Showing posts sorted by date for query PENSION DEFICIT. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query PENSION DEFICIT. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Saturday, June 27, 2026

 

‘There is no sovereignty with empty plates’: Cuban president explains urgent need for economic reforms

A man fills water jugs from a tanker truck in Havana, May 28, 2026. Without fuel, pumps that service homes and businesses are shut down.

First published at Granma. This version has been lightly edited with subheadings and notes added by World-Outlook.

Speech delivered by First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Republic, at the closing of the Extraordinary Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, at the Palace of the Revolution, on June 17, 2026, “Year of the Centennial of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz.”

Comrades, members of the Party’s Central Committee;

Distinguished guests;

Compatriots:

This extraordinary plenary session is taking place at a decisive moment for Cuba. As proud heirs to the legacy of the Commander-in-Chief, we Cuban revolutionaries today face challenges of enormous magnitude that demand unity, ideological steadfastness, courage, boldness, and creative resilience.

We are guided by our leader, a prominent member of the vanguard of the Centennial Generation and a zealous guardian of the continuity of the socialist Revolution — which he played a decisive role in building from its foundations to the present day — Army General Raúl Castro Ruz, Hero of the Republic of Cuba, who has taught us every day the sacred value of unity.

The context is extraordinarily complex and challenging due to the relentless aggression of the intensified economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States government and the criminal intent behind the hostile actions of the current administration: first, the inclusion of Cuba on the infamous and spurious list of countries that allegedly sponsor terrorism, and other equally false accusations that seek to discredit the government’s authority and administration, while depriving the country of any source of foreign exchange.

This blockade has been further intensified by the Executive Orders [of U.S. president Donald Trump] of January 29 and May 1, which reinforce the genocidal energy blockade and, through secondary sanctions, internationalize the blockade, take financial, energy, and investment persecution to extremes of maximum pressure.

Parallel to this, political and ideological subversion is being intensified through media disinformation on social media to undermine the Revolution’s credibility — among both Cubans and foreigners. It is fostering social disorientation in a national and international context marked by profound transformations in the socioeconomic structure and global geopolitics that are a consequence of the unlimited powers of a hegemonic imperialist policy that seeks to shatter multilateralism, fuels neo-fascist movements, and exacerbates global tensions, constantly threatening international peace and security and attempting to break the indispensable unity of leftist forces.

A ‘silent genocide’ against the Cuban people

The silent genocide being waged against Cuba is causing immeasurable damage and terrible hardships in our daily lives as a people, while its perpetrators brazenly lie to the world by denying the energy blockade and claiming that we are blocking the entry of million-dollar donations — donations they tout extensively although hardly anything of what was promised has been delivered.

Cuba is resisting heroically and creatively, but for far too long it has suffered a barbaric, undeserved, and unbearable punishment, to which is now added the threat of military aggression as a new weapon against our collective resistance.

Cuba faces a cruel blockade and real, daily financial persecution that drives up the cost of every drop of fuel, every medicine, every food item, every part, and every piece of technology the country needs.

Reality demands urgent and necessary changes. And when life for the people becomes so difficult, the primary duty of the Communist Party and the revolutionary government is not to explain the crisis better, but to change whatever needs to be changed to overcome it.

What is required is a comprehensive and agile economic agenda, executable in the short term, that combines macroeconomic stabilization, incentives to stimulate and promote a productive atmosphere, legal guarantees, the attraction of investment, intensive use of technology, and targeted and effective social protections.

Let us recall that at the closing of the 11th Plenary Session, we stated that the postponement of the Congress did not preclude the possibility of making the necessary changes, modifications, and adjustments, taking into account the powers of Party and government structures — such as the Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee when it comes to resolutions adopted by Party congresses.

To this end, intensive work has been carried out, based on the informative report and debate from the ANEC [National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba] Congress, the public discussion on the Economic and Social Program for 2026, the opinions of economists and experts, the debates and contributions made by the Economic Commission of the Party’s Central Committee, the Economic and Social Policy Guidelines approved and updated at the 6th, 7th, and 8th Party Congresses, the proposals of the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, and the work carried out by the commissions that have been preparing the documents for the postponed 9th Party Congress — for reasons that are well known — regarding the update of the Conceptualization of the Economic and Social Model, the Guidelines, and the National Plan for Economic and Social Development through 2030.

In addition, a study has been conducted on the experiences of socialist construction in other countries, such as China and Vietnam, and artificial intelligence has also been utilized to further the search for references and evaluate the proposals in relation to our current laws and regulations.

Enormous challenge under cruel conditions

We are facing the enormous challenge of continuing to advance the process of socialist construction, defending the Revolution and its achievements, and perfecting our society, under the conditions of a country subjected to the most cruel, most genocidal, and longest-lasting economic, financial, energy, and commercial blockade imposed by the world’s most powerful nation. And to overcome this, the legacy we have is that of our Commander-in-Chief, Fidel Castro Ruz. (Applause)

No one in the history of humanity has ever faced the challenge of socialism under the conditions that this country, this nation, and this people are currently facing! We will, without a doubt, overcome this challenge through unity, courage, popular participation, and full conviction in our ability to achieve victory.

The transformations we are proposing are intended to advance the defense of socialism, to support and expand social justice, and to create economic wealth and distribute it equitably. Without wealth, there is nothing to distribute; we would be speaking of social justice in the abstract.

Social justice as conceived by the Revolution — with its humanistic mission to help the most disadvantaged, generally through free welfare programs and projects — does not cost the people anything, but it does cost the State. And to carry it out, to deepen it, to sustain it, and to maintain it, the State needs wealth — and we must produce that wealth ourselves. If there is no wealth, there is no social justice, and everything else is a fairy tale — everything else is a fairy tale! Either we produce under these conditions, create wealth, and then distribute it with social justice and equity — not egalitarianism. That is the challenge!

We need to unleash the productive forces, to have more production rather than more restrictions, because it has been proven that control without supply merely drives operations into the informal market.

