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Tuesday, July 14, 2026

 

Source: Jacobin

A century ago, Britain was rocked by perhaps the most serious episode of class struggle it has ever known. Millions of workers joined the general strike of 1926, buoyed by hope that they could fend off attacks on the pay and conditions of coal miners and reverse efforts by bosses to claw back the gains organized labor made when workers were in urgent demand during World War I.

They faced opposition from employers, Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative government, and a larger swath of the middle classes who were anxious about the growth of trade union power and the political instability that Britain had experienced over the previous decade and a half. David Torrance’s new account of the general strike, The Edge of Revolution, addresses the strike as a pivotal industrial and political conflict that had profound and lasting consequences for Britain.

Cast of Characters

Torrance is a journalist and a political historian as well as a House of Commons Library constitutional expert. His previous books include The Wild Men, an account of Britain’s first short-lived Labour government that was elected in 1924. The first Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, remained the party’s leader in 1926, facing the difficulties of marrying support for the miners with the growing conventional wisdom that Labour was committed to a parliamentary road to socialism.

The Edge of Revolution continues what Torrance describes as the “biographical approach” he applied in the previous books. Readers are introduced to a set of “dramatis personae” which includes key political and trade union leaders as well as industrialists who represented the interests of the mine owners. But Torrance’s cast extends beyond such expected characters.

It also includes, for instance, socialist women with memories of organizing support for the strike such as Ellen Wilkinson, the Labour MP for Middlesbrough East, who would later gain fame as the leader of the Jarrow March of unemployed shipbuilders and their supporters during the Great Depression. Jennie Lee, the Fife miner’s daughter who founded the Open University as a Labour education minister in the 1960s, was an embattled Edinburgh University student at the time, trying to rally the pro-strike minority in a hostile environment.

The Road to 1926

The 1926 strike is exceptional in British history as a generalized withdrawal of labor on a national basis that was officially sanctioned by trade unions. In the years before and following World War I, there were several important episodes of strike action inspired by radical syndicalist perspectives in Ireland and Britain that centered around the idea of linking up workers across occupational or industrial divisions through organizing direct action.

These perspectives were visible in high-profile localized disputes like the Liverpool transport strike of 1911, the Dublin lockout of 1913, and the forty-hours strike in the west of Scotland led by the Clyde Workers’ Committee in 1919. Politicization and displays of workers’ power marked these disputes, with crowd mobilizations involving women and children. That alarmed the British authorities who deployed police and troops to help defeat the strikers.

Following World War I, the coal industry became a key focus. British miners had launched their first national strike in 1912. This confirmed a new level of national organization in a sector historically marked by the parochial orientations of county unions in regionally disparate coalfields. Government took over the running of the industry during wartime, which facilitated further gains for the miners.

The Sankey Commission, appointed to see off an upswell of mobilization after the war ended, had recommended that public ownership should continue permanently. However, the mines were handed back to their private owners, who promptly attacked the gains of the miners, leading to a lockout in 1921. On this occasion, the miners were isolated and defeated. Their “triple alliance” partners in the rail and transport unions abandoned them to stand alone.

Before the Crash Comes

In effect, the general strike was a larger and more consequential sequel to these earlier episodes. It was the outcome of a determined attempt to reimpose market order and employer authority over the miners, with clear political implications.

Torrance emphasizes the divisions that swept through the fading Liberal Party in 1926. Formerly a dominant party of government, Liberalism was being replaced by Labourism on the left and squeezed by the Conservatives on the right, a position from which it would not recover over the next century. He also quotes the reflections of Lord Halifax, the recently appointed viceroy and governor-general of India, in the aftermath of the general strike: “Democracy has arrived at a gallop in England, and I feel all the time that it is a race for life: can we educate them before the crash comes.”

Here, then, was the nature of the dispute as understood from above: it was a desperate struggle to contain rising forces from below. There had been a major extension of the franchise in 1918, to large swaths of working-class men as well as women over the age of twenty-eight, and Labour soon rose to a position of electoral viability. For a Tory like Halifax, the forces of Irish and Indian nationalism abroad and trade unionism at home were all dangers that British governments had to see off.

Churchill’s Gauntlet

In his role as chancellor of the exchequer, Winston Churchill triggered the dispute by insisting on the pursuit of prewar parity for the sterling/dollar exchange rate. This was an act of economic folly that imperiled Britain’s already threatened industrial exports. Britain had exported around one-third of its coal before World War I, and coal was also a crucial raw material for manufacturing industries that sold their wares on the global market.

Churchill’s policy was an act of class struggle. Industrial workers were forced to pay the price so that middle-class bondholders and the City of London could prosper. The mine owners responded by demanding miners work longer shifts for lower wages in an industry where more than a thousand men commonly lost their lives belowground each year, and where many more were often seriously injured.

As a result of trade unions rallying around the miners, there was a postponement of the confrontation on what was dubbed “Red Friday.” Miners and their supporters celebrated as the government agreed to finance a nine-month wage subsidy. However, this merely put off the inevitable conflict to come, and it created a crucial window during which the state stepped in to organize the resistance that followed.

As Torrance records, these efforts built on earlier preparations such as the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, which permitted the suspension of civil rights in extraordinary circumstances. In preparation for the expected general strike, middle-class volunteers were enrolled into the Organization for the Maintenance of Supplies while others became Special Constables (auxiliary police officers).

Mussolini Minor

Torrance profiles Home Secretary William Joynson-Hicks as one the key protagonists. Joynson-Hicks was an authoritarian, fanatically anti-communist figure whose critics referred to as “Mussolini Minor.” He supplements these pen portraits of political leaders with local examples of strikebreaking once the dispute began.

