WWIII

Military Challenges to China's South China Sea Claims are Increasing

Courtesy Royal Canadian Navy

Published Oct 27, 2024 7:00 PM by The Strategist

 

 

[By Joe Keary]

Deployments of ships and aircraft to challenge China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea are increasing. European ships are appearing more often, while Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly conducting activities in areas that China regards as sensitive.

Several nations have claims in the South China Sea, but China’s claim is the most extensive and controversial. Beijing seeks to enforce sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all features within the nine-dash line, including the islands, rocks and atolls that make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China claims this territory despite a 2016 ruling that found that China’s claims had no basis in international law.

With international law doing little to curb China’s ambitions, more countries are using their militaries to challenge China’s claims. In 2024, more European navies operated in the South China Sea than previously in recent years, with Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands all sending ships to the region. Meanwhile regional counties, such as Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, stepped up their engagement, including via joint sailings with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Different countries take different approaches to challenging China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea. Some militaries are operating within the nine-dash line. Others sail naval ships directly through the Spratly Islands. Some advertise their activities; others do not.

Only a few have conducted activities close to the Paracels, because doing so is unusually risky. A 2022 incident in which a Chinese pilot dumped chaff in front of an Australian P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft is an example of the risk.

The US is the only country to send aircraft or ships within 12 nautical miles of claimed features. By doing so, it would be entering territorial waters if China did in fact own the territory.

These military activities to challenge China’s claims have occurred since 2015:

Apart from countries around the South China Sea, which must routinely operate on or over it, the US has by far the most public and active military presence. In 2023, the US military conducted 107 activities, including six specific operations to challenge China’s illegal claims under the US Freedom of Navigation program. US activities are always accompanied by strong public statements.

France and Canada are both active in the region, including within the Spratlys. Both advertise their military presence and actions. Canada now carries journalists on some South China Sea transits. It has operated close to the Paracel Islands, but, as demonstrated when a Chinese fighter fired flares near a Canadian helicopter in 2023, doing so comes with risks. In 2015, France boldly exercised its right to freedom of navigation by sailing a task force through the Paracels.

Australia has an active military presence in the South China Sea. There’s evidence that Australia operates close to China’s illegal claims. However, the tempo and nature of its military challenges are hard to determine, because Canberra does not advertise them. China’s military has been aggressive in seeking to deter Australia from operating near the two island groups by engaging in unsafe intercepts.

New Zealand has a semi-regular presence inside the nine-dash line, commensurate with the size of its armed forces. Meanwhile, Japan has a growing military presence in the region and is increasingly working with partners, such as the US, Australia and the Philippines. As with Australia, there are signs that Japan and New Zealand operate close to, or within, the Spratly group, but neither publicise specific actions, so the nature of them is hard to determine.

Britain sent a carrier strike group through the South China Sea in 2021 and intends to do so again next year. The British military operates close to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and uses public messaging to reinforce the importance of sailing in these areas.

Signalling growing European interest in the region, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy sent navy ships to the area in 2024. But none seems to have overtly challenged China’s claims within the Spratlys or Paracels.

The most notable regional absentee is South Korea. In 2018, a South Korean destroyer, Munmu the Great, took refuge from a typhoon in the Paracel Islands. But Seoul quickly clarified that the ship was not there to challenge China’s claims. Likewise, when the littoral states of South East Asia routinely operate there, they do not directly challenge China’s claims via freedom of navigation transits.

The growing presence of European navies in the South China Sea and stepped-up activity of Asia-Pacific countries there is welcome. It’s helping to push back on China’s growing aggression and reinforce longstanding rules and norms that underpin regional prosperity.

Joe Keary is a senior analyst at ASPI. This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here. 

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

China Tailors its History for South China Sea Propaganda

Two China Coast Guard cutters on a "rights protection" mission water-cannon a Philippine cutter in the Philippine EEZ (Courtesy PCG)

Published Oct 27, 2024 2:24 PM by The Lowy Interpreter

[By Mahbi Maulaya]

Historians in China need to play a dual role. Not only do they contribute to the advancement of knowledge, but they also need to actively defend their country’s national interests in the South China Sea. According to a report by the South China Morning Post, Chinese scholars gathered at the end of June were urged to “give a forceful response to false narratives” to strengthen their nation’s claims in the South China Sea.

At the seminar held in Hainan Province, China, Wu Shicun, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, emphasised the critical importance of “narrative construction and discourse building” for China. He said that the strategy would effectively defend the nation’s rights and interests in the South China Sea.

Many Chinese strategies have focused significant attention on the South China Sea conflict.

China asserts its claim to more than three million square kilometres of the Sea through the “nine-dash line” concept – contrary to international law. History has become a battleground in the dispute waters. Beijing has sought to draw upon the Western Han dynasty (200BCE to 9CE) to illustrate that China has historically fished in the waters for thousands of years. Yet a 2016 international tribunal decision on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea did not concur, concluding that there was no legal basis for China’s historic rights claim.

At the June seminar, Wu Shicun encouraged the 100 historians and numerous legal experts in attendance to help China defend its “rights and interests” in the legal field of the South China Sea. The aim was to rebut the 2016 arbitration ruling invalidating China’s claims to most of the South China Sea, including contested areas in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and areas claimed by Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Wu was reported to have said that the international academic community had developed “some strange theories that deliberately distort the history of the South China Sea and maliciously smear China’s rights and claims”. He urged the audience to restore the “correct” historical and legal background.

