Peace broker or weapons dealer? China’s latest balancing act in the war in Ukraine

A peace plan, reports of potential weapons sales, and an ‘eternal friendship’ with Russia make for a confusing picture.

Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, left, and President Xi Jinping of China pose for a photograph during their meeting in Beijing on Feb. 4.
ALEXEI DRUZHININ/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images


Lili Pike, China Reporter, and Tom Nagorski, Global Editor
February 27, 2023

From the day Russia invaded Ukraine, the geopolitics of the war have mattered almost as much as events on the battlefield. And for all the focus on the U.S. and its NATO allies and their robust support for the Ukrainian resistance, China’s role has loomed large. And it’s not always clear where exactly President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party stand when it comes to the war.

Recent developments have heightened the attention on Beijing. On Sunday, the Biden administration issued the latest of several public warnings against China providing military aid to Russia — in the wake of reports that such aid was in the offing. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said weapons sent to Moscow would be used to harm civilians in Ukraine, and that China would face “real costs” if it went ahead with arms shipments to Russia. “China should want no part of that,” Sullivan said on ABCs “This Week.”

On Friday, the anniversary of the Russian invasion, China issued a 12-point position paper on the war (or the “Ukraine crisis,” as China prefers to call it) that laid out conditions for a negotiated solution. The document was seen as heavily biased toward Russia; it suggested a ceasefire that would freeze Russian gains in place and offered no condemnation of the invasion itself. The document got at best lukewarm reactions in Western capitals, and outright dismissals in others. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by saying he would be happy to meet with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping — adding, “China historically respects our territorial integrity, and it should therefore do everything for Russia to leave the territory of Ukraine.”

Over the weekend, Beijing announced it would host Belarus’ President Aleksandr Lukashenko, a close Kremlin ally, for a state visit. That drew a suggestion via Twitter from a top aide to Zelenskyy that China choose its allies more carefully. “You don’t bet on an aggressor who broke international law and will lose the war,” Mykhailo Podolyak wrote. “This is shortsighted.”

For its part, China said Monday that the U.S. was “hypocritical” to warn Beijing about sending weapons to Russia. “While the United States has intensified its efforts to send weapons to one of the conflicting parties, resulting in endless wars and no end in sight for peace, it has frequently spread false information about China’s supply of weapons to Russia,” said Mao Ning, the spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry.

Taken together, the recent developments highlight China’s complex and often opaque approach to the war. Just three weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin and China’s leader Xi Jinping met and declared a “no limits” friendship and were sharply critical of NATO and the U.S. Ever since the war began, China has sought to balance the partnership with Russia against a concern that it not rupture completely its relationship with the West.

To date, the balance has tilted toward Moscow; China has refused to criticize Putin, kept up a busy wartime commerce with Russia, amplified Russian falsehoods about Ukraine and placed blame for the war at the feet of the NATO alliance. Now China is in effect nominating itself as a neutral broker in a possible resolution to the conflict.

As the war enters its second year, Grid spoke with two experts on Sino-Russian relations — Cheng Chen, a Professor of Political Science at University at Albany, State University of New York, and Marcin Kaczmarski, a lecturer in security studies at the University of Glasgow. They weighed in on the latest signals from China and what they might portend.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Grid: Has China’s position on the war shifted in any significant way over the last year?

Cheng Chen: From the beginning, China has emphasized that its position remains neutral and will not take sides. This rhetoric has not changed. At the same time, China has significantly toned down its enthusiasm when talking about its relationship with Russia. Although China refused to condemn Russian aggression, it made it clear that it had no prior knowledge of Putin’s plan of invasion and paid lip service to the importance of sovereignty.

This “neutral” stance, however, does not prevent China from playing a major and indispensable role in propping up Russia’s embattled economy, which contributes directly to Russia’s war efforts. It also does not prevent China from carrying out joint military exercises and joint military patrols, or holding high-level meetings and even summits with Russia, which thwarts the West’s efforts to make Russia an international pariah. In this sense, China has provided Russia with a vital lifeline in this time of crisis.

Marcin Kaczmarski: Firstly, I think China’s position on the war has evolved with the war, because my understanding was that China, just as Russia and many countries around the world, expected that it would be a very quick war, with a decisive victory for Russia.

