territory.

Sharda Devi, 55, a settler’s daughter, recalls the first arrivals “toiling in some of the harshest conditions” to carve plantations out of the tangled forests.

She initially welcomed the project, before realising the airport would encroach on her land.

“The government is going to take back 11 acres (4.5 hectares) alloted to my father, without offering us another suitable plot of land or even proper compensation,” she said.

Her neighbour, 71-year-old Kusum Mishra, who arrived 50 years ago, also dismissed the “petty compensation” offered, complaining that “they are uprooting us and destroying our lives.”

– ‘See the world’ –

Around 400 kilometres away, change is already starting to ripple through the archipelago’s island of Little Andaman, which Joshi has said will see the “next developmental thrust” after Great Nicobar.

Raja, one of just 143 surviving members of the En-iregale, or “perfect person” in their language, describes a life on Little Andaman where his people still fish in bountiful coral reefs or hunt wild boar in the areas of forest still protected by their millennia-old stewardship.

“We don’t need anything from the government — or anyone,” he told AFP, stressing that “we have everything”.

Past forced contact with outsiders brought trauma, including disease outbreaks that devastated Indigenous populations lacking immunity.

Many of Raja’s community, more widely known as the Onge, still live in near isolation in neat thatched homes on stilts in coastal forests.

But contact is growing rapidly today, even if outsiders are barred from entering Indigenous territory, with members curious about the wider world — and the modern comforts it can offer.

Authorities, treading a delicate line in managing an increasing number of visitors, began last year to recruit more than 500 young men from communities across the archipelago as police “homeguards”.

“They are sons of the soil,” said HGS Dhaliwal, police chief of the archipelago.

Raja, along with his friend Jhaj, was among the first five men from their community recruited.

Jhaj, who speaks some Hindi, which he learnt in a government school around their settlement, has become a keen volleyball player.

Weeks after completing his training, he made a major drug seizure, after finding a seven-kilogramme (15-pound) methamphetamine stash, hidden by traffickers who ply the Andaman Sea south from Myanmar.

“These developments point to better things on the horizon,” Ashish Biswas, 54, who works for a government-backed society, Andaman Adim Janjati Vikas Samiti (AAJVS), which mediates between locals and outsiders.

“I see so many of them in our local school wanting to study and improve, to follow Jhaj and Raja’s inspiration.”

Raja said that his salary was attracting other young members of his community, interested in the world beyond their island.

“They now know that if they wear the uniform, they too will get to travel outside the village and see other places,” Raja said.
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Occupation and Genocide Anywhere Are a Threat to Democracy and Freedom Everywhere

Not only is taking a stand against the overwhelming devastation that has been unleashed on Palestinians a duty, but also an obligation for people desiring peace and liberation for all.

Members of the group Defend Our Juries publicly declare their opposition to Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza and their support for the proscribed group Palestine Action while Metropolitan Police officers look on before arresting them during a July 4, 2025 demonstration in London.
(Photo by Kristian Buus/In Pictures via Getty Images)

Koketso Moeti
May 20, 2026

Common Dreams

Earlier this year a number of participants announced their withdrawal from Australia’s Adelaide Festival’s “Writer’s Week” following the disinviting of Australian-Palestinian author, Randa Abdel-Fattah. The event was subsequently cancelled.

This made me think of United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Francesca Albanese’s words—“The occupation of Palestine must be understood as part of a broader project of domination. This is not merely about the physical borders of historical Palestine. It is a systematic assertion of permanent supremacy that knows no border…”—delivered in her Nelson Mandela Lecture.

Indeed, the impact of the ongoing genocide and occupation not only echo far beyond Palestine, because of our shared humanity, but also because of the impact it is having on freedoms across the globe. The censorship of Abdel-Fattah is yet another example of this, and it is not only happening in Australia. Even in South Africa, a country that charged Israel with genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), artists are facing attempts to constrain their work.

The global wave of solidarity with Palestine has been used by some governments as a pretext to diminish freedoms by attacking the right to protest and political participation. While some did this by using laws that were already in place, others enacted ambiguous or unduly expansive legislation criminalizing Palestine solidarity and weaponizing the battle against antisemitism.

Protecting the freedom to advocate for Palestine is essential to protecting the right to protest, a fundamental tenet of democracy.

