Liberal Christian denominations condemn US actions in Venezuela, call for peace

(RNS) — Four days after the raid that extracted the Venezuelan leader and his wife and brought them to face federal charges in New York, nearly every mainline Protestant group has condemned the US actions.

Protesters demonstrate outside the White House, Jan. 3, 2026, in Washington, after the U.S. captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in a military operation. (AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson)

Yonat Shimron
January 7, 2026
RNS

(RNS) — Four days after the U.S. military seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in a strike on Caracas that took nearly everyone by surprise, liberal Christian denominations have begun to criticize the raid.

The bishops of the United Methodist Church on Wednesday (Jan. 7) issued a statement “condemning all acts of violence, military aggression, and violations of national sovereignty” and urging its members to pray for the Venezuelan people.

The United Methodist Church does not have churches in Venezuela, a mostly Catholic country with growing numbers of Protestants and other faiths, but it does have autonomous Methodist churches.

In the letter, the United Methodist bishops pointed to their social principles that oppose war and violence. It did not mention the deposed Venezuelan leader by name. Neither did it mention President Donald Trump, who ordered the raid that extracted Maduro from the country and brought him to a New York City jail. On Tuesday, he pleaded not guilty to federal drug and weapons charges.

The Episcopal Church was quicker to respond. An Action Alert released Saturday — the same day as the raid — by its Office of Government Relations condemned the use of military force “aimed at disrupting a non-imminent, uncertain military threat.” It also called on Congress to investigate the operation, which it said “marks a striking and unprecedented escalation of conflict.”

RELATED: Vatican faces ‘complicated’ balancing act in responding to US arrest of Maduro

The Episcopal Church has more skin in the game. The denomination has a diocese in Venezuela with 17 congregations and several more missions. The diocese’s provisional bishop, Cristóbal Olmedo León Lozano, is stationed in Ecuador.

“The Episcopal Church called for an investigation and accountability, first because of our 2009 resolution condemning ‘the first use of armed force in the form of a preventive or preemptive strike that is aimed at disrupting a non-imminent, uncertain military threat.,” said Rebecca Linder Blachly, chief of public policy and witness for the Episcopal Church. “Also, we are firm supporters of the United Nations, and this operation lacked legal authorization under international law, per the UN charter. Additionally, there was no congressional authorization for the use of military force nor advance notice to all required members of Congress.”

The Rev. Canon David Ulloa Chavez, the Episcopal Church’s partnership officer for Latin America and the Caribbean, said he has spoken via phone with the provisional bishop and has been assured that no church members have been injured so far.

“From what I understand, everyone is safe,” Chavez told RNS. “There is this sort of ambiguity around what is actually taking place. There’s sort of a nervous calm at this stage.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told members of Congress on Wednesday that the Trump administration has plans for a prolonged mission in the country that included taking control of its vast oil reserves.

Many Venezuelan migrants to the U.S. celebrated Maduro’s capture. Political and economic insecurity under Maduro’s authoritarian rule has led to an exodus of some 7.9 million Venezuelans as of December 2024, according to the Migration Policy Institute. As of 2023, some 770,000 Venezuelan immigrants had entered the U.S. In 2021, the Biden administration designated Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, which grants legal immigration status to people fleeing countries facing armed conflict or humanitarian crises. Trump ended the program last year.


Venezuela, red, is located on the northern coast of South America. (Map courtesy of Wikimedia/Creative Commons)

But inside the country, some have described an uneasy quiet and deep fears about what might come next.

Chavez said he and leaders in the Episcopal Church’s province that covers Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, are talking about how to better support Venezuelans who are leaving via its long western border with Colombia. “How do we partner for the sake of our migrating neighbors that are coming into not only our province, but throughout the region?” Chavez said.

Other liberal Protestant denominations have also condemned the U.S. action. The United Church of Christ and the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) released a joint statement condemning the attack, saying it posed a “troubling pattern of unlawful U.S. military activity, including the December 25, 2025, airstrikes in Nigeria.”

The World Council of Churches also condemned the raid and Maduro’s capture, saying the U.S. actions constituted “stunningly flagrant violations of international law.”

And Pope Leo XIV voiced “deep concern” over the situation. “The good of the beloved Venezuelan people must prevail over every other consideration,” he said in a Sunday address, with an appeal to end the violence and guarantee the country’s sovereignty.

Caracas Residents Describe Terror of US Invasion as They Worry for What’s Next

“It was a massacre against defenseless people,” a mother of three said of the US operation to abduct Maduro.

By Rodrigo Acuña , 

Truthout

January 9, 2026

A woman attends a march to demand the release of kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 8, 2026.Federico PARRA / AFP via Getty Images

“Several helicopters were dropping bombs, and the windows shattered from the shockwaves,” Caracas resident Paola Rosal told Truthout, describing her experience of the U.S. attack on Venezuela on January 3.

Rosal, a mother of three who lives in Ciudad Tiuna, a massive government-built housing project located in the Fuerte Tiuna military complex in Caracas, said she was alone getting ready to take a shower when “the power went out, and the first bomb fell near my building.” Feeling a sense of terror and panic, Rosal describes how she fled and, for a while, was alone in a carpark. Her mother, who was in her own apartment with her daughters, witnessed a bomb drop in front of her apartment which shattered all of the windows.

“When we went outside to take cover, the next bomb fell,” Rosal told Truthout. “People didn’t know where to go for shelter. It was so awful that my daughter doesn’t want to go back, and like her, many other people feel the same way.” Rosal, a married 40-year-old owner of a bodega, has long voted for the leaders of the Bolivarian revolution: first President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), and then President Nicolás Maduro, who won his first election by a narrow margin in early 2013.

Rosal said she has concrete criticisms of Maduro’s government: For example, she is concerned that the government’s decision to distribute weapons to citizens in preparation for a full-scale U.S. invasion could result in pro-government civilian armed groups (colectivos) gaining more power, and that worries her.

But Rosal was vehement in her outrage and fury in response to the U.S. attack.

Experts Say Even Average Venezuelans Critical of Maduro Won’t Back Regime Change
A US military attack “would bring more chaos, more poverty,” one Caracas resident said.
By Rodrigo Acuña , Truthout  December 16, 2025

“It was a massacre against defenseless people,” Rosal told Truthout, expressing that she is still frightened, angry and uncertain about the future and adding that the U.S. military attack “damaged the infrastructure, the buildings where we live, and killed civilians,” including “the elderly.” Full data has yet to come out on the ages of all the people killed in the strike, but The New York Times confirms that 80-year-old Rosa González was among the dead.