As a consequence, it seems likely we will witness a form of history warfare as part of China’s new propaganda to boost its South China Sea claim, drawing on documents, maps, and records that purportedly portray China’s long-standing rights. It could also help China galvanise domestic support.

The gathering of Chinese historians in June, with the express intention of crafting narratives around China’s ownership of the South China Sea, should not be underestimated.

Many studies have indicated that governments have the ability to influence public opinion by directing citizens’ attitudes towards history. Political scientists Yiqing Xu and Jiannan Zhao found that the historical narrative of China’s humiliation in the past has contributed to its society’s scepticism towards foreign governments and support for China’s aggressive foreign policies. This illustrates the powerful effect of propaganda in Chinese society.

Propaganda based on China’s history may also be directed at individuals who are not Chinese citizens. It is reasonable to anticipate that China’s interpretation of the South China Sea history will be taught in mainland China’s universities, where international students are pursuing their degrees. China may also choose to communicate this interpretation to the international community through public diplomacy channels that it has established globally.

Add to this China’s active construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, and the claim becomes magnified. According to Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative data, China has established 3,200 acres of new land in the South China Sea since 2013. A scenario can be imagined where in the next ten years China claims historical rights to the territory because it has developed the region’s geography, habitats and facilities.

The gathering of Chinese historians in June, with urging to craft narratives around China’s ownership of the South China Sea, should not be underestimated. It is crucial to consider the potential outcomes of China’s proposed strategy.

Mahbi Maulaya is a private researcher who graduated from Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta’s International Relations Department. His research interests concern Security and Strategic Studies surrounding the Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Indonesia. 

This article appears courtesy of The Lowy Interpreter and may be found in its original form here. 

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

The Danger Is Not China But the Fake China Threat

So argues Joseph Solis-Mullen in a slim, valuable book

by John V. Walsh Posted onMay 27, 2024

At times a book is convincing not only because its arguments are sound but also because of the author’s identity.  It would be no surprise to encounter a book penned by a socialist or Sinophile that takes on the false portrait of China that graces the US media.  But Joseph Solis-Mullen, the author of The Fake China Threat And Its Very Real Danger, is neither socialist nor Sinophile.

Solis-Mullen is a libertarian in the mold of Randolph Bourne and Justin Raimondo. Hence, he is classified as a conservative in our impoverished political taxonomy.  But his book is not written to appeal to people of any single political outlook.  It is written with only one thing in mind, the interest of the American people and, dare I say, of humanity in general, China included.  Hence it is of great utility for people across the political spectrum who sense that our people are being hoodwinked by fake China threats.  It may answer your questions on China or those of your friends in ways understandable to the average American.

The Fake China Threat is ubiquitous – and dangerous

Solis-Mullens explains the purpose and scope of the fake China Threat as follows:

“On the one hand, (the fake China Threat) serves as a legitimating device, a new reason for continually climbing defense budgets… and for the continued meddling… in the affairs of other states…

“On the other hand, the fake China Threat serves as a convenient scapegoat for the end results of the bad policies that Washington has itself authored and for decades pursued.  America deindustrialized?  China’ fault.  Millions of Americans hooked on drugs? China’s fault.  The Saudis and Iranians don’t want the Americans around anymore? China’s fault.  Et cetera.”

“There is one element of truth to the fake China Threat, however; the existence of an independent China (or Russia) is a threat to Washington’s accustomed ability to do more or less whatever it wants, wherever it wants.  But the existence of an independent China is already a fact.  Refusal on the part of Washington to accept it will cause more than theoretical problems, and therein lies the real danger. “ (Italics, jw)

To remedy that “real danger” is the purpose of this book as the author explains in these words:

“So built up in the imagination of many Americans has been the threat China allegedly poses to them and their families, that the determined opponent of the fake China Threat must venture onto the tiresome grounds of so-called ‘Great Power competition.’  He must then make estimations of relative power that, as it happens, largely buttress the case against Washington doing anything other than seeking normal relations with Beijing… The purpose of this book is to put in one place and in concise form the arguments why the interests of the American people are not served by confrontation with China.  The task is an urgent one.”

Solis-Mullen succeeds on all counts in that task. The book is indeed concise, a mere 65 pages, albeit in small print, and with extensive footnotes to satisfy the reader seeking more evidence or deeper understanding.

History, empathy, the military, and the economy

The author begins with a capsule history of Sino-US relations, really an account of the West’s interaction with China beginning in the early 19th Century and leading to a century of colonial exploitation and oppression which the Chinese refer to as the Hundred Years of Humiliation. Next, he proceeds to a view of how Beijing sees the world, in other words an attempt to see the world as our official enemies do, one of the main requisites for a peaceful world, all too often forgotten by would be champions of peace.  And he returns to these themes later in the book with a quick review of “Chinese Foreign Policy Historically.” One truth that emerges from this treatment is that China’s development of its military is reactive rather than aggressive, the result of the Century of Humiliation and the latest buildup of US forces ringing China since Obama launched his Pivot to Asia in 2011 which successor administrations have built on and developed further. The way to peace one concludes is to stop poking the Panda lest it morph into a fire breathing Dragon.

A central question is taken up in a chapter entitled “China’s Internal Problems and External Constraints.”  The author argues, incorrectly I believe, that China’s demographics and geography put limits on its economic might.  But we have heard such arguments in the past and they always come up short; China keeps surprising the pundits of the West.  But Solis-Mullen argues that both his pessimistic view of China’s economic prospects and my optimistic view are irrelevant when it comes to America’s course of action.