Equality and integration among economic actors are necessary in accordance with the National Plan for Economic and Social Development through 2030 and the territorial and local development strategies involving state-owned enterprises, mipymes,1 cooperatives, agricultural producers, foreign and Cuban investors, residents and non-residents alike: all must act and contribute to the country’s socioeconomic development under clear rules.

We must export and produce to attract and bring in foreign currency and make productive use of it. Every unit of foreign currency that enters the country must be channeled to finance production, imports, investment, wages, and infrastructure.

Legal guarantees must be secured: contracts, usufruct rights, leases, concessions, surface rights, and licenses must offer temporal stability and protection against arbitrary changes. Without legal certainty, no one will invest, and no one will take risks.

We must promote digitalization with traceability: electronic invoicing, digital payments, public registries, and interoperable data as a foundation for reducing tax evasion and corruption.

Social protection must be prioritized: replacing inefficient blanket subsidies with direct support for vulnerable people. We must always ensure that each action does not increase social inequalities; on the contrary, they should be gradually reduced until they disappear.

We must attract technology, financing, markets, and external knowledge in a selective and intelligent way, while protecting strategic sectors through regulation, not stagnation.

A gradual, experimental approach

A gradual and experimental approach is necessary: reform should be implemented in phases and through verifiable pilot programs, maintaining government leadership and adjusting course based on evidence to address and minimize potential economic and social costs.

Also essential are political unity to ensure the consistency and credibility of the measures; clear and precise communication of the decisions to be implemented, to gain support for the transformations; and the adoption of compensatory mechanisms to mitigate economic and social impacts.

We must work with agility, consistency, and quality — and above all, with control. What has been approved must be implemented properly.

In this scenario, it is necessary to make progress on at least five fronts simultaneously:

  • Macroeconomic stabilization and the recovery of foreign revenue.
  • The transformation of the Economic and Social Model.
  • The stimulation and recovery of the agricultural sector.
  • The strengthening of accounting and cost management.
  • Anticipating and mitigating the social costs associated with the necessary transformations of the Economic and Social Model.

And these five aspects are very well developed in the report presented by ANEC at its last congress.

The Commander-in-Chief taught us that in times of crisis we could not give up on either development or critical thinking, that no obstacle is insurmountable, and that there is always an opportunity to grow. And along that path, the Army General showed us that it is possible, that it was possible, and that it will always be possible.2

The people understand the causes of many of the difficulties we face, but they also need concrete answers, timely decisions, and results that are felt in their daily lives.

There are obstacles that do not come from outside or from blockades. There is sluggishness, bureaucracy, regulations that hold back those who want to produce, and decisions we have put off. Those things that depend on us, we ourselves must change — and we must change them now.

Resistance alone is not enough

We owe our homeland to the resistance, but today resistance alone is not enough. This time demands that we transform, produce more, remove more barriers, listen more, make better decisions, and be accountable.

What we intend to set in motion is an emergency economic and social agenda, comprising measures that are part of our Government Program and policies approved by the Party, along with decisions that can no longer wait. Some will not enjoy unanimous consensus, but they cannot be postponed. And each will have a specific person in charge, a defined deadline, a metric to measure its implementation, and public accountability to the nation.

What works will be expanded. What does not work will be corrected without delay. Anyone with a responsibility will have to be held accountable for it, and when someone cannot meet the demands of this moment, they must responsibly make way for someone who can do it better.

We will face this process as the challenge of the generations that today share the defense of the Homeland, the Revolution, and Socialism.

Regarding the Economic Management System, I want to emphasize that the most important point is that, if we adopt these transformations, central planning would not serve to manage the economy, but rather to create an appropriate institutional and regulatory environment so that enterprises and workers are encouraged to produce goods and provide quality services efficiently, as well as to introduce innovations into their management for these purposes.

And we must definitely ensure that the Plan is built from the ground up with the participation of workers.

We will continue restructuring the government apparatus, the State, the Party, and our institutions. We will integrate structures where necessary, review duplicated functions, reduce unnecessary steps, and continuously optimize the way the country is governed and served. These structures must be more dynamic, more proactive, and less bureaucratic.

Boost the country’s development from the ground up

One of the most important and urgent tasks is to boost the country’s development from the ground up, starting with the municipalities.

We cannot delay any further in empowering municipal governments and ensuring they have and exercise all possible authority to develop.

No economic change will be sufficient if socialist state-owned enterprises — which will remain the fundamental pillar of the economy — do not have the genuine capacity to manage, innovate, and be accountable for their results.

It is necessary to reform the management of state-owned enterprises based on real autonomy, economic and financial evaluation, the separation of state and business functions, and the application of the “comply or explain” principle to prevent regulations from becoming an obstacle when a more beneficial and demonstrable solution exists.

To that end, we will move forward in two directions: greater real autonomy for enterprises and more professional management of state assets through the National Institute of Business Assets, which is tasked with representing the owner of the means of production, evaluating results, demanding efficiency, and better separating the business function from the regulatory function of the ministries.

Autonomy does not mean a lack of control; it implies a framework of accountability. It means being able to make timely decisions, form better partnerships, invest more effectively, pay better wages, and be accountable for results to the people and to the State.

We need to strengthen state-owned enterprises, not replace them with administrative mechanisms that paralyze them. To this end, we must complete the separation between state and business functions, evaluate performance using economic and financial tools, and grant real autonomy to manage material, financial, and human resources — with subsequent oversight, transparency, and accountability.

There is no sovereignty with empty plates

There is no sovereignty with empty plates. The Cuban people’s food will be treated for what it is: a matter of national security.

And idle land in Cuba must be eliminated. Every piece of land that is currently overgrown with marabú — when it should be producing food — will require a clear solution: either it is put to productive use or it is handed over to those willing to do so.

We will expand the granting of land in usufruct to those who are willing and able to produce: producers, cooperatives, mipymes, and other forms of association—without ever renouncing national sovereignty or regressing to the dependent country we left behind with the Revolution.