The Coldstream Guards marched through London’s East End in tin helmets, supported by tanks and armored cars and accompanied by volunteers to move supplies. The Royal Navy even used submarines to provide power at the docks and deployed its ships to port cities. The fearsomely named HMS Warspite was among the warships deployed up the Clyde.

By contrast, the Trades Union Congress’s (TUC) response was much less well planned. The strike was not a general strike in the sense of having been inspired by a syndicalist perspective on workers’ power. Rather, it was a massive “sympathy strike” in support of the miners, scrabbled together as their employers locked them out.

Initially, the unions called out 1.75 million “first line” workers to back the one million miners who were locked out. Railways, buses, trams, and the docks came to a standstill while the power stations and steelworks stood idle.

As Torrance records, there were major divisions at the top of the TUC General Council that was responsible for leading the dispute. Most famously, Jimmy Thomas, the general secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen, was always a reluctant supporter. However, the membership of his union played a crucial role in organizing the strike across the country.

Middle-Class Warriors

Torrance’s book contributes to a growing body of scholarship that has received some renewed attention around the centenary. His focus is primarily on leading personalities, with an elite bias that is related to the memoirs left behind.

This does generate some powerful anecdotes about the organization of the class struggle from above and the feelings of disappointment in bourgeois circles with those who refused to join it. The family of Hugh Gaitskell, the future Labour Party leader, rebuked him as a “class traitor” after he joined left-wing historian G. D. H Cole’s efforts to organize support for the strike while studying at Oxford.

Many middle-class strikebreaking volunteers looked back fondly on their experiences of temporarily working on the docks or the railways. But Torrance underlines the fact that there were moments of coercion and violent class conflict, too. A pitched battle engulfed the streets of Edinburgh’s Old Town as Special Constables, including student volunteers, faced off alongside mounted officers against local men, women, and children.

The Communist MP for Battersea North, Shapurji Saklatvala, was imprisoned in Wormwood Scrubs for refusing to put up bail money. Saklatvala had been arrested after he called for soldiers to lay down their arms at a May Day rally.

Meanwhile, a convoy of cars carrying men who were identified as uniformed members of the British Fascists, an organization that had been formed under the leadership of Rotha Lintorn-Orman in 1923, ominously surrounded the TUC headquarters at Eccleston Square in London while the strike was coming to an end. It collapsed after nine days as the government and the employers refused any compromise with the miners or the TUC.

Aftermath

Although the government ultimately succeeded against the strikers, Torrance stresses the farcical nature of its attempts to have the strike ruled illegal. These spurious attempts culminated in the passing of the Trades Dispute Act the next year, which did in fact legally prohibit sympathetic action.

Yet his depiction of the strike’s aftermath is comparatively sanguine. In the long run, organized labor recovered. Ernest Bevin, the leader of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, was crucial to the organization and ultimate termination of the strike. During World War II, he became Churchill’s minister of labour, and the postwar Clement Attlee government went on to repeal the Trades Dispute Act.

In the coalfields, the conflict continued. Locked-out miners were left isolated and starved back to work in defeat toward the end of the year. These were potent and politically painful memories. Miners and their families did not forget the events of 1926, even if they faded from view more quickly elsewhere.

The folly of Red Friday was a reference point for trade unionists as late as 1981, when miners won an initial victory following a walkout against pit closure proposals under the government of Margaret Thatcher. In the great strike of 1984–85, memories of 1926 resonated in criticisms of other unions for failing to offer industrial support. Such memories also prompted the labeling of Labour’s equivocal leader Neil Kinnock as “Ramsay MacKinnock” in reference to his 1920s predecessor.

Perhaps the key value of Torrance’s book lies in its exploration of perspectives on the strike from elite vantage points. His telling of the strike does not generally flow through the history of the local organizational structures — councils of action — that controlled the transportation of food, people, and coal in many industrial areas.

In The Edge of Revolution, it is the determined opposition to the strike from the government, and the strength of support the anti-strike coalition had from its middle-class supporters, that shine through. In turn, these factors only added to the uncertainties that beset a labor movement leadership broadly committed to understanding the miners’ lockout and the sympathetic action it elicited as an industrial rather than a political event.


This article was originally published by Jacobin; please consider supporting the original publication, and read the original version at the link above.

Friday, June 26, 2026


Labour and Brexit: the arguments that still divide the party a decade on


Ten years on, the Brexit referendum remains one of the most consequential events in post-war British political history. It toppled prime ministers, redrew Britain’s electoral map and transformed the UK’s relationship with the EU. For Labour, Brexit was never simply a contest between opposing parties, but a battle that was also fought within its own ranks.

While much of the discourse about 2016 is framed as a clash between the pro-European and eurosceptic factions of the Conservative Party, Labour also entered the referendum with divisions of its own. Not only were its voters, and to a much lesser extent its MPs, split over competing visions of sovereignty and internationalism, but questions were raised about Jeremy Corbyn’s support for Remain during the campaign, which many saw as lacklustre.

A decade later, LabourList spoke to five prominent Labour voices who found themselves on opposite sides of the argument. Their reflections reveal not only how Labour experienced the referendum campaign, but how its divisions over Europe continue to shape Labour’s and British politics today.

‘I tried hard to persuade Miliband that we should say we’d have a referendum’

Questions over Brexit began when David Cameron promised an in-out referendum on EU membership in the run-up to the 2015 election.

Graham Stringer, a long-standing eurosceptic in the PLP, said he was among a group of Labour MPs calling on Ed Miliband to make a similar pledge in the run-up to the general election.

He said: “I tried very hard to persuade Miliband that we should say we’d have a referendum. His words to me were ‘I don’t want to spend my first five years in Downing Street campaigning about the European Union’.

