Iraq At The Crossroads: Strategic Ties With Iran, Turkey, And The Arab World – Analysis

Map and location of Iraq. Credit: VOA

June 9, 2026 

The Congressional Research Service (CRS)
By Christopher M. Blanchard

The Republic of Iraq sits at a crossroad in the Middle East region, with ties to Iran, Turkey, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula that shape Iraqi interests, create constraints and opportunities, and attract intervention. In May 2026, Shia Arab businessman Ali Al Zaydi was sworn in as Prime Minister after Iraq’s parliament approved his government program and 14 of 23 cabinet nominees. A newcomer to government, Al Zaydi was the nominee of the Coordination Framework, a Shia coalition whose members won the most seats in Iraq’s November 2025 election.

After a post-election government formation process complicated by regional tensions and the spillover of the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict, Al Zaydi’s government faces questions about its strategic orientation, commitment to asserting state control over armed groups, and plans for averting conflict-amplified fiscal and energy crises. Under U.S.-Iraqi agreements, U.S. military forces have mostly withdrawn from central Iraq and consolidated in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. U.S.-Iraq security cooperation continues, including on efforts to secure more than 5,700 Islamic State (IS/ISIS) prisoners transferred to Iraq from Syria in 2026.

Since February 2026, Iran-backed Shia Iraqi armed groups have carried out hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and on civilian targets in the Kurdistan region and neighboring countries, drawing counterstrikes and intensifying pressure on Iraq to rein in Iran-backed militias. Al Zaydi’s ability to do so may be limited and contingent; the CF coalition that nominated him includes parties with ties to Iran-backed armed groups. Like his predecessors, Al Zaydi may be challenged in asserting Iraqi sovereignty while maintaining Iraq’s internal cohesion and balanced relations with competing neighbors and the United States.

Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $8.4 billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. The 119th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Trump Administration’s FY2027 requests for security assistance, as well as proposals related to foreign aid, security, and Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities.

Background

Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the invasion ended the decades-long, dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party but ushered in a long period of chaos, violence, and political transition. U.S. forces withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled IS insurgents to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq from 2014 to 2018. U.S. military forces and coalition partners returned to Iraq in 2014 at the government of Iraq’s invitation to help defeat the Islamic State group. Iran’s influence in Iraq also grew during this period as several Iran-backed Shia militia groups mobilized. Some of these militias were later legally consolidated into Iraq’s security sector under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state force with an estimated 238,000 personnel and a 2024 budget of about $3.4 billion.

Compared to earlier decades marred by conflict, relative stability and prosperity prevailed in Iraq from 2022 through 2025 under then-prime minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani. Joint U.S.-Iraqi operations targeted IS remnants in remote areas, and IS threats diminished. As conflict inside Iraq receded, new economic opportunities emerged, but regional conflict and unresolved domestic issues threatened to undermine Iraq’s gains. The Sudani government rested on an uneasy partnership between most Shia Arab parties and major Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that enacted expansive public spending laws. Political rivalry and national officials’ disputes with Kurdish leaders over security, energy, and revenue sharing limited government effectiveness. Intra-Kurdish divides have enabled national government efforts to re-centralize decisions and processes.

Sudani’s challenges now fall to Ali Al Zaydi. Unilateral foreign military operations in Iraq and Iraqi airspace by Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United States have prompted nationalist demands to assert Iraq’s sovereignty. Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups’ attacks contravene Iraqi law, invite retaliation, and jeopardize Iraq’s stated desire to cooperate with foreign partners. Iraq’s young, growing population creates economic promise and employment pressure. Fiscal dependence on oil export revenue persists and public sector hiring has grown, while regional conflict and domestic disputes have limited trade and energy output.

 
U.S.-Iran Conflict and U.S.-Iraq Ties

Conflicts involving Iran since 2023 have shaken Iraq’s security and have placed a spotlight on the future of Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq. Some of these groups have been integrated into the PMF, whose origins lie in the 2014-2018 war against the Islamic State. Others have remained outside the PMF, working alongside some PMF-integrated forces to oppose the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. and coalition forces and to occasionally or repeatedly attack U.S. forces in Iraq, national and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces, and Iraq’s neighbors.