Once it turned out that Ukraine was successfully resisting, and the West had united quite unexpectedly behind Ukraine, the Chinese feeling about the war started changing. On the one hand, China is trapped in this attempt to position itself as a neutral party — and this is what I would say Beijing attempts to do vis-à-vis the external world. But on the other hand, Beijing struggles to avoid any association with the West against Russia.

This position, which China presents as neutrality, in the West is read as support for Russia. This is why the Chinese narratives, the official discourses, are repeating Russian points, blaming the U.S., blaming NATO for the war, and so on. In this sense, I would say China’s trying to walk this line since it turned out that the war was going to last longer than we expected, than Russia expected.

G: Just how significant has China’s trade with Russia been in keeping Russia afloat economically?

MK: There are two main points here. Firstly, China is not alone in this capitalizing on Russia’s difficulties, in finding other customers. If we look at India or Turkey, these two states have also rushed to buy Russian oil, for instance. Second point is that in the case of China, my argument would be that it is still Chinese companies that are capitalizing on Russian difficulties and capitalizing on the fact that Russia has to sell oil, for instance, on discounted prices, rather than a strategic decision of the Chinese state to throw its economic weight behind Russia.

One instance is a project, the Trans-Mongolian Gas Pipeline, which Russia has lobbied quite strongly for, and which will be a clear signal that China is offering an alternative market to the European gas market. But so far, Mongolia says “yes,” Russia is willing to proceed with the project, but China still does not agree to a contract. I see it as the absence of China’s strategic support.

G: What do you make of the reports that China is considering providing Russia with weapons? Do you think that’s going to happen? Why or why not?

CC: Currently, there is no evidence that China has provided lethal aid to Russia. In the short term, it is highly unlikely that China will directly provide lethal weapons to Russia, because that would undermine any pretense of China’s neutrality and deprive Xi’s peace plan of any credibility. It would also subject China to severe Western sanctions at a time when China really wants to focus on economic growth after ending its zero-covid policy.

Nevertheless, there are numerous other ways in which China could boost Russia’s military capability, including supplying various nonlethal aid and dual-use materials and components, many of which have origins that are hard to trace. These options are much less costly, and therefore likely to remain China’s preference. All this, of course, does not mean there aren’t internal discussions of other options, as reported by The Wall Street Journal. The U.S.’s revelation of this intelligence, I think, might be for the purpose of deterring Beijing from actually pursuing that path, and implicitly discrediting Xi’s “neutral” peace plan.

MK: First, the Chinese leadership would not like to see Russia lose this war, because this would mean that the West is reinforced, that the whole narrative of the West’s decline, which is so widespread in Chinese official discourse, that this narrative is not exactly correct.

But at the same time, we have also seen the Chinese as unwilling to openly support Russia in circumventing or bypassing sanctions. While I wouldn’t exclude that there are some weapons deliveries to Russia, I think, from Beijing’s perspective, it is still too costly. Perhaps not that costly in relations with the U.S., because I would think the Chinese elite sees the conflict with the U.S. as rather a permanent feature of China’s position in the world. But it would be much more problematic when it comes to Europe, because in my understanding, China still hopes to either drive a wedge or keep Europe at a certain distance from the U.S., especially when it comes to a potential joint trans-Atlantic policy toward China.

As I said, I wouldn’t exclude such arms supplies; but I would say that their potential costs outweigh benefits for China at this stage.

G: Did anything stand out you in China’s new position paper on the war?

CC: I did notice the thinly veiled criticisms of the U.S.’s “double standards” regarding sovereignty and NATO expansion. The document doesn’t contain specifics about a potential peace process and is therefore open to potential interpretations. Notably, it does not explicitly call for any Russian military withdrawal from occupied territories.

In the coming months, it is likely that China will come up with more specific plans to broker peace. The first point in the current document [”Respecting the Sovereignty of All Countries”] is apparently an attempt to reassure Ukraine and the West that China does not support Russia’s territorial annexations. The points which follow, however, point to a pause to NATO’s future expansion and lifting sanctions against Russia. These points hardly dispel the West’s impression of China’s bias toward Russia and will be difficult for Ukraine to accept under present circumstances. How to convince Ukraine of Beijing’s sincerity and true neutrality will remain a challenge.

MK: In this position paper, there’s no clear stance that [the war] might end if Russia decided to just withdraw. I would see it as part of, on the one hand, China’s own efforts to present itself as this neutral party. Secondly, it is probably also a signal sent to Europe, because there are some policymakers and elites in Europe that encouraged China to do something about Russia, and to use this leverage that they have with Russia in order to influence Moscow.