Either China is very strong, he says, “in which case antagonizing China over issues directly in its backyard is stupid; or actually China is quite weak in which case antagonizing China in its backyard is unnecessary and counterproductive.” He continues, “In any event is hard to hard to imagine how the life of the average American would be improved by courting conflict with China, while it is quite easy to imagine countless ways in which it could be made worse.”

The Uyghurs

One of the most powerful sections of the book is chapter 8, “Uyghurs, Genocides and Realities,” where the Uyghur “genocide” hoax is debunked.  One need only visit Xinjiang, home of the Uyghurs, and compare it to Gaza, to see that the charge of genocide is wildly off the mark.  It is easy to do this since China is encouraging tourism in Xinjiang.  Most notably, Solis-Mullen points out, the UN has not charged China with genocide despite entreaties from the US.  And the US State Department seems to have dropped the term, at least for now.  Most satisfyingly, the work of Adrian Zenz, who has provided much of the “documentation” to justify the charge of genocide, is called out.  Zenz, Solis-Mullen informs us, is “a German anthropologist of frankly questionable scholastic character and fitness,” citing as evidence the excellent work of Max Blumenthal and Gareth Porter at The Grayzone. (See also the articles by Ajit Singh here.).  The Uyghur genocide hoax makes for an excellent case history instructing us on how false narratives are constructed to advance anti-China sentiment.  The chapter “Who Writes About the Fake China Threat and Why” adds more to the picture.

Solis-Mullen’s book is solidly in the American tradition of anti-interventionism which has been struggling to make itself felt since it was smothered at the end of WWII.  He declares he is driven by enlightened self-interest, that most valuable form of selfishness, telling us: “It is the lives, liberty, property and the prosperity of my fellow Americans that I seek to defend in doing what I can to discredit the fake China Threat.”Faceboo

Author: John V. Walsh

John V. Walsh writes about issues of war, peace, empire, and health care for Antiwar.com, Consortium News, DissidentVoice.org, The Unz Review, and other outlets. Now living in the East Bay, he was until recently Professor of Physiology and Cellular Neuroscience at a Massachusetts Medical School. John V. Walsh can be reached at john.endwar@gmail.com View all posts by John V. Walsh

The Newly Elected Leader of Taiwan Says He’s the Only Legitimate Ruler over All of China

by Eric Zuesse / May 27th, 2024

The newly elected leader of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te, said in his May 20 inaugural speech, that all of China is one country, which is ruled by the leader of Taiwan, himself. His argument for this was that when the forces of (the Truman-backed) Chiang Kai-shek, who were beaten by the forces of Mao Tse-tung, escaped to the Japanese-occupied island of Taiwan after Japan was defeated in WW2, they set up a Government there and proclaimed it to be the Government of China and created a ‘Constitution’ for it that asserted itself to be the Constitution for all of China.

However, according to the “Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan)”, which was publicly announced on 1 January 1947, that narrative is simply not true: the escapees from mainland China who had set up that government in Taiwan, made no claim at that time alleging they controlled and ruled over anything but “Taiwan.” (On the other hand, the Truman Administration got Taiwan’s government appointed to the China-seats at the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, and this remained in force until 25 October 1971 when mainland China received those seats instead.)

Lai’s speech ignored this historical fact — that the Constitution alleged to pertain only to Taiwan — and stated the opposite, by using the following argument:

We have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty. Right in the first chapter of our Constitution, it says that “The sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens,” and that “Persons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China.” These two articles tell us clearly: The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. All of the people of Taiwan must come together to safeguard our nation; all our political parties ought to oppose annexation and protect sovereignty; and no one should entertain the idea of giving up our national sovereignty in exchange for political power.

The U.S.-empire propaganda vehicle, Britain’s Financial Times, grudgingly headlined on May 21, “China has a point about Taiwan’s new leader: Lai Ching-te’s language on sovereignty has already strayed from the path taken by his more cautious predecessor”, and reported:

China is right to say that Lai is straying from the path of his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen — a leader whom China refused to engage but who managed to keep a delicate peace. And some question the wisdom of taking such a gamble at a time of high tension.

“Lai’s stance is a step back towards more confrontation, undoing much of Tsai’s line,” says Chao Chun-shan, a Taiwan academic who advised Tsai and her three predecessors on China policy. He argues that it puts China’s leader Xi Jinping in a difficult spot. “Xi doesn’t want a showdown now, before the result of the US election is clear.”

Lai ran for president with a pledge to follow Tsai’s China policy and preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. …

But critics say Lai deviated from his promises this week during an inaugural address that used conspicuously different language, while also spelling out some of the facts that most jar Beijing.

They failed to identify what ‘facts’ they were referring to there, but said only:

He cited the ROC constitution’s language that sovereignty resides with the people, who are of ROC nationality. “This tells us clearly: the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” he concluded.

While this textual analysis may verge on hair splitting, China policy experts say Lai is in danger of upending the ambiguity that has provided political space to allow Beijing’s territorial claim to sit alongside Taiwan’s de facto independence without sparking conflict.

“He is raising the stakes by stressing a difference in sovereignty between the two countries,” says Tso Chen-dong, a professor at National Taiwan University who has advised the Kuomintang (KMT), the opposition party that embraces the notion of Taiwan being part of a greater Chinese nation. The KMT argues the ROC’s territory, under its constitution, still includes all of China; what divides it from Beijing is not a battle over sovereignty, but a question of jurisdiction.

Even the pro U.S-empire “Course Hero” online site gets the history here right when it says:

In 1949, China ended a long civil war. The victorious communist forces led by Mao Zedong established their capital in Beijing. About two million supporters of the losing side, known as the nationalists, retreated to Taiwan. China was divided between two governments, one on the mainland and one in Taiwan, that each considered itself China’s legitimate ruler. The government on the mainland never gave up its claim on Taiwan, and Taiwan never declared independence.

