It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
A United Kingdom navy ship that was instrumental in the evacuation of civilians from Beirut in 2006 and active from 2005 to 2016 is ending its service with the Royal Navy. The Ministry of Defence confirmed the long-rumored transfer of HMS Bulwark to Brazil.
The HMS Bulwark (L15) is one of two Albion Class amphibious assault ships whose fate has been the subject of speculation. Both ships have been out of service for years, undergoing life-extension overhauls with the British government committing significant investments in their upgrade program.
For Bulwark, which was commissioned in 2005, the government has spent a total of $100 million on her midlife upgrade project that is nearing completion. The revitalization program has involved the modernization of its command and control systems, upgrades to communications equipment, and a full overhaul of its propulsion and power generation systems. The aim was to extend her operational service life by another two decades.
Instead of returning the landing platform dock ship to service with the Royal Navy, the UK’s Defense Ministry has now ended the speculation by confirming she is being sold to the Brazilian Navy. While the government did not reveal the price at which the ship was sold, reports indicate it was sold at only $26 million. The same fate is likely to befall her sister ship, Albion, which remains moored at the Devonport naval base pending disposal.
The MoD asserts the disposal of the two ships was part of the government’s plan to modernize navy ships. It highlights the effort to transition to a hybrid Navy, which it says will be anchored by a £1.5 billion ($2 billion) Defense Investment Plan.
A new £2.4 billion ($3.2 billion) deal has since been signed in partnership with the Netherlands for construction of a fleet of eight next-generation amphibious transport ships that will replace the capability provided by the Albion class. At 160 meters (525 feet) in length and displacing 15,000 tonnes, the new vessels will be capable of transporting troops, vehicles and equipment, including drones, wherever they are needed.
Bulwark passing her sister Albion in December 2016 when she ended active service (Royal Navy)
Bulwark, which is 176 meters (577 feet) long, displaces 18,500 tonnes, and has capacity for 700 military personnel, is being sold after an illustrious service with the Royal Navy. The ship’s core roles were amphibious deployments, humanitarian missions, and multinational exercises. It is credited for her role in Operation Highbrow that involved the evacuation of British citizens during the 2006 Lebanon crisis. Other critical missions included providing maritime security for the Sailing Regatta at the London 2012 Olympics and counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. Bulwark was also involved in various naval exercises and served as the Royal Navy’s Fleet Flagship between 2011 and 2015.
“HMS Bulwark served this country and our allies with distinction for over two decades, and I’m pleased that she will continue her story in Brazilian service, with a nation that has long stood alongside us as a defense partner,” said Lord Coaker, UK Minister of State for Defense.
The ship was ordered to stand down at the end of 2016, entering a period of Extended Readiness scheduled to run until 2021. For the next two years, until 2023, she was scheduled to undergo her overhaul and modernization. Critics now question the investments in the ships, which have never returned to service.
When she enters service with the Brazilian Navy, the ship is expected to be primarily deployed in operations in the Blue Amazon region, where she will be useful for a wide variety of both military and humanitarian aid operations supporting the civil community.
This is not the first time the UK has sold naval hardware to Brazil. The multipurpose aircraft carrier, NAM Atlântico (A140), which is the flagship and largest warship in the Brazilian Navy, was acquired from the UK at a cost of $84 million in 2018.
Friday, September 04, 2026
UK Shipbuilding and RFA Mark Milestone as Keel is Laid for Support Vessel
Keel block ceremony for the UK's first Fleet Solid Support vessel (Royal Navy)
Officials from the UK’s Ministry of Defence, the Royal Navy, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and Navantia UK gather at the Appledore shipyard on September 3 to witness the ceremonial keel laying for the first of three Fleet Solid Support vessels for the RFA. A long time in coming, it marks more than just a shipbuilding milestone, as it is a key addition to the RFA and the revitalization of shipbuilding at Appledore and the Harland & Wolff Group, acquired by Navantia.
“Today is an important moment for Fleet Solid Support, for Appledore, and for the renewal of UK shipbuilding,” said Donato Martínez, CEO of Navantia UK. “The laying of the keel marks the formal start of assembly of the first ship and is clear evidence of the momentum we have built across the programme.”
