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Wednesday, November 11, 2026

GERMANY

Controversial kinship: From colonial rule to the Holocaust?


Helen Whittle
DW
November 10, 2026

Hitler once called Eastern Europe "Germany's India." A new exhibition examines the links between colonialism and Nazism, and the bitter debate over where comparisons illuminate history and where they fall short.

European colonialism was marked by the — often extremely violent — exploitation of people and resources.
 [Pictured: Clearing of land by setting grass on fire during a German research expedition to Tendaguru in German East Africa, 1909–1913]
Image: Archiv/Museum für Naturkunde


Racial hierarchy, dehumanization, concentration camps, settler expansion in the name of "living space," collective punishment and mass violence: At first glance, the continuities between colonial and Nazi violence appear obvious. In 1941, Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler himself compared Eastern Europe to "Germany's India" after the British colonial model, declaring that "like the English, we shall rule this empire with a handful of men."

But the extent to which Nazism was shaped by the age of empire, and whether the two systems of violence can even be compared, remains the subject of intense debate. This is particularly true in Germany, where the fear is often expressed that any comparison risks relativizing or minimizing Nazi crimes, and particularly the Holocaust. Others have argued that the intense focus on the Nazi era has, at least in part, come at the expense of a meaningful reckoning with Germany's colonial history.

'Murder for the very purpose of murder': The industrialized mass murder carried out in Nazi death camps such as Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka and Auschwitz-Birkenau had no direct precedent in colonial history. [Pictured: Cans of Zyklon B gas, Auschwitz-Birkenau, German Nazi concentration and extermination camp in Poland]
Image: Taiftin/Depositphotos/IMAGO

"I do think this is nonsense," says Stephan Malinowski, a Professor of Modern European History at the University of Edinburgh. "If it were true, then all other colonial countries who are not discussing the Holocaust, like Great Britain for example, or France or Spain or Portugal, they would then supposed to be very, very attentive to colonial crimes and to colonial history, which it seems to me is not the case."

"Controversial Kinship: Colonial and National Socialist Violence," a new exhibition at the German Historical Museum in Berlin curated by Malinowski, does not aim to settle the debate but to tell its story.

From colonial brutality to Nazi rule

The exhibition begins with a hippopotamus-hide whip used in African colonies displayed alongside a canister of Zyklon B, the poison used in Nazi gas chambers. The juxtaposition highlights the contrast between colonial violence and the industrialized mass murder of the Holocaust. Yet it also points to connections: Whips were used in Nazi concentration camps, while Fascist Italy deployed chemical weapons against civilians and soldiers during its invasion of Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) in 1935-36.

The extreme brutality of Fascist Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, including the use of chemical weapons, caused uproar around the world. [Pictured: The bombing of the Ethiopian village of Dessye by Italian planes]
Image: Topfoto/United Archives International/IMAGO

In the 1930s, anti-colonial thinkers from India to the Caribbean argued that colonialism and fascism were two sides of the same coin. "There is nothing new or original about the blustering exploits of Hitler and Mussolini," observed the Trinidadian journalist and Pan-Africanist George Padmore in 1938. "They have all been used before by the British in their efforts to obtain the subjection of less powerfully armed and more industrially backward people."

European colonial rule was marked by the ruthless exploitation of people and resources, often enforced through extreme violence. In "The Origins of Totalitarianism" (1951), German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt argued that colonial territories served as laboratories for racial ideologies and practices of domination that could be applied beyond the legal constraints of Europe. Arendt described how these later "boomeranged" back into Europe and helped shape totalitarian politics in distinct and unprecedented form.
One of the most notorious symbols of King Leopold II's rule was the amputation of hands, inflicted on men, women and children who failed to meet rubber production quotas. [Pictured: A Congolese child with an amputated hand, circa 1900]
Image: United Archives/World History Archive/IMAGO

The Congo Free State, King Leopold II of Belgium's private colony from 1885 to 1908, became notorious for its extreme brutality, as colonial authorities used executions, amputations and sexual violence to ensure rubber production quotas were met. Forced labor was also central to Nazi rule, with millions of Poles, Ukrainians, Russians and others from the Soviet Union, and Jews, subjected to exploitation and "Vernichtung durch Arbeit" ("extermination through work"). Within a few years, the regime mobilized around 13 to 14 million forced laborers, a scale comparable to the transatlantic slave trade over more than three centuries. The Nazis sought to extract value from their victims at every stage, confiscating their property, exploiting their labor, and even harvesting gold teeth and hair from the dead.

