Poisoning The World Cup: The American Way

Graham Peebles

 July 9, 2026

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A 2026 FIFA World Cup group stage match between Belgium and Egypt, at Lumen Field in Seattle, Washington. Photo Wikipedia.

The football has been brilliant, because football is brilliant. But the 2026 World Cup—hosted across the US, Canada, and Mexico—mainly in America—is the most corrupt, polluted tournament in the tournament’s 96-year history.

Let’s start with discrimination: Omar Artan, the first Somali referee ever invited to officiate at a World Cup, was refused entry at Miami airport—having been issued a US visa—based on spurious claims of “terrorist connections.” He flew home to a hero’s welcome, celebrated for his dignified response to a humiliating ordeal.

Palestinian Football Federation President Jibril al-Rajoub was denied entry to the US; fifteen members of Iran’s delegation were refused visas, and the Iran national team was forced to commute from Mexico for matches in the US.

Iraqi striker Aymen Hussein was detained for nearly seven hours at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, his mobile phone confiscated and searched; Iraqi team photographer Talal Salah was deported after more than ten hours in detention; Brazilian journalist Karine Alves was racially profiled and subjected to a strip search upon arrival at a New Jersey airport.

Senegal and Ivory Coast fans were barred by Trump’s travel bans. The Ivory Coast supporters’ group president stated: “the US government does not want to see supporters from certain countries, including Ivory Coast, on its soil.”

Dozens of Moroccan supporters were denied entry into the US. Many had purchased match tickets of around $500 each, with some buying three-match packages totalling $1,500, and paid visa fees of $180, with total individual losses reaching up to $2,000, plus flights and hotel costs.

The exclusion of African and Muslim-majority nations was the pattern, a level of discrimination that makes a mockery of FIFA’s claim that this was the “most inclusive World Cup in history.”

Corruption and Greed

It is the financial exploitation of supporters that stands out as the crudest, most visible form of corruption. From FIFA’s eye-watering ticket prices to inflated air and train fares in the US, visceral greed has polluted this World Cup.

Less than 2 per cent of tickets have been made available at the much-trumpeted “budget” $60 price point (for the worst seats in the stadium), and even these were commanding resale prices averaging $1,600. The cheapest ticket for the final exceeds $2,600; the top category, originally priced at $6,730, rose to $32,970—an increase of 417 per cent—thanks to “dynamic pricing,” a demand-based system designed to maximise FIFA’s revenue.

US airlines operating flights to host cities bumped up fares by an average of 42 per cent. Public transport to stadiums has been similarly exploited: a standard $13 journey from New York to MetLife Stadium rose to $98 on match days.

FIFA’s ticket pricing has been so extortionate that prosecutors in New York and New Jersey have launched legal investigations into FIFA’s tariffs, citing “unreasonably high” ticket costs.

Total revenue for the 2022–2026 cycle is projected to be FIFA’s highest ever—hitting $13 billion—virtually double the $7.57 billion generated in the previous period, and a 73% increase on the 2019–2022 cycle.

The 2026 World Cup is the perfect union of filth and greed: the major host, America—a country led by the most corrupt president in US history—and FIFA, an unethical, unaccountable organisation led by a sycophantic megalomaniac—Gianni Infantino—who appears to see himself as the head of a nation state, rather than football’s governing body.

As Reboot FIFA states: “FIFA isn’t fit to govern world football and needs to be rebooted as an organisation so that it runs the global game in the interests of players, supporters and communities, rather than the interests of corrupt football elites, big business and authoritarian states.”

FIFA’s institutional cowardice was revealed in the starkest way on 5 July, when the US forward, Folarin Balogun, who had been given a red card in the match with Bosnia-Herzegovina, miraculously had his automatic suspension lifted—just before the knock-out game against Belgium.

It turned out that Trump, who admits to not knowing anything about football, had telephoned Infantino and asked FIFA to review the red card decision. Infantino agreed and the one-match ban was swiftly suspended, allowing Balogun to play against Belgium. Trump later boasted: “I’m the one that got them to do it.”

To the delight of football fans around the world, who were outraged by the injustice of FIFA’s actions, Belgium hammered the USA 4-1. By playing Balogun, the US team revealed itself to be devoid of principles, complicit in the corruption of Trump and Infantino.

Poisoning everything

All of this filth—the manipulation of the rules, the discrimination, and the corruption—reveals two entwined issues, pervasive and polluting: the total disregard for the law by the rich and powerful, particularly Trump and other demagogues; and the socio-economic doctrine of greed and division, which affects the lives of everyone everywhere. An unjust reductive system that reduces everything to a commodity and everyone to a consumer.

This is the American way: a world without substance, where money and winning are everything. A crass, materialistic world in which wealth and power buy impunity, and the vulnerable and marginalised can be ignored and exploited. It is loud and hollow, and it poisons everything it touches.

In spite of all the ugliness, and to the utter credit of the players and the fans, the football has been brilliant—because football is brilliant, uniting people across cultures, creating moments of collective joy and drama that will live long in the memory.

Graham Peebles is a British freelance writer and charity worker. He set up The Create Trust in 2005 and has run education projects in Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and India.  E: grahampeebles@icloud.com  W: www.grahampeebles.org

 

Container Rates Near a Two-Year High Amidst Renewed Tariff Concerns

iStock

Published Jun 26, 2026 10:16 PM by The Maritime Executive

2026 was widely expected to be a quiet year for container shipping, but events are proving the forecasts wrong. Containerized freight rates are approaching two-year highs, driven upwards by tariff expectations, limited capacity and the impact of the U.S.-Iranian war. 

This week, the Drewry World Container Index neared the $4,200 per FEU level, driven upward 40 percent year-over-year thanks to strong demand from American importers and strong ex-China bookings. The SCFI has more than doubled compared to rates seen last year.

Part of the cause is the expectation of soon-to-come tariff hikes. After the Supreme Court struck down the White House's International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariff rates earlier this year, the administration used a separate set of legal authorities - Section 122 - to impose blanket import tariffs of 15 percent on all nations. The Section 122 tariffs expire at the end of July, and President Donald Trump is widely expected to announce additional new tariffs to replace them. That prediction is proving accurate: on Friday, he threatened import duties of 100 percent on any nation that collects taxes on the overseas revenues of U.S. tech companies, taking aim at European plans for a digital services tax. 

"The section 122 tariffs will expire on July 24th and it is not yet known which new tariffs, likely from the Section 301 investigations, will supersede them," commented freight market expert Lars Jensen in a LinkedIn post.

For importers, the current 15 percent baseline tariff under Section 122 appears favorable, as it is equal to or less than the IEEPA rates in effect last year - and likely better than what might be available in several months' time, forwarders and BCOs told the Wall Street Journal. To take advantage of current tariff rates, bookings for the annual holiday season imports are getting moved up, and freight rates are increasing accordingly. The benchmark Shanghai-LA box rate is up 12 percent this week alone, according to Drewry, reaching $5,750 per forty-foot container. Southeast Asia-USWC rates have also soared abruptly, a welcome reprieve for ocean carriers.

It may be a short-lived bump, according to Jensen. Container spot rate futures on the NYFI index suggest that investors expect a substantial drop from the current heights within just a month's time, Jensen noted - aligned with the expected imposition of new tariff rates. 