The ceremony took place on Merchant Navy Day, which celebrates the UK’s civilian seafarers, including the men and women of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. It involved putting the first block, a section of the bow of the future RFA Resurgent, onto the Seahorse barge in Appledore’s dry dock. The barge was built at Navantia UK’s Methil Yard and will carry completed blocks to the Harland & Wolff yard in Belfast. Other portions of the FSS vessels are being assembled at Navantia’s yard in Cadiz, Spain, with final assembly for the vessels at the yard in Belfast.
The program began in 2023 but was challenged by the insolvency of Harland & Wolff, which was rescued by Navantia. Today’s ceremony marked the next critical step following the start of test block construction at Appledore in August 2025, the completion of the Critical Design Review in October 2025, and the cutting of the first steel at Appledore in December 2025.
During the keel-laying ceremony for RFA Resurgent, head of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, Commodore Sam Shattock, also revealed the second and third vessels would be named RFA Reliant and RFA Resourceful. He noted that RFA Resourceful is a new name embodying the spirit of the project while Resurgent and Reliant are names with storied histories for the Royal Navy. Shattock said the names are intended to convey values associated with the role that Fleet Solid Support Ships will play for the fleet.
Rendering of RFA's new Fleet Solid Support vessels (Royal Navy)
At around 39,000 tonnes and 216 meters (708 feet) long, the vessels will be the largest ships in UK military service after the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. They will provide logistical and operational support, including counter-piracy and counter-terrorism missions, and will collaborate with allies on operations. Each ship will have a core RFA crew of 101, with accommodation provided for an additional 80 personnel operating helicopters, boats, or performing other roles when required. The three Fleet Solid Support ships are designed to provide munitions, stores and provisions to Royal Navy task groups at sea.
As the project proceeds, it also marks the restoration of shipbuilding at Appledore, which had ceased operations when it was acquired by Harland & Wolff in 2020. The executives called it a significant moment in the regeneration of Appledore, which is undertaking its first shipbuilding activity since the completion of the Irish Naval Service offshore patrol vessel LÉ George Bernard Shaw in 2019.
Appledore today has a workforce that has grown to 210 people as part of Navantia UK’s investment of around £15 million at Appledore as part of more than £157 million across the four yards of the group. A new roof was put on the building hall at Appledore, as well as plasma-cutting equipment and a new pipe shop. Navantia looks to leverage this project and to position the UK operation to participate in the government’s planned investment in the Royal Navy in the coming years.
Tuesday, September 01, 2026
HIGH SEAS PIRACY
U.S. Eyes 18th-Century Law to Seize and Sell Iranian Oil
The U.S. is considering reviving centuries-old “prize law” to seize ownership of Iranian ships and oil captured during its blockade, potentially replacing slower civil forfeiture proceedings.
Captured oil and vessels could be sold with proceeds flowing to the U.S. Treasury, turning maritime seizures into another source of economic pressure on Tehran.
The strategy faces major legal and geopolitical risks, from questions over wartime authority to fears that China or other rivals could eventually use the same precedent against U.S. shipping.
The US government is exploring an unusual legal route for dealing with Iranian oil and ships captured as part of its blockade: bringing back a wartime maritime system that has barely been used for generations, according to Bloomberg.
The Justice Department, working with the Pentagon, is preparing to use prize law, which historically allowed courts to decide whether vessels and cargo captured during armed conflict could legally become property of the United States. The mechanism was once commonplace in naval warfare but largely disappeared from American practice after the 19th century and has been dormant since World War II.
The appeal for the administration is largely practical. At present, the government generally relies on civil forfeiture to take ownership of vessels accused of sanctions violations or other offenses. Those cases can become complicated and slow, particularly when shipping companies, creditors, terrorism victims or other parties assert competing rights to the ship or its cargo. A prize proceeding could potentially narrow those disputes and allow captured oil to be sold more quickly, with the proceeds going to the US Treasury.
Bloomberg writes that Houston is being considered as a central venue for these cases. The Southern District of Texas has jurisdiction over a major port and sits alongside the country’s largest concentration of petrochemical infrastructure, giving it the capacity to receive and store substantial quantities of crude. US Attorney Aaron Reitz, whose office is working with DOJ officials in Washington, said the department is “now reviving” prize courts, describing the concept as an “ancient body of maritime law.”
The effort comes as Washington looks for additional ways to put economic pressure on Iran. US forces have already intercepted Iranian-owned or Iran-linked vessels since the blockade was imposed in April. Using prize law could turn those captures into a more direct financial tool: ships and oil deemed lawful prizes could be liquidated, potentially generating revenue while depriving Iran of valuable exports.
