Showing posts sorted by date for query Sri Lanka. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Sri Lanka. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, March 27, 2026

 

Chevron Plans to Buy Oil From Sable's Controversial Santa Ynez Unit

Dreamyshade
Oil storage tanks at Ellwood Beach, Goleta, California (Dreamyshade / CC BY SA 4.0)

Published Mar 26, 2026 12:30 AM by The Maritime Executive

 

Houston-based Sable Offshore, owner of the Santa Ynez platform complex and pipeline in Santa Barbara County, has a buyer for its production. Chevron says that it will begin buying 20,000 barrels per day from Sable now that the Trump administration has approved a restart of the former Santa Ynez pipeline, the oil major announced Tuesday. 

"We’re going to run Sable’s crude at El Segundo in April," Chevron president of downstream Andy Walz told Bloomberg. "We’re taking American crude oil, putting it in American pipelines, running an American refinery and selling those products to American motorists — and it’s going to be cheaper than importing."

The former Santa Ynez pipeline was shut down in 2015 after a significant oil spill caused by corrosion (under previous ownership). Sable bought the entirety in 2024 and has been seeking state permission to restart the line, now known as the Las Flores pipeline. In an executive order signed last Friday, the White House invoked the Defense Production Act to overrule California state regulators and allow Sable to bring production and pipeline exports back online. 

California has filed suit to block the executive order and keep the pipeline shut down. The state claims that the White House decision "illegally asserts exclusive jurisdiction over two California onshore oil pipelines," which the state government has not given permission to restart. On Saturday, for extra measure, California's parks department ordered Sable to physically remove the pipeline from Gaviota State Park, which the line crosses. Environmental nonprofits have also filed suit to block the line's operations; the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) of Santa Barbara alleges that the aging pipeline is corroded, and should be more rigorously inspected before operations begin. 

California has the highest gasoline and diesel prices in the lower 48 states, thanks to refinery closures, isolation from the rest of the U.S. energy market, and exposure to the demand signal from critically-undersupplied East Asian markets. 

The state is heavily dependent upon imported oil, receiving more than 60 percent of its crude from foreign producers. It cannot source refined products or crude via pipeline from the rest of the country, and its isolated market has higher pricing, intrinsically linked to the Asia-Pacific refineries where California gets one-fifth of its refined fuel. Asia and Oceania currently face a serious energy crunch due to the disruption in the Mideast, with supply outages and rationing measures reported in Thailand, Sri Lanka and other localities. In a free-trading Pacific market, California competes with Asian buyers, with an effect on price: diesel prices at the pump in the state now average more than $7 per gallon, and climbing. 

Top image: Dreamyshade / CC BY SA 4.0

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Iranian Sailors Trapped in Sri Lanka: Tehran Demands Return, US Pressure Mounts — Can Colombo Stay Neutral?
IRIS DENA: Via: X

By Sumit Ahlawat
-March 26, 2026
EurAsian Times 

“You can’t be neutral on a moving train,” is the title of US historian and activist Howard Zinn’s 1994 autobiography.

The world (or the ‘train’), wrote Zinn, “is already moving in certain deadly directions, often toward war, injustice, inequality, or suffering.” Pretending to be neutral often means accepting the status quo, he concluded.

Pretending to be neutral in a ruthless war is difficult enough. However, it is nearly impossible if you’re a small, vulnerable nation trying to maintain good relations with both adversaries, and none illustrates this point better than Sri Lanka’s dilemmas.

The tiny Indian Ocean island-nation sits over 4,200 km away from Iran’s southern border. However, in the three-week-old conflict, Colombo has been tested multiple times.

In fact, the Iran-US War has also been termed as the biggest foreign policy test of the 18-month-old government in Colombo.

For now, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government has been able to somewhat placate both Iran and the US; however, the question is whether, if the war spreads and the pressure to pick sides intensifies, Sri Lanka could continue to maintain neutrality.
Sri Lanka’s Dilemmas in the Iran-US War

The US-Iran War started on February 28.

However, in the tiny Indian Ocean island-nation of Sri Lanka, the war dilemmas arrived 48 hours earlier.

On February 26, two papers landed on the desk of the Sri Lankan President Dissanayake. One from the US and one from Iran.

Washington asked permission for two U.S. military aircraft, armed with anti-ship missiles, to land at Mattala airport. Simultaneously, Tehran asked permission for three Iranian naval ships to dock at Sri Lankan ports.

The three Iranian naval ships were in India in February to take part in a naval exercise.

“We received the request on February 26 for the three Iranian vessels to call at port on a goodwill visit between March 9 and 13. On the same evening, the US requested permission for two of its warplanes near Djibouti to land at Mattala airport,” President Dissanayake informed the Sri Lankan Parliament last week.

Committed to maintaining neutrality and ensuring that Colombo does not become a party to the conflict, Sri Lanka denied permission to both.

“So there were two pieces of paper on our desk; one asked for permission for the Iranian vessels to call at port between March 9-13, the other from the US asking to allow 2 naval warplanes to land at Mattala. What should we have done? As a neutral nation, we said no to both. That’s impartiality,” he added.

He said the US wanted to bring in two warplanes armed with eight anti-ship missiles from their base in Djibouti to Mattala International Airport, but “Sri Lanka said no”.\

That should have been the end of Sri Lanka’s role in the conflict; however, as Howard Zinn warned, it is difficult to be ‘neutral on a moving train.’

On March 4, a US submarine torpedoed the Iranian warship, IRIS Dena, which had earlier requested Sri Lanka’s permission to dock. The Iranian warship was torpedoed by the US submarine in international waters, but within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and search-and-rescue region.

As many as 87 sailors died in the incident, which also brought the deadly conflict right to Sri Lanka’s doorstep.

One week earlier, Colombo had categorically denied permission to IRIS Dena to dock at its port; now, with the lives of 136 sailors hanging by a thread on its doorstep, Colombo had no choice but to respond to IRIS Dena’s distress call.

At least 87 sailors were killed. Sri Lanka recovered 87 bodies and 32 survivors.
Colombo also faced criticism, both domestic and international, for denying permission to IRIS Dena to dock at its port, leading to its drowning.

President Dissanayake responded to these criticisms in his statement in the Parliament.

“Certain parties are saying that we have signed agreements with the US, and that’s why we delayed entertaining the Iranian vessel. It was said in Parliament that an 11-hour delay on our part sacrificed the Iranian vessel. That’s outrageous, inhumane,” he said.

Under pressure, Sri Lanka also allowed IRIS Bushehr, an Iranian Navy supply ship, to dock at its port on March 5, less than 24 hours after the drowning of IRIS Dena and the death of 87 sailors.

Sri Lanka also rescued the 221 sailors on board the IRIS Bushehr. Together with the 32 sailors rescued from IRIS Dena, these 252 Iranian sailors have been in Sri Lanka since then.
Iranian Sailors in Sri Lanka Remain in Limbo

While rescuing the drowning sailors, Sri Lanka would not have thought that its humanitarian gesture would become its geopolitical dilemma in the coming days.

Sri Lanka has repatriated the bodies of 87 sailors it recovered from the IRIS Dena, after the Iranian government chartered a special plane.

Colombo would like to do the same with 252 Iranian sailors in its custody, especially given that Tehran has repeatedly requested Colombo to repatriate these sailors.

Iran considers the release of its sailors to be a “bilateral” issue that can be resolved directly, since the two countries are on friendly terms, Alireza Delkhosh, Iran’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, said in an interview last week.

However, there is one problem. The US would not allow Sri Lanka to do so, and Colombo is wary of antagonizing the US.

A US State Department cable dated March 6, cited by Reuters, indicated that Jayne Howell, the charge d’affaires at the US embassy in Colombo, urged Sri Lankan authorities not to send back the 32 survivors or the crew of another Iranian vessel, the IRIS Booshehr.

There is also some confusion about the legal status of these sailors.

Delkhosh said they should be free to go because Sri Lanka is not a participant in the hostilities, meaning the sailors are not prisoners of war. He also said many of the sailors were cadets still in training.

“They are not belligerents, they are not fighters, they are just students,” he said. “And here is not the battleground.”

Several other people on board were not from the army. “They were… a music band,” he said.

However, the US differs. Some of the sailors on the ship could be intelligence operatives, and their return to Iran could harm US interests in a war situation, Washington contends.