Following armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes during the 2023-2024 Israel-Hamas war, U.S. officials and the Sudani government agreed to end the presence in Iraq of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS during 2026, while U.S. forces relocated within and outside Iraq and refocused toward a bilateral security cooperation mission. While these plans were underway, the onset of Operation Epic Fury against Iran in February 2026 and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria prompted an “accelerated transition and force realignment” by U.S. forces in Iraq and a sharp uptick in armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes, including some U.S. strikes that killed Iraqi security personnel. Clandestine military operations in Iraq’s deserts attributed to Israel and Iranian attacks on Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish groups both contribute to Iraqi sovereignty concerns.

The United States has demanded that Iraq take action to dismantle Iraqi armed groups that have attacked U.S. targets and civilian targets and infrastructure in Iraq and neighboring countries. Iraqi officials and legislators may consider proposals to alter the status of the PMF and its personnel or address PMF ties to specific armed groups. Prime Minister Al Zaydi may face political and diplomatic dilemmas, as the coalition that nominated him includes parties that have been tied to the PMF and armed groups and as Iraq’s security sector has sought continued U.S. support. Al Zaydi has welcomed decisions by some groups to disengage from the PMF and/or accede to state control of all arms. According to U.S. defense officials, U.S. plans for long term security cooperation with Iraq envision “counterterrorism-focused training, intelligence sharing, and episodic presence without permanent basing.” U.S. forces in Iraq now operate at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and from the Kurdistan region.

Views from the Kurdistan Region

Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq’s constitution recognizes KRG federal authority in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG referendum favoring independence, national forces reasserted control of some disputed territories.

The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in Iraq’s parliament. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged, delaying formation of a new KRG cabinet since the 2024 regional election. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his nephew, Nechirvan, is KRG president, and his son, Masrour, is KRG prime minister. The KDP and PUK retain separate aligned militia and security units, despite U.S. efforts to help unify and depoliticize the KRG security sector.

The United States has cooperated with the KRG and has supported the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over oil production, the budget, territory, and security. In September 2025, a KRG-Baghdad agreement conditionally resolved disputes that had delayed transfers of funds and contributed to serious KRG fiscal strains. Since 2022, Iraqi court rulings have reduced KRG autonomy, including rulings that have found the KRG oil and gas sector law unconstitutional, invalidated KRG electoral arrangements, and required the transfer of KRG revenue to national authorities for payment of KRG employees.

Iraq opposes Turkey’s unilateral military presence and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish forces have targeted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK’s 2025 decision to disarm and steps taken to implement this decision could prompt future changes in Turkey’s posture.

U.S. Partnership and the 119th Congress

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil have been attacked in 2026, but remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra closed in 2018. The position of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is vacant, and Joshua Harris has served as chargé d’affaires A.I. since September 2025. On May 31, 2026, President Donald Trump named U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack as Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq.

Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 2026, and has appropriated related funds available through September 2027. The requestfor 2027 seeks nearly $119 million for Iraq’s military and Counter Terrorism Service, but does not seek funds for the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA).

The Trump Administration’s 2025 foreign aid review ended some U.S. aid programs in Iraq and preserved others. The Trump Administration has not requested a specific amount of Foreign Military Financing foreign assistance for Iraq in FY2027, but seeks $900,000 to continue International Military Education and Training.

Members may conduct oversight and shape implementation of U.S. policy toward Iraq, including through consideration of the FY2027 defense authorization (H.R. 8800) and appropriations bills and other measures. The House Armed Services Committee-passed version of H.R. 8800 would limit most U.S. defense aid for Iraq until the Administration certifies that Iraq’s government has reduced the capacity of Iran-aligned armed groups and improved internal controls.About the author: Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

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KURDISH RESISTANCE

30 Years Since a Protocol for Dialogue and Resolution

A protocol signed 30 years ago following talks between Abdullah Öcalan and a German delegation in Damascus has resurfaced through archived documents kept by Prof. Ulrich Gottstein.

By Devriş Çimen

May 27, 2026

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Photo of a billboard in Berlin, courtesy of Devriş Çimen, for an exhibit including ‘Cry for Freedom’ by Ali Zülfikar - portrait of Abdullah Öcalan

The history of Abdullah Öcalan’s search for a solution to the Kurdish question dates back at least 30 years. During this period, he held numerous meetings both with the Turkish state and with international delegations. One of these meetings, largely unknown to the public, resulted in a protocol signed with an international delegation. At Öcalan’s invitation, a delegation traveled to Damascus on 25–26 May 1996. The delegation included Prof. Ulrich Gottstein, then deputy chair of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), an international physicians’ peace movement; Prof. Norman Paech, an expert in international law; political science professor Ulrich Albrecht; and Hans Branscheidt, general director of Medico.

