It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
As part of justifying Donald Trump’s crass imperial aggression in Venezuela, Canadian officials have taken up the mantra of “democracy”.
In one post on the weekend Mark Carney opined about “the democratic will of the Venezuelan people” while in a follow-up statement the prime minister boasted that “Canada has not recognised the illegitimate regime of Maduro since it stole the 2018 election.” But Canadian hostility to the independent, socialist minded government dates to a time when no credible observer questioned the government’s electoral legitimacy.
Ottawa has been hostile to the Venezuelan government for over two decades. The Jean Chretien government wasn’t overly concerned about democracy in April 2002 when the military took President Hugo Chavez prisoner and imposed an unelected government. Ottawa passively supported a coup, which lasted only 48 hours before popular demonstrations, a split within the army and international condemnation returned Chavez. While most Latin American leaders condemned the coup, Canadian diplomats were silent. “In the Venezuelan coup in 2002, Canada maintained a low profile, probably because it was sensitive to the United States ambivalence towards Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez,” writes Flavie Major in Promoting Democracy in the Americas.
Taking up his post three months after the coup, Canada’s ambassador to Venezuela, Allan Culham was hostile to Chávez. According to a WikiLeaks publication of US diplomatic messages, “Canadian Ambassador Culham expressed surprise at the tone of Chavez’s statements during his weekly television and radio show ‘Hello President’ on February 15 [2004]. Culham observed that Chavez’s rhetoric was as tough as he had ever heard him. ‘He sounded like a bully,’ said Culham, more intransigent and more aggressive.”
The US cable quoted Culham criticizing the national electoral council and speaking positively about the group overseeing a presidential recall referendum targeting Chavez. “Culham added that Súmate is impressive, transparent, and run entirely by volunteers,” it noted. The name of then head of Súmate, Maria Corina Machado, was on a list of people who endorsed the coup against Chavez, for which she faced charges of treason. Machado signed the now-infamous Carmona Decree that dissolved the National Assembly and Supreme Court and suspended the elected government, the attorney general, comptroller general, and governors as well as mayors elected during Chavez’s administration. It also annulled land reforms and reversed increases in royalties paid by oil companies.
In January 2005, Global Affairs invited Machado to Ottawa. Machado oversaw Súmate, an organization at the forefront of efforts to remove Chavez as president. Just prior to this invitation, Súmate led an unsuccessful campaign to recall Chavez through a referendum in August 2004.
Canada also financed Súmate. According to disclosures made in response to a question by NDP foreign affairs critic Alexa McDonough, Canada gave Súmate $22,000 in 2005. Minister of International Cooperation José Verner explained that “Canada considered Súmate to be an experienced NGO with the capability to promote respect for democracy, particularly a free and fair electoral process in Venezuela.”
In fact, alongside large sums from Washington, Canada has provided millions of dollars to groups opposed to the Venezuelan government over the past two decades. According to a 2010 report from Spanish NGO Fride, “Canada is the third most important provider of democracy assistance” to Venezuela after the U.S. and Spain. In a 2011 International Journal article Neil A. Burron describes an interview with a Canadian “official [who] repeatedly expressed concerns about the quality of democracy in Venezuela, noting that the [federal government’s] Glyn Berry program provided funds to a ‘get out the vote’ campaign in the last round of elections in that country.” You can bet it wasn’t designed to get Chavez supporters to the polls.
The Stephen Harper government didn’t hide its hostility to Chavez. When Chavez was re-elected president with 63 per cent of the vote in December 2006, 32 members of the Organization of American States — which monitored the election — supported a resolution to congratulate him. Canada was the only member to join the U.S. in opposing the message.
Just after Chavez’s re-election, Harper toured South America to help stunt the region’s rejection of neoliberalism and U.S. dependence or as a Global Affairs official told Le Devoir “to show [the region] that Canada functions and that it can be a better model than Venezuela.” During the trip, Harper and his entourage made several comments critical of the Chavez government. Afterwards the prime minister continued to demonize a government that had massively expanded the population’s access to health and education services. In April 2009 Harper responded to a question regarding Venezuela by saying, “I don’t take any of these rogue states lightly.” A month earlier, the prime minister referred to the far-right Colombian government as a valuable “ally” in a hemisphere full of “serious enemies and opponents.”
After meeting opposition figures in January 2010, Minister for the Americas Peter Kent told the media, “Democratic space within Venezuela has been shrinking and in this election year, Canada is very concerned about the rights of all Venezuelans to participate in the democratic process.”
The head of Canada’s military joined the onslaught of condemnation. After a tour of South America in early 2010, Walter Natynczyk wrote: “Regrettably, some countries, such as Venezuela, are experiencing the politicization of their armed forces.” (A Canadian general criticizing another country’s military is, of course, not political.)
After Chavez died in 2013, Harper declared that Venezuelans “can now build for themselves a better, brighter future based on the principles of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” But when Maduro won the presidential election later that year Ottawa called for a recount, refusing at first to recognize the results.
In response to Venezuela’s economic troubles, the rightward shift in the region and Donald Trump’s hawkishness, Canada ramped up its bid to oust Venezuela’s elected president in 2017. Under Chrystia Freeland’s direction, Canada helped create the Lima Group, imposed sanctions, broke off diplomatic relations, took Venezuela to the International Criminal Court and recognized a marginal opposition figure as president in January 2019.
None of this had anything to do with an equal voice for every Venezuelan. Rather it was about trying to keep a country trying to go its own way in line with the US empire.
Canadian support for the kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro has nothing to do with “democracy”.
The US Propaganda Campaign to Smear Venezuela’s New President Delcy Rodriguez
by Stansfield Smith / January 8th, 2026
The US “regime change” operation against Venezuela has been defeated. The Bolivarian Revolution remains firmly in power. Now, Washington’s campaign against the Chavistas attempts to paint Interim President Delcy Rodriguez as compromising on the heritage of Presidents Nicolas Maduro and Hugo Chavez. The Wall Street Journal ran an article Venezuelan Regime’s New Strategy: Appease Trump to Survive, referring to Delcy Rodriguez’ official statement January 4 (below).
The Washington Post on January 6 could state “the Trump administration appears to have quietly settled on Delcy Rodríguez, Nicolás Maduro’s right hand, as the figure it prefers to lead Venezuela after Maduro’s fall. This was not an improvised choice. Reportedly, it is the result of prolonged negotiations in which she presented herself as the natural successor to Maduro.” In fact, Venezuela operated according to its constitution, approved in a national referendum, where the vice president takes office if the President cannot fulfill his duties. The vice president is Delcy Rodriguez. Her becoming president follows Venezuela’s highest law. Trump had nothing to do with it.
Trump’s remarks on January 3 that Rodríguez had spoken with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and appeared “quite courteous,” saying “we’re going to do whatever you need,” aimed to sell the story of her acquiescing to Washington. But Rodríguez swiftly contradicted that story hours later, appearing on state television to declare that “there is only one president in this country, and his name is Nicolás Maduro Moros.”
January 5, the Wall Street Journal escalated the campaign to smear now acting President Delcy in an article that came out two days after she assumed presidential powers. It claimed the CIA viewed Delcy as the best-positioned short-term successor to President Maduro. The intention is to make us think the CIA has a special connection with her. In fact, by this time, she was already interim president, and Washington saw it could do nothing about it but sell the story she is there by US choice.
This US fake news campaign seeks to sow division in the Chavista movement and among defenders of Venezuela by instigating rumors that the kidnapping of Maduro involved a “mole,” and that Delcy Rodriguez had a deal with the CIA and Trump.
In addition, much is made of part of her January 4 statement out of its context: “We invite the US government to collaborate with us on an agenda of cooperation oriented towards shared development within the framework of international law to strengthen lasting community coexistence.” Some interpret this as compromising if not a step towards capitulation. In fact, she emphasized Venezuela does not want war, but a “respectful international relationship between the United States and Venezuela, and between Venezuela and the countries of the region, based on sovereign equality and non-interference…That has always been the position of President Nicolás Maduro and it is the position of all of Venezuela at this time.” This is also exactly what Cuba has always asked of the United States.
Venezuela reaffirms its commitment to peace and peaceful coexistence. Our country aspires to live without external threats, in an environment of respect and international cooperation. We believe that global peace is built by first guaranteeing peace within each nation.
We consider it a priority to move toward a balanced and respectful international relationship between the United States and Venezuela, and between Venezuela and the countries of the region, based on sovereign equality and non-interference. These principles guide our diplomacy with the rest of the world.
We extend an invitation to the US government to work together on a cooperation agenda aimed at shared development, within the framework of international law, and to strengthen lasting community coexistence.
President Donald Trump: our peoples and our region deserve peace and dialogue, not war. That has always been the position of President Nicolás Maduro and it is the position of all of Venezuela at this time. That is the Venezuela I believe in, to which I have dedicated my life. My dream is for Venezuela to be a great power where all good Venezuelans can come together.
Venezuela has a right to peace, development, sovereignty, and a future.
Delcy Rodríguez, Acting President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Unfortunately, many who should know better fell for the US rulers’ propaganda campaign. A Consortium News piece declared, “Did Venezuela VP Hand Over Maduro in Deal With the US?” Rather than exposing US psyops, which earned it its high reputation, here it gives it legitimacy. Another, Tariq Ali, once a respected Trotskyist anti-war activist, claimed on X that “the US is backing Delcy who has promised them whatever they want.” And reposts long discredited Eva Golinger, “Internal Coup? Was Maduro Betrayed by his VP?” And, “Sure seems like Delcy Rodriguez was the CIA source on the inside who set Maduro up and handed him over to the United States.” None of these smears are based on any evidence.
On January 4, President Trump declared, “If she doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.” Delcy Rodriguez has responded, “The Venezuelan people are a people who do not surrender, and we do not give up…President Nicolas Maduro’s instructions have been given. Let’s go out and defend our homeland…We are ready to defend Venezuela…We will never again be slaves.”
Manolo de los Santos’ excellent article explains who Delcy Rodriguez is. “The Rodríguez family’s revolutionary credentials are etched in struggle. Their father, Jorge Antonio Rodríguez, a leader of the Socialist League, a Marxist-Leninist organization, was tortured and murdered by the Punto Fijo regime in 1976. Both Delcy and her brother Jorge (the President of the National Assembly) emerged from this tradition of clandestine and mass struggle for socialism. President Maduro himself was a cadre of the same organization. To suggest betrayal among them or capitulation born of cowardice or opportunism ignores four decades of shared political formation, persecution, and leadership under relentless imperialist aggression and the class character of their revolutionary leadership.”
Now, not only do we have the US government repudiating the world and international law by invading a country and seizing its president for admitted concocted reasons. We must face the fact that the US psyops system continues to be so effective that it is able to dupe leading long-time opponents of the US empire, like Tariq Ali, into being mouthpieces for its own “regime change” propaganda.
Stansfield Smith, ChicagoALBASolidarity.com, stansfieldsmith100@gmail.com. Stan has been involved in anti-war organizing for 45 years, and has written a number of articles about Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, as well as previous articles related to the subject here. They have appeared in Monthly Review online, Orinoco Tribune, Dissident Voice, Counterpunch, Popular Resistance, and others. Read other articles by Stansfield.