Racism, antisemitism and extermination

While racism underpinned both colonial empires and Nazism, Malinowski says the goals were different. The colonial powers tended to present assimilation as a path to advancement, forcing colonized people to adopt European culture, serve imperial interests, and suggesting that a select, educated few could gain opportunities at elite institutions such as Oxford or Cambridge. "This is definitely not something that the Nazi regime is offering to Poles or to Russians or let alone to Jews," added Malinowski.

"In terms of violence, colonial violence was just as extreme as Nazi violence. But Nazi violence was annihilatory and exterminatory compared to colonial violence in the colonies," says Edward Kissi, a historian at the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies at the University of South Florida. He points to the example of how, unlike European colonial powers in Africa, the Nazis pursued the elimination of Black-Germans or peoples of African descent in Germany through forced sterilization. "Even in racism, colonial color-based racism and colonial anti-Jewish sentiments were fundamentally different from what the Nazis pursued."

From 1904 to 1908, German colonial rule in present-day Namibia culminated in the genocide of the Herero and Nama, in which tens of thousands died. [Pictured: Concentration camp for Herero and Nama in German South West Africa in 1905]
Image: Sam-Cohen-Bibliothek/Scientific Society Swakopmund

On October 2, 1904, German General Lothar von Trotha issued the "Vernichtungsbefehl" ("extermination order") following the Herero uprising in German South West Africa (present-day Namibia). Historians generally attribute the order to a combination of racial ideology, a desire to terrorize the population into submission, and efforts to secure colonial control over land, labor and resources. Between 1904 and 1908, an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 Herero (around 80% of the population) and 10,000 (around half the population) Nama died.

One area where the exhibition draws no direct parallel is the industrialized killing carried out in Nazi death camps such as Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz-Birkenau. "Where the two things really diverge is the Holocaust and is the systematic mass murder of the European Jews and it's murder for the very purpose of murder," explains Malinowski. The deportation of around 1,800 Jews from the Greek islands of Rhodes and Kos in July 1944 illustrates how Nazi persecution often defied military or economic logic. Even after the war was effectively lost, the community was transported to Auschwitz, where most were murdered immediately upon arrival.

The politics of historical comparison

The issue of the "singularity" of the Holocaust came to the fore during the 1980s "Historikerstreit" ("historians' dispute"). Historian Ernst Nolte argued that Nazism should be understood in the wider context of 20th-century political violence, and as a response to Bolshevik terror in particular. Critics accused him of downplaying German responsibility for Nazi crimes.

Since 2020, a renewed debate dubbed the "Historikerstreit 2.0" has focused on whether the Holocaust should be viewed as a unique reference point in German memory culture or be understood alongside the histories of colonialism, racism and empire. The dispute now is less about the legitimacy of comparison than about its implications.

After being deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1943, French artist David Olère depicted scenes he witnessed. Here, deportees arrive at a crematorium shortly before their murder. [Pictured: David Olère, 'Vers la mort' ('On the Way to Death'), Paris, 1945]
Image: Mémorial de la Shoah/Coll. David Olère

The mass murder of tens of thousands of the Herero and Nama during four years of German colonial rule is now regarded as the first genocide of the 20th-century. In 2016, Nama representatives walked out of talks after Germany's chief negotiator said what happened was "incomparable" to the Holocaust. The German government has since recognized the events as genocide "from today's perspective," but it has not yet accepted legal liability or agreed to pay formal reparations.

Rethinking Germany's culture of remembrance

Martinican intellectual Aimé Césaire argued in "Discourse on Colonialism" (1950) that Europe condemned under Nazism forms of violence it had long accepted in its colonies. The exhibition opens amid renewed debates over settler colonialism, the definition of genocide, and the meaning of "never again," sharpened by Nicaragua's case against Germany at the International Court of Justice over German support for Israel during the war in Gaza. These tensions are reflected in visitors' comments in the exhibition's epilogue, even though the exhibition itself does not address Israel or Palestine beyond a reference to Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921.

Germany has unequivocally accepted responsibility for the Holocaust, which is front and center of the country's culture of remembrance. However, Kissi likens Germany's apparent reluctance to reckon with its colonial history to debates in the US over slavery, in Cambodia over the Khmer Rouge, and in Turkey over the Armenian genocide. According to him, Germany's contemporary identity cannot be fully understood without examining its colonial history and the ways the Nazis appropriated and transformed aspects of that legacy. "I think Germans and all other human beings who have experienced violent pasts and difficult pasts should be very careful not to delink or dissociate those facts from their present," Kissi said. "These are historical patterns. It is better to deal with these historical patterns and discomforts than to just fight them and then say this has absolutely nothing to do with German national identity."

"Controversial Kinship: Colonial and National Socialist Violence" is on show at the German Historical Museum until April 11, 2027.