Furthermore, once in Iran, they could join the war against the US.

According to the New York Times, there is tremendous pressure on Colombo not to let these sailors return to Iran, at least till the war is not over.

In an interview, Sri Lanka’s foreign affairs minister, Vijitha Herath, expressed his dilemma.

“They are not prisoners,” he said. “But that doesn’t mean, give them all freedom.”

Herath also disagreed with the characterization of the Iranians as students. “They were in the warship,” he said.

Walking a tightrope, for now, Colombo has given all the Iranian sailors a one-month visa for Sri Lanka.

Herath stated that, at present, the captain of the Bushehr and 14 of its sailors remain on board the vessel, which is still in Sri Lanka. The rest of the ship’s crew are at a Sri Lankan Navy camp in Welisara, about 12 miles north of Colombo, he said, adding that the 32 survivors of the Dena are at a separate camp operated by the Sri Lankan Air Force.

Colombo is also bearing the cost of their medical expenses and their stay in the country, while also facing pressure from Washington and Tehran to quickly resolve the issue.

“This is a very unique situation. Keeping them is an expense, an obligation, and a security issue for us,” George I. H. Cooke, a visiting lecturer at the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, told NYT.

Sri Lanka is in a difficult position as both regions are critical for the island-nation.

The US is Sri Lanka’s largest single export destination, accounting for 23 percent of merchandise exports in 2025, with exports to the U.S. reaching nearly US$3 billion.

Sri Lanka’s garment sector is especially exposed to Western markets, and Herath said that more than 40 percent of garment exports go to the United States.

Any blowback on trade with the US could have devastating consequences for a country that has just emerged from near economic collapse.

At the same time, Colombo relies on West Asia to meet its energy needs. Additionally, more than one million Sri Lankans work in West Asia and send significant remittances home.

Sri Lanka would not like to be a party to this conflict. The country has historically followed a non-aligned policy of ‘friends to all, enemies to none’.

Colombo has worked hard to maintain its neutrality in this war, refusing permission to both US fighter jets and Iranian warships. However, the question is for how long a tiny, vulnerable nation can continue to do so?


Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Can The Middle East Crisis Resurrect Sri Lanka’s ‘Ghost Airport’? – OpEd



A Strategic Sanctuary Amid the Scrubland: An Antonov Airlines An-124 (UR-82008) at Mattala (MRIA). In the silence of the "world's emptiest terminal," even birds treat the horizontal stabilizer as a perch. Today, this isolation is being reframed as a wartime lifeboat for the Gulf’s aviation giants. 
Credit: Tang Lu


March 24, 2026 
By Tang Lu


From “World’s Emptiest” to the Gulf’s Lifeboat: How a bold Sri Lankan ‘Proposal’ is testing the limits of Mattala (MRIA) amid the great Persian Gulf airspace crisis.

In the heat that blankets southern Sri Lanka, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA)—just 18 kilometers from the Port of Hambantota—stands like a stage set waiting for its cast: the lights are rigged, the curtain is drawn, the runway gleams, and the terminal is immaculate. Yet the performance never begins. Built at a cost of over $200 million, designed to handle one million passengers a year, equipped with a 3,500-meter runway capable of accommodating an Airbus A380, twelve check-in counters, and two jet bridges—on paper, MRIA is an airport engineered for the future. In practice, starved of commercial traffic, it has earned an unflattering international reputation as “the world’s emptiest airport” and, more bluntly, a ghost airport.

My sense of this place, however, doesn’t come from headlines. It comes from the drives, the interviews, and the particular quality of silence I’ve encountered on every visit.
Peacocks, Hitchhiking Ground Crew, and a 100-Rupee Admission Ticket

The highway leading to MRIA is well-maintained, but as you draw closer, nothing about the surroundings suggests an international transit hub. The road is flanked by open scrubland and low vegetation; elephants and peacocks drift through the margins; the traffic thins to almost nothing, and you find yourself instinctively lowering your voice. The airport’s modern shell is entirely severed from the life around it.

After wrapping up an interview one afternoon, I gave a lift to a ground crew member who had just finished escorting foreign visitors through the terminal. He had been standing at the roadside for nearly two hours waiting for the bus back to Hambantota Town. He told me he leaves home before 4 a.m. every morning and rarely returns before 8 p.m. The chasm between the grandeur of the infrastructure and the grinding reality of daily commuting is, in its way, the truest portrait of MRIA.

On my 2017 visit, the departures board in the main hall still showed a flight to Dubai—a flicker of purpose. By 2019, those occasional updates had gone dark entirely. Entering the terminal required purchasing a 100-rupee ticket, as if it were a heritage site; apart from staff, the only visitors were locals curious to have a look around. The building was polished and pristine, less an airport than an exhibit about an airport.

A Cathedral of Infrastructure: The grand entrance of MRIA. Under the “Departures” sign, only a statue of Buddha keeps watch. In stable times, this is “isolated modernity”; in crisis, it is priceless redundant capacity.photo by Author

From Stranded Infrastructure to “Break-Even Fuel Stop”

And yet, something was always happening at MRIA—just not what its architects had imagined.


In 2018, I covered the landing of the world’s largest cargo aircraft, the Antonov An-225 Mriya, at MRIA. That singular machine was destroyed in the opening days of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. My photographs, taken without any awareness of what was coming, turned out to be among its last records at an Indian Ocean airport.

Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines had long considered MRIA an essential staging post for its heavy-lift fleet across the region. Scrolling through photos from 2019, I find the An-124 Ruslan—registration UR-82008—parked quietly on the apron. As the heaviest operational production cargo aircraft ever built, the Ruslan flew roughly four sorties a month through MRIA, stopping to refuel and rotate crews while carrying precision cargo: generators, satellite components, industrial machinery. When that machine thunders down the runway, the 3,500-meter strip stops looking like overkill and starts looking like the point.



Empty counters but staff work. Photo Credit: Tang Lu


Evidence of Capacity

MRIA’s strategic location has also made it a pressure valve for Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) in Colombo during crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic it served as a critical transit node. In the years that followed, Russia’s Red Wings and Ukraine’s SkyUp launched seasonal charter operations, drawn by MRIA’s off-the-beaten-path incentives: full departure-tax exemption, low apron fees, and aviation fuel piped directly from Hambantota Port.

Between 2020 and March 2026, more than 195,000 passengers arrived on 502 Red Wings flights; SkyUp completed its final flight of that season to Moldova on March 11.

On the question of profit and loss, there is a Rashomon quality to the accounts. The Colombo government’s official gazette classifies MRIA as a loss-making project, weighed down by debt service. But the ground crew members who hitch rides home with me run a different set of numbers: the cash generated by refueling heavy wide-body aircraft and charging apron fees alone, they insist, covers day-to-day operating costs. This “operational self-sufficiency,” tenuous as it may be, is the quiet heartbeat keeping MRIA alive.

A Lifeline for 70% of the Gulf Network


The inflection point came in 2025. According to Sri Lankan state media, several international carriers were already operating scheduled services connecting MRIA with Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Annual passenger throughput reached a record 140,614, with 703 international flight movements. A project long derided as a white elephant finally produced numbers worth putting in an annual report.

The government moved quickly to formalize a “Revitalize MRIA” roadmap: fiscal incentives, public-private partnerships (PPPs), and a program to position the airport as both an aviation hub and a southern tourism gateway. The proposal list included duty-free zones, transit hotels, expanded cargo facilities, and non-aviation land development—solar energy among them. None of it is particularly romantic, but all of it reflects a government that has begun to view MRIA through a commercial lens rather than a purely ceremonial one.

Then, in March 2026, the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran. The resulting pressure on Persian Gulf airspace—diversions, cancellations, cascading delays—propelled MRIA toward a far more dramatic reckoning. The hub-and-spoke architecture of the Gulf mega-carriers is extraordinarily efficient in peacetime and extraordinarily fragile in a crisis. Quantitative assessments are unsparing: roughly 70% of the operational lifeline of the Gulf aviation giants runs through Persian Gulf airspace. Sever those corridors, and an “offshore fuel depot” like MRIA—with its long runway, secure fuel supply, and distance from any active theater—stops being an option and becomes the last link preventing network collapse.

The Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL) moved to extend formal invitations to Emirates and Qatar Airways, positioning MRIA as a contingency hub: emergency landings, refueling and technical stops, and potentially the absorption of some transfer traffic. Sri Lanka’s overtures reached as far as Singapore, Thailand, and India, pitching MRIA as a “zero-risk node” in the wartime flight map—an island of reliability in a disrupted region.

The narrative reversal is almost too clean to be real. What was once dismissed as “deserted” is now reframed as “available capacity”; what was awkward emptiness has become “immediate-access readiness.”

Geopolitical Black Hole


Behind that readiness lies a colder game. MRIA’s isolation makes it a natural information vacuum—useful for missions that do not invite scrutiny. The remains of sailors from an Iranian warship sunk in Sri Lankan waters were quietly repatriated via this remote runway. During the cyclone emergency in December 2025, U.S. Air Force C-130J Super Hercules transports made repeated landings here.

This delicate balance came to a head during the parliamentary session of March 20, 2026. In his address, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (commonly referred to as AKD) confirmed that as recently as February 26—when signs of escalating Middle East tensions were already unmistakable—the United States had formally requested clearance for two combat aircraft to land at MRIA. Sri Lanka declined, in accordance with its long-standing doctrine of non-alignment. The message was deliberate: MRIA could serve as a humanitarian lifeline or a shelter for commercial aviation; it would not become a forward operating base for any great power. When sensitive supply runs and a formal military rejection converge on the same tarmac, MRIA’s emptiness begins to look less like neglect and more like a calculated strategic posture.

Opportunities and Costs

The opportunity is real. A secondary hub functions simultaneously as a tool of aviation diplomacy and an engine of economic recovery. If MRIA can absorb technical stops, refueling operations, and temporary diversionary traffic, the direct revenue—landing fees, apron charges, fuel uplift, ground handling—would be substantial, with indirect spillover into hotels, ground transport, and hospitality across the Hambantota region. More consequentially, it could reshape how airlines perceive southern Sri Lanka: not as a beach requiring a four-hour drive from Colombo, but as a direct-access aviation gateway.

The challenges are systemic. MRIA’s difficulties are not simply a function of route scarcity—they reflect deep infrastructure deficits across baggage handling, aircraft maintenance, and fuel logistics. Aviation journalist Andreas Spaeth, who has written critically on MRIA’s structural limitations, cuts directly to the logistical nerve: MRIA’s aviation fuel supply still depends on 33,000-liter road tankers making continuous highway runs from Hambantota. A planned 32-kilometer fuel pipeline connecting the port to the airport exists, for now, only on paper. Whether a road-based fuel delivery model can sustain genuine hub operations is a serious and unresolved question.


The competitive pressure is growing. Contingency hubs are a scarce resource in a crisis, and India, the Maldives, and Singapore may simultaneously court the same Gulf carriers. Industry voices in the Maldives have already called on their government to ensure Sri Lanka does not monopolize what one commentator termed “the dividend of uncertainty.” That kind of regional envy, however reluctantly expressed, is the most honest endorsement of MRIA’s strategic value.

And the longer question remains: if the conflict cools and airspace reopens, will airlines simply return to their legacy hubs? Can the Sri Lankan government’s current investments generate durable structural benefits, or will the boom prove to be a temporary surge of crisis-driven relevance? These are harder questions than the ones being asked today, and they deserve continued scrutiny.

When the Crisis Passes?

Beyond the immediate tactical pivot, there is a quieter, more domestic shift at play. The move to revive MRIA under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) reflects a departure from the self-defeating political cycles of the past. For over a decade, the airport was a prisoner of its own origin story—a legacy project of the Rajapaksa family that subsequent administrations often chose to neglect or even discredit to score domestic points. Even when the Rajapaksas returned to power in 2019, they found themselves trapped by a “ghost airport” narrative they could no longer outrun, eventually locked down by the pandemic and the subsequent economic collapse.

Moreover, the management of MRIA has long been a geopolitical chessboard for major powers with vested interests in the Indian Ocean. For years, the facility was caught in a cycle of “defensive positioning” and silent diplomatic friction, where agreements were signed and then discarded as the airport became a landscape of shifting international allegiances. By decoupling the facility from its dynastic shadow and pursuing a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, the AKD administration is offering MRIA a clean slate—treating it, perhaps for the first time, as a strategic asset rather than a political verdict. Yet, in a land where policy can be as volatile as the monsoon winds, the question remains: can MRIA find a stable pilot before the next political shift?

Perhaps it is premature—and a little too convenient—to cast MRIA as a comeback story. It is better understood as a mirror: one that reflects the two fates of large-scale infrastructure in the age of globalization. In stable times, the logic of efficiency concentrates traffic into a handful of dominant hubs. In crisis, redundant capacity suddenly becomes irreplaceable.

I am writing about MRIA again at this juncture not to rehabilitate its reputation, but to ask a harder question: if an airport must depend on an external catastrophe to be noticed, what survives once the catastrophe passes? For MRIA to become a genuine hub rather than a recurring footnote in crisis journalism, it needs more than a surge in flight movements. It needs to translate “isolated modernity” into “sustainable connectivity”—and that transformation is precisely the most difficult, and the most worth watching, thing happening here.



Staff seek devine blessings. Photo Credit: Tang Lu

Tang Lu
Ms. Tang Lu has served in India, Sri Lanka and Maldives as a journalist for many years
Trump Is Caught In A Cleft Stick With Iran And Israel Playing A Zero-Sum Game – Analysis


March 24, 2026 
By P. K. Balachandran


Faced with a major global economic crisis due to the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz, muted support among allies in Europe, and mounting opposition at home, US President Donald Trump is desperately seeking an end to the war with Iran.

But he is not a free man to conjure up a solution and implement it the way he wants. He needs to meet the onerous demands of an increasingly belligerent Iran that is beefed up by the excellent showing of its offensive and defensive abilities since the war began weeks ago. In addition, Trump has to deal with a stubbornly aggressive and petulant Israel, which is not only hung up on its maximalist demands but has the backing of the American power elite. The two sides cannot be reconciled because they are playing a zero-sum game in which the winner takes all.

Despite the constraints, Trump scrambled to address the mounting global economic issue. He first dropped the sanctions on Russian oil and then on Iranian oil. But it is argued by some that while these steps will bring relief across the world on the energy question, they will also channel revenue directly into the Iranian and Russian war chests.

Trump’s Claims About a Deal

Be that as it may, Trump claimed on Monday that his team of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner had “very good and productive conversations” with Iran and that the talks would continue throughout this week.

“We have had very, very strong talks. We’ll see where they lead. We have major points of agreement. They went, I would say, perfectly. I would say that if they carry through with that, it’ll end that problem, that conflict,” he told reporters.

The aim of the talks was to see that Iran “has no nuclear bomb, no nuclear weapon, not even close to it,” he added.

Who are the Iranian Interlocutors?

While revealing that Witkoff and Kushner were talking on behalf of the US, Trump did not reveal who on the Iran side they were talking to. Trump ruled out talks with the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei but added, ” We’re dealing with the man who, I believe, is the most respected and the leader.”

Two names mentioned in this connection are President Masoud Pezeshkian and Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Both have been with the powerful Revolutionary Guards – the Iranian army.

Iran Denies Talks

However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry rejected Trump’s claim on talks. It said, “The U.S. president’s statements are within the framework of efforts to reduce energy prices and gain time to implement his military plans.” The Ministry, nevertheless, said that there are initiatives by regional countries to de-escalate tensions.

The known Iranian conditions for talks are – the US and Israel cease their attacks before the start of negotiations; the US should commit to never attacking Iran again and agree to pay Iran compensation for war-related damages and loss of life. It has also demanded that the US bases in the Gulf should be dismantled.

Nevertheless, as part of his efforts to make a deal, Trump told the US military to postpone strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure for five days, subject to the success of the on-going discussions. Earlier, on Saturday, Trump had issued a 48-hour warning to Tehran to open the Strait of Hormuz or face strikes on its power plants. Sure enough, Trump’s announcements sent markets up and energy prices diving.

Israel’s Stance Unclear

Like Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also blowing hot and cold. Netanyahu said he had spoken to Trump and sounded ready for a deal.

“President Trump believes there is an opportunity to leverage the tremendous achievements we have reached alongside the US military to realise the goals of the war through an agreement, an agreement that will safeguard our vital interests.”