For instance in the US, Project Esther was released by the Heritage Foundation, a right-wing think tank also responsible for the odious Project 2025. The strategy’s recommendations have made their way into the policy of the Trump administration. This includes suing, firing, deporting, and defaming activists, organizations, and institutions by effectively claiming that involvement in advocacy for Palestine is material support of “a terrorist support network.” And also clamping down on college and university campuses where “more than 3,100 people have been arrested or detained.”

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, used counterterrorism legislation to ban Palestine Action. This despite an intelligence assessment report undermining the government’s claims by finding that most of the groups’ activities are “not terrorism” and the ban risked wrongfully criminalizing people. While the ban has been found to be unlawful, since put into effect in July 2025 terrorism arrests have increased by 660%, with the majority of these linked to it.

Across Europe Palestine solidarity was particularly targeted, like in Germany where the homes of pro-Palestinian activists have been raided and support for Israel has become a prerequisite for citizenship.

The effects of these actions will not be limited to Palestine advocacy and puts all movements at risk by diminishing freedoms that enable organizing across issues. So protecting the freedom to advocate for Palestine is essential to protecting the right to protest, a fundamental tenet of democracy.

Research by investigative journalist and author of The Palestine Laboratory, Andrew Loewenstein, identified over 120 countries that have bought weapons or some form of repressive technology from Israel, all principally tested on Palestinians.

Israel provided military and strategic support to apartheid South Africa’s invasion of Angola, resulting in mass casualties; it is among the countries that armed perpetrators of Rwanda’s genocide and Myanmar at a time it was found to be committing a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” against its Rohingya Muslim population.

In modern times Israel’s offerings have included drones, spyware, and surveillance tools. Like the Israeli-made spyware being used by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an immigration agency that has been found to not only undertake abusive practices, but also violate its own policies.

For us in South Africa though, this is no surprise. The “homeland” of Bophuthatswana, where I was born and raised, was a product of the South African apartheid regime’s segregationist policies—which Israel took interest in—and stripped Black people of South African citizenship.

Like other homelands when it declared “independence” in 1977, it was shunned by the world. Despite its official stance, Israel was the only country to quietly recognize Bophuthatswana through informal connections and a quasi-diplomatic mission. A Jerusalem Post editorial in 1992 even referred to Bophuthatswana as “Africa’s Little Israel.”

The backdrop of this relationship was the “clandestine alliance” between Israel and South Africa’s apartheid regime. Not only did the two countries collaborate on nuclear, but Israel would also become South Africa’s largest weapons importer after the 1977 UN arms embargo and support the regime’s attempt to undermine sanctions.

It was a relationship of mutual admiration, an ideological alignment that in recent times is only matched by India’s admiration of Israel.

Apartheid had far-reaching consequences that extended beyond South Africa’s borders. Along with unlawfully occupying Namibia, a colonial legacy embraced by the regime, it also launched hostilities in countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. Similarly, Israel continues to conduct atrocities and aggression not only against the Palestinian people, but also in places like Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. More recently, more than 300 people have been killed and scores injured following Israel’s 10 minute assault in Lebanon—despite a two-week Middle East ceasefire, which Israel would afterwards claim did not include Lebanon. In the same way apartheid was deemed a threat to international peace and security, so too is the occupation and genocide in Palestine.

Not only is taking a stand against the overwhelming devastation that has been unleashed on Palestinians a duty, but also an obligation for people desiring peace and liberation for all. Because beyond the bombs, Israel has used international humanitarian law to try to justify the murder of civilians—a template being adopted by others like the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.

Like the people of South Africa and oppressed people everywhere, the people of Palestine too will continue to make their rightful claim to freedom. And for the sake of humanity everywhere, people of conscience must continue to stand with them and keep the fire of freedom within reach.

Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


Koketso Moeti
Koketso Moeti has a long background in civic activism and has over the years worked at the intersection of governance, communication, and people-power.
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The Chance To Break ASEAN’s Glass Ceiling – OpEd

 May 19, 2026 

By Jonathan Manullang

The next nomination for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) secretary-general in 2028 could determine whether the bloc remains strategically relevant—or continues drifting into institutional inertia.

For the first time in decades, Indonesia will be shaping how ASEAN responds to rising geopolitical rivalry, internal divisions, and declining public confidence. The question is not whether the nominee should be male or female, but what kind of leadership ASEAN now needs.