Number of Containers Lost Overboard Rises for a Second Year, Reports WSC

The MSC Elsa 3 casualty accounted for more than 40 percent of the containers reported lost at sea in 2025 (Indian DGS)

Published Jun 25, 2026 5:27 PM by The Maritime Executive

One casualty and a few incidents pushed the number of containers lost at sea up for the second year in a row, reaching possibly the fourth-highest level in the 18 years that the World Shipping Council has been tracking losses. The level of losses, however, appears in line with the long-term average, with the industry trade group further highlighting that it is an infinitesimal portion of the number of containers transported each year.

In its annual Containers Lost at Sea Report, WSC calculates that a total of 1,478 containers were reported lost overboard in 2025 out of a total of approximately 280 million transported globally. It notes that one casualty, the loss of the MSC Elsa 3 off India in May 2025, accounted for 640 containers within the total. That represented 43 percent of the boxes reported lost overboard during the year.

The number, however, is above the three-year average for the industry and is nearly triple that of 2024, when 576 containers were reported lost overboard. The prior year, 2023, had seen the industry’s lowest ever recorded level at just 221 containers reported lost at sea.

The peak years generally consist of one or two major casualties as well as various smaller incidents. The highest recorded losses were in 2013, with 5,578 containers lost, primarily driven by the MOL Comfort, which broke in two in the Indian Ocean. The next highest peaks came in 2020 with a series of casualties, including the ONE Apus, which lost 1,816 boxes in the North Pacific, and in 2021, when several ships were caught in heavy seas, and the X-Press Pearl burnt and sank off Sri Lanka.

WSC highlights that the key challenges remain weather and ocean conditions, although the industry has made significant strides in managing the phenomenon known as "parametric rolling." It also points to fire-related losses. 

As an industry, they continue to work on improving safety factors, with work focusing on the misdeclaration of dangerous goods. It highlights the 2026 introduction of new reporting requirements adopted by the International Maritime Organization and safety rules for the transport of charcoal.

The report also shows that for the first time, 128 containers were recovered in 2025. The WSC says that it is the highest recovery figure since it began gathering data in 2023 on boxes recovered.

It is also continuing its education efforts for the industry on issues such as stowage and lashing plans and the safe execution of voyages. Another focus is on the Code of Practice for Packing Cargo Transport Units. A draft code has been developed and submitted to the IMO for consideration. 

The World Shipping Council concludes by saying the long-term trend continues to show that container losses remain a very small fraction of the total global movements of boxes. It says year-to-year figures fluctuate, often driven by extreme weather and isolated events, while the overall trajectory remains stable and significantly below earlier peak years.

The Decline In India’s Birth Rate – Analysis

June 27, 2026 
 Anbound
By Zhao Zhijiang

Key Takeaways

India’s Fertility Rate Drops Below Replacement – India’s TFR has fallen to 1.9, with births down ~20% from peak and the child population projected to shrink sharply by 2051.

Widespread Decline Hits Schools First – The trend affects most states (some at 1.3), already causing thousands of school closures and enrollment drops.

Risk of “Getting Old Before Getting Rich” – Driven by education, smartphones, and high child costs, India must urgently upgrade education and jobs or lose its demographic dividend.

Analysis

As the world’s most populous nation, India is undergoing a structural shift that is noteworthy, where there is a significantly accelerating decline in fertility. Latest statistics reveal that India’s total fertility rate (TFR) has dropped to 1.9, falling below the replacement level of 2.1 required to maintain long-term population stability. For India, long perceived as a “young country” with a “demographic dividend”, this shift marks a crucial moment. It serves as a reminder to the outside world that India’s development can no longer be viewed through the outdated lens of “Indians prefer large families”. Instead, there is a critical need to re-evaluate the new challenges brought about by its population growth momentum, labor force structure, and intergenerational replacement processes.

This of course does not imply that India will immediately enter a phase of population contraction. Its total population will continue to grow from the current 1.45 billion, as it takes a considerable amount of time for a reduction in births to translate into a decline in total population. However, India’s annual number of births has already fallen by approximately one-fifth from its peak in 2001. The International Institute for Migration and Development (IIMAD), a well-known Indian institution, recently completed population projections for India from 2021 to 2051. The results show that the number of children aged 0 to 14 in India stood at 341 million in 2021. By 2031, this figure is projected to decline to 322 million. This means that during the decade from 2021 to 2031, the number of children aged 0 to 14 will decrease by 19 million. Between 2031 and 2041, the child population will shrink by another 34 million, followed by a further reduction of 22 million between 2041 and 2051.


More notably, this demographic shift is not confined to a few affluent cities but has emerged as a pervasive trend across multiple states. The total fertility rate in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal is approximately 1.3, on par with Finland. Maharashtra, which includes Mumbai, stands at around 1.4, close to the level of Norway. The appearance of a “Nordic-style” demographic profile in India was entirely unimaginable in the past.

This shift has already shown visible consequences at the local level. The tangible impacts of India’s demographic transition are reflected in realities ranging from the closure of 1,200 schools in Tamil Nadu last year due to insufficient student enrollment, to a sharp drop in first-grade enrollment in Kerala, a massive wave of school consolidations in Karnataka, and a nationwide reduction of approximately 20,000 public schools over five years (between the 2019-20 and 2024-25 academic years). A declining child population first impacts schools, subsequently rippling into child-related consumption, local employment, housing demand, and future labor supply. The shocks of demographic change never unfold uniformly, as they tend to manifest first in localized sectors before gradually spreading into nationwide structural issues.


Researchers at ANBOUND believe that the decline in India’s birth rate is a major case of “cognitive reversal” in global demographic logic. In the past, it was generally assumed that developed countries had low fertility rates while developing countries had high fertility rates. Under such logic, affluent groups have fewer children, whereas impoverished groups have more. This conventional wisdom once possessed strong explanatory power, but it is now failing. Both statistical data and empirical field surveys clearly indicate that low fertility is no longer a unique characteristic of developed economies like Europe, Japan, and South Korea, but is rapidly spreading to middle-income and certain lower-income countries. Brazil, Iran, Thailand, and Turkey have remained below replacement level for years. Sri Lanka’s total fertility rate is approximately 1.3, Tunisia’s is around 1.6, and Morocco’s has also fallen below the replacement threshold. Even in regions characterized by high marriage rates and low female formal employment rates, birth rates are declining. This demonstrates that the impact of modernization on reproductive behavior has transcended traditional income levels and cultural differences.

A closer inspection of the drivers behind India’s rapid fertility decline reveals three primary factors.

The first is the universalization of female education, which constitutes the most critical long-term factor driving down fertility rates. Demographic research shows that increases in female educational attainment typically lead to a significant reduction in fertility desires and actual births because it alters women’s timing of marriage and childbearing, intra-household status, life choices, and labor force participation opportunities. Since the 1990s, India has vigorously promoted enrollment policies for girls, leading to a continuous rise in net enrollment rates for girls at both primary and secondary school levels. This change exhibits a clear chronological correspondence with the subsequent acceleration of fertility decline. In contrast to India, birth rates remain high to this day in regions such as Niger, Chad, and northern Nigeria, where formal education coverage for girls remains very low. India’s experience demonstrates that once education penetrates broader households, the preferences for fewer children, delayed childbearing, and high-quality parenting gradually replace traditional mindsets of “more children bring more blessings”, becoming the mainstream reproductive choice in society.


