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Monday, March 09, 2026

THE EPSTEIN CLASS



Trump joins the global Jewish conspiracy

(official White House photo)
March 09, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

It bears repeating that Donald Trump’s rationale for war against Iran keeps shifting because Trump himself does not believe his own rationales. The goal of this war has little to do with Iran. It has to do with creating conditions in which an old, depleted and unpopular president looks big, tough and loved on American TV.

But there may be a reason outside the president’s fear of defeat in this year’s congressional elections. While he believes that he benefits from the perception of being a war president, it looks like the decision to become one wasn’t entirely his to make.

Early reporting on the war suggested that Israel was going to attack Iran without or without Trump, and that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was lobbying him to join the effort. USA Today reported yesterday that Netanyahu decided in November of last year to order a long-planned operation to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Marco Rubio confirmed that reporting on Monday: "We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces, and we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties.”

Just so I have this straight in my mind: Trump did not attack Iran in order to stop it from having nukes; in order to stop it from being a global leader in state-sponsored terrorism; in order to liberate the Iranian people; or in order to manifest world peace.

No, the president launched an illegal and unjustified war with Iran because America’s ally, Israel, put him in a no-win situation in which, as one source told the Post over the weekend, “the only debate that seemed to be remaining was whether the US would launch in concert with Israel or if the US would wait until Iran retaliated on US military targets in the region and then engage.”

Trump could have condemned Netanyahu after the fact, but apparently the appeal of being a war president was too great.

If I were the commander-in-chief of the world’s mightiest military, and if I allowed a foreign head of state to lead me around by the nose, I would also come up with a couple dozen reasons for going to war with Iran, no matter how unconvincing those reasons may be, because I would be highly motivated to draw attention away from the view that I’m not entirely in charge.

I mean, Trump can’t even take credit for Khamenei’s death. Pete Hegseth told reporters the Israeli strikes killed him Saturday. The only “credit” he can claim is having followed Netanyahu’s lead.

That it appears the decision to attack Iran was Netanyahu’s more than it was Trump’s is going to be a problem, most immediately because of the outcry in the Congress. If Trump was not acting in self-defense, and clearly he was not, then this war against Iran is a war of choice, which requires the consent of the Congress. Trump is going to be forced to explain himself, thus risking being held accountable for the spike in goods and oil prices, Tuesday’s sell-off on Wall Street and general chaos in the Middle East.

(According to journalist Steve Herman, the State Department told Americans to “immediately leave 16 countries and territories: Bahrain, Egypt, Gaza, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, West Bank and Yemen.” NBC News reported that the mandatory orders are coming despite many airports in the region being shuttered. In Qatar, Americans who can’t get out were advised that “should not rely on the US government for assisted departure or evacuation.”)

The White House’s best rationale for war seems to be that the US was forced to attack Iran, because Iran was forced to defend itself against Israel’s attack. Such a rationale is not going to fly with most of the Congress, including many maga Republicans. That’s why Trump lied Tuesday. He said Netanyahu didn’t force my hand. I forced his. According to Kaitlan Collins, he said “it was his opinion that Iran was going to attack first if the US didn't.”

For the lie to work, however, he needs the full faith of maga. He needs the base to trust him enough to play along. To do that, he must affirm his dominance. If supporters believe he’s Netanyahu’s puppet, however, such displays of dominance will seem empty and hollow to his own people, thus creating problems much bigger than abstract debates in the Congress over war powers.

To understand the problem he has created for himself, bear in mind the true nature of America First, which has been largely sanitized by the Washington press corps. It is not rooted in high-minded principles like freedom and national sovereignty. It is rooted in conspiracy theory and antisemitism, which are often provided a veneer of respectability by rightwing intellectuals and gullible reporters. Peel away the noble-sounding language, however, about nation-builders “intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand themselves,” as Trump said last year, and what you find at the center of America First is an unshakeable belief in a global Jewish conspiracy against America.

This belief in a global Jewish conspiracy against America was the foundation beneath the push to release the Epstein files during Trump’s 2024 campaign. The belief took on a slightly different form, but the animus was the same. Trump was supposed to have been the hero sent by God to fulfill a prophecy to save America from a secret cabal of powerful Jews who sex-trafficked young girls to untouchable elites. In maga lore, Jeffrey Epstein came to represent this shadowy, malevolent syndicate. Once reelected, Trump was supposed to bring them all to justice. When he didn’t, he triggered a crisis of faith that can be registered in recent polling that lumps him in with the rest of the “wealthy elites” who act with impunity for the law – the so-called “Epstein class.”

The Times reported Tuesday on the growing uproar within the maga movement over the possibility that Netanyahu said “jump” and Trump asked “how high?” Some of the most invested maga personalities, men like Jack Posobiec, told the Times that divisions can be overcome and lingering doubts will only be relevant to future candidates to lead the maga movement.

If supporters believed Trump betrayed principles, Posobiec might be right, as they don’t really care about principles. Supporters could shift from anti-war to pro-war as seamlessly as Trump does. But what Posobiec is ignoring, because it’s in his interest to ignore it, is that America First is not rooted in high-minded principles. It’s rooted in Jew-hate. Supporters are not going to warm up to the appearance of an American president seeming to take orders from the leader of a Jewish state. Instead, they might see Trump doing to believers in America First what he has done to supporters who demanded the release of the Epstein files.

Again, this is why the president lied Tuesday. In an attempt to assert dominance, he said he was the one to force Netanyahu’s hand, not the other way around. That might have worked – the base might have trusted him enough to play along with the lie – but for his already established betrayal in the Epstein case. With Iran, he has now compounded maga’s crisis of faith. He must contend with the growing suspicion that instead of destroying the global Jewish conspiracy against America, he has joined it.










'Clearly there’s a coverup': Evidence mounts against Epstein’s suicide


Ghislaine Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein are seen in this image released by the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., U.S., on December 19, 2025. (U.S. Justice Department/Handout)

March 09, 2026 
ALTERNET

No matter how many times President Donald Trump “starts illegal wars and engages in military strikes, it will never be enough to make people forget that he was best friends with the world’s most notorious pedophile, Jeffrey Epstein,” argued Left Hook publisher Wajahat Ali.

Ali joined forces with television producer and Epstein documentary creator Zev Shalev and Blue Amp Media editor Ellie Leonard as they discussed new information posted in the Miami Herald incriminating prison guards in covering up the alleged murder of convicted sex-trafficker Jeffrey Epstein. Both the New York Medical Examiner and the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that Epstein died by suicide, but a forensic pathologist hired by Epstein’s estate to attend the autopsy, has said he Epstein’s injuries look more similar to strangulation than suicide.


However, new information from the Herald by Epstein researcher Julie K. Brown suggests prison guards discussed covering up Epstein’s death, according to FBI conversation with a fellow inmate.

“An inmate housed at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York told the FBI he overheard guards talking about covering up Jeffrey Epstein’s death on the morning he died,” reports the Herald. “The federal government’s online Epstein library contains a five-page handwritten report of an FBI interview with an inmate who awoke the morning of Aug. 10, 2019 to the loud commotion in the Special Housing Unit, or SHU, where he and Epstein were jailed.”

“… [C]learly there's a cover up. Clearly the DOJ has been covering up for the president of the United States,” said Shalev. “That is a scandal of huge, mammoth proportions. … We can't have that. We can't have a president of the United States facing allegations, multiple allegations of raping young girls and then still being a sitting president as the DOJ covers up for him. I mean, it's just unacceptable. It's untenable for any regime.”

Shalev told Ali that the circumstances under which Epstein died had far too many holes not to draw suspicion.

“How did [the guard Tova Noel] have time … to do all these searches, but then didn't have time to do the regular 30-minute checks on the prisoner that she was meant to do because she had fallen asleep? I mean, one of these things doesn't add up. Either the guards fell asleep or they were so distracted doing searches, but their job is to do regular check-ins on the prisoner, and they didn't do that. For… a whole night.”

“And then she gets this mysterious $5,000 check or whatever it is — payment that she gets. No one knows where she's from. She's just a prison guard.

The Herald reported a five-page handwritten report in the federal government’s online Epstein library, consisting of an FBI interview with an inmate who awoke the morning of Aug. 10, 2019 to a loud commotion in the Special Housing Unit where he and Epstein were held.

“Breathe! Breathe!” he recalled officers shouting about 6:30 a.m., according to the Herald, followed by an officer saying: “Dudes, you killed that dude.”

The inmate then heard a female guard reply “If he is dead, we’re going to cover it up and he’s going to have an alibi -- my officers,” according to the FBI notes. The inmate claimed the whole wing overheard the exchange.

Later, after learning Epstein had died, inmate claimed other inmates said “Miss Noel killed Jeffrey.”

“It's not common for her to get these $5,000 infusions of cash. And obviously the whole thing stinks,” said Shalev. “I mean, with the circumstantial evidence it’s hard to see how he committed suicide there. It's hard to see.”


Bombshell investigation verifies key details in 13-year-old Trump accuser's story

Alexander Willis
March 9, 2026 



Donald Trump holds a cabinet meeting at the White House in Washington. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

Key details in the account of a woman who’s accused President Donald Trump of sexually assaulting her when she was a minor were verified Sunday in an explosive investigation conducted by The Post and Courier.

The woman first came forward to the FBI following the 2019 arrest of Jeffrey Epstein, and was interviewed by the agency four separate times. A Justice Department source told the Miami Herald that the woman was found credible by the agency, the outlet reported.

In her interviews with the FBI, the woman accused Epstein and at least two other associates, including Trump, of sexual assault when she was 13. She accused Trump of sexually assaulting her, pulling her hair and punching her in the head sometime in the mid-1980s.

While details of her specific allegations against Trump were not further verified by The Post and Courier, other details she provided the FBI were, giving further credence to her account.

Details verified by The Post and Courier include the fact that her mother had rented a home to Epstein in South Carolina. The outlet also verified details of another associate of Epstein’s that she accused of sexually assaulting her, an Ohio businessman that she said was "affiliated with a Cincinnati-based college,” and whom the outlet confirmed was a member of a for-profit school.

The woman also accused Epstein of possessing nude photographs of her as a minor and extorting her mother for money to keep them secret, which she said led her mother to begin stealing money. The Post and Courier confirmed that the mother had been charged with stealing $22,000 from the real estate firm she worked for.

The woman’s identity was verified by The Post and Courier by cross referencing details of her account with various public records and old news clippings, though the outlet declined to name her, and both she and her attorney declined to comment on the report.