And again, like Trump, he did not spell out the nature of the deal. Nevertheless, Netanyahu made it clear that Israel would continue to strike at Iran and Lebanon. “We will safeguard our vital interests under all circumstances,” he stressed.

Israeli officials have assessed that leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran may be amenable to a deal. Additionally, Israeli officials do not expect to be blindsided by any US-Iran agreement. If a deal is reached, it will align with Israel’s core war objectives.

According to the Israeli Channel 12, Israel is now working to ensure that the terms of a potential agreement will meet its demands, prioritising an end to Iran’s nuclear program and strict limits on uranium enrichment. Regime change is viewed as a less central goal. Netanyahu is expected to be involved in shaping any final agreement to end this round of fighting.

Israel’s Doubts

At the same time, Israeli sources cautioned that even if a deal was reached, Iran might not honour it. Trump suggested earlier that perhaps the Strait of Hormuz could be “jointly controlled” by the US and Iran when it finally reopens. But neither Iran nor Israel would accept it. Both Iran and Israel are playing a zero-sum game, where the winner takes all.

Channel 12 further claimed that Iran may be willing to halt its ballistic missile program for five years, “reduce” its uranium enrichment, and enter discussions over its stockpile of 60 per cent enriched uranium. Iran could also agree to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of remaining centrifuges and to stop funding regional proxy groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iraqi militias.

But Iran which is fighting tooth and nail for its sovereignty and its very existence, is most unlikely to accept a capitulation of this kind.

Uranium Stockpile

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz is an important global goal. But the fate of Iran’s nuclear program and the estimated 440 kg of highly enriched uranium is critically important for all three belligerents- Iran, US an Israel. The uranium is believed to be buried in canisters deep underneath the ground.

It cannot be done away with unless there is a land invasion – a very costly proposition in terms of human lives and equipment. Trump has been talking about a land invasion but his advisors may be cautioning him on this.

Several Leaders working for Truce and Talks

Because of the grim scenario, several leaders in West Asia and Europe are working for a negotiated settlement. The Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi wrote on X, that his government is working intensively to put in place safe passage arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz. And British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said, “We are working with others to see how we can develop that to a point of de-escalation. It’s very important that we get to that.”

He was reacting to the Goldman Sachs warning that Brent prices could exceed their record 2008 level — US $147 per barrel — if oil does not resume flowing through the strait within 10 weeks.

Noting that India has always raised its voice for peace in the interest of humanity, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “The crisis to anyone’s life in this war is not in the interest of humanity, India’s effort is to encourage all parties to swiftly pursue a peaceful resolution.”


However, there is no sign that India is making any efforts to join or craft an international anti-war coalition. It is just a worried bystander hoping that Iran will be considerate to its shipping.

Meanwhile, the Qatari daily “The Peninsula” reported that the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani, received a phone call from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkiye, Hakan Fidan. The two sides also discussed joint efforts aimed at resolving disputes through peaceful means.

The Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan Al-Thani, received a phone call from the Minister of Defence of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Ali Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, to discuss cooperation to end the war. There were calls from the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Egypt, and Indonesia.

Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani received a call from Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. They discussed ways to resolve all disputes peacefully. All the dignitaries condemned the Iranian missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructures.


P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.

Monday, March 23, 2026

Geopolitical Turbulence In India’s North-East – Analysis

Burma  (Myanmar) on the left and India on the right bank of Tio River. Rihkhawdar is the busy trading broader town on the Chin State of Burma side and Zokhawdar on Mizoram State of India side. 

Photo Credit: Ericwinny, Wikipedia Commons

By P. K. Balachandran

India’s North-Eastern State of Mizoram and the Chin State of Northern Myanmar have a history of tribal unrest, armed rebellion, and secessionism. While the Mizo insurgency was curbed due to New Delhi’s decision to give the Mizos autonomy within the Indian Union, the Chin insurgency continues in Myanmar because Yangon’s reluctance to address the Chin’s grievances and give them a measure of autonomy.

Although the Mizos are well-integrated in India, with many of them holding high positions in the government due to their proficiency in English, there is a complication when it comes to their relations with the Chin, who live across the border with Myanmar. They are kindred tribes, sharing a language and culture. It is the British rulers who had divided them by drawing a line separating “India” and “Burma” (now Myanmar). Since the Chin are fighting the Myanmar junta with arms, they get help from the Mizo on the Indian side. People, insurgents, drugs and arms infiltrate from both sides despite the mountainous and forested terrain.

When waters are troubled anywhere, interested parties, including foreign countries, intelligence agencies, arms and drug smugglers, come to fish in them. The Mizo-Chin area is no exception. Currently, the game features Americans and Ukrainians. Their aim appears to be to help the Chin against the military junta in Myanmar, which is backed by China and Russia.

India is neutral in the fights in Myanmar, but does nothing to curb the anti-insurgency measures of the junta in Yangon. It is in India’s interest to see this area is pacified.

The foreign element in the recent imbroglio became public in March when a US citizen and six Ukrainians were arrested by the Indian National Investigation Agency (NIA) for illegally crossing into Myanmar via Mizoram, apparently to train armed ethnic groups in weapons handling and drone warfare methods.


This group had been under watch for the past several months. The accused have been identified as US national Matthew Aaron Van Dyke; and Ukrainians Hurba Petro, Slyviak Taras, Ivan Sukmanovskyi, Stefankiv Marian, Honcharuk Maksim, and Kaminskyi Viktor. They were reportedly arrested from Delhi, Lucknow and Kolkata airports in the night of March 13.

Van Dyke is “media personality” based in Ukraine. He has not hidden that simultaneously, he runs covert operations in various countries to effect regime change. In one of his posts, he said, “To the leaders of Venezuela, Burma (Myanmar), Iran and other authoritarian regimes, we are coming for you. Russia, we are coming for you as well.”

While the US embassy in Delhi would not comment on it, the Ukrainian government said the Ukrainians were innocent and demanded consular access. It also blamed the Russians for the plot to arrest them.

The foreigners were arrested for going in and out of “No Go” areas such as Mozoram with the Protected Area Permit (PAP). But the Ukrainian MFA said that it might have been an “unintentional violation”. The accuse were sent on custody till March 27, booked under Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.


In December 2024, the Indian Home Ministry had alerted the North Eastern States of Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland to keep a close watch on foreigners visiting the States.

Interestingly, in March 2025, Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma had told the State Assembly: “We have specific intelligence that the Ukraine war veterans travelled to Myanmar’s Chin State via Mizoram to train rebel outfits fighting the military junta. Though the State had registered close to 2,000 visitors from Western countries between June and December 2024, barely a few foreign tourists were seen in Aizawl,” raising the suspicion that they had disappeared into prohibited areas.
Peter Thang

A report in “The Quint” by V.K. Shashikumar referred to a key figure in the Chin movement, Peter Thang is the vice-president of the Chin National Defence Force (CNDF), the armed wing of the Chin National Organisation (CNO), established in 2021 in Chin State, in Myanmar.

Before the 2021 coup staged by the Myanmar junta, Thang ran a travel agency in Yangon. Now, he runs CNDF’s drug-trafficking operations and is the chief arms procurer who also organised the drone smuggling operation in which VanDyke and the six Ukrainians were involved.

Both CNDF and CNA operate under the umbrella of the Chin Brotherhood. American missionary networks support them. However, the armed struggle is financed primarily through narcotics.
American Connection

Matthew VanDyke, the US national, was born in Baltimore, holds a Master’s in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a second Master’s in War Studies from King’s College London. He is the founder of Sons of Liberty International (SOLI), a 501(c)(3) non-profit security contracting firm whose stated mission is to provide military training to forces fighting authoritarian regimes.


VanDyke fought in Libya’s 2011 civil war, spent six months as a prisoner of war in Muammar Gaddafi’s prisons, filmed an award-winning documentary in Syria, and founded SOLI after ISIS (Islamic State) beheaded his journalist friends James Foley and Steven Sotloff. Van Dyke trained Iraqi Christians to fight ISIS, and Ukrainian civilians against Russia from 2022 onwards. His operational footprint spans Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Philippines, Venezuela, and now Myanmar.