We will recognize the right of those who work the land to invest in what they need to make it productive, and we will allow those who commit to real results to import seeds, fertilizer, parts, and equipment directly.

But one principle must be clear: that land will continue to belong to the people; and if it does not produce, if it does not serve the country, if it does not fulfill its social function, it will have to pass into the hands of those who can indeed make it productive.

We cannot continue to demand that Cuban farmers produce more food with fewer tools and at prices below their costs; they must have effective mechanisms for direct access to foreign currency, such as selling to exporters — as is the case with tourism — or on the foreign exchange market.

We must make the land an opportunity rather than a burden; ensure that those who sow see the fruits of their labor; enable those who produce to live better lives; and provide those who invest in the countryside with security, support, and a future.

Cuba needs its farmers, their work, and their trust. When the Cuban countryside becomes a path to prosperity for those who work it, the country will be stronger, more just, and more sovereign.

Foreign trade, debt, and the private sector

With regard to foreign trade, exports, logistics, and value chains, we must authorize direct imports and exports for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises — whether they are productive, export-oriented, or import-substituting — while maintaining technical and fiscal requirements but eliminating mandatory intermediation.

Regarding debt renegotiation, we must carry out a debt-for-assets swap process, focused primarily on exchanging national assets for debt, without permanently relinquishing ownership of those assets. Through this mechanism, we can secure financing and other benefits without losing ownership rights over the assets.

We must also explore other mechanisms, such as “debt-for-nature” or “debt-for-social-development” swaps, the issuance of bonds tied to the Sustainable Development Goals, and others.

We will comprehensively review the list of activities prohibited to the private sector, guided by a clear principle: to replace, whenever possible, prohibitions with responsible regulation. The country needs to establish legal pathways for these activities, with clear rules and appropriate controls.

We will also make the scope of the corporate purpose of mipymes and other economic actors more flexible and significantly alleviate the bureaucratic burden currently faced by many entrepreneurs; furthermore, we must streamline the creation of economic partnerships between state and non-state management models.

Foreign investment is also trapped in a web of obstacles that hinder its necessary growth. We must not only tell foreign investors where to invest, but also allow them to take the initiative to invest in the economic sector of their choice, as well as to directly hire their workers without state intermediaries at all times.

We must authorize foreign direct investment in the national private sector, including mipymes, with clear rules on ownership, repatriation, reinvestment, and dispute resolution.

To Cubans abroad: ‘This is your home; our door is open’

We must facilitate investment models with different modalities and involving all stakeholders on the part of Cubans living in Cuba. And to Cubans living abroad who wish to invest, donate, import technology, open a market, or launch a project in their homeland, we will offer a clear, stable, and respectful framework, without them being viewed with suspicion for wanting to help their own people or contribute to the development of the land where they were born.

To anyone who wants to build a future with Cuba, without seeking to impose anything on it, we say with our hearts on our sleeves: this is your home, and our door is open to you, because at this moment, this homeland cannot afford to lose a single good Cuban. (Applause)

A power outage isn’t just a matter of megawatts or a generation shortfall. A power outage is the child who couldn’t study for a test, the food that went bad in the refrigerator, the elderly person who spends the night awake, restless, and sweltering. It’s the hospital operating at full capacity, the doctor’s office that can’t store medication, the worker who loses a day’s pay, and the business that has to close. That is why energy is not a technical issue; it is a human, economic, and national issue.

We will accelerate the integration of solar energy into the national economy, as we have been doing. To achieve this, we will facilitate the direct entry of foreign companies that supply panels, batteries, inverters, and related solutions, reducing the number of intermediaries that drive up costs for the population and for the country.

Import tariffs on solar technologies, storage systems, and energy-saving equipment have already been eliminated. Now we will also move forward with eliminating taxes on their sale and on services related to their installation and maintenance.

In addition, we will create credit and financing mechanisms so that these solutions are not accessible only to a few, but can gradually reach households, mipymes, medical clinics, educational centers, nursing homes, and other essential services for the population. And in this effort, our Cuban companies and technicians — both state-owned and private — will be at the center, installing, maintaining, repairing, integrating, and creating jobs. Cuban companies can specialize in the installation, integration, operation, and support of these technologies.

We will promote electric transportation powered by renewable energy sources. Any electric vehicle intended for public, private, or light-duty freight transport that demonstrates it operates entirely or primarily on solar energy will be eligible for special incentives, tariff exemptions, elimination of sales taxes, and facilitation of imports of chargers, batteries, parts, and related solutions.

We will also promote the installation of solar panels throughout the country with foreign, private, cooperative, and state investment, prioritizing urban routes, tourist hubs, productive zones, and essential services. Along with this, we will establish an expedited process for granting licenses for transportation operators, electric taxis, or associated mobility services, under clear rules, technical oversight, road safety standards, and transparent pricing.

The top priority, above all else, is the people who cannot wait for the economy to improve, because there are hardships that know no deadlines. True social justice is not built on artificial prices that eventually lead to shortages, long lines, low wages, and an illegal market.

Building social justice on real foundations

Social justice is built on real foundations: incomes with purchasing power, direct protection for those who need it most, and a national economy capable of producing more. There are no shortcuts; these are not new ideas, but decisions that the country discussed and approved years ago. The mistake was not in proposing them, but in postponing them — and that period of delay must come to an end.

The basic food basket3 will be guaranteed to retirees, families with chronically ill children, and vulnerable populations. Targeted programs will be developed to promote social transformation in the poorest neighborhoods. The state-owned and private business sectors must be given a greater role and incentives to get involved in solving prioritized local problems, such as soup kitchens, sanitation, and shelters for children without family support, among others.

These decisions will entail new, concrete tasks: delivering pension payments to retirees near their homes so they do not have to wait in line for hours under the sun; sponsoring soup kitchens, nursing homes, senior centers, and children’s centers; creating solidarity quotas and cost-based pricing for those who truly need it; and digitizing everything so that it is clear who contributes, who receives, and what results are achieved.