Following two days of meetings as Öcalan’s guests in Damascus, the delegation and Öcalan signed what became a protocol document. The text included calls and demands concerning the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey and Germany, issues that, despite the passage of three decades, remain strikingly relevant today. While Öcalan has responded positively to every constructive step taken toward a solution, the Turkish state and international powers involved in the Kurdish people’s struggle for freedom and rights continue to remain trapped in a cycle of deadlock.

The Turkish problem

The characterization of Kurds as a “problem” is an approach developed outside the borders of Kurdistan. When viewed in the context of the institutionalization of imperial interests during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the identification of the “problem” with the Kurds takes on an entirely different dimension. Kurds resisted, rebelled against and sought solutions to these externally imposed policies. Especially after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the geography of Kurdistan was framed as a “problem” within the logic of divide-and-rule policies. The construction of the Republic of Turkey on the basis of the nation-state model, and the development of this process through the assimilation of ethnic and cultural identities,o produced the most problematic phase of the issue. During this period, “Turkishness” was imposed as the foundational identity. The matter gradually ceased to be framed as a “Kurdish question” and instead evolved into what could be described as a “Turkish problem,” as Kurdish identity, language and culture were systematically banned. Uprisings such as those led by Sheikh Said, Koçgiri and Ağrı during the 1920s and 1930s emerged in opposition to these policies.

Solidarity from allies

While the Kurdish struggle for existence was suppressed by the Turkish state through the doctrine that “violence is the monopoly of states,” the struggle was simultaneously criminalized internationally. One of the clearest examples of this approach, which transforms the victim into the perpetrator in international politics and diplomacy, emerged in Europe, particularly in Germany. Despite the stance of states, solidarity from allies of the Kurdish people never disappeared. After the banning of PKK activities in Germany on 26 November 1993, Kurdish demands for rights were subjected to systematic criminalization.

‘Doctor of peace’ Gottstein

Prof. Dr. Ulrich Gottstein, who spent many years as a peace activist, was among those who stood in solidarity with the Kurdish people. While campaigning for the lifting of the PKK ban and for Kurdish rights, Gottstein carried out activities under the umbrella of the German section of the IPPNW, where he served as honorary chair. Together with Prof. Norman Paech, Prof. Ulrich Albrecht and Hans Branscheidt, Gottstein visited Öcalan in Damascus in May 1996. Ulrich Gottstein, honorary president of IPPNW, who passed away on 30 December last year at the age of 99, was also widely known as the “doctor of peace.”

Please convey my greetings to Abdullah Öcalan

Alongside his work for peace and in medicine, Gottstein also showed solidarity in Germany for the lifting of the PKK ban and for Kurdish rights. On 17 October 2014, during the days when ISIS was attacking Kobanê, he invited me to a seminar at his home. I was surprised to encounter nearly 40 doctors there. During that evening, marked by both excitement and solidarity, Ulrich Gottstein also spoke about his meeting with Öcalan in Damascus. Whenever we sought solidarity or consultation from Gottstein, whether personally or institutionally, he never left us unanswered. During the hunger strike process led by Leyla Güven between 2018 and 2019, demanding an end to the isolation imposed on Öcalan, a friend and I visited him to discuss what could be done. We consulted him on many different issues. Gottstein said, “I do not know whether he would remember me, but if the conditions allow it, I would like you to convey my greetings to Abdullah Öcalan.” Although a limited number of lawyer visits took place after the hunger strikes, the conditions necessary to deliver his message never emerged as the isolation deepened over the years. During our meeting, Gottstein once again recounted his 1996 visit to Öcalan in Damascus, saying: “Abdullah Öcalan is a leader very open to a solution.”

How the document resurfaced

During our conversation, Gottstein explained that Öcalan had called on the German state to develop solution-oriented policies, emphasized that Kurds should organize within the framework of German law and signed a text addressing these and other issues. When we asked him what had happened to the document, he replied: “After returning from Damascus, I delivered the document signed by Abdullah Öcalan to the German foreign minister. A copy remained in my archive.” According to the document, Öcalan was already calling on international institutions at that time to take peaceful initiatives. Signed exactly 30 years ago, the text still retains its relevance in the context of the Kurdish people’s struggle for existence. Despite the policies pursued by Turkey and Germany over the past three decades, policies marked by persistent deadlock, Öcalan’s solution-oriented approach remains as relevant today as it was then. Last November, when I visited Gottstein and asked to receive a copy of the document, we had arranged a meeting. However, due to his deteriorating health conditions, the meeting had to be postponed. After his death, the document was eventually delivered to me from among the files archived by his family.