NIA officials have told the court that their teams had been tracking the suspects in the northeast for several months before the coordinated arrests. Investigators believe the group had been making repeated trips since 2024. Eight more Ukrainian nationals, part of a larger group of 14 who entered India on tourist visas, remain untraceable.

VanDyke’s interrogation revealed that on February 12 and 20, 2026, the KIA and allied People’s Defence Forces (PDF) used suicide drones to attack Myitkyina airport. A passenger plane at the airport was reportedly damaged.

Fighting was also intense in Kachin State in January this year, with junta air strikes in Bhamo Township and clashes in Hpakant. Myitkyina airport was officially shut down on February 26.

Sources said that VanDyke admitted during interrogation that he had supplied several drones in knock-down condition — transported in dismantled parts rather than as fully assembled units – to the KIA and the PDF to supplement and augment the rebels’ military hardware stock.
Russian Tipoff

Multiple sources told “The Quint” that Russian intelligence had tipped off India. Russia and China are the Myanmar junta’s principal external patrons: Russia supplies helicopters, fighter jets, armoured vehicles, and artillery; China provides military equipment and exercises leverage through its influence over ethnic armed groups along the China-Myanmar border, such as the Wa.

According to Shashikumar, British national Daniel Newey was arrested at Aizawl airport on 19 June 2024 with ammunition while returning from Chin rebel areas. Belgian national Simon Clemente was arrested at Aizawl airport in March 2025, again with ammunition.
Bangladesh Angle

It may be recalled that before the January 2024 Bangladesh elections, the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had warned—without naming anyone—that a “White man” had proposed helping her return to power if she allowed foreign forces to establish bases in Bangladesh as in St. Martin’s Island.

She also expressed concern about a possible conspiracy to create a separate Christian state involving parts of Chattogram and Myanmar. India’s North Eastern States barring Assam, Manipur and Tripura, have a Christian majority. These States could be made part of the proposed Christian State. “India Today” drew a comparison with East Timor’s separation from Indonesia.

Humanitarian Corridor

During the Interim Government period , the US wanted to create a “Humanitarian Corridor” between Myanmar and Bangladesh to help the flow of humanitarian aid to the persecuted Rohingya Muslims living in Rakhine State in Myanmar and the Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh. That move was backed by the pro-US Chief Advisor Dr. Muhammad Yunus, but the Bangladesh media and the army Chief Gen. Waker-uz-Zaman shot it down on the grounds that it would facilitate Rohingya as well as foreign infiltration.

P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.

Sunday, March 22, 2026

Trump and Hegseth: Two Souless Men Incapable of Remorse or Even Pity


After blowing up an elementary school killing over 160 girls, sinking an unarmed Iranian frigate, and then abandoning the crew to drown, all the US can do is deny responsibility.



Some of the crew of the sunken Dena being prepared in Iran for a mass public funeral. (Iran government photo)

Right at the launching of the US and Israeli war on Iran, itself a major war crime, the US fired a precision strike with a Tomahawk missile on an elementary school building. Some 160 girls aged 7-12 were killed, either by the powerful blast or by the collapse of the two story concrete structure. Asked about the tragedy and slaughter of innocents, Commander-in-Chief Trump, after initially pleading innocence. He later suggested it was the Iranians, whose missiles he claimed “are often inaccurate.”

When later videos appeared showing the distinct image of a Tomahawk missile striking, he slithered over to another lie, calling the Tomahawk a “generic missile that many countries have bought and can buy.”

The truth? The Tomahawk is a US missile made in the US and is strictly controlled, and offered only to a few trusted allies like Britain and Australia.

Hegseth avoided Trump’s brazen lying by saying, “The Pentagon is investigating,” even as investigators said the gruesome slaughter was looking increasingly likely to have been the US’s fault. When that investigation finally concluded definitively that Pentagon targeters had been using eight-year-old maps that allegedly identified the building as an office for the Revolutionary Guard, though — whether true or not — neither “no mercy” Hegseth nor “no truth” Trump could not find it in themselves to express remorse or regret about the “mistake. ” Three weeks later they still have not.

We saw the same callousness from both men in the case of he sinking of a Iranian Navy frigate by two huge torpedoes fired at the vessel off the southern tip of the island nation of Sri Lanka. As I wrote in an article on March 7, the Dena was in an unusual situation: It was invited to participate in the MILAN Fleet Review, an annual event that brings together naval vessels, crews and officers of the navies of dozens of countries (this year there were 74 participating countries including Iran and the US. At the time the Dena set sail for and participated in joint exercises with vessels of other countries at the event the two nations were not fighting each other. In fact, the US, which did not send a ship to the event, but did send an admiral, as wall as a P-81 Poseidon, a sophisticated sea patrol aircraft equipped to spot and track vessels including submarines over wide areas of ocean. That aircraft actually conducted an exercise with the Dena, a ship that it almost certainly already was tasked to sink once the US and Israel concluded their all-out war on Iran, no doubt picking up all kinds of useful knowledge about the Iranian ship’s capabilities, its radar and communications systems, etc.

Once the Fleet Review event had ended and the US-Israel assault on Iran had been launched, the Poseidon followed and tracked the Dena as it sailed towards a planned stop at a port at the southern end of Sri Lanka where, unknown to the Dena, a US nuclear fast attack sub, the Charlotte was waiting, submerged, with two huge torpedoes ready to sink the ship

The attack came without warning at 5:08 am on May 4. No effort was made by the sub to notify the ship that it was a bout to be blown up, which the US sub could easily done at a safe distance.

To make matters worse, after sinking the ship in two minutes with two torpedo hits the US sb left the scene of the attack. 87 sailers died in the attack, some certainly from the huge blasts ,and some no doubt of drowning while waiting two hours without flotation in the open ocean for rescue ships of the Sri Lankan Navy, moored 20 miles away, to arrive. Only 32 of the crew survived the attack, with over a dozen missing and presumed dead. The attack has been criticized a “treacherous act,” given that the Dena was not in a war zone, had gone to an India-hosted event dedicated to “peace and friendship,” was likely not armed or only lightly armed because of an Indian stipulation that participating ships be unarmed, and because in any event there was no way the ship could have joined the battle with Iran’s military in the Persian Gulf, where US and Israeli air forces have total control of the air over Iran and the waters around it. The Dena would have had no choice but to remain in a safe harbor until that war ended (whenever that is!).

All Americans heard about this incident in their news reports on the Dena’s destruction was Hegseth’s ugly boast: “This was never meant to be a fair fight, and it’s not a fair fight…We are punching them while they’re down, and that’s exactly how it should be.”

Except that abandoning injured enemy soldiers or sailors to die after a battle is over is a war crime.

It will be interesting to see what awards get handed by out to the officers and crew of the Charlotte for this “heroic” naval engagement.

Dave Lindorff has written for the NY Times, Nation, FAIR, Salon, London Review of Books and Rolling Stone. Dave cofounded the LA Vanguard, ran the LA Daily News county bureau and was a BusinessWeek Asia correspondent. He currently writes a Substack: ThisCantBeHappening!Read other articles by Dave.
Sri Lanka And India Dodge US Dragnet With Mix Of Firmness And Tact – Analysis


Sri Lanka's President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 
Photo Credit: PM India Office


March 22, 2026 
By P. K. Balachandran


With a mix of tact and firmness, Sri Lanka and India recently dodged US attempts to drag them into the ongoing US-Iran war. Both countries refused to bow to America’s demand that the stranded Iranian naval vessels and their crew, currently under their care, should not be repatriated to Iran.

Sri Lanka also denied permission to the US to land two of its armed military aircraft to land at Mattala airport in South Sri Lanka.

By doing so, they had escaped, by the skin of their teeth, an American plan to drag them into its war with Iran. America is lacking in allies as its only supporter is Israel, which is also a combatant in the Iran war. Europe and NATO have been dilly-dallying. They are now being subjected to Trump’s threat to abandon them in their hour of need. The Gulf and Arab States have been of no active help, but they allow the US to use its bases among them.

The US not only needs active allies but also strategic depth, in case the theatre of operations has to be expanded to the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific. The need for such an extension was evident when Iran fired missiles into the US air base in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean near the Maldives. In case the US needs to act in the Indian Ocean, east of Diego Garcia, it will need facilities if not bases in Sri Lanka and India. The Maldives will not be suitable because it is a 100% Muslim country with close ties with the Islamic world.