Lai did in his inaugural speech go even beyond declaring Taiwan’s independence — he declared himself to be the ruler of all of China, including mainland China. He is demanding to reverse the fact that Mao won that civil war and that Chiang lost the civil war.

By contrast, the Financial Times article said “Lai spoke of ‘China’ throughout. He also tackled the controversial issue of sovereignty head-on.”

The tactics by which U.S.-and-allied propaganda-vehicles warp meanings, and warp realities, 180 degrees to their exact opposites, are instructive models for any of the sophistry professions.

Also on May 21, the house-organ of the real China headlined “’Lai-style Taiwan independence’ agenda is a dead-end: Global Times editorial” and opened:

On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the role of Taiwan region’s new leader and delivered his inaugural speech. Lai shamelessly stated in his speech that “the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign, independent nation” and “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” spewing various “Taiwan independence” fallacies and hostile provocations against the Chinese mainland, once again exposing his stubborn nature as “a worker for Taiwan independence.” This speech can be described as a blatant “Taiwan independence manifesto” and “a declaration of harm to Taiwan.” It is extremely dangerous, and the Taiwan compatriots should be particularly vigilant and united in opposition.

We noticed that in this speech, the term “democracy” was mentioned 31 times, and “peace” 21 times, which precisely exposes the anxiety of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities – they are well aware that what they are doing now is pushing Taiwan into a dangerous pit of war and danger, hence desperately using “democracy” as a fig leaf and talisman to cover themselves. It is clear to all discerning eyes that the so-called “democracy” is nothing but inferior makeup smeared on the face of “Taiwan independence,” unable to conceal its true face of “seeking independence by relying on foreign support and by force.”

In the positioning of cross-Straits relations, Lai boldly defines the two sides of the Straits as “two countries,” listing “Taiwan,” “Republic of China Taiwan,” and “Republic of China” as so-called “national names,” further advancing on the “one China, one Taiwan” path of “Taiwan independence.” This blatant “two states” theory cannot change the fact that Taiwan is only a part of China, nor can it stop the historical trend of reunification of the motherland. Its only effect is to exacerbate the tension in the Taiwan Straits and make Taiwan society pay a high price for the reckless gamble of “Taiwan independence.”

While treating compatriots from the mainland as “foreigners,” Lai in his speech regards Western anti-China forces as “family members,” throughout the speech filled with servility and begging for mercy from Western anti-China forces, which is very shameful. In order to gain the support of Western anti-China forces, he claims that “the world greeting a new Taiwan,” Taiwan is “an important link in the global chain of democracies,” ” Taiwan is strategically positioned in the first island chain,” and so on. These remarks of selling out Taiwan treat the hard-earned social achievements and wealth accumulated by the Taiwan residents for decades as offerings to anti-China forces in the West, reducing Taiwan to a pawn of the US and giving it the appearance of “unworthy descendants.”

Even more dangerous is the subtle manifestation of the arrogant ambition of “seeking independence by force” in his speech. On the one hand, Lai echoes the fallacies of certain Western countries, smearing the mainland as a “threat”; on the other hand, he attempts to indoctrinate the residents in Taiwan into cannon fodder for “Taiwan independence,” openly advocating for raising the citizens’ “defense awareness,” fully exposing the sinister intention of sacrificing innocent people on the island for the selfish desire of “Taiwan independence.” …

The U.S. Government said, and signed with China’s Government, in 1972, the Shanghai Communique, including “The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” George W. Bush’s Administration tried unsuccessfully in 2007 to outlaw internationally the phrase “Taiwan is a part of China”; and, so, the Shanghai Communique has remained the official U.S. Government policy to this day. (It hopes to get China to invade Taiwan in order for the U.S. to have a supposed pretext to then ‘defend that independent nation’ ‘against China’s aggression’, by invading China.)

On 19 July 2023, I headlined and documented “Biden Wants to Invade/Conquer China”. It opened:

His plan is to arm Taiwan and entice it to announce its complete independence from China — that Taiwan is no mere province of China but instead an independent country — which announcement would then immediately force China either to invade China or else to accept Taiwan’s becoming a separate and independent country.

Taiwan’s new leader has complied with that, even in his inaugural address. Will Biden go to war against China in the months leading up to the November 5 U.S. elections if China invades Taiwan in order to make clear to Taiwan’s voters that they had been suckered by U.S.-imperial propaganda to choose as their ‘President’ someone who would declare that Taiwan is not only independent of China but ruling over China? How much international backing would the U.S. regime have if it did that?

Taiwan’s billionaires — like Taiwan’s public — are hardly unified about whether Taiwan should concede that it is a Province of China (as it long had been), On 7 August 2023, the Hong Kong based South China Morning Post headlined “Two titans of tech are offering two very different views of Taiwan” and reported that whereas Foxconn’s leader Terry Guo was opposed to the independence movement and thought it wouldn’t win power, “Morris Chang, founder of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) who is often called the godfather of the island’s tech industry, said he didn’t think there was likely to be a war across the Taiwan Strait,” and,

We all hope he is right, but of course he would say that. After all, some Washington politicians have openly declared that at the first sign of conflict, the US military would blow up all of TSMC chip foundries to deny them to the mainland Chinese.