“The way the helicopters attacked indiscriminately is unacceptable,” Rosal added, calling Trump a “violator of all rights,” and decrying how Trump “enters our country as if nothing is wrong, and no one says a word to him.”
The Trump Administration’s Attack on Caracas

At around 2 am on January 3, the bombs ordered by U.S. President Donald Trump commenced falling on Venezuela. The bombs hit the country’s largest military complex, Fuerte Tiuna, whose perimeter contains the civilian Ciudad Tiuna housing project, which is far larger than the military facilities and which is home to tens of thousands of people. The capital’s electricity was also cut off for several hours in sectors of the south, center, and west of Caracas.

Near the capital, the Generalissimo Francisco de Miranda Air Base (La Carlota) was hit, as was the Port of La Guaira — the primary maritime gateway for the Caracas. According to the Venezuelan News Agency, in La Guaira, warehouses of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security, which holds supplies for dialysis and nephrology programs, were also bombed. Outside of the capital, the Barquisimeto F-16 Base was reportedly hit, as was the Charallave Private Airport and the Higuerote Military Helicopter Base in the state of Miranda.

On January 7, DW News (the international news branch of Germany’s public media outlet) said 24 members of Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Armed Forces were killed, as were 32 members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba and the Ministry of the Interior who were serving an international security mission in a sister Latin American nation. (Due to several agreements between Caracas and Havana, since 1999 thousands of Cuban doctors, nurses, teachers, and sports trainers have been working in Venezuela. By 2009, the number stood at 42,000 Cubans, several of whom have been on military missions.)

Officially, on January 8, the Venezuelan government said 100 people were killed with a similar number injured. On January 3, The New York Times reported that, on the U.S. side, “about half a dozen soldiers were injured” in the operation.

Roughly two-and-a-half hours after the bombing commenced, Trump publicly declared that the United States had “successfully carried out a large-scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolás Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the country.” The first image to be released of 63-year-old Maduro showed him in a Nike tracksuit, handcuffed and wearing blackout goggles, with his ears covered. On January 5 it was noted that Maduro’s 69-year-old-wife, Cilia Flores, in a New York court, had a bandage on her head, bruises on her face, and was suffering “significant injuries,” according to her lawyer.

Venezuela Residents and Political Analysts Express Fears for the Future

Jessica Falcon, a Caracas state employee in her late thirties, is deeply worried about the future of Venezuela and the actions of the Trump administration. Asked by Truthout what she thought about the act of war by the United States toward her homeland, Falcon said:


Once again, the U.S. is doing whatever it pleases with the complicit gaze of the rest of the world and multilateral organizations. Venezuela is experiencing a period of great tension, and this violation of our sovereignty seems outrageous. Archaic colonialism in the 21st century — a true step backward.

Corporate media outlets in the United States, Britain, and Australia have focused on the military details of Washington’s illegal actions in Venezuela, using words like “capture” or “arrest” rather than “kidnapping” to describe what the U.S. did to Maduro and Flores.

In contrast, within Venezuela state media have focused on interviewing injured soldiers and civilians. Venezuelan media have also covered Delcy Rodríguez, formally the vice president, being sworn in as the acting president of Venezuela, saying, “I come with pain for the suffering that has been caused to the Venezuelan people after an illegitimate military aggression against our homeland.”

On the streets and online, two key questions are repeatedly asked: How was the U.S. military able to completely disable Venezuela’s air defense systems? And were there people inside Maduro’s inner security circle that betrayed him?

Speaking to Truthout, Clinton Fernandes, a professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia who assess the threats, risks and opportunities that military forces face in the future, said: “Over the past 10 years, there has been a revolution in sensing and precision technologies, eroding the survivability of air defenses and the targets they seek to protect.” Fernandes claims that “new sensors in all domains, including air, space, and cyberspace, have increased enemy transparency.” This development, he said, shaped the course of events last year when Iran’s nuclear facilities were bombed in June 2025, and also shaped the outcome of the U.S. attack on Venezuela.

Fernandes added:


The U.S. has been at the cutting edge of technological advances in stealth, sensing, and precision. Stealth allows it to approach targets undetected. It has guidance systems with advanced inertial sensors relying on stellar updates, sensors, data processing, communication, artificial intelligence, and a host of other products of the computer revolution. Its advantages allow it to create openings for disarming strikes against enemy positions and forces.

Caracas-based Ricardo Vaz, who is a writer and editor at Venezuelanalysis.com, told Truthout that the outcome of the U.S. strike is forcing analysts to reassess previous “expectations concerning Venezuela’s military capabilities and readiness.” Vaz added:


There was an assortment of Russian-supplied short-, medium- and long-range surface-to-air weapons which failed to offer much deterrence to the invading U.S. forces. It is possible that U.S. air power, including bombers and electronic warfare planes, managed to completely neutralize air defences.

Meanwhile, speaking recently to journalist Jeremy Scahill, Venezuela’s ex-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for North America Carlos Ron said that while he did not want to speculate that someone inside Maduro’s security detail betrayed him, “you can’t rule out that something to that effect happened.”
What Comes Next for Venezuela?

Back in Washington, during his first press conference after Maduro and Flores’s kidnapping, a gloating Trump declared: “We are going to run the country,” in reference to Venezuela. He added: “We’ll have the greatest oil companies in the world going in, invest billions and billions of dollars. … And the biggest beneficiary are going to be the people of Venezuela.” When asked about installing opposition leader María Corina Machado, who claimed the 2024 presidential election was stolen from Edmundo González, who ran on her behalf, Trump replied: “She doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country.” On January 9, Trump claimed he would meet with Machado in the next week.

Asked to comment on the ramification of Washington’s actions in Venezuela, Luis F. Angosto-Ferrández — a scholar at Sydney University and the author of the book Venezuela Reframed — predicted that the Trump administration “will use the kidnapping of President Maduro (and the forthcoming theatralisation of his trial) as another mechanism of destabilisation and pressure on the Venezuelan government.” Still, Angosto-Ferrández argued, “it is evident that they continue to fail in their attempts at making the government collapse.”

While a clearer picture will develop as future events unfold under the pressure of the current U.S. economic blockade on Venezuela, Angosto-Ferrández says:


What is clear is that the U.S. government’s expectations of an immediate collapse of Venezuelan governance and institutionality are not going to happen even with the kidnapping of Maduro. Other than that, the U.S. may decide to continue with its illegal attacks, and perhaps even invade the country with the goal of controlling it in part — basically, enclaves that give access to oil and perhaps minerals.

Constantly paraded in front of the global media in a humiliating manner as he is being transported (it is illegal to publicly degrade prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention), Maduro has shown himself to be cordial with his captors while making a two-handed symbol — one hand forming a “V,” the other pointing toward it — meaning “Nosotros venceremos,” or “Together we will win”.

In front of a judge in New York on January 5, President Maduro in Spanish declared: “I am innocent. I am not guilty. I am a decent man.” He described himself a “prisoner of war” and said he was illegally captured.