For years, we operated under a system of wage controls, price regulations, and a government that subsidized a huge portion of the country’s economic life. That formula had its rationale, its context, its results, and its time; but it no longer addresses the complex reality we face today. The prices families face have become far too disconnected from the income of workers and retirees, and we cannot continue to act as if that gap does not exist.

We will also open new avenues for secure access to medications.

Correcting a failed policy

Regarding fiscal, tax, monetary, and financial restructuring policies, we propose that the primary objective for reducing the fiscal deficit lies in increasing production — which is the basis for tax revenue — and cutting unnecessary budget expenditures. That is why we will also correct a policy that failed to deliver the expected results.

Price caps, in practice, failed to curb inflation. They often led to product shortages, a shift toward the black market, higher prices, lower tax revenue, and an impossible race between actual prices and administrative decisions that were always late or remained rigid in the face of changing economic realities, thereby limiting all those who wish to conduct their economic activities legally and transparently. For this reason, we will not continue to impose blanket price caps, as the Prime Minister explained. We must correct distortions in the tax system that currently drive up the costs of production chains and ultimately get passed on to the final price.

We will move toward a creditable value-added tax (VAT) progressively supported by electronic invoicing to avoid cascading taxation. But these decisions can only be implemented alongside more direct and effective social protection, with a shift from subsidizing products to subsidizing people, and with efforts to restore the purchasing power of wages and pensions. It is not a matter of leaving anyone to fend for themselves in the market; it is a matter of providing better protection, increasing production, regulating intelligently, and managing with realism.

We need a financial system that supports the economy, serves the needs of the various economic actors, reduces lines, facilitates payments, ensures transparency in transactions, and turns savings, credit, and investment into concrete tools for development.

We must thoroughly modernize the country’s banking and financial system. To do so, Cuba needs banks that are more agile, more digital, closer to the people, and more useful to those who produce, export, import, invest, or start businesses.

Ensuring that moving money is not an obstacle course

We will open up opportunities — under strict regulation — for private and foreign financial institutions; new mechanisms for credit, productive financing, the development of financial markets, and payment services, in which state, cooperative, and private actors can participate. The goal is to ensure that collecting a pension, receiving a remittance from abroad, paying for a service, applying for a loan, financing a harvest, purchasing equipment, or moving money to support production is not an obstacle course.

We will allow offshore accounts, foreign-currency payments between companies, and auditable international transactions for entities that import, export, or provide global services.

This is not about weakening the role of the state, but rather about expanding and modernizing the country’s capacity to finance production, support those who generate goods and services, regulate the flow of money, and provide better service to our people.

We will turn digital transformation, software, and artificial intelligence into cross-cutting tools to develop agriculture, the energy sector, healthcare, education, foreign trade, banking, e-commerce, logistics, tourism, and tax enforcement.

Specific proposals related to software, artificial intelligence, the knowledge economy, and the digital economy must be presented as cross-cutting infrastructure to boost national productivity. This is not merely about exporting software, but about digitizing payments, taxes, foreign trade, agriculture, healthcare, energy, logistics, government, and statistics.

With regard to tourism and the real estate sector, new business models must be implemented, with the participation of all economic actors. We must develop a productive, regulated real estate market that includes: leasing of idle state-owned properties; rental of buildings, commercial spaces, warehouses, offices, tourist facilities, workshops, and industrial spaces; concessions; rights of use for real estate; and transparent bidding processes open to state, private, cooperative, or mixed-ownership entities.

We have discussed fuel imports and all the opportunities that have been opened up to the private sector, but now the goal is to achieve this with reasonable, transparent, and non-exploitative profit margins.

As for vehicle imports, we must eliminate all import barriers, prioritize the import of electric vehicles, and, of course, develop solar panel manufacturing facilities.

Concerns about partial dollarization

I know there is concern — and rightly so — about the partial dollarization of the economy, inflation, and the lack of many products priced in local currency. We are not going to ignore this problem. The business models we are authorizing in foreign currency must directly and verifiably contribute to an increase in foreign exchange revenue that allows for the sustainability of offerings in local currency.

We must impose stricter requirements on the use of digital payment platforms. We must expand approvals for wholesale and retail trade, eliminating intermediaries, and, without a doubt, we must implement electronic invoicing.

We must eliminate wage barriers that prevent the retention of talent and a highly skilled workforce in the productive, export, technology, energy, and agro-industrial sectors, and allow for variable compensation in CUP [Cuban peso] and foreign currency linked to verifiable results in exports, import savings, increased productivity, innovation, energy availability, or foreign sales.

With regard to digital government, public data, and smart monitoring, we must implement mandatory and phased electronic invoicing for medium and large taxpayers; then move on to mipymes and self-employed workers, using simple tools adapted to actual connectivity.

We must modernize the National Statistical System and the ONEI [National Office of Statistics and Information] through digital data collection from companies and entities, publication via public service applications using artificial intelligence, and the protection of sensitive data.

We must use artificial intelligence to simplify procedures, process scanned documents, detect errors, validate files, authenticate documents, and reduce administrative burdens.

We must improve the quality of services provided to the public by designing new approaches to each issue.

And we must seriously address a problem that affects the daily lives of millions of Cubans: solid waste collection. We will launch local projects to improve the collection, treatment, and disposal of solid waste, in which — responsibly — those who place the greatest burden on the system must also contribute more to sustaining it.

But this solution will not be solely state-led; it will incorporate foreign investment into the non-state sector, the business system, communities, and creative initiatives that help restore cleanliness, order, and health to our cities and communities.

Cuba doesn’t need further delays; it needs solutions

Comrades:

Cuba does not need further delays; it needs solutions. It is not a matter of creating more offices or holding more meetings, but of achieving concrete results.