The second factor is the widespread penetration of smartphones and media dissemination. Although this variable occasionally sparks debate, it is equally impossible to ignore. Smartphones may influence fertility rates by altering social patterns, reducing face-to-face interactions, increasing leisure time, and expanding access to information regarding contraception, marriage, and childbearing. Some studies have identified a correlation between smartphone penetration and declining adolescent birth rates. In India, earlier research pointed out that when cable television first entered villages, it was associated with a decline in fertility rates because the portrayal of urban middle-class families in television series reshaped rural residents’ imaginations regarding family size and female roles. Today, the reach and influence of smartphones far exceed that of television, bringing urban lifestyles, consumption standards, educational anxiety, and middle-class family models into a broader spectrum of rural and low-income populations. This does not necessarily lead directly to having fewer children, but it reinforces people’s perceptions of modern life, causing lifestyles characterized by nuclear families, fewer children, and high investment to become social norms at a faster pace.

More practical and fundamental pressures stem from the third factor, namely the economic dimension. The decision made by Indian families is not a simple matter of “not wanting to have children” but rather a recalculation of child-rearing costs amidst intensifying social competition. With the advancement of urbanization, rising housing costs, escalating educational competition, and growing healthcare expenditures, children are no longer viewed merely as a source of household labor or the continuation of lineage in the traditional sense. Instead, they have become a long-term, high-cost, and high-investment project. The higher parents’ expectations are for their children’s education and upward social mobility, the more they tend to reduce the number of children to concentrate resources on fewer offspring. This logic is highly pronounced in India. In 2025, approximately 39% of Indian children attended fee-charging private schools, up from 32% in 2015, indicating that an increasing number of families have been drawn into an educational arms race. Deficiencies in the quality of public education have further intensified the financial pressure on families to fund private schooling. When a household observes neighbors having fewer children and investing more money into their upbringing, they are compelled to adopt similar strategies to prevent their own children from falling behind in the competition.

It must be pointed out that a distinct characteristic facing India is that it will confront the pressure of “getting old before getting rich”. India’s economy is growing rapidly, infrastructure development is accelerating, and high hopes are pinned on its manufacturing sector and digital economy. The country indeed retains substantial room for growth and may well become a wealthier and globally more influential nation over the next two decades. However, demographic structural changes remind external observers that India’s window of opportunity will not remain open indefinitely. The key to the so-called demographic dividend lies not merely in a large population size, but in a high proportion of young labor, robust employment absorption capacity, improvements in educational quality, and industrial upgrading capable of accommodating labor transfers. If the birth rate continues to decline while employment quality, the educational system, social security, and public health systems fail to improve in tandem, India will bear the burden of an aging population prematurely, before fully transitioning into a high-income society.


To the world, the continuous decline in India’s birth rate means that the international community’s traditional imagination of India’s future path needs to be adjusted accordingly. India is no longer simply a country experiencing continuous population expansion, nor is it a place that will forever supply an infinite amount of cheap labor. Although it still possesses the potential to rise, this rise will be accompanied by demographic constraints far more complex than in the past. For global capital and multinational corporations, merely viewing India as the next market to enjoy a long-term demographic dividend risks underestimating the structural changes unfolding within it. The India of the future will become wealthier, but it may also simultaneously become older. It will possess a larger consumer market, yet face higher household child-rearing costs. At the same time, it will project stronger national ambitions, while simultaneously being forced to manage comprehensive challenges woven from interlocking pressures in education, employment, religion, regional disparities, and social security.

Final analysis conclusion:

The obvious decline in India’s birth rate signifies that the global trend of low fertility has penetrated deeply into major developing nations. Advancements in female education, rising child-rearing costs, intensifying educational competition, the diffusion of urban lifestyles, and the spread of smartphones have collectively driven Indian families toward a transition marked by fewer births and high-investment parenting. India retains the potential to rise, but its future challenges are no longer a matter of pure population quantity. Instead, they center on the phenomenon of “getting old before getting rich” and whether it can effectively translate a finite demographic dividend into comprehensive capabilities across education, employment, industry, and social security.

Zhijiang Zhao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.


About Anbound
Anbound Consulting (Anbound) is an independent Think Tank with the headquarter based in Beijing. Established in 1993, Anbound specializes in public policy research, and enjoys a professional reputation in the areas of strategic forecasting, policy solutions and risk analysis. Anbound's research findings are widely recognized and create a deep interest within public media, academics and experts who are also providing consulting service to the State Council of China.
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QUAD To Safeguard Undersea Cables Against Chinese Disruptions – Analysis

June 18, 2026 
By P. K. Balachandran

The Foreign Ministers of the QUAD countries — the US, Japan, Australia, and India — met in New Delhi on May 26 and vowed to collectively safeguard undersea cable networks from threats and sabotage by both non-State and State actors.

Spanning around 1.4 million kilometres across every ocean, these undersea cables carry nearly 100% of global internet traffic. They form the backbone of the modern economy, enabling instantaneous financial transactions, real-time diplomatic exchanges, and military communications.

In warfare, severing them could isolate a nation’s command structures from intelligence feeds, sensor data, and deployed forces. For a nuclear-armed state, the loss of reliable communications could prove catastrophic, undermining control over strategic weapons.

West Sees Threat from China and Russia

While undersea cable disruptions can stem from various causes, the QUAD’s primary concern centres on China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific. In “The Conversation”, John Calabrese highlighted how Chinese researchers unveiled a new deep-sea tool capable of cutting even the world’s most secure subsea cables.


First revealed in February 2025 and promoted as a civilian salvage and seabed mining device, the tool can operate at depths of 4,000 metres — far beyond most existing infrastructure. This capability raises serious implications for global communications and security.

Taiwan has repeatedly accused Chinese vessels of sabotage. In 2023, two Chinese ships were blamed for cutting the only two cables serving the Matsu Islands, isolating 14,000 residents for six weeks. Taiwan documented 27 such disruptions since 2018. In January 2025, its coast guard linked another incident off the northeastern coast to a vessel operated by a Hong Kong company with Chinese crew. These actions coincide with intensified Chinese military drills around Taiwan.

Russia has also demonstrated interest in such tactics. In 2023, a cable between Sweden and Estonia was damaged alongside a gas pipeline. In January 2025, a Latvia-Sweden cable was breached, prompting NATO patrols and the seizure of a suspect vessel. Dmitry Medvedev hinted at targeting undersea cables in retaliation for incidents like the 2023 Nord Stream explosions.

Need to Internationalise Protection

The roughly 650 operational undersea fibre-optic cable systems, which facilitate daily transactions worth US$10 trillion, lack robust international protection. This stems from competing national security interests and heavy private-sector involvement.

Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter note in an article in “Science Direct” that in January 2023, US Assistant Secretary of Defence Ely Ratner announced enhanced satellite monitoring via Hawkeye-360 Cluster 6 to track illicit activities, including threats to cables. The US pledged to share this data with QUAD partners. This was followed by the May 2023 QUAD Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, which leverages member expertise in manufacturing, deploying, and maintaining cable infrastructure.

A core goal is to avoid routing traffic through Chinese-owned or operated cables, given Beijing’s laws requiring firms to hand over data to the government. China’s “Digital Silk Road” initiative further aims to align global cable networks with its strategic interests.