The four charges that the U.S. has made against Maduro are narcoterrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation conspiracy, possession of machine guns and destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess machineguns and destructive devices.

Maduro has hired Barry Pollack — the distinguished U.S. trial lawyer who spent years representing Australian WikiLeaks editor Julian Assange — to join his legal team.

Meanwhile, with Maduro’s next court appearance set for March 17, the U.S. armada continues to sit off the coast of Venezuela while crushing economic sanctions are imposed on the Latin American country.


This article is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), and you are free to share and republish under the terms of the license.

Rodrigo Acuña
Rodrigo Acuña holds a PhD on Venezuelan foreign policy from Macquarie University. Together with journalist Nicolas Ford, last year he released his first documentary Venezuela: The Cost of Challenging an Empire. Rodrigo has been writing on Latin American politics for close to 20 years and publishes a newsletter on Latin America. He works the NSW Department of Education and can be followed on X (Twitter) @rodrigoac7.

Israel, Somaliland, And Turkey: Recognition Battleground In The Horn Of Africa – Analysis

Map of Somaliland. Credit: Wikipedia Commons

January 9, 2026 
By Scott N. Romaniuk

Many regions illustrate the fault lines of contemporary geopolitics, and the Horn of Africa is among the most revealing. Long treated as peripheral to Middle Eastern power struggles, the region has become a critical junction where maritime security, ideological competition, and post-colonial sovereignty converge.

Recent discussions on Israel’s diplomatic recalibration in Africa have brought Somaliland’s status back into focus. What was long a dormant issue has become an active geopolitical fault line, generating divisions between Israel and numerous countries and drawing condemnation within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Within this context, Israel’s decision on December 26 to recognize the breakaway Republic of Somaliland marks more than a mere diplomatic gesture. It represents a strategic recalibration with consequences that extend far beyond northern Somalia, placing Israel on a potential collision course with Türkiye and challenging long-standing assumptions about borders, legitimacy, and influence.

At its core, the Somaliland question appears straightforward but conceals complexity. Somaliland has functioned as a de facto state since 1991, maintaining its own institutions, security apparatus, elections, and currency. Yet it remains unrecognized internationally, largely due to a global preference for preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity. Israel’s willingness to challenge that consensus has transformed a frozen dispute into an active geopolitical contest.

Recognition as Strategy, Not Symbolism

Diplomatic recognition is often treated as a legal or moral act, but in practice it functions as a strategic tool. Israel’s engagement with Somaliland is less an endorsement of self-determination than a calculated move shaped by geography, security, and diplomatic isolation.

The Horn of Africa sits astride one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors. The Bab al-Mandeb Strait links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and serves as a gateway between Europe and Asia. In recent years, instability in Yemen and attacks on commercial shipping have turned this passage into a zone of heightened risk. Any actor capable of influencing this corridor—directly or indirectly—acquires leverage disproportionate to its size.

From Israel’s perspective, Somaliland offers proximity without entanglement. Unlike Somalia’s federal government, Somaliland is relatively stable, internally coherent, and not deeply embedded in broader Islamist or regional rivalries. Engagement there provides Israel with strategic depth near the Red Sea while avoiding the political complications of dealing with Mogadishu’s fragmented authority.

This approach fits a historical pattern in Israeli foreign policy. Israel has long sought relationships along the periphery of hostile or unstable regions, prioritizing access, intelligence, and security partnerships over formal alliances. Somaliland aligns with this tradition.

Türkiye’s Stakes in Somalia

If Israel’s interest in Somaliland is strategic, Türkiye’s opposition is existential in geopolitical terms. Since re-engaging with Somalia in 2011, Ankara has invested heavily in the country, positioning itself as Mogadishu’s most committed external partner. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit that year at the height of Somalia’s famine underscored Türkiye’s humanitarian and political commitment during a period of acute crisis.

Turkish involvement spans infrastructure development, humanitarian aid, diplomatic backing, and military training. Somalia is not merely a recipient of Turkish assistance; it is a cornerstone of Türkiye’s broader ambition to project influence across Africa and the Red Sea basin.

For Ankara, Somalia represents a rare convergence of moral narrative and material interest. Turkish leaders frame their engagement as solidarity with a Muslim nation emerging from decades of conflict while simultaneously securing access to ports, trade routes, and military footholds. This dual framing allows Türkiye to build influence without provoking the backlash associated with overt great-power interventions.

Israel’s engagement with Somaliland threatens to disrupt this model. Recognition of a breakaway region undermines the authority of the Somali federal government—Türkiye’s primary partner—and weakens Ankara’s claim to be the principal external guarantor of Somali unity and sovereignty.

From Türkiye’s perspective, the issue is not merely Somaliland’s status, but the precedent Israel sets by challenging Somalia’s territorial integrity without regional consent.

DIMENSIONISRAELTÜRKIYEIMPLICATIONS / NOTES

Strategic Objective Gain proximity to the Red Sea, access to ports, and leverage in the Horn of Africa without entanglement Preserve Somalia’s territorial integrity, maintain influence in the Red Sea, counter regional rivals Highlights the clash between flexible partnerships and an emphasis on territorial sovereignty

Engagement Method Potential recognition, functional partnerships with Somaliland, limited entanglement Investment in infrastructure, humanitarian aid, military training, political backing for Mogadishu Different tools of influence: Israel relies on signaling, Türkiye on embedded presence

Risk Tolerance Willing to challenge norms of territorial integrity for strategic gain Low tolerance for challenges to Somali sovereignty Israel’s approach creates precedent risk; Türkiye’s approach may provoke overreach in defense of its model

Regional Vision Flexible, functional partnerships; acceptance of fragmentation Centralized sovereignty; preservation of existing borders Reflects competing visions of regional order

Geopolitical Lens Diversifying partnerships amid diplomatic isolation; strategic depth along the Red Sea The Red Sea and Horn of Africa as extensions of influence; countering UAE and Egyptian rivals Both view the region through broader strategic priorities

Potential Flashpoints Diplomatic pushback from Somalia, Türkiye, and African institutions Israeli engagement with Somaliland; potential involvement of external actors Risk of escalation, miscalculation, and externalization of conflict

Outcome for Somaliland Opportunity for investment, recognition, and strategic visibility Potential constraint due to loyalty to Somalia and Turkish-backed frameworks External attention brings benefits but also the risk of instrumentalization

Source: Author

Competing Visions of Order

The tension between Israel and Türkiye over Somaliland reflects a deeper clash between two visions of regional order. Türkiye emphasizes centralized sovereignty, strong state partners, and influence exercised through development and security assistance. Israel favors functional partnerships with actors capable of delivering stability and access, regardless of formal recognition.