Helen Whittle British journalist in Berlin
Edited by:Sarah Judith Hofmann

Sunday, November 08, 2026

 

Victor Serge’s revolutionary literature

On the anniversary of the October Revolution, we revisit Victor Serge’s life and work. Caught between revolutionary hope and Stalinist betrayal, his writings illuminate Europe’s turbulent twentieth century.




By Ian Birchall

A 1913 courtroom sketch of Victor Serge by Paul Charles Delaroche. (Bibliothèque Nationale de France)

Review of Victor Serge: Unruly Revolutionary by Mitchell Abidor (Pluto Press, 2025)

Many readers will be familiar with Victor Serge’s literary work: his novels, notably The Case of Comrade Tulayev, and his fascinating autobiography Memoirs of a Revolutionary. All his work centers around the great historical events of the first half of the twentieth century, the hopes aroused by the Russian Revolution of 1917, and its subsequent disastrous outcome.

Now Mitchell Abidor has written a biography of Serge, based on extensive research and using documentation collected by the great Serge scholar and translator, Richard Greeman. While Abidor does not fundamentally challenge the account Serge himself presented in the Memoirs, he does add much fascinating detail that places Serge’s political evolution in context.

Anarchism and Bolshevism

Born to a Russian family in Belgium with the name Viktor Lvovich Kibalchich, Serge went through a remarkable process of intellectual development while still a teenager (he never went to school). He moved to Paris and became active as a writer and editor in the anarchist milieu, ending up in jail for five years.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 was the vital turning point in Serge’s development.

Abidor devotes the first quarter of the book to Serge’s time as an anarchist. Revolutionaries are not born such, but make themselves, often through a path marked by difficulties and contradictions. Though Serge always retained a certain sympathy for anarchism, Abidor shows that there were some deeply reactionary elements in the Parisian anarchist scene.

The influence of radical individualism and a marked pessimism about the possibility of social change meant that Serge was very skeptical about the viability of collective action. It was his later experiences of mass action, first in Spain and then in Russia, that would lead to a fundamental reorientation of his political activity.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 was the vital turning point in Serge’s development. For Serge, as for a whole generation devastated by the horrific mass slaughter of World War I, the rise to power of the Bolshevik Party was a moment of hope — hope that it would be possible to construct a quite different social order.

The young Serge had engaged in speculation about the possibility of revolution. Now a real revolution had happened, and even if it diverged from his earlier ideas, he was determined to play his part in it. With great difficulty, he made his way across Europe and put himself at the service of the Bolsheviks.

Postrevolutionary Russia was no paradise. The main reason — and one which Abidor might have stressed more — was the efforts made by the great powers of the West (Britain, France, the United States, etc.) to subvert and overthrow the new regime and to prevent the hope it embodied from infecting working people elsewhere in the world. Foreign armies invaded Russia to join up with native counterrevolutionaries; the so-called civil war was a war of national defense. Serge, who fought in the armed defense of Petrograd and wrote a powerful history, Year One of the Russian Revolution, understood this well.

Certainly Serge had, as Abidor shows, criticisms and reservations about the earliest years of the revolution. But there is no doubt that his main motivation in these years was a commitment to defend and propagate the revolution. He even supported the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt against the Bolsheviks in 1921 (though he changed his mind about this later). Serge developed the concept of “double duty”: the need to confront the external enemies of the revolution but also at the same time the negative factors within the revolution.

Like Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, Serge was convinced that the revolution could only survive and develop if it spread westward. In the mid-1920s, he moved to central Europe, aiming to play his part in the hoped-for German revolution that would have transformed the balance of forces throughout Europe. However illusory the hopes of a German revolution may appear to have been in retrospect, the Germany of 1923, described by Serge in a series of press reports, was on the verge of social and economic collapse — it really did look like a society on the brink of revolution.

Midnight in the Century

The ten years of revolutionary commitment were, in a sense, the most important years of Serge’s life. They gave him an ideal and a vision of hope against which subsequent deformations and betrayals of the revolution could be measured. By the late 1920s, things had changed catastrophically. Lenin was dead, Trotsky had been sent into exile, and Joseph Stalin was increasingly in control of the USSR.

Serge’s sympathies were with Trotsky, a figure whom, despite differences between them, he always admired. But the regime could not tolerate Serge’s support for the Left Opposition, despite — indeed because of — his record as a supporter of the revolution. He was arrested, savagely interrogated, and sent into exile over nine hundred miles from Moscow.

In a sense Serge was lucky: he was exiled, but not sent to a concentration camp. Most of his contemporaries who had oppositional sympathies ended up dead. One of the main reasons Serge avoided this fate was the fact that a significant group of friends and comrades in France waged a vigorous campaign for his release. Stalin, who needed allies on the French left, decided to exile him rather than put him on trial.