To govern is to solve problems, remove obstacles, provide support, and ensure that decisions translate into real improvements; because creating in Cuba, investing in Cuba, working in Cuba, and staying in Cuba also depend on the country’s ability to blaze new trails, organize intelligently, and support those who want to contribute.

Alongside economic opportunities, we will also promote concrete spaces where young people can take action within their communities.

The Community Youth Network must be a pathway for young people to find places to receive training, find employment, serve their community, and turn an idea into a real project. This network must coordinate useful initiatives in neighborhoods: revitalizing public spaces, supporting vulnerable people, cultural and sports activities, training in trades and technologies, community communication, productive projects, local employment, and support for at-risk youth.

This is not about creating yet another structure or bringing young people together merely to receive guidance; it is about giving them skills, tools, knowledge, responsibilities, and real opportunities to transform the places where they live — because staying in Cuba must also mean having a place where they can be useful, grow, learn, lead, and build a future starting from their neighborhood, school, workplace, and municipality.

We know our country; we know where the obstacles lie, where corruption lurks, where there is excessive red tape, and where a sense of shame and dignity is lacking.

Every measure we announce will have designated leaders, deadlines, and performance indicators. We will report on what is progressing, what is not being met, and what needs to be corrected.

There will be matters that, to protect them from those who wish to sabotage them, we will have to handle with discretion. Martí4 has already taught us that some things must remain hidden in order to be achieved; but discretion will never be an excuse to hide anything from the people.

Either we do this together, or we don’t do it at all

As a people, we are not going to come together merely to resist; we are going to come together to create, to produce, to decide, to hold others accountable, to prosper, and to transform, because what we are starting today is not something a government does — this is something we all do together — or it won’t be done at all: with the farmer who returns to the fields to plant, with the mipyme that dares to take risks, with the technician who installs the first solar panel, with the teacher, with the doctor, with the young person who decides to stay and invest in their homeland, with the Cuban living abroad who reaches out, with you, with me, with everyone.

We will not deny the problems; we will not defend bureaucracy; we will not close the door on talent; we will not abandon the vulnerable; and we will never allow the suffering of this people — caused by the perverse imperialist blockade — to be used against the sovereignty of our homeland. (Applause)

Nothing will be impossible if we embrace the challenge as an opportunity and history as inspiration!

Céspedes, Agramonte, Maceo, Gómez, Martí, Mella, Villena, Guiteras, Che, Camilo, Almeida, Fidel, and Raúl — all our heroes5 — faced moments that were just as difficult, or even more so, for their time, than those faced today by the new revolutionary generation, and all emerged from those challenges with honor and glory — even those who fell in combat without living to see victory — because they bequeathed to us lessons in courage that endure to this day, as was demonstrated on January 3 of this year when 32 Cuban combatants6 fell while confronting elite troops vastly superior in numbers and resources.

No revolution has had it easy, and ours has had the audacity to survive six decades of a blockade, genocidal laws, hybrid warfare, and a series of unilateral coercive measures that no other nation has endured — nor could it endure — for so long.

On the centennial of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro’s birth and the 95th birthday of Army General Raúl Castro Ruz, the best tribute we can pay to the admirable work of our two historic leaders is to defend it and preserve its essence of social justice, amid the storm of predatory wars, threats of invasion, and processes of neocolonization that, like the Seven-League Giant, are sweeping across the sky, devouring worlds in these times.

We are all called to action, and together we will prevail.

Long live Free Cuba! (Shouts of: “Long live!”)

Long live the heroic Cuban people! (Shouts of: “Long live!”)

Long live the sovereignty of the Cuban nation! (Shouts of: “Long live!”)

Socialism or Death!

Fatherland or Death!

We will prevail! (Shouts of: “We will prevail!”)

(Applause)

  • 1

    Mipymes (MSMEs — Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises) were permitted to operate in Cuba beginning in 2021. They can be established as state, private, or mixed entities, but are prohibited in certain strategic sectors such as health, telecommunications, energy, defense, and the media.

  • 2

    “Commander in Chief” is a reference to Fidel Castro, the central leader of the Cuban revolution. He served as Cuba’s president from 1976 until his retirement in 2008. He died in 2016.

    “Army General” is a reference to Raúl Castro, a lifelong leader of the Cuban Revolution, and the former Commander of Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces who served as the country’s president prior to Díaz-Canel. He holds the title General of the Army, Cuba’s highest military post. Castro was indicted by the U.S. justice department on May 20, 2026, on bogus charges of murder and conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens stemming from a 1996 incident over Cuban territorial waters. 

  • 3

    The “basic food basket” is a system guaranteeing that every Cuban can satisfy their basic nutritional needs.

  • 4

    José Martí, born in Havana in 1853, was a poet and essayist who died in battle in 1895 fighting for Cuba’s independence from Spain. His patriotism and martyrdom made his name a symbol for liberty throughout Latin America. He is considered Cuba’s national hero.

  • 5

    Carlos Manuel de Céspedes del Castillo, was a plantation owner in Cuba who freed his slaves,  made the declaration of Cuban independence in 1868, starting the Ten Years’ War (1868 – 1878). This was the first of three wars of independence, the third of which led to the end of Spanish rule in 1898 and Cuba’s independence in 1902. In April 1869, Céspedes was chosen as President of the Republic of Cuba in Arms; he was killed by the Spaniards in 1874. He is known in Cuba as the “Father of the Homeland.”

    Ignacio Agramonte y Loynaz was a Cuban revolutionary who was killed in 1873 during the Ten Years’ War.

    José Antonio Maceo was a leader of the fight for Cuba’s independence from Spain and the end of slavery on the island. In 1878, the Pact of Zanjón, which granted amnesty for insurgents, but failed to grant full independence for Cuba or the immediate abolition of slavery, was signed by a group of Cuban rebels; Maceo, then in command of the independence forces in eastern Cuba, refused to sign during an historic meeting in the town of Baraguá.