Pattern of Cable Ownership

Traditionally, cables were owned by consortia of telecom firms. Leading players include Japan’s NEC Corporation, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, and the US’s SubCom, now joined by tech giants like Google and Meta. Chinese entities such as HMN Tech (linked to Huawei) and China Unicom have rapidly expanded through state support, heightening espionage and sabotage risks amid broader geopolitical rivalries.
Australia’s Leadership Role

The QUAD assigned Australia a leading role in cable security following the 2023 partnership launch. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) coordinates technical and policy research while providing regional support. Members rotate contributions based on strengths, with Australia convening workshops. Collaboration can extend bilaterally, trilaterally, or plurilaterally.

The US supports efforts through its CABLES program. Australia, the US, and Japan are jointly investing US$95 million in a cable project linking Micronesia, Nauru, and Kiribati to counter Chinese dominance in the Pacific.

Washington urges partners to exclude “unreliable suppliers” from networks and has withheld licences for cables involving Hong Kong or mainland China. It has promoted alternatives like the Apricot, Bifrost, and Echo consortia, rerouting through trusted locations such as Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Guam. Since 2019, the US has offered training grants to discourage engagement with Chinese firms.

QUAD’s Informal Structure

The QUAD has evolved with annual summits and joint statements but remains informal, lacking binding commitments, budgets, or enforcement mechanisms. This flexibility offers advantages: it enables coordination on shared maritime interests while preserving member sovereignty. However, it can slow decisive action on threats.

Informality suits States wary of ceding autonomy. It fosters trust-based alignment without rigid hierarchies, though history shows collective action often faces impediments even among allies.

Impediments to Action

Private companies prioritise operations over security, while public entities face regulatory hurdles. Unilateral measures are simpler, but multilateral efforts require aligned legal and governmental frameworks. Jurisdictional limits — states control territorial waters but not the high seas — add reluctance, particularly among some Asian nations.
Towards Collective Action

QUAD countries should first map inter-agency coordination (navies, coast guards, marine police, telecom regulators) within their governments. This embeds cable protection into broader maritime strategies and clarifies tensions between public and private interests.

Each QUAD country should designate a lead agency to coordinate domestically, aligning with International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) best practices. Cross-sector dialogue between officials, cable owners, suppliers, and operators is essential for policy alignment.

India’s Vital Role

Enhanced Indian participation is crucial given its growing global influence and inclusive multilateral approach. The QUAD should also engage the Global South, emphasising that secure cable connectivity underpins communications and economic development for vulnerable states.

Cable Repair Vessels

Repair remains largely a private endeavour. Cannon and Rossiter recommend that the QUAD consider a dedicated fleet of strategically deployed cable repair ships across the Indo-Pacific to enhance resilience.

By strengthening cooperation, the QUAD can better protect these critical information superhighways against state-sponsored threats, particularly from China, while promoting a more secure and resilient digital infrastructure in the region.

About P. K. Balachandran
P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.
View all posts by P. K. Balachandran →

US and Iran sign deal, but who really won? Here's what to know

Copyright AP Photo

By Aleksandar Brezar

Published on 18/06/2026 - EURONEWS

Trump signed the framework deal at Versailles while Pezeshkian signed in Tehran, pledging to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and triggering 60 days of further talks. Analysts say the terms leave Tehran in a stronger position than the deal's framing suggests.

The US-Iran framework deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and bring the two adversaries back to the negotiating table over Tehran's nuclear programme was signed on Wednesday amid differing reports and growing confusion over its contents.

Despite an earlier announcement that the agreement would be signed at a ceremony in Switzerland on Friday, US President Donald Trump signed a physical copy of the deal while dining with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Palace of Versailles.

In Tehran, President Masoud Pezeshkian also signed the document on Wednesday, according to the state-run IRNA news agency, which posted an image of him holding up the deal with his signature next to Trump's.

Apart from the new oil revenue for Iran, the two sides are seemingly back where they were at the beginning of this year — before Israel and the US launched their intervention prompting Iranian attacks on neighbouring countries, which have left thousands dead across the region, triggered a global energy crisis and shaken the world economy.

Iran and the US will now enter a 60-day period of negotiations, with the question hanging over them of whether Trump can wrest a better deal for the US than the 2015 nuclear accord he scuttled eight years ago.

Meanwhile, Tehran has already secured significant concessions in its favour, as the Islamic Republic reportedly wrangled another boost to its coffers in the form of a $300 billion reconstruction fund.

Here is what to know based on details released by US officials, Iranian state-run media and independent analyses comparing the available documents and statements by both sides.

Neither Washington nor Tehran has officially published the agreement's text; multiple outlets have published what appears to be leaked versions, and ISW-CTP cautioned that its assessment was based on those unofficial copies.

Who stands to gain the most?

The leaked text of the agreement, if accurate, suggests that Tehran has emerged from the conflict in a stronger strategic position than the framing of the deal would imply, according to the latest analysis by the Institute for the Study of War think tank (ISW).

The ISW said the reported terms would grant Iran significant economic relief that it would likely use to try to reconstitute its missile, drone and nuclear programmes, as well as its regional network of proxies.

The think tank said it had observed no indication that Iranian decision-makers were willing to make concessions on the nuclear issues that would need to be resolved in any final agreement, despite the prospect of further economic relief tied to reaching one.

Iranian officials and state media are largely framing the agreement as a victory that formalises Iran's military gains.

Iran's English-language outlet Press TV argued on Tuesday that the signed memorandum represents "the political codification of a battlefield reality," according to ISW.

Get the oil flowing again

Under the agreement, the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, and the US will lift its blockade of Iranian ports — both of which should push gas prices down.

Passage through the waterway will be toll-free for 60 days, and the deal does not preclude fees after that, according to U.S. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to read details of the draft, which has not yet been officially released by Washington.

Iran's closure of the strait, through which around a fifth of the world's traded oil passed before the war, proved to be perhaps its strongest weapon.

It drove up global petrol prices, made food and other products such as fertiliser more expensive, and raised concerns about a possible air travel crisis ahead of the summer holiday season.

FILE: Tankers and cargo vessels are seen in the Gulf of Oman, along shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz, 16 June 2026 AP Photo

The ISW assessed that Iran will likely try to exploit ambiguous language in the agreement to maintain effective control over shipping through the strait.

The think tank said the reported text does not explicitly bar Iran from "managing" the waterway, meaning Tehran could continue to insist vessels use its traffic separation scheme in Iranian territorial waters and pay fees to the IRGC Navy — the same arrangement Washington has previously sanctioned as unlawful.

With the deal in place, the Islamic Republic has survived the most serious attempt ever by Israel and the US to topple its regime, despite the thundering opening volleys of the war that killed Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top officials.

Iran to sell oil freely, 'downblend' its uranium

The deal immediately waives — but does not eliminate — sanctions that Trump imposed on Iran's oil exports, allowing it once again to sell its crude on the world market and restoring a revenue stream worth billions.

Last year, Tehran earned an estimated $45 billion from oil sales. But it had only one major buyer, China, and had to ship its crude through a shadow fleet of tankers to elude sanctions, eating into its profits. Under the blockade since April, its exports have nearly ground to a halt.

With the waiver, Iran will likely be able to find more customers and sell its oil for higher prices.

The draft agreement calls for Iran's highly enriched uranium to be "downblended" — or diluted — under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA), without elaborating. Negotiations on any other restrictions on Tehran's nuclear program lie ahead.