Due to the sheer volume of Epstein-related materials released by the DOJ, many of the documents contain unverified, uncorroborated allegations that do not constitute evidence, and do not establish wrongdoing. Trump is not facing any criminal charges or investigations related to the allegation.

A dark web of influence: Brexit, the hard-right and why the Epstein mentions matter


7 March, 2026 
Left Foot Forward


If Epstein’s networks helped broker access or funding for political movements, it’s a matter of public concern. These aren’t insinuations, but a matter of accountability, and in the unresolved story of Brexit, accountability remains in short supply.



When the latest tranche of documents linked to Jeffrey Epstein was released earlier this year, much of the British reaction focused on familiar establishment names, notably Peter Mandelson and former Prince Andrew. Given the seriousness of the allegations surrounding them, that scrutiny is understandable.

But the spotlight has been too narrow.

Buried within the correspondence and contact lists are connections that reach into Britain’s hard-right networks and intersect with the political forces that drove Brexit. Yet, these connections have largely been overlooked or ignored by mainstream media.

Epstein was not merely a disgraced financier cultivating proximity to power, he was enthusiastic about Britain’s departure from the EU and celebrated the nationalist turn in Western politics.

Inclusion in Epstein’s files does not, in itself, imply wrongdoing. Yet the context of those mentions, the political projects being discussed, the money being courted, and the alliances being enriched, is a matter of public interest.

If the disclosures are to mean anything beyond lurid scandal, they must prompt a broader examination of how wealth, influence and political power intervene in modern Britain.

Brexit as “just the beginning”

Among the material are emails in which Epstein discusses Brexit with tech billionaire Peter Thiel. In one exchange, Epstein describes Britain’s vote to leave the European Union as “just the beginning,” heralding a “return to tribalism,” a “counter to globalisation,” and the forging of “amazing new alliances.”

Such remarks suggest that Brexit was viewed in certain elite circles not merely as a domestic democratic event, but as part of a broader ideological realignment across the West.

Thiel’s footprint in the UK has grown steadily in recent years. As Left Foot Forwardreported in 2022, his data analytics firm Palantir Technologies secured multiple UK government contracts during the pandemic and has undertaken extensive work with the Ministry of Defence, including a £10 million contract in March 2022 for data integration and management.

A report by Byline Times described a “Thiel network” seeking to influence debates around free speech in academia, and part of a broader effort to normalise anti-liberal ideas among British intellectuals and policymakers.

Some figures linked to these debates, including right-wing commentator Douglas Murray and a British Anglican priest and life peer Nigel Biggar, who regularly rages against ‘woke’ culture, have also been associated with initiatives such as the Free Speech Union, founded by perennial culture warrior, Toby Young.

Thiel’s influence also extends through his Thiel Fellowship programme, which has backed entrepreneurs including Christian Owens, founder of the UK payments “unicorn” Paddle.

None of this proves a coordinated “Thiel–Epstein Brexit plot,” but it does point to something subtler, and arguably more consequential. As the New World observed in an analysis about the Epstein files and the Brexit connection, “while millions voted Leave to strike back at a remote elite, parts of that same elite were calmly gaming out how the resulting disorder might be useful to them.”

That tension alone warrants scrutiny.

Nigel Farage and Steve Bannon



The Reform UK leader appears dozens of times in the Epstein files, though many references reportedly stem from duplicated email chains or attached news articles. Farage has denied ever meeting or speaking with Epstein.

Yet the context in which his name arises is important.

Steve Bannon, a former White House chief strategist to Donald Trump, described brilliantly by the New World’s Steve Anglesey as “the sweaty MAGA insider/outsider who once fancied himself a Brexit architect and dreamed of setting up a pan-European far right movement that would ultimately destroy the EU,” appears in thousands of exchanges with Epstein. In one message, Bannon boasts about his relationship with Farage. In another, he writes: “I’ve gotten pulled into the Brexit thing this morning with Nigel, Boris and Rees Mogg.”

The correspondence shows Bannon attempting to tap Epstein for support and funding to bolster far-right movements in Europe. He discussed raising money for figures such as Italy’s deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini and France’s Marine Le Pen, showing the transnational nature of these networks.

Again, mention does not equal misconduct, but when a financier later exposed as a serial abuser is simultaneously being courted as a potential backer of nationalist political movements, the public is entitled to ask questions about access, influence and intent.

Tommy Robinson and the “backbone of England”

The files also contain references to UK far-right activist, Tommy Robinson.



Bannon has never shied away from sharing his support for Robinson. At the 2024 Conservative Political Action Conference, when on stage with Liz Truss, he described the founder of the English Defence League as a “hero” and Truss appeared to agree with him. “That is correct,” she said.

When Robinson was released from prison in 2018, Epstein messaged Bannon: “Tommy Robinson. !! good work.” Bannon responded: “Thanks.”

In July 2019, after Epstein shared an article reporting Robinson’s contempt of court conviction for live-streaming defendants in a child sexual exploitation trial, Bannon replied by calling Robinson the “backbone of England.”

The significance here is not that Robinson appears in correspondence, but that discussions around him sit within a wider ecosystem, that is wealthy financiers, American political strategists and European nationalist figures exchanging messages about funding, media and mobilisation.

Nick Candy, Reform UK and transatlantic links

Nick Candy, luxury property mogul and now treasurer of Reform UK, is also mentioned numerous times in the files, in discussions that appear to concern the potential sale of Epstein’s New York mansion.

In 2024, Candy left the Conservative Party to join Reform. He later attended a strategy meeting at Trump’s Florida residence alongside Farage and tech billionaire Elon Musk. All three men appear within the tranche of documents released by the Department of Justice.

Some messages reference Candy in connection with Ghislaine Maxwell, though the full context of those exchanges remain partially redacted – we’ll come on to redaction shortly.

The files also reveal previously underreported contact between Musk and Epstein in 2012 and 2013, including discussions about a possible visit to Epstein’s private island. The visit does not appear to have taken place.
Like Bannon, Musk has actively involved himself in European politics. He has repeatedly got into spats with politicians including Keir Starmer.

“Civil war is inevitable” … “Britain is going full Stalin”… “The people of Britain have had enough of a tyrannical police state,” are just some of his comments on X in recent years.

And he’s used his own platform X to amplify voices on the right and far-right online, including sending a heart emoji to Tommy Robinson, who said Musk had funded his defence for a charge related to counter-terrorism law.

“A HUGE THANK YOU to @elonmusk today. Legend,” Robinson wrote.



It bears repeating, appearing in Epstein’s files does not establish criminality. Guilt by association is not journalism, nor is it justice.

But context is not smearing, it’s scrutiny. Examining who communicated with whom, how often, and in what capacity is a legitimate part of understanding how power operates.

There’s also the question of redaction. Many of the documents released have been heavily blacked out, names, photographs, email addresses and other identifying details obscured. In sensitive criminal cases, redaction is both necessary and appropriate, particularly to protect victims.

In some instances in the Epstein files, the reasons are obvious. Yet, as the Conversation has observed, “the absence of any reason for the redaction has simply added fuel to the fire, with spectators filling in the blanks themselves.” When transparency is partial and unexplained, it can deepen suspicion rather than resolve it.

The public release of the Epstein files was presented as a milestone for transparency. Instead, it has prompted further questions: about how sensitive material was handled, about the criteria used to withhold information, and about the extent of Epstein’s connections to powerful political figures, including figures on the far-right in the UK. If Epstein’s networks provided introductions, cross-border access, or even financial pathways into political movements, that is a matter of legitimate public interest.

More broadly, the scandal raises structural concerns. What channels enable wealthy outsiders to cultivate influence across government, academia and media? How rigorously are those relationships scrutinised? And what safeguards exist to ensure political outcomes are not quietly shaped by individuals whose interests diverge sharply from the public good?

These are not questions of insinuation, but of accountability, and in the unresolved story of Brexit, accountability remains in short supply.

Gabrielle Pickard-Whitehead is author of Right-Wing Watch


Misogyny, Epstein and Reform’s cultural agenda

6 March, 2026

From Epstein’s web to Reform’s proposed raft of policy ideas, creeping misogyny now risks redefining women’s rights in Britain  




Pampered by the press as ‘the next government in waiting’, Reform continues to poll strongly. We’re familiar with how the party fosters racism through its hostile rhetoric and flagship immigration stance, but its ubiquitous misogyny receives less attention. A Reform win at the next general election will be partly because enough people either didn’t know, or didn’t care, about its views on females. For International Women’s Day, I’d like to explore these views through the lens of the Epstein files.

The octopus

The web of Epstein’s influence, in all its vast complexity, is now coming into full view, like a multi-armed, gigantic octopus being lifted from the seabed. We’re seeing Epstein the enabler, matchmaker, wheel-oiler, and co-ordinator extraordinaire in a multidimensional kleptocratic network of corporate, political, cultural and sexual interest.

You’d need a 3-D modeller to trace the complex inter-connections he orchestrated between climate denialists, fossil fuel industries, political lobbyists (Brexitthe Kremlin) the tech broligarchyracists, eugenicists, Israeli intelligence, and more, all whilst supplying a deadly pipeline of women and child victims to the depraved subculture he cultivated. It’s all coalescing into one repulsive integrated whole.

Network participation is layered like an onion with peripheral involvement shading into roles that have varying degrees of knowledge and whistle blowing capacity on Epstein’s darkest activities. We may never know all the players or precisely which layers Epstein’s UK friends occupied. But only the outer layer is free of guilt by association of colluding with a monster.

Creeping patriarchy

The island of Little Saint James was the black heart of Epstein’s misogyny, but the objectification and dehumanisation of females there was driven by a culture of extreme patriarchy – the presumed superiority and dominance by males over females. Patriarchal attitudes are tightly embedded in far-right thinking and are central to viewpoints such as Christo-fascism where they fuse with Christianity, authoritarianism and white, right-wing nationalism.

This regressive ideology lurks in Project 2025, in the Christian nationalism of JD Vance, Stephen Miller and in far-right parties across central and eastern Europe. It calls for a return to a traditional Christian heterosexual, patriarchal family model in which the primary responsibilities of females are homemaking, procreation and subservience to the male family head. For ‘guidance’, listen to pastor Dale Partridge’s homily on, amongst other things, why a women’s vote must never cancel her husband’s.


Handmaids UK

Extreme patriarchy is also spreading its tentacles in the UK via organisations such as Jordan Peterson’s Alliance for Responsible Citizenship (ARC). Linked to the right-wing think tank Legatum, ARC emphasises traditional gender roles and women’s duties as breeders.