Neither approach is inherently illegitimate, but they produce different outcomes. Türkiye’s model preserves borders as a bulwark against fragmentation. Israel’s model accepts fragmentation as a reality to be managed. Somaliland thus becomes a test case for which vision more accurately reflects political realities in the Horn of Africa.

This divergence is sharpened by distinct strategic lenses. For Türkiye, Somalia anchors its presence along the Red Sea and counters rivals such as the UAE and Egypt. For Israel, Somaliland offers an opportunity to diversify partnerships when traditional diplomatic support has become more conditional.

Sovereignty, Precedent, and the African Dilemma

One reason Somaliland has remained unrecognized is fear of precedent. African states, shaped by colonial borders that often ignored ethnic and historical realities, resist secessionist claims to avoid opening a Pandora’s box. Recognition by a major power risks weakening this informal but powerful norm.

Israel’s willingness to challenge this restraint places it at odds with Somalia, Türkiye, and much of the African diplomatic establishment. Yet it also exposes limits in the existing framework. Somaliland has outperformed many recognized states in governance and security while remaining excluded from international institutions. The gap between effectiveness and legitimacy is increasingly difficult to justify.

Israel’s move does not resolve this contradiction but forces it into the open. Treating Somaliland as a viable partner implicitly questions whether recognition should be tied to inherited borders or to demonstrated capacity—a question that resonates beyond the Horn of Africa.

Diplomatic Realignment and the Gaza Factor

Timing matters. Israel’s engagement with Somaliland cannot be separated from its broader international position. Facing scrutiny and strained relations in Europe and the Global South, Israel seeks partnerships in regions less constrained by domestic politics.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has linked Israel’s recognition of Somaliland to plans to relocate Palestinians from Gaza, complicating the optics. Somaliland has denied any agreement to accommodate Gaza refugees or host Israeli military bases. While Somaliland is not merely a diplomatic substitute, Israel’s engagement signals a willingness to challenge consensus rather than accommodate it.

Türkiye, already a vocal critic of Israel, views the issue as a symbolic confrontation. A technical recognition dispute has thus become a broader expression of regional rivalry.

Risks of Escalation

Despite its strategic logic, Israel’s engagement carries risks. It may provoke diplomatic or economic retaliation, complicate relations with African institutions, and entangle Israel in complex local dynamics.

Türkiye’s response also carries risks. By portraying Somaliland’s recognition as unlawful and existentially threatening, Ankara may amplify the dispute and invite further external involvement. What begins as a bilateral disagreement could escalate into a wider geopolitical flashpoint.

The dispute also illustrates a broader trend: the Horn of Africa is no longer a passive recipient of influence, but an arena where global and regional powers actively compete. Ports, trade routes, and recognition have become instruments in a wider struggle over access and alignment.

For Somaliland, external attention offers both opportunity and risk. Engagement may bring investment and visibility but also threatens to instrumentalize Somaliland’s aspirations in conflicts not of its making. Somalia faces the challenge of asserting sovereignty in a context of growing external contestation.

Recognition as a Signal

Israel’s engagement with Somaliland, and Türkiye’s opposition, reflect more than the legal status of one territory. They reveal a shifting international environment where norms are negotiable and strategic advantage often trumps convention.

Recognition becomes a signal of broader intent. Türkiye’s reaction underscores how threatening such signals can be to states invested in the existing order.

Whether Somaliland gains wider recognition remains uncertain. What is clear is that the debate itself has reshaped the Horn of Africa’s political landscape—a potentially enduring consequence in a region marked by long memories and shifting alliances.

A version of this article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com



Scott N. Romaniuk

Dr. Scott N. Romaniuk is a Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary.

Yemen is back from the brink, but frenemies Saudi Arabia and UAE have much to negotiate

ANALYSIS

The UAE this week announced a withdrawal of its troops from southern Yemen, marking a de-escalation in year-end tensions with its ally Saudi Arabia. But 2026 offers little hope for a strategic patch-up between the two Gulf powerhouses. That could mean more trouble for Yemen, the region, and the international community in the world’s chokehold zone.


Issued on: 02/01/2026

FRANCE24
By: Leela JACINTO

Southern Transitional Council (STC) soldiers under a South Yemen flag man a check point, in Aden, Yemen, December 31, 2025. 

The New Year kicked off with Yemen, an unstable country straddling a strategic maritime corridor between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, seemingly back from the brink.

After an explosive, public blowout in the last weeks of 2025 that saw Saudi Arabia bomb an alleged arms shipment from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to its proxies in Yemen, tensions have cooled. Abu Dhabi denied the arms shipment accusations, but nonetheless complied with a 24-hour deadline to withdraw its forces in southern Yemen.

READ MOREWhat we know about the Saudi-led air strikes in Yemen

Saudi Arabia and the UAE came together in a military coalition in 2015 to prevent a takeover of Yemen by Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebels. But a decade later, the two Gulf powerhouses, who officially refer to each other as “brotherly” countries, have turned into frenemies. Ambition has driven a wedge between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan and a once-close relationship between the two royals has been ripped by a divergence of strategic vision.

The Houthis have not been vanquished, but the coalition against them is hanging by a thread. Riyadh backs the internationally recognised Yemeni government under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), an unwieldy umbrella body that includes the Islah party, which the UAE accuses of ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and the party denies. Abu Dhabi supports the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is also within the PLC, but has secessionist aspirations that are at odds with its coalition partners.

The year may have begun with the UAE pulling its “counterterrorism teams” from southern Yemen, but few expect Abu Dhabi to stop wielding its influence and economic heft in a geostrategic coastal zone.

On the regional front, Emirati interests in the Red Sea area are increasing exponentially. Its co-signatory to the Abraham Accords, Israel, ended 2025 with the surprise recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, just across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen. Meanwhile the Houthis continue to target Red Sea shipping lanes and Israeli cities under Iran’s “axis of resistance” banner.

Finally, the latest Saudi-UAE spat in Yemen unfolded in the volatile southern region that has long been an al Qaeda stronghold and offers ideal terrain for jihadist groups.

It may not be a very happy new year for Yemenis who have borne the brunt of a devastating conflict, nor for the international community scrambling to cope with the fast-moving pieces on the Middle East chessboard. By the end of the week, Saudi air strikes had already slammed southern separatist camps, causing deaths and injuries, according to a senior STC official.

‘Mixed messaging’

In southern Yemen, this week's de-escalation came just as swiftly as the dramatic escalation. On Thursday, the UAE-backed STC said Saudi-aligned government forces would enter territories it had seized in recent weeks.

In its statement, the STC said it would continue to operate in the regions but had agreed to the deployment of the Riyadh-backed National Shield government force. “Today, we launched an operation to integrate the southern National Shield forces so that they can assume the responsibilities and missions that fall to our armed forces,” they announced.