    Máximo Gómez y Báez was a Dominican-Cuban general who fought for Dominican independence and later in both the Ten Years’ War and the Cuban War of Independence from 1868 to 1898. He is considered a war hero in both his native Dominican Republic and in Cuba.

    Julio Antonio Mella was a Cuban political activist, journalist, and one of the founders of the original Communist Party of Cuba in the early 1920s. He was assassinated in 1929.

    Rubén Agnelio Martínez Villena was a Cuban writer, lawyer, and revolutionary leader.

    Antonio Guiteras y Holmes was a young Cuban and the founder of Joven Cuba, a group with anticapitalist views that was inspired by the example of José Martí. He died in a gun battle against the army of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1935 at the age of 18.

    Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Argentine by birth, was a commander of the guerrilla forces during the Cuban revolution and a leader of Cuba’s new revolutionary government, spearheading the agrarian land reform and literacy campaigns alongside other roles. Inspired by revolutionary possibilities in Africa and Latin America, Guevara left Cuba in 1965 for internationalist missions. He was captured and executed in Bolivia by CIA-assisted forces in 1967.

    Camilo Cienfuegos Gorriarán was one of the central figures of the Cuban Revolution. After the victory against the Batista regime, he became chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. He died, presumably in a plane lost at sea, in 1959.

    Juan Almeida Bosque was one of the original commanders of the insurgent forces in the Cuban Revolution and remained prominent in the country’s leadership. At the time of his death, he was a vice president of the Cuban Council of State and its third ranking member. 

  • 6

    The 32 combatants is a reference to the Cubans killed during the January 3, 2026, U.S. assault on Venezuela. They died attempting to protect Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia Flores.




Wednesday, June 24, 2026

Cuba: An urgent, but risky, reform

LJC graphic cuba reform

First published in Spanish at La Joven Cuba.

Cuba faces not just another reform, but a make-or-break decision. The government has announced some of the most far-reaching economic and social reforms in the country’s post-1959 history. It comes as the country has no more room to manage the crisis with stopgap measures, slogans or delays.

Various economists have repeatedly recommended many of the measures. That they are finally being heeded is a positive sign, but also confirms how much time was wasted. Cuba faces one of the most severe socioeconomic crises in its recent history, with an energy crisis devastating daily life, production, services, family care, mental health and people’s ability to sustain a dignified existence. Added to this is the real, profound and growing impact of the United States’ sanctions. These have intensified in recent years and aim to cut off funding sources, foreign income, access to fuel, international operations and economic room for manoeuvre.

Acknowledging this impact, however, does not absolve the government of its domestic responsibilities. Precisely because the island faces such severe external pressure, the government had less right to waste time, less room for improvisation and a greater obligation to make the changes needed to build a stronger economy.

There lies a paradox of our times. The economic war makes reform riskier, because it is implemented under conditions of extreme scarcity, institutional decay, low social trust and impoverishment. Yet it is also clear that, indirectly, this pressure ultimately propelled a transformation that had been continuously postponed. Many of the measures now presented as essential could have been adopted during the opening promoted by the Barack Obama administration, when there was a less hostile international environment, greater domestic wealth and a less exhausted society.

The outcome of this process will not just depend on internal decisions. The role of the US, as well as powers with strategic ties to Cuba such as China and Russia, will be key to the transformation’s success or failure. If the reform sends credible signals of openness, legal certainty and economic rationality, they could help stimulate foreign investment and partially reduce the country’s financial isolation. However, if sanctions are maintained or tightened, and if international allies limit themselves to political support without significant economic commitments, the scope for reform will be much narrower. Cuba needs to play its part, but the international environment can accelerate, limit or profoundly distort its results.

Overall, the package contains measures that point in the right direction. It is correct to recognise the need to grant state-owned enterprises greater autonomy, expand the scope for private-sector activity, reduce absurd prohibitions, facilitate access to inputs, open more diverse financing channels, review pricing policy, and give greater decision-making power to producers, enterprises and local communities. It is also important that it opens a discussion on wage reform, regular pension and benefit rises, and better-targeted subsidies.

For too long, the Cuban economy operated under a combination of shortages, prohibitions, ineffective controls and delayed decisions, which ultimately pushed millions of people into precarity, informality or emigration. Opening up space for initiative, the market and diverse ownership and management forms should not be seen as a concession. Rather it is a minimum condition to restore productive capacity and sustain any viable social policy.

These potential benefits, however, coexist with significant risks. This reform could expand production, attract capital, revitalise regions and reduce red tape; but if not implemented with clear rules, they could also increase inequalities, further affect those who depend on an income in national currency, facilitate asset concentration and create new areas of inequality.

The difference between a transformation geared towards national wellbeing and a simple redistribution of privileges will depend on transparency, citizen participation and effective protection of those unable to compete in the new market. The debate must not be reduced to for or against the reform; the key is what kind of reform is implemented and in whose interest. This requires looking beyond the measures' general outline and focusing on practical scenarios for their implementation.

In this sense, the transition from subsidising goods to subsidising people may be needed, but it will only be considered legitimate if it translates into concrete and enforceable social protection. It is not enough to announce a fund or set out general objectives; it must define who will be protected, with what resources, through which institutions, and with what safeguards against potential price rises and further dollarisation of the economy.

In today’s Cuba, the effects of a state withdrawing from its role guaranteeing basic services without creating decent redistribution mechanisms are already being felt. New forms to access income have emerged — such as the sale of gas for foreign currency amid the energy crisis and shortages of subsidised services — creating alternatives for one part of the population while closing the door on most workers and pensioners. It may be better to have this option than none at all, but if an essential good is available to only part of the population — and not necessarily those who work, or have worked, the most — daily life becomes organised around a stark divide between those who can survive and those left destitute.

That is why every step towards liberalisation must be accompanied by redistributive measures. It is not a question of preventing new supply channels from emerging, but of ensuring that access to basic needs is not completely out of reach for those on average incomes. If the state withdraws from certain areas without putting effective safeguards in place, the reform will not be a social lifeline, but rather the unequal management of scarcity.