ASEAN is entering one of the most uncertain periods in its history. Rivalry between the United States and China continues to intensify, while regional tensions test the organization’s cohesion. At the same time, ASEAN faces a quieter challenge: growing doubts about its relevance among its own citizens.

Jakarta’s decision in 2028 must be understood in this context. A conventional appointment drawn from familiar diplomatic circles may preserve internal balance, but it will do little to address ASEAN’s deeper weaknesses.

The next secretary-general must offer more than administrative competence. The role now requires strategic vision, crisis management skills, and the ability to communicate ASEAN’s relevance to a wider public. The organization can no longer rely only on consensus to manage increasingly complex challenges.

Recent experience highlights the problem. Beyond its widely criticized handling of Myanmar, ASEAN has struggled to present a unified position on the South China Sea. Divisions among member states have repeatedly blocked strong joint responses to incidents involving Chinese vessels and Southeast Asian claimants. Negotiations with China on a binding Code of Conduct have dragged on for years with limited progress.

Economic integration has also moved unevenly. Despite the ASEAN Economic Community framework, implementation gaps and competing national priorities continue to slow deeper coordination. This shows ASEAN’s difficulty in turning plans into action.

These challenges are not new. Past secretaries-general, including Surin Pitsuwan, Le Luong Minh, and Lim Jock Hoi, helped raise ASEAN’s international profile and expand its partnerships. But their tenures also reflected the organization’s limits: constrained authority, dependence on consensus, and cautious diplomacy.

Those limits remain, but the environment has changed. ASEAN now faces pressures that demand more adaptive and visible leadership. This is why Indonesia’s 2028 nomination matters. It is a chance to redefine what ASEAN leadership should look like in the future.

Indonesia often presents itself as ASEAN’s natural leader—the region’s largest economy, its most populous democracy, and a central diplomatic actor. But leadership claims bring expectations. If Jakarta defaults to a safe, conventional nominee, it risks reinforcing the view that ASEAN’s talk of reform and inclusion lacks substance.

A more forward-looking approach would recognize that competence and institutional change are not mutually exclusive. For nearly six decades, ASEAN has never been led by a woman. That pattern now looks structural rather than accidental. Breaking it would carry strategic weight, not just symbolic value.

A qualified female secretary-general would meet the demands of merit-based selection while signaling that ASEAN can evolve with the societies it represents. Such a decision would strengthen the organization’s credibility on inclusion and project a more modern identity.

Indonesia does not lack capable candidates. Across diplomacy, government, and international organizations, Indonesian women have the experience needed for the role. The constraint is not capacity, but political will.

The next secretary-general will also inherit a region under strain. ASEAN’s difficulty responding to political crises, managing major power rivalry, and maintaining unity has exposed the limits of its traditional approach. Restoring confidence will require leadership that is diplomatic, visible and engaged.

ASEAN’s long-standing disconnect from its citizens makes this even more urgent. For many Southeast Asians, the organization remains distant and technocratic. A secretary-general who can engage younger generations, civil society, and the private sector could help change that perception.

Indonesia’s choice in 2028 will send a clear signal. A cautious nomination would suggest ASEAN remains comfortable with incremental change. A more ambitious choice would show a willingness to adapt.

The country has a rare opportunity to redefine ASEAN leadership—making it more inclusive, more strategic, and more responsive. Choosing a secretary-general who represents both professional excellence and institutional renewal would not just mark a historic first. It would show that ASEAN is capable of evolving instead of just enduring.

Myanmar: No Redress For Rohingya Muslims In Arakan Army Massacre, HRW Says

File photo of Arakan Army soldiers in Myanmar. Photo Credit: Arakan Army

May 19, 2026 
By Eurasia Review


Two years after the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group, killed and wounded hundreds of Rohingya Muslims and burned down their village in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the survivors remain unable to return home, with many effectively detained, Human Rights Watch said in a report released Monday. The Arakan Army has rejected responsibility for the massacre at Hoyyar Siri (Htan Shauk Khan in Burmese), Buthidaung township, which involved grave violations of the laws of war amounting to war crimes.