Supporters also see a strategic purpose beyond the money. Reviving the system would reinforce the message that the US considers the blockade a serious wartime measure rather than simply another sanctions regime. It could also make it more difficult for neutral commercial vessels to continue transporting goods that Washington believes support Iran.
But there is considerable uncertainty over how a centuries-old framework would operate under modern international law. “This really is a historical area of law that is not tested in modern times,” maritime attorney Allison Luzwick said. Courts could be asked to determine whether the current conflict provides sufficient legal grounds for invoking prize authority at all, particularly given questions surrounding congressional authorization for the hostilities.
The practical challenges are significant as well. Federal judges, prosecutors and the Navy have virtually no contemporary experience administering prize cases, meaning procedures would effectively have to be rebuilt for modern shipping and warfare. Shipowners and other parties with financial claims are also expected to contest seizures.
There are broader geopolitical risks. Critics argue that normalizing prize law could create a precedent that Washington may later regret. A rival power such as China, for example, could point to US practice when attempting to seize American or neutral merchant vessels during a future conflict.
The proposal therefore offers Washington a potentially faster way to convert captured Iranian oil into government revenue and tighten economic pressure on Tehran, but it would do so by reopening an area of wartime law that has gone largely untouched for more than a century.
Turkish commandos working from a frigate off the coast of Somalia retook the cargo ship Lutuf,which had been seized nearly two weeks ago by Somali pirates. In a statement from Turkey’s Ministry of Defense, they confirmed that the ship had been transporting supplies to the TURKSOM Military Base in Somalia when it was targeted by pirates.
In an operation that lasted 10 days, the Turkish Navy, working with Somali forces, had been closely monitoring the vessel. The Ministry said the ship was retaken on Saturday morning, August 29, after rejecting ransom demands by the pirates. Unconfirmed media reports said the pirates had initially demanded $10 million, but it was later lowered to $2 million.
There had been reports from Somalia of several earlier skirmishes with the pirates. The media said between four and six pirates were killed when they left the cargo ship in a small boat to resupply. The cargo ship was reportedly then placed in a full lockdown by the pirates. The crew of the Lutuf consisted of 10 members: six Indian nationals, one Turkish national, one Georgian, and two Serbian security guards.
Pirate on the bridge of the Turkish cargo ship (TC Defense)
The 1,400-dwt Lutuf, built in 1995 and operating under the flag of Cameroon, was seized by pirates in the Indian Ocean waters on Monday, August 17, approximately 4.5 nautical miles south of Maraya on the southern coast of Somalia. According to the information, at least eight pirates boarded the ship and took control.
“The forces have taken full control of MV Lutuf, which has now safely resumed its voyage,” said the Somali authorities. “Acts of piracy are serious criminal offences carrying severe penalties. The Ministry warns those involved, their backers and anyone who supports or condones such acts that they will be held accountable and brought to justice.”
Somali pirates are thought to be still holding four more ships that have been seized since April. Countries including Egypt and Pakistan have been pressuring for a diplomatic solution to release their citizens who are among the kidnapped crewmembers. Pakistani officials had said that because the ships are tankers, it would be too dangerous to attempt to retake the vessels by force.
Location of piracy incidents between January 2025 and July 2026 (MSICO report)
Since the beginning of the year, 15 ships have been seized or attacked by pirates, developments that are renewing concern about maritime security in the region that is critical to international trade. Analysts have suggested the pirates were emboldened by the instability in the region, encouraged by the increased cost of oil, and possibly receiving direct support from the Houthis in Yemen.
Turkey’s direct involvement in the operation to free Lutuf demonstrates Ankara’s determination to protect its growing interests in Somalia, which include maritime, military, energy, and infrastructure among others. As part of its deepening involvement, Turkey has deployed the navy ships TCG Kemalreis and TCG Yzb to the Horn of Africa to combat piracy and protect maritime routes linking the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean.
Friday, August 28, 2026
EU sea defence: the new race to protect cables, pipelines and trade
Is the deep blue sea the next frontier for defence? Global economies are increasingly dependent on vulnerable subsea data and energy pipelines. So, the EU and its members are shifting budgets towards maritime defence tools.
In just the last decade, the EU has spent almost €118 billion in maritime defence, with a sharp 23.6 percent increase in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Data from the EU Blue Economy Observatory show a sharp rise in domestic maritime defence spending, reaching a record high of €11.6 billion. Submarines alone account for 27 percent of the EU's total production value; the rest includes surface ships, aircraft, and other types of warfare.