The announced measures do provide for an annual adjustment of the minimum wage, pensions and benefits in line with inflation, as well as a public sector pay rise, but these will prove insufficient if they remain far below the real cost of living.

Another critical issue is privatisation. In this context, it means the part transfer of management, ownership, shares, assets and accumulation opportunities to domestic and foreign private actors. This may be needed in some areas, particularly where the state has not efficiently managed underutilised assets, companies have suffered sustained losses, or in sectors requiring capital, technology and expertise. However, we must remember that privatising, leasing, selling shares or granting usufruct rights without transparency can open a dangerous door.

Without measures such as transparent final beneficiaries, public tenders, independent audits, or conflict-of-interest declarations, the transfer process could lead to oligarchic appropriation of public assets. We must clearly define the rules for how opportunities are distributed, who has access to them and how, and the measures taken to prevent wealth accumulated over generations from being opaquely transferred to new networks of privilege. This cannot be achieved without citizen access to information, civil society organisations and a media genuinely capacity of scrutiny — all shortcomings of the Cuban political model.

Municipal decentralisation also deserves close attention. In principle, transferring powers to municipalities can bring decision-making closer to the local level and promote local solutions. However, many of these structures are underfunded, lack qualified staff and are plagued by management problems. Delegating economic, urban planning, budgetary and investment powers to them without strengthening their capacities or citizen oversight creates a perfect breeding ground to exacerbate corruption.

Oversight cannot rest solely with the state. Institutions have important responsibilities, but cannot substitute for citizen oversight. This means civil society, independent media outlets, trade unions that truly represent workers, community organisations, and the general public, with access to data, processes, contracts, tenders, budgets and results. Likewise, there must be effective mechanisms to influence decision-making, demand accountability and recall elected officials who fail to act in the interests of those they represent.

Unleashing productive forces without also unleashing civic forces would be an extremely dangerous contradiction right now. The history of several former socialist republics shows that economic liberalisation without transparency, pluralism, accountability and popular control can lead to deeply unequal oligarchic capitalism that is captured by power networks. Cuba is not immune to this risk; quite the contrary, particularly with its political culture permeated by secrecy and the systematic dismissal of criticism.

Finally, another worrying element is the implementation timeframe. The announcement said the reform will affect more than 100 legal provisions, including regulations to be repealed, amended and created. This raises the question of how long it will take to translate these general statements into concrete policies, regulations and operational mechanisms. For now, the direction is supposedly clear, but the timetable and sequence are not. In a crisis of this magnitude, time is a decisive political and social factor.

***

This may be the Cuban government’s last chance to reverse the erosion of the basic material foundations underpinning the social gains of the nation’s project. But this project will not be salvaged with slogans, appeals to the past or repeating that the reform is not abandoning socialism. It will only be salvaged if people’s lives concretely improve.

Resistance to change has already caused too much suffering. Persisting with it would only make things worse. But, alongside unleashing productive forces, we must unleash civic forces to ensure the fruits of that production benefit the majority, and do not impoverish those who have worked for years for the country’s development. That will be the true measure of reform; beyond what it achieves in terms of macroeconomic indicators, how much dignity does it manage to preserve and rebuild.


Socialism with a twist or crony capitalism? Cuban reforms spark debate

Havana (AFP) – Cuba's communist president has cited China and Vietnam as models for a historic shift towards a market economy that was hurriedly pushed through last week to try to end a severe crisis.


Issued on: 24/06/2026 - RFI

New cars and SUVs are an increasingly common sight in Havana, where the private sector is fast replacing state enterprises in the supply of food, clothing and fuel © Pablo PORCIUNCULA / AFP

But some worry that Russian-style crony capitalism could be on the menu instead.

Under immense pressure from US sanctions, including a crippling fuel blockade, Cuba's government last week drew a line under nearly seven decades of central planning.

Unveiling 176 reforms that represent a seismic change to the island's socialist model, it said state-owned enterprises would be converted into joint-stock companies and opened up to private investors, private banks would be authorized and private developers would be allowed to build tourist infrastructure.

President Miguel Diaz-Canel said the measures, which also included sweeping changes to land use, aimed to "preserve" socialism rather than bury it.

But economists warned that a politically-connected elite would profit most from a rushed transition implemented without any semblance of democratic reforms.

Spain-based Cuban economist Pedro Monreal warned that a quick-fire sale of state enterprises "without robust legal safeguards" could result in "the capture of state assets by insiders well-connected to those in power."

"I inevitably think of the "crony capitalism" of the Russian transition," he wrote on X, referring to the former communist officials who snapped up state assets at knock-down prices after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Fellow Cuban economist Ricardo Torres, a research fellow at the American University in Washington, issued a similar warning.

The "structural conditions for insider capture are present," he told AFP, noting that there are "no independent valuation mechanisms, no competitive bidding requirements, and no oversight body insulated from party control."

Socialism with Cuban characteristics


A man offers pineapples for sale out of the back of a car at a market in Havana, where affordable food has become scarce © Pablo PORCIUNCULA / AFP

Former president Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, who led the country from 2006 to 2018, regularly cited Vietnam as an inspiration for his timid reform effort starting in 2010, when he boosted small private businesses and legalized home sales.

Communist Vietnam has become one of southeast Asia's fastest growing economies since introducing market-led reforms in the 1980s.

In China, meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" has produced hundreds of billionaires and major homegrown companies such as internet giants Alibaba and Tencent.

London-based Cuban economist Daniel Torralbas argued that neither China nor Vietnam served as a useful comparison for Cuba because their transformation was "much more gradual."

"Both began with agricultural reforms that lasted several years, and then the reforms expanded to promoting foreign direct investment, international capital, the creation of special economic zones, and, of course, the expansion of the role of private property in the economy."

Cuba's opening up, by contrast, comes "at its worst moment," he said, when the economy is at rock bottom and US sanctions, including the fuel blockade, have caused an exodus of foreign investors and tourists.