Norman Paech: Still relevant today

Norman Paech, the 88-year-old jurist and retired professor who taught political science and public law at the University of Hamburg, continues to stand in solidarity with oppressed peoples, particularly the Kurdish people. Summarizing this commitment, Paech said: “We placed solidarity at the center of our philosophy of life as both a responsibility and a conscious choice. Together with Ulrich Gottstein and all our other friends, we stood with the Kurdish people and their struggle for freedom on the basis of this responsibility, and I will continue to do so.”

A document of the meeting

Paech described the impressions of the visit as follows: “When Ulrich Albrecht, Ulrich Gottstein and I set out in May 1996 to visit Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus, the PKK, just as today, was being treated by politics, the media and the judiciary as a ‘terrorist organization,’ while its undisputed leader Öcalan was regarded as a ‘terrorist.’ Public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany had never shown much sympathy for liberation movements, particularly those in Africa. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Sam Nujoma, Agostinho Neto and Luis Cabral were all regarded as ‘terrorists’ until they defeated colonial systems of oppression and assumed leadership in their newly independent countries. For this reason, establishing contact with such ‘terrorists’ at that time, as today, was considered dangerous, and Ulrich Gottstein, who was then president of the IPPNW, did not think it appropriate for this to become a political statement on behalf of the organization. He therefore asked that no one be informed and that his name remain confidential, and this request was respected. Ulrich Gottstein was a courageous, independent and internationalist-minded figure. He was able to approach without prejudice the goals, evaluations, ideas and decisions developed by Abdullah Öcalan and shared with us during our meeting. At the end of our meeting, it was also Ulrich Gottstein who drafted the short text signed by Abdullah Öcalan. For him, this text served almost as a guarantee, a form of evidence, a document of our discussions on peace, independence, equality and the future of the Kurdish people.”

Abdullah Öcalan’s two decisions

Paech also said: “Specifically, there was discussion at the time about two decisions taken by Abdullah Öcalan: abandoning the goal of struggling for an independent Kurdish state and renouncing violence and armed guerrilla warfare. From that point onward, the objective was to become autonomy and self-government within the borders of each respective state. These two decisions were closely interconnected.

Abdullah Öcalan had concluded that the Kurdish people, divided among four states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria), had not yet developed a common sense of national belonging and therefore were not yet ready for a common state. This approach also coincided with the conclusion reached by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the late 1970s. The OAU determined that the internationally guaranteed right to self-determination should no longer aim at separation and the creation of an independent state, but instead at securing autonomy and self-government within the borders inherited from colonial rule.

Öcalan was already rejecting Europe’s classical nation-state model and advocating a confederation of free peoples. He also recognized the dangers that peace and security would face if Kurds living across four states were to rise up for a common state. Abdullah Öcalan did not express this progressive and entirely peace-oriented approach only during our unforgettable meeting. These views were also broadly voiced throughout the Kurdish movement. However, European media outlets and governments ignored them because they conflicted with the policies they pursued on the basis of their close relations with NATO ally Turkey.

At the very least, Ulrich Gottstein was deeply influenced by this perspective and planned to establish closer relations between the German section of the IPPNW and its counterpart organization in Turkey. I accompanied him on his first visit to Turkey. However, we encountered only limited and hesitant interest. Still, thanks to him, the IPPNW did not withdraw, and over the years friendly and close relations were built through mutual visits and exchanges between Kurdish society and activists struggling for human rights and peace. Dr. Gisela Penteker in particular invested tremendous effort in this work, thereby continuing Ulrich Gottstein’s ideas and legacy.”

The protocol between Öcalan and the delegation

We are publishing the Turkish translation of the document in full:

Meeting with PKK General Secretary Abdullah Öcalan. Damascus, 26 May 1996

“We want to end the war, but the Turkish army continues its attacks,” PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan said during a meeting held on Whitsun Saturday with German academics including political science professor Ulrich Albrecht, Ulrich Gottstein from the IPPNW, public law professor Norman Paech and Medico International Director Hans Branscheidt. Öcalan stated that the PKK was not pursuing separatism. He said that an independent Kurdish state would not be economically viable and “would lead to a war lasting more than a hundred years.” Instead, he explained that the goal was full political and social equality for Kurds, along with cultural autonomy, within a federal democracy in Turkey. In this way, he added, a “federative bridge” could also be established with other Middle Eastern states where large Kurdish minorities live.