Kidnapping Blues: The Maduro Abduction Precedent
by Binoy Kampmark / January 8th, 2026
Once done, it remains, by nature and fact, irreversible. The precedent of indicting and abducting a serving head of state and his spouse, dropping them into the jurisdiction of another country to face criminal charges of inventive pedigree (narcoterrorism foremost among them), is the stuff of nightmares in international statecraft. With the now former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores facing such charges in New York, other world leaders are doubtless feeling a prevailing gloom. Is there anything stopping US President Donald Trump from deploying the US military and law enforcement agents from nabbing the next sitting leader in the middle of the night? Even more broadly, is there anything stopping other States from doing the same?
This is something that has excited discussion in various political quarters, notably in East and Southeast Asia. Regarding the sullen, fleshy North Korean despot, Kim Jong-Un, the question is a pressing one. Certain lawmakers certainly think so. South Korean Rep. Lee Jun-seok, leader of the Reform Party, noted the brazen indifference the Trump administration had taken to renaming Maduro as a “leader of a transnational crime ring” instead of accepting him as a legitimate head of state. “The logic applied to President Maduro could also be applied to the North Korean leader,” reasoned Lee on Facebook. The US Justice Department had, after all, indicted North Korean hackers in 2021, using rather hyperbolic language in describing them as the “world’s leading bank robbers”.
The former mayor of Daegu, Hong Joon-pyo, was similarly confident that the North Korean leader “must have been startled by this.” Here, we were witnessing “a return to the logic of power and the era of imperialism”. That said, the tendency of brutish US power to apprehend and dispose of sovereign heads of state, was not spanking, new exercise. “There was the invasion of Panama in 1989, the arrest of [Manuel] Noriega in 1990, and the United States has also played the role of world’s police in events such as the case of Chile [the overthrow of the Allende government in 1973] and the execution of [Saddam] Hussein.” A truly sterling record.
Kim Dong-yub of the University of North Korean Studies also considered the Maduro precedent “deeply concerning” for Pyongyang, offering the following, tormented formulation: “When an adversary believes decapitation can arrive without warning, under the guise of policing or asset recovery, the rational response is to automate retaliation and compress decision time.” Leaving aside the torturous prose, the nervousness at the prospect of such a fate inflicted by so fickle a world leader is bound to be palpable.
The North Korean leader, for his part, responded to the events in Venezuela with military drills involving the firing of two hypersonic missiles into the Sea of Japan. The activity in question was, according to him, “clearly aimed at gradually putting the nuclear water deterrent on a high-developed basis”. This was “necessary” because of “the recent geopolitical crisis and complicated international events”. Kim also expressed pride in the “important achievements” that had been made in preparing the country’s nuclear forces “for an actual war”.
North Korea’s Foreign Ministry was less oblique in a statement on Maduro’s fate. “The incident is another example that clearly confirms once again the rogue and brutal nature of the US, which the international community has so frequently witnessed for a long time”.
In Southeast Asia, the abduction precedent particularly troubled the Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. “The leader of Venezuela and his wife were seized in a United States military operation of unusual scope and nature,” he brooded in a social media post. “Such actions constitute a clear violation of international law and amount to an unlawful use of force against a sovereign state.” Irrespective of the reasons behind the move, “the forcible removal of a sitting head of government through external action sets a dangerous precedent”, eroding “fundamental restraints on the use of power between states and weakens the legal framework that underpins international order.”
Malaysia’s neighbour, Indonesia, was similarly troubled by the Maduro precedent. A January 5 statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed “grave concern over any actions involving the use or threat of force, which risk setting a dangerous precedent in international relations and could undermine regional stability, peace, and the principles of sovereignty and diplomacy.”
In the Philippines, the official response, given the security ties between Manila and Washington, was less testy. It was left to various lawmakers to state a few troubling truths. Rep. Perci Cendaña of the left-wing Akbayan Party-list saw the actions of the Trump administration as birds of a feather with the “similar aggressive acts of Russia in Ukraine and China in the West Philippine Sea”.
Mamamayang Liberal Party-list Rep. Leila de Lima considered the operation against Venezuela one of disturbing redux, the US having again morphed “into an aggressor state” and sabotaging the rules-based international system. In doing so, its conduct had normalised the actions of Russia in the ongoing Ukraine War, Chinese expansionist aggression in the South and East China Seas, and Israel’s genocidal policy against the Palestinians. It was time, she opined gravely, to consider her country’s reliance on the US “for moral leadership on the world stage and as an ally for regional security and a rules-based international order.”
With the thuggish Donroe Doctrine running with strapping vigour, and the Trump administration hungering for additional scalps in its name, de Lima’s sentiments, along with those of her colleagues, are hard to fault.
The US Justice Department, Fake Cartels, and Maduro
A Shameful Sham
by Binoy Kampmark / January 7th, 2026
The Trump administration is increasingly resembling a government previously abominated by the current US president as entangling, bumbling, and prone to fantasies. President George W. Bush was well versed in baseless existential threats stemming from Mesopotamia, supposedly directed by the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. There was a critical problem in this assessment: in his dry drunk state, Bush was criminally wrong, proposing a doctrine in response to the attack by al-Qaeda on the United States on September 11, 2001 heavy on violence and slim on evidence.
The patchy formulation came to be known as the Bush Doctrine, permitting the United States to unilaterally and pre-emptively attack any country allegedly posing a threat to its security despite never evincing any genuine means of doing so. There would also be, Bush stated in his address to the nation, “no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts [of 9/11] and those who harbor them.”
Such streaky reasoning eventually fastened upon Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), apparently at the ready to strike the US and its allies. If not Baghdad, then certainly an opportunistic terrorist proxy would be more than willing to deploy them. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush solemnly stated that “the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.” Such weapons might be used “for blackmail, terror, and mass murder” or provided or sold “to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation.”
As the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq proceeded with its increasingly bloody bill of sale, there were no WMDs to be found. Saddam, foolishly as things would have it, destroyed or disarmed those weapons he had made free use of in the Iran-Iraq War. This hardly mattered. There was shoddy intelligence aplenty, including false claims that Iraq had tried to purchase 500 tons of yellowcake uranium powder from Niger, and cloudy lines of cooperation between Baghdad and al-Qaeda. With school boyish enthusiasm being shown by the evangelical UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the Saddam threat ballooned for Bush. Neoconservatives rejoiced at this chance of cratering, erasing and reforming the Middle East.
The Donroe Doctrine, childishly envisaged and clumsily applied, has an unmistakable analogue with that of Bush. In repurposing the Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere, excluding threatening foreign interests in Latin America and extinguishing governments adversarial or unsympathetic to the United States, Trump scorns the evidence. A fundamental reason for abducting President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, by way of example, was accusing him of being a narco-terrorist amenable to nasty foreign interests. Elevating his stature as a threat, he was accused of being a figure of the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns).
This pattern stretches back to the first Trump administration, when a grand jury indictment alleged that Maduro, along with other officials, “participated in a corrupt and violent narco-terrorism conspiracy between the Venezuelan Cártel de Los Soles and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia”. Five years later, when the Treasury Department retrieved the initial text, the Cartel was designated a “terrorist organization”. Come November 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio directed the State Department to do the same.
With an eerie sense of the past cantering into the present, we find the US Justice Department conceding that there was no link between Maduro and this sinister cartel. This stands to reason, given that the group does not exist as a tangible organisation. The allegation has long been contentious, but those close to Trump were not willing to be swayed by that dullest compendium of subject matter unfashionably called “the facts”.
Believers in virgin births, tooth fairies and Sky Gods sometimes intrude into the making of American foreign policy, and Rubio, in justifying extrajudicial killings of those on board alleged narco-vessels in the Caribbean Sea by US military forces had this to say: “We will continue to reserve the right to take strikes against drug boats that are bringing drugs toward the United States that are being operated by transnational criminal organisations, including the Cartel de los Soles.”
The 2020 indictment mentioned the cartel no fewer than 32 times. The new indictment makes a mere two references to a term that has ceased to be an entity and become a concept, revised as a “patronage system run by those at the top.” It does not feature as an organisation along with the list of alleged “narco-terrorists” outlined in the fourth paragraph.
Those versed in the slippery argot of drug trafficking in Latin America have concluded that the Cartel de los Soles is a colloquialism minted by Venezuelan media to out despoiled officials sporting the sun insignia on their uniforms. It became a matter of usage in the 1990s, making it less a description of organisational reality than identifying a broader system of corruption.
From the outset, Venezuelan figures such as interior and justice minister Diosdado Cabello dismissed the cartel as the product of a fevered imagination. In August last year, he coolly remarked that US officials, when bothered, would name the target of their indignation “the head of the Cartel de los Soles”. The organisation makes no appearance in the United Nations’ annual World Drug Report, preferring to reference Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, and Brazil’s Primeiro Comando Capital (PPC) and Comando Vermelho (CV). The US Drug Enforcement Agency’s annual National Drug Threat Assessment makes reference to the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua, “a violent criminal organization founded between 2012 and 2013” that “mainly operates within Venezuelan migrant communities” in the United States. No favours are done naming the Cartel de los Soles, however.
The rewritten indictment against Maduro reveals how presidential doctrines can be used to force evidence upon a Procrustean bed, sawing or extending it to fit the set dimensions of a dogma. The crime of aggression against Iraq in 2003 was based upon forged evidence, implausible links and flimsy assumptions. The crime of aggression against Venezuela on January 3 reprised the performance. Instead of a uranium hoax, we got the Cartel of the Suns.
'Independent state?' Proposed referendum question approved on Alberta separation
Story by Jack Farrell
EDMONTON — Alberta's election agency announced Monday it has approved a proposed referendum question on the province separating from Canada.
The question seeks a yes or no answer to: "Do you agree that the province of Alberta should cease to be a part of Canada to become an independent state?"
Elections Alberta said the proponents — the Alberta Prosperity Project and its chief executive officer, Mitch Sylvestre — have until early January to appoint a financial officer for its petition campaign, after which signature collection can begin.
Sylvestre, a constituency association president for Premier Danielle Smith's United Conservative Party, has four months to collect just under 178,000 signatures. If he does so, the question would be put to Albertans in a referendum.
The Alberta Prosperity Project said on social media Monday that the approval is a "huge victory" for the province.
"This is the breakthrough we've been fighting for," it said.
Sylvestre, in an interview, said he thought Alberta needs to go it alone because of Ottawa's restrictions on oil production and dim prospects for federal electoral change.
"This last election when the Liberals won after 10 years of absolute brutal government, as far as I was concerned, I believe that there's absolutely no way that we'll ever win another election in Alberta," he said.
"It's up to us to decide what to do about that."
Sylvestre said the group already has 2,000 people signed up internally to collect signatures, and more than 240,000 people who have previously pledged their willingness to sign.
"This is very non-partisan as far as I'm concerned," he said.