As part of the Labour for a Referendum campaign, the late Labour donor John Mills commissioned polling that suggested such a commitment would shift the dial in dozens of constituencies and prevent Labour seats from going to the Tories.

Brendan Chilton, the campaign’s director, said: “We presented this information to the party and said this is significant – and it wasn’t a one-off poll; it was a series of polls with field research as well. The party said no, and funnily enough one of the seats that was going to be affected was Morley and Outwood, which was Ed Balls’ seat.”

Labour’s Eurosceptic past

Once the stage was set for an in-out referendum on membership after the Tories’ victory in 2015, Labour dropped its opposition for such a poll, with the party supporting the campaign to remain within the EU.

Labour had not always been so supportive of the European project, having called for Britain’s withdrawal from the EEC in 1975, although Harold Wilson and his Cabinet backed continued membership.

Stringer said: “Most of the Labour Party and trade union movement were in favour of coming out – you’d find it difficult to get selected as a parliamentary candidate if you were in favour of staying in.”

He said that he still holds the same principles that led to him voting out in 1975. 

“I believe in national democracy and the fundamental right of being able to throw out the people who make our laws in elections, which you can’t do with the European Union.”

Former MP Alan Johnson, who worked as a postmaster at the time of the 1975 referendum, said Wilson’s approach was critical in helping secure a victory for the ‘yes’ side in that vote.

“He [Wilson] played that brilliantly, because he got the Cabinet to vote in favour of ‘yes’. He knew the party was against it, he knew the PLP was against it ten to one, but thanks to Tony Benn’s brilliant idea of a plebiscite, he managed to sail his way through it and in the campaign, he stayed out of it… but he made sure the Cabinet were behind yes, which allowed him to then say the government is in favour of staying.”

Two tribes

As the 2016 referendum got underway, two Labour campaigns emerged – Labour IN for Britain, founded by Alan Johnson, and Labour Leave, chaired by Brendan Chilton.

Johnson said: “Our job was to get a Labour vote out, pure and simple – to get Labour people voting Remain.”

He said the strongest argument for Remain through a Labour lens could be summarised in a single word: “solidarity”.

“When countries that had been dictatorships were suddenly democracies all without a bullet being fired, all because there was a thing called the European Union – that reflected our values and principles and toleration and respect of the law.”

Meanwhile, the smaller band of 20 or so Labour MPs in the Labour Leave camp, including Graham Stringer, focused their case for Leave around Bennite-style arguments of accountability, democracy and national sovereignty.

Chilton said: “Our job, first of all, was to represent that cohort of voters that were Labour but also wanted to Leave.”

However, he also said another job in the campaign was to “disrupt” Labour’s Remain campaign.

“We would attend debates; if there was a Labour Remain stall in some village, ours would pop up next to it; if we got wind that a load of Labour Remain leaflets were being delivered in East London, ours would go out the next week, that sort of thing.

“I remember one night, I don’t know why, but there were like 20 debates in London – and we had to organise Ubers to pick up MPs as soon as the debate was finished and ferry them immediately over to another [debate].

“I remember we had this little map with little dots of where our people were speaking that night. I felt like the air command in the war, with nothing in reserve.”

‘Corbyn was the biggest asset the Leave campaign had’

Jeremy Corbyn at a polling station on June 23, 2016 – photo: Euan Cherry/Shutterstock













Then-Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who had long been a eurosceptic, came under fire for his lacklustre enthusiasm in campaigning for Remain.

Chilton said: “Jeremy Corbyn was the biggest asset the Leave campaign had, because essentially he was a Brexiteer – he was an old Bennite Brexiteer – and everyone knew it.

“When he appeared on television, no one believed it. What the party should have done, but it would never have done, would be to say the leader has got a different view to the members.”

Johnson told LabourList that Corbyn was often obstinate when working with Labour’s Remain campaign.

“We didn’t have much to do with Stronger In (the official Remain campaign), but they would help us by having days clear for us to do stuff that would not be diluted by them doing something as well. Jeremy had all these opportunities, but never took them.

“We were going to do something with the surviving Labour leaders, except Jeremy wouldn’t share a platform with Tony [Blair]. There were all these plans and he would not do it.

“He had no problem standing with existing Labour people, but it would have been more powerful if we could have done it with Gordon [Brown] and Tony.”

Despite this, Johnson was clear where the blame for the referendum result lies.

“I don’t blame Corbyn, I blame Cameron. It was absolute folly to have a referendum on Europe out of nowhere.”

‘We surrendered immigration to Leave’

For Johnson, the Remain campaign’s biggest mistake was to surrender the debate around immigration to Leave activists. In particular, he highlights the publication by the ONS of net migration figures around a month before the referendum, with net migration hitting 330,000 in 2015.

He said Labour’s Remain campaign had sought to sell the positive case for immigration and freedom of movement, but “Stronger In wouldn’t talk about it”.

“They said when the argument’s on the economy, we win. When the argument’s on immigration, Leave wins – so let’s keep the argument on the economy.

“Too late – the 330,000 wiped that away. We surrendered it [immigration] to them. We did our bit, David [Blunkett], in particular, was brilliant – but it never got the cut-through.”

When asked what he would have done differently during the campaign, Johnson said: “I would get the immigration stuff in early. We were on the back foot because the ONS published that figure. When they published it, we were kind of reacting to it, so I’d have got in a bit earlier.”

‘Leave should never have put that figure on the side of a bus’

Among Chilton’s memories of the referendum campaign, one rally in Essex stood out.

“I was sitting next to Sir David Amess and we were going onto the stage one by one to speak. The audience had had quite a lot of beer, they were well oiled. 