The 56-page report, “‘Skeletons and Skulls Scattered Everywhere’: Arakan Army Massacre of Rohingya Muslims in Hoyyar Siri, Myanmar,” documents the May 2, 2024 attack, in which Arakan Army fighters deliberately fired on unarmed villagers who were seeking safety after the armed group advanced on two Myanmar military bases in the vicinity. Details of the massacre only began emerging more than a year later, after some survivors fled to Bangladesh and Malaysia.

“The Arakan Army’s murder of hundreds of Rohingya civilians and the burning of their village in Rakhine State in 2024 took the armed conflict with Myanmar’s junta to a new level of depravity,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Today, the massacre’s survivors are effectively detained by the Arakan Army, which has neither provided redress nor held those responsible to account.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed several dozen witnesses and survivors, corroborated their accounts by satellite imagery, and analyzed and verified photographs and videos.

Hostilities between Myanmar junta forces and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State resumed in November 2023. Both sides have been responsible for serious abuses, including targeted attacks on civilians, arson, and unlawful conscription. The findings contradict the Arakan Army’s claims in a letter to Human Rights Watch that its fighters only targeted military personnel or members of Rohingya armed groups.


Arakan Army fighters first opened fire on a group of civilians leaving Hoyyar Siri, some of whom were waving white flags. “First, my son was hit by a bullet,” said one man. “Then my wife and baby daughter were shot, followed by my other daughter.” The fighters continued to fire on the villagers as they turned back and attempted to flee.

One woman said the fighters gathered a group of villagers in a paddy field beside a mosque. “Within minutes they opened fire at us randomly, without saying anything,” she said. “No one was spared. My husband was hit by a bullet. When the Arakan Army saw he was still alive, they came closer, firing at him several more times.”

Human Rights Watch compiled a list of over 170 villagers, including about 90 children, who were killed or are still missing after the Hoyyar Siri massacre. The actual death toll is likely much higher.

Human Rights Watch analyzed and verified photographs and videos showing human remains at three separate sites in the village. At two of these sites, civilian clothing is visible among human remains. Satellite imagery corroborates witness accounts that Arakan Army fighters set fire to Hoyyar Siri and, after taking control, destroyed the entire village.

The fighters also robbed villagers of their cash and jewelry. One man detained by the Arakan Army said that he and other detainees were beaten and tortured, including with electric shocks. Several witnesses reported that fighters abducted Rohingya women and girls from the village.

In February 2025, the Arakan Army ordered all surviving Hoyyar Siri residents to relocate to a makeshift camp nearby. Villagers who later managed to flee to Bangladesh told Human Rights Watch that they were denied freedom of movement, subjected to forced labor, and faced severe shortages of food and medical care. They said that in August, the armed group organized a controlled media visit to Hoyyar Siri in which survivors were forced to provide false testimony to exonerate the Arakan Army for killing the civilians.

Over the past decade, the Myanmar military has committed ethnic cleansing, genocidal acts, and other atrocities in Rakhine State that have forced over a million Rohingya to flee. The massacre in Hoyyar Siri underscores that returning to Rakhine State is still unsafe for Rohingya refugees, even in areas now controlled by the Arakan Army.


The Myanmar military and Arakan Army should immediately end attacks on civilians, release all civilians unlawfully detained, and provide redress to victims and their families, Human Rights Watch said. The Arakan Army in its letter to Human Rights Watch said it would facilitate inquiries by international human rights groups deemed credible and independent. Both parties should cooperate fully with independent investigations, including by granting access to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the United Nations special rapporteur on Myanmar, and human rights groups.

“Myanmar’s military seemed indifferent to the plight of the Rohingya civilians at Hoyyar Siri in 2024, and since then the junta has done nothing to address their broader human rights concerns,” Ganguly said. “Concerned governments should urgently press both the Myanmar junta and the Arakan Army to respect the rights of all communities in Rakhine State.”

India Among 4 Countries in HKH Region That Saw Over 10 Major Disasters in 2025

Mohd. Imran Khan | 16 May 2026

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ICIMOD’s analysis of EM-data shows that across the region, about 1.2 million people were displaced or directly affected by disasters last year.

Representational Image. Image Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons

Climate change has increased the risk of disasters. India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan in the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region experienced more than 10 major disasters in 2025, as per a latest scientific study by experts.

Asia accounted for a large share of disasters globally in 2025, a trend reflected in the HKH, which spans parts of South and East Asia. Four of the eight countries in the HKH region are more vulnerable to disasters, according to data analysis by the Kathmandu-based ICIMOD, highlighting the region’s growing exposure to hazard-related risks.