The bloc decided to transition from a purely commercial ‘blue’ economy approach to a securitised maritime strategy. In 2023, it updated its European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) to protect critical seabed infrastructure.
Then it locked in its strategic defence priorities by launching dedicated European Defence Projects of Common Interest and implementing a Submarine Cable Security Toolbox to counter grey-zone threats and protect underwater networks.
Protecting international trade
The global economy relies almost completely on secure, open seas. More than 95 percent of international digital traffic moves through them. Financial transfers happen through over 1.4 million kilometres of submarine fibre-optic cables, which carry an estimated €9.2 trillion in financial transactions every single day. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by water.
80 percent of global trade volume is transported by ocean shipping. For the EU, maritime transport accounts for 75.6 percent of all imports and 73 percent of all exports. It totals around €1.126 trillion in goods annually. A disruption at key maritime chokepoints risks triggering inflation and global manufacturing shortages.
An attack on these sea lanes and underwater assets would paralyse Europe, so it needs more than traditional naval patrols. “Underwater Domain Awareness is a critical activity to know what is happening below the surface, particularly around cables, pipelines and offshore energy infrastructure, prioritising those identified as critical for the security of the Union”, said Jürgen Scraback, Head of the Maritime Domain Unit at the European Defence Agency (EDA).
As threats increasingly come from low-cost drones, uncrewed underwater vehicles and mine warfare, governments are investing in autonomous technologies and surveillance systems. Between 2016 and 2025, the EU's annual production value of crewless vehicles, including aerial and submarine drones, increased by 132 percent to €847 million. Fixed-wing unmanned systems accounted for one third of that output, worth €277 million, while production of traditional unmanned submarine platforms fell by 23 percent over the same period.
Fleet modernisation continues to focus on both conventional naval assets and autonomous platforms. Manned surface ships now account for 65 percent of EU maritime defence vehicle production value and serve as the primary platforms for command, logistics and force projection.
Submarines represent another 27 percent of production, supported by new procurement programmes and investment in next-generation underwater weapons. At the same time, autonomous surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles are becoming increasingly important for surveillance, reconnaissance and infrastructure monitoring missions.
EU27 maritime defence industry: production by function of vehicle, 2016-2025
Investments also extend to digital tech for maritime surveillance, with European operators deploying AI-enabled unmanned systems to monitor ports, offshore energy infrastructure, and submarine cables, detecting threats across large areas
For Scraback, “autonomous and unmanned systems combined with AI-enabled data fusion are among the technologies likely to have the greatest impact. They can provide persistent surveillance over large areas without requiring expensive crewed platforms to remain almost permanently deployed”.
How is the EU boosting maritime defence?
The 2014 Maritime Security Strategy guides Europe's maritime strategy, protecting citizens, the economy, infrastructure, and borders, while redefining Europe’s approach to maritime defence.
“The new strategy calls for a greater emphasis on the hard power aspects of maritime defence and security, where the EU had previously faced challenges in establishing a role and identity”, said Chris Kremidas-Courtney, senior advisor at the European Policy Centre and associate fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. It identifies “the protection of critical infrastructure in the maritime domain as a key priority”, they added.
The Industrial Maritime Strategy, adopted in March 2026, backs this shift. It boosts Europe's naval production through a new EU Industrial Maritime Value Chain Alliance and reinforces naval, underwater, and dual-use capabilities, including a dual-use ferry construction programme.
By July, Europe allocated €325 million to five European Defence Projects of Common Interest, including one maritime and seabed defence project to strengthen its industrial base. Since February, a new Counter-Drone Action Plan has shifted production towards unmanned naval drones and counter-drone systems for aerial, surface, and underwater threats.
The EU funds its naval ramp-up through defence tools, such as the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Programme. The Readiness 2030 roadmap totals over €800 billion, including naval capabilities and sea lines of communication protection.
The bloc also invests in detection and surveillance technologies to fight threats and sabotage to seabed cables. As cables cover large areas, are privately owned and can be easily damaged, “the best approach is a layered resilience system designed to make interference detectable, limit the disruption caused by a successful attack and restore service quickly”, Kremidas-Courtney explained.