But I think China’s trying to square the circle. On the one hand, it wants to appeal to Europe and pull Europe a bit away from the U.S. But at the same time, it doesn’t want to criticize Russia in any way. This is why I think it leads to this very vague and general paper where China doesn’t take an explicit position, but rather tries to hide behind general formulations which on their own may be correct and rightful, but when you apply them, they don’t work.

China might have been more explicit about the need for Russia to do certain things. Or, in practical terms, China’s leader might finally talk to President Zelenskyy. The Chinese leadership has avoided any bilateral talks, any phone calls with Zelenskyy, which also shows those difficulties — how China has maneuvered in between trying not to be associated with Russia, but at the same time, not wanting to suggest the outside world that their ties with Russia are somehow fragile because of this war.

G: Following up on the first point in the document, which calls for respecting the sovereignty of all countries, how do you interpret that in this context?

MK: This is very problematic because this sentence can be read in a number of ways. The first reading could just be that China means that Russia should respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. But then, the Russian policymakers might say that what China says is actually supporting the [2014] annexation of Crimea. China hasn’t ever formally recognized the annexation — but at the same time, China has never called for Crimea to return to Ukraine.

I think this is one of the problems of this position paper: Each side can read it as they want, or as it is convenient for their aims in this war.

G: Looking ahead at what role China wants to play in the peace process, do you think it will move toward more concrete asks of Russia or bilateral talks with Ukraine? And do you think Ukraine and the West would be open to China’s involvement?

CC: One year into the conflict, neither side has been able to deliver a crushing blow on the battlefield. Consequently, neither side has strong incentives to engage in negotiations to end the conflict. As Russia’s most powerful partner, China definitely has leverage. China chose this moment to step in because it wants to counter the U.S.’s accusation that China took the side of the aggressor — Russia — and establish its image as a major global mediator.

Other than the two sides of the conflict, China has two target audiences. One is Europe, which has been rightly concerned about China’s role in supporting Russia and contemplating “decoupling” from China amid growing U.S.-China tension. Knowing that most European countries are averse to a protracted conflict, China hopes to be seen as playing a proactive role in ending the conflict while reassuring Europe that continuing engagement with China will not undermine European interests. The other major target audience is the Global South, which so far has not taken a side. China has endeavored to be seen as a leader of the Global South. Proposing a peace plan, which is dismissed by the West, will make China appear to be the more reasonable and pro-peace party as opposed to the U.S.’s “adding fuel to the fire.” In sum, Xi’s peace plan is fundamentally driven by China’s own interests.

In this sense, the fact that China is coming up with a peace plan now is more significant than the substance of the plan itself, which is unlikely to make either side happy. As the current status quo on the battlefield favors Russia [because Russia is still occupying large chunks of Ukrainian territory], a call to “freeze” the conflict as it is, even if in a demilitarized fashion, is still biased toward Russia. China’s point, however, is not for Ukraine and the West to accept this proposal, but to embellish its “neutral” and “pro-peace” image in order to appeal to Europe and the Global South.

MK: Any changes in China’s position will relate to potential changes on the ground. If Ukraine manages to regain some of its territories, if it demonstrates on the battlefield that it is capable of inflicting damage on the Russian forces, and if there is a success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, then I would expect China to be more flexible and perhaps to decide that, in its own interest, it’s better to help with the end of the conflict by distancing at least a bit from Russia or by pushing Russia to accept certain conditions if and when negotiations start. But I think that it really depends on what happens on the battlefield. At this stage, the calculus in Beijing is still that Russia is able to win this war.

G: Xi might visit Russia in April or May. Do you have any thoughts on why then, and what the aim of the visit would be?

MK: If we are talking about April and May, it is most plausibly a sign that the Chinese side didn’t want the visit to take place in February, around the anniversary of the war.

Secondly, it is China’s turn. Apart from the period of the pandemic, when both leaders didn’t travel, they saw each other every year. Even before Putin’s return to the presidency. So in this sense, Xi Jinping’s not going to Moscow would have been read in the West very clearly as a signal of tensions in the relationship, and even if tensions are there, both sides would work hard to sweep them under the carpet.