Some strategic thinkers suspect that the torpedoing of the Iranian vessel IRS Dena off Galle, south of Sri Lanka, was deliberate and meant to signal to Sri Lanka and India (the net security provider for the region) the US is supreme, can do what it likes and countries in the will be well advised to cooperate with the US, including bases and facilities the US may seek.

US-Sri Lanka Agreements

The US already has agreements with Sri Lanka and India covering US warships.

The US-Sri Lanka Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was first signed in 2007 and renewed/expanded in 2017. This agreement facilitates reciprocal provision of logistics support, supplies, and services (e.g., refuelling, maintenance) between the militaries only during exercises, humanitarian operations, or peacekeeping.

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has a more complex history. An earlier version dates back to 1995, but a proposed expanded or updated SOFA (draft sent by the U.S. in 2018) faced significant opposition in Sri Lanka over fears it would grant broad legal immunities to US personnel, access rights, and potential impacts on sovereignty. It was never signed.

Recent developments focus on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in November 2025 under Sri Lanka’s current NPP government (led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake). This MOU formalises a defence partnership under the US Department of Defence’s State Partnership Program (SPP), linking Sri Lanka’s armed forces with the Montana National Guard and US Coast Guard District 13. It covers “non-binding” cooperation in areas like joint training, maritime domain awareness, disaster response, humanitarian assistance, aviation/maritime operations, and professional military education.
US-India Agreements

As for India, a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) was signed with the US in 2016. It is the primary framework governing logistical support for US warships (and other military assets) in Indian ports. This agreement is a tailored version of the US’s standard Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), adapted to India’s sensitivities on sovereignty and non-alignment.

LEMOA enables reciprocal, case-by-case provision of logistics support, including refuelling, supplies, repair and maintenance, port services, billeting, transportation, spare parts, medical services, and other essentials. But support is strictly limited to predefined activities, such as joint exercises, training, port calls, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief.

There is no automatic right of access—each request requires mutual consent and is evaluated individually by the Indian government.

LEMOA does not permit permanent basing, establishment of US military bases on Indian soil, or use for combat operations without explicit Indian approval. It preserves India’s strategic autonomy, with no obligation for India to provide support in conflicts or alliances.

Overall, facilities for US warships remain limited to logistical and exercise-related support under LEMOA—no basing rights, no routine combat staging, and full Indian oversight. This aligns with India’s multi-alignment policy.
Lankan President’s Tact

Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake told parliament on Friday that Sri Lanka refused to allow US war planes to land at the Mattala airport in South Sri Lanka on March 4 and 8. Colombo also rejected a US demand that the Iranian ship IRS Bushehr and the crew in its care should not be repatriated to Iran. Sri Lanka has told the US that it plans to repatriate them to Iran, but only after the US-Iran conflict ends.


“We want to maintain our neutrality despite many pressures. We won’t give in. The Middle East war poses challenges to us, but we will do everything possible to remain neutral. They (the US) wanted to bring in two warplanes armed with eight anti-ship missiles from their base in Djibouti to the Mattala International Airport and we said no,” the Sri Lankan President said.
Meeting With Sergio Gor

Dissanayake’s statement came a day after his meeting with the US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor. Gor and Dissanayake discussed US efforts to safeguard vital sea lanes and ports, reinforce mutually beneficial trade and commercial ties, and advance a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, a US State Department statement said.

Following the torpedoing of IRIS Dena and the shelter given to IRIS Bushehr, a total of 204 of the sailors are now accommodated at the Sri Lanka naval facility near Colombo. The US had pressed Sri Lanka not to repatriate the men and the vessel Bushehr to Iran. The US State Department said that the Sri Lankan authorities should minimise Iranian attempts to use the detainees for propaganda.

But the Sri Lankan President negatived the request saying that his country had a “humanitarian responsibility” to shelter the crew.
Dissanayake’s firmness made the US back off. As regards India, deft diplomacy by External Affairs Minister S.Jaishankar prevented the US from exploiting Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Israeli Knesset in which he pledged India’s support to Israel “now and beyond”. The dithering US-Israeli military action against Iran, Iran’s successfully blocking the Strait of Hormuz and the energy crisis the blockage created, softened the US stand on the Iranian vessels in India.

India on its part, gave up its standoffish attitude to the war and held out a hand of friendship to Iran. Prime Minister Modi talked to the Iranian President and told him that India is a friend of Iran. Iran, which has had a very close relationship with India, responded quickly and meaningfully by permitting three Indian tankers to pass the Strait of Hormuz. India had been buying Iranian oil and was building a port at Chabahar before the war began.

But Jaishankar said that Iran will be giving permission to vessels only on a case-by-case basis. About 22 Indian vessels are awaiting.



P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.

 The War Against Iran: Does It Mark The Beginning Of A New Middle East? – Analysis




March 22, 2026
By Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

Introduction

On February 28, 2026, in a joint military operation, the United States and Israel bombed several major cities in Iran. The Israeli operation was named “Roaring Lion,” and the American one, “Epic Fury.” Iran retaliated the same day with Operation Honest Promise 4. Within hours, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attack. For the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, an open and direct war broke out between Israel, the United States, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Middle East, already weakened by years of accumulated tensions, entered a new era whose contours remained uncertain.

This war did not arise from nothing. It is part of a long sequence of escalation that began with the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, continued with the exchanges of airstrikes in 2024, culminated in the Twelve Day War between Israel and then the United States against Iran from June 13 to 24, 2025, and in the American operation “Midnight Hammer” targeting the Iranian nuclear sites of Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Each stage has altered the balance of power, undermined mechanisms of restraint, and reduced diplomatic space to the point that direct confrontation has become inevitable in the eyes of the belligerents.

The question posed by this essay concerns the historical and geopolitical significance of this conflict: does the war against Iran mark the beginning of a new Middle East? The central hypothesis is that this conflict represents a triple rupture—strategic, political, and normative—the effects of which will permanently reshape the regional order. To answer this question, this essay will first analyze the dynamics that led to the war (I), before examining the ongoing transformations within the region (II), then considering the implications for the international order and the uncertainties surrounding the future (III), before updating the analysis in light of the first nineteen days of the conflict (IV and V).

1. From the “Regional Cold War” to Open Confrontation: The Drivers of a Shift

1.1 A Forty-Five-Year-Old Structural Hostility

The Iranian-Israeli antagonism is not a product of recent circumstances. Since seizing power, the rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran have called for the destruction of the State of Israel. From the very first days of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Khomeini referred to Israel as the “little Satan,” a “cancerous tumor” that must be “wiped off the map.” This hostility was long expressed indirectly, through Iranian support for non-state actors—Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Yemeni Houthis—forming what Iranian doctrine calls the “axis of resistance.” This proxy architecture allowed Tehran to project its power without exposing itself to a direct response, and Israel to inflict blows without triggering a full-scale war.


Iran seeks to expand its political and military influence in the region, while Israel attempts to limit this influence, particularly in the face of Iran’s nuclear program, which it considers a major threat. Thus, even without direct war for a long time, the two states have clashed through allies, clandestine operations, and diplomatic tensions. Since the 2000s, Israel has waged a shadow war against this program — assassinations of scientists, cyberattacks (the Stuxnet virus in 2010), sabotage — while the United States alternated between economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiations, notably the 2015 Vienna agreement (JCPOA), from which the American withdrawal in 2018 under Trump had led Tehran to accelerate its uranium enrichment.

1.2 The Escalation 2023–2025: The Stages of a Flare-Up

The Gaza War of October 2023 was the triggering turning point. By radically undermining Israel’s deterrent posture, Hamas’s attacks forced Israel to respond with considerable force, leading to an unprecedented regional mobilization. Hezbollah opened a “northern front,” Iran increased its arms deliveries to its proxies, and the Houthis disrupted shipping in the Red Sea. In April 2024, Iran launched its first direct strike on Israeli territory, followed by a measured Israeli response. These exchanges broke a taboo: direct confrontation became conceivable.


On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a surprise attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, targeting key sites of the Iranian nuclear program and their scientists, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iranian air defenses, and energy infrastructure. On the night of June 21-22, 2025, the US Air Force and US Navy launched Operation Midnight Hammer, using B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and Tomahawk missiles to strike Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. This Twelve-Day War ended without Iranian surrender, leaving Tehran humiliated but resilient, and the nuclear issue unresolved.