"Every Albertan will benefit from this, and it'll give Alberta children and my grandchildren and my kids a much brighter future as far as I'm concerned, or I wouldn't be doing it.
The group's approved question is similar to one it had previously submitted: “Do you agree that the province of Alberta shall become a sovereign country and cease to be a province in Canada?”
That question was held up in court for a review of its constitutionality.
The delay prompted Smith's government to change the rules for citizen-initiated referendums earlier this month.
The changes rendered the court review moot, as it allowed Sylvestre to reapply at no charge while also preventing Alberta's chief electoral officer from rejecting referendum proposals should they be unconstitutional or not factually accurate.
Justice Colin Feasby, who issued his decision on the original question despite the government vetoing the result, deemed the proposal to be unconstitutional, but only under the previous rules.
Feasby, in his decision, wrote that Alberta separating from Canada would violate certain Charter and treaty rights, as there are no guarantees Albertans would keep their right to vote federally or maintain mobility rights if the province were to become its own nation.
He also noted that those rights would need to be accounted for in any negotiation undertaken to amend the Constitution, something that would be required should Alberta actually look to quit confederation.
"Alberta chose not to give citizens the power to propose to take away Charter and Treaty rights through the citizen initiative process," Feasby wrote.
But he added: "Alberta seems to regret this decision now."
Justice Minister Mickey Amery's press secretary, Heather Jenkins, said in an email that it's a democratic right for people to participate in citizen initiated referendums and bring forward questions they deem important.
"If those seeking independence believe that they have the support for it, this is their chance to prove it," she said.
Sylvestre said he was excited at the prospect that Albertans could soon decide their own fate.
"In spite of the fact that this has been a roller-coaster up and down ride, I think it's going to be well worth it no matter what happens," he said.
"The people are going to be able to decide based on the information that they get what they want to do with their future, and I think this is what democracy should be all about."
This report by The Canadian Press was first published Dec. 22, 2025.
— With files from Dayne Patterson in Calgary.
Jack Farrell, The Canadian Press
Alberta Next Panel recommends ditching RCMP, referendum to quit CPP
EDMONTON — Alberta Premier Danielle Smith’s hand-picked panel re-examining the province's relationship with Ottawa says it’s time to ditch the RCMP and hold a provincewide referendum on quitting the Canada Pension Plan.
The Alberta Next panel, in a report with findings and recommendations, says creating a provincial pension plan was the most hotly debated topic among citizens and one that needs to proceed to a vote.
“Replacing the CPP with an (Alberta plan) is the most financially meaningful initiative Albertans have the right to pursue on our own to enhance our sovereignty and financial independence within a united Canada,” says the report from the panel, which was headed up by Smith.
But the panel stresses such a vote should only be held after residents receive more information on the pros and cons of the province going it alone.
And it says a vote would be contingent on an Alberta pension plan matching or improving the payouts and premiums of the federal system.
The report was issued Friday afternoon without a news conference, and Smith was not made available for an interview.
Her office, asked if she would support a CPP referendum, pointed to Smith's earlier comments that it would be tight to get the issue on any ballot for next fall.
The next general election is set for October 2027.
The report comes after months of public town halls across the province and survey feedback.
It also recommends continuing work to create an Alberta police force to replace the RCMP when the latest contract with the national force ends in 2032.
Smith’s government has long questioned whether the province is getting value for money on the Mountie contract, while saying a provincial force can bolster accountability.
The panel acknowledged a provincial force was also a polarizing topic in debates but said it heard concerns about police staffing levels, particularly in smaller communities, with hundreds of contracted policing positions going unfilled.
“Some, like Cypress County, have been paying the RCMP with zero officers provided,” says the report.
The panel also called for referendums on more provincial control over immigration and on specific constitutional questions, such as abolishing the "unelected Senate."
It suggested doing a cost-benefit analysis of Alberta running its own tax system.
And it urged Alberta to push harder for equalization reform, saying that on balance Albertans are OK with subsidizing smaller provinces but “the vast majority strongly oppose their federal tax dollars subsidizing provinces with the fiscal and economic strength to deliver such services on their own.”
Opposition NDP Leader Naheed Nenshi labelled the Alberta Next project a stage-managed distraction from government failures on health care and education.
He said Smith didn't campaign on any of the issues prioritized in the report, which he noted was released on the Friday before Christmas.
"The government has spent millions of taxpayer dollars on a sham consultation, where they actively silenced anyone who dared to disagree with them,” Nenshi said in an interview.
“(They) are now pretending that that was the voice of Albertans to justify spending millions of dollars more on referenda on things that Albertans don't want.
Nenshi said the CPP issue is a stalking horse to create a government controlled piggy bank.
“They want to create a large asset fund that is under the control of the government to invest in things the government wants to invest in," he said.
Debate in Alberta over whether to quit the more than $777-billion CPP has been ebbing and flowing for more than two years under Smith. The premier has linked a standalone plan to long-standing concerns that Albertans are paying more into Confederation than they deservedly get back.
In 2023, her government issued a report estimating Alberta is entitled to more than half the money in the national nest egg should it go its own way.
That number was hotly contested. Absent a clear exit figure, Smith put formal consultations on hold and the issue faded into the background.
As late as this spring, Smith said no firm bottom line number coupled with a lack of public “appetite” for leaving the CPP precluded any referendum for the time being.
However, the panel said a straw vote of people at its town halls supported the idea, as did a slim majority of those in its poll. But it noted a “clear majority” of those who sent online feedback opposed leaving the CPP.
The panel said it heard concerns about what would happen if a provincial fund was mismanaged or if Alberta’s strong economic advantage didn't continue, not to mention questions about portability.
The panel said all those details – contribution rates, management structure, benefits and more — need to spelled out for Albertans ahead of any referendum.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published Dec. 19, 2025.
Lisa Johnson, The Canadian Press
Alberta increases referendum petition fees to $25,000 — a 5,000 per cent hike
EDMONTON — Alberta Premier Danielle Smith's government is hiking the cost to apply for a citizen-initiated referendum by 5,000 per cent, saying it's about making sure applicants are serious.
It’s the latest in a series of rule changes that one petitioner – country singer Corb Lund – characterizes as exhausting.
A cabinet order released late Wednesday afternoon upped the fee to $25,000 from $500.
Heather Jenkins, press secretary to Justice Minister Mickey Amery, says the cost will be refundable if the applicant meets the required threshold of signatures and completes reporting requirements.
"Citizen initiative petitions are costly,” Jenkins said Thursday in a statement.
“That is why a higher application fee was chosen, to discourage frivolous applications and protect Alberta taxpayers.”
The move comes despite previous efforts by Smith's United Conservative Party government to make it easier for citizens to apply for a policy initiative or a constitutional referendum, including efforts to put Alberta separation on the ballot.
Lund may not have to pay the higher fee.
Elections Alberta confirmed Thursday his prior application to launch a referendum to stop new coal mining in Alberta's Rockies will have a grace period
The new fee would be waived if Lund files his paperwork by Jan. 11.
Lund, in an interview, said it’s disturbing to see Smith’s government make sudden rule changes for what he views as "random, self-serving reasons.”
"The chaos and confusion and exhaustion is very similar to the same confusion, chaos and exhaustion that we've seen from the government on how they've been handling the coal situation for the last six years," Lund said.
"It just keeps changing."
He said no matter what else might shift, he won't be deterred from completing a process that's already been cancelled by recent election law changes, forcing him to start again.
"We'll fill out as many forms as they make us fill out if it means we can keep the coal mines out of the headwaters of the rivers that provide our drinking water."
Premier Smith has long championed the merits of direct democracy.
In late November, when asked about Lund's petition, she said, "I support citizen-initiated referenda. I think it's really important that people have their say. The rules are out there, and I will watch with great interest.”
Earlier this year, Smith's government significantly lowered the thresholds for citizens to apply for a referendum, including the number of signatures required.
Earlier this month, her government passed a new law to clear further legal hurdles faced by those aiming to hold a separation referendum.
A pro-Confederation petition organized by former Alberta deputy premier Thomas Lukaszuk is not affected. Elections Alberta has already certified that petition as having the required signatures. Lukaszuk seeks to spike separatist sentiment by forcing a decision to reaffirm Alberta staying in Canada.
Another application has already received the green light to proceed. It seeks to gather signatures to ask whether Alberta should end spending public money on independent schools.
Alberta NDP justice critic Irfan Sabir says the fee increase shows the UCP government doesn't have any respect for the democratic process.
"This change is clearly meant to stifle democratic action,” Sabir said in a statement.
Chief electoral officer Gordon McClure told a legislative committee earlier this month it cost $340,000 to verify Lukaszuk’s petition and that the cost to prepare for a subsequent provincewide referendum would be more than $3 million.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published Dec. 18, 2025.
Lisa Johnson, The Canadian Press
Thursday, December 11, 2025
Venezuela: The imperialist threat and possible scenarios
Much like a script written by English comic book writer Warren Ellis (creator of The Authority, Transmetropolitan, Planetary), rife with exaggerated plot twists, the past four months have featured an intense media and military offensive against Venezuelan sovereignty. The US administration’s double standards has seen it move between buying oil from Venezuela — under neocolonial conditions, due to US sanctions and the Maduro government’s subservience — to claiming Venezuelan state leaders are part of a criminal drug cartel to justify a military deployment and eventual attack.
The US is fully aware of the Nicolás Maduro government’s lack of internal and international legitimacy. It has a clear lack of democratic credentials (especially since the 2024 presidential elections), has undergone an authoritarian and neoliberal shift (even if keeping its leftist rhetoric), and has overseen a clear deterioration of working people’s quality of life (with a monthly minimum wage of less than US$1 amid triple-digit inflation and basic consumer prices double the regional average). Forced migration of millions of Venezuelans, for economic and political reasons, has torn apart families and eroded the government’s popularity, causing the Maduro government to fail to forge a national anti-imperialist front against the US offensive involving all sectors of the country. The right-wing lackeys of imperialism have formed a fifth column, justifying an invasion with arguments placing popular electoral sovereignty above territorial sovereignty, claiming that the lack of transparency in the July 28, 2024 elections justifies US intervention.
None of this, on its own, is enough justification for US, Latin American and world public opinion to accept a disproportionate military attack against Simón Bolívar's homeland. That is why the US seeks to portray as criminal the same government that has submissively handed over its oil to the US since the start of the Ukraine war — a propaganda operation seemingly inspired by the monsters created by the late [US comic book writer and artist] John Cassaday.
However, something is still unclear about this US military and media offensive. One day it bombs small boats, then escalates verbal attacks, then issues bombastic statements against the Venezuelan government, creating the impression of an imminent attack, only to then follow this with silence and inaction, fuelling a frenzy of rumours and speculation. To top it off, one weekend the US labels Venezuela’s government “criminal” while the next announcing the start of direct talks between Miraflores [Venezuela’s presidential office] and the White House.