These billionaires are aware that the independence movement threatens them, but do nothing about it. On the other hand, Radio Taiwan International headlined on 16 August 2022, “UMC Founder: KMT needs to give up ‘one China policy’” and opened:

United Microelectronics (UMC) Founder Robert Tsao says the Kuomintang (KMT) party needs to give up its one China policy. He made the remarks in an interview with Radio Taiwan International on Tuesday.  The UMC is the world’s second-largest contract microchip maker.

Tsao recently announced he is donating NT$3 billion (US$100 million) for Taiwan’s defense. As China has been elevating its military threat against Taiwan, he said the people of Taiwan need to be determined to strengthen the nation’s defense abilities to deter China from attacking Taiwan.

He criticized the opposition KMT’s 1992 Consensus policy in which Taiwan and China agree to one China, but each side has its own interpretation. He said that’s because China has never accepted another interpretation.

On 15 January 2024, Australia’s Financial Review bannered “Billionaire urges Taiwan to ‘prepare for the worst’”, and reported:

Billionaire Robert Tsao warns that Taiwan’s 23 million people must be prepared for an eventual war with China, even though the risk of an invasion has eased while Xi Jinping fights economic challenges at home.

The 76-year-old founder of one of Taiwan’s first semiconductor manufacturers has retired from big business to devote his life to what he believes is protecting the island nation’s interests from its aggressive neighbour.

So, not only is he not doing nothing about it, but he is actually encouraging what America’s Government is encouraging (by its donating U.S. weapons to Taiwan): an open public declaration of Taiwan’s independence from China.

The only difference from Lai’s policy is that the policy of Tsao and unofficially of the current U.S. Government is that Taiwan and China are two separate countries and are at war against each other.

That policy, of course, is exactly what the world’s biggest armaments manufacturers, which are headquartered in the United States, would want and lobby for. Whether Tsao is receiving any behind-the-scenes financial benefits from the U.S. for this isn’t yet known

Eric Zuesse  is an investigative historian. His new book, America's Empire of Evil: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public. 

WWIII

Philippines to build airport on South China Sea island

Published: 18 Jul 2024 

The USS Gabrielle Giffords receives passing honours by Philippine Navy Officers aboard BRP Gregorio Del Pilar during the 3rd AFP-USINDOPACOM Maritime Cooperative Activity in the disputed South China Sea. 

(Photo by Handout / Armed Forces of the Philippines' Western Command / AFP)

The Philippines is developing an airport on an island it occupies in the South China Sea, as the Southeast Asian nation asserts its claims in the disputed waters amid lingering tensions with Beijing.
Procurement of land for the runway extension is underway for the Pag-asa Island Airport Development Project, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s communications office said in a statement on Thursday.

Pag-asa is the local name of Thitu Island in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, where Beijing lays sweeping claims. Once completed, the project is expected to provide an efficient mode of travel to and from the remote island where Filipino civilians and military personnel live, according to the statement.

The plan shows the Philippines’ resolve to keep its presence in contested waters, as China also pushes its claims that have been dashed by a 2016 arbitral ruling. Manila has also been sending vessels in the disputed sea, causing clashes with Beijing.

A military runway on the island of Balabac in Palawan province near the South China Sea is also nearing completion. Balabac is one of the four new sites that the US military can access under a defense agreement that was expanded last year.

"We are in the final stages of working on the Balabac military runway, especially since Palawan will play a big role in national security,” Marcos said.

The infrastructure projects are among priorities under the Marcos administration and are part of efforts to open the region south of the capital to new investments, ease transportation, and strengthen the tourism sector.

A New Chapter in the South China Sea Dispute

Amid tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, a new chapter has emerged in the region following the defense pact between the Philippines and Japan.

BYZUBAIR ALI SOOMRO
JULY 17, 2024

MODERN DIPLOMACY

:X @bongbongmarcos

Amid tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, a new chapter has emerged in the region following the defense pact between the Philippines and Japan. The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) is designed to deploy forces on each other’s soil, to conduct joint military exercises, and Filipino forces will be able to carry out combat training in Japan. The pact is tailored due to the shared threat by China to Japan and the Philippines in the East China Sea and South China Sea, respectively. However, the pact has to be ratified by their respective parliaments. The defense pact carries significance for both signees to create an impression of deterrence and unity against China. Most significantly, the pact is a step to contain the influence of China with the assistance of the United States in the South China Sea.

The pact is the consequence of continuous skirmishes between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. The most serious happened on June 17, when Chinese coast guard personnel wielding sticks, knives, and an axe surrounded and boarded three Philippine navy boats during a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly Island. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. denounced the actions of China in the South China Sea and warned that the death of any Filipino at the hands of China would be deemed close to an act of war. Besides, the Philippines asked for financial compensation of $1 million for the June collision.

But the Chinese Foreign Ministry termed it provocation and warned to stop it, saying that it was safeguarding its rights and enforcing law. So, the Philippines should bear the consequences of its infringement activities.

Actually, the dispute in the South China Sea has numerous reasons. Firstly, the region is rich with fishing, and with China controlling much of the area, it is becoming one of the largest fishing industries in the world. The fishing industry in China has constructively contributed to the Chinese economy, making her biggest exporter of aquatic products in the world. Secondly, the region is also rich in energy, as the US Geological Survey estimated in 2012 that the entire South China Sea contains around 12 billion barrels of oil and 1900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Thirdly, control over the South China Sea would guarantee its security in distant waters. Also, China can expand its maritime navigation, which can outmatch US maritime dominance and power in East Asia. The South China Sea connects the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and helps with global commerce of goods and energy shipments to China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Control over this region enables China to thrive through exports. Lastly, China mitigates any vulnerability to be attacked through the South China Sea.