FILE: The exterior of the heavy water production facility in Arak, 360 kms southwest of Tehran, is seen in this 27 October 2004 file photo AP Photo

Trump withdrew from a previous nuclear deal with world powers, criticising it for giving a huge windfall to Iran. The interim deal outlines even more lucrative incentives if Iran reaches a new nuclear agreement.

One is the eventual lifting of all international sanctions, which would seem to go further than the 2015 accord. That agreement lifted embargoes related to Iran's nuclear program but kept others in place over what the US alleged were Tehran's support for terrorism and rights abuses.

The interim pact also promises a $300 billion fund for postwar reconstruction. It is not clear where that money will come from — but Trump said so far the US would not contribute.

To give a sense of the extraordinary scale of the fund, the World Bank estimates that Syria, after 13 years of civil war, needs $215 billion for reconstruction. The Gaza Strip, largely devastated in two years of the Israel-Hamas war, needs $53 billion.

The deal also promises to unfreeze billions in Iranian assets held abroad through a procedure the two sides will work out, according to the text provided by US officials.

ISW also assessed that Iran had structured the deal specifically to limit Washington's ability to impose renewed pressure during the 60-day negotiating period, making it harder for the US to extract further concessions before a final agreement is reached.

Iran's missiles and support for proxies not on the table

The Trump administration repeatedly said its war aims were to "obliterate" Iran's missile arsenal, "sever its support" for armed proxies in the region, "annihilate its navy," and ensure it never acquires a nuclear weapon.

The seven weeks of US-Israeli bombardment are believed to have heavily damaged Iran's missile arsenal and production facilities as well as other parts of its military.

Houthi supporters raise a poster of their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and a poster criticising President Donald Trump during a rally in Sanaa, 16 June 2026 AP Photo

How heavily is not known, and Iran continued to fire on Israel as recently as last week. Meanwhile, Iran's ties with its militant proxies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza and Shiite militias in Iraq — appear as strong as ever.

Neither the missile arsenal nor Iran's support for its allies appears to be on the table in the upcoming negotiations.

US-Israeli ties strained

The deal calls for an end to the war in Lebanon, where Israel has been fighting Hezbollah.

However, Israel and Hezbollah are not parties to the agreement. Iran insists Israel must withdraw from the large swath of southern Lebanon it is occupying, but the interim deal does not explicitly require that and only ensures Lebanon's "territorial integrity".

The ISW said Tehran is interpreting the clause requiring a ceasefire "on all fronts" as obligating Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah and withdraw from Lebanon entirely — part of a broader Iranian effort to preserve Hezbollah by securing what the think tank described as Israeli capitulation in Lebanon.

A woman walks through her apartment damaged in Israeli strikes in the southern port city of Tyre, 18 June 2026 AP Photo

Israel has vowed to keep troops in Lebanon, while Hezbollah says it is committed to resisting Israel "until full withdrawal is achieved." Fighting between the two could derail the deal unless Washington and Tehran can rein in their respective allies.

Israel was squeezed out of the negotiations with Iran, and Israelis from across the political spectrum have called the deal a disaster, directing their fury at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Tensions between Trump and Netanyahu, meanwhile, have occasionally spilt into the open, including when the US president described the Israeli leader as "crazy".

At the G7 summit in France this week, Trump said that Netanyahu "has to be more responsible with respect to Lebanon."

Netanyahu is left in a precarious situation ahead of national elections later this year. His relationship with Trump may require downscaling a military campaign in Lebanon that is broadly popular in Israel.

Much depends on final agreement

The 2015 agreement negotiated by the Obama administration severely limited Iran's nuclear program for 15 years.

During that period, Iran could only enrich uranium to a low level, far below what's needed for a weapon.

FILE: A B-2 bomber arrives at Whiteman Air Force Base, MO., on June 22, 2025, after returning from a massive strike on Iranian nuclear sites AP Photo

It could stockpile only 300 kilograms of the material and had to sharply reduce the number of centrifuges carrying out enrichment. It was also put under stricter inspections by the IAEA.

One main criticism was the 15-year time limit, after which opponents said Iran would be able to quickly ramp up its ability to produce a bomb. Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

A key question now will be whether the US can win stricter limits for the long term.

 U.S. Officials Disclose Details Of Framework Deal With Iran

June 18, 2026 
RFE RL
By Alex Raufoglu

Senior US officials have disclosed details of the framework deal with Iran that is set to be officially signed during a ceremony in Switzerland on June 19.

The memorandum of understanding envisages ending the fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon, reopening the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic, and ending the US naval blockade on Iran, according to the text read out on a background call with reporters on June 17.

Upon officially signing the deal, the two sides commit to agreeing to a final settlement in 60 days that includes limits to Iran’s nuclear program and the removal of US sanctions on the Islamic republic, the US officials said.

“This is fundamentally an agreement that allows us to open the Strait of Hormuz immediately, commits the Iranians to destroying the nuclear stockpile, and then gives us a dial,” one senior US official said.

The accord, which has already been signed electronically, marks the most sweeping US-Iran diplomatic breakthrough in years and comes after months of war, maritime disruption, and back-channel negotiations involving regional mediators.

Despite presenting the agreement as a major diplomatic opening, US officials repeatedly stressed deep skepticism about Tehran’s intentions and warned military and economic pressure could quickly resume.

A second senior US official said a critical test would come at talks in Switzerland this weekend, where negotiators are expected to try to convert the memorandum into a sequencing plan for implementation.

“The meeting this weekend in Switzerland will be quite critical,” the official said. “If one party is not meeting the expectation of the other party, we’ll hopefully know within days or weeks, not months.”

Hormuz Toll-Free, US Blockade Lifted

One of the most significant provisions requires Iran to facilitate safe commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz free of charge for 60 days, while negotiating a longer-term maritime framework with Oman and Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

The United States will begin ending its naval blockade immediately upon the official signing and fully remove it within 30 days, according to the text.

Officials said the provision was already having an impact. “For the first time in the 100 days of this conflict, Iran did not fire at any vessels,” one official said.

The accord also provides for waivers allowing Iranian oil exports to resume, a move officials defended as economically pragmatic despite criticism from some conservative US politicians.

Iran’s Nuclear Stockpile

The nuclear provisions appear to be the most politically sensitive and strategically significant.

Iran reaffirms it “shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons,” while agreeing that its enriched uranium stockpile would at a minimum be down blended on-site, the US officials said.

“That’s the floor,” one official said. “We will push for more than that.”

A senior US official said Washington would rely heavily on the UN nuclear watchdog and US technical teams for verification. “We’re not in the trusting business,” the official said.

The official added that US personnel were prepared to assist in physically removing nuclear material, if required.

Officials also said damage from recent US air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities had significantly limited Tehran’s ability to quickly recover the material.

Sanctions Relief Tied To Compliance

The deal envisions the eventual lifting of all US primary and secondary sanctions on Iran, but only as part of a final agreement.

The United States would also release billions in frozen Iranian assets in stages, contingent on what officials described as “good behavior.”

“What Iran wanted was access to these funds upon signing,” one official said. “What they conceded is that they wouldn’t get any money unless they performed.”

The agreement also outlines a reconstruction and development fund worth at least $300 billion, backed by Washington and regional partners, although officials emphasized Washington would not directly contribute funds.

Instead, sanctions waivers would allow Gulf investors and others to finance projects in Iran.

Alex Raufoglu is RFE/RL’s senior correspondent in Washington, D.C.