“In terms of the speaking order, it always went everyone, me and then Farage. I’d finished my speech, I sat down and Farage came onto the stage. All I can remember is his silhouette moving up onto the stage and speaking – this was really the moment when I thought this man one day could be a severe and terrifying threat to the Labour movement.

“The audience was what I would call a white working class, but also mixed race working class people from that part of the world. He held that audience in his hand, he was like a conductor.

“I can remember David leaning over to me and he said ‘Thank God there’s not an election tomorrow’.”











For all his criticism of “fanciful claims” made by the Remain campaign, there was one element of the Leave campaign which Chilton singled out for disapproval.

“The official Leave campaign should never have put that figure on the side of a bus. From a PR and marketing campaign, it was very clever – but actually it wasn’t about the referendum.

“It was a silly thing to do, because the way they presented it people were going to expect that we’d leave on the Thursday and on the Friday £350 million was going to land in the NHS’ lap. That was never going to happen.”

‘I anticipated we would lose the referendum’

MP for Oxford East Anneliese Dodds, who served as an MEP for the South East at the time of the Brexit referendum, said there was no point in the entire process that she believed Remain would win the referendum.

“I anticipated we would lose the referendum for two reasons. The first was I was very used to knocking on people’s doors across the South East of England and having the response from people that they didn’t like Europe. They had nothing against me personally but they didn’t like Europe, so that was the first reason why I knew from the beginning that this would be a really difficult referendum.

“Secondly, I felt those who traditionally represented the EU in debates about it within the UK tended to be presenting themselves as supporting the institutions – and for me, as a Labour Party member and activist, I never supported a set of rules and procedures. I supported the fact they had delivered more jobs, that they had brought families’ costs down.

“That was why I supported us remaining, but that argument had just not been made in Britain and, if I’m being completely honest, it wasn’t really made during the referendum either. The debate was focused again on institutions that felt as far away, if not further, than Westminster.”

Stringer, on the other hand, was confident throughout almost all the campaign that Leave would win.

“Our private polling always indicated Leave would win. It turned out to be on a false basis; it was based on relatively low turnout and the extra commitment of Leave voters to vote. It turned out both sides were committed; we just had a majority.

“I always thought we were going to win, until I was sat watching a football match and the news came through that Jo Cox had been shot. I thought that, in the way politics is sometimes completely irrational, I felt at that moment we were ruined.”

The beginnings of the ‘red wall’ schism

In the end, Britain voted by a narrow margin to Leave the European Union, with more than three million Labour voters – particularly in the North of England – splitting with the party’s official stance to vote Leave.

Johnson told LabourList that he was surprised by the result – having expected the Leave margin to be wider than it ended up being on referendum night.

Chilton sees the referendum as the origin of the schism between Labour’s traditional voters in the ‘red wall’ and the party.

“For the first time, Labour voters said to the party ‘we do not agree with your policy’ in their millions and they were able to vote Leave. They were then able to vote Tory, because once they had voted Leave they dabbled a bit, and now they’ve gone Reform.”

Stella Creasy, MP for Walthamstow and chair of the Labour Movement for Europe, said that the relatively close margin of the Scottish independence referendum should have been a “wake-up call” that traditionally progressive voters were losing connection with the principle of collaboration – and that the party was not connecting with them during the campaign.

“The whole Remain campaign was infused with the sense of the sheer arrogance of people for even questioning our membership, that nobody would be that stupid to give it up, so we made a case for the status quo – and as progressives, we should never be satisfied with the status quo until the status quo is without inequality, injustice or inequity.”

Dodds recalled returning to the European Parliament in the wake of the referendum, with many of her colleagues in the Socialists and Democrats grouping being surprised by Britain’s decision to leave – apart from one notable figure.

“Interestingly, the one person who wasn’t was Martin Schulz. He articulated one of my concerns, saying the UK had just gone through a financial crisis, people were rejecting the status quo – and therefore the referendum provided a way for people to register their discontent.”

‘Backing second referendum was the biggest mistake’

In the aftermath of the referendum result, Labour underwent a shift in policy on Brexit from an initial soft Brexit approach toward backing a second referendum by the time of the 2019 election.

All the people we interviewed for this piece, from both sides of the Brexit divide, were unanimous in their view that Labour’s support for a second referendum was a huge mistake.

Johnson said: “It was the biggest mistake. They called it a ‘people’s vote’ – who do you think voted the first time? It fed into this argument that the ruling classes are very keen to get our views, except when they get them, they just ignore them and want to do something else.”

He argued that Labour should have instead supported Theresa May’s Brexit deal, describing it as being “as close as you’re going to get to a soft Brexit reflecting a 52-48 decision”.

“It would have been tough to support Theresa May’s deal, but in a sense we would have been supporting Brussels’ deal.”

Britain’s future with the EU

What should Britain’s relationship with Europe look like in the decade to come? Rather than calling for Britain to rejoin, a position Mayor of London Sadiq Khan has recently urged Labour to adopt, Creasy has advocated for the UK to look into adopting a Swiss-style deal to rebuild our damaged relationship with the EU.

She argued that, while jumping to rejoin is unrealistic in the short term, Switzerland’s sector-by-sector agreements with the EU have helped unlock access to parts of the single market vital to manufacturing and industry. 

“I call it a salvage operation. None of that rules out any future relationship or rejoining, but it does recognise the catastrophic damage done by the way in which we left, the urgency of giving people some sense that you could actually fix some of these challenges and showing our European counterparts that we understand and appreciate we have to win back their trust.”

Chilton, on the other hand, sees Brexit as “largely settled”, comparing those wanting to rejoin to the “Japanese soldiers on the islands after World War Two, still fighting after the emperor’s declared peace”.