China is engaged in a tussle with the Philippines on four islands, namely the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Island and Reefs. China claims its historical right over these islands, which are covered by a nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Nine-Dash Line covers much of the South China Sea, even cutting half of the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The Spratly Islands, having rich marine resources, minerals, and hydrocarbon deposits, have been a bone of contention for standoffs among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Reportedly, except Brunei, all others have established garrisons on the Spratly Islands.

China has also constructed artificial islands in the South China Sea to claim much of its territorial water. De facto, the United Nations Convention on Law of Seas (UNCLOS) permits the construction of artificial islands under Article 60, but it allows constructing it in their own exclusive economic zone, with the restriction that the island-constructing country should inform other coastal states nearby and preventing any harm to those countries.

In this regard, the Philippines filed a case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, where in 2016 court favored the Philippines, declaring nine-dash line without legal basis. But China refused to comply with the decision, saying that the court lacks the jurisdiction to try this case. Notably, the powerful countries do not comply with most of the decisions of international courts or tribunals because they do not have any specific implementing machinery. They comply with the decision if they file a case in contentious jurisdiction, which remains binding on the parties to the case. However, where decisions are implemented by the United Nations Security Council, countries with veto power exercise their veto power to prevent the implementation of such decisions against themselves or their allies.

With this pact, the Philippines is also expected to benefit from the Japanese program, launched in April 2023, that is designed to provide weapons and equipment free of charge to like-minded countries to expand security cooperation, which will at least assist the Philippines in acquiring weapons and other such equipment to engage in any standoff with China effectively but still be unable to outmatch China. Besides, in November, Japan provided the Philippines with five surveillance radars to strengthen its coastal supervision capabilities, which will surely improve the surveillance of the Philippines’s end in the South China Sea.

Most importantly, the Philippines is strategically useful for the United States because the South China Sea dispute can drag the USA. So due to its proximity to Taiwan, it is too important for the USA to engage in any possible war on Taiwan since American analysts believe that if not today, China will invade it tomorrow. So, to assist her, the Philippines will play a key role. Thereby, the USA has played an active part in forming this pact to strengthen its allies against China in the region, maintain its influence, and contain the growing influence of China in the world.

For Japan, the pact does not seem too constructive since Japan does not engage with China in any direct dispute, but the presence of its forces on the Philippines’ soil and joint drills may be a deterrent for China and a signal of unity among its antagonists against China.

Japan and China have been in a tussle over a group of islands named Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China. These islands can be frontiers to safeguard China from Japan and the USA. China can use the islands to establish submarine bases, missile bases, and radar systems that will surely expand China’s security and military in the region. As photographs suggested, Mischief Reef was armed with anti-aircraft weapons and a CIWS missile defense system in the South China Sea. In a similar way, this group of islands can be used for defense purposes in the East China Sea.

If the pact is ratified, possibly it will be ratified, it will be a signal that is not too sound but capable of deterring China from any engagement in war, but it will not help the Philippines get its due share in the South China Sea as China claims its historic right over its claimed sea with the help of the nine-dash line.

Peace broker or weapons dealer? China’s latest balancing act in the war in Ukraine

A peace plan, reports of potential weapons sales, and an ‘eternal friendship’ with Russia make for a confusing picture.

Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, left, and President Xi Jinping of China pose for a photograph during their meeting in Beijing on Feb. 4.
ALEXEI DRUZHININ/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images


Lili Pike, China Reporter, and Tom Nagorski, Global Editor
February 27, 2023

From the day Russia invaded Ukraine, the geopolitics of the war have mattered almost as much as events on the battlefield. And for all the focus on the U.S. and its NATO allies and their robust support for the Ukrainian resistance, China’s role has loomed large. And it’s not always clear where exactly President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party stand when it comes to the war.

Recent developments have heightened the attention on Beijing. On Sunday, the Biden administration issued the latest of several public warnings against China providing military aid to Russia — in the wake of reports that such aid was in the offing. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said weapons sent to Moscow would be used to harm civilians in Ukraine, and that China would face “real costs” if it went ahead with arms shipments to Russia. “China should want no part of that,” Sullivan said on ABCs “This Week.”

On Friday, the anniversary of the Russian invasion, China issued a 12-point position paper on the war (or the “Ukraine crisis,” as China prefers to call it) that laid out conditions for a negotiated solution. The document was seen as heavily biased toward Russia; it suggested a ceasefire that would freeze Russian gains in place and offered no condemnation of the invasion itself. The document got at best lukewarm reactions in Western capitals, and outright dismissals in others. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by saying he would be happy to meet with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping — adding, “China historically respects our territorial integrity, and it should therefore do everything for Russia to leave the territory of Ukraine.”

Over the weekend, Beijing announced it would host Belarus’ President Aleksandr Lukashenko, a close Kremlin ally, for a state visit. That drew a suggestion via Twitter from a top aide to Zelenskyy that China choose its allies more carefully. “You don’t bet on an aggressor who broke international law and will lose the war,” Mykhailo Podolyak wrote. “This is shortsighted.”

For its part, China said Monday that the U.S. was “hypocritical” to warn Beijing about sending weapons to Russia. “While the United States has intensified its efforts to send weapons to one of the conflicting parties, resulting in endless wars and no end in sight for peace, it has frequently spread false information about China’s supply of weapons to Russia,” said Mao Ning, the spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry.

Taken together, the recent developments highlight China’s complex and often opaque approach to the war. Just three weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin and China’s leader Xi Jinping met and declared a “no limits” friendship and were sharply critical of NATO and the U.S. Ever since the war began, China has sought to balance the partnership with Russia against a concern that it not rupture completely its relationship with the West.