So I think in this sense, Xi doesn’t have a choice. He needs to go to Moscow to demonstrate the relations are still very good and normal despite the war. But the fact that he’s not rushing there may be a sign that they are once again trying to strike this balance between cordial relations with Russia and attempts to be neutral.

Thanks to Dave Tepps for copy editing this article.

• 
  Lili Pike

  China Reporter

  Lili Pike is a China reporter at Grid focused on climate change, technology and U.S.-China relations.

  lili_pike
• 
  Tom Nagorski

  Global Editor

  Tom Nagorski is the global editor at Grid, where he oversees our coverage of global security, U.S.-China relations, migration trends, global economics and U.S. foreign policy.

  TomNagorski

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Is Geopolitics Deterministic?

The US, China, and Taiwan context

by Kim Petersen / January 22nd, 2024

In an online video interview, libertarian judge Andrew Napolitano asked University of Chicago political scientist and international relations professor John Mearsheimer to “translate” president Xi’s remarks in his New Year speech.

The professor answered, “There is no question that the Chinese want Taiwan back. They want to make Taiwan part of China…. There is also no question that the Taiwanese don’t want to be part of China. They want to be a sovereign state. These are two irreconcilable goals.”

First, it must be stated that much of what Mearsheimer says about geopolitical issues (particularly, with respect to the United States’ agenda in the world) comes across as arrived at by honest, factual, realistic appraisal.

It is axiomatic that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would like the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) fully back in the fold. As far as the PRC is concerned, Taiwan is de jure a part of China, and the United Nations and 181 countries concur that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. This includes the United States. Mearsheimer’s words elide this reality. His words also appear in contradiction since he admits that Taiwan is not sovereign. Taiwan is not a country. Mearsheimer’s wording aligns with the oleaginous US position toward the PRC and Taiwan.

In US diplomacy, words too often do not match facts or deeds. The US signed on to the One China policy. However, because of the increasing alarm that the economic, technological, military advancement of the PRC is eclipsing the US’s arrogant claim to full spectrum dominance, the US has precipitated, what looks on its face to be, an abject desperation to maintain its place in at the top of the world order, as it defines this order.

As for Mearsheimer’s evidence-free claim of there being “no question that the Taiwanese don’t want to be part of China.” That is disputable. Legacy media will point to the recent presidential victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Lai Ching-te to buttress this claim of Taiwan’s desire for sovereignty.

While Lai led with 40.05% of the vote, the opposition Guomindang (KMT) presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih received 33.49% of the votes, and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je received 26.45%. So roughly 60% of the electorate’s votes did not go to the DPP. Earlier Ko had proposed a failed KMT-TPP alliance, which suggests something other than a sovereignist agenda for 60% of Taiwanese voters.

Looking at the voting results might, therefore, lead one to refute the “no question” Taiwan wants to be separate from the PRC claim to be itself questionable.

Mearsheimer continued, “The interesting question, at this point in time, is whether or not the Chinese are going to try to conquer Taiwan by military force.”

To most of the world Taiwan is a part of One China. It is obvious that the PRC is not bent on militarily conquering Taiwan. It need not unless Taiwan crosses its red lines. Approaching these red lines is usually done in collusion with the US. This points to a historical fact that the reason Taiwan is in a sovereignty limbo to this day is because the US used its naval might to back the KMT and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) at the time of a militarily exhausted China. One ought to consider that Taiwan has been a part of China much, much longer (since 230 CE) than the geopolitical entity called the United States of America has existed based on its dispossession and genocide of the Original Peoples. Therefore, American proclamations about the PRC and Taiwan must be skeptically scrutinized since they are based in hypocrisy and desperation, with crucial facts confined to the memory hole, to anchor in place the US conception of a world order. Mearsheimer does not dwell on the relevancy of this reality when discussing the PRC and Taiwan.

Mearsheimer reveals his patriotic realism: “We [the US] are not only concerned about maintaining Taiwan as an independent state because it is a democracy and we have long had good relations with it, but we also think keeping Taiwan on our side of the ledger is very important for strategic reasons…”

Mearsheimer needs to define democracy and support his contention that the US is supportive of democracy, let alone whether the US is a legitimate democracy. Genuine democracy represents the will of the people.

Taiwan was for decades a KMT military dictatorship which resorted to mass murder to consolidate its power. Finally, in 1996, the electoral vote came to Taiwan. Yet, does a vote every few years mean a country is a democracy? Is that all it takes?