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Read the full text of the 14-point US-Iran agreement as released by Tehran

By Gavin Blackburn & Aleksandar Brezar

Published on 18/06/2026 - EURONEWS

After a draft agreement was leaked earlier this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian published Tehran's copy of the framework deal he and US President Donald Trump separately signed on Wednesday. Here are its contents.

Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian published Tehran's copy of the 14-point framework deal on Thursday, after he and US President Donald Trump separately initialled its physical copies, bringing the two countries closer to the end of the war that enveloped the Middle East following its opening salvos in February.

Despite an earlier announcement that the agreement would be signed at a ceremony in Switzerland on Friday, Trump put his signature on the deal while dining with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Palace of Versailles.

In Tehran, Pezeshkian also signed the document on Wednesday, according to the state-run IRNA news agency, which posted an image of him holding up the deal with his signature next to Trump's.

The deal calls for Tehran to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and waives US-backed sanctions on the country, immediately allowing Iran to sell its oil freely in a major concession from Washington, according to details released by both countries.

Pezeshkian published the facsimile of the document on Thursday on X, stating that it is "a historical document and a message from a powerful Iran: peace will be realised in the shadow of mutual respect."

"The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been committed and steadfast to global peace while preserving its dignity and independence, as well as to progress and regional cooperation," Pezeshkian said on X.

A separate document purporting to be the draft of the framework deal, initially published in Arabic-language media, had gained much attention on Wednesday despite not being officially confirmed by either Washington or Tehran.

The 14-point draft circulated at G7 meetings in France saw Tehran committing not to build nuclear weapons while Washington pledged $300 billion for Iran's reconstruction.

Trump appeared irritated by the leaks, telling reporters on the sidelines of the summit that "no one knows what it (the deal) is, but it will be very strong."

Here is the full text of the agreement as shared by Pezeshkian, titled "Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America":

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, and their allies in the current war, by signing this MoU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final Deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America commit to negotiating and achieving the final Deal, in maximum 60 days extendable with mutual consent.
2. Immediately upon the signing of this MoU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final Deal.
3. Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf Littoral States, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
4. The United States of America undertakes, with regional partners, to develop a definitive mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion, for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalised as part of final Deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.
5. The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final Deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned and express their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
6. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon, in accordance with the schedule mentioned in paragraph 7, with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on-site, under the supervision of the IAEA. The two Parties also agree to discuss the issue of enrichment, and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final Deal. The final Deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned and express their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
7. Pending the final Deal, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America agree to maintain the status quo; the Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions, and will not deploy additional forces in the region.

A poster of US President Donald Trump is set on fire during a rally in Tehran, 8 June, 2018 AP Photo

8. The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MoU, and until the termination of sanctions, the U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.
9. The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use, the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MoU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorisations accordingly.

Related

10. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this MoU and the future compliance of the final Deal.
11. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.
12. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.

Trump’s Iran Accord And The 2015 Nuclear Deal: What’s Different This Time? – Analysis

June 18, 2026 

 RFE RL
By Ray Furlong

The US-Iranian deal to end their war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz is inevitably being compared with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed with Tehran by then US President Barack Obama.

That deal was fiercely criticized by his successor, Donald Trump, who pulled the United States out of JCPOA in 2018 during his first term of office. Trump has repeatedly said his deal would be better, although the text he signed in Versailles on June 17 is not the final one — it leaves many issues to be negotiated over the next 60 (or more) days.

“If it were easy we would have resolved it, you know, two wars ago,” Naysan Rafati, Iran Senior Analyst at the International Crisis Group, told RFE/RL, referring both to the 12-Day War in June last year and to this year’s hostilities, that reignited with US and Israeli air strikes on February 28.

“The fundamentals of the Iranian nuclear program since last June have been different to what they were like under the JCPOA,” he added.

What Was In The JCPOA?

One thing that is unchanged is that Iran has always denied wishing to develop nuclear weapons but possesses enriched uranium to grades beyond what is needed for civilian purposes.

This was a core problem then and remains so today.

Key elements of the JCPOA were for Iran to ship 98 percent of its enriched uranium stockpile out of the country, accept limits on future enrichment to well below weapons-grade levels, mothball some centrifuges that are used for enrichment, and allow all this to be checked by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Wrapped in all this was a wealth of technical details, for example on exact levels of enrichment, quantities of enriched material, storage locations, and specific models of centrifuges. In addition, Iran pledged not to develop nuclear weapons.

In return, international sanctions related to the nuclear program (but not other issues such as Iran’s support for armed proxy groups across the Middle East, its missile program, or its human rights abuses) would be lifted based on verification that Iran was complying.

Additionally, Iran was granted access to overseas frozen assets whose value was greatly disputed (and variously calculated), with claims and estimates varying between $50-$100 billion, as well as payments from the US government totaling $1.3 billion.

The deal had a dispute resolution mechanism and a 2030 sunset clause. It was approved by the UN Security Council.

The agreement faced political resistance in Congress from both sides of the aisle from lawmakers who criticized it for limiting Iran’s nuclear program rather than dismantling it completely. Others pointed out that it failed to address the wider issues beyond the nuclear program that had also made Iran an international pariah.

Sanctions on Iran were lifted following IAEA verification in January 2016, with Washington certifying twice in 2017 that Iran was sticking to the deal.

The Road To War

In May 2018, President Trump withdrew from the agreement, which he described as “horrible, one-sided.”

From 2020-2021, Iran began ramping up both its numbers of centrifuges and its uranium enrichment, according to IAEA reports. This led Britain, France, and Germany (known as the E3) to say Tehran was no longer complying with the JCPOA.

In June last year, Israel and the United States carried out air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, warning that Iran was close to developing nuclear weapons. The Pentagon later assessed that operation Midnight Hammer had put back the program by up to two years, though there were conflicting reports about the exact extent of the damage.


“There has been widespread damage both to its facilities and across many of its senior nuclear-related personnel. But we also have not had on-the-ground inspections at the damage sites. The IAEA has been able to go into a couple of facilities, but not the major enrichment facilities that were targeted under Midnight Hammer,” said Rafati.

Iran began to restrict IAEA monitoring after the June conflict. Then, in September last year, another JCPOA provision, its so-called snapback clause, took effect.

This meant UN sanctions lifted under the terms of the deal were reimposed following Iranian noncompliance. The E3 initiated the move after Iran refused to meet their demands of full access for IAEA inspectors and transparency regarding enriched material stockpiles.

After the June 2025 conflict, Washington and Iran reengaged in nuclear talks. Those talks were abandoned when US and Israeli air strikes on Iran began on February 28.

What Now?

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Trump and Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian on June 17 provides for the immediate waiving of US oil sanctions on Iran, while tying the end of wider sanctions and the release of frozen assets to Iran implementing commitments, such as “down-blending” its stocks of highly enriched uranium under IAEA supervision.

“We’re not in the trusting business,” a senior US official said during a background callwith journalists on June 17.

The issue of enrichment is also left to be dealt with in further negotiations, while Iran “reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.”

As with the JCPOA, the MOU has been criticized, including with rumblings of discontent from Republican lawmakers who suggest Washington has given up too much for too little.

Max Meizlish, a senior analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, voiced concern over the oil sanction waivers.

“What we should be doing, if this is truly a performance-based deal, is tying any sanctions relief to actual conduct by the regime that goes beyond just participating in the negotiation, signing the memorandum of understanding, and opening up the strait,” he told RFE/RL.