To date, the balance has tilted toward Moscow; China has refused to criticize Putin, kept up a busy wartime commerce with Russia, amplified Russian falsehoods about Ukraine and placed blame for the war at the feet of the NATO alliance. Now China is in effect nominating itself as a neutral broker in a possible resolution to the conflict.

As the war enters its second year, Grid spoke with two experts on Sino-Russian relations — Cheng Chen, a Professor of Political Science at University at Albany, State University of New York, and Marcin Kaczmarski, a lecturer in security studies at the University of Glasgow. They weighed in on the latest signals from China and what they might portend.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Grid: Has China’s position on the war shifted in any significant way over the last year?

Cheng Chen: From the beginning, China has emphasized that its position remains neutral and will not take sides. This rhetoric has not changed. At the same time, China has significantly toned down its enthusiasm when talking about its relationship with Russia. Although China refused to condemn Russian aggression, it made it clear that it had no prior knowledge of Putin’s plan of invasion and paid lip service to the importance of sovereignty.

This “neutral” stance, however, does not prevent China from playing a major and indispensable role in propping up Russia’s embattled economy, which contributes directly to Russia’s war efforts. It also does not prevent China from carrying out joint military exercises and joint military patrols, or holding high-level meetings and even summits with Russia, which thwarts the West’s efforts to make Russia an international pariah. In this sense, China has provided Russia with a vital lifeline in this time of crisis.

Marcin Kaczmarski: Firstly, I think China’s position on the war has evolved with the war, because my understanding was that China, just as Russia and many countries around the world, expected that it would be a very quick war, with a decisive victory for Russia.

Once it turned out that Ukraine was successfully resisting, and the West had united quite unexpectedly behind Ukraine, the Chinese feeling about the war started changing. On the one hand, China is trapped in this attempt to position itself as a neutral party — and this is what I would say Beijing attempts to do vis-à-vis the external world. But on the other hand, Beijing struggles to avoid any association with the West against Russia.

This position, which China presents as neutrality, in the West is read as support for Russia. This is why the Chinese narratives, the official discourses, are repeating Russian points, blaming the U.S., blaming NATO for the war, and so on. In this sense, I would say China’s trying to walk this line since it turned out that the war was going to last longer than we expected, than Russia expected.

G: Just how significant has China’s trade with Russia been in keeping Russia afloat economically?

MK: There are two main points here. Firstly, China is not alone in this capitalizing on Russia’s difficulties, in finding other customers. If we look at India or Turkey, these two states have also rushed to buy Russian oil, for instance. Second point is that in the case of China, my argument would be that it is still Chinese companies that are capitalizing on Russian difficulties and capitalizing on the fact that Russia has to sell oil, for instance, on discounted prices, rather than a strategic decision of the Chinese state to throw its economic weight behind Russia.

One instance is a project, the Trans-Mongolian Gas Pipeline, which Russia has lobbied quite strongly for, and which will be a clear signal that China is offering an alternative market to the European gas market. But so far, Mongolia says “yes,” Russia is willing to proceed with the project, but China still does not agree to a contract. I see it as the absence of China’s strategic support.

G: What do you make of the reports that China is considering providing Russia with weapons? Do you think that’s going to happen? Why or why not?

CC: Currently, there is no evidence that China has provided lethal aid to Russia. In the short term, it is highly unlikely that China will directly provide lethal weapons to Russia, because that would undermine any pretense of China’s neutrality and deprive Xi’s peace plan of any credibility. It would also subject China to severe Western sanctions at a time when China really wants to focus on economic growth after ending its zero-covid policy.

Nevertheless, there are numerous other ways in which China could boost Russia’s military capability, including supplying various nonlethal aid and dual-use materials and components, many of which have origins that are hard to trace. These options are much less costly, and therefore likely to remain China’s preference. All this, of course, does not mean there aren’t internal discussions of other options, as reported by The Wall Street Journal. The U.S.’s revelation of this intelligence, I think, might be for the purpose of deterring Beijing from actually pursuing that path, and implicitly discrediting Xi’s “neutral” peace plan.

MK: First, the Chinese leadership would not like to see Russia lose this war, because this would mean that the West is reinforced, that the whole narrative of the West’s decline, which is so widespread in Chinese official discourse, that this narrative is not exactly correct.

But at the same time, we have also seen the Chinese as unwilling to openly support Russia in circumventing or bypassing sanctions. While I wouldn’t exclude that there are some weapons deliveries to Russia, I think, from Beijing’s perspective, it is still too costly. Perhaps not that costly in relations with the U.S., because I would think the Chinese elite sees the conflict with the U.S. as rather a permanent feature of China’s position in the world. But it would be much more problematic when it comes to Europe, because in my understanding, China still hopes to either drive a wedge or keep Europe at a certain distance from the U.S., especially when it comes to a potential joint trans-Atlantic policy toward China.

As I said, I wouldn’t exclude such arms supplies; but I would say that their potential costs outweigh benefits for China at this stage.

G: Did anything stand out you in China’s new position paper on the war?

CC: I did notice the thinly veiled criticisms of the U.S.’s “double standards” regarding sovereignty and NATO expansion. The document doesn’t contain specifics about a potential peace process and is therefore open to potential interpretations. Notably, it does not explicitly call for any Russian military withdrawal from occupied territories.