Öcalan explicitly described democratic institutions such as those in the Federal Republic of Germany positively. He stressed that PKK sympathizers were absolutely obliged to comply with the legal order of the democratic countries in which they were guests.

Öcalan strongly demanded that war crimes committed in Turkey, regardless of who was responsible, be prosecuted under criminal law before an international court. Unlike Turkey, the PKK has signed Protocol I of 1977 additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Öcalan stated that attacks against civilian institutions would under no circumstances be carried out. He also said that the ongoing massacres against Kurdish civilians and the forced displacement of people from their villages should be brought before international human rights courts such as the ECtHR.

The PKK is striving for the establishment of an open international dialogue and believes that the best method for this would be the organization of a peace conference on Kurdistan. As in the peace process between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, it is hoped that the broadest possible active international mediation can play a role.

Finally, Mr. Öcalan once again emphasized that the Turkish government had unfortunately not responded to the PKK’s December 1995 ceasefire.

“I confirm that my main statements have been accurately conveyed.”

A. Öcalan, 26.5.1996 – Signature

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This article was also published in Turkish by the Kurdish daily newspaper, Yeni Özgür Politika.Email

Devriş Çimen

Devriş Çimen is a Kurdish journalist and politician.

 

BEYOND THE BOSPORUS: PKK renames itself Apoist Movement Management

A photo of Apo (PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan) was placed on the wall behind the two PKK members (also members of the KCK management board) who referred to the PKK as Apoist Movement Management during a press conference held in the Qandil mountains. / ANFFacebook

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By Akin Nazli in Belgrade May 17, 2026

The one-year anniversary of the latest self-dissolution declaration by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) arrived earlier this month. And at a press conference held in northern Iraq’s Qandil mountains, a new name was put into circulation. The PKK that does-not-but-does exist referred to itself as “Apocu Hareket Yonetimi” (Apoist Movement Management).

Throughout last year, countless headlines declared that the PKK had indeed disbanded and laid down arms. The ‘analysis’ and commentaries on this supposed fact kept on coming.

Nowadays of course, journalists are rarely heard talking about keeping the public informed as to what is really going on, instead they are fixated on attracting clicks. The fresh name, nevertheless, is recorded as a new development in the centuries-long Kurdish question.

Back to factory settings

The political movement of Turkey’s Kurds is loosely referred to in general as “the PKK”. It has established itself as the dominant political organisation of the Kurds in Turkey and Syria by order of the gun since the 1980s.

Between 1973 and 1978, the initial antecedents of the movement that would later become the PKK amounted to a loose ideological circle in Turkey, referred to by themselves as the Revolutionaries of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Devrimcileri).

Others, meanwhile, called them the Apoists (Apocular) after Abdullah Ocalan, also known as Apo, who would go on to become the indisputable leader of the PKK. 

Now half a century later, the political organisation is calling itself the Apoist Movement Management, which provides an interesting nuance.

In the last five decades or so, the PKK has also called itself the Kurdish Freedom Movement (Kurt Ozgurluk Hareketi) and the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (Kurdistan Ozgurluk Hareketi). These names are also still in use today.

2002, first self-dissolution announcement

Since it was launched in 1978, the PKK has utilised a sophisticated “umbrella” strategy, frequently changing names to adapt to shifting legal and geopolitical dynamics.

Between 1978 and 2002, the “umbrella” organisation called itself the PKK and declared that it was waging an armed insurgency in Turkey for an independent state.

In 2002, the PKK declared its first self-dissolution, three years after Ocalan was in 1999 handed over to Turkey’s intelligence service, MIT, by the CIA in Kenya.

During 2002 and 2003, the name of the umbrella organisation became the KADEK (Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress) as part of an attempt to pivot toward legal diplomacy.

During 2003 and 2005, KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s Congress) was employed as the name to describe the umbrella organisation.

Since 2005, the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) has been in use. There are dozens of combinations of three letters that operate under the KCK, a name that is also still in use.

And, with a May 5 press release, the organisation returned to its factory settings by calling itself the Apoist Movement Management. They also underlined their demand that Ocalan be given official status.

The names keep coming

In addition to the many names used for the “umbrella” organisation, the PKK uses many other names for dozens of sub-groups that operate under the umbrella.

The PKK’s most significant achievement across its history has been the expansion of the movement into northern Syria. PYD (Democratic Union Party), YPG/YPJ (People’s/Women’s Protection Units), SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society) are just a few of the names still in use in Syria.