ICIMOD’s analysis of EM-Data shows that countries in the HKH region experienced economic losses of more than $$6 billion in 2024 alone from these events, with most of the damage linked to water-related hazards, such as floods, landslides and storms.

The situation continued into 2025. Intense monsoon rainfall triggered repeated flooding and landslides across several HKH countries, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. Other hazards, such as glacial lake outburst floods, were also reported in select locations. Across the region, about 1.2 million people were displaced or directly affected by disasters during the year. 

Globally, disaster-related economic losses in 2025 were estimated at more than $169 billion. In comparison, losses recorded across the HKH highlight how extreme events translate into disproportionate impacts in a region characterised by complex terrain and high exposure. 

Data also shows that Myanmar, Pakistan, and China experienced a series of monsoon-induced floods in 2025, causing widespread damage to infrastructure and livelihoods. 

Researchers link the increasing impact of disasters in the HKH to the growing prevalence of multi-hazard events. Multi-hazards occur when more than one type of hazard, such as floods, landslides, or droughts, happen at the same time or when one hazard triggers another. Past examples in the region include the Kedarnath floods in Uttarakhand in 2013, and the South Lhonak glacial lake outburst flood in Sikkim in 2023, India, as well as the Melamchi flood in Nepal in 2021. 

“Recent years show how floods, landslides, and other hazards are increasingly overlapping in mountain regions, amplifying damages to homes, infrastructure, and essential services,” said Pema Gyamtsho, Director General at ICIMOD, commenting on the regional trend. 

Long-term data covering the period from 1975 to 2024 shows a decline in death rates and the number of people affected by disasters in the HKH after 2013. Analysts caution that data gaps may influence this trend, but improvements in preparedness and early warning systems may also be contributing factors. 

“The numbers are still worrying, but the post-2013 trend suggests fewer lives are being affected year on year, which may reflect better climate services and preparedness in parts of the region,” said Manish Shrestha, a hydrologist at ICIMOD, adding that “sustained investment in preparedness and planning remains critical as risks continue to rise.” 

Early warning systems have been credited with reducing losses in some flood-prone areas. In eastern Nepal, alerts issued from a flood early warning system along the Khando River in 2024 helped inform and evacuate around 60,000 people living downstream. 

Analysts note that reducing future disaster losses in the HKH will also depend on risk-informed investments, where development and infrastructure planning take multi hazard risks into account. Without integrating hazard and vulnerability data into investment decisions, exposed communities risk locking in higher losses as climate driven extremes intensify. 

Experts warn that multi hazard risks are likely to intensify in the coming years as climate change alters weather patterns and increases the frequency and severity of extreme events, leaving exposed communities across the HKH vulnerable to escalating losses.

The U.S. Leans Toward War, China Toward Trade – OpEd

May 17, 2026 
By Alejandro A. Tagliavini


We are not going to tire of repeating it, violence always destroys, especially the one who initiates it. That is why states, when they use their monopoly of violence to impose “laws” and “regulations”, what they achieve is that their countries are backward.

Thus, while the federal state of the United States has chosen to close its borders with more customs tariffs and various military interventions, the Chinese, although communist and authoritarian, has acted more wisely by opting for freer trade. And the results are indisputable.

On an ironic note, Trump’s best ally, another supporter of state interventions, the president of Argentina, “betrays” him behind his back and increases his trade with China.

Gabriel Cohen publishes in Visual Capitalist the following graph and article that leaves no room for doubt. Compare (in blue) the trading partner countries of the United States and in red those of China, in the year 2000 vs 2025:

Key points

In 2000, only 33 countries traded more with China than with the United States.

By 2025, China had become the top goods trading partner for most countries in the world.

Only a handful of African countries continue to trade more with the United States than with China.

Twenty-five years ago, the United States was the world’s dominant trading power. Today, China has surpassed it as the top goods partner for most countries globally.

This map compares whether countries traded more with the U.S. or China in 2000 and 2025, based on total bilateral imports and exports using data from the IMF’s Trade Statistics Directorate.

China’s rise was fueled by its emergence as a global manufacturing hub and growing demand for raw materials such as oil, copper, iron ore and soybeans.