In the coming months, it is likely that China will come up with more specific plans to broker peace. The first point in the current document [”Respecting the Sovereignty of All Countries”] is apparently an attempt to reassure Ukraine and the West that China does not support Russia’s territorial annexations. The points which follow, however, point to a pause to NATO’s future expansion and lifting sanctions against Russia. These points hardly dispel the West’s impression of China’s bias toward Russia and will be difficult for Ukraine to accept under present circumstances. How to convince Ukraine of Beijing’s sincerity and true neutrality will remain a challenge.

MK: In this position paper, there’s no clear stance that [the war] might end if Russia decided to just withdraw. I would see it as part of, on the one hand, China’s own efforts to present itself as this neutral party. Secondly, it is probably also a signal sent to Europe, because there are some policymakers and elites in Europe that encouraged China to do something about Russia, and to use this leverage that they have with Russia in order to influence Moscow.

But I think China’s trying to square the circle. On the one hand, it wants to appeal to Europe and pull Europe a bit away from the U.S. But at the same time, it doesn’t want to criticize Russia in any way. This is why I think it leads to this very vague and general paper where China doesn’t take an explicit position, but rather tries to hide behind general formulations which on their own may be correct and rightful, but when you apply them, they don’t work.

China might have been more explicit about the need for Russia to do certain things. Or, in practical terms, China’s leader might finally talk to President Zelenskyy. The Chinese leadership has avoided any bilateral talks, any phone calls with Zelenskyy, which also shows those difficulties — how China has maneuvered in between trying not to be associated with Russia, but at the same time, not wanting to suggest the outside world that their ties with Russia are somehow fragile because of this war.

G: Following up on the first point in the document, which calls for respecting the sovereignty of all countries, how do you interpret that in this context?

MK: This is very problematic because this sentence can be read in a number of ways. The first reading could just be that China means that Russia should respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. But then, the Russian policymakers might say that what China says is actually supporting the [2014] annexation of Crimea. China hasn’t ever formally recognized the annexation — but at the same time, China has never called for Crimea to return to Ukraine.

I think this is one of the problems of this position paper: Each side can read it as they want, or as it is convenient for their aims in this war.

G: Looking ahead at what role China wants to play in the peace process, do you think it will move toward more concrete asks of Russia or bilateral talks with Ukraine? And do you think Ukraine and the West would be open to China’s involvement?

CC: One year into the conflict, neither side has been able to deliver a crushing blow on the battlefield. Consequently, neither side has strong incentives to engage in negotiations to end the conflict. As Russia’s most powerful partner, China definitely has leverage. China chose this moment to step in because it wants to counter the U.S.’s accusation that China took the side of the aggressor — Russia — and establish its image as a major global mediator.

Other than the two sides of the conflict, China has two target audiences. One is Europe, which has been rightly concerned about China’s role in supporting Russia and contemplating “decoupling” from China amid growing U.S.-China tension. Knowing that most European countries are averse to a protracted conflict, China hopes to be seen as playing a proactive role in ending the conflict while reassuring Europe that continuing engagement with China will not undermine European interests. The other major target audience is the Global South, which so far has not taken a side. China has endeavored to be seen as a leader of the Global South. Proposing a peace plan, which is dismissed by the West, will make China appear to be the more reasonable and pro-peace party as opposed to the U.S.’s “adding fuel to the fire.” In sum, Xi’s peace plan is fundamentally driven by China’s own interests.

In this sense, the fact that China is coming up with a peace plan now is more significant than the substance of the plan itself, which is unlikely to make either side happy. As the current status quo on the battlefield favors Russia [because Russia is still occupying large chunks of Ukrainian territory], a call to “freeze” the conflict as it is, even if in a demilitarized fashion, is still biased toward Russia. China’s point, however, is not for Ukraine and the West to accept this proposal, but to embellish its “neutral” and “pro-peace” image in order to appeal to Europe and the Global South.

MK: Any changes in China’s position will relate to potential changes on the ground. If Ukraine manages to regain some of its territories, if it demonstrates on the battlefield that it is capable of inflicting damage on the Russian forces, and if there is a success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, then I would expect China to be more flexible and perhaps to decide that, in its own interest, it’s better to help with the end of the conflict by distancing at least a bit from Russia or by pushing Russia to accept certain conditions if and when negotiations start. But I think that it really depends on what happens on the battlefield. At this stage, the calculus in Beijing is still that Russia is able to win this war.

G: Xi might visit Russia in April or May. Do you have any thoughts on why then, and what the aim of the visit would be?

MK: If we are talking about April and May, it is most plausibly a sign that the Chinese side didn’t want the visit to take place in February, around the anniversary of the war.

Secondly, it is China’s turn. Apart from the period of the pandemic, when both leaders didn’t travel, they saw each other every year. Even before Putin’s return to the presidency. So in this sense, Xi Jinping’s not going to Moscow would have been read in the West very clearly as a signal of tensions in the relationship, and even if tensions are there, both sides would work hard to sweep them under the carpet.

So I think in this sense, Xi doesn’t have a choice. He needs to go to Moscow to demonstrate the relations are still very good and normal despite the war. But the fact that he’s not rushing there may be a sign that they are once again trying to strike this balance between cordial relations with Russia and attempts to be neutral.

Thanks to Dave Tepps for copy editing this article.

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  Lili Pike

  China Reporter

  Lili Pike is a China reporter at Grid focused on climate change, technology and U.S.-China relations.

  lili_pike
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  Tom Nagorski

  Global Editor

  Tom Nagorski is the global editor at Grid, where he oversees our coverage of global security, U.S.-China relations, migration trends, global economics and U.S. foreign policy.

  TomNagorski

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