The first question
The Maduro government is not a continuation of Chavismo; it has its own character, producing an eclectic mix of outdated socialist rhetoric — much like Josef Stalin or Mao Zedong — to hold onto the solidarity of its international supporters, while attacking the entire left at home (via legal interventions against its organisations); launching an anti-worker offensive against unions and labour associations (who seek to organise for fair wages and decent living conditions); and eliminating basic democratic freedoms (while implementing a neoliberal package justified with a sui generis leftist discourse). This does not stop it rhetorically attacking US imperialism — to appease its social base — while handing over oil to the US under terrible neocolonial conditions.
Before the 2024 election, a significant section of Venezuela’s left pointed out that Maduro was the US’ ideal candidate, because he had built a government that was effective in its authoritarianism — though not in economic, political or social terms — and that shamelessly handed over the nation’s wealth in exchange for keeping power, something that not even the María Corina Machado–Edmundo González Urrutia duo could do with such impunity, as their social base would question this.
Those who view Maduro's leadership as timid are wrong; on the contrary, he is extremely adept at clinging onto power amid an unprecedented level of popular discontent. The dictator Juan Vicente Gómez ruled at the start of the 20th century without facing the same amount of collateral damage, and the Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, while lacking in democratic freedoms, stabilised the economy through a capitalist development program under which the working class did not experience the same levels of poverty as now. The fact that Maduro has held onto power under such conditions implies a unique capacity for managing and controlling the balance of forces, which must be factored into any analysis.
But if Maduro was already engaged in open negotiations with the US since the Ukraine war, effectively turning Venezuela once again into a reliable oil supplier to the North, why then the unprecedented military deployment against Venezuela? Simplistic explanations, suggesting it is solely about guaranteeing absolute control of Venezuela’s oil reserves, are insufficient. While Venezuela's natural wealth makes it a target for global capitalist greed, especially for US imperialism, this disproportionate deployment seems to point to other underlying factors. So, it is worth asking ourselves this question in order to better understand what might not be apparent at first.
The facts
In mid-August, the US initiated a naval, amphibious and troop deployment in the Caribbean, particularly around the Venezuelan coast; one with no precedent since at least 1902–03, when President Cipriano Castro refused to pay Venezuela’s foreign debt. The US initially announced the mobilisation of 4000 military personnel, including parts of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) together with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, a guided-missile cruiser (the USS Gettysburg), a nuclear submarine (USS Newport News, SSN-750), a P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and Marine Corps helicopters. The armed group departed from Norfolk, Virginia, on August 15, after a prolonged period of inactivity in the region. The international media reported that the USS Newport News later joined the deployment (August 27), along with other destroyers and support units, to carry out surveillance and deterrence operations in the Southern Caribbean.
In response, Venezuela’s government launched a media offensive (initially blaming US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for the deployment and insisting he had deceived Trump); a political offensive to activate its dwindling social base and the militia, calling for national unity (though refusing to release all political prisoners, restore the legal status of leftist parties, and persisting with its neo-capitalist accumulation model); a military offensive (through designing a strategy of prolonged resistance, which in reality would require even broader social fronts); and a diplomatic offensive in various multilateral forums (from the United Nations to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC). After an almost childish attempt to sow division within Trump’s government, it shifted to denouncing the offensive as imperialist, while being careful not to close the door to dialogue with the White House.
Progressive governments have responded in different ways: Gabriel Boric (Chile) has insisted on highlighting the authoritarian and non-socialist character of the Maduro government; Gustavo Petro (Colombia) has emphasised the lack of democracy in Venezuela while saying this does not justify a military invasion; Lula da Silva (Brazil) has said this is a concern for the entire continent’s sovereignty; and the Mexican president (Claudia Sheinbaum) has prioritised an anti-imperialist discourse.
Operation Southern Spear was formally announced by the US on November 13, with a focus on eradicating what the US calls narco-terrorists with ties to Venezuela. But, the first military strike occurred on September 2, destroying a small vessel in the Caribbean allegedly involved in drug trafficking and causing 11 deaths in international waters. These attacks continued into mid-September, with three more deaths.
The Maduro government declared Venezuela on high alert on September 1, warning it would respond if US forces attempted to violate its national sovereignty. Maduro also threatened to declare an armed rebellion against any foreign aggression.
On October 10, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced the creation of the counternarcotics Joint Task Force (JTF) to coordinate maritime, air and intelligence operations against drug trafficking networks. This JTF is led by the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF). Since October 11, maritime patrols have intensified, with the use of logistical support aircraft and Marine helicopters, and coordination has been strengthened with nations such as the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. More than 20 attacks on small boats had occurred by November 16.
In October, the Venezuelan government organised military exercises, mobilising its air force and anti-aircraft defences to respond to potential provocations. But anti-imperialist sentiment remains precarious among the population, a product of the terrible social exhaustion caused by 11 years of unprecedented economic crisis. This does not mean that a significant portion of the population — right-wing, non-partisan, and even left-wing — agrees with some kind of military aggression against the country; rather they are increasingly fed up with the current government. Faced with this, a segment of the population seems to prefer the “devil you don’t know”, holding illusions that this might provide a way out of a situation characterised by average incomes below the poverty line — as if history does not show that wherever the gringos invade, misery, chaos, and destruction ensue.
Although announced beforehand, on November 16 the US mission added the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and its strike group, along with long-range bombers and more air and sea patrols. This increased the troop presence to about 15,000. To date, the number of deaths from related military operations has reached 83. These are extrajudicial killings: human beings who could have been captured and tried with due process, as denounced by human rights groups.
Upon the US announcing the USS Ford’s arrival, Venezuela mobilised nearly 200,000 troops in a preparatory operation designed for any potential escalation. This coincided with increased propaganda emphasising the need for national unity and defence of sovereignty. This has undoubtedly helped cohere Maduro's social base, but has not been sufficient in building effective anti-imperialist resistance.
The so-called Cartel of the Suns was officially declared a criminal organisation on November 24. Despite a lack of evidence, it is allegedly composed of members of Venezuela's high military and political command, including Maduro. At the end of November, speculation increased and there were announcements about possible US ground operations against drug trafficking — a euphemism for a military attack on Venezuelan territory — while Trump himself discussed a possible meeting with Maduro. At the time of writing, the New York Times has reported that an initial telephone conversation took place, but no progress was made toward a non-aggression pact.
US imperialism’s neocolonial policy
Trump is not a “wild bull” leading the world’s most important imperialist nation; on the contrary, he reflects structural policies, albeit applied in his own eccentric and strident style, typical of illiberals. What is happening in the Southern Caribbean is part of a broader picture connected to restructuring the global capitalist governance system that emerged after World War II. China’s rise as an economic power, and Russia’s position as a nuclear military giant, as well as the relocation of a powerful innovation hub between China and India, and Europe’s diminishing geostrategic-military influence, are just a few signs of the radical transformation occurring within the capitalist order.
As always, the new order will be the result of negotiations or war — the latter being apocalyptic for humanity and capitalism itself — but the pieces have already started moving. The US is operating as an imperialist nation. Much of what is occurring today began with former president Joe Biden. Both Democrats and Republicans see that the US’ real interest lies in geopolitics: the US needs to show the world it is still the most powerful arms-producing nation, with large-scale destructive capabilities and an extraterritorial military presence in many countries.
The central objective is to recognise that US economic prosperity depends on the uninterrupted flow of goods, services, people, capital, information and technology across borders. Therefore the aim is to mitigate risks to domestic economic security through coordinated activities — political, financial and military — across the government, and updating in a bilateral manner historical ties between each country and the empire. This includes strengthening military presence in some countries and establishing cooperative operations with others.
Key objectives are geared towards strengthening the US’s global economic position by: promoting policies to protect critical supply chains; reducing vulnerabilities to threats such as trade disruptions, cyberattacks or unfair competition (for example, from China); and integrating economic security with national security and using the “Homeland Security Enterprise” to respond to risks that affect economic stability, such as fluctuations in international trade or dependencies on essential imports.
TES’s practical actions have focused on conducting annual assessments to inform policy, promote secure trade, and collaborate with allies to diversify supply chains. This includes emphasising sectors such as manufacturing, technology and natural resources, with a focus on reducing economic risks “of foreign origin”. This security policy shift, presented as a carrot-and-stick approach, has been normalised. It is a shift toward a “whole-of-government” approach, combining economic diplomacy, trade regulations and international cooperation, compared to previous, more isolationist approaches.
TES policy has remained in effect as a state framework under the Trump government since January. Although specific Biden directives have been rescinded in sensitive areas around immigration and law enforcement (for example, the January 24 directive issued by Acting DHS Secretary Benjamin Huffman), TES reports continue to be an active reference in DHS publications. Other related documents, such as the ICE Pact Workforce Development Plan and Joint Statement of Intent, extend through to 2026, indicating continuity. It has not been formally replaced, but integrated into broader Trump-era initiatives.
Homeland Security’s economic/TES policy provides a conceptual framework for the current military deployment in the Caribbean, but marks an evolution in approaches: from Biden’s economic diplomacy with eventual military support, to the centrality of offensive military action under Trump. The Trump government argues that transnational drug trafficking — the focus of Operation Southern Spear — directly threatens TES goals by creating conditions to potentially disrupt supply and trade chains, since cartels such as the Cartel of the Suns control maritime routes in the Caribbean. This is said to affect the flow of legal goods (such as oil and agricultural products) and raise logistical costs, undermining the “border-dependent economic prosperity” highlighted in TES policy.
On the other hand, drug trafficking generates regional instability, especially due to its links with mass migration, as shown by the economic crises in countries such as Venezuela. Furthermore, drug trafficking fosters dependence on illicit imports and reduces trade cooperation with Caribbean allies, contradicting TES’s emphasis on alliances to diversify supplies. For the Trump government, all of this impacts domestic economic security, as fentanyl and other drugs flood the US, costing billions of dollars in public health and productivity — a situation TES identifies as a “homeland” risk requiring an integrated response.
Under Biden, TES prioritised non-lethal measures such as economic sanctions, intelligence sharing and assistance to regional partners, to dismantle the financial networks of drug cartels. In Venezuela’s case, Biden prioritised ensuring the supply of Venezuelan oil to the US under neocolonial conditions. This year, the Trump government has escalated via a huge military deployment, in what appears to be an adaptation of TES — in this case to “protect economic stability” through military containment.
Oil market
OPEC and International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates place Venezuelan oil reserves at 303 billion barrels, the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world (ahead of Saudi Arabia and Iran). TES policy makes it a strategic area for the US economy’s future, meaning a covert strategy to establish US military bases on Venezuelan soil makes sense. The US — in the fierce competition with China and Russia for oil markets — wants to secure the world’s largest reserve, located within its immediate sphere of influence. It can only achieve this through direct military control.
Washington has been unsettled by Chinese and Russian company announcements they have commenced operations to explore and exploit Venezuelan oil. It appears to be seeking coercive mechanisms to avoid the loss of direct influence over this important energy reserve. Therefore, the Southern Caribbean military deployment not only seeks to change the government in order to secure oil supplies; it also seeks to create the conditions for direct military control, which represents a violation of national sovereignty exceeding what occurred during the Cold War and the Fourth Republic [which existed prior to former president Hugo Chávez].