Patriarchy is very much alive and kicking within Reform. Its intrepidly retrograde Christian nationalist policy creators, James Orr, Danny Kruger and Matthew Goodwin, are currently defining Reform’s cultural agenda in patriarchal terms straight from the wider Christo-fascist comfort zones they share.

Orr opposes abortion in all cases and pushes the pro-natalist policy of families having more children “to boost birth rates”. Kruger, also a keen pro-natalist, personally supports the reversal of no-fault divorce. He wants a ‘reset to sexual culture’ and challenges the rights of pregnant women to ‘absolute bodily autonomy’. Goodwin wants a “biological reality check” for girls and tax increases for childless couples.


Securing the property

Goodwin recently opined that the “sexual exploitation of women and girls is because of open borders”. This devious but false claim uses a supposed threat to females s to attack the liberal left, but arguably, also suggests unspoken proprietorship – we must ‘protect our women and girls’ to end foreign interf
erence with our property.

In an equally stunning patriarchal vein, Farage, who endorsed Andrew Tate as an “important voice”, describes men as ‘more willing than women to sacrifice family life for career’, and objects to the 24 week abortion limit as “ludicrous”.

To enshrine women’s demotion to second class citizens, Reform has pledged to drop the 2010 Equalities Act which provides legal recourse for maternity leave, sexual assault, domestic abuse and employment discrimination. Reform also plans to ditch the ECHR thus thwarting its use by women as another court of appeal. You can hear the sound of doors closing.

All these narratives call for controls on women’s mental, physical and developmental freedom and autonomy and constitute a clear attack on women’s rights.

‘But’, the Reform curious wail, ‘we want change – migrants and Labour must be punished and removed. So, we’ll take the US route and ignore Reform’s misogyny as non-serious, or too unpopular to survive’. Left-leaning progressives join the dismissive fray, insisting that culturally, Britain has moved on from this hopelessly backward-facing misogyny.

Yet Reform is unashamedly pushing back with their patriarchal narratives. Why?

One reason is sheer manospheric arrogance combined with the belligerence of a party looking set for power – the macho ‘just try stopping us’ mindset.

Another is that Reform’s ideas are still camouflaged. ‘Resetting sexual culture’ could mean any number of abuses of women’s rights once Reform is in power, but, for now, can be trained on DEI and LGBTQ issues which reverberate with the right-wing electorate. Similarly, ‘reversing no-fault divorce’ is just Kruger’s “personal view” – for now. Farage’s abortion concerns only imply the need for minor tweaking – for now. And pro-natalism links nicely with great replacement anxieties whilst sounding mildly patriotic – heroic Brits can keep non-whites at bay by breeding more.

The ambiguity of Reform’s statements provides space for moderation whilst simultaneously positioning the party for much more full-throated future iterations of misogynist ideas. Orr’s advice that Reform should “hold its cards close to its chest” and keep certain operations under wraps before entering government reminds us that the party’s position isn’t static.

Human shields

Reform can challenge accusations of misogyny by pointing to women in its senior party roles. But this defence has no more clout than Trump trying to deny his own blatant misogyny but listing the fawning Barbie doll chatbots in his administration. Arguably, women in Reform are serving, like Reform’s non-white cabinet members, as useful pre-election human shields for a party that’s essentially riddled with racist and misogynistic elements.

The misogynist attitudes driving Reform are reason alone for women across the political spectrum to heed what supporting Reform might mean for them, and to recognise what a dangerous backward step it would be.

But we should also recognise that Reform’s misogyny sets a cultural tone of readiness for Epsteinian abuse by providing a direct pathway from regressive, patriarchal policies to sexual exploitation.

Epstein’s network reveals how the corrupting influence of power is a gateway drug for depravity. With excess power, whether as elites or via the privileges of patriarchy, players disengage from norms and stray further afield. Favours, financial rewards and the secrecy of illicit deals create useful bonds for kompromat and further corruption.

Epstein’s network is a forum for experimentation and risk taking, both financially and morally. ‘Getting away with it’ by stepping beyond legal red lines is a self-substantiating way for the patriarchal order to continually reassert control, dominance and virility. The Trump regime’s coercion of leaders and nations, like the abuses on Epstein’s island, are all ways of exercising the same male supremacist drive across different spheres. Epstein’s sex traffickers and guests parallel Trump’s sadistic geopolitical harassment of Greenland and Volodymyr Zelenskyy – ‘you will suffer (more) if you disobey’.

Life support machines

Reform policy is being forged against a transnational backdrop of extreme patriarchy. This framework is the quiet kick-off for Epstein’s darker world.

The research is clear that patriarchal conceptions of women’s role are intimately linked with sexual abuse. Patriarchal values are ingrained in power dynamics, gender hierarchy, and societal norms which drive gender-based iniquities and contribute to the perpetuation of sexual violence (Murnen et al, 2002Spencer et al, 2023Trottier et al, 2019).

The Epstein files are strewn with heinous crimes against females, including “sexual slavery, reproductive violence, enforced disappearance, torture, and femicide”. It’s a world in which, as Virginia Giuffre’s memoir testifies, women and children are discardable commodities and legitimacy is given to ‘those who get high on making others suffer’.

The determination of Reform’s policy setters to weaken the infrastructure underpinning women’s equality and rights over their own bodies, once realised, risks dehumanising and corralling women back into their historical dual roles of procreation and sexual pleasure. Projects like pronatalism come together with Epstein in the perception of females as essentially abusable life support machines for babies and vaginas.

I’m not, for a moment, implying that Kruger and co indulge in Epsteinean depravity. But I am asserting that he, along with Goodwin, Farage and other Reform policy creators, are re-positioning society in ways that orientate male thinking towards a future of increased sexual abuse.

Pushback vs forward movement

We should be as deeply alarmed by Reform’s misogynist elements as we are by its racist tendencies, climate denialism and attacks on workers. Women are directly affected because Reform potentially poses an acute, existential threat directly to them.

Epstein was not an aberration. Both he and Reform’s policy makers are hitching a ride with a far more ancient, long-standing misogynistic mindset spanning human history. Reform is part of a clamour across the global far right to push back against threats to white male supremacy. If Reform wins power, regressive misogyny risks being normalised again, encouraging chauvinist males to push boundaries ever further, taking advantage of new norms and tolerance levels.

The issue is not about whether parliament would retain the power of veto over the roll out of Reform’s misogynist policies. It’s about how dangerous it is even to give these ideas any traction in the first place by letting Reform win power. These are not battles that 21st century Britain, as a supposed beacon of human rights, should be having. Women must come together on International Women’s Day and beyond to halt this menace.

This article was first published on the Bearly Politics Substack on 4 March 2026





The Slovenian Choice: Liberal Or Illiberal Democracy – Analysis

Ljubljana, Slovenia

March 9, 2026 
By IFIMES


Slovenia will hold its tenth parliamentary elections since independence on 22 March 2026, under a proportional representation system. The country is divided into eight electoral units, each comprising eleven electoral districts. A total of 1,698,352 registered voters are eligible to participate, with eleven parliamentary seats allocated in each electoral unit. The parliament comprises a total of 90 deputies.

A distinctive feature of the Slovenian electoral system lies in the constitutionally guaranteed representation of national communities. The Italian and Hungarian communities each elect one representative under a majority system, thereby further strengthening their institutional status. Members of these communities cast two ballots – one for the general electoral lists and another for the list of their respective national community – which constitutes a form of positive discrimination grounded in law and aimed at ensuring their effective parliamentary representation. The general electoral threshold for entry into the National Assembly is set at 4 per cent of valid votes; this requirement does not apply to representatives of the Italian and Hungarian communities.

The following parties, coalitions or lists are participating in the parliamentary elections: ● Freedom Movement ● Slovenian Democratic Party – SDS ● The Left and Vesna ● Democrats of Anže Logar ● New Slovenia, Slovenian People’s Party, Fokus Marko Lotrič ● Social Democrats – SD ● Revival – the party of Vladimir Prebilič ● Karl Erjavec – Party of Trust ● Greens of Slovenia + SG Generation Party ● Coalition Alternative for Slovenia (the None of This Party and the For a Healthy Society Party) ● Slovenian National Party – SNS ● We, the Socialists! ● Pirate Party of Slovenia ● Civic Movement Resni.ca ● Pavel Rupar’s Voice of Pensioners.

Elections in Slovenia 2026: between the politics of building and dismantling and the country’s strategic direction

As Slovenia approaches its parliamentary elections, a fundamental question arises regarding the country’s future political and civilisational direction. Current political dynamics place Slovenia at a crossroads. Voters’ decisions will determine whether Slovenia continues on a path of institutional consolidation, social cohesion and European integration, or shifts towards confrontation, polarisation and the erosion of constitutional standards.

The view expressed by Slovenia’s first president, Milan Kučan, that the elections amount to a choice between “politics that build and politics that dismantle” goes beyond routine political rhetoric and points to a broader issue concerning the paradigm of national development amidst global upheaval. Slovenia enters this electoral cycle amid geopolitical, security, energy and environmental, and social transformations that are redefining the balance of power and relativising the relevance of smaller states.

In IFIMES’ assessment, the elections on 22 March are not merely a formal democratic procedure, but a decision with long-term implications for the stability of the political system. Isolated scandals and shortcomings must not overshadow the overall picture of positive change; the key lies in distinguishing systemic reforms — including progress in healthcare, energy policy, climate action and digitalisation — from individual political missteps or communication lapses. Kučan’s warning should therefore not be interpreted as a defence of any particular government, but rather as a call for a rational evaluation of both achievements and shortcomings.

Civilisational and environmental challenges remain a central concern for the future government. Slovenia, as part of the European political space, faces an energy transition, climate risks and security challenges stemming from the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East. The coming government will need to focus on three key priorities: the green transformation of the economy, the bolstering of institutional resilience, and the preservation of the welfare state amidst constraints on public finances.

Against this backdrop, the distinction between “building” and “dismantling” primarily reflects the difference between gradual adaptation to complex changes and radical interventions undertaken without a long-term strategy. The elections, therefore, represent a civilisational test, as voters’ decisions will determine whether Slovenia remains part of the Enlightenment tradition of rational dialogue and democratic culture, or slides into an authoritarian and ideologically dark period.

The International Institute IFIMES emphasises that the ensuing political dynamics will affect not just the composition of the government, but the very stability of democracy, respect for human rights and the quality of public discourse. In this regard, the institutional framework, political culture and the long-term vision for the country’s development will remain paramount.