Instead, he argues the government ought to be doing more to take advantage of being outside of the EU and embrace Mark Carney’s idea of an “alliance of middle powers”.

“I’d like to see a Britain that is looking out to the world… looking to other countries like a resource-rich Canada, Australia, the Pacific countries and India.

“In a world where we’ve got Donald Trump, and even when he goes it’s likely that this American isolationism will continue, we need a Britain armed to the teeth and that is going to mean some very difficult choices in terms of spending.

“We have a real competitiveness problem and a real productivity problem. We should be massively trying to incentivise industry in this country. Why can’t we have a lower corporation tax for manufacturers? Why can’t we have employment incentives for manufacturers? What on earth has happened to planning reform?

“We’ve got a finite time left in government, and if people don’t feel at the end of this that they are wealthier and the country is on a path to prosperity, we’re going to be in real difficulty.”

 

A decade on, it is clear that scars remain within the Labour family over the divisive referendum and the legacy of the deal struck by Boris Johnson. With growing calls for Labour to pursue a closer relationship with Europe, and with new leadership heading for Number 10, the European question that the referendum sought to answer looks set to continue rumbling through Labour politics for another decade to come.


The US Is Engineering Britain’s Next Brexit

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

At the end of May, Greg Bovino, the former chief of the US Border Patrol, was the keynote speaker at a “Remigration Summit” in Portugal. There, he won applause from neo-Nazis for a program that ends in the forced removal of immigrants, legal residents, even citizens. A week later, US Vice-President JD Vance used a British teenager’s murder to attack the country’s immigration policy.

Neither man is British, yet both are helping to engineer Britain’s next Brexit.

The comfortable story is that this is a domestic argument: a homegrown mood and a country internally debating immigration. But Brits told themselves something similar in 2016, when American money, Cambridge Analytica data, and foreign social media operations turbocharged a fringe idea into a referendum result before anyone grasped what had happened.

Remigration is the same playbook. Except now, it runs out in the open.

Look at who is doing the talking. In May, the White House posted an image of Donald Trump crossing out “replacement migration” and writing “remigration”, a word with white-nationalist roots in Europe. Only last week Vance pinned 18-year-old Henry Nowak’s murder on a “mass invasion of migrants”, though the perpetrator was a British citizen. Downing Street has itself warned of outside attempts to interfere in British democracy and stir up division. Vance and Elon Musk are not amplifying a British movement so much as manufacturing one, with Muslim communities as the target and Reform as the vehicle.

The communities on the receiving end feel it deeply. A survey by Opinium for transatlantic thinktank The Concordia Forum found that more than half of British Muslims are more frightened of anti-Muslim violence than a year ago, and roughly a third have changed their routines to avoid certain places. Nearly half fear that they or someone close to them will be harmed.

What makes this so dangerous is that Britain is now less equipped to resist. In March, the government stripped the term “Islamophobia” and the framing of anti-Muslim hatred as racism from its official definition. The same day, it launched a social cohesion plan, with an incoming anti-Muslim hostility “tsar” expected to make that narrower definition permanent. That is a government chasing Reform’s voters, as Labour chased UKIP’s in 2015, and they should realize how that strategy ends: not with the threat contained, but with the mainstream redrawn around it.

The ground has already shifted under our feet. A Hope Not Hate survey this year found that 54% of Reform members want non-white citizens born abroad removed or encouraged to leave – not a fringe grumble about migration, but a majority position, inside a party leading the polls, that some British citizens do not truly belong.

I have seen how this works in my own country. For years, Sweden treated the Quran burnings on its streets mainly as a matter of public order and free speech, arguing over permits and police powers rather than naming the anti-Muslim hatred behind them. One of the men who staged them, Salwan Momika, was eventually shot dead. A government that will not name this hatred as racism loses the power to fight it, and the hostility keeps spreading without ever having to admit what it is.

Yet even Sweden is walking into the same trap again on remigration. Aggressive deportations of teenagers and proposals to pay refugees to leave have focused public debate on how many non-white or Muslim Swedes should be in Sweden, and invited the most hateful to participate. Our once proudly open society risks closing, and threatens the core values that make Swedish and European democracy work.

Some will say this is overblown, that worrying about immigration is legitimate and “social cohesion” is a worthy goal. It is. But a cohesion strategy that deletes the very word for the racism it claims to confront is not building cohesion; it is managing the people it has already decided are a problem. The danger is not only what anti-Muslim racism does to Muslims; it is also about what it does to democratic societies. When a society begins to treat the belonging of one group as conditional, it weakens the principle of equal citizenship for everyone. Historically, exclusion rarely stops with a single group.

And the premise underneath all of it, that Muslims are unassimilated and a threat to Western values, falls apart on contact with the evidence. In that same Concordia poll, British Muslims backed democracy more strongly than the general public – 85% to 71% – and 94% said everyone should be treated equally under the law, against 80% of the wider population.

Naming anti-Muslim racism as racism does not shut down debate; it is a precondition for an honest one, and for protecting every citizen equally. I wrote the Council of Europe’s 2022 report defining Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism. In doing so, I hoped to give governments across Europe the tools to identify and confront discrimination before it shakes the foundations of European democracy. Britain risks throwing those tools away.

If nothing changes, the cost will not be only trade deals and wasted years, as it was with Brexit. It will be millions of British citizens being told that their place here is conditional, and a party system reorganized around the question of who counts as truly British.

The way to resist is simple. Keep the language. Keep Muslim organizations in the room. Hold the line institutionally and refuse to let the meaning of racism be quietly rewritten under pressure from the same forces that brought us Brexit. In 2016, Britain did not see the interference coming. This time, nobody can say they were not warned.