Lately, it was said that the SDF is over and done with now since it made a recent deal with the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) government in Damascus. It is hard to keep track of the fate of all the names used by the PKK.

The mainstream media loves to rabbit on about how the PKK’s military presence has faded in recent years. That is only because the organisation built an army of a few dozen thousand fighters in Syria. It is erroneous to think they are covered by a separate organisation.

The fighters have been adapted to roles in Syria’s newly-established army in battalions. Turkey and the HTS had pushed for the inclusion of fighters as individuals, but the Kurds managed to keep their military force together.

Other names in use are PJAK (Free Life Party of Kurdistan in Iran) and PCDK (Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party in Iraq).

HPG (People’s Defense Forces) is a name used by the armed groups in the Qandil Mountains on the Iraq-Iran border. YPS (Civil Protection Units) and YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement) are other examples of names used to describe the armed groups that carried out attacks in Turkey.

And there are still other names used by the PKK not mentioned in this article. In addition to armed groups and umbrella organisations, there are also legal entities active in Turkey and many countries across Europe.

Cycles upon cycles

Since the 1980s, governments in Turkey and the political movement of the country’s Kurds have entered into cycles where, in coordination, concepts of war and peace are addressed.

Currently, a ceasefire prevails. It was initiated in October 2024. Donald Trump, who does not like US proxies jostling among each other, was on the road to the White House. A widescope operation against the Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu-led main opposition party (Republican People’s Party, or CHP) was picking up pace.

In July, IntelliNews wrote: “Make no mistake. What we have here is an Erdogan, PKK coalition.” Why so? You can read about it here.

The coalition process that holds sway in Turkey is conducted by the powers that be. Erdogan pulls the strings. When the time comes to sell a sharp U-turn in rhetoric, the masses are always, step by step, subject to thorough preparation.

As regards the selling of the ceasefire, we saw the PKK step forward to announce that the PKK – which strictly speaking was actually abolished in 2002 – was disbanding and soon after stage a ceremony for invited media during which they set some old school Kalashnikov rifles on fire. No other decommissioning of weapons seems to have taken place since.

The Kurdish affair has a complex structure and long history. Coupled with it is always heavy manipulation from multiple sides (foreign players in addition to different power groups within the various parties involved in the conflict) as well as the courage of ignorance that dominates media coverage. In fact, relying on media reports for the sake of understanding developments is not advisable.

In March, this publication reported that Turkey’s government has built a house for Ocalan on Imrali prison island, where he remains an inmate.

“Not Guns for Hire”: Trump’s Failure to Trigger a Kurdish Uprising

Trump tried to enlist the newly allied Kurds to his war. The U.S. discovered they were highly skeptical of being dragged into conflict by a foreign power.

By Alexis Daloumis

April 11, 2026

Source: Drop Site News

Soldiers at Komala (CPI) camp near Suleymaniyah. Photo: Alexis Daloumis.

SULEYMANIYAH, KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ—On April 5, during an interview with Fox News journalist Trey Yingst, President Donald Trump apparently confessed to trying to foment an armed uprising by dissidents inside Iran earlier this year, suggesting that the effort had only failed due to the betrayal of unnamed Kurdish groups. The U.S. government had, Trump said, “sent guns to the protesters, a lot of them. We sent them through the Kurds, and I think the Kurds took the guns.”

The claim of an ill-fated Kurdish role in attempting to topple the Iranian government triggered immediate denials by all major Iranian Kurdish parties. In comments to Drop Site, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), one of the largest and most organized Kurdish parties, denied Trump’s claim that they or other Kurdish groups—six of whom had formally announced the formation of a new alliance days before the start of the war—had received U.S. weapons to fight or transfer to other opposition factions in the country.

“No, we have never received weapons or assistance from the United States or any other country. As far as we know, all Kurdish parties have rejected Trump’s statements and are not aware of such claims,” said Zegrus Enderyarî, a member of the PJAK External Relations Committee. “It is possible that Trump intended to do such a thing or wanted to test the reaction of Iran and other regional countries. However, the time he referred to was when thousands of protesters in Iran were killed by the regime, and at that time, this alliance had not yet been formed.” (Drop Site could verify neither Trump’s claim he sent weapons nor the Kurds’ denial.)