Symbolic capital, polarisation and Slovenia’s strategic stability


Although the first president of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kučan, no longer formally holds the levers of power, he remains one of the most influential symbolic figures of the nation’s transition and independence. His enduring public presence demonstrates that part of the political spectrum remains anchored in the state-building narrative. IFIMES contends that the first president’s symbolic capital exerts a dual effect: it mobilises a segment of the electorate that identifies with stability and continuity, while simultaneously sharpening polarisation among voters who perceive the transitional elite as part of the problem. Consequently, the elections also unfold at a symbolic level — between interpretations of the past and projections of the future.

The Slovenian political space remains divided between two relatively stable blocs, presenting a structural challenge for the incoming administration. IFIMES assesses that the primary hurdle will not only lie in the composition of the coalition, but above all in the capacity to mitigate political and social polarisation. In this context, the politics of “dismantling” manifests itself as the delegitimisation of institutions, the subordination of the rule of law to particular interests and the promotion of conflict as the primary tool of political mobilisation. By contrast, the politics of “building” implies gradual reform, respect for constitutional mechanisms and the pursuit of a broader social consensus.

IFIMES assesses that the forthcoming elections will effectively represent a referendum on institutional stability and the future direction of the country’s development. At a time when a new global architecture is taking shape, a small country such as Slovenia can ill afford internal destabilisation. The main issue is not only which political option will prevail, but whether the post-election dynamics will enable a stable and programmatically consistent government capable of tempering ideological tensions and securing Slovenia’s position at the heart of European integration.

Ultimately, Kučan’s thesis about a choice between building and dismantling is not merely a rhetorical flourish, but a stark warning that political culture and institutional accountability remain the bedrock of long-term national sovereignty and social cohesion.

Slovenia needs a different political culture

Slovenia stands at a crucial political and civilisational crossroads, where the forthcoming elections will determine the country’s future trajectory. An analysis of public discourse, cultural symbols and political statements reveals a clear conflict between the culture of democracy and growing authoritarian tendencies—currents that history identifies with the hallmarks of fascism.

The Slovenian cultural landscape is symbolically tethered to the cultural holiday of 8 February, which reminds Slovenians of the values embodied by France Prešeren, the country’s greatest poet and one of the cultural pillars of Slovenian statehood. Today, culture is not merely a matter of artistic creativity, but a foundation of civilisational standards, rational dialogue and respect for human rights. IFIMES observes that Slovenian society is increasingly drifting away from these principles due to both global and domestic political challenges, while at the same time witnessing the rise of populist and authoritarian tendencies.


The core question remains: will political parties and voters opt to strengthen democratic institutions and cultural values, or will they succumb to a politics of fear, hatred and retrograde ideologies?

The rhetoric and political strategy of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS/EPP) are particularly critical. How other political actors define their position on cooperation with the party will directly influence the stability of democracy, respect for human rights and the quality of public discourse.

The Slovenian elections transcend a mere formal political event; they represent a civilisational litmus test. Voters will determine whether Slovenia remains anchored in the Enlightenment tradition, rational dialogue and democratic culture, or slides into authoritarianism and ideological obscurantism.

Slovenian society has the opportunity to demonstrate that culture is not a luxury, but the very bulwark of democracy, which protects the individual and fortifies society’s resilience against extremism. IFIMES will continue to monitor these political and cultural developments with the aim of supporting the stability of the political system, the transparency of institutional governance and adherence to international standards and democratic principles.

The forthcoming parliamentary elections are of central importance for Slovenia’s political and civilisational direction. Voters’ decisions will determine whether the country continues on the path of democratic consolidation and civilisational standards, or risks a descent into authoritarian patterns. The preservation of cultural values, rational dialogue and institutional accountability remains the foundation of long-term stability and social cohesion in Slovenia.
Slovenia’s political landscape ahead of the elections: liberal or illiberal democracy

In the run-up to the forthcoming elections, Slovenia’s political arena is starkly divided between two dominant blocs: the centre-left, led by the Freedom Movement (GS/ALDE) of current Prime Minister Robert Golob, and the centre-right, led by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS/EPP) of Janez Janša. The contest between the two camps remains tight, often pushing smaller parties to the margins, as voters resort to tactical voting in an effort to influence the final outcome.

The Freedom Movement is a liberal party and a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), while the Slovenian Democratic Party is a centre-right, Christian-democratic and conservative party within the European People’s Party (EPP). Certain political aspects, however, point to ideological affinity with the Hungarian party Fidesz led by Viktor Orbán.

Slovenia now faces a choice between liberal and illiberal democracy. The liberal project of the Freedom Movement offers the continuation of an open, European-oriented policy. In contrast, the illiberal alternative, still immature and often controversial in Slovenia’s political landscape, suggests connections with Orbán’s circles, which hinder European integration and cultivate links with Putin’s sphere of influence. Neither approach on its own can fully meet the country’s needs; policy must remain flexible in light of current social, economic and geopolitical challenges. Should Robert Golob form a new government with his Freedom Movement, he would become the first prime minister since Janez Drnovšek to secure a second mandate.

Analysts further caution that Slovenia’s electoral system is outdated and no longer corresponds to the country’s contemporary needs. One proposal under discussion is the introduction of a chancellor-style system modelled on Austria. Proponents argue this would better align with Slovenia’s political culture and facilitate more efficient decision-making, as the current proportional system often hinders development and undermines political stability.


IFIMES

IFIMES – International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN since 2018. IFIMES is also the publisher of the biannual international scientific journal European Perspectives. IFIMES gathers and selects various information and sources on key conflict areas in the world. The Institute analyses mutual relations among parties with an aim to promote the importance of reconciliation, early prevention/preventive diplomacy and disarmament/ confidence building measures in the regional or global conflict resolution of the existing conflicts and the role of preventive actions against new global disputes.




Sunday, March 08, 2026

Regime change for oil? The real motivations behind the US military intervention in Venezuela


Regime change graphic CEDES

First published in Spanish at CEDES and Viento Sur. Translation by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

In the early hours of January 3, the United States carried out a military intervention in Venezuela, “Operation Absolute Resolution”, which culminated in the head of state, Nicolás Maduro, being taken to a New York prison. Hours later, US President Donald Trump declared: “We are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition.”1 Why did the US decide to “insert” itself so deeply into the Venezuelan state as to claim it was now “running the country”? In the first instance, we could say, in line with Antonio Gramsci’s realistic and factual observation, that “the great Powers have been great precisely because they were at all times prepared to intervene effectively in favourable international conjunctures”2 The answer, therefore, to what motivated the US military intervention would simply be that a favourable situation opened up for it to insert itself effectively and take advantage off.

However, in “real history,” as Gramsci called it, the dialectic between international and national forces is more complex and thorny. How favourable a situation is for a Great Power to intervene is determined by the extent to which the dialectic within civil society (horizontal power relations) gives way to the penetration of a foreign sentinel (vertical power relations). The crux of the matter is that integral state crises create fertile grounds for forceful solutions. Such crises can be resolved internally through “organised economic and political expressions” rooted in national life but also create favourable circumstances for the “activities of unknown forces” (Gramsci dixit), generally represented by the actions — first technical-military and then political-military — of a foreign sentinel. According to Gramsci, the “charismatic ‘men of destiny’” who tend to emerge when integral state crises can not be organically resolved — that is, when a static equilibrium means no side can definitively prevail — do not necessarily come from within the competing national forces, but may express an international force penetrating into national life.3 A Great Power international Caesarism?

Returning to the focus of this essay: what was the ultima ratio for US military intervention in Venezuela? Was it just an inexcusable regime change for oil? Did the fate of two states — Venezuela and the US — intertwine simply because it is “all about oil” (David Harvey dixit)? When answering these questions, the words of Thomas Friedman come to mind: 

There is nothing illegitimate or immoral about the U.S. being concerned that an evil, megalomaniacal dictator might acquire excessive influence over the natural resource that powers the world’s industrial base.4

Yet can this imperial moralising be sustained when Trump 2.0 is clearly seeking to reformat the naïve “rules-based international order”? Is the claim that the Trump 2.0 administration’s intervention in Venezuela was simply “about oil” as simplistic, naïve and insufficient as the argument that it seeks to “restore democracy” and stabilise the country?

The problem with the it’s “all about oil” thesis is that this is an excellent explanandum but helps little in terms of explanans. In other words, this thesis tells us what is crucial, the ultima ratio of imperial intervention: they are there for the oil. But it fails to explain why this is crucial: that is, how they intend to benefit from the oil. Furthermore, it simplifies the situation by obscuring some of Washington’s other economic and geopolitical objectives. My argument is that the explanans for US military intervention is both the US civil society dynamics and the catastrophic outcome for Venezuelan society of the country’s integral state crisis and Long Depression. It also finds its reason in the current state of the modern inter-state system and the US hegemonic cycle.

The catastrophic outcome of a state crisis

Nation-states coexist in a hierarchical, unequal and polarised inter-state system, within which relative strength determines who imposes their will and who suffers as a consequence. Strong states — namely, those that have been successful in building state capacity, organising warfare and accumulating capital — impose their will and entrench themselves at the top of the hierarchy, while weak states suffer and are relegated to the bottom. It is no coincidence that, as Immanuel Wallerstein argued, national economic development is a priority collective task for political communities grouped into nation-states. In a world economy governed by the relentless accumulation and centralisation of capital and power among classes, countries and regions, the weakening of a state will always provide a great opportunity for a foreign sentinel to act. States can therefore not afford, under any circumstances, to live through prolonged periods of organic crisis of authority and hegemony, much less a “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces” that undermines the sources of social power on which the nation-state is built. In sum, nation-states in the modern inter-state system cannot afford processes such as the Long Venezuelan Depression.

Building on my argument in La Larga Depresión Venezolana (The Long Venezuelan Depression) and drawing on Gramsci’s conceptual arsenal, I argued in “The Venezuelan transition to patrimonialism” that the integral state crisis in which Venezuelan society had been mired since 2016 had escalated eight years on to a point where the ruling elite was denied “breathing-space”, foreshadowing the “peace of the graveyards” that follows the “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces” at a domestic level, and worse still, the intervention of a “foreign sentinel.”5 The crux of my argument was that the Trump 1.0 administration (2017–21), with its strategy of collapse, had not failed to bring about regime change in Venezuela, if one considers the transformations in the country’s political economy and mutations in the ruling elite. In La Larga Depresión Venezolana, I pointed out that 

comprehensive sanctions on the public sector set the stage and prepared the legitimacy for the passive counter-revolution that embraced orthodox monetarist macroeconomic stabilisation, neoliberalism with patrimonialist characteristics, and crony capitalism.6

If we take a realistic view of interstate system dynamics, then why would this regime change from below not then lead to an outward regime change or geopolitical realignment via subjugation, if the sources of national power were completely undermined? In other words, if national political life was determined by the catastrophic stalemate between A and B, then what factors could prevent the intervention of force C from outside?