But in Yemen, the devil lies in the official statement details. “We are seeing mixed messaging,” said Mohammed Al-Basha, founder of the Basha Report, a US-based risk advisory, in a post on X, noting that while Saudi-aligned figures claimed National Shield forces “will take over security” in Hadramawt, “STC influencers say an agreement was reached to share security responsibilities, tasks, and even garrisons and bases”.

The current crisis was sparked by the STC’s lightening sweep in early December from its heartlands around the southwestern port city of Aden towards the east, seizing parts of the resource-rich Hadramawt and Al Mahra provinces.

Yemen’s history has been marked by a north-south divide, with its southern coastal regions – centred around the ancient strategic port of Aden – culturally distinct from the northern area which includes the capital Sanaa. The STC is the latest iteration of longstanding southern secessionist movements fed by grievances against the north.

Over the past few years, “the STC ran most of the south”, said Basha. “Any diplomat, envoy, journalist going to the south did not see any symbols of the Republic of Yemen, it existed only on paper.”

STC supporters hold a poster of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan at a rally in Aden, Yemen, January 1, 2026. © Fawaz Salman, Reuters

Defining ‘the south’

The “southern question”, as it’s known in Yemen policy circles, is a legitimate issue, analysts concede. But in its current form, there are two “major points of contention”, according to Elisabeth Kendall, president of Girton College at the University of Cambridge and a seasoned Yemen expert.

“One is, does the southern cause mean a separate southern region, or does it mean a separate southern state that's independent and sovereign? And two, how big is that southern region or state? Is it just the southern heartlands, the four governorates that are in and around Aden? Or does it include the two vast eastern governorates of Hadramawt and Al Mahra? The Saudis would argue that it does not include Hadramawt and Al Mahra because they border Saudi Arabia,” she added.

The easternmost Al Mahra governorate also borders Oman, a neutral Gulf country that has strained to contain a spillover of the Yemeni conflict into its own Dhofar region that has seen rebellions in the past. “Neither Saudi Arabia nor Oman want a UAE-influenced state on their borders,” Kendall said.

Within Yemen, there are divides between the southwestern and eastern states, notes Basha. “There's no cohesiveness, even though the STC is the largest political bloc. In theory they could run the south, but they don't have the support of the east,” he noted.

While the eruption of the “southern question” exposed the faultlines with the east, it did little to address Yemen’s core security issues. “Two groups are benefiting from everything that's happening right now in the east and the south. It's the Houthis and AQAP,” noted Basha, referring to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. “The Houthis are sitting back, watching the anti-Houthi coalition fight each other, watching the two regional backers have a very public divorce,” he explained. “And al Qaeda loves to flourish wherever there's a vacuum.”

File photo taken October 20, 2020, of the picturesque Haid al-Jazil village perched on a rock in Dawan directorate in the Hadramawt governorate. © AFP file photo

One of the key reasons for the STC’s lightening sweep to the east in December was the fear that the Saudis could reach a peace deal with the Houthis, leaving the Shiite rebels in a commanding position in the north while sidelining southern powerbrokers.

A prisoner swap between the Houthis and the Yemeni government last year sparked some hopes for a peace deal. But given the complexities of the conflict, expectations are low.

“In 2026, will we see a peace deal between the Saudis and the Houthis? Absolutely, yes. Is it going to be implementable on the ground? I am not sure,” said Basha. “The real problems in Yemen will appear after a peace agreement is signed,” he added, predicting that the country’s myriad armed groups are likely to “just either fight each other for territory and resources, or collapse, or join AQAP, or form other militant groups”.
Realpolitik sidelines nation-building

While the UAE agreed to troop withdrawal from southern Yemen to avert a military confrontation with Saudi Arabia, analysts question whether it will mark an end to Abu Dhabi’s funding and support for its proxies in the region.

The 2025 crisis in Yemen has put a spotlight on the UAE’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and extension of its sphere of influence in Middle East, Africa and the seas in between.

“These maritime locations are supremely important geopolitically. The area that the UAE seeks to extend its influence in, via the STC, is right on that very important corner of the Arabian Peninsula, where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea,” explained Kendall.

Yemeni territory includes the island of Perim, located in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is a gateway for oil tankers heading to Europe via the Suez Canal. Further east lies Socotra, an archipelago and UNESCO World Heritage Site that is also a part of Yemen.

Sand dunes plunge into the sea on the Yemeni island of Socotra on September 21, 2024. © AP file photo


Satellite imagery reveals an expanded network of airstrips, military and intelligence bases built by the UAE, according to investigative reports. They extend from Socotra in the Indian Ocean to Yemen’s Arabian Peninsula coast to the Horn of Africa.

The UAE’s strategic partnership with Israel, strengthened by the Abrahams Accord, has also come under the spotlight during the recent tensions in Yemen.

Israeli media last month speculated about the resulting benefits of an independent southern Yemen under Abu Dhabi’s patronage. Arab outlets noted The National’s interview with Aidarous Al Zubaidi, head of the UAE-backed STC and also vice president of the Saudi-backed PLC, wherein he said he believed “we will be part of the [Abraham] accords”.

While this may be music to the Trump administration’s ears, it adds credence among local populations to the Houthis' self-declared role as defenders of the Palestinian cause.

Last month, when Israel suddenly recognised Somalia’s breakaway region of Somaliland, it raised eyebrows in Middle Eastern capitals and policy circles – and protests in Mogadishu.

Israel's recognition of Somaliland drives divides

It also drew attention to the UAE’s goals in the region. Noting Abu Dhabi’s strategic sweep from Perim island in the west to Socotra in the east, Kendall remarked that the UAE “has a stranglehold on the Gulf of Aden. Add to that, the fact that it was silent when its ally in the Abraham Accords, Israel, expressed its solidarity with the breakaway ‘nation of Somaliland’ on the other side of the Gulf of Aden, and it looks like that whole area is encircled by the UAE.”

Meanwhile across the Red Sea in Sudan, UN sanctions monitors have described what they deemed credible allegations that the UAE provided military support to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the civil war against the Sudanese army. Abu Dhabi denies the allegations.

The problem, many analysts say, is not Abu Dhabi’s goal of increasing strategic influence, but its effects on weak states. The UAE bases its foreign policy on “realpolitik and doesn't mind working with secessionist movements or with minorities”, said Basha. “You see that with the Rapid Support Forces. You're seeing that with the southerners in the STC. The Saudis are completely against that.”

This year, until and unless the two Gulf brotherly nations-turned-frenemies manage to sort out their differences, Yemen – and the wider Middle East – is unlikely to enjoy a lasting peace.