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Momodou Malcolm Jallow is a Member of the Swedish Parliament since 2017 and Chair of the Civil Committee since 2022. His tenure includes roles on the Swedish Delegation to the Council of Europe and contributing to various Riksdag committees. An advocate for racial justice, Jallow previously served as General Rapporteur on Combating Racism and Intolerance for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and leads the Afro-Swedish Forum for Justice, promoting anti-racism and the welfare of Afro-Swedes.


Watch: Keir Starmer resigns… what now for Labour? (LabourList Podcast Special)

LabourList editor Emma Burnell joins reporter James Tibbitts for a special discussion following Keir Starmer’s announcement that he will step down as Prime Minister and Labour leader.



Read Keir Starmer’s resignation speech in full

Photo: Number 10/Flickr

Walking up this street two years ago was the proudest moment of my life. A new Labour government, the first in 14 years.

A page in our country’s history turned after years of disappointment and despair. The chance to change the lives of millions of people for the better.

That’s what I came into politics for. The journey to that point was not easy. Six years ago, I inherited a Labour Party that was politically, financially, and morally bankrupt.

I was told time and time again that my party was finished, that we were consigned to history, that a majority at the general election, let alone a landslide majority, was impossible. But we proved those people wrong because we changed our party, ripping out the poison of antisemitism, restoring trust on the economy, defence, and national security, and becoming a party that once again stood proudly with, not against, our national flag.

The hard work of change was with a singular purpose—Not power for power’s sake, but to change Britain for the better. To build a fairer country with dignity and respect, where everyone is seen, everyone is valued, wealth and opportunity for all, not just the privileged few.

And look at what we’ve achieved in just two years: an economy that is stronger, growing faster than our peers, wages rising faster than inflation in every single month since we came to power. Investment secured, infrastructure being built, an end to austerity with the fastest fall in NHS waiting lists for 17 years, the biggest improvement in rights for workers and renters in a generation, the biggest uplift in defence spending since the Cold War, small boat crossings falling, asylum hotels closing, protecting young people from social media, and half a million children being lifted out of poverty because of the choices that I made.

Our reputation in the world restored, with Britain once again standing up for decency, respect, and the rule of law, securing trade deals, standing with Ukraine, standing up for our values and rebuilding our relationship with our allies in Europe.

Change promised by a Labour government, change fought for by a Labour government, change delivered by a Labour government. But I know the question being asked now is not who was best placed to change the Labour Party, to take us into power, and to begin the vital work of improving lives for millions of people. Those questions have been answered.

The question my party is asking now is whether I am best placed to lead us into the next General Election. I have heard the answer of my parliamentary party to that question, and I accept that answer with good grace. Every decision I’ve taken has been about putting the country I love first.

That is why I will resign as leader of the Labour Party. I have spoken to His Majesty the King this morning to inform him of my decision. I will ask the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party to set out a timetable with nominations opening on the 9th of July. And completed by the summer recess.

In the case of a contest, this will ensure a new leader is in place before Parliament returns in September. I will remain in post as Prime Minister until the contest is complete, and I will do everything I can to ensure an orderly handover of power.

I will also give my successor my full and unequivocal support, knowing that they will inherit a Britain that is far stronger and fairer than the one I inherited two years ago, better prepared for the challenges ahead, and better able to ensure the Labour Party secures a second term in office.

I want to thank all of those friends and colleagues who have been at my side for these past six years or so for their incredible commitment, service, and support.

I want to thank the brilliant Number 10 staff and our country’s extraordinary civil service who dedicate their lives to public service.

And when I leave the biggest job in the country, I shall spend more time on the most important job: being the best husband I can to my fantastic wife Vic, who has been a rock by my side through good times and bad, and being the best dad I can to my beautiful children, who are my pride and my joy. Thank you very much.

‘Starmer: A historical perspective’


Photo: @Keir_Starmer

Now Keir Starmer has announced his resignation, and begins to enter history, we can start to place his leadership of the Labour party and the country into some kind of perspective.

Measured in a certain way, Starmer is one of the most successful of Labour’s leaders. Just winning a Commons majority in 2024 puts him streets ahead of all but three predecessors; moreover at 174 seats the size of that majority is only bested by Tony Blair.

What makes Starmer’s achievement even more remarkable is that it came after Jeremy Corbyn’s drubbing at the hands of Boris Johnson. It was widely believed Brexit had created an electoral realignment to the advantage of the Conservatives who many predicted would remain in office for a generation. Few thought Starmer, when elected to replace Corbyn in 2020, would ever become Prime Minister; that he would instead play a role like that of Neil Kinnock who spent nine years transforming the party after 1983 only for Blair to reap the reward. Despite initially promising more continuity than change, Starmer turned Labour away from Corbyn’s radical commitments and chased the former leader and many of his supporters out of the party.

Even so, Starmer’s huge 2024 majority was deceptive, being based on only 33.7 per cent of votes cast: if Labour won 211 more seats than in 2019 it did so with just a 1.4 per cent bigger share. In terms of mobilising popular support therefore Starmer looks a much less striking figure, especially when one considers how desperate many were to be rid of the Conservatives who by then had squandered their Brexit advantage. Indeed, Labour’s vote share was below that of any other majority governing party in the modern era. That this shallow triumph was followed, once Starmer became Prime Minister, by an unprecedented collapse in support to just 17 per cent in the May 2026 local elections,only compounds such an impression.

The 2024 election victory, undeniably Starmer’s greatest achievement, was then paradoxical, one whose causes and consequences (and his own contribution to both) will likely be the subject of much debate in the future.

Some might argue Starmer’s modest 2024 support and its disintegration was largely out of his hands and that he faced problems unlike those of his predecessors. He inherited an ailing economy, one suffering the combined results of austerity, Brexit, Covid and the Ukraine war. Government debt was huge so the scope to borrow and invest in collapsing public services was severely limited especially given, thanks to a prolonged stagnation of living standards, there was little public appetite for tax increases.