This thinking now drives EU policy. The Action Plan on Cable Security (2025) strengthens Europe’s ability to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from cable incidents that disrupt critical functions like communication and energy supply. The €92 million OceanEye expands maritime awareness using AI, autonomous sensors, and digital twins.
Under Horizon Europe, the UnderSect and Smart Maritime and Underwater Guardian projects invest nearly €6 million each in underwater threat-detection systems for ports and maritime infrastructure. European Defence Fund (EDF) projects, such as SHIELD and SOUND2, develop AI systems to detect threats using underwater acoustic signals.
Ramping up maritime defence goes beyond detecting and repairing cable breaks. For Kremidas-Courtney, authorities should identify behavioural patterns such as unexplained slowing, shipping lane deviations, and manipulation of identification signals.
“The most effective solution to me is an integrated information-and-action network that fuses undersea sensors, AIS data, coastal radar, satellite imagery, intelligence and port records into a continuously staffed existing regional maritime operations centre”, Kremidas-Courtney explained.
Who invests the most?
Between 2016 and 2025, cumulative EU production of maritime defence vehicles and equipment reached €117.8 billion. According to the EU Commission’s Blue Economy Observatory, production remained concentrated in four countries. France, Germany, Italy and Spain together account for 87 percent of the bloc's maritime defence industrial output. The Netherlands, Sweden and Poland contribute a further 8 percent, largely through surveillance technologies and maritime security systems.
In 2025, France generated 37 percent of the EU’s total production of maritime defence vehicles. Germany and Italy each contributed 19 percent, and Spain followed with 8 percent. These four countries accounted for 82 percent of the EU’s total output value and 60 percent of the EU's total defence expenditure. This shows that defence spending remains higher in member states with a long tradition of armaments.
EU maritime defence industry: total output value by member state, 2016-2025, billion EUR
“A few large navies can provide scarce high-end capabilities, but they can’t secure every coastline, patrol the sea lanes, and protect every piece of undersea infrastructure. Europe doesn’t need everyone to build a fleet to match Italy's or France's, but it does need credible, distributed forces connected by interoperable systems and a shared maritime picture. The only way to make that work is a whole-of-Europe approach which includes the UK and Norway”, Kremidas-Courtney warned.
At company level, the France-based Naval Group led with 24 percent of the EU’s total output, producing advanced surface combatants (frigates and corvettes), nuclear-powered submarines, and unmanned surface and underwater systems. Italy’s Fincantieri (15 percent) specialises in warships and underwater defence systems, including torpedoes and sonars.
The German Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems accounted for 8 percent of the EU’s overall market for maritime defence vehicles, focusing on surface vessels and submarine construction. Spain’s Navantia (7 percent) builds multi-mission frigates, AIP-equipped submarines, aircraft carriers and patrol vessels.
The EDF supports European companies in developing joint defence technologies and equipment. It invests €2.7 billion in collaborative defence research and €5.3 billion in collaborative capability development for the period 2021-2027. The 2025 EDF totals €1.07 billion and funds 57 projects, including E-DOMINION, which develops a digital architecture and combat cloud for European navies.
According to Scraback, “we need to continue shifting from fragmented national solutions towards interoperable, scalable and jointly developed capabilities”. He explained that the European Defence Project of Common Interest on Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence “can be a key vehicle for this, bringing Member States, existing European programmes and investments together under one coherent framework”.
EU pours billions into maritime defence as threats to its seas persist
From undersea cables to warships, the EU is spending record sums to defend its waters. Watch the video.
The EU is increasing maritime defence spending as threats to its ports, undersea cables and offshore infrastructure grow.
90 percent of EU trade, energy supplies and internet data move by sea. This exposes the bloc to hybrid and cyber attacks, border tensions and infrastructure sabotage, including from Russia.
Brussels updated its Maritime Security Strategy in March 2023 and funding followed. EU countries spent €343 billion on defence in 2024, up 19 percent year-on-year. Equipment procurement jumped 39 percent. Spending hit a record €392 billion in 2025, much of it through the €150 billion SAFE fund under the EU's Readiness 2030 roadmap.
A large share goes to building ships. The bloc's maritime defence industry produced €13.7 billion worth of vessels in 2025, two-thirds surface ships. France, Germany, Italy and Spain accounted for 82% of output. Shipbuilders Naval Group, Fincantieri, Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Navantia cooperate on the European Patrol Corvette project while securing multi-billion-euro export deals with Norway and Indonesia.
Which EU countries invest more in maritime defence and why?