This was the point at which the fate of the “patrimonialist party” shaped by Nicolás Maduro’s leadership (2013/2016–2025) was sealed: its strategy of power for power’s sake, patrimonialism, and crony capitalism undermined both popular and national sovereignty, and the sources of social power (ideological, economic, military and political) on which Venezuela’s Westphalian sovereignty rested on — namely, other states’ respect for a national authority. This reduced the political, social and military costs of foreign military intervention, which, of course, is contrary to international law and the Westphalian framework.

In summary, thanks to the ruling elite’s decision to appropriate the state for itself, disregard the will of the people and undermine all sources of social power that sustain the nation-state, along with the counter-elite’s inability to resolve the catastrophic stalemate without the help of international Caesarism, the price that Venezuelan society paid was the intervention of a foreign sentinel, the attempt to install a protectorate, the plundering of our natural resources via tribute and, ultimately, the jeopardising of the sovereign existence of the Venezuelan nation-state. The resolution of the catastrophic stalemate that characterised the integral state crisis came in the form of a Jacksonian-Hamiltonian, mercantilist, territorialist, ethnocentric foreign sentinel that had internalised Ulpian’s maxim: quod principi placuit vigorem legem habet (what pleases the prince has the force of law).

The dialectic of US civil society and the Venezuelan opposition

David Harvey suggestively argued in his classic book, The New Imperialism, that we must take very seriously the hypothesis that US interventions abroad are motivated by a desire to distract attention from internal difficulties. In Harvey’s words, 

There is indeed a long history of governments in trouble domestically seeking to solve their problems either by foreign adventures or by manufacturing foreign threats to consolidate solidarities at home.7

To support this thesis, Harvey referenced a passage from Hannah Arendt, where she exposes the inherent instability of a civil society based solely on the accumulation of wealth and power. For Arendt, such a society can only remain stable 

by constantly extending its authority and only through process of power accumulation ... [The] ever-present possibility of [civil] war guarantees the Commonwealth a prospect of permanence because it makes it possible for the state to increase its power at the expense of other states.8

Let us ignore here Trump’s reasons for using Venezuela as a domestic scapegoat and focus instead on the actions of the decadent Venezuelan opposition political elite, which converted Venezuela into an ideal scapegoat amid the internal turmoil of US civil society under Trump.

During 2024, a window of opportunity opened up as Venezuela’s organic crisis entered a plebiscitary moment. After the resounding failure of Juan Guaidó’s dual power strategy, María Corina Machado opportunistically changed her perspective, momentarily abandoning insurrectionary strategies, believing she could lead the traditional opposition to take advantage of this plebiscitary moment, given the evident support of the vast majority of Venezuelans for an electoral and peaceful solution to the crisis. However, this plebiscitary moment “from below” ran counter to the political will of the “patrimonialist party” and the “foreign party” of the opposition “from above.” This was a first warning sign that Venezuelan society was very likely heading toward the “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces,” the “peace of the graveyards,” and the intervention of a “foreign sentinel.” Consequently, between July 28, 2024, and January 10, 2025, this window of opportunity opened by this plebiscitary moment was closed off, the catastrophic stalemate became irresolvable, and corruption, violence and fraud were consolidated as the source of social power. From January 2025 onwards, the Machado-led opposition was left with no room for manoeuvre at the national level, instead hoping that a foreign sentinel would resolve the catastrophic stalemate in its favour.

Machado’s wager on a foreign sentinel must therefore be considered an integral part of the Venezuelan political class’s shift towards corruption, violence and fraud as a source of domination without authority. Is there anything more violent, corrupt and fraudulent than contributing to and promoting a military intervention against your own nation? Since January 2025, Machado’s only political asset, apart from sentimental exploitation of the Venezuelan diaspora, has been her adherence to, support for and promotion of the Trump administration’s theories about Venezuela and Venezuelans, motivated by his desire to push forward with his domestic immigration policy and his “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. 

While Maduro persecuted and imprisoned militants from her political party, Vente, Machado’s political activity focused not on protecting her militants from repression, national resistance or forming a broad political front, but rather on helping — often in ways that bordered on the pathetic — to build Washington’s case against Venezuela, against Venezuelans and against Maduro.9 For his part, Trump, ignoring reports from his own intelligence services, found in Machado’s narrative and actions the ideal scapegoat to: 1) justify an immigration policy that has led to heightened conflict within US civil society; and 2) intervene militarily against a weakened and discredited enemy and initiate the US Grand Strategy pivot towards Latin America amid the current Great Power rivalry by realigning Caracas with Washington. All this while appropriating manu militari an oil tribute for “favours rendered” as the sentinel and Caesar of the catastrophic stalemate. Rather than bringing her to political power, Machado’s Faustian pact with Trumpism served to declare Venezuelans hostis humani generis and contributed to the MAGA offensive against the popular and national sovereignty of several Latin American states.

The crisis/contest phase of the US hegemonic cycle and the “Donroe doctrine”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published in November 2025, states:

After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere. This “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests.10

Much ink has been spilled in Latin America over the past two centuries regarding the Monroe Doctrine. In most cases, it has been to support, in a victimising and essentialist tone, the denunciation that US imperialism has a providential motivation in Latin America. Here, on the contrary, I want to put forward a situational interpretation of the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The US hegemonic cycle has entered its third phase, the crisis/contest phase, following the geopolitical failure of the Project for a New American Century in the Middle East and, above all, the Great Recession that began in 2007. As Immanuel Wallerstein has argued, the balance-of-power or crisis/contest phases of hegemonic cycles are “a period of slow but steady disintegration of world order, the previous order.”11 The modern inter-state system is today not heading towards any kind of “world order”, but rather towards systemic chaos, in one of the two senses given to the concept by Giovanni Arrighi: a conflict that arises “because a new set of rules and norms of behaviour is imposed on, or grows from within, an older set of rules and norms without displacing it.”12 Alluding to the classic phrase of the master Thucydides, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney recently pointed out in Davos that at such moments within the modern interstate system, it is not just the weak but also middle powers who suffer. How do they suffer? They suffer both as a result of the logic of territorialist power and from the segmentation of the world market among Great Powers. Arrighi’s conceptual distinction between the logic of capitalist power and the mode of territorialist domination is essential to interpreting the situation:

Territorialist rulers tend to increase their power by expanding the size of the container. Capitalist rulers, in contrast, tend to increase their power by piling up wealth within a smaller container only if it is justified by the requirements of the accumulation of capital.13

Trump 2.0’s territorialism — and, of course, the intervention in Venezuela with the intention of turning it into a “reliable partner,” economically and politically — must be interpreted in light of the demands of capital accumulation in the context of the balance-of-power phase. In other words, the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, with its respective territorialism, is the flip side of containment in East Asia; the commitment to the logic of capitalist power in Asia corresponds to the commitment to the logic of territorialist domination in the Western Hemisphere. Hence, the contrast between territorialist and harsh words dedicated to the Americas in the National Security Strategy quoted above and the tone of capitalist power logic dedicated towards Asia: “In the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict.”14 The demands of global capital accumulation and the US–China hegemonic conflict has led to territorialism and the expansion of power and resources in the Americas.

Trump’s regime change for oil in Venezuela, or geopolitical and geoeconomic realignment of Caracas, has geostrategic incentives if Venezuela’s integral state crisis is situated amid the crisis/contest phase of the US hegemonic cycle. The weakening of sources of social power in Caracas created a low-cost window of opportunity for the Trump administration to rebalance its withdrawal from Asia with a realignment in the Western Hemisphere, starting with an oil-producing state in crisis capable of offering an example to the entire continent of what the weak will suffer if they do not adapt to US interests in this phase of Great Power rivalry.

The transformation of inter-entreprise competition into inter-state competition on a global scale is a recurring pattern of the modern world-system in the crisis/contest phase.15 Prior to the Trump 2.0 administration, trends and countertrends could be used to debate whether a turning point had been reached, regarding when competition between capital accumulation agencies became competition between states, with their respective territorial, militaristic and industrialist escalation. However, the Trump 2.0 administration marks a point of no return from inter-company competition to Great Powers competition for territory, natural resources and supply chains. The segmentation of the world market, which for Arrighi was a key element in the transition from the previous phase of crisis/contest to collapse/transition, and from there to war pandemonium seems to now be an irreversible trend in the current crisis/contest phase.

Territorialism over a country with Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, regardless of their quality, is alluring for US oil corporations in a scenario of global market segmentation, as it guarantees the management and disposal of resources essential for the valorisation of downstream oil, where global inter-corporate competition in the oil industry and inter-state struggle for capital in search of investment and profits converge. Amid Great Power rivalry and global market segmentation, the benefits of controlling Venezuela’s oil fields for the US state include expelling geopolitical competitors from accessing it as, paradoxically, secondary sanctions reduced the cost of Venezuelan oil for China due to discounts. For US oil corporations, Caracas’s geopolitical realignment may offer them the everlasting possibility of competing for profits through accumulation by dispossession: profits from vibration rather than production. In other words, the possibility of generating substantial profits leveraged on the artificial reduction of costs and the manu militari conversion of the Venezuelan nation’s property rights into the private property rights of corporations. Political capitalism hand-in-hand with international Caesarism? Exploitative domination?

In an article dedicated to analysing the doctrinal bases of Trump 2.0’s foreign policy, I argued that to understand his actions, it is necessary to abandon the restricted and euphemistic use of the term “regime change” and adopt a broader one with three meanings: 1) a violent overthrow of a foreign government; 2) a structural transformation in the mode of regulation and regime of accumulation in a peripheral and semi-peripheral country to the benefit of a Great Power; or 3) the establishment of an international or regional order by a Great Power.16 The “regime change” taking place in Venezuela — accelerated by the January 3 military intervention — falls into the second category: Caracas’s realignment with Washington’s geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Regime change for oil? Yes, but also for the sake of establishing a protectorate.

The success of international Caesarism and of the establishment of a protectorate as a way of resolving the catastrophic stalemate in Venezuela will be determined by the dialectic revolution/restoration and which element predominates. In Gramsci’s words, “it is revolution or restoration which predominates.”17 The US protectorate, as a form of resolving the catastrophic stalemate between passive and active restoration, does not escape the fact that “restorations in toto do not exist.” On the contrary, it might unleash the progressive power that until now had been overshadowed by the catastrophic dialectic of the struggle between two restorations.