Does Mearsheimer really believe that the US supports democracy? Is supporting so-called color revolutions indicative of an adherence to democracy? Did the US backing of the Maidan coup to overthrow the elected president Viktor Yanukovych indicate a support of democracy? The examples are myriad.

Is blocking a presidential contender from receiving votes in certain states (from Ralph Nader to Donald Trump) indicative of a fidelity to democracy? Or when a government ignores the will of a majority to follow a policy rejected by the masses, such as the US government’s vindictive agenda against publisher Julian Assange? So what does Mearsheimer mean when he posits an American support for Taiwan predicated on it being a democracy?

Does the PRC not have a claim to being a democracy? Does China not pursue policies for the good of the masses of Chinese? In his compellingly argued book, Democracy: What the West Can Learn from China, Wei Ling Chua makes the case for China as a democracy based on its devotion to the well-being of all its citizens. Harvard University’s Ash Center found in its last survey in 2016 that 95.5% of those surveyed reported being either “relatively satisfied” or “highly satisfied” with the Communist Party of China government.

Even if China attempted to take Taiwan back now, Mearsheimer opined, “I think Xi Jinping has lots of domestic problems that are more important to deal with at this juncture, and furthermore, I don’t think the Taiwanese [he meant Chinese] have the military capability to take Taiwan back at the this point in time.” (Read “How Does Technology Factor in for US Militarism Toward China?”)

Mearsheimer is opining through most of the interview. This is adduced by framing many opinions with “I think.” Even non-nuclear war simulations that predict a US victory point out that it would come at a staggering price. Would the US citizenry be willing to pay the price?

Mearsheimer is convinced that regardless of the cost of a military confrontation between China and the US that “… the United States is definitely committed to containing China and keeping Taiwan out of China’s hands, then the United States would axiomatically fight war with China over Taiwan.”

He predicates this commitment on the comments of, with all due respect, a brain addled president.

Napolitano asks, “Is China a threat to the United States of America?”

Mearsheimer sidesteps the “threat” and states “the Chinese are a serious competitor.”

“Furthermore, the Chinese are interested not only in taking back Taiwan, they are interested in dominating the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and the South China Sea is of immense importance to the United States and to the world economy. And the United States does not want China to take the South China Sea back or take control of it, or take control of the East China Sea. We’re opposed to that. More generally, we do not want China to be the dominant power in Asia.”

“Taking back,” says Mearsheimer. In so stating, Mearsheimer is acknowledging Taiwan was removed from China. It was removed by Japanese imperialism. And that removal was enforced after World War II by the US against its WWII ally, China.

And what does the professor mean by “dominate”? How is China dominating these waters? Is that not what the US attempts by sending war ships into the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, South China Sea, and the East China Sea? (Read “Who has Sovereignty in the South China Sea?”) Does China prevent innocent passage of shipping through these waters?
Does China prevent innocent passage of shipping through these waters? Noteworthy is a legal position that holds that military transit requires China’s approval.

Mearsheimer: “But China naturally wants to be the dominant power in Asia just like we want to be the dominant power in our backyard…”

Naturally, as if this is ineluctable. And again, this word dominate? The US dominates by having other countries adhere to its coercive demands, especially commercial demands, (read John Perkins’ Confessions of an Economic Hit Man by for elaboration), by situating its preferred people in charge in targeted countries (e.g., splitting Korea and transplanting the dictator Syngman Rhee from the US to South Korea, supporting Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam before later abandoning him, and the installment of the unpopular Ayad Allawi as prime minister in Iraq).

The US is ensconced on ethnically cleansed Indigenous territory. It supported a corporate coup against the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and apologized for this in 1993, but still the US continues to occupy Hawai’i. There are also the cases of Puerto Rico, Guam, Saipan, Palau, the Chagos archipelago, the Marshall Islands, and others.

According to the reasoning proffered by Mearsheimer, the US was predetermined to pursue building an empire. And in his reasoning the US is unexceptional in this regard because China’s eventual imperialist path is also likewise predetermined.

Mearsheimer acknowledges that “China is ambitious for good reasons on their part, and the United States is committed to limiting China’s ambitions for good strategic reasons on its part.”