Contrary to shifts in oil markets during past US offensives against oil-producing countries, nervousness has not affected price indicators. Throughout 2025, oil prices have trended downwards (from $78 in January to $64 in November), indicating the market anticipates an agreement between the Maduro and Trump governments (which could involve a permanent US military presence on Venezuelan soil) rather than a direct military operation. Since the start of the US military deployment in the Southern Caribbean, oil prices have varied slightly when tensions between the White House and Miraflores escalated, but have kept falling. Such market behaviour must be factored in when exploring potential scenarios. While the oil market does not seem to expect a military offensive against Venezuela in the short term (and so has not reacted nervously by raising prices), a rise in the cost of black gold would benefit crude oil traders, including Trump himself.
Trump and Latin America and the Caribbean
Since the start of his second term, Trump has focused significant efforts on the US’s military presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a continuation of the TES policy, with a greater emphasis on expanding US military presence in dependent countries.
Some of the most relevant initiatives include the memorandum of understanding signed by Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino and announced by Hegseth, involving the “rotational use” of former bases, airfields and naval stations that the US had in Panama before the 1977 handover of the Canal. In Puerto Rico, the US Roosevelt Roads Naval Base has reopened and operations reinforced, with military exercises on the island of Vieques. Ecuador’s parliament approved a constitutional reform to allow the expansion of US military presence on its territory; however, a popular referendum rejected the measure. In November, the Dominican Republic authorised the use of local bases (Isidro Air Base and Las Américas International Airport) for counternarcotics logistics operations, and the Trump government has promoted the intensified use of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) in El Salvador, Curaçao, Palenque/Apiay/Malambo, and other airfields (Colombia). Within just a few months, it has successfully repositioned the US military in the region.
The US has long sought to establish military bases in Venezuela. They tried it in the 1960s, but faced opposition from the social-democratic Rómulo Betancourt government of, which agreed to military cooperation but rejected the permanent stationing of troops. The US seems to want to change this situation, paradoxically with Maduro, whose policies are considered the antithesis of Betancourt’s. Given this, military pressure on Venezuela appears aimed at not only controlling oil but securing US military deployment on Venezuelan territory, either through an agreement with Maduro' s government or a potential succession government led by Machado, who recently hinted at this possibility. This would partly explain why, despite Venezuela supplying oil to the US under neocolonial conditions in recent years, the US is pushing a disproportionate military offensive against it and the Maduro government.
Imperial predictive control regime
Class struggle is the driving force of history, as Karl Marx once said. Constructing an empire — imperialism — is a constitutive part of that struggle; in this case, by the capitalists, as a social class, on a global scale. Class oppression is carried out through the capitalist state and its institutions, which have taken various forms that include biopolitics (Foucault) and psychopolitics (Chul Han) in the liberal and neoliberal periods.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution’s technological developments, especially the internet, data harvesting, metadata analysis, artificial intelligence and large-scale, multi-level information management systems, has helped develop an imperial predictive control regime. There is particular interest in mass data collection to understand behaviours, segment and locate them, and construct future scenarios to help make them a reality. This is especially useful for new forms of oppression and imperial control over territories.
We have seen this in action now for almost four months, where we have seemed to be on the constant brink of large-scale military action against Venezuela. This has generated reactions of sympathy or rejection, disbelief or optimism, and support or opposition from the population, not only in Venezuela but in the region and the world. It has also generated a huge volume of information of predictive value, which, due to the impunity with which it has been collected, marks a very important victory for US imperialism. Now the US has more information about the potential behaviour of the population and politicians in the face of potential interventions in the region, including the genuine probabilities of winning support or facing resistance. This is all processed using automated open intelligence methods.
OSINT
Military operations began the moment the US deployment to the Southern Caribbean was announced. I am not talking about firing missiles, as in conventional warfare, but the implementation of a phase of a new kind of hybrid warfare, which may not be immediately apparent. I am referring to the military’s use of multiple technologies, of which I will focus on analysing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).
OSINT first emerged as part of military intelligence in the 1940s and ’50s (radio, press), but became widespread with the rise of the internet in the 1990s. Between 2015–25, with artificial intelligence (AI) and big data, OSINT entered into its automated era, enabling near real-time analysis.
Automated OSINT is a method to collect and analyse public information (news, social media, satellite images, official documents, maritime/air traffic, forums, open databases, etc), where specialised software automatically performs tasks previously requiring hours of human work. Automated trawling (web scraping) of thousands of pages and open source generates automatic classification (by topics, geography, sentiment, relevance) using AI models, detecting patterns in real time (military movements, media campaigns, economic changes), producing alerts based on key events (naval deployments, speeches, sanctions announcements), and generating integrated reports from multiple sources. Examples are systems monitoring maritime routes and detect unusual ship movements, platforms analysing satellite images to identify military activity, tools correlating official speeches, sanctions and logistical movements, search engines tracking news in dozens of languages and produce automatic summaries, and bots following hashtags or political narratives on social media.
OSINT is used to assess risks of conflict or military escalations; monitor drug trafficking, smuggling or organised crime; anticipate political or economic crises; analyse disinformation campaigns; and measure the impact of sanctions and diplomatic tensions.
As tensions escalated in the Southern Caribbean, OSINT appears to have been used in four main ways. The first involves maritime traffic monitoring (AIS + satellite OSINT), tracking military, commercial, and fishing vessels using the Automatic Identification System (AIS). This involves pinpointing anomalous routes near Puerto Rico (with a reactivated military presence), Curaçao, Trinidad, La Guaira, and the Gulf of Venezuela. It detects logistical patterns, such as resupply, approaches to exclusion zones, behaviour in response to restrictions, and repetitive patrols, among other things. Also, work is underway to exploit potential AIS blackouts for covert operations, optimising the use of available military technology in the region.
The second is the use of automated satellite imagery. Through the use of automatic detection systems (machine vision), information is obtained on the deployment of destroyers or aircraft carriers, activities at US bases (especially Roosevelt Roads, Mayport and Key West) and unusual movements at Venezuelan bases (La Orchila, Punto Fijo, Sucre, Puerto Cabello, Guárico, Maracay, and the border areas), which together enabled the successful increase of P-8 Poseidon or MH-60 helicopter surveillance flights. These satellite images allow for real-time detection of “pixel” changes and raise alerts when new vessels, thermal shadows, logistical columns, stored fuel and active radar equipment appear — information that is especially useful when escalating military operations.
The third involves automated monitoring of speeches, coercive measures and official statements. Bots trained in natural language processing scan media releases and directives from the DHS, Southern Command and the State Department, as well as reactions from public authorities and the Venezuelan armed forces, detecting keywords such as “unusual threat,” “strategic response,” “violation of territorial waters,” and “activation of militia.” They then calculate the implicit and explicit risk based on the tone of the discourse, its frequency, historical precedents of escalation, and the veracity of claims made on previous occasions, as well as the actors involved and their presence in different scenarios.
The fourth is automated monitoring of social media and weak signals. Algorithms track videos of military movements uploaded to the internet by civilians, posts from fishing communities, criticisms or expressions of support posted or sent via text messaging, unidentified flights (aviation OSINT), as well as leaks from military personnel, allowing for the detection of movements before they occur or are announced.
The combination of OSINT with predictive geopolitical risk models enables measuring the probabilities of escalation — though they can not predict specific events — through three main techniques: correlation and time series models (ARIMA, VAR, Granger); risk models of the "odds ratios" type and logistic probabilities; and simulation models (Monte Carlo + geopolitical game analysis).
Correlation and time series models integrate the frequency of naval movements and official announcements, oil prices, tensions within the country, activities along shipping routes (such as drug trafficking), and the potential and actual intensity of sanctions, weighting each factor and assessing their interactions. These models seek to determine whether one factor can anticipate another, according to Granger causality principles.
In logistic risk and probability models, regression estimates the risk of incursions, confrontation and military escalation due to miscalculation. They do not predict which event will occur, but their probability.
Simulation models develop scenarios based on the distance between military units, the intensity of rhetorical hostility ( including election periods where exaggerations are likely), oil production, and actions by non-state actors, especially cartels. Each scenario indicates the probability of an incident leading to a direct confrontation, targeted attack, escalation or sanction.
OSINT requires a great deal of information to be effective. That is why the Southern Caribbean deployment, which has been going for more than three months without any concrete attacks on Venezuelan territory, has been important for generating responses from the population and governments. The military operation’s communications offensive has involved days with more frequent attacks on vessels (Mondays) and strong statements (Wednesdays) to gauge the resulting behaviour, gather huge amounts of information, and inform potential scenarios.
The war has already begun without a single missile fired at Venezuela. A key element in gathering intelligence is understanding the local population’s stance towards the ongoing offensive, the US military presence and its evolution. Sympathies and resistance are being identified and analysed.
NOTAMs
Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs, formerly Notices to Airmen) are official mandatory notices issued by a country's aviation authority. In the US, they are issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to inform pilots, air traffic controllers, airlines and air navigation services about conditions or restrictions that may affect flight safety.
In Venezuela’s case, the FAA issued a NOTAM (A0012/25) on November 21, noting increased military activity, recommending extreme caution due to potential risks when flying over Venezuela. This includes the flight, layovers, takeoff, landing and ground movement phases of the aircraft.
On November 29, Trump announced the complete closure of Venezuela’s airspace, even though he lacks the authority to do so. This had a significant impact on public opinion. Airlines such as Iberia, TAP and others temporarily suspended their flights, although as of November 30, airlines such as Copa, Laser and Wingo are flying normally to Caracas.
In the context of escalating tensions between Caracas and Washington, the NOTAM and Trump’s subsequent announcement must be viewed in three dimensions. First, it effectively intensifies the blockade and siege of Venezuela, further crippling the local economy and seeking to accelerate regime change. Second, it continues exerting pressure on the ongoing negotiations. Third, it generates more volumes of intelligence for the predictive intelligence regime.
ODDS
ODDS (Odds and Differences)1 is a system or methodology for establishing the probabilities of different scenarios, and is widely used by the business sector and news agencies. While there is a background of a high risk of military intervention, belligerent rhetoric and alarm on both sides, direct action does not yet appear likely, based on all the available information.
Although there are no official ODDS, using its construction technique we can infer that the probability of a US military intervention in Venezuela in the short term (24–160 hours) is only 5–12%. We can expect that more days or weeks will pass before the probability of military intervention increases (or dissipates).
Madurismo in its labyrinth
I want to insist on this point: those who underestimate Maduro’s political abilities make a mistake. Maduro is clearly not an intellectual, but a politician with exceptional skill for holding onto power, especially because he is more pragmatic than ideologically driven.
Maduro is also not Chávez, nor is Madurismo similar to Chavismo. Chávez did not share leadership — he never operated as part of a collective leadership, even with the Movement for a Fifth Republic (MVR) or the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Possessing enormous empathy with the common people, and aware that his power depended on connecting with the majority, Chávez used polarisation as a strategy to build a base around the project he embodied. He made many mistakes, but was deeply committed to creating a new multi-class system (to replace the Fourth Republic’s multi-class system), with his actions guided by his notion of social justice.