Europe's naval rearmament is rising. Which countries drive the maritime defence boom and why the map may be misleading.
Europe’s militaries are pouring money into the sea. EU defence expenditure rose to €418 billion in 2025, a 20 percent increase from the previous year, and is projected to reach €454 billion in 2026, equivalent to 2.4 percent of GDP. Maritime defence is one of the fastest-growing sectors. Production of naval vehicles and equipment across the bloc has reached €117.8 billion since 2016, with output hitting €13.7 billion in 2025 alone.
Who’s building Europe’s navies
On paper, four countries dominate that output. France, Germany, Italy and Spain account for 87 percent of the EU’s maritime defence industrial base and captured 82 percent of its total output value last year. France alone produced 37 percent of the bloc’s maritime defence vehicles in 2025, followed by Germany and Italy at 19 percent each, and Spain at 8 percent. Together, the four also account for 60 percent of the EU’s total defence expenditure.
For Christophe Tytgat, Secretary General of SEA Europe, the shipyards and maritime equipment association, that pattern is no accident: “the concentration is real and structural, not incidental,” reflecting decades of naval-industrial history and geography concentrated in a handful of states. Submarines are also a growth area, now 27 percent of EU maritime defence output, with the same four countries producing 93 percent of the bloc’s naval exports.
A skewed picture?
But industrial output isn’t the same as military commitment, according to Chris Kremidas-Courtney, senior advisor at the European Policy Centre, who argues the four-country narrative overlooks some of Europe’s most exposed navies. “Industrial concentration is not the same as maritime-defence commitment,” they said, naming Greece and Sweden as “conspicuous omissions.”
Greece runs one of Europe’s strongest conventional submarine fleets and maintains a demanding operational posture across the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea. Sweden’s smaller navy is purpose-built for the Baltic and backed by a serious domestic defence industry.
The real test, Kremidas-Courtney says, is integration rather than size. “Europe doesn’t need everyone to build a fleet to match Italy or France, but it does need credible distributed forces connected by interoperable systems and a shared maritime picture”, an approach they argue must extend beyond the bloc to include the UK and Norway.
Measured against GDP rather than raw output, the map zooms towards the east. Poland spends the largest share of any EU state on defence at 4.48 percent of GDP, ahead of Lithuania (4.00 percent), Latvia (3.73 percent) and Estonia (3.38 percent), all frontline states bordering Russia or its ally Belarus. Germany has more than doubled its share of GDP since 2021, from 1.27 percent to 2.14 percent, and aims to reach €162 billion in annual defence spending by 2029.
Tytgat argues neither the industrial giants nor the frontline states can carry EU maritime security alone: “only four EU countries cannot substitute for broad-based EU maritime security, because collective security strategy requires interoperable capability, resilient supply chains and genuine burden-sharing across the whole Union.”
What’s driving this spending
Behind all this spending is Russia’s war on Ukraine and the maritime threats that followed. A “shadow fleet” of sanctioned tankers allegedly used for surveillance and sabotage has put the EU on alert. A series of undersea cable cuts in the Baltic Sea, including the BCS East-West Interlink, C-Lion1 and Estlink 2 incidents in late 2024, pushed Brussels to adopt a Cable Security Action Plan in 2025, alongside NATO’s “Baltic Sentry” naval patrol mission.
The EU revised its Maritime Security Strategy in 2023. The previous strategy was built with a focus on “piracy, illegal fishing, migration flows”; the updated one is built to confront state-based threats, Tytgat explains. He also warns the current strategy lacks teeth: “the tools have multiplied, but the financing and governance architecture to actually translate the strategy into tangible action is still lacking.”
How is the EU helping with funding?
A Commission subsea infrastructure package announced in February 2026 carries €347 million, alongside a separate €92 million ocean-observation initiative launched mid-2026. Tytgat calls both “a first step,” but says the sums are “far from enough if the EU wants to face the daily threats it deals with appropriately.”
Brussels is trying to close that gap through other channels: the €150 billion SAFE loan facility under its “Readiness 2030” roadmap, the European Defence Fund, 68.4% of which has gone to France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and PESCO’s joint shipbuilding projects, including the Italian-led European Patrol Corvette.
In March 2026, the EU also launched an Industrial Maritime Strategy, folding shipbuilding into a bloc-wide industrial framework for the first time rather than leaving it to national champions and earmarked €325 million for naval and undersea defence projects.