The winter of 2025-2026 was marked by a dual crisis in Iran: the economic collapse of the rial and a wave of nationwide anti-government protests that were brutally suppressed. On February 27, 2026, Donald Trump stated during a press briefing that the Islamic Republic had “killed at least 32,000 protesters.” It was in this context of internal weakening and indirect nuclear negotiations under Omani auspices—which the Omani mediator present in Geneva described as close to an agreement, with Iran having finally accepted enormous concessions—that the strikes of February 28, 2026, were launched. This paradoxical timing fueled an intense debate about the true motivations behind the decision: was it strategic urgency or a political and electoral calculation, both in Washington and in Tel Aviv?

1.3 The Stated Objectives and Their Contradictions

On February 28, after weeks of negotiations between Washington and Tehran under Omani auspices, the American and Israeli armed forces launched a massive strike campaign against Iran with the explicit aim of destroying its ballistic missile capabilities, annihilating the Iranian navy, preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, ensuring that the regime could not continue to arm, finance, or direct armed groups outside its borders, and bringing about its overthrow.

These objectives conceal deep internal tensions. Destroying the nuclear program is one thing—and even then, doubts remain about the capabilities still available in Iran’s underground arsenal. Overthrowing a 46-year-old regime that has developed structures of resistance, succession, and decentralized command is quite another. Iran responded to the attacks much more quickly than many observers expected, suggesting that a highly redundant continuity plan is indeed in place: multiple successions, pre-authorized strikes, and a decentralized chain of command in the event of the regime’s decapitation. The Assembly of Experts is meeting via videoconference to elect a new Supreme Leader, following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the strikes. The regime is not a man.

2. Ongoing Transformations: Towards a Recomposition of the Regional Order

2.1 The Destruction of the Iranian Proxy Architecture


The first structural transformation concerns the axis of resistance. Even before the 2026 strikes, this axis had suffered considerable losses. Israeli strikes against Hezbollah had already killed 850 people on Lebanese soil. Hamas had been decimated in Gaza. The Houthis appear to be respecting their May 6, 2025 peace agreement with the United States. If the destruction of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities and the navy is confirmed, Tehran would be deprived of its main regional bargaining chip: a credible armed threat.

This dismantling of Iran’s proxy strategy creates a vacuum that could either be filled by local actors seeking to break free from regional control or generate new dynamics of instability. In Lebanon, the question is whether Hezbollah can survive as a political and military force without its Iranian patron. In Iraq, Shiite militias will have to redefine their position between a weakened Tehran and Baghdad, which is concerned about its sovereignty. In Yemen, does the peace agreement with the Houthis signal a lasting normalization or simply a respite?

2.2 The Realignment of the Gulf Arab Powers

The geography of the conflict reveals a fracture within the Arab world. The Gulf monarchies—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain—find themselves in an uncomfortable position: their territories host American bases that have been targeted by Iranian missiles, involuntarily exposing them to war. Explosions were heard in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai, Kuwait City, and Manama. Many airspaces in the region were closed, leading to a series of flight cancellations to the Middle East. The US embassy in Riyadh was targeted by drones; explosions caused a major fire within the diplomatic compound, but no injuries were reported.

This paradox is forcing the Gulf monarchies to undertake a profound strategic reassessment. Saudi Arabia, which had begun a discreet normalization process with Iran under Chinese auspices in 2023, sees this effort rendered meaningless. The United Arab Emirates, which had developed substantial economic ties with Tehran despite political tensions, are facing unprecedented pressure. Ultimately, if the Iranian regime falters or transforms, these countries will have to decide what kind of Iran they want as a neighbor: a weakened and fragmented Iran could generate as much instability as a powerful and hostile one. The Israeli-Arab normalization process, initiated with the 2020 Abraham Accords, is also on hold. Arab public opinion, mobilized by images of Gaza and now of bombed Tehran, is a constraint for leaders who sought to separate the Palestinian issue from their strategic interests. The current conflict makes this separation politically untenable in the short term.

2.3 The Question of Iran’s Future


Khamenei’s death constitutes an unprecedented political earthquake since the 1979 revolution. For forty-six years, he embodied the regime’s transcendent legitimacy—the wilayat al-faqih, the tutelage of the jurist-theologian. A significant number of key figures in power have been eliminated, including the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ali Khamenei, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, the Minister of Defense, Aziz Nasirzadeh, and his successor, Majid Ebnelreza. Iranian media also reported the deaths of the Supreme Leader’s daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter.

The scenarios are numerous. The first is that of resistance: the regime survives, becomes more radicalized, and the war drags on indefinitely. The second scenario is fragmentation: the central state collapses, the Revolutionary Guards splinter, and Iran enters a period of chaos similar to that experienced by Iraq or Libya after foreign interventions. The third—the one Washington and Tel Aviv hope for—is an orderly transition to a more moderate regime. Ali Larijani, a close ally of Khamenei whom Donald Trump seems to have chosen to stabilize the regime, is presented as pragmatic and diplomatic, capable of ensuring continuity of power while offering assurances to the United States. However, the experience of forced regime changes since 2001 suggests extreme caution regarding this last scenario. Iranian civil society, which has been demonstrating en masse since December 2025, finds itself in a precarious position. For many Iranians, foreign bombings do not liberate—they humiliate. The convergence between internal opposition and external military pressure is not automatic: it can just as easily turn into defensive nationalism, as evidenced by the history of foreign interventions in the Middle East.

2.4 Israel: Military Victory, Strategic Uncertainty


For Israel, the neutralization of the Iranian nuclear program and the dismantling of the resistance axis represent considerable strategic gains, objectives pursued for decades. According to a poll by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 81% of the Israeli public supports the strikes against Iran, while 63% of respondents believe the campaign should continue until the regime falls.

But military victory does not resolve the fundamental political issues. The Palestinian question, far from being resolved by the destruction of Hamas and the weakening of Iran, would resurface in new forms. Israel’s international legitimacy, already severely damaged by the Gaza war, is once again being challenged by strikes that the United Nations and numerous states describe as violations of international law. The Israeli Prime Minister has every interest, for domestic political purposes, in prolonging the conflict as long as possible, with parliamentary elections approaching in October 2026.

3. Implications for the International Order

3.1 A Crisis of International Law and Multilateralism


Although the operation is supported by some regional allies, it has drawn condemnation from the United Nations and several states, which denounce it as a violation of international law and a destabilization of the Middle East. Legal criticisms have also emerged, deeming the strikes illegal under US domestic law and violations of Iranian sovereignty.

Europe is not entirely absent from the conflict. Several states have granted access to their bases for logistical or defensive support operations, particularly in the Gulf and Cyprus. Some governments, such as Spain, refuse any direct participation, while others, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, leave the door open to more active cooperation. The European Union has not activated its mutual military assistance clause. Giorgia Meloni’s statement—”this war is not ours”—aptly summarizes the predicament of allies caught between Atlantic solidarity and rejection of a conflict they did not want.

This normative crisis is all the more serious because, in a context of great power resurgence—where Russia is attacking Ukraine and China is projecting its power in the Indo-Pacific—the principles of sovereignty and non-aggression that underpin the UN order are being severely tested. The war against Iran reinforces the perception, particularly in the Global South, of a West with a flexible approach to international law.

3.2 Global Energy and Economic Stakes

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil production passes, has become a major point of contention. Iran is maintaining pressure in this strategic waterway and increasing its attacks against oil installations in the Gulf. The closure or partial blockade of the Strait would have immediate global economic consequences, with a surge in hydrocarbon prices that would primarily affect importing economies. Air travel disruptions are already significant: numerous regional airspaces have been closed, leading to a cascade of flight cancellations. Global supply chains, already weakened by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since 2023, are experiencing a further shockwave.

3.3 The Role of Non-Western Powers


In one year, Donald Trump ordered more airstrikes than Joe Biden did during his four years in office. The United States has bombed seven countries since Trump’s return to the White House—Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. This hyper-interventionist stance exposes Washington to increasing challenges to its legitimacy in the Global South.