Madurismo is the result of an abrupt leadership transition from Chávez (after his illness and death) to Maduro, who lacked both the charisma and the favourable balance of forces that characterised Chavismo. Madurismo is an alliance of second-tier leaders and groups (Diosdado Cabello, the Rodríguez brothers, and others), which has expanded to compensate for Maduro’s lack of military experience (to include Padrino López and the new post-Chavista military-police leadership). These groups accept Maduro’s leadership but have their own economic and political interests. While Chavismo advocated for a civic-military alliance, Madurismo’s authoritarian turn has expanded this into a civic-military-police alliance.
In its efforts to build an identity and consolidate power, Madurismo has distanced itself from Chavismo’s allies. This has created a Chavista opposition to Madurismo, though it remains weak. Madurismo also generated left-wing opposition due to its confrontation with every authentic left group (Communist Party of Venezuela, Homeland for All, and others), by stripping them of their electoral registration. Coordination between dissident Chavismo and the critical left remains very weak.
Consequently, any negotiation on a transition can not be limited to just Maduro, but has to take Madurismo into consideration, and cannot disregard the Chavista and leftist opposition, which is anti-Madurista. This is a strategic error of the more radical right wing and the Machado–González leadership, who want to sweep away the entire past and view Chavismo as the same as Madurismo.
As I explain in the book Venezuela y el Chavismo (2025), Madurismo represents a break with Chávez’s multi-class project. It seeks to consolidate a new capitalist class, which emerged from the business dealings and corruption of the past 25 years and whose interests are temporarily opposed to those of the old capitalist class, but with whom they share a strategic horizon.
The only thing Madurismo has kept from Chavismo is its socialist and popular-communal rhetoric, which it holds onto to keep its diminished social base united. Even if it is unable to win free, fair and transparent elections in the short term, it still represents about four million voters, which is not insignificant when discussing a democratic transition.
Maduro's regime has so far had four stages. The first, between 2014–17, featured the crushing and legal intervention into right-wing and traditional pro-capitalist political parties, as well as coopting a significant part of the opposition leaders, who still present themselves as the opposition but who, in Venezuelan parlance, are seen as alacranes (scorpions, capable of turning against their own people). The second, between 2018–2024, involved legal intervention into and stifling of the pro-Chavez political left, destroying trade union rights to organise, mobilise and go on strike, and the start of negotiations with the US to rebuild bilateral relations. This was largely aided by the Ukraine war, which again transformed Venezuela into a reliable oil supplier for the US under conditions of neocolonial dependence worse than during the pre-Chávez period, openly devoid of any trace of nationalism. I reiterate, Venezuela and the US, regardless of the bombastic pronouncements typical of each country's political class, had significantly improved their relations between 2020–25, until the start of the US military deployment in the Caribbean.
The third phase, between 2024–25, featured a shift from formal democracy to de facto cancelling the democratic process — even if elections, the National Electoral Council (CNE) and participatory rhetoric persist. This occurred through escalating selective repression via the detention of hundreds of social movement activists, which has placed Madurismo in a defensive position, nationally and internationally. The fourth phase, which started with the military siege (2025-), is one in which anything goes and survival in power is the leitmotif.
The inability to provide credible results for the July 28, 2024 election generated an unprecedented international crisis for Madurismo, of which the US military offensive in the Southern Caribbean is the most significant escalation. The US is using this situation, under the guise of combating drug trafficking, to advance its TES strategy in the region with the clear objective of establishing military bases on Venezuelan territory, as part of a global political reordering.
This is an unprecedented challenge for Madurismo. Negotiating with the US now not only implies discussing a transition — which could be delayed for years if they yield to the US’s strategic intentions of establishing military bases — but also accepting a sword of Damocles hanging over its head, as they relearn how to maintain a minimal relationship with the US. The US would find it easier to intervene in local politics if it had a military presence in the country.
In other words, Madurismo’s political life insurance is a kind of “Russian roulette”. Extending its stay in power, in such a scenario, implies definitively abandoning its ideological discourse and shifting to new rhetoric more aligned with the US. That is, something like a Venezuelan version of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former terrorist with a price on his head who is now a US ally accepted by Trump after breaking with his jihadist past.
The other alternative is radicalising its pseudo-ideological rhetoric, hoping to replicate the Cuban experience, where political leaders have remained in power for decades. However, this is difficult for Madurismo, given the class nature of the Venezuelan government and its desire to consolidate a new capitalist class, which Madurismo not only represents but is structurally part of. The interests of this neo-capitalist class demand building a future where they can use and enjoy the wealth accumulated (under Madurismo), and continue as part of Venezuela’s rentier accumulation economic model.
Madurismo is not suicidal, but driven by the need to cling onto power to continue accumulating wealth. It has not yet achieved a transitional formula that could inspire confidence and reassure the US. If this mutation process is not carried out quickly enough, it could precipitate a US military aggression.
To make matters worse, recent weeks have changed Madurismo’s geopolitical landscape. The New Democratic Party (NDP) in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has just defeated Ralph Gonsalves’ United Labour Party (ULP), a Maduro ally. In Honduras, all indications are that the left candidate, Rixi Ramona Moncada Godoy, lost the November 30 elections, a further setback for Madurismo. Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism (MAS), another Maduro ally, was virtually wiped out in the August elections.
Furthermore, relations with friendly governments have shifted: Lula and Petro remain distant, calling for greater democracy in Venezuela, while the progressive candidate in Chile, Jeannette Jara (of the Communist Party), views Madurismo as a dictatorship. To make matters worse, the newly elected mayor of New York Zohran Mamdani has declared Maduro is a dictator and said his vision of socialism is radically different from examples such as Madurismo.
But Madurismo’s labyrinth is not ideological, it is pragmatic. The question is whether it will manage to construct a formula that allows it to remain in power, with US approval — even if not explicitly.
Machado-González: Leadership is not the same as governability
Machado’s leadership is undeniable, as is her ability to lend this to González, an utterly opaque and secondary figure. Machado garnered support in the 2024 presidential elections far beyond the traditional base of the right-wing opposition to Chavismo and Madurismo. Even a significant part of those who still support Chavismo, as well as sectors of the left fed up with Maduro’s authoritarian drift, voted for González — not because they have become right-wing voters, but to facilitate change in the face of the disaster caused by Madurismo. Those of us on the left maintaining our independence from Maduro and Machado are a minority — I emphasise this not to indicate that we are morally superior, but to highlight the political tragedy of the moment.
The problem is that Machado-González envision a transition in the style of [Grand Inquisitor] Tomás de Torquemada: launching a political inquisition against those who took part in the recent past of Chavismo (which they do not differentiate from Madurismo), the social movement upholding the 1999 Constitution, and the entire military leadership. This would be impossible to achieve without a civil war.
Their illiberal agenda — as expressed in their 2024 government program2 — also proposes continuing with Madurismo’s anti-working-class policies, while further incorporating local capital into the dynamics of financialisation without any sign this would follow a period of recovering people’s living standards. Their free market recipe is based on the premise that it will make everyone prosperous. In a potential post-Maduro scenario, this would instead generate deep social discontent, which would lead to instability and precarious governability.
This is so obvious that it seems to align with US interests in consolidating their political and military influence in the country, by shaping leaders and representatives completely aligned with their strategic objectives. The post-Maduro chaos that Machado-González would generate is entirely functional to the US’s neocolonial interests in Venezuela.
How long could a potential transition capable of achieving minimal stability in the country, and restoring working people’s material living conditions and political freedoms for its organisations, last? That is the question that interests us. This is impossible to achieve if we stand passive by; rather, it requires organisation, discarding illusions in the post-Maduro capitalist class and US troops, and preparing for struggle.
Simplified scenarios
This all leads us to several possible scenarios, which I will outline in a simplified way:
Scenario 1: The US launches a classic invasion in the short term (less than three months). Military personnel numbers currently available are insufficient for this type of operation in a country with such rugged geography, extensive borders and potential for organised resistance. Such an operation would be lengthy, undermine the Trump government, and generate a backlash in Latin America and the US. The likelihood of a US defeat would be very high, making this scenario highly improbable.
Scenario 2: The US launches an air attack on Venezuela’s power infrastructure, accusing it of supporting drug trafficking. This would include attacking some military installations. Its purpose would be terrorising the population, sowing division within the armed forces and triggering an internal shift in the political regime, facilitating a negotiated transition overseen politically and militarily by the US. Machado and González would only have a transitional use in this scenario. The ultimate goal would be to establish military bases in Venezuela, militarily secure control of Venezuela’s oil, gold and rare earth production, and establish a US military presence in this part of the Southern Caribbean. This scenario is highly improbable because Madurismo has a tightly cohered command structure united by shared interests; they know a split would lead to their collective downfalls.
Scenario 3: The US combines psychological operations, media manipulation and targeted military operations to produce an anti-Maduro popular uprising, justifying a large-scale US military operation to “support democracy.” For example, it could say that Maduro has moved his command centre to a poor working-class neighbourhood (Petare, La Vega, El Valle, etc), then launch targeted military actions there, causing civilian casualties. The aim would be for the population – already fed up with the economic situation, the precariousness of the healthcare system, the wage crisis, and the impact of mass migration on families — to take to the streets demanding Maduro’s resignation with the slogan, “We have suffered enough, now they are killing us because of you: Resign!” Prolonged chaos would serve the US’s purposes (the Haiti model), with a democratic transition led by Machado-González merely a pretext, and its duration short-lived due to the lack of governability. The ultimate goal would remain the same: establish military bases on Venezuelan soil, direct control of oil production, and maintain a strategic military presence in the Southern Caribbean. Such a scenario has a medium probability.
Scenario 4: US targeted attacks on military and political objectives in Venezuela, similar to its recent attacks on Iran. This would aim to eliminate part of Madurismo’s leadership and force the Madurismo’s civic-military-police alliance to surrender or start a short-term transition. This would risk backlash from US and global public opinion, from the collateral damage in human lives and the possibility that the regime will not surrender. The transition would be preceded by the deployment of US military forces (which would initiate establishing military bases) under the pretext of guaranteeing a return to democracy. The real objective would be controlling access to and use of Venezuelan natural resources (oil, gold, rare earth elements) and consolidating a geostrategic presence in the Southern Caribbean. The likelihood of this happening in the short term (within three months) is moderate; if this happens after more than three months it would likely require a unified political vote in US Congress, which is unlikely for now.
Scenario 5: Internal destabilisation through activating US intelligence within Venezuelan territory, generating mobilisations and chaos to foster a Latin American version of the Arab Spring. This would justify a subsequent direct military intervention under the guise of restoring democracy. The ultimate goal is the same: establish a permanent military presence in Venezuela. The problem with this scenario is that Madurismo’s civilian-military-police alliance has built an effective apparatus and network of social control and repression, instilling fear in the population and limiting people’s willingness to take to the streets. Furthermore, the most rebellious section of the opposition and the youth, who could be expected to protest in the streets, are currently living outside the country. The effectiveness of such a scenario is impossible to predict, meaning it has a low probability.