The Alliance of Iranian Kurdistan Political Parties—involving six out of the seven active Kurdish parties in Iranian Kurdistan—was announced on February 22, six days before the start of the war. The timing of the pact has led many to suggest that it was intended as preparation for an alignment with Israel and the U.S. in the coming conflict. Enderyarî, without directly refuting that narrative, pointed out that the relevant discussions between the parties had started in the aftermath of the 2022 anti-government “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in Iran—significantly predating the current war. “Although political conditions also played a role, the formation of this alliance was a historical necessity, and it can even be said that it was delayed,” said Enderyarî.

Regardless, Iranian Kurds quickly found themselves thrust into the forefront of the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran. In the first week of fighting, the U.S. and Israel bombed numerous government positions in Kurdish regions of Iran, while making public calls to Kurdish groups to launch an uprising against the government. That uprising, intended to drain the resources and attention of the Iranian military, while potentially causing the ethnic dissolution of the country, did not come to pass.

Other Iranian Kurdish groups who spoke to Drop Site expressed suspicion over attempts to maneuver them into a conflict at the behest of foreign powers.

Ebrahim Alizadeh, General Secretary of Komala (CPI), also known as the Kurdistan Organization of the Iranian Communist Party, the only party of the seven that didn’t join the alliance, stated that one of the reasons his group had not joined the February 22 announcement was out of belief that the alliance had been hastily formed in the shadow of U.S. and Israeli war plans.

“We asked to have a trial period of collaboration…but we realized that there was external pressure to do it faster. Afterwards we understood that this pressure was related to the war that started,” he said. ”When the war started, the Americans and Israelis asked them to enter Iran to liberate a region and put pressure on the central state. The plan didn’t work and they withdrew from it, partly because Turkey convinced them.”

The Iranian portion of Kurdistan, where Israel and the U.S. have tried to encourage revolt, has several distinctive features setting it apart from the other three parts. Unlike Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria—all once part of the Ottoman Empire—Iranian Kurdistan has been under continuous Iranian rule for at least four centuries, with the Safavid Empire dismantling Kurdish principalities far earlier. Most Iranian Kurds are also Sunni in an emphatically Shia state, making them a double minority.

The failure to trigger a Kurdish uprising was one of many factors that contributed to transforming the war into a quagmire for the U.S. By early April, Trump’s frustrations over the war had begun publicly boiling over, leading to public accusations of betrayal by Kurdish groups.

On April 6, Trump fulminated that U.S. arms “were supposed to go to the people so they could fight back against these thugs. You know what happened? The people that they sent them to kept them because they said, ‘What a beautiful gun. I think I’ll keep it.’ So, I’m very upset with a certain group of people and they’re going to pay a big price for that.”

Trump’s references to “the Kurds,” as well as, “a certain group of people,” has led to confusion about whether his allegations are leveled against a specific Iranian Kurdish party, factions based in Iraqi Kurdistan, or the Kurdish people in general.

“He has still not clarified which Kurds he was referring to: the Kurds of Iraq or the Kurds of Iran?” Alizadeh told Drop Site. “All Iranian Kurdish parties have denied it. We reject cooperation with the American project in Iran. Other parties, by contrast, have sought weapons from the United States and are saying that they did not receive them. Were those weapons given to the Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan? They have remained silent on this matter. In the end, someone here is clearly lying.”

“Leave the Kurds alone”

Trump’s claims, which have been treated with disbelief by several regional journalists and experts, come amid intensified attacks on Iranian Kurdish parties and other targets within Iraqi Kurdish territory by Iran and its proxies. The attacks reflect a recurring tendency by the U.S. and Israel to “out” the Kurds and expose them to violent Iranian retaliation. This portrayal of Iranian Kurds as a perpetual fifth column working at the behest of foreign states has been devastating for Iranian Kurdish parties, who operate across the border in Iraq where many have been hosted by the autonomous Iraqi Kurdish government.

On March 4, false reports began circulating from journalists and others that thousands of Kurdish fighters had already crossed the border into Iran to begin a ground operation against the Iranian government.

The next day, Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmed, the wife of Iraqi President, Abdul Latif Rashid, as well as a long-standing Kurdish politician and a senior figure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), denounced the idea of an intervention egged on by Tel Aviv and Washington. In a public statement decrying the effort to involve Kurds in the war, Ahmed said, “Leave the Kurds alone, we are not guns for hire.”

Ahmed’s statement, celebrated by many Kurds in the region, was released on the anniversary of Raperin, another famous Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991. That rebellion, which had also been tacitly encouraged by the U.S., was brutally suppressed by the Iraqi military, adding another chapter to a long history of perceived betrayals by Western powers.