The United States entered the 21st century with a good tone of support. After the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy and open markets were expanding throughout the former Soviet bloc, while global trade was mainly focused on the U.S. consumer market.


In 2000, only 33 countries traded more with China than the United States. Many of these countries were Chinese neighbors such as Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Others were states with strained or no relations with Washington, including Cuba, Iran, Libya and North Korea.

For her part, Tasmin Lockwood, also in Visual Capitalist, shows another graph that visualizes those countries most dependent on imports from China.



Ironically, it turns out that technology is China’s biggest export. Cheap commercial products have historically been associated with the “Made in China” seal, but today technology is its biggest export after consolidating itself as a strong manufacturing hub with cheaper labor.

Integrated circuits, which are central to most modern technologies, make up the bulk of exports and highlight China’s critical role in global supply chains; mobile phones and cars follow.

And by the way, the world is critically dependent on China for the processing of critical minerals, which are used in everything from consumer electronics to basic military systems. This reliance has prompted U.S. policymakers to try to strengthen and diversify local capacity.

Is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan imminent?

Issued on: 17/05/2026 - FRANCE24

After nearly a decade since his last visit, US President Donald Trump is meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in a historic summit focused on global trade, technological rivalry and rising tensions over Taiwan, one of the world’s most sensitive flashpoints. 🇹🇼China claims Taiwan as part of its territory while the United States continues to back the island with military support and strong diplomatic ties. Caught in the middle is a resilient democracy that has become one of Asia’s greatest success stories, despite never being formally recognised as a sovereign state by most other countries. 🎥FRANCE 24's Stella Elgersma takes a closer look at the tense triangle between Taiwan, China and the United States: how it came to be, what's really at stake and whether a military confrontation is truly on the horizon.

Video by: Stella ELGERSMA

Did Trump just sell the world in Beijing?

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By bne IntelliNews May 15, 2026

The optics were the policy. Donald Trump arrived at Beijing Capital International Airport on May 13, accompanied by Elon Musk, Tim Cook, Larry Fink, Jensen Huang and the chief executive of Boeing. The next morning he was received at the Great Hall of the People by Xi Jinping, walked through an honour guard of the People's Liberation Army, and within hours of the opening ceremony agreed a joint position on Iran's nuclear programme and the Strait of Hormuz. Xi reciprocated with the warmest welcome accorded any Western leader since the founding of the People's Republic. The summit ran two days. The aftershocks will run longer.

From outside the room, the visit looked less like a stabilisation exercise than what Bonny Glaser of the German Marshall Fund called, before Trump boarded the plane, the risk of "a tacit or explicit bargain in which Washington appears to concede a sphere of influence to Beijing over Taiwan" in exchange for concessions elsewhere. That formulation, reported by CNBC on May 11, has since become the lens through which the Trump visit is being read across four continents. In Taipei, in Riyadh, in Moscow, in Warsaw, in Brasília and in Astana, the question being asked is not whether Trump struck a grand bargain. It is whether he sold something that was not his to sell.

Begin with the Middle East. The White House readout of May 14 confirmed that Trump and Xi had agreed "Iran can never have a nuclear weapon" and that "the Strait of Hormuz must remain open." Xi, on the same readout, made clear "China's opposition to the militarisation of the Strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use," and expressed interest in purchasing more American oil to reduce Chinese dependence on Hormuz crude. Al Jazeera's analysis on May 15 noted that the Chinese statement, by contrast, omitted any explicit reference to Iranian nuclear weapons, instead calling for "political settlement" and "dialogue and consultation."

For the Gulf monarchies, watching from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the spectacle of Washington and Beijing co-announcing the terms on which their region's principal waterway would be reopened, without any Gulf state present in the room, confirmed every suspicion that has been building since the Iran war began on February 28. The American-led security order, the one for which Saudi Arabia and the UAE pay through arms purchases and which the Trump administration has spent fifteen months actively dismantling, is now being negotiated bilaterally with China over their heads.

Iran's interpretation was sharper. Chinese state media circulated Xi's softer language and Iranian officials briefed regional outlets that Beijing had not in fact endorsed the American position. The Soufan Center's May 13 brief observed that China had "defended Iranian sovereignty and security concerns" and "resisted US-backed efforts at the United Nations to pressure Iran over the Strait of Hormuz." Tehran's working assumption is that Xi will pocket whatever trade and rare-earths concessions Trump delivered, and continue to buy Iranian crude at the discounted prices Beijing has paid since March. The Iranian leadership has, in effect, been told it has no patron, only a buyer. The Gulf monarchies have been told the same thing. Neither will forget.