Scenario 6: Successful negotiations between the Trump and Maduro governments, preventing military action on Venezuelan territory. In this scenario, Madurismo authorises installing US military bases in Venezuela, under the guise of a memorandum of understanding for the joint fight against drug trafficking, while also committing to an orderly democratic transition within the next two to three years. The key achievement for the US would be authorising a US military deployment in Venezuela. The collateral effect would be the displacement of Machado-González as the driving force behind the transition, leading to a new axis of democratic openness emerging within the opposition (a new leadership built from those in the opposition who engage in dialogue with the government — the “scorpions”), and guaranteeing Madurismo that there will be no persecution. The problem in this scenario would be for Madurismo, which would have to accept that losing power was a serious possibility. This implies a re-engineering of the balance of forces (both within Madurismo and the various oppositions) to make such an agreement possible, and is highly probable.
Scenario 7: A combination of the previous scenarios, resulting in a political regime change in 2026. This scenario would require at least three months of preparation, so its implementation would begin in February or March. The ideal time for this scenario would be after the Colombian elections, where the US seeks to displace the progressive movement from power, creating the conditions for establishing a multinational force that could intervene from the Colombian border with US air and missile support. The ultimate goal is establishing a permanent US military presence on Venezuelan soil. The probability of this scenario, in the short term, is low to medium.
Scenario 8: A false flag attack against US military or civilian targets, unifying the US political class behind initiating targeted operations in the short term. In this scenario, the purpose would be to bring about Madurismo’s swift fall, buying time to prepare conditions for a multinational intervention in the medium term. The probability of such a scenario is medium.
Scenario 9: Maintain the military siege for the next three months, escalating psychological and technological warfare, to weaken Madurismo and initiate a negotiated transition, which included deploying military forces on Venezuelan territory. This scenario has a medium probability.
Scenario 10: Maintaining the current situation for a few more months, with the aim of creating the political conditions (consensus in the US Congress), military conditions (formation of a multinational force), and economic conditions (total crippling of the Venezuelan economy), which would enable the deployment of multi-level operations to remove Maduro from power. Machado and her Nobel Peace Prize would play a central role in the transition in this scenario, though she would be replaceable in the medium term. This is a highly probable scenario.
Scenario 11: Trump withdraws quietly. In this scenario, the US demobilises its military infrastructure deployed since August, under any pretext. This would be viewed as a victory for Madurismo, allowing him to consolidate his power. Such a scenario is very improbable.
Scenario 12: The US intervenes in Venezuela and is surprised by the level of armed resistance, conscious of a likely prolonged popular struggle. This scenario is unlikely because most of the population blames mistakes by the Maduro government for their material living conditions, and therefore has a very low probability.
These twelve scenarios are hypothetical and constructed from existing multi-referenced information. A factor can evolve in different directions, modifying the possibilities of each scenario. Such scenarios and their probability must be monitored daily.
Anti-imperialism and a culture of peace
We can have many differences, of various kinds, with the Maduro government and Madurismo, but these do not justify a US intervention on Venezuelan soil. Progressive, democratic, nationalist, popular and socialist forces across the continent and the world must denounce the Trump government’s attempts to violate sovereignty. A military attack on Venezuela is an attack on the sovereignty of all Latin America.
We must combine this with denouncing the anti-democratic, anti-working-class and neoliberal nature of the Maduro government, which masquerades behind left-wing rhetoric. Madurismo and Maduro are neither socialist nor revolutionary; they are the political representatives of a new capitalist class that has emerged in the past 25 years, which continues to disagree with US imperialism only until it demonstrates that they can ally to achieve common goals.
The Venezuelan people have suffered terrible misery for the past decade, with families torn apart by migration, social institutions destroyed, and with wages disappearing as a source of survival. They do not deserve to die under the bombs and bullets of an invasion force that disregards their interests like Madurismo. Therefore, any initiative that prevents the military escalation of the conflict should be welcomed from the perspective of the people.
Reality is often richer than any analysis, so we will keep paying close attention to what happens in the coming days.
Luis Bonilla-Molina is a visiting professor at the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) in Brazil, as part of the CAPES Solidaridade program. He is a researcher in the fields of politics, technology, education, and communication.
The earliest records of probability calculations come from games of chance and betting in Greece and Rome during Antiquity and the Middle Ages. But these did not express formally established mathematical models. Formal odds theory emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, thanks to the contributions of two key figures — Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat — who analysed gambling problems and laid the foundations of probability theory. Later, Huygens, Jakob Bernoulli, and De Moivre formalised the concept of expected value through compound probability and the theory of errors. In the 19th century, modern bookmakers in England established bookmaking systems, combining fractional odds with empirical statistics. In the 20th century, odds began to have political and military applications, especially during World War II, with Bayesians (who analyse their beliefs based on probabilities whenever new information arrives), intelligence analysts, and military statisticians (who used probability models to anticipate attacks, predict movements and assess strategic risks). Through this, the discipline of quantitative geopolitical risk analysis was born. In the 21st century, advanced models have been developed for predicting wars, assessing country risk, automated open intelligence (OSINT), machine learning, prediction markets and financial analysis. Today, organisations such as the Good Judgment Project, Metaculus, the RAND Corporation, and the Swift Centre publish geopolitical probabilities based on expert analysis and mathematical models. Odds and Differences (ODDS) offer advantages over traditional probability because they allow for direct comparison — for example, an event is three times more likely to occur than not — integrate qualitative signals effectively, and are intuitive for measuring rapid changes. ODDS are not certainties, absolute predictions, evidence of secret decisions, or non-public intelligence; they are simply probability tools based on observable and historically comparable data.
See “Who is María Corina Machado?”, which I wrote with Leonardo Bracamonte https://luisbonillamolina.com/2024/09/21/venezuela-quien-es-maria-corina-machado/
Venezuela is in the crosshairs of the United States. Over the past month, a series of US airstrikes on alleged drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean has left at least 37 dead. A large US fleet of eight warships and 10,000 troops has been installed off the coast of Venezuela. In late October, the Trump administration authorised covert CIA operations in Venezuela, and the most powerful aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R Ford, has been sent to support the operation.
This dramatic escalation is not primarily about drug smuggling but aims at toppling the government of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. Over the past decade Maduro has survived the collapse of the Venezuelan economy, waves of mass protests, a raft of sanctions by the US, determined efforts by the opposition to remove him from power and even an assassination attempt. He now faces the prospect of a fully-fledged US military operation. With Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller steering the Trump administration towards a maximum pressure approach to Venezuela, a significant military strike, if not invasion, seems inevitable.
The sudden change in direction — from rapprochement at the start of Trump’s second term to the brink of war — has baffled most commentators on the subject. There are daily articles speculating on Trump’s endgame for Venezuela and his potential reasons for launching what would in all likelihood be a prolonged, unpopular and bloody war. The left, too, finds this difficult to explain. Our stock explanation that Trump, representing US imperialist interest and ambitions, is after Venezuela’s vast oil and mineral resources does not take us far. We also need to ask: why now? Is this going to be the pattern of US imperialism for years to come?
For Venezuelans a US invasion leading to state collapse has the potential to be an unimaginable catastrophe. However, even with this threat hanging over our heads, it is speculation rather than rejection of the invasion that has largely taken hold. A return to the consensus where all sections of the left and their popular base support the state has to face the difficult terrain of rising authoritarianism, widespread grievance, economic crisis and the reality of what US intervention means for Venezuela. The prospective invasion will arrive at a nadir in Venezuelans’ popular mobilisation and support for the state. This may go some way to explaining why Trump is choosing to attempt to oust Maduro now.
Between crisis and invasion
Venezuela is in the midst of a political crisis unlike any other in its recent history. The Bolivarian revolution, beginning in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez, was noted for having some of the world’s highest rates of political and democratic participation, with 14 national elections taking place between 1998 and Chávez’s death in 2013. Throughout the revolution, the state drew legitimacy from this near-constant mass democratic exercise. As Chávez saw it, the transition to socialism was to be built, steadily, through this mass democratic consent. However, after Maduro won a tighter than expected presidential election in 2013, the revolution has been unable to maintain this mass democratic support; in 2015 the right-wing opposition won a supermajority in the legislative elections.
Riding this wave of momentum, the opposition quickly moved to hold a recall referendum against Maduro and seek the presidency for itself. This was quickly undone in 2017, when Venezuela’s supreme court ruled that the national assembly was in contempt and suspended all its legislative functions. Mass protests followed, leaving over 100 dead and thousands arrested. Over the next six years a disorganised opposition launched multiple initiatives to try to seek power, including supporting US sanctions and the proclamation of national assembly member Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s acting president, which was recognised by the Trump administration along with ten Latin American countries and most of the EU.
A bigger threat to the revolution, however, had begun to take hold. As the opposition boycotted elections and the government ran unopposed, rates of democratic participation plummeted and the 2020 national assembly elections saw a record low turnout. With the government suffering from the effects of the economic crisis and lacking grassroots mobilisation, a new political class, formed largely by the military and their allies, took hold of increasing amounts of power. This compact between a rump left-wing government and a powerful military class with widespread private interests in Venezuela’s oil and mining sectors now controls Venezuela in an authoritarian manner.
Seeking to get out of sanctions on Venezuelan oil and the assets of key figures in the government, Maduro submitted to the internationally mediated 2023 Barbados Accords. In exchange for the removal of sanctions, Maduro and the opposition agreed to contest the 2024 presidential elections with international observation. With a background as a right-wing anti-Chavista hawk, opposition politician and recent Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado became the opposition’s candidate, reinventing herself as a centrist politician critical of the pro-sanction leaderships of the right. Her campaign picked up momentum from unlikely places, holding massive rallies in former Chavista strongholds such as Barinas state. Left-wing parties, such as the Venezuelan Communist Party and Fatherland for All (PPT), both formerly part of the Bolivarian revolution’s coalition, clustered instead around the alternative candidacy of former national electoral council member Enrique Márquez.
Although she was ultimately banned from standing in the elections, Machado endorsed former diplomat Edmundo González as the opposition’s candidate. When the elections were finally held on July 28, the government and the opposition announced different results. The government claimed that Maduro had won a resounding victory, with 51 per cent of the vote against 40 per cent for González. However, the opposition claimed that González had won a landslide victory with over 67 per cent. Anticipating this situation, the opposition collected disaggregated tallies and proofs (actas) from each polling station (under Venezuelan electoral law, each contesting party is allowed to obtain a copy of this data), publishing them online.
The opposition-collected actas appeared to bear out its claims for a González victory, and this was supported by the international observers invited by the government to oversee the process. The government’s failure to provide its own set of actas and to audit the results, on the other hand, led to the failure of the international community to recognise its alleged victory. Most importantly, historic left-wing allies of Chavismo and the Bolivarian revolution, such as the presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Chile withheld recognition of the results until the government provided its own proof. Alleging a hack on the electoral system, the government claims it has lost the actas, and still has not provided proof of its victory to this day.