The ten years of revolutionary commitment were, in a sense, the most important years of Serge’s life.

Like many people, I have often been asked to express support for people imprisoned in foreign countries, and wondered if there was any point to it. Serge’s release shows that such campaigns can work, sometimes at least.

Serge returned to Belgium, then France. He continued to write copiously, both journalism and novels. While he had escaped Stalinism, other threats remained. Throughout Western Europe, fascism was on the rise.

After Francisco Franco’s triumphal march into Madrid and Barcelona in 1939, France was surrounded on three sides by fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, and Spain. It was, in a phrase Serge coined as the title for one of his novels, “midnight in the century.” When France was occupied by German troops the following year and a viciously right-wing, antisemitic regime established, Serge aimed to get out of Europe and escape to North America.

This was the phase of Serge the asylum seeker. Perhaps few asylum seekers have a political past like Serge’s, or a literary talent like his. But in his efforts to find a place on a boat bound across the Atlantic, Serge reminds us of the problems and torments faced by all refugees from his time to our own.

Serge found sanctuary in Mexico, which welcomed many refugees from Europe. Leon Trotsky had been exiled (and murdered by a Stalinist agent) there. Serge spent his last years surrounded by European exiles, with a variety of hopes and aspirations for the postwar world. He continued to write, both for publication and in his notebooks. He died in 1947, aged only fifty-six, in deep poverty (there were holes in his shoes), worn out by a life of struggle and persecution.

Unanswered Questions

For those like myself who have long admired Serge, the concluding section of Abidor’s book is perhaps the saddest. Abidor has carefully examined Serge’s published and unpublished writings from his last years, and he convincingly concludes that in his last years, Serge saw communism as the “main enemy.”

For those like myself who have long admired Serge, the concluding section of Abidor’s book is perhaps the saddest.

In one sense, this is scarcely surprising. Stalinist violence was not confined to the USSR: the pro-Stalin Communists in Mexico had physically attacked Serge and may even have tried to kill him. It was small wonder that he would come to see them as his principal enemy.

In fact, it is difficult to know how Serge would have developed had he lived longer. He died in the autumn of 1947; the Cold War had begun only earlier that year, with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine as the US president promised material support to nations resisting communism and the turn to militant strikes by the Communist Parties of Western Europe. For the next forty years, world politics would be dominated by the confrontation between the US and Soviet blocs.

Some ex-Communists, like Arthur Koestler, became loyal and enthusiastic supporters of the Western camp. But there was also a much smaller current, represented by figures such as C. L. R. James, Hal Draper, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Tony Cliff, who took a different view. While arguing that Stalinism had nothing in common with socialism, they sought a political path that would be independent of both Washington and Moscow. Would Serge have backed the Americans in Korea and Vietnam, or would he have stood by the spirit of revolutionary independence that had characterized his life so far? We can only speculate.

The range of choices facing Serge can be illustrated by looking at some of the companions who shared his exile in Mexico. Marceau Pivert had been the leader of the French Socialist Party’s far-left faction during the 1930s before breaking away to form a group of his own. In 1945, he returned to France and rejoined the Socialist Party.

While he opposed all cooperation with the French Communist Party, Pivert became increasingly dissatisfied with the Socialist Party’s rightward drift. In particular, he remained committed to the cause of colonial liberation and strongly opposed the repression of the movement for Algerian independence; this led to his final break with the Socialist Party leadership shortly before his death in 1958.


Another of Serge’s close associates, Julián Gorkin, followed a different path. During the Spanish Civil War, he had been a leader of the POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unity), which confronted the Communist Party of Spain from the left. Exiled in Mexico, he helped Serge obtain a Mexican visa, and together with him had faced violence from Mexican Stalinists.

However, by the time he moved to Paris in 1948, Gorkin had firmly aligned himself as an anti-communist in the Cold War. He became editor of a Spanish-language journal, Cuadernos, on behalf of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which (as became widely known) was financed and controlled by the US Central Intelligence Agency.

Hope and Betrayal

One thing is clear: Serge’s perspective is primarily European. Although he had written a very perceptive article on the Chinese rising of 1927, he otherwise showed little interest in Africa and Asia. Yet the collapse of the old colonial empires was one of the most important developments after 1945. Britain was forced out of India, while France fought two bloody and disastrous wars in Indochina and Algeria. How Serge would have responded we cannot know.

If Serge’s death left unanswered questions, his life was a remarkable contribution to the politics of the socialist left.

If Serge’s death left unanswered questions, his life was a remarkable contribution to the politics of the socialist left. Abidor’s account is a fascinating and well-documented story; it deserves to be read and hopefully will encourage more people to read Serge’s own writings.