Starmer also operated in a uniquely fluid electoral landscape in which voters were alienated from old party loyalties, where age and education rather than class created new affiliations, especially support for populist parties. The impact of these changes was, moreover, turbo-charged by the traditional media and social media platforms embracing what amounted to a far-right politics of nihilism.

How far Starmer was the prisoner of structural factors over which he had little control is however something others would challenge. For, under the tutelage of Morgan MacSweeney – the main architect of Labour strategy during this period – the party deliberately sought less to engage with these difficult new realities and more to restore a lost politics. It was this approach – and its demonstrable failure – which mostly explains the truncated nature of Starmer’s premiership.

Most Britons were never sure what Starmer stood for, partly because he was a poor communicator, but he had a clear objective as leader and Prime Minister. He wanted to return the country to the time before populism and so to the world prior to the 2008 international financial crisis, austerity and Brexit to what he considered ‘normal’ politics. To that end he sought to recreate Labour as the party of the pre-Brexit working class, which many older, white and less educated proletarians supported, especially by emphasising his commitment to reducing immigration.

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But such voters had no desire to return to Labour. He could not satisfy their visceral dislike of immigration, something revealed by the 2024 result and confirmed even as his government oversaw a significant decline in numbers while it introduced harsh measures to deter refugees entering Britain. Unfortunately for him, instead of gaining votes, Labour lost many of their 2024 voters dismayed by this approach. And yet he persisted with this approach until the end.

Starmer’s other – and most critical objective – was to promote higher economic growth, notably through investment in green industries. This involved granting a greater role to the state to direct resources to neglected parts of the country and make good the depredations inflicted first by Margaret Thatcher and then those governments which followed in her neo-liberal footsteps. Many of these radical plans were however reined in during the run-up to the 2024 election confirming Starmer’s deep-set caution, Put together with the impact of Donald Trump’s erratic policies Britain looks set to remain a low growth economy for years to come. Significantly, the one measure many economists believed would bolster growth – reversing Brexit – was something Starmer refused to countenance.

Starmer campaigned in 2024 promising ‘Change’ but so far as most voters were concerned, he has delivered too little of it. Some would argue that was because he was not given enough time, others that he was simply too conservative, that he was simply inadequate to the moment in which he came to lead his party and country, that he neither had the actions and certainly not the words to challenge an increasingly visceral popular mistrust of the kind of ‘normal’ politics to which he wanted the country to return – if that was even possible.

Most significant political figures go through reputational transformations: many of those seen as successful at the moment they depart the stage are eventually held up to opprobrium. For others, those viewed by contemporaries as failures, who later may see be seen in a more positive light. Ramsay MacDonald, once the great betrayer, is now viewed as having achieved some modest but important reforms; Clement Attlee, now regarded as a kind of secular saint was, for many years after his retirement, thought to have lost the plot in office; and Harold Wilson, who resigned amidst accusations of corruption and lack of principle, is now praised for avoiding British entanglement in the Vietnam war and as the architect of the Open University.

So, assessing Starmer as a historical figure when he has only just announced his resignation is perhaps something a ‘fool’s errand’. In the end, how historians of the future see him depends on what happens next. Will Starmer’s successor chart a successful new course for the government, dish the populists and secure re-election or will they be overwhelmed by the same problems that faced Starmer? Over to you … Andy Burnham.



Tariq Ali: “tweedledee”

Source: New Left Review

There was nothing to commend Starmer. A political dud, he was put in place following Corbyn’s 2019 defeat after a legal career – in Northern Ireland and at the Crown Prosecution Service – of kowtowing to those in power. The sordid story was told in an effective broadside by Oliver Eagleton in The Starmer Project (2022) and later in forensic detail by Gabriel Pogrund and Patrick Maguire in Get In (2025) and Paul Holden in The Fraud (2025). In the July 2024 election, a divided right – Tories: 24 per cent; Reform: 14 per cent – handed Starmer a majority with 34 per cent. His advisers, led by Mandelson protégé Morgan McSweeney, counselled the new leader to suck up to Farage in public and compete with his policies. This was done via a photo-op in the House of Commons when the Prime Minister walked up to Farage and shook hands with him, thus becoming a stranger to many in his own party.

There followed expulsions of the Labour left, attacks on child benefits and pensioners’ fuel allowance and Farage-style rhetoric about immigrants (‘Island of Strangers’), wrapped up in austerity budgets. In line with the preceding Tory government, a woman of colour, Shabana Mahmood, was appointed Home Secretary to push through deeply reactionary policies on race and civil liberties.

The liberal press, thrilled by the purge of the left, eagerly supported Starmer. And Starmer eagerly supported the Israeli genocide unleashed in Gaza. The Labour Prime Minister gave his backing to Israeli measures like cutting off water, electricity, food and medicines to the Palestinian people. If Starmer opposed the targeting of women and children, he kept it to himself. The state apparatuses and RAF surveillance were employed to actively assist in the genocide. Starmer’s abject servility to the ultra-conservative Board of Jewish Deputies was loyally mimicked by cabinet members Cooper, Lammy, Streeting and the 100-plus Labour MPs imposed on local parties by Mandelson’s gang.