Backlash and repression
Following the elections, a mass wave of protests arose across the country. In Caracas, the protests clustered around the working class areas that Chavismo had formerly called its strongholds. These seemed to escape the control of the official opposition, which had refused to call demonstrations until it could obtain and upload its actas. Seeing a popular challenge to its rule unlike any that had come before, the Maduro government swiftly moved to put down these protests, detaining thousands of people under terrorism charges. The independent left-backed candidate, Enrique Márquez was also jailed following a legal appeal to the Supreme Court to force the government to release disaggregated results. Unlike previous waves of protests and government reprisals, the government was now firmly focusing on critics to its left. Hundreds of union leaders, community activists and local electoral observers have been detained without trial or forced into exile, with this repression continuing to this day.
This story, however, isn’t complete without taking into account the main reason for the ebbing away of popular support for the government: the economic crisis. Between 2014 and 2019, Venezuela saw an unprecedented peacetime collapse of its economy. The 2014 collapse in the global price of oil began the crisis, leading to Venezuela defaulting on its debt and attempting to meet the shortfall by increasing the supply of money in its system, resulting in hyperinflation. The first Trump administration’s sanctions on Venezuela, beginning in 2017 and supported by the opposition, forbade the country from accessing international finance and restructuring its debt.
The combined results were catastrophic, with inflation running at over one million per cent in 2018 and GDP collapsing by 50 per cent. Over 7 million Venezuelans, a quarter of the country’s population, emigrated. In recent years, the government has managed to somewhat arrest the crisis by implementing costly reforms that have empowered the domestic capitalist class, such as the dollarisation of the economy, privatisation of industries and the slashing of public sector salaries. These moves have undone a significant amount of the economic equality and social progress achieved under Chávez. An increasing number of strikes in the Venezuelan oil and energy sectors have been the result, but this has not yet yielded a working class political recomposition significant enough to put pressure on the government.
Faced with the combined consequences of the economic crisis and the lack of democracy in the latter years of the Bolivarian revolution, popular movements may now be weakened enough for the US to attempt to impose itself in the country. If it is successful, it will not be because this is the desire of Venezuelans but because of failures in the Bolivarian leadership to renew the revolution, break out of the failing oil extractivist model and hold to the practices of its mass democratic origins. But key questions remain — what are the US plans for Venezuela, and why has the Maduro government, now largely subordinate to an alliance of the military and the capitalist class, failed in its rapprochement with the US?
More than just resources
Shortly after Trump came into office this year, the US made new overtures to Venezuela. In its last months in office, the Biden administration had passed two new sets of sanctions on Venezuelan officials and state companies, as a response to the contested 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections, and there was growing support among Republican and Democratic lawmakers to directly sanction the Venezuelan oil sector. The Trump administration quickly reversed course on this push. First, it sent presidential envoy Richard Grenell to Venezuela to negotiate the resumption of deportation flights from the US, as well as the release of American citizens imprisoned in Venezuela accused of plotting against the government. Secondly, it granted Chevron a license to directly produce and export Venezuelan oil to the US, thus significantly boosting Venezuelan oil sales to the US
Venezuela, it seemed, was on the path to normalising relationships with the US That was until the mood in Washington seemingly changed overnight, catching the Venezuelan government by surprise. Their initial response to the airstrikes on Venezuelan boats in the Caribbean was to state that they did not take place but were AI generated videos, arguing that the office of the hardline anti-Maduro US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had created them to scupper the rapprochement between the Trump administration and Venezuela. It has been reported that Maduro even pushed for greater concessions to the US oil and mining industries in an attempt to stave off the escalation, but it has become increasingly apparent that the US is not just after Venezuela’s resources.
From the standpoint of the Venezuelan government, the strikes were irrational and sudden. To this we might add that from the standpoint of international capital the strikes can hardly be considered productive. Despite having a nominally nationalised oil industry, Venezuela is heavily reliant on financing and arrangements with foreign and private oil companies for both the fixed capital required to extract its oil (drills, pumps, refining systems, etc.) as well as trained engineers. Foreign oil companies form over 50 ‘mixed enterprises’ with the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, and account for between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of its oil exports.
The passage in 2020 of the Anti-Blockade law has hastened the creation of mixed-enterprise companies without democratic oversight, in effect privatising increasing swathes of the domestic oil sector in concessions lasting beyond the 2040s. In its current form, the Venezuelan state, rather than being a block to private access to its oil wealth, has instead become a willing partner and guarantor of this extraction. Indeed, the Venezuelan state has taken upon itself the task of disciplining the workforce in its oilfields, jailing over 100 oil industry union leaders in the last year alone.
The situation is much worse in Venezuela’s historically underdeveloped mining and minerals extraction sector. In 2016 the government created the Orinoco Mining Arc National Strategic Development Zone, covering 12 per cent of national territory, including the historic territories of the Warao, Pemón, Piaroa, Ye’kwana and Arawak indigenous tribes. The results have been ecologically and socially disastrous, with most of the mining operations led by small non-state actors and transnational organised gangs, leading to human trafficking, illegal mining, environmental devastation and a plethora of human rights abuses against the indigenous population including massacres, child exploitation, sexual abuse and slavery. Almost none of the mined wealth makes its way into Venezuelan coffers; instead it is laundered for direct export to world mineral markets. The Venezuelan Armed Forces oversee this area, either turning a blind eye to the widespread practices of exploitation and environmental destruction or benefiting from kickbacks and provision of resources such as fuel.
Over the last decade the Venezuelan government has proved itself pliant to the demands of fossil and extractive capital, whether represented in globalised private oil companies or in small illegal mining operations. While the US is interested in Venezuelan resources, the risks that come with an invasion would paradoxically make them harder to extract, at least for decades. Without the armed forces’ control over territory, disciplining function over the population and coordinating function over the transport of goods and capital, Venezuela is a less attractive prospect for exploitation. The US may believe it can achieve a quick victory and transition to a new regime with the state structure largely left intact, but the likelier result from a state collapse is that a situation characterised by chaotic and lawless extraction with low productivity will prevail.
Maduro and the domestic capitalist class behind him have certainly not run out of road with the concessions they could make — but Trump is uninterested. We need to see not only Venezuelan resources as being a main driver here, but also Trump’s new style of foreign policy, where immediate economic concerns are equal to political and racial motivations and the administration’s attempts to project power and military might in a world where the US is steadily declining in influence.
The new face of imperialism
On 3 October, the US Supreme Court approved the Trump administration’s move to remove Temporary Protected Status (TPS) from over 300,000 Venezuelan immigrants in the US, paving the way for their eventual deportation from the US. TPS covers the status of the majority of Venezuelan immigrants residing in the US. Although a small percentage of the over seven million Venezuelans who have fled the country in the past decade, Venezuelans in the US are at the forefront of a new campaign of racialisation and demonisation, being linked with gangs such as the Tren de Aragua and the international drug trade. This is echoed by right-wing politicians across Latin America, such as José Antonio Kast in Chile and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. The rise of global right politics furnishes imperialism with additional motives to attack and intervene in foreign states — ones founded on racial politics and the management of internal populations.
In this light, the current US escalation in Venezuela has two important goals. The first is that regime change can set the conditions for the forcible return of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans residing abroad to the country. The second is that the wielding of extraordinary force against Venezuelans whether as criminalised immigrants in the US or as criminalised individuals in their own territory, creates the rationale for further deployment of such force, embedding it as a core state function. The management and policing of internal immigrant populations merges with military action against those same populations in their home countries, a logic pioneered by the War on Terror and now being extended in Trump’s anti-migrant rhetoric and use of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
The turn in Trump’s administration, from rapprochement and normalisation with Venezuela to buildup of forces in the Caribbean and strikes against the country, can be explained by the sustained lobbying efforts of María Corina Machado in the months following Trump’s election. This lobbying has consisted of linking the international drug trade with Venezuela’s government, and highlighting claims that two Venezuelan criminal organisations — the Tren de Aragua gang and the Cartel de los Soles — operate in the U.S. The two organisations play a comparatively minimal role in drug trade in the U.S. (something understood by U.S. intelligence agencies), yet Machado has furnished the Trump administration with a casus belli and much of its rhetoric justifying attacks against Venezuelan immigrants in the U.S. and the Venezuelan state. It has even pushed the narrative of Iranian agents three hours away from Miami, a vision of the Venezuelan state as a fundamental enemy of the U.S. that warrants its destruction. Machado has created a powerful alignment between her political ambitions and Trump’s domestic policy, running roughshod over the lives of Venezuelans targeted by ICE and Venezuelans targeted by military action in the Caribbean.
However, the US lacks a strategic vision for Latin America. The days of forming a bloc subservient to the interests of global capital based on neoliberalism and free trade agreements are gone. Domestic capitalist classes in the continent increasingly look to China and other emerging economies for trade and development. The US is interested in seizing key resources for itself — be they the Panama Canal or Bolivian rare earths — but is no longer able to structure entire economies and polities around itself. The US could previously rely on a combination of aid, free trade agreements, control over the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the promise of integration with transnational organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), but those days are gone.
As a fading empire, the US now operates primarily on a transactional basis, hoping that the threat of military force is enough to get countries to fall in line. Latin American countries will be left to chase the phantasms of Trump’s domestic priorities — less emigration, more rare earths, less drug production, less engagement with China, etc — under the pain of military action. In the case of Venezuela, the use of force is the goal: to make a disciplining example to the entire region and its peoples, to drive home the point that you can collapse a state and not face consequences. It is an empty projection of power that is bound to backfire, but not before millions of Venezuelans suffer from it.
Making solidarity count
Caught between state repression, attacks from the opposition right and the threat of US invasion, Venezuela’s poor and working classes find themselves in the incredibly difficult position of having to recompose political opposition from below. For a unionised oil worker in Paraguaná, a Pemón miner in Guasipati or a resident in the Cota 905 barrio in Caracas the prospect of a US attack is more distant and abstract than their day-to-day confrontations with the military and business classes that such forces back. It is necessary to support all working class struggles, highlight abuses committed by the state and make room for criticism of the Venezuelan government. Yet it would also be a grave error for the left to make its support of Venezuela, facing a US imperialist onslaught, conditional in any way.
The opposition led by María Corina Machado provides no answers to Venezuela’s suffering. Its policy of offering the entirety of Venezuela’s natural resources to private capital, its willingness to play along with Trump’s demonisation of Venezuelan migrants and its lobbying for military action against Maduro’s regime makes it obvious that far from a democratic, liberal and unitary formation, the opposition is still captive to its most reactionary wing. Unable to build on the momentum of July 28 2024, it now bets on risking a complete collapse of the Venezuelan state for ascending to power.
Fortunately, recent struggles furnish the international left with renewed answers to these dilemmas. As the Palestine solidarity movement has shown, imperialism is a project of the ruling class that begins at home. It has a material basis in the states and societies we live in. To be effective, anti-imperialism must expand from the old forms of stage-managed international visits, trade union delegations and carefully formulated political statements and distinctions. The current situation demands solidarity action. The weapons industry, fossil capital and regimes of racist oppression and border policing that dominate the lives of a good portion of the seven million Venezuelans living abroad must be directly challenged by mass, working-class mobilisation. A new array of strategies is called for.