All of Serge’s life and work was dominated by a contradiction — the way the very real hope inspired by 1917 gave way to the betrayal of Stalinism. As Serge summed it up: “Out of a magnificent workers’ victory we have seen the rise, on the basis of the socialist ownership of the means of production, of an inhuman regime, profoundly anti-socialist in the way it treats human beings.”

It was this contradiction that shaped the world of the twentieth century. The heritage is still with us, as we face midnight in our own century. Thus rebels against the system are labeled “Marxists,” often by people who know little or nothing of what Marxism is. The memory of the Cold War and McCarthyite anti-communism remains with us. There is still much to be learned from the life and work of Victor Serge.


Ian Birchall is the author of Sartre Against Stalinism and many articles and essays on the twentieth-century French left.

The first major electoral victory against Big Tech came from Brazil, from us!

Saturday 7 November 2026, by Ann Carol




What the Brazilian working class, especially our younger segment, achieved over this past month will be remembered as one of the greatest electoral victories in history. [1]

It was never part of the script that a grand coalition consisting of fascists, the agribusiness sector, transnational corporations, the financial sector, organized crime and militias, faith scammers, sports betting companies, soccer clubs, and the Big Tech companies would be defeated by popular mobilization. This is all the more remarkable given that it followed a government fraught with limitations, and a first-round campaign that felt like Lula had “already won" without much mobilization.

Make no mistake: we defeated fascism at the ballot box not because of the political consultants working for Lula, the Workers’ Party (PT), or figures like Janones, but rather through the self-organization of the working class. From the very first moment following the setback in the first round, committees, WhatsApp groups, social movements and collectives sprang up across every corner of Brazil, uniting to strategize and engage in the day-to-day reality of the class struggle.
In a way not seen for a long time, labour unions opened their doors, becoming hubs for popular organization. People gathered after work to brainstorm ways to win over votes and how to reach out to those who hadn’t been sufficiently convinced to head to the polls in the first round. Carpools and crowdfunding efforts were organized to ensure that everyone could cast their vote.

While social media, which had been the primary focus of Lula’s first-round campaign, played a role, this was not the sole factor in shifting votes. In fact, had we relied on social media alone, we would have suffered yet another defeat. The direct influence from Trump and the Big Techs, most notably Meta, was overwhelming. The takedown of profiles and posts, the restriction of reach, discriminatory advertising pricing (Bolsonaro’s campaign had to pay less per ad and Lula’s was restricted for sometime to spend money on META’s platforms), and all manner of arbitrary actions on platforms through which most Brazilians shop and consume information combined with a Superior Electoral Court (TSE) held captive by Jair Bolsonaro’s appointees André Mendonça (the "terribly evangelical" one) and Kassio Nunes Marques (a friend of Vorcaro and Flávio Bolsonaro), created a monster that, until now, had won every election it has competed in. From the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s two election campaigns to Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018, the exponential growth of far-right parties across Europe and Latin America to, finally, the crossroads where we find ourselves today following the second round of the elections it is likely that this marks the first major defeat for the Big Techs.

It was on the streets, at universities, within our local territories and workplaces through the daily face-to-face interactions between people that we managed to escape this monster and rebuild human networks for political engagement and debate.

We, the youth, have shown once again why we are the "loose piece" in this system and a source of great danger to those in power. Within hours the streets of Niterói in Rio de Janeiro were occupied without the need for any sound trucks, fueled solely by the power of our own fury. In just a few more hours, that same desire spread through universities, Federal Institutes and schools: a cry of hope from those who have very little, yet demand everything.

Looking ahead, we cannot allow this momentum to dissipate once Lula takes office once again. We know based on the last few decades, and especially on the most recent administration, that the conservative governance practiced by Lula is fraught with contradictions.

The coming months and years will not be easy. Many of Lula’s own proposals are not in our favor - not to mention the far-right agenda held by the majority in the National Congress. The good news is that we possess the antidote: ourselves. A self-organized working class is the answer and mobilization is the path forward. The class consciousness built up over the recent period must serve as our fuel and our tool to secure victories in the time ahead. Let us reach the next election with clear restrictions on how Big Tech companies operate in Brazil, with universal fare-free public transit provided by a federal public transport company, a fairer distribution of electoral resources, a higher minimum wage, a shorter workweek, freedom of association for unions and strengthened universities and schools.

Let’s fight this together! Defeat fascism and make our victories on the streets!

4 November 2026

P.S.

If you like this article or have found it useful, please consider donating towards the work of International Viewpoint. Simply follow this link: Donate then enter an amount of your choice. One-off donations are very welcome. But regular donations by standing order are also vital to our continuing functioning. See the last paragraph of this article for our bank account details and take out a standing order. Thanks.