Gulf countries edgy after very rare and very public spat between Saudi Arabia and UAE

2 January 2026

COMMONSPACE.EU



The very public, and very rare, spat between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which saw Saudi planes bombarding cargo in Mukalla in Southern Yemen, which had just been unloaded from two ships that arrived from the UAE port of Fujairah, has caused concern among the four other GCC countries, and other neighbours in the region.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al Busaidi visited Riyadh on Wednesday for talks with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan on the developments in Yemen, which have raised concern across the region.

Oman's Foreign Ministry said the meeting between the ministers “addressed efforts to contain the escalation of violence and ways to support the political process aimed at addressing the root causes of the crisis”.

Tension has risen in recent weeks after the military takeover of Mahra and Hadhramaut, which share a 700km border with Saudi Arabia, by the Southern Transitional Council. The STC is the largest faction within the forces of the ruling Presidential Leadership Council, led by Rashad al-Alimi.

In Riyadh, Mr Al Busaidi and Prince Faisal discussed “achieving a comprehensive and sustainable settlement that preserves the sovereignty of the Republic of Yemen over its security and stability, while also taking into account the aspirations of its people and the higher national security interests of neighbouring countries and the rest of the region”, Oman's Foreign Ministry said.

Oman has played a vital mediation role in Yemen since Houthi rebels seized the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, forcing the government to flee south. A Saudi-led coalition, including the UAE, intervened at the request of the government to counter the Houthis, who control most of the north.

On Monday ( 28 December) the UAE announced that it was heeding calls by Mr Alimi, backed by Saudi statements, which called for the withdrawal of UAE forces from Yemen. This in turn raised concerns about internationally backed efforts to counter terror groups there.

Gulf countries have called for calm and restraint following the recent escalation. GCC members, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, said they were monitoring the situation closely, highlighting the important role played in the past by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in supporting “stability and security” in Yemen.

Bahrain expressed its “confidence in the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and their ability to contain any differences in viewpoints within the framework of a unified Gulf

Qatar and Kuwait commended statements issued by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which reflected “a commitment to prioritising the interests of the region, strengthening the principles of good neighbourliness and adhering to the foundations and principles upon which the GCC Charter is based”, Qatar's Foreign Ministry said.

Beyond the Gulf, Egypt said it was confident that the UAE and Saudi Arabia would approach the recent developments “wisely”, adding that it will continue to work with all sides towards de-escalation.

Jordan's Foreign Ministry said it held in high regard the “wisdom of the leaderships of the sisterly kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in addressing the situation in Yemen”, which reflects their keenness to preserve Yemen's security and interests.

The STC, which is seeking to re-establish a separate state in southern Yemen, said on Wednesday that “the south does not harbour any hostility towards any country in the region or its Arab surroundings, especially the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with which the south has deep and long-standing historical ties”.

Source: commonspace.eu, with the National (Abu Dhabi), Al Jazeera (Doha) and agencies.

Picture: Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Al Busaidi and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan in Riyadh on Wednesday, 31 December. (Photo courtesy of the Foreign Ministry of Oman).

All UN Security Council Members Except US Join Somalia in Condemning Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland

Somalia’s UN ambassador said Israel plans to “relocate the Palestinian population from Gaza to the northwestern region of Somalia,” and warned that “this utter disdain for law and morality must be stopped now.”


Abukar Osman, Somalia’s permanent representative to the United Nations, spoke at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on December 29, 2025.
(Photo: screenshot)

Julia Conley
Dec 30, 2025
COMMON DREAMS

At an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on Monday regarding Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, 14 of 15 member states joined Somalia’s permanent representative to the UN in condemning what the ambassador called an “act of aggression”—and at least one denounced the Trump administration’s defense of Israel’s move.

The emergency summit was called days after Israel announced its formal recognition of the region, which declared independence in 1991 after a civil war, but which has not been acknowledged by any other country. Somalia continues to claim Somaliland as part of the country while the region’s leaders say the state is the successor to the former British protectorate.

Israel announced its decision months after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with leaders in Somaliland about a potential deal to trade formal recognition of the region for help with illegally deporting Palestinians from Gaza, and as Israeli policy advisers have argued that Somaliland could be used as a base for military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

Despite evidence that Israel formally acknowledged Somaliland to further its own military and territorial interests, Israeli Deputy Permanent Representative Jonathan Miller arrived at the meeting Monday with the aim of explaining the “historical context” for the country’s decision.

“Entire cities were destroyed,” said Miller. “Civilians were deliberately targeted. These crimes are now widely recognized as a genocide... Israel’s then-acting permanent representative, Yohanan Bein, submitted this letter to this very council warning of grave human rights violations in Somalia... That history provides essential context for the discussion surrounding Israel’s recognition of Somaliland today.”

Abukar Dahir Osman, Somalia’s permanent representative to the UN, suggested Miller’s comments only added insult to injury, considering Israel has been assaulting Gaza for more than two years—with attacks continuing despite a “ceasefire”—and has killed more than 71,000 Palestinians in what numerous human rights groups and experts have called a genocide.

“If we want to talk about genocide, it’s Israel that’s committed this to our own eyes every day,” said Osman. “[Miller] represents a government that killed more than 70,000 people. Civilians, including children, women, elderly, doctors and other health workers, and patients in hospitals. Destroying infrastructures, deliberately starving people of Gaza.”

“To come to this place, and lecture us [on] humanity and genocide and human rights and independence and democracy. And we know what you’re doing on a daily basis,” said Osman. “It’s just an insult.”



Warning that the recognition of the breakaway region could destabilize Somalia as well as the broader Horn of Africa, the ambassador also expressed concern that Israel plans to “relocate the Palestinian population from Gaza to the northwestern region of Somalia.”

“This utter disdain for law and morality must be stopped now,” said Osman.

Other representatives expressed similar outrage, with the UN envoy for the 22-member Arab League, Maged Abdelfattah Abdelaziz, saying the group would reject “any measures arising from this illegitimate recognition aimed at facilitating forced displacement of the Palestinian people, or exploiting northern Somali ports to establish military bases.”

Muhammad Usman Iqbal Jadoon, deputy UN ambassador for Pakistan, said Israel’s move following its previous comments on potentially deporting Palestinians to Somaliland was “deeply troubling.”

Tammy Bruce, who was sworn in Monday as deputy US representative to the United Nations, was alone in backing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, though she noted that US policy on the region has not changed.

“Israel has the same right to conduct diplomatic relations as any other sovereign state,” said Bruce. “Earlier this year, several countries, including members of this council, made the unilateral decision to recognize a nonexistent Palestinian state. And yet, no emergency meeting was called to express this council’s outrage.”

More than 150 countries, including a number of major US allies, have recognized Palestinian statehood, with nearly two dozen governments announcing their recognition since Israel began its assault on Gaza in 2023.