From centralism to capitalism


Alexei, a 52-year-old building supervisor in Havana, recalled Mikhail Gorbachev's 1989 visit to Cuba, when the Soviet leader touted his perestroika reforms to a skeptical Fidel Castro and suggested that Cuba, too, needed to adapt.

"The best time to implement these reforms was in the 1990s," Alexei, who did not wish to be identified when talking about government policy, said, echoing a sentiment voiced by many Cubans about what they saw as wasted years.

Santiago, an engineer who worked in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, said the move to privatize chunks of the economy was long overdue, "because the state can't be dealing with simple things like fixing a television."

But the 59-year-old, like many Cubans who spoke to AFP, was worried about the pace of the changes and the risk of the island's most vulnerable being left behind.

In a recent opinion article in Time magazine, Torres, the economist, urged Havana to "resist the temptation to leap from bureaucratic centralism to a harsh, socially detached form of capitalism."

He called for the preservation of Cuba's core values: "that education is a fundamental good, that access to healthcare should not depend solely on purchasing power, and that exclusion of whole communities, whole generations, is not an acceptable price for growth."

© 2026 AFP

Cuba oil lifeline hinges on Mexican firms willing to brave US sanctions

Cuba oil lifeline hinges on Mexican firms willing to brave US sanctions
Mexico's prior oil relationship with Cuba was commercially structured and paid. But the sanctions environment that private firms would now navigate bears little resemblance to what Pemex faced before January, when the US captured Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro and started ramping up pressure on Cuba.Facebook
By Alek Buttermann June 24, 2026

Mexico is gearing up to resume oil shipments to Cuba through privately owned companies rather than state entities, President Claudia Sheinbaum announced on June 22, floating a manoeuvre that would sidestep Washington's blockade while leveraging Havana's newly enacted economic liberalisation measures. The initiative, though, faces a materially harder sanctions environment than when Mexico first suspended its deliveries in January.

The backdrop is a near-total collapse in Cuban energy supply. Cuba produces only around 40% of the petroleum it requires domestically and has historically depended on imports from Venezuela, Russia and Mexico. That structure disintegrated on January 3 when a US military operation resulted in the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, halting Caracas' subsidised deliveries. Mexico stepped into the breach but suspended its own Pemex-operated shipments after the Trump administration issued an executive order on January 29 declaring a national emergency over Cuba and threatening tariff penalties on any country supplying hydrocarbons to the island. Only one oil shipment has reached Cuba since: a Russian tanker docking on March 30 carrying 730,000 barrels of crude. A second Russian vessel turned around off the coast of Brazil on May 27 without arriving. Cuba's Ministry of Energy and Mines warned on May 14 that the country had run out of oil and diesel entirely.

The humanitarian toll is severe and worsening. The record power deficit was registered on May 13 and 14, reaching between 2,153 and 2,174 MW and leaving 70% of the country without power. Grocery store shelves are empty, hospitals can barely function, and the lack of diesel has stalled the agricultural sector, marine vessels and trucks. Cuba's economy is forecast to contract by between 6% and 15% this year, according to estimates cited by multiple analysts.

Sheinbaum's proposed workaround pivots on the 176 economic reforms approved unanimously by Cuba's National Assembly on June 18 under Prime Minister Manuel Marrero. Among them, documented under the "Energy Transformations" section, is a provision allowing private domestic companies, cooperatives, joint ventures and foreign investors to participate in fuel importation and distribution — a sector historically monopolised by the state entity Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET).

Sheinbaum argued this reform creates legal space for Mexican private operators to engage commercially with the island without routing supply through state channels. "The mechanism would be through private companies that have permits to transport fuel to Cuba," she said at her daily press conference, without naming firms or specifying a timeline. Her foreign ministry has indicated it can facilitate introductions for interested businesses.

The sanctions deterrent, however, has grown considerably more severe since January. The Trump administration's original tariff threat was subsequently invalidated: on February 20, the US Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not give the president authority to impose tariffs. Washington's response was to escalate through a different instrument. On May 1, President Trump signed Executive Order 14404 establishing a new Cuba sanctions authority under IEEPA, authorising OFAC to impose blocking sanctions on foreign persons determined to operate in Cuba's energy sector — covering oil and gas supply, electricity generation, distribution and fuel trading — as well as defence, metals and mining, and financial services.

Critically, the order extends secondary sanctions risk to foreign financial institutions that process transactions on behalf of designated Cuban entities. Any Mexican private company with US dollar banking exposure or American investors faces the prospect of SDN designation and loss of access to the US financial system.

OFAC has released no guidance on what constitutes "operating in" Cuba's energy sector for the purposes of secondary sanctions exposure, and there is no price-cap carve-out comparable to the Russia framework. That ambiguity will almost certainly be read conservatively by compliance officers at any firm with material US exposure.

Whether Mexican companies will accept the commercial risk remains the article's open question. Unlike the state-backed Pemex, which has the sovereign weight of the Mexican government to cushion geopolitical friction, private mid-sized transporters and fuel traders possess no such safety net; losing access to US dollar clearing accounts represents an overnight death sentence.

Sheinbaum is offering political cover and ministry-facilitated introductions, but no indemnification against US enforcement action. Cuban authorities themselves cautioned that implementation of the reforms could be slow, and acknowledged that the measures will not be viable if the US maintains its current posture. The designation of GAESA, the Cuban sprawling military's commercial conglomerate, as an SDN under the May order further narrows the universe of Cuban counterparties any Mexican firm could legally transact with, particularly now that OFAC's wind-down period for existing GAESA relationships expired on June 5.

Mexico's prior oil relationship with Cuba was commercially structured and paid. Pemex's then-director Víctor Rodríguez Padilla stated in February that Cuba had paid $496m for crude and refined products during 2025 with no overdue invoices. But the sanctions environment that private firms would now navigate bears little resemblance to what Pemex faced before January.