Footnotes

[1] Photo: President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva celebrating his electorial victory after the 2006 elections. Marcello Casal Jr.

Mobilising against two existential threats

Data centre

First published at Walden Bello’s Facebook page.

I am sharing these thoughts a few days after Lula da Silva’s impressive electoral victory in Brazil. Democracy was under threat from fascism and the people came out in force to save it. What made the difference, according to many accounts, was the combination of street mobilisation and coordinated online protest to get people to vote.

Inspiration from Brazil

What is notable is how many people worldwide have drawn inspiration from Lula’s victory. In the days leading up to and after the elections, people the world over felt invested in Lula’s fate — whether they were in Africa, Asia, Europe or North America, they felt their future would be affected.

Hence the great sigh of relief and elation that was heard from Rio to Johannesburg to Jakarta. This feeling of global solidarity has revealed to many the vision of what we could accomplish if we translate that solidarity into a coordinated global movement to save democracy, save the climate, and save humanity from AI.

Ever since the world became aware of the climate crisis, pressure from civil society has been focused on getting governments to come up with an agreement to prevent the rise of global mean temperature by 1.5oC. That strategy has had some success, notably the Paris Agreement of 2015.

But the limits of that strategy have become evident a decade later: the voluntary climate reduction efforts nations have pledged will not prevent a rise of 2.7oC of global mean temperature by the end of the century, and meeting the target of $100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries has had little success.

What we need is a global mass mobilisation that can move governments to take more decisive action to save the climate.

Lessons of the anti-globalisation struggle

If you think that is impossible, remember it was global mass action that stopped globalisation in its tracks and exposed the fact that it was not leading to prosperity but to great inequality, more poverty, and global economic crisis. If no one talks anymore about the so-called benefits of globalisation — the mantra we kept hearing in the late 1990s and the 2010s — it is because of global mass mobilisation.

Of course, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19 played a role, but global mass resistance was decisive. A landmark study led by Isabel Ortiz and her colleagues found that of the 2809 protests between 2006–20 they analysed, 1484 were related to neoliberal reform or structural adjustment; that is, issues

related to jobs, wages and/or labor conditions; the reform of public services; corporate influence, deregulation, and privatization; inequality; tax and fiscal justice; low living standards; agrarian/land reform; high fuel and energy prices; pension reform; housing; and high food prices.

In addition,

897 protests were for environmental and climate justice; against the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank, and the European Union/European Central Bank; against imperialism (United States, China); against free trade; in defense of the global commons; and against the G20.

These protests included transborder mobilisations against key instruments of globalisation: the World Bank, IMF, and the World Trade Organization. Protests against these multilateral institutions were among the most prominent of some 209 transborder protests in the period 2006–20.

The most decisive were the mass mobilisations that led to the collapse of the Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle, in late November 1999, and the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, in 2003. The WTO was intended to be the key instrument in liberalising global trade and investment. With the collapse of the WTO ministerial conference in Cancun, the US and EU lost interest in the WTO as the main agency for globalisation. It also led to the widespread discrediting of the globalist project.

The point is mass protests made the difference in stopping the project of corporate-driven globalisation.

Data centres are great, juicy targets

We can do the same with the fight against climate change. Having demonstrations at COP climate summits is important, but it is better to have concrete targets that large numbers of people can unite and mobilise against at the local level.

AI data centres are great targets. Data centres consume huge amounts of water and energy that would otherwise be used for community needs. They also contribute tremendous amounts of carbon emissions that worsen the climate crisis.

US President Donald Trump is going all out for AI, partly because it needs huge amounts of energy that can only be provided by the fossil-fuel industry, one of his main backers. By targeting data centres, we would be hitting two existential threats to the planet and humanity: climate change and AI.

There are 12,250 to 12,660 data centres globally, of which 1136 to 1189 are hyperscale — indeed, city-size — facilities, serving the huge cloud and AI computing needs of Google, Microsoft, Amazon and other Silicon Valley giants. More are on the way.

They are being constructed in the Global North and South. In the US, the Yakama and other indigenous nations are resisting the construction of 240 data centres in the Columbia River area. But while much of the news coverage focuses on the resistance of communities in the Global North, opposition to data centres is also occurring in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra in India; Queretaro in Mexico, where Silicon Valley giants have built 32 water-intensive data centres on arid land; and Batam, Indonesia, where the community has protested against their water supply being consumed by data centres.

There have been cases of successful resistance. In Oton, Iloilo, in the Philippines, residents subjected the representative of a Norwegian firm seeking to build a data centre to such hostile questioning in a community meeting that the proposed project was cancelled.