When asked about the influence of Ahmed’s intervention, PJAK’s representative Enderyarî told Drop Site that despite a history of betrayals, Kurdish groups were still ultimately divided on the broader issue of foreign support. “The statements made by Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmad received wide attention among Kurds and others. However, not all political groups share the same view. Some believe that without foreign support—especially from the United States—it is not possible to change the regime in Iran, and therefore they support external intervention to some extent,” he said. “However, we, as a force based on grassroots organization and public awareness, believe that change must come from within society.”

Enderyarî added, “We do not see ourselves as part of this war. For us, this is a conflict between two hegemonic forces: one at the global level, the United States, seeking to maintain its dominance, and the other at the regional level, such as Iran and Israel, seeking regional hegemony. We do not choose either of these paths. Instead, we choose a third path based on self-governance and peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the region.”

This idea of the “Third Path” is not new, nor a product of the latest developments. PJAK belongs to the same political ecosystem as the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK. The historical Kurdish leader and founder of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, has long expressed concern about the possibility of the Kurdish movement falling into Israel’s sphere of influence and being weaponized by it. Other top leaders of PKK such as Duran Kalkan have recently been explicit about it as well, stating in a recent interview that Israel and the U.S. were merely seeking a new, undemocratic hegemony in the region, and “preparing a new Shah” to replace the Islamic Republic.

Despite this stance from most of the leadership, there seems to be a real current among the base as well as some senior figures that see potential benefits in aligning with Israel.

“It is true Reber Apo and Duran Kalkan said those things, but there are indeed a lot of people within the movement that see Israel favorably,” Kawa, a 32-year-old construction worker in Suleymaniyah who’s ideologically aligned with PKK/PJAK told Drop Site. “If you ask me, is Israel good? No it isn’t. But it looks like Israel wants to give some respect to the Kurds—that’s why people think like that.”

The discourse around potential Kurdish involvement in the war is happening in the aftermath of recent developments in northeastern Syria, where a Kurdish-led project in autonomous governance known as the the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) was dissolved by force in a military offensive by the new Syrian government based in Damascus. Despite working for years with U.S. forces as a counterterrorism partner, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) found itself abandoned at this critical moment—an episode viewed by many Kurds around the region as the latest chapter in a long history of betrayals.

The forcible integration of the DAANES into central government control came about after numerous Arab tribes that had previously fought alongside the SDF switched sides and pledged allegiance to Damascus. That decision has helped trigger a renewed sense of unity among Kurds across different factions, alongside sentiments of ethnic nationalism and resentment towards Arabs.

“I can’t, I’m done. I’m done with the Arabs,” said Marwan, a seasoned Kurdish fighter of the SDF, who spoke to Drop Site in the Syrian city of Haseke this February. The veteran of the historical Kobane battle against the Islamic State emphasized the sense of betrayal many Kurds felt from their former Arab partners. “It was not the government forces that attacked us in Shedadi and killed so many friends. It was our formerly allied Arab tribes that stabbed us in the back. How can we trust them any more?”

In the Kurdish-majority Syrian cities of Haseke and Qamislo, the Kurdish national flag is now everywhere—something which until recently was forbidden by the SDF because of policies stressing ethnic inclusion. Banners featuring Ocalan, together with Iraqi Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, or of SDF chief Mazlum Abdi and Massoud Barzani, have become visible in some areas.

A sense of newfound ethnic unity and resentment has become particularly prevalent in Iraqi Kurdistan , where recent developments in Syria have been seen as a vindication of the nationalist conservative politics that dominate the regional government.

“Before, in my social group there were Arabs and Kurds and we were all just friends, but after all this we became Arabs and Kurds” said Sevak, a 24-year-old metal worker who spoke to Drop Site in Erbil. “Now the Kurds are united, before they were divided along party lines, ‘You are with Ocalan, or you are with Barzani.’ Now they are one.”

The increasing debates about the future of the Kurdish liberation movement comes as Iraqi Kurdistan has faced hundreds of missile and drone attacks from Iran and pro-Iranian militia groups in Iraq. In one of the latest incidents, a drone strike killed a Kurdish civilian couple in a rural agricultural village with no military presence—Musa Anwar Rasool and his wife Mujda Asaad Hassan, leaving behind two orphaned daughters.

The attacks, many of which are believed to have been carried out by groups associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces, an official part of the Iraqi security establishment, have further raised tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad. For the time being, the tentative ceasefire in Iran may give time for the Kurdish movement to reassess its future. The events of the past months will not soon be forgotten.