China, which had carefully balanced its relations with Iran and its economic interests in the Gulf states, finds itself in a delicate position. Beijing condemns the strikes and calls for de-escalation, but its influence over the belligerents remains limited. Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, derives an indirect benefit from the American mobilization in the Middle East, which reduces Washington’s focus on Eastern Europe. These dynamics fuel the growing polarization between a Western bloc—whose legitimacy is increasingly challenged—and a group of revisionist powers that see each crisis as an opportunity to challenge American hegemony.

4. The Conflict Becomes a Quagmire: From Blitzkrieg to Strategic Trap

4.1 A Battlefield Extending Beyond Iran’s Borders


What was initially thought to be a short and surgical campaign quickly transformed into a conflict with multiple regional ramifications. Late in the day on March 1, Israel announced the launch of a new phase of massive attacks against Iranian missile launch sites. Hezbollah fired several rockets at northern Israel, drawing Israel into a simultaneous two-front war. Since Lebanon was drawn into the regional conflict, 826 people have been killed, including 106 children, and more than 830,000 have been displaced, according to authorities. The geography of the conflict expanded unexpectedly once again. An Iranian missile landed in Turkey, in Hatay province. Ankara asserted its right to self-defense, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that the alliance was committed to defending Turkey. Iran officially denied deliberately targeting Turkey, attributing the incident to a “technical anomaly.” The possible invocation of NATO Article 4 has become a focal point of urgent diplomatic discussions between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and his allies. The expansion of the conflict to a NATO member state constitutes a qualitative threshold whose implications could prove decisive for the future of the Atlantic alliance.

The war also reached the Indian Ocean. On March 4, 2026, the Iranian frigate Dena was sunk by a submarine attack off Galle, in the far south of Sri Lanka. The provisional death toll was at least 101 missing and 78 wounded among the 180 crew members. This was the first ship sunk by an American submarine since World War II. This singular feat illustrates both the global reach of the conflict and the American determination to eliminate any Iranian naval projection capability.

4.2 Iran Resists: Stockpiling Depletion and the Logic of a Protracted Conflict

Contrary to Trump’s hopes for a swift victory, Iran’s ballistic missile launch rate had decreased from the start of the war until March 4. Analysts point to a depletion of Iranian missile and launcher stocks, as well as a rationing strategy in preparation for a protracted conflict. On March 5, an Iranian military source indicated that Iran had launched more than 500 ballistic and naval missiles and nearly 2,000 drones since February 28. Nearly 40% of the attacks were directed toward Israel, and almost 60% toward American targets in the region.

Iran has carried out at least 7,171 strikes against Gulf states since February 28. The cost of the war is rising considerably for the belligerents: in the first 96 hours of the war alone, the Americans and Israelis reportedly spent the equivalent of more than a thousand precision weapons. Experts are questioning the ability to maintain this operational tempo in the event of a prolonged conflict. Furthermore, a fire aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford lasted more than 30 hours, according to sailors’ accounts—a duration far exceeding what the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) described in its official statement. More than 600 sailors have lost their bunks since the incident.

4.3 The Humanitarian and Heritage Dimension: A War with Civilizational Costs

Beyond military losses, the conflict is inflicting unique damage on Iran. UNESCO has warned of the damage caused to Iran’s cultural heritage: four of the 29 Iranian World Heritage sites have been hit by airstrikes. The Iranian Ministry of Cultural Heritage has reported damage to at least 56 museums and historical sites across Iran. In Tehran, the bombings damaged the Golestan Palace, a UNESCO World Heritage site sometimes compared to Versailles, and one of the oldest in the Iranian capital, in the first few days. In Isfahan, Naqsh-e-Jahan Square, a 17th-century architectural gem surrounded by mosques, a palace, and a historic bazaar, was among the sites damaged. These acts of destruction against national heritage fuel a narrative of national victimization that could unite Iranian society around the regime rather than turn it against it. Unprecedentedly large-scale demonstrations of mourning were organized to pay tribute to Khamenei. Videos show Isfahan’s main square completely filled with demonstrators chanting “Allahu Akbar.” Similar scenes were filmed in Tehran’s Revolution Square. The paradox is stark: in seeking to liberate the Iranian people, the strikes initially appear to rally them around their regime.

5. The Fault Lines of the International Community

5.1 NATO Divided, Europe Without a Compass


France will not participate in securing the Strait of Hormuz “in the current context” of the war in Iran, stated Emmanuel Macron. Donald Trump criticized the refusal of several NATO allies to respond positively to his request for assistance in securing this strategic waterway. This transatlantic rift is unprecedented in its form: Washington is demanding direct military participation from its allies in the name of a conflict they have explicitly refused to endorse. Emmanuel Macron has convened a new defense council on the situation in the Middle East, while Trump is pressuring France to respond positively to his request for assistance in securing the Strait of Hormuz, whose disrupted access poses risks to rising interest rates and French debt.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called for an end to the war in the Middle East, stressing that it “benefited no one and was economically damaging to many,” while affirming that “all diplomatic channels” were being used. The E3, comprising the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, met to try to prevent further Iranian strikes, resolving to support, if necessary, “proportionate defensive military measures” against drones and ballistic missiles. This convoluted wording reflects a Europe attempting to reconcile its rejection of war with its need not to completely abandon its allies.

5.2 China, a reluctant actor


China is directly impacted by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: more than half of its seaborne crude oil imports come from the Middle East and transit primarily through this waterway. Beijing announced it would release $200,000 in humanitarian aid through the Red Cross Society of China, particularly after the explosion that killed more than 150 people, including many children, at a school in Minab, southern Iran. Symbolically modest given the scale of the crisis, this aid nevertheless marks the first concrete Chinese intervention since the start of the conflict.

5.3 The “Day After” Dilemma

On the 16th day of the war, Iran dismissed the idea of ​​negotiating with the United States, even though Donald Trump had stated that Tehran wanted to “reach an agreement.” Iran, through its Foreign Minister, asserted that it “sees no reason to negotiate.” The United States and Israel have repeatedly insisted that they intend to prolong the conflict for several more weeks, until all their objectives are achieved.

The question of “what happens next” is haunting the capitals. A transitional triumvirate composed of Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Parliament, and the head of the judiciary is managing day-to-day affairs in Iran, while the Assembly of Experts deliberates on the succession. Among the candidates being considered is Ali Khomeini, grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, who is married to the granddaughter of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. This choice would allow for a revival of the revolutionary narrative by opting for a younger, more charismatic figure, while also benefiting from the dual religious legitimacy of the Shiite clergy in Iran and Iraq.

Conclusion


Does the war against Iran mark the beginning of a new Middle East? The answer is necessarily nuanced. Yes, in that the conflict is causing profound and likely irreversible ruptures: the death of Khamenei and the ensuing succession crisis; the structural weakening of the axis of resistance; The dismantling of the indirect confrontation paradigm that had prevailed since 1979; the first destruction of a warship by an American submarine since 1945; the involuntary involvement of a NATO member country in the conflict. These elements alter the fundamental dynamics of regional and global geopolitics.

But no, if by “new Middle East” we mean a stabilized order reconfigured on consensual grounds. What the war is currently producing is less a new order than increased disorder: an Iran in existential crisis with an unpredictable outcome; exposed and disoriented Arab Gulf powers; a militarily victorious but diplomatically isolated Israel; a NATO fractured by contradictory demands; a Europe adrift; an international community divided between power politics and the defense of international law. UNESCO reminds us that the preservation of heritage sites has been an international obligation since the 1954 Hague Convention—and their mass destruction adds a civilizational dimension to an already profoundly destabilizing war.

The history of the Middle East teaches us to be cautious about pronouncements of a clean slate. Regional realignments take time, generate unforeseen effects, and encounter resistance from societies and identities. The “regional cold war” between Sunnis and Shiites, between Arab nationalism and foreign influence, between democratic aspirations and persistent authoritarianism, cannot be resolved with bombs. The question of whether the current violence will give rise to order or lasting chaos remains, as of March 18, 2026, entirely open. The answer will depend less on the belligerents’ military capabilities than on their diplomatic wisdom—and this has proven a rare commodity in the region for several decades.



Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

Dr. Mohamed Chtatou is a Professor of education science at the university in Rabat. He is currently a political analyst with Moroccan, Gulf, French, Italian and British media on politics and culture in the Middle East, Islam and Islamism as well as terrorism. He is, also, a specialist on political Islam in the MENA region with interest in the roots of terrorism and religious extremism.