In Moscow, the calculation runs in the opposite direction but reaches the same conclusion. The Conversation, in a May 14 analysis subsequently republished by Asia Times, observed that Vladimir Putin will have watched the Trump-Xi summit nervously. Dennis Wilder, a former US intelligence official quoted by CNBC on May 11, put it plainly: "Russia would be nervous about an overall improvement in US-China relations." Putin's relevance to Beijing has rested on three propositions: that the Sino-Russian partnership is "no limits," that Russia provides China with discounted hydrocarbons and strategic depth against the West, and that Trump and Xi cannot do business directly. Each is now under strain.

Xi did not accept Trump's invitation to pressure Russia on Ukraine, on CSIS's reading, and Beijing will continue to prop up the Russian war economy. But the symbolism of the summit, the warmth of the welcome, and the fact that Putin's own Beijing visit was scheduled to follow Trump's rather than precede it, have signalled to the Kremlin that it is now the junior partner not just of China, but of an emergent China-led arrangement to which Washington has been admitted as an interlocutor rather than excluded as an enemy.

For the post-Soviet states of Central Asia, the implications are immediate. The Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments have spent the past three years balancing China's Belt and Road infrastructure with American security partnership and Russian inertia. The Trump-Xi summit, occurring in the same month as ongoing C5+1 ministerial discussions, suggests that the American leg of that triangle has been quietly redefined. Astana now has to plan for a world in which the United States and China coordinate at the strategic level on questions affecting Central Asian transit corridors, critical minerals and trans-Caspian logistics. The Soufan Center's January reading of the Iran-Russia-China axis, that Western alliance-system analysis no longer fits the region, applies with equal force to the CIS.

In Latin America, the visit lands on already-frayed ground. Caracas, since the US naval blockade of Venezuelan ports earlier this year, has assumed Washington will not negotiate. Brasília and Mexico City, both of which sent senior delegations to the EU-CELAC summit in Santa Marta last November where Trump was conspicuously absent, now read Beijing's diplomatic graduation as confirmation that Latin America's most consequential strategic relationship is no longer with the country to its north. Argentina's Milei government, the only Latin American capital genuinely aligned with Trump, finds itself isolated within the region. The Council on Foreign Relations, in its May 8 preview, noted that Trump's new China policy has been reduced to "not fighting," and that the structural agenda, Taiwan, technology controls, and Beijing's "active support of US adversaries such as Iran and Russia," has been quietly shelved. Latin Americans, watching their Chinese trade lifelines deepen as US engagement thins, have drawn the obvious conclusion.

Eastern Europe is the most exposed. Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn have spent the post-2022 period rebuilding their security architecture on the premise that American commitment to NATO's eastern flank was non-negotiable. The Greenland crisis of January, the Pentagon's withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany on May 1, and now the Beijing summit have compounded into a single message. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk's earlier post on X about "the ongoing disintegration of our alliance" reads, in retrospect, as the first European acknowledgement of what the Trump-Xi visit has made unavoidable. If Washington is now coordinating with Beijing on the terms of Middle Eastern security, the working assumption in Warsaw must be that a similar coordination on the terms of European security is not far behind. The Eastern flank cannot afford to discover otherwise too late.

The Council on Foreign Relations editorial of May 8 captured the deeper problem. "Not fighting" is now the north star of American China policy, which means that the structural issues, China's support for Russia, its position on Iran, its mercantilist trade model, and its designs on Taiwan, have been relegated. What the rest of the world saw in Beijing was not a stabilisation but a transactional alignment between the two powers most able to reshape the international order without the consent of those affected by it. Graham Allison, the Harvard scholar quoted by CNBC on May 14, predicted Trump would emerge with announcements of "an additional $1 trillion of American goods" purchased by China. The world's response is that the bilateral arithmetic of US-China trade is not what matters. What matters is what the rest of the international system was traded for.

That is the diplomatic damage Trump has done. The visit was sold as an act of statesmanship. It has been received, from Riyadh to Warsaw and from Caracas to Astana, as an act of betrayal. The grand bargain may not exist. The suspicion that it does will outlast the summit by years.