“The US Congress is not going to give up easily here, absent significant reforms by Iran. And we’ll have to see. We’ll have to see what the US ultimately pushes for,” he added, referring to the talks yet to come.

Meizlish also criticized the lack of any reference to Iran’s other “malign activities” such as its missile program and support for groups such as Hezbollah, which is designated a terrorist organization by Washington.

As noted, the JCPOA was criticized on the same grounds.

The situation now, following two wars that have devastated Iran’s economy and damaged its nuclear facilities, is very different from 2015. Those conflicts have also substantially eroded trust, further complicating talks.

The JCPOA was not just a bilateral US-Iranian process: Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany were all involved in negotiations lasting nearly two years. The MOU says negotiators will aim for a deal within 60 days but also that this time period can be extended.

Rafati said the talks will need to be more technical and complex than they have been so far in 2025-26.

“Even when they were in Oman or in Rome, they were this cumbersome process of indirect negotiations in fairly kind of short bursts of time, kind of between brunch and dinner,” he said.

“Are they going to be accompanied by expert delegations that are actually going to get into the granularities of the nuclear nonproliferation side of things and the sanctions-relief side of things? Those technical delegations were present at some, but not all of the past negotiations…if there’s any kind of aspiration for getting this wrapped up in 60 days, it would have to be a fairly regular and empowered and technically competent set of experts from both sides,” he added.

Ray Furlong is a Senior International Correspondent for RFE/RL. He has reported for RFE/RL from the Balkans, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and elsewhere since joining the company in 2014. He previously worked for 17 years for the BBC as a foreign correspondent in Prague and Berlin

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RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.
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America’s Power Under Strain: Iran War Reveals U.S. Limits, Allies Pay The Price – OpEd

Family photo of G7 Summit in France. Photo Credit: White House, X

June 17, 2026 
By A. Jathindra

Who truly emerged victorious in the war between the United States and Iran? The conflict has yielded no clear answers, yet America’s friends have borne the brunt of Washington’s decisions. Iran’s retaliation against U.S. Gulf partners—and the deaths of three Indian seafarers in American strikes on oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz—underscore Henry Kissinger’s enduring warning: “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”

That maxim now applies most directly to India, which described the incident as a “profound loss to our maritime family.” The tragedy highlights how America’s military campaigns reverberate far beyond the battlefield, leaving allies vulnerable and questioning the costs of alignment with Washington.

During and after the war, a striking question emerged: will President Trump’s place in American political history be unique, or will he be remembered as the leader who challenged America’s global image? Under “Operation Absolute Resolve,” the Trump administration captured Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife in a twohour and twentyeightminute military raid, proclaiming a new Monroe Doctrine to reassert U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Yet the campaign against Iran proved far less decisive, registering instead as a historic setback. Although Trump and his advisers declared victory, they have struggled to sell that narrative on the world stage.

The 40day war has inevitably raised doubts about America’s titanic military power. Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenka, a close ally of Moscow, seized on the U.S.–Iran standoff to declare that President Donald Trump had shown the world the United States is “not as powerful as it claims.” “If the Americans couldn’t handle Iran, then they should not mess with China,” he added. His remarks may be dismissed as propaganda, yet the perception that Iran held its ground against Israel—the Middle East’s strongest military—and the United States, the world’s foremost military power, has gained traction across West Asia.


Pakistan’s mediation in the conflict added further complexity. Washington’s acquiescence to Islamabad’s agenda is seen as a sign of U.S. selfdecline. President Trump claimed credit for brokering a ceasefire during India’s “Operation Sindoor,” launched after the Pakistanbacked Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 people. India rejected Trump’s assertions, though he continued to maintain that his intervention had brought peace. Pakistan—a country that once sheltered Osama bin Laden, who was killed during a covert raid in Abbottabad—now positioning itself as a peace broker illustrates yet another slippage in America’s global image.

Why was “Operation Epic Fury” carried out? As Daniel Byman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies observed, Trump’s team set ambitious goals: ending Iran’s nuclear programme, degrading its missile and conventional forces, halting support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and ultimately regime change in Tehran. To that end, U.S. and Israeli forces killed Iranian leaders and bombed military infrastructure.

Israel launched an air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear programme and regime leadership on 12 June 2025, aiming to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of weaponisation. Some analysts noted that the 12day campaign succeeded to an extent by exposing structural weaknesses in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and demonstrating Israel’s technological superiority. Yet despite these tactical gains, the operation ultimately failed to achieve its strategic objectives. This failure was the reason the United States and Israel launched another war.

Washington now appears to be seeking a settlement rather than confrontation, with talks and an official signing ceremony expected on 19 June in Switzerland. This is widely seen as evidence of the failure of America’s “Big Stick Diplomacy” toward Iran. Negotiating with Iran’s theocratic regime—responsible for massacring tens of thousands of protesters—allows Tehran to claim victory simply by surviving. Even though U.S. commanders insist they achieved their objectives, including the destruction of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities, the reality is stark: Iran remains at the table with the world’s sole hegemonic power.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated on 8 April that the U.S. military had three objectives: to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities, its navy, and its defence industrial base to ensure it could not reconstitute power beyond its borders. He declared those objectives achieved. Admiral Brad Cooper of CENTCOM echoed that claim the following day. Yet the fact that Washington is now pursuing a settlement suggests otherwise.

The truth is undeniable: Iran can claim success simply by surviving and now negotiating as an equal with the United States. For Israel, the implications are profound. A regime that continues to chant “Death to Israel” has endured, and in West Asia, Iran remains a formidable challenge to the State of Israel and its security.

Even if Washington and Tehran were to reach an agreement, profound uncertainties would remain: would it truly guarantee peace in the Middle East, end Iran’s proxy operations against Israel, or halt its nuclear ambitions? The answers are far from assured. As long as the antiIsrael regime in Tehran endures, peace in the region will remain elusive—and in that sense, America appears to have forfeited its ability to decisively shape the future trajectory of the Middle East.


About A. Jathindra
A.Jathindra is a geopolitical analyst and the founding director of the Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies, an independent think tank based in the port city of Trincomalee, Sri Lanka. His work focuses on Geopolitics and International Relations, with particular emphasis on China, South Asian security challenges, regional politics, and transnational terrorism.He is an alumnus of the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), having participated in the regional initiative “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific.”
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Hormuz And The New Era Of Economic Warfare – OpEd

June 18, 2026 
EurActiv
By Chris Kremidas-Courtney

(EurActiv) — The Strait of Hormuz crisis is offering new lessons about how power works in the 21st century. Europe should take heed.

Despite reports of a new ceasefire agreement, the situation remains unstable and negotiations between Washington and Tehran have been opaque. Iran has previously threatened a complete closure of the Strait if it judges ceasefire terms to have been violated – a condition which shows that the economic warfare could still be ramped up.

In a world where key chokepoints are weaponised, the only two options are to shape events or be shaped by them. Right now, Europe is being shaped.

Its energy security strategy remains largely reactive and dependent on a US naval presence to keep critical waterways open, and on market diversification that is proving to be too shallow when a disruption materialises.

Having spent the years since 2022 diversifying away from dangerous energy dependencies – replacing Russian gas with LNG and building strategic reserves – the current situation reveals the underlying vulnerability was displaced but not yet solved.

Latest data from the first days of June shows that Iranian crude exports have collapsed by 84% in a single month, falling 87% below the average of the previous year. Production itself has been cut by 800,000 barrels per day.