Usually to be ambitious is considered in a positive vein: learn all you can, develop, become independent, become a leader. However, in Mearsheimer’s wording one assumes ambition to be negative, as in dominating others and halting the ambitions of others, as the US wants to do to China. Limiting China’s ambitions — so much for win-win, as China is committed to. And why is limiting China good strategic reasoning by the US? Doesn’t the US trumpet so-called free markets?

Napolitano picks up on this and asks: “What are the reasons for limiting China’s ambitions if the ambitions are commercial in nature?”

Mearsheimer points to determinism,

And you know how the United States behaves. The United States is a highly aggressive state that runs around the world using its power quite liberally. Why do you think that if China had a powerful military that it wouldn’t do the same thing? The United States just doesn’t want any other power on the planet to be more powerful than it is. I think that any other country on the planet, if it had its druthers, would want to be the most powerful state in the system. And the reason is that the international system [Which system is Mearsheimer referring to: that overseen by the United Nations or the so-called rules based order? — KP] is a really dangerous place. It is in many ways a brutal jungle. All you have to do is look at what is happening to the Palestinians. If you were the Palestinians, wouldn’t you want your own state, and wouldn’t you want that your state to be really powerful, so that nobody, in effect, could mess around with you? I think the Chinese are driven by this mentality? [italics added]

Mearsheimer rejects that China’s reasons are just commercial. He posits instead a geopolitical determinism. Freedom for a country to choose its direction in the world apparently does not exist. Nation states are bound to follow a determined trajectory.

Mearsheimer assumes China will follow the US trajectory. He asks, “Why do you think that if China had a powerful military that it wouldn’t do the same thing?” [italics added]

Why did the Soviet Union dissolve? A commonly heard answer is that the military power that the Soviet Union once was was brought to its economic knees due to military overspending. Why is the US’s economic preeminence challenged by a serious competitor now? Does China have 700 to 900 foreign military bases (numbers vary according to source, but a lot)? This must cause a serious outpouring of money. Maybe that is why China wouldn’t pursue the same folly as the US? Moreover, China is steadfastly promoting peaceful win-win relations between and among countries. China’s economic success is based on these win-win relationships. By engaging in win-win relations, China wins and the other country wins. There is no need to dominate. China is able to receive the commodities, materials, and services that it desires (except when a competitor decides to limit “free trade”), and it continues to prosper as does its partner country.

Of course the Chinese don’t want to suffer another century of humiliation (but does that mean the Chinese want to oppress others as the West have been doing?) Besides, wasn’t Vietnam syndrome humiliating? Wasn’t the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan humiliating?

Relationships of domination and humiliation are not win-win. One side will be aggrieved in such a relationship and will seek another relationship, and more likely elsewhere with a trustworthy partner. It seems that China is aware of this dynamic.

Mearsheimer posits how the US should deal with China:

“I think the United States should go to great lengths to contain China.” Contain, meaning “to prevent China from dominating the South China Sea, to prevent China from taking Taiwan, and to prevent China from dominating the East China Sea,” and to make good relations with China’s neighbors in furtherance of this US objective; and avoid provoking a war with China.

Said the professor, “We should try to roll back Chinese military power; the United States should manage China-US relations to avoid war.” In other words, the US should dominate China, as is natural, according to the professor.

Given the multitude of wars carried out by the US abroad, it is surely self-evident that if a nation state wants to avoid wars and does not have a powerful ally, then a certain level of a defensive capability is a sine qua non. For the aggressive US, by far the highest spending military-industrial complex on the planet, to call out the strengthening of another country’s military, especially a country frequently excoriated and threatened by US government officials, must be viewed as blatant hypocrisy.

Hence, it is quite a conundrum Mearsheimer lays out: avoiding war by rolling back another country’s military power by virtue of it having greater military power. Supposedly, in this scenario, China will accede to the US curtailment (“rolling back”) of Chinese military might and not be provoked to war; it will give up its national aspiration to bring Taiwan fully back into the Chinese nation; it will allow itself to be humiliated once again by a foreign nation. Paradoxically, this scenario also calls on China to reject geopolitical determinism? It sounds a lot like Mearsheimer has constructed a pretzel of contradictions. How sensible, how probable is what the professor proffers?

Mearsheimer asserts that China seeks power that is self-serving – that is, power that is not shared as in a win-win scenario: “… We have a vested interest in not letting China shift the balance of power in its favor, and, therefore against us, in a major way.”