 

In the time of predators: The stakes of Trump’s imperialist intervention in Venezuela


Tempest graphic Venezuela interview

Republished from Tempest.

The attack against Venezuela in early January and the abduction of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores are part of the new U.S. strategy within the broader reorganization of the world and of inter-imperialist power relations. This aggressive strategy notably involves increased economic pressure and direct military interventionism toward Latin America. Franck Gaudichaud looks back at these events in an interview conducted by Antoine Larrache for Inprecor magazine, with remarks updated for Contretemps Web. This interview was translated into English by Hector Rivera for International Viewpoint and Tempest Magazine.

What happened during the abduction of Maduro and his partner?

Quite a few elements and details remain unknown, even more than a month later, but we are clearly facing a large-scale imperialist aggression and, quite literally, a coup d’état, which took place on the night of January 2–3. Venezuela was bombed with an unprecedented military deployment (with more than 150 aircraft and helicopters operating simultaneously). It is the first time that a South American country has been bombed in this way (let us recall the most recent interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, against General Noriega in Panama in 1989, or the invasion of Grenada in 1983, which was preceded by the arrest and execution of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop).

The U.S. had a massive military presence in the Caribbean for several months, including the deployment of the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, along with an entire armada, all under the pretext of fighting drug trafficking — an operation that resulted in several extrajudicial killings and the bombing of boats. The possibility of an intervention was ultimately confirmed. Special forces landed on the ground during the operation and destroyed several strategic and defensive points in Venezuela. The near-total absence of organized and centralized defense, particularly anti-aircraft defense, by the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) made it possible to capture and detain, in record time, the sitting president Nicolás Maduro and his partner, deputy Cilia Flores, who were then “extracted” and deported to the United States. They were presented before a judge in New York on fabricated charges, including accusations of leading a “narco-state.”

This military operation, which violates Venezuela’s sovereignty and — of course — all international law (which is the least of Trump’s concerns), marks the beginning of a brutal attempt to recolonize the country and perhaps even to establish a protectorate in the medium term, if we are to believe the first statements coming from the White House. Within the context of the prolonged crisis of capitalism, the decline of U.S. global hegemony, and the violent reorganization of the inter-imperialist system, Trump’s objective is to bring the entire hemisphere to heel, using or threatening to use the largest military-industrial arsenal humanity has ever built. It is also, more directly, about regaining control over Bolivarian Venezuela and preparing the colonial plundering of the country’s vast heavy oil reserves.

According to your information, what has been the attitude of the state apparatus and the ruling layers in Venezuela following this operation?

It is still in the process of reorganization. What we can clearly observe — and what our contacts on the ground confirm — is that following the detention of the president and his partner, there has been continuity within the Madurista state apparatus, now embodied by the figure of interim president Delcy Rodríguez. Both military and civilian leaderships, the upper levels of the bureaucracy, leaders of the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), and the various factions of the Bolivarian business bourgeoisie appear to be closing ranks… for now. Of course, what is decisive here — and will continue to be — is the attitude of the army, the pillar of Maduro’s political control, particularly since the crises of 2014 and 2017–2019.

For now, we see the main leaders of what had been Madurismo in power since the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, on Delcy Rodríguez’s side. First and foremost is Diosdado Cabello, the regime’s strongman, who controls the police, maintains very strong ties with the army, and also with China. The Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, the seemingly untouchable Vladimir Padrino López, has expressed his support (he was not dismissed despite the January debacle), as has the president’s brother, Jorge Rodríguez, one of the key figures of Chavismo and then Madurismo, now president of the National Assembly. There are nevertheless debates about the extent to which a sector of the regime may have dropped Maduro beforehand and struck a deal over the ongoing transition, in the face of maximum pressure from the United States and the repeated failures of negotiations with Trump.

A whole segment of the existing bureaucracy, particularly high-ranking military officials, has economic interests in oil and mining extraction to protect, as well as their own impunity to negotiate in the event of regime change… But how much room for maneuver do they have now (especially in the absence of a broad, autonomous national popular resistance movement)?

The fact remains that there was no immediate politico-military capacity to respond to what was, at the very least, an anticipated or possible aggression by the Pentagon — despite armed forces supposedly on permanent alert. Several billion dollars had been invested in Russian and Chinese equipment, particularly to protect Caracas and its airspace, with anti-aircraft defenses and sophisticated radar systems over recent years. Everything appears to have been neutralized beforehand. There are therefore many unknowns from this perspective, but there was no coordinated national defense movement. Does this indicate limited internal active or passive complicity, a breakdown in the chain of command, or a strategic passivity by the General Staff while awaiting a reorganization of power? Debates are raging at Miraflores Palace, and rumors and fake news are also being feverishly fueled by Washington’s services to maintain control. Those who paid the highest price for this debacle were more than 100 people (civilians and military personnel), including members of Maduro’s personal guard and particularly 32 Cuban agents killed in the confrontation.

As for Delcy Rodríguez’s position, she confirmed the establishment of a state of exception. We are therefore far from any perspective of opening or democratization, quite the opposite, even if several political prisoners have also been released, including the opposition figure Enrique Marquez. If approved by parliament, it would allow — under certain conditions — the release of several hundred political prisoners. The bill officially acknowledges the existence of prisoners of conscience in Venezuela (detained for political offenses or for “criticism of public officials”). Though it should be noted that the law does not cover murders or aggravated violence, particularly those committed by the far right, nor does it cover corruption (which is rather positive). This amnesty proposal is also the product of intense mobilization by several collectives of families of detainees.

More broadly, however, the Rodríguez siblings seem to be confirming what Trump and Marco Rubio proudly announced at their press conference immediately after the aggression: They would be willing to usher in a new era of “cooperation” with the United States, particularly to facilitate the “reconstruction” of the oil industry under imperial oversight. Their room for maneuver is admittedly limited. Internally, however, the president has repeated that the goal is to safeguard the country’s sovereignty; she is officially demanding the immediate release of Maduro and Flores and adopts anti-imperialist rhetoric in her televised speeches. Yet CIA director John Ratcliffe was received in Caracas and even awarded a medal! And Trump announced that he was canceling any further attack because “the United States and Venezuela are now working well together.”

To what extent can a “Madurismo without Maduro” be organized, under pressure from imperialism and in collaboration with Trump? Why have there been no significant mobilizations of Chavistas and popular bases?

It was believed that Trump’s main option was that of regime change, placing the ultra-conservative, neoliberal, pro-U.S. opposition embodied by Maria Corina Machado and the 2024 presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez, who was disqualified following electoral fraud, on the “throne.” But Machado has been publicly humiliated and sidelined by Trump, at least for now: and the gift of her Nobel Peace Prize medal to the autocrat of the United States will not change much! Trump’s gamble is therefore clearly to rely on the state apparatus and Madurismo, calculating that they control the country, noting that they retain the essential support of the army and also real (albeit diminished) social bases: popular Chavism, whose potential resistance must be channeled. This would be accompanied by considerable political, military, and economic threats and pressure. Washington’s calculation is that Corina Machado and Edmundo González would not be able to radically reorganize the country in the short term without direct support from imperialism, including ground troops. An Iraq-style scenario is unthinkable for Trump and would be too costly, including domestically, given that his MAGA base is highly critical of military invasions, that the situation in the United States is tense, with major struggles underway (against ICE in particular), and since the midterm elections are coming up in November.

It is quite surprising that the state apparatus and the “bolibourgeoisie” are capable of navigating such an upheaval.

Everyone is waiting to see what happens. The interim Venezuelan government, as I said, is blowing hot and cold, including in relation to its own population. But the collapse is shocking, especially for those who thought that massive national anti-imperialist resistance, fueled by years of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” was possible. Fear and uncertainty dominate at this stage, and while there have been demonstrations in support of Maduro’s release, they have remained relatively timid. This is not so surprising. On the one hand, there is the immense military asymmetry and maximum political pressure exerted by U.S. imperialism, in a regional context that is, moreover, hostile. On the other, for more than a decade, we have witnessed the authoritarian disintegration, political collapse, and economic destruction of Chávez’s country and of what the Bolivarian process and its progressive, national-popular, and anti-imperialist impulse had embodied in the 2000s.

Madurismo exacerbated the most problematic aspects of Chavismo and consolidated a Bolibourgeoisie caste in power, a new oligarchy that has accumulated foreign currency from oil and mining extraction and certain state assets through dispossession and corruption. After repressing (often violent) demonstrations and conservative pro-imperialist opposition sectors, temporarily closing the elected parliament, and concentrating power in the executive branch, Maduro did the same to the left-wing opposition, against former allies (notably the PCV, Venezuelan Communist Party), imprisoning trade unionists and former Chavista leaders and ministers. The internal situation, exacerbated and worsened by years of U.S. blockade and unjust sanctions, has led to the exile of 8 million Venezuelans (out of a population of 28 million!).

Despite this there has been a slow and steady macroeconomic recovery in recent years, embodied by the very pragmatic management of Delcy Rodríguez, who is responsible for oil extraction, among other things. However, as several Venezuelan trade unions have denounced, Maduro’s economic policy and labor rights resemble more a neoliberal dystopia, with the destruction of all fundamental rights and a headlong rush into extractivism with catastrophic ecological consequences, than “21st-Century Socialism.” A broad trade union front had even planned to hold strikes and demonstrations in mid-January, but this plan was thwarted by Trump and his warmongering.

Under these circumstances, the absence of conditions for a broad, multi-party anti-imperialist resistance, with a popular base mobilized behind a legitimate national government, is glaringly obvious. And the Trump administration is well aware of this. We are not at all in April 2002, when Hugo Chávez suffered a coup d’état, supported by the CIA and local business leaders, and was “saved” by a very strong popular mobilization, while the military showed its willingness to reject this pro-imperial coup.

Are there still sections of the civil-military apparatus that remain rooted in this nationalist-populist perspective and ready to resist the new colonial rule? Popular Chavismo, critical left-wing movements, trade unions, and social movements have been considerably weakened, with some demoralized and others co-opted. However, memories of early Chavismo remain, and here and there, collective community experiences are still alive. Nevertheless, it seems that a significant part of the population, with a great deal of resignation, believes that this new crisis could perhaps loosen the stranglehold on the country and that the arrival of U.S. capital could lead to an economic rebound, or even the return of millions of exiles.