The US has not only been sanctioning Iranian oil but also deployed warships to deter very large crude carrier movements, making the insurance and compliance cost of shadow fleet participation increasingly prohibitive.

This has forced Tehran into smaller, slower, more expensive tanker classes that reduce export capacity even when individual shipments do get through.

During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the US intervened to protect commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Today, Washington is selectively suppressing Iranian oil traffic while Iran is simultaneously blocking other vessels, including many commercial crude carriers. It is two actors using one chokepoint as a weapon simultaneously.

The post-Gulf War sanctions regime against Iraq offers a second, cautionary comparison. Those sanctions succeeded in suppressing Iraqi oil revenues and constraining rearmament, but they leaked persistently through the Oil-for-Food programme and regional workarounds involving Jordan and Turkey. The lesson was that sanctions without enforcement can leave large gaps, and the political will to close them erodes over time.

The most important enforcement gap today is also the most revealing. Chinese-affiliated vessels accounted for nearly a quarter of all ships exiting the Gulf since March, and this appears to be by arrangement rather than by accident. The US has been applying maximum pressure on Iranian revenue while declining to directly confront Beijing over its continued purchase of sanctioned crude. The exemption China enjoys signals precisely where Washington is willing to escalate, and where it is not.

The shadow fleet is also transforming in ways that will likely outlast this crisis. The emergence of mainstream shipowners taking on tankers with documented sanction histories suggests the lines between the legitimate and shadow maritime economy are beginning to blur.

This greying of the global shipping fleet is creating long-term governance gaps that existing sanctions regimes were not designed to address. Of course, the UN law of the sea (UNCLOS) was flawed from the start since geopolitical horse-trading gutted flag state accountability before the ink was dry.

Iran’s effective closure of the Strait is also an act of economic warfare whose costs are spread across global markets. Insurance premiums have spiked and rerouting shipments adds expenses to supply chains far beyond the Gulf. Tehran may be losing the export battle but its capacity to hamstring the global economy remains unchecked.

What June 2026 tells us about economic warfare is that whether wielded by a superpower or a sanctioned state, it can produce collapsing export revenue, production cuts, exhausting workarounds, and amplify risk across global markets. It’s also more viable when conducted with enough ambiguity to avoid triggering the escalatory responses that a more direct confrontation might invite.

European energy markets remain exposed to Gulf disruption, and the all-time high prices in late May were an early signal of what a prolonged crisis means for European industrial competitiveness. The EU is not a party to this conflict but is nonetheless absorbing its consequences.

About the author: Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre, associate fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and author of ‘The Rest of Your Life: Five Stories of Your Future.’

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COMMENT: Iran and the GCC, the memory remains

Relations across the Gulf are near zero. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Professor Simon Mabon June 15, 2026

When Iranian rockets and drones hit the US 5th Fleet in Manama, videos posted on social media showed some Bahrainis celebrating the strikes. The videos revealed the deep-seated anger felt by many at the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, and a spiritual figure for Shia Muslims around the world. For the Bahraini authorities, the videos once again raised suspicion about the loyalties of Shia inhabitants of the country, highlighting the multiple security calculations emerging from the conflict.

One hundred days into the war, and a diplomatic resolution appears within reach, albeit merely a Memorandum of Understanding at this point. Even if there is a final agreement, the memory of the past 100 days will linger for years to come. Finding a way to address the suspicion and animosity is of paramount importance.

Amongst the many different issues raised by the conflict, the question of regional security is perhaps foremost in the minds of Gulf leaders. The conflict has highlighted the vulnerabilities that come with relying on the US for security. Moreover, as several officials have stressed, Arab Gulf states cannot change their geography; they have to find a way of living alongside the Islamic Republic and, in addition, create an environment that is conducive to the security of all parties.

This conclusion had previously been reached by Saudi Arabia following the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais oil refineries in 2019. Furious Saudi officials had expected a forceful response from the US, but this was not forthcoming. Instead, in a marked policy shift, the Kingdom embarked on a long and arduous process of resetting relations with Iran, a state with which the Saudis had severed diplomatic relations in 2016. This process took a huge amount of effort and the work of countless intermediaries who undertook track II diplomatic efforts, highlighting the depth of animosity between the two states. Ultimately, diplomatic efforts were successful, seen through the normalisation agreement signed in 2023 in Beijing. Yet recent developments appear to have derailed this progress.

The volume of strikes conducted by Iran on its Gulf neighbours makes shared security an increasingly challenging outcome to achieve. Though Tehran was initially quick to stress that strikes were on US targets, not against their Arab and Muslim brothers - statements that were swiftly rejected by Gulf leaders - as the war progressed, strikes also hit non-US targets within the Gulf states.

Across the past 4 decades, geopolitical crises have resonated within states as well as between them. A closer look at history in this time highlights this. Suspicion at the region’s Shia inhabitants has long plagued politics across the Arab Gulf states. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the articulation of an expansionist foreign policy in support of the “downtrodden” of the Muslim world, the region’s Shia population has been viewed with suspicion and trepidation by many of their Sunni counterparts.

Iranian involvement in the establishment of Hezbollah, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, collaboration with Hezbollah al Hijaz, and other Shia groups fostered suspicion towards both Tehran and their coreligionists across the Middle East. Statements from Ruhollah Khomeini, the theological architect of the Islamic Republic, and other Iranian officials about exporting the revolution exacerbated many of these concerns.

Following the US lead invasion of Iraq in 2003, narratives of perfidious Iranian engagement across the Middle East reverberated, perhaps best captured in King Abdullah of Jordan‘s remarks about a Shi’a Crescent that spread from Iran all the way across to the Mediterranean Sea. This again hinted at the divided loyalties among local Shi’a populations and Iran's growing capacity to manipulate those divisions. What followed was the emergence of a climate of distrust and violence, exacerbated by the sectarian conflict that consumed Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Fearing the growing influence of Iran, Bahrain’s rulers sought to cultivate closer relations with Israel back in 2007, some 13 years before the signing of the Abraham Accords.

When the Arab Uprisings broke out in 2011 the legacy and memory of Iranian actions during the 1980s shaped the responses of many in Bahrain for example the ruling Al Khalifa family framed protesters as nefarious Iranian fifth colonists With some evoking memories of the 1980s to justify these actions. Others suggested that Iran had been smuggling weapons into Bahrain while similar developments were felt in Kuwait with terrorit plots allegedly thwarted by the state.

As history has shown, trust is difficult to build but easy to shatter. But geography is inescapable. Qatar shares a gas field with Iran, there is a large Iranian population in the UAE, and the Islamic Republic has cultivated positive relations with Oman. While the signing of the Saudi-Iran normalisation agreement shows that suspicion can be overcome, the sheer volume of Iranian attacks on Gulf states has provoked deep anger and concern. Add possible spoilers into the mix and the situation remains volatile, even if a final agreement can be reached.

Much of the goodwill generated between the Saudis and Iranians from March 2023 to February 2026 has dissipated. Few will trust Iran moving forward, especially if, as some suggest, the Islamic Republic is emboldened by the outcome of the war (which is looking increasingly likely). Whether trust can be restored between states in the Gulf, but also between different sectarian communities within states, remains to be seen.

Simon Mabon is Professor of International Politics at Lancaster University and the author of Schism: The Story of Sectarianism in the Modern Middle East (Yale University Press, 2026).