Samuel Zbogar, Slovenia’s UN ambassador, pushed back against Bruce’s comparison.

“Slovenia recognized Palestine as an independent state,” he said. “We did so in response to undeniable right of Palestinian people to self-determination. Palestine is not part of any state. It is an illegally occupied territory as declared by the [International Court of Justice], among others. Palestine is also an observer state in this organization.”

“Somaliland, on the other hand, is part of a UN member state and recognizing it goes against Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter,” he said.

On Tuesday, protests erupted in cities across Somalia, including the capital of Mogadishu, with demonstrators calling for national unity.

Somalis rally against Israel’s world-first recognition of Somaliland

Demonstrations sweep Somalia as the government seeks global diplomatic support.

Protesters gather at Mogadishu Stadium to denounce Israel's recognition of Somaliland, December 28, 2025 [Hassan Ali Elmi/AFP]



By Faisal Ali
On 30 Dec 2025

AL JAZEERA

Protests have erupted across Somalia following Israel’s formal world-first recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, with demonstrators taking to the streets in multiple cities, including the capital, Mogadishu.

On Tuesday morning, large crowds gathered at locations including Mogadishu’s main football stadium and around the city’s airport, where protesters waved Somali flags and chanted slogans calling for national unity.

The demonstrations, which also took place in Baidoa, Dhusamareb, Las Anod, Hobyo and Somalia’s northeastern regions, came as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled to Istanbul for talks with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan following a stop in neighbouring Djibouti.

Somalia and Turkiye have close political and security ties, with Ankara emerging as a regional rival to Israel in recent months.

Small gatherings also took place in Borama, a city in western Somaliland, where the population has appeared more ambivalent about separation from Somalia, to express opposition.

Somaliland unilaterally declared independence in 1991 following a civil war, but has failed to gain international recognition despite maintaining its own currency, passport and army.

Somaliland’s leaders say the state is the successor to the former British protectorate, which voluntarily merged with Italian Somaliland and has now reclaimed its independence. Somalia continues to claim Somaliland as part of its territory and does not recognise its independence.



Israel became the first and only country to formally recognise it as a sovereign state last Friday, describing the move as being in the spirit of the Abraham Accords that normalised ties between Israel and several Arab nations.

President Mohamud urged Somaliland’s leadership over the weekend to reverse the decision, warning that its territory, overlooking the strategic gateway to the Red Sea, must not be used as a base for targeting other nations.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have said any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be considered “a military target for our armed forces”.

Shortly after Somaliland announced mutual recognition with Israel on Friday, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi said the move “is not a threat, not an act of hostility” towards any state, and warned that Somalia’s insistence on unified institutions risks “prolonging divisions rather than healing” them.

The widespread public anger in Somalia reflects a rare show of political unity, where leaders across the spectrum have condemned Israel’s decision.

On Monday, the National Consultative Council — chaired by Mohamud and including the prime minister, federal state presidents and regional governors — rejected the recognition as an “illegal step” that threatens regional security stretching from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

Four federal member states issued coordinated statements over the weekend denouncing the move. However, Puntland and Jubbaland — both of which recently announced their withdrawal from Somalia’s federal system over electoral and constitutional disputes — have remained silent.




Most United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members slammed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland at a meeting convened on Monday in response to the move, which several countries said may also have serious implications for Palestinians in Gaza.

The United States was the only member of the 15-member body not to condemn Israel’s formal recognition at the emergency meeting in New York on Monday, although it said its own position on Somaliland had not changed.

Somalia’s UN ambassador, Abu Bakr Dahir Osman, warned that the recognition “aims to promote the fragmentation of Somalia” and raised concerns it could facilitate the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza to northwestern Somalia, a fear echoed by several other nations.

“This utter disdain for law and morality must be stopped now,” he said.

US deputy representative Tammy Bruce told the council that “Israel has the same right to establish diplomatic relations as any other sovereign state”, though she added Washington had made “no announcement” regarding its own recognition of Somaliland.

Israel’s deputy UN ambassador, Jonathan Miller, defended the decision as “not a hostile step toward Somalia” and made the case to the UNSC for other countries to follow its lead.

Somalia’s state minister for foreign affairs, Ali Omar, thanked UNSC members for their “clear and principled” stance on the issue in a post on X.

Why Israel’s ‘recognition’ of Somaliland is fuelling fears of Palestinian resettlement

Any policy advocating the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza will constitute a clear violation of the commitments made under the Gaza peace plan, analysts say.

TRT WORLD

Kazim Alam
2 hours ago


Israel's decision on December 26 to become the first country to formally recognise the separatist entity of Somaliland as an “independent and sovereign state” has triggered widespread international outrage, deepening fears that it is part of a strategy to forcibly displace Palestinians from Gaza.

Even though it seceded from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland is recognised by neither the African Union nor the UN as an independent state.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's announcement, made during a phone call with Somaliland's self-proclaimed president Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, was framed as expanding cooperation in agriculture, health and technology.

Yet the move has been widely condemned as a blatant violation of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, with many linking it directly to Israel's ongoing aggression in Gaza.

The Arab League, African Union, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and numerous other states have rejected the recognition, explicitly warning that it could facilitate the forced relocation of Palestinians, a policy critics describe as ethnic cleansing.

At a UN Security Council briefing on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Pakistan called Tel Aviv’s act “deeply troubling”, given that Israeli officials have previously referred to the territory as a “destination for the deportation of Palestinian people, especially from Gaza”. 
RelatedTRT World - MSF accuses Israel of 'weaponising' aid as Gaza medical crisis persists despite truce

Yunus Turhan, a post-doctoral researcher at Harvard University’s African Studies Center, frames Israel's action as driven by dangerous strategic motives tied to Gaza.

“Israel’s decision to recognise Somaliland, despite receiving criticism from across the African continent and beyond, can be assessed within the framework of strategic calculations,” Turhan tells TRT World.

“In the short term, this move may be linked to ongoing discussions concerning forced population transfer scenarios in the context of Gaza, with Somaliland potentially being considered as one such option,” he says.

He points out that the Netanyahu government has been exploring Somaliland as an alternative destination for Palestinians.

Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Libya and Indonesia are some of the other countries that Israel has reportedly approached for the resettlement of about two million Palestinians uprooted by the war in Gaza.

Israel’s plans have faced global criticism, and even Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan explicitly states that no one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return.

Turhan says that any policy advocating the forced relocation of Palestinians will constitute a clear violation of the commitments endorsed during the first phase of the peace plan.

But the fact remains that Israel has shown little regard for peace agreements.

Since the announcement of a ceasefire on October 10, Tel Aviv has repeatedly violated the truce, killing more than 400 Palestinians.

“Israel has repeatedly deviated from such commitments in the past, and the Somaliland issue should therefore be interpreted as presenting Gazans, already exhausted by prolonged warfare, with an almost impossible choice,” he says.