Will we see the establishment of a kind of forced co-management and “pro-imperial” collaboration on the part of a section of the Bolibourgeois cast to to save its interests (which is in fact unlikely in the long term), while continuing to run the country in this quasi-protectorate context? There is no question of transition, or even elections, in the short term. But it is already being considered by everyone in the medium term. Is a nationalist response by the government conceivable? In any case, the new hydrocarbons law defended by Rodriguez as a step forward which has just been approved, greatly deepens the liberalization that Maduro had begun in recent months. It radically challenges the state’s sovereignty over the resource, as well as the orientations of the 1999 Bolivarian constitution, to the benefit of U.S. multinationals. This is a historic setback! The United States will decide on extraction. They have announced that they will start by confiscating 50 million barrels for their own benefit and that part of the future dividends from oil exploitation will be placed in Qatar and returned in dribs and drabs to run Venezuelan public services, at their discretion.

Under these circumstances, what will be the capacity of the working classes to reorganize autonomously in order to reject Trump’s control and demand real democratization of the country, in this new context of colonial oppression, after years of immense material precariousness and authoritarian abuses? This is a key question.

Trump explained that he wanted to recover what had supposedly been stolen from the United States in terms of oil resources.

Trump announced without mincing words the destruction he wanted to wreak and his intention to regain control of the country. Historically, since the discovery of oil and the first wells in 1914, and especially during the golden age of extraction in the 1960s under the control of Yankee multinationals, these companies have been able to reap the full benefits of oil extraction, with huge, excessive profit margins, much more than, for example, in Saudi Arabia or the Middle East.

This is in line with the thinking of the ruling oligarchy in the United States, and there is a desire to return to this type of “savage” accumulation through dispossession. When Trump says they were “sidelined,” one might think he is referring to the 1976 nationalization by Venezuelan social democracy (under Carlos Andrés Pérez), but in fact he is referring more directly to 2007 when Chávez reorganized joint ventures for the benefit of PDVSA, and nationalized much of the extraction in the Orinoco oil belt, where the main reserve is currently located, perhaps 300 billion barrels! This is the largest proven reserve in the world, but it is extra-heavy bitumen, which is very expensive to refine.

What billionaire Trump would like to see is for this reserve to fall back into the hands of Exxon, Chevron, and other major U.S. corporations, and also to be able to dictate the price of crude oil worldwide (Venezuela is a key player in OPEC). This is not so easy in reality, given that 80 percent of exports currently go to China and the infrastructure is in a state of advanced disrepair (with 800,000 barrels per day currently being produced). In any case, there are major investments to be made, with some talking about $60 billion or even $100 billion over several years to be injected by North American capital. Nothing is certain, however, as these capitalists would need long-term guarantees that the country’s social and political control will remain stable and that China will be effectively sidelined or at least marginalized. This is truly a prospect of recolonization that could take shape.

At the same time, while the energy and oil angle is obvious — in his speech, Trump says, “Money is coming out of the ground in Venezuela” — we need to analyze the geostrategic aspect, which, in my opinion, is essential and which, incidentally, is brutally expressed by Marco Rubio: to discipline the entire region and threaten South America. The target is Brazil, which still has a degree of geostrategic autonomy. At the same time, the aim is to realign the Caribbean region and, above all, to bring down Cuba (the obsession of Marco Rubio’s Miami clan) like “ripe fruit” rather than through intervention. Cuba is losing its essential ally in Caracas and its oil supply, while the island’s economy is in a situation even worse than during the “special period in peacetime” of the early 1990s. The island is clearly under threat today, which would be another major defeat for Latin American sovereignty. And in doing so, it would threaten Colombia and Mexico, both of which are still governed by progressive governments and enjoy a certain degree of relative autonomy in the regional arena (elections are coming up in Colombia and the pressure will be strong).

The White House’s new “National Security Strategy” (NSS), published last December, confirms a desire to disrupt international relations and even a growing “fascistization” of the world order. Éric Toussaint has just devoted a detailed study to this subject. We are once again entering an era of predatory states and imperialist gangsterism (which, admittedly, never disappeared), where only brute force counts: Latin America as the U.S. backyard, while Putin can more or less do what he wants on a European scale (the European bourgeoisie is despised for its weakness, timidity, and division), including in Ukraine, while China embodies the true “systemic” enemy: a Middle Kingdom to be weakened in Latin America and contained in Southeast Asia.

The Trump administration is redrawing the world map to cope with the decline of its once-hegemonic empire. This new phase of international relations in the era of the fourth age of capitalism and major climatic and ecological upheavals is more dangerous than ever, with the remilitarization of inter-state relations and continental-scale military conflicts. Gilbert Achcar describes a “new Cold War,” bloc against bloc, and indeed, this one is increasingly punctuated by open, “hot” conflicts and colonial violence, starting with the genocide in Gaza.

How do you see this process of recolonization in Latin America, given that China is currently Latin America’s largest trading partner?

We are seeing the consequences of what we have been calling, for some time now, the “polycrisis” of the capitalist and inter-imperialist system. The major powers have not really recovered from the crisis since 2008, and we are more broadly in a long wave of “secular stagnation,” with an ongoing reorganization of value chains and marked by the hyperconcentration of capital at the global level. In this phase, the current leading power — the United States of America — is in decline and wants to violently reclaim space, resources, markets, and capacity for geostrategic projection.

In this sense, it is very interesting to return to the writings of Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernest Mandel, and Samir Amin on imperialism, without reading them as “revealed truth,” of course. The same applies to the rich debates on center-periphery relations, the theory of uneven and combined development, and the theory of dependency in the 1970s. Authors who believed that the era of imperialism was more or less over, or that we would see the emergence of a “super-imperialism” of multinational, trans-state corporations that would rule the world, were sorely mistaken: what is emerging is a highly hierarchical and competitive inter-imperialist system, based above all on strong nation States and national military powers. Multinational corporations accompany them in this process, as does financial capital.

In this context, the idea of “hemispheric security” and the doctrine of national security, which is at the heart of U.S. strategic thinking for Latin America, is being reaffirmed in an ultra-violent manner. The Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, and gunboat diplomacy are being revisited by the Trump administration with renewed violence in the form of the “Donroe Doctrine.” According to this worldview, the problem now is competition from China on all fronts, particularly in technology, infrastructure (including Big Tech and monetary infrastructure), and geopolitical power (even if not yet on a military level). Benjamin Bürbaumer’s work is illuminating in this regard: China’s capitalist development since the 1990s directly threatens globalization under U.S. hegemony and that of the dollar, as it was built during the second half of the 20th century. China is in the process of displacing the U.S. commercially and economically in Latin America: it is the leading trading partner of Brazil, Peru, Chile, and South America as a whole. This trajectory seems almost impossible to alter. Even Mexico, which is fully integrated into the U.S. market and its supply chains (notably through a free trade agreement), has China as its second largest trading partner, with companies directly established by the Chinese on the border with the United States.

Trump has said it repeatedly: China could no longer be allowed to control the Pacific and Atlantic ports at the entrances to the Panama Canal, and he succeeded in changing the situation through political pressure and millions of dollars: Panama is once again a canal entirely under U.S. control. His tools are the multiple U.S. bases, the deployment of the Fourth Fleet, and very tight military, informational, and economic control, while China has no real military means in the region.

The relationship with Colombia is central in this regard, since until now, that country has been the key to military geostrategy for the South American region, via the “Plan Colombia” and under the pretext of fighting guerrillas and “narcos.” This is despite the fact that Central America and the Caribbean are considered easier to control (although Cuba continues to resist). This explains Trump’s rather harsh diplomatic conflicts with President Petro, even though negotiations are ongoing.

The outcome of this clash of titans is uncertain — even in Javier Milei’s Argentina, China remains central to trade. There are therefore geopolitical and ideological aspects: Trump wants to strengthen “his own,” in the regional far right, the Mileis, the Bolsonaros, the Kasts, and practices electoral interventionism, as he did in the midterm elections in Argentina. He has also recently succeeded in Honduras, and he will continue to rely on Kast, the newly elected Pinochetist in Chile, the conservative billionaire Noboa in Ecuador, and the conservative liberal right in Bolivia, and put pressure on even very moderate governments, such as Lula’s in Brazil, to say: “If you resist us, you will be considered enemies, and if you are enemies, we will impose completely unprecedented tariffs of 40 or 50 percent, or we will simply threaten you militarily, as we did in Venezuela.”

This show of force, which is also underway against Greenland, shows that the United States is less and less a “hegemon” capable of projecting force or soft power, support, and consensus: They now represent raw domination centered on political-military power relations and commercial ultimatums, against a backdrop of threats of economic or colonial destruction against the “non-aligned,” including Europe and NATO allies if necessary.

It must be very complex to change supply chains and the international organization of labor, so it will require extremely repressive governments. Even in Venezuela, this could very quickly contradict what Trump or others might present as a supposed democratic opening.

Exactly. It is interesting to note the recent statements by figures representing U.S. fossil capitalism and the major oil companies, who expressed their doubts and reservations about the considerable investment that would be required to “reconquer” oil in Venezuela for their own profit, and the lack of guarantees since political stabilization is hard to achieve without establishing a repressive and costly protectorate. Trump had to meet with them and reiterated his commitment to them. In return, Chinese leaders expressed their rejection of the aggression against their Venezuelan ally, but they will have to acknowledge that this is a serious blow, as their military equipment on the ground has proven ineffective.

Xi Jinping’s special envoy to Latin America had met at length with Maduro in Caracas just hours before Trump’s raid. Nevertheless, they issued new strategic documents renewing their rejection of U.S. imperialism and their willingness to engage in “friendly” cooperation and technology transfer with Latin American countries, in contrast to the belligerent attitude of the United States. China understands the threat and has an Achilles heel: its energy dependence (the country buys 70 percent of its oil needs from abroad). Chinese leaders will seek to consolidate their influence in Latin America in the name of mutual respect, despite the setback in Venezuela, without entering into direct confrontation with Trump in the hemisphere. They are promoting a “win-win” discourse, yet the relationship between China and Latin America remains completely asymmetrical: They always want more raw materials, minerals, arable land, and agribusiness. They have announced their intention to reach their goal of $700 billion in investment in the region by 2035. The recently inaugurated Chancay megaport is their flagship project in the region for the “New Silk Road.” Nevertheless, the economic slowdown is also affecting China.

Even though the Chinese Communist Party subscribes to the discourse on multilateralism, the construction of the BRICS and the “Global South,” many activists are well aware that the voracious capitalism of the Asian giant cannot embody a real alternative in terms of emancipation, development, and even diplomacy. This has been evident in their silence in the face of the massacres in Gaza, and even their direct or indirect support for Netanyahu. They advocate for a different global order, certainly, but one that will not necessarily bring liberation to the peoples of the South.