To take the measure of the Mandelson implants: even Labour loyalists Robin Cook and Clare Short resigned from the Blair cabinet when he took the country to war in Iraq against the will of a majority of his citizens, backed by the endless lies of his media manager, Alastair Campbell (and the barking of dogs of war like Burnham). Not a single Labour MP resigned from Starmer’s government on Palestine or the use of US military bases in the UK to attack Iran. On the contrary: the expelled Corbynites – John McDonnell and Co. – disgraced themselves by crawling back into the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Starmer made sure that there was nothing to choose from at any level between the extreme centre parties in parliament – Labour, Tories and Lib Dems. As the British economy stagnated and Labour’s ratings plunged to their current 18 per cent, the Greens took off from July 2025 to reach 16 per cent this spring. Coupled with the short-lived hopes in a new Corbynite vehicle, they revealed a substantial constituency to Labour’s left. After reading the focus-group runes, McSweeney’s men steered Starmer into a series of semi u-turns from the second half of 2025: fuel allowance, child benefits, anti-migrant digital IDs. None of it helped. In combination with his wooden appearance and inability to defend himself in Parliament, his flip-flops only increased the contempt for Starmer in the country at large. He will go. There are rumours that Burnham might offer him a cabinet job. Can I recommend the Ministry of Untruth.


This article was originally published by New Left Review; please consider supporting the original publication, and read the original version at the link above.Email
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Writer, journalist and film-maker Tariq Ali was born in Lahore in 1943. He owned his own independent television production company, Bandung, which produced programmes for Channel 4 in the UK during the 1980s. He is a regular broadcaster on BBC Radio and contributes articles and journalism to magazines and newspapers including The Guardian and the London Review of Books. He is editorial director of London publishers Verso and is on the board of the New Left Review, for whom he is also an editor. He writes fiction and non-fiction and his non-fiction includes 1968: Marching in the Streets (1998), a social history of the 1960s; Conversations with Edward Said (2005); Rough Music: Blair, Bombs, Baghdad, London, Terror (2005); and Speaking of Empire and Resistance (2005), which takes the form of a series of conversations with the author.

Opinion

Keir Starmer is a decent man, but he lacked key skills for leadership

'There is no doubt he is a respected statesman who has worked hard all his life for the right reasons. 
JUNE 24, 2026




Jamie Stone is the Liberal Democrat MP for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross and the chair of the House of Commons Petitions Committee.

“Nay lad, we don’t vote Liberal in these parts.”

That was Batley and Spen during a by-election some five years ago. Amid the red-brick, Coronation Street backdrop of this part of Yorkshire, I soon tried a different tact.

“Morning, lovely day isn’t it. I’m out doing the by-election rounds and I’m wondering, are you a betting person? If so, who do you think will win the seat?”

“Oh, well that’s kind of you to ask – it’s got to be Kim…”

So I returned to Westminster with the rather unsurprising intelligence that Labour would comfortably hold the seat. Later that day, who should I bump into on the House of Commons terrace overlooking the Thames but the new Leader of the Labour party Keir Starmer.

“Keir, it’s in the bag. I’ve been up there – without a shadow of a doubt, you’ve won.”

Now the reason I’m telling you this is because Keir’s reaction was interesting. He looked quite startled, almost jumped out of his skin in fact (i’m not that frightening, am I?) – almost as if he’d been caught off guard by his own success. “Do you really think so? Are you sure?”

It struck me then that a different sort of political leader might have replied, “Of course we are, Jamie – you don’t need to tell me that.” Or even: “Isn’t it about time you faced reality and joined the Labour party”. Instead, there was only cautious optimism. The pragmatism of a good, decent person doesn’t always translate to the qualities necessary for leadership.

That small, fleeting exchange told me something important about Keir Starmer and his leadership style. When the chips were down, certainty did not seem to be his natural habitat.

Another giveaway is the fact that I don’t even once remember seeing him in the House of Commons tea room engaging in gossip and swapping information in between votes.

Nor did I ever see him in the tea room around the corner, where the real temperature of Parliament is often taken. If you want your finger on the pulse of the House, being amongst your colleagues engaging in this kind of chatter matters more than it might seem. In fact, when previous Prime Ministers were in trouble they were to be seen making the rounds alongside loyal supporters in an often vain attempt to secure support amongst the rank and file of their party’s membership.

The trouble with power, particularly at the level of Prime Minister, is how easily it can isolate you. It is very easy to retreat into Number 10 and gradually lose the instinctive read of your own parliamentary party who you once socialised with.

My conclusion – rightly or wrongly – was that Keir is a decent, diligent, hard-working man, but perhaps without that extra gear of bonhomie, that “one of the lads” instinct that can make all the difference in leadership politics. None of this is a criticism; it is simply an observation of a style that he did not adopt. And, unfairly or otherwise, the most superficial airs of charisma can matter enormously when pressure builds.

In retrospect, one can see how a series of political U-turns and certain misjudgements accumulated into a perfect storm that ultimately led to his resignation during the recent political upheaval. And, of course, sometimes fatal misjudgements such as the appointment of Peter Mandelson…

At the end of all this, I am not a member of his party – but I can say that when I raised issues on behalf of my constituents, Keir Starmer always took the time to respond properly. That alone is not nothing in modern politics.

And when I look back at some of his predecessors, it takes only a moment to recall just how damaging the Johnson and Truss years were. They were periods that did real harm to the reputation of the office of Prime Minister and, in many eyes, to the credibility of British politics itself. That charge cannot fairly be laid at Starmer’s door.

In conversations across Parliament in his final days in office, it was clear that even many who opposed him recognised his diligence and seriousness. I wish him well. There is no doubt he is a respected statesman who has worked hard all his life for the right reasons.

He kept us out of a war and did his best to safeguard the special relationship with the United States and on the international stage. There can be no doubt that he made our country proud on many occasions. A refreshing change from the leaders that came before him.

Perhaps now, in a slightly different world, the next Prime Minister might consider finding him a role that will allow him to put these talents to good use. Foreign Secretary might suit him rather well..