Pax Silica: A value chain whose links are great targets

The opportunities for protest will be expanded by the implementation of Pax Silica. This US initiative, which includes 26 countries, is meant to create a value chain from the mining of minerals such as lithium through to the running of data centres. All sectors of the value chain are carbon and water intensive. Therefore, all major points along the value chain could potentially be sites of protest. 

In the Asia Pacific, Japan, India, South Korea, the Philippines and Singapore have already signed on to Pax Silica. In the Philippines, the Marcos Jr government is devoting more than 1600 hectares — the size of a small city — to hosting an AI complex, even though foreign corporations have yet to make investment commitments. Even before Pax Silica has taken off, it has already united so many oppositional forces in a way no issue has been able to in the past few decades.

AI value chain links, from mining to data centres, provide the potential of uniting people beyond political differences in other countries. Data centres are so unpopular that they have become one of the hottest issues in the US midterms, with pro-tech politicians busy backtracking from their previous positions.

Targeting data centres need not be the only strategy in building a mass movement against climate change that forces corporations and governments to take decisive action. There can be various complementary strategies based on one conviction: unless people come out in force, as they did in Brazil, the factors pushing two existential risks to humanity — climate change and AI — will not be stopped.

This is a revised version of Bello’s presentation at the Conference on Planetary Well Being from the Ground Up, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, October 31, 2026.


The Greatest Existential Risk of the Early 21st Century

To dominate supply chains, the Trump administration is weaponizing the global AI race. Instead of learning from the lessons of postwar atomic regulation, the administration is reversing them, thereby paving the way for catastrophic risks.

by | Nov 5, 2026 | 

Anthropic’s IPO filing on Monday set the stage for the Claude creator to pursue possibly largest initial stock offering in history. According to CNBC, investors are measuring the 5-year-old company’s potential market cap in the trillions, putting it in a category with the world’s most valuable companies, even as the stock market is showing signs of jitters on the AI trade.

Anthropic devoted 94 pages of its 400-page securities registration statement to the “risk factors” section. “If misused, replicated, weaponized, or operated with a high degree of autonomy,” Anthropic acknowledged, “it could pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity.”

On September 29, President Trump convened the CEOs of the leading U.S. AI companies and announced a voluntary “Joint Commitment on Frontier Responsibilities.” The agreement calls on frontier-AI developers to establish robust internal controls, use independent external auditors, and create board-level committees to review safety assessments. But since it is not legally enforceable, it is neither “morally binding” nor a “constitution” for AI safety.

The AI giants being asked to police AI admit that increasingly autonomous systems can behave in ways their creators did not anticipate. Yet, they are promoting the unpredictable products within the US military-industrial complex. The net effect? A historical acceleration of existential risks. 

Weaponizing U.S. technological primacy      

Trump has repeatedly framed AI as a competition between the United States and China, saying there will be “a winner and a loser.” He has rejected cooperation with Beijing because he believes the US is already leading.

But the administration is not just pursuing laissez-faire economics. It is constructing an AI-national-security-industrial complex.

In January, war secretary Pete Hegseth issued Pentagon’s milestone AI memorandum, which laid out a plan with a drastic focus on acceleration, not deceleration. “Speed wins,” Hegseth wrote.

In spring, according to the CNN, a U.S. Special Operations Command analyst used a large language model that almost misled the U.S. into instigating a war with China.

And yet, the June 2026 national-security memorandum directed the U.S. national-security establishment to obtain the most advanced AI systems, rapidly integrate commercial and open-source models, build high-security computing infrastructure and establish a strategic reserve of AI expertise.

The objective is a “decisive and enduring AI advantage” over adversaries.

This fosters an odd hybrid of market freedom, enormous public infrastructure, military integration and geopolitical protectionism, without legally enforceable safety regulation.

AI ecosystem is already transnational            

In view of the economic rationale, frontier AI exhibits enormous potential first-mover advantages. So, Washington is unwilling to impose rules that might slow U.S. companies while China continues developing its own ecosystem – even at the risk of accelerating catastrophic risks.

The problem is that AI is already transnational.

American companies depend upon global supply chains; advanced chips involve Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and Europe. Models circulate globally. Open-source weights cross borders instantly. Researchers move internationally. Cyber vulnerabilities are inherently transnational. And AI systems increasingly interact with infrastructure belonging to other countries.

International community cannot accept an exclusively U.S.-controlled AI order.

China is simultaneously pursuing rapid AI deployment and a substantially more state-directed safety regime, including mandatory safety assessments and emerging standards for autonomous agents. Its 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan explicitly calls for international cooperation, safety, controllability and inclusive participation.