The Latin American region finds itself at the intersection of two conflicting tectonic plates: a dominant, violent imperialism in crisis and a global imperial hegemony that could potentially be emerging. At this stage, the United States spends more than 36 percent of the world’s total military expenditure. This is considerable. 250,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed around the world, compared to only a few hundred Chinese and perhaps 30,000 to 35,000 Russians. Trump wants to rely on this enormous military-industrial power to try to reestablish the United States as an untouchable global player.

Do you have any information on resistance to this offensive in Latin America? What about the attitude of so-called “progressive” governments?

Progressive or center-left governments are denouncing the aggression against Venezuela, the kidnapping of President Maduro, the breakdown of international order, and the violation of a neighboring country’s sovereignty. Lula, Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico, Boric in Chile, and Gustavo Petro even more clearly in Colombia have all spoken out, which does not mean, however, that they support the Maduro regime.

Lula has intervened mainly on the diplomatic front and in a rather timid manner: He has called for an urgent UN meeting, as the legitimate forum for the settling international conflicts; he also tried to mobilize the Organization of American States, but at the same time he has shown a certain powerlessness. Whereas in the 2000s, national-populist governments had a strong capacity for cooperation and pooling resources, with UNASUR, CELAC, and even ALBA, in an attempt to exert influence on the international stage, we are now once again facing fragmentation.

There is no longer any talk of the Bank of the South project, or even of an alternative common currency. Today, the ideal of the Patria Grande (José Martí’s great Latin American homeland) is in decline, nationalism and the far right are on the rise, the collapse of the Bolivarian experiment is weighing heavily on the entire region, Cuba is suffocating and in danger, Bolivia’s Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) is tearing itself apart, the Boric experiment is giving way to Kast, etc. The progressive governments in power (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay) seem relatively isolated, even though Petro and, even more so, Claudia Sheinbaum have managed to consolidate a solid multi-class social and electoral base.

The decisive factor in such a context is and will continue to be grassroots resistance, class and popular struggles, feminists, peasants, indigenous peoples, regardless of the position of governments, for self-determination and national sovereignty. One way to gain more influence on the regional stage and in relation to Trump, including for left-wing governments, would be to rely on a mobilized population, invoking the historic anti-imperialist horizon that is still very much present in the collective imagination and values of some Latin Americans. However, in Brazil and under Boric in Chile, progressive politics has tended to deactivate struggles and mobilized actors. Not to mention Venezuela. The Maduro government has co-opted and/or repressed resistance, and what it has not done directly, economic collapse and sanctions have taken care of. There are still some “communes” and courageous experiments in self-organization that are worth supporting, but they remain fragile.

This does not mean that there are not multiple mobilizations and resistance movements taking place right now. The continent of Sandino and the Zapatistas remains dotted with struggles. In Brazil, this is very clear, as we have seen the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) remains powerful, despite internal debates about its relationship with Lula. In Ecuador too, in the face of Noboa, with the large mobilizations of CONAIE, the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador, urban unions, and ecological collectives, which succeeded in inflicting a crushing political defeat on the government in the November 2025 referendum, rejecting the project for a new Yankee military base and the authoritarian reform of the Constitution. So in several countries, things are moving.

We could talk about the power of feminist, indigenous, and decolonial movements: For example, there is hope in Chile to confront Kast and his socially regressive, racist, and patriarchal measures. But there are currently no continent-wide mobilizations, as there have been in the past, for example to confront the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) project, which was defeated in 2005. One place of support that could be truly fundamental is the increasingly massive mobilizations underway in the heart of the United States, with the “No Kings” protests and the struggles against police violence and the fascist immigration police (ICE). Mamdani’s victory in New York, and the recomposition of the left against the Democratic Party establishment also come to mind.

Otherwise, we must recognize that there is a rising neo-conservative, even reactionary, tide in many areas in most countries, which weighs heavily. Violence also pervades everyday life and the media, whether it be from cartels and drug trafficking, the state or paramilitaries, or forced migration. This is the case in Chile, which I know well. It is imperative for us to understand what led this country from the great popular uprising of 2019 (which was heavily repressed) to the massive victory of José Antonio Kast’s neo-Pinochetismo in 2025: this is fundamental, in my opinion, because it is a major defeat for all social and political leftists in a country that is emblematic of global neoliberalism.

We are living in a time when neo-fascism and the conservative far right can appear to be an “alternative” in the eyes of a significant portion of the working classes. A time when the left has been discredited or has lost touch with the working classes to the benefit of conservative evangelical churches. A time when anti-capitalist left-wing movements remain weak, sectarian, or lacking in credibility. Of course, from our point of view, the far right is an ultra-regressive “alternative” that serves capital, the destruction of the environment, patriarchy, the brutal domination of oligarchies, etc. It also serves U.S. imperialism in the Americas. Thus, Kast loudly welcomed the kidnapping of Maduro and Cilia Flores. The same is true of Noboa, who posted tweets claiming that the attack was excellent news for Latin America. The Brazilian far right thinks the same. They are Trump’s “lackeys.” Elections are coming up in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru in a few months. In Colombia, there is a real risk of a return of the right. What will happen in Brazil, with an institutional left still dependent on the figure of an aging Lula, now in his 80s?

What suggestions would you give for a transitional global anti-imperialist program?

That’s very (too) ambitious! Because I can’t answer such a question on my own, which, moreover, would have to be adapted to local, national, and then global conditions based on the collective efforts of the populations concerned. What we can say with certainty is that the solution will certainly not be found in this context of militarization, imperial offensives, wars, genocide in Gaza, invasion of Venezuela, widespread submission of peoples to authoritarian governments, mass repression as in Iran, and fascism… So, as our friend Daniel Bensaïd said, we must start by saying “no!”

In the current Latin American context, what militant and radical leftists are seeking to build is already the broadest and most unified anti-imperialist resistance possible on a continental scale, in support of Venezuela and to defend against new interventions on the continent right now. At this stage, continental mobilization remains far below the urgency of the moment. They are already demanding the immediate withdrawal of the huge armada that the United States has been maintaining for months in the Caribbean and the immediate release of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, based on the clear principle that it is up to the Venezuelan people, and only them, to decide who governs them.

In the countries of the “South,” this requires the creation of broad united fronts to reject attacks on sovereignty and self-determination. But such open fronts of resistance should in no way sacrifice the construction of combative left-wing movements, independent of the national bourgeoisie, and of shaky governmental progressivism that has shown all its contradictions over the past 25 years.

This also means a clear debate with the many Latin American “campist” currents, as well as at the international level: “geopolitics” cannot lead to sweeping under the rug the struggle against authoritarianism (whatever form it takes) and the necessary unconditional defense of peoples fighting against imperialisms other than Trump’s (starting with Russia). In the countries of the “global North,” the urgent task is to build active and concrete internationalist solidarity. This is what we have begun, albeit timidly, to put in place in France around Venezuela. This internationalism will also have the task of denouncing the hypocrisy and responsibility of our own governments in the disorder of the world and their submission to Trump: Gaza has painfully reminded us of this, as has the scandalous position of the Macron government on Venezuela. In the short term, in March 2026, the anti-fascist conference in Porto Alegre could be a valuable opportunity. We hope that it will also be transformed into an international anti-imperialist conference to try to bring together, without sectarianism, political and social forces that do not agree on everything, such as the PT, the PSOL, the Brazilian CUT, and sectors of the radical left from across the continent, around common objectives. La Via Campesina, trade unions and feminist groups, social movements from all over the world.

In terms of concrete alternatives, we should try to promote the slogan “war on imperialist war” against the current insane militarization, while supporting those who are courageously waging armed resistance movements for liberation, particularly in Ukraine, Palestine, and Kurdistan. Beyond this “defensive” aspect, this means thinking collectively and “positively” about building democratic alternatives in a context of climate collapse, the collapse of the biosphere and biodiversity, and therefore thinking about a post-capitalist and post-productivist transition program, i.e., a perspective that is both eco-socialist and based on degrowth. Degrowth, of course, in rich countries, but “fair” degrowth, differentiated according to intersectional criteria (class, gender, race), and also degrowth for the oligarchies of the countries of the South. This would involve rebuilding public services, radically redistributing wealth, and implementing ecological planning on several scales (from local to global) based on deliberation, community organizing, self-organization, and democratic control. It is a perspective that raises the question of the exploitation and oppression that permeate our societies and affect us as individuals (racism, sexism, ableism, etc.).

All this cannot be “proclaimed” in an abstract way, like a mantra. How can we jointly develop very concrete transitional programs and measures that are part of a broader strategy based on wide-ranging deliberations? Which stories from the past can inspire us and teach us lessons? How can the left once again “enchant the world,” speak to the “affects” of millions of people, and forge a historic bloc that raises the question of power and its conquest, without denying itself or falling into dogmatism? Let’s start by avoiding ready-made answers. The 20th century and its horrors are still with us…

We know that there will be no emancipation without emancipation in the workplace. Rebuilding workers’ rights (both salaried and precarious) could be a first step in this direction. Let us also keep our ears open to utopian ideas and practical experiences. For example, Latin America is the birthplace of Zapatismo and several revolutionary processes, and for the past 20 years these movements have been debating ways to build a society based on “Buen Vivir,” which draws on a reinterpretation of certain demands and community practices of indigenous peoples. The same is true of women’s rights and all feminist demands against patriarchy. We have seen how the Chilean feminist movement has been able to take a cross-cutting and radical approach by responding to the “precarization of life,” confronting neoliberalism, promoting the dignified reception of migrants, and defending the rights of indigenous peoples. We must therefore start from there to think about transitions, applying them country by country, but also by rebuilding regional and international solidarity. In the face of globalized capital, it is essential to think at this level as well. This without giving in to the siren songs of “patriotism” from part of the left, including the decolonial left, assuming that we must indeed “dream” again, reinvent our collective powers, and help to co-construct popular sovereignties at several levels (including the national level, of course).

We believe that the situation is overdetermined by the catastrophe (already underway) of climate change and that we must rethink everything on this basis if we want to avoid a real cataclysm. The famous “transitional program” (proposed by Trotsky in 1938) must therefore be completely rethought. It is this perspective that the Fourth International has brought to the debate, in several languages, with the Manifesto for an Eco-Socialist Revolution – Breaking with Capitalist Growth, and is the result of several years of collective international work. The challenges are colossal: it is urgent to “pull the emergency brake,” to quote Walter Benjamin’s beautiful phrase. However, the scale of the challenges must not paralyze us. As Daniel Tanuro writes, “it is too late to be pessimistic.” Trump, Netanyahu, Macron, Putin, and their world are capable of the worst; let us feel capable of imagining the best!