Any relocation of Palestinians from Gaza will only exacerbate an already catastrophic humanitarian situation, likely resulting in additional casualties, he adds.

RelatedTRT World - Israel launches renewed air strikes across Gaza, violating ceasefire


According to Kaan Devecioglu, the coordinator for North and East African Studies at the Ankara-based think tank ORSAM, Israel’s recent discourse on “permanent security control” in Gaza cannot be reduced to a single official document establishing a direct intent-policy link with allegations of forced displacement or ethnic cleansing.

“Nevertheless, developments on the ground, including the confinement of the population to specific areas, the large-scale destruction of civilian infrastructure, and debates over plans to ‘concentrate’ the population, significantly reinforce these concerns,” he tells TRT World.

Devecioglu says the ongoing discourse threatens the Palestinians’ right to self-determination in two fundamental ways.

First, the possibility of forced displacement that weakens the people’s de facto link to their land would render any future political settlement “demographically and spatially” meaningless, he says.

Second, determining Gaza’s political future through the military and political decisions of external powers, rather than through local will, runs counter to the very essence of self-determination, he adds.

A threat to regional stability

The recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty also advances Israel's military ambitions in the Red Sea, according to analysts.

Turhan says Israel’s engagement with Somaliland will provide it with strategic access to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a 32-kilometre-wide body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, a key maritime route.

“This access would enable Tel Aviv to conduct discreet intelligence, surveillance, and security operations along a critical global maritime corridor without the need for large-scale military deployment,” he says.

Devecioglu says Israel’s attempt to complement its military objectives against the Houthis in Yemen by expanding access in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden corridor puts regional stability at risk.

He says that Israel’s recognition of a separatist entity risks encouraging the redrawing of borders in Africa through unilateral secession.

“If the African Union’s long-standing principle of preserving existing borders were to erode, pressures for chain-reaction secessionism could emerge... This would increase the risk of internal conflict across fragile states,” he says.

Turhan echoes this view, noting that Israel’s unilateral act of recognition threatens Africa’s political integrity: The move can spur more than 30 active separatist movements in 27 African countries, he says.

In early 2023, violent clashes between two major clans and the Somaliland administration resulted in the de facto separation of significant portions of three eastern provinces, he says.

These clans subsequently established a new regional administration integrated into the Federal Republic of Somalia, known as the Northeastern State of Somalia, which now exercises de facto control over nearly half of the territory commonly referred to as Somaliland, Turhan adds.

“Israel’s recognition largely overlooks these on-the-ground realities.”

SOURCE:TRT World

China to Develop New Port in Kuwait for Regional and Global Trade

Kuwait has agreed to have China design and build a new regional and global trade port (Kuwait Ports Authority)

Published Dec 23, 2025 6:21 PM by The Maritime Executive

Kuwait and China formalized a new agreement, building on their cooperation and which aims to complete the development of a new port in northern Kuwait. Known as the Mina Mubarak Al-Kabeer port, it is a key part of Kuwait’s Vision 2035 project and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Plans have been discussed for the new port as part of Kuwait’s economic diversification project aimed at moving the country’s economy away from its total dependence on oil. In 2023, China signed a series of Memorandums of Understanding to aid Kuwait with major infrastructure projects, including the new port. 

On December 22, the Ministry of Public Works signed the contracts for the engineering, supply, and construction with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). The project calls for the development of the port in a project that is estimated to cost approximately $4 billion.

Few details were provided on the plan other than its role in the future economy. They said it would be focused on manufacturing and light industry and would emerge as a new center for regional and international trade. Kuwaiti officials highlight the historic assets, mutual political respect, and the intersection of confidence and interests between the two countries.

CCCC highlights that it will be its first Middle East port project partially built to Chinese standards. They said it would incorporate the company’s expertise and technology.

Kuwaiti officials asserted that the project has progressed with the first phase as much as 50 percent completed. It is to have four berths and is expected to be operational by 2026.  They said the modern port will streamline cargo handling and improve supply chain efficiency as a regional hub. The port will also be linked to the Gulf Railway project.

According to media reports, when the port is completed, its area will have increased tenfold. It is to encompass approximately 116 million square meters.

The location on Bubiya Island is in northern Kuwait near the Iraqi border. The project is expected to spur a new regional competition as many of the countries vie for an increased role in regional trade.

MSC Strikes Deal for Construction of Bagamoyo Port in Tanzania

Central Bagamoyo's beachfront (Arnold Tibaijuka / CC BY)

Published Dec 21, 2025 8:21 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

After a decade of negotiating uncertainty, Bagamoyo Port project is finally moving ahead. Last week, Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) revealed Africa Global Logistics (AGL), a subsidiary of the ocean carrier MSC, as the construction partner for the port. In a new agreement, TPA awarded AGL the rights to design, construct and operate the initial three berths at the Bagamoyo Port.

“We expect construction of the three new berths at Bagamoyo to begin early January,” said Plasduce Mbossa, TPA’s Director General. “We welcome more local and international investors to join the project, which aims to bring major transformation to port operations in Tanzania.”

The MoU marks an important milestone in re-launching the port project, which has suffered massive delays since it was first unveiled in 2013. At the time, the port was seen as a flagship project for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the administration of the late President John Magufuli canceled the project in 2019. Magufuli accused China of exploitative terms in the deal for the port's construction, which included demands for massive tax exemptions.

When the current President Samia Suluhu Hassan took power in 2021, she restarted negotiations for the port project, describing it as a national priority. With the appointment of AGL, the shift from a Chinese to a European-led project seems complete. This comes at a time that MSC group is tightening its grip on African port operations, specifically through its terminals arm TIL and logistics division AGL.

In recent years, AGL has become increasingly being involved in port expansion projects across Africa, including in countries such as the Republic of Congo, Angola, Namibia and Ivory Coast. Now with the investment in Tanzania, AGL has said that it will further unlock its access to multiple African markets based on the strategic location of Bagamoyo port in the Indian Ocean.

If completed, the $10 billion Bagamoyo port project is planned to have 28 berths and a special economic zone, which could support up to 760 industrial facilities. In addition, the port is designed to have annual container capacity of 20 million TEUs, 25 times that of Dar es Salaam Port. Located just 42 miles north of Dar es Salaam port, Bagamoyo port is intended to address operational and capacity limits at the current gateway.

Most importantly, Bagamoyo hopes to compete with Kenya’s greenfield port of Lamu, which has benefitted from the realignment of liner schedules this year. Lamu port had remained unutilized since its commissioning in 2021 but is seeing a bump in traffic. In August, the port had a record nine ship calls.

Top image: Bagamoyo's beachfront (Arnold Tibaijuka / CC BY)