The real test for burden-sharing will be when the European Commission releases its progress report on the maritime strategy in October 2026. For now, Tytgat says the EU should focus on ensuring it has “the necessary tools and investment to meet the current challenges it faces in its vicinities but also in all global chokepoints that create threats to the EU's security of supply, trade and economy."
Tuesday, August 25, 2026
False Flag Ops Continue to Grow in Avoidance of Sanctions
Despite the crackdowns in Europe stopping and detaining false flagged tankers the number of false registries continue to grow (UK Royal Navy)
The challenge of false flag operations continues to spread as unscrupulous operators seek the latest techniques to avoid detection and sanctions enforcement. Maritime AI data analytics firm Windward released a new report detailing the growth of false flags and the challenges of tracking down the perpetrators.
In its Q2 analysis, Windward reports there are 22 distinct fraudulent ship registries that have been identified globally. It points out they generally fall into two categories: states that do not actually have an international ship registry, or false operators who mimic legitimate flags with false operations. There are also the ships that make false claims to a legitimate flag.
The latest false flags that are emerging, according to Windward, are Syria and Myanmar, which appeared for the first time last quarter. Neither state operates an international ship registry. It points out that these countries joined Nicaragua and Equatorial Guinea, which were newly used in the first quarter.
Windward tracked 275 internationally trading tankers during the second quarter that were broadcasting the flag of a fraudulent registry. It was down slightly from the first quarter when 290 were tracked, but Windward reports “the overall universe of falsely flagged vessels has continued to grow.” The IMO currently lists 580 falsely flagged vessels, which was up from the 550 at the end of the first quarter of 2026 and 470 at the end of 2025.
Windward writes that the practice of flying false flags is centuries old, dating back to the romantic era of piracy in the 18th century and before. Then as now, legitimate nations struggled to fight the scourge of false flags and piracy.
“What has changed in 2026 is the operational scale of the practice and the specific commercial and geopolitical purposes it now serves,” writes Maya Romi, Maritime Intelligence Content Specialist at Windward. “The scale of false flag broadcasts in 2026 is a direct response to the sanctions environment.”
As an example, Windward calculates that there are approximately 430 tankers currently active in the Iranian trade. It says 62 percent are falsely flagged, and 87 percent are sanctioned.
The driver of false flag operations is sanctions evasion. Windward calculates that around 90 percent of tankers using fraudulent registries are Western-sanctioned. As the sanctions continue to grow, so too do the efforts at evasion and the use of fraudulent registries.
Windward calculates that four registries, the Netherlands Antilles, Guyana, Guinea, and Madagascar, account for a large share of the falsely flagged tankers in early 2026.
“Detecting false flag vessels requires all-source intelligence that combines behavioral analysis, ownership tracing, and cross-referencing against verified maritime registry records rather than relying on the declared flag alone,” writes Romi.
Countries detect the operations and issue public notices, which discourages the fraudulent operators. For example, the landlocked Central Asian Kyrgyz Republic issued a warning to the IMO at the end of July and asked that the notification be widely distributed. Madagascar and landlocked Zimbabwe warned the IMO of illegal activity and the use of their flags, as did Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, and Tonga, while Cameroon, after seeing a massive spike in its legitimate registry and international pressure, began efforts to purge the fraudulent operators. In 2025, it was uninhabited Matthew Island east of New Caledonia that a shadowy operator was promoting as a host for a registry.
When the fraud is discovered, Windward reports some tankers shift to different fraudulent registries. Others move to legitimate flags known for weak enforcement, and it also tracked approximately 60 tankers in the first half of 2026 that, when discovered or when the pressure grew at the registries, moved to Russia’s flag. Famously, in January, the tanker Bella 1 attempted to change its name to Marinera and hide behind the Russian flag in the middle of the North Atlantic as it was being pursued by the U.S. Coast Guard. In the past, tankers have also suddenly claimed Iranian registry when they were being pursued.
Flag hopping overall, Windward says, however, has declined. It recorded a 26 percent decline in Q1 2026 compared to Q4 2025. It says seizure pressure pushed vessels toward more stable false-flag identities. There have also been efforts by many of the flags to specifically crack down on the hopping activities.
While the pressure continues to grow with sanctions and surveillance of the shadow fleet, the use of false flags persists. Even with the crackdowns such as those seen in France or Sweden, these operators continue to attempt to avoid the regulations through the use of false registries.