Europe is moving in a different direction. The EU AI Act imposes obligations on general-purpose models and substantially stronger requirements on models classified as presenting systemic risk.

Trying to make the U.S. the sole gatekeeper risks converting an already competitive technological system into a fragmented geopolitical system. Instead, what is needed is international multilateral cooperation.

The military-civilian debate over atomic regulation

Following the success of the Manhattan Project, a fierce debate erupted over the military and civilian architects on who should control the newly unlocked power of the atom. General Leslie Groves, who directed the Manhattan Project, championed military retention, while J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project’s Los Alamos Laboratory, and a coalition of scientists fiercely advocated for civilian governance.

Groves’s stated priority was national security. He and the War Department viewed atomic energy primarily as a supreme weapon of war. They believed that maintaining strict military secrecy and keeping custody of the weapons stockpile was essential to deter foreign adversaries, especially, during the emerging Cold War.

By contrast, Oppenheimer insisted on civilian leadership. As scientists, Oppenheimer and his peers knew that the atom held significant dual-use potential. Atomic energy was not just a bomb. It had immense civilian potential for medical research, electric power, and peaceful scientific progress. Military control would choke off open scientific inquiry. Furthermore, they hoped to prevent the transformation of the United States into a permanent garrison state.

Finally, the scientists believed in international cooperation. A military-run agency would signal aggressive intent to the rest of the world, making international arms control and treaties structurally impossible.

Atomic and AI Regulation: existential lessons and risks  

The atomic debate shares striking structural commonalities with AI regulation, though the modern landscape features unique complications.

DimensionAtomic Energy (1946)Artificial Intelligence (Present)
Primary ActorState-funded military project (Manhattan Project)Private commercial tech corporations (e.g., Anthropic, Google)
Nature of ThreatHardware bottleneck: Limited by access to physical uranium/ plutonium.Software proliferation: Scalable, dual-use code that is easily copied and distributed.
Regulated DomainHigh-energy physics, centralized weapon facilities.All-encompassing digital infrastructure (societal, corporate, military).

 

Like nuclear power, AI is dual-use technology. While it powers autonomous weapons, it also drives medical breakthroughs, consumer software, and economic growth. Restricting AI entirely to a national security framework risk strangling open innovation and commercial progress. But unlike the 1940s, the state does not own the technology; private corporations do.

Hence, the effort of the Trump administration and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to push for military/national security overview. The two seek to filter AI governance through a hyper-accelerated national security lens, as evidenced by the establishment of the four-star Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM). The logic centers on three tenets.

First, the “wartime speed” race against China: The administration believes that traditional, civilian-led bureaucratic regulatory bodies are sluggish, risk-averse, and counterproductive. In their view, the U.S. is locked in an existential technological arms race with foreign adversaries, mainly China.

Second, hostility toward private sector “guardrails”: When AI firms like Anthropic refused to strip out safety guardrails that prevent their models (such as Claude) from being integrated into fully autonomous offensive drones or surveillance tools, Hegseth designated them a “supply chain risk” and blacklisted them. The White House views civilian ethical constraints as a vulnerability that hampers national security.

Finally, bypassing domestic regulatory agendas: By framing AI primarily as an asset of national survival and weaponization, the administration shifts the center of gravity away from civilian federal agencies (like the FTC or DOJ) and places it into the hands of military and intelligence entities like the newly formed Technology Support Office (TSO). This allows the Pentagon to retain unrestricted, unhindered use of the computing architectures.

How 2026 is falling behind 1946                       

In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, civilian leadership won the battle on the control the of the atom. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) established the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under strict civilian authority, dealing a heavy blow to the Pentagon’s initial plans.

There were three reasons for the civilian triumph. Oppenheimer and the newly formed Federation of Atomic Scientists engaged in a smart, coordinated public relations and congressional lobbying campaign, framing atomic energy as a turning point for humanity, not just a military asset. Second, they were supported by congressional skepticism of military monopoly. Finally, even President Harry S. Truman supported civilian control.

Unfortunately, AI regulation is unlikely to benefit for similar tailwinds. Today, the leading AI scientists operate in the corporate sector, not in the public realm. Second, decades of forever wars have dramatically transformed the Capitol Hill, due to the increasing share of congressional members with military, intelligence and security background. To win and retain their seats, most rely on financial contributions by the military-industrial complex and related industries.

To make things even more challenging, the Trump administration, blinded by faded fantasies of U.S. unipolar primacy in an increasingly multipolar world, rejects the idea of civilian control.

And so, the scene is set for catastrophic risks – in the name of national security.

The original commentary was published by China-US Focus on October 30, 2026.

Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internationally recognized visionary of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (US), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net