This raises many questions and requires elucidation. Who is the “we” here? One assumes Mearsheimer means the US. Is it in the “vested interest” of the masses in the US? It must be because to be vested otherwise would be undemocratic. While in the US millions sleep in their cars or under bridges each night, scrape through garbage receptacles for sustenance during the day, and beg for handouts, China has eliminated such extreme poverty. Shouldn’t that be a signal for the impoverished strata in other societies?

China is not the enemy. China is not perfect, and it doesn’t profess to be. It does not profess to be an indispensable nation. It does not proclaim to be a beacon on the hill. It does not list as a goal full spectrum dominance. Mearsheimer apparently thinks that the evolution of the capitalist US must also apply to socialist China. Nonetheless, it would seem more accurate to portray China, which in the earliest stage of socialism, as an alternative model to US capitalism, militarism, imperialism, and dominance.

Other nations state should seriously consider how socialism matched with their country’s characteristics might function for them.

• See also Kim Petersen, “Obstacles to the Peaceful Reintegration of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China: Interview with author Wei Ling Chua.”

Kim Petersen is an independent writer. He can be emailed at: kimohp at gmail.com. Read other articles by Kim.

The China – Solomon Islands security agreement and the competition in the South China Sea

March 2, 2023
By Dr.Nadia Helmy

China attaches great importance to strongly enhancing its influence in the South Pacific region, by consolidating and developing its relations with the island countries there, led by the “Solomon Islands” and its capital “Honiara”. This was evident in the development of relations between Beijing and Honiara in the recent period, as part of a plan China to encircle the islands surrounding the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. At a time when the Solomon Islands are pursuing a foreign policy characterized by flexibility and maneuver, by exploiting the geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing and employing it to serve its interests and maximize its gains as much as possible.

And China has become dependent on its surrounding regional relations to mobilize all parties to recognize China’s right to the disputed islands in the South China Sea, or what is known as (the line of nine sectors), which refers to the lines of demarcation used by China to prove its right to the largest part of the Sea of ​​​​China. South China, which includes most of the disputed areas in the South China Sea, which are mainly:

(The Paracel Islands, the Spartly Islands, and many others, including Brattas Island, Vereker’s Grove, Macclesfield Shelf, and the Scarborough Shoal)

Hence the first Chinese reaction to the security moves of the United States of America in the Indo-Pacific region in the American sense or the Asia-Pacific region in the Chinese concept, especially after the United States of America signed the Quad Quadruple agreement with Australia, India and Japan and the Aukus nuclear defense and security agreement with Australia and Britain, to surround and limiting China mainly in its areas of direct influence in the South China Sea. Therefore, the Chinese reaction came through the establishment of Chinese security alliances in response to the American counterpart, coinciding with the conduct of military exercises of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in that region, so China proceeded to sign a security agreement with the Solomon Islands group, under the name (Shanghai Declaration), which sparked International fears that China is about to declare effective control of the South China Sea. Especially since Australia is located 1,500 km south of the Solomon Islands.

The problem of the South China Sea is related to the existence of disputes over the division of maritime borders between China and a group of countries bordering the sea, such as Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan, as allies of Washington, each of which claims that it has the right to its territorial waters. Disagreements are still burning over the Spratly and Brasilian islands. So China released its famous map known as (The Nine Lines), through which it asserted its historical rights to it. At the same time, China worked to build artificial islands that were built on coral reefs in the region, which the United States of America and other surrounding countries are still warning of, but China confirms the legitimacy of its policy towards the South China Sea.

The South China Sea is the most important water area for the world economy. It passes through about a third of world trade. It is also the most dangerous sea that could witness a military confrontation between the United States of America and China. The most prominent indication of this possibility appears in the insistence of the United States, along with other countries in the region such as South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and others, to consider this sea an international and open shipping lane, while China constantly asserts that it is an integral part of its lands and internal seas, similar to its dealings with Taiwan insists on independence.

Currently, China’s construction of “three artificial islands in the South China Sea” raises Taiwan’s concerns as an ally of the United States of America about whether it should extend the runway of Taiping Island to handle larger warplanes. The commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific region “John Aquilino”, confirmed in March 2022 that the Chinese army had already completed the militarization of the three artificial islands, and armed them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment, and combat aircraft against Taiwan and Washington’s allied regimes such as the Philippines and Japan.

In the same context, the security agreement signed between China and the Solomon Islands, known as the “Shanghai Declaration”, has raised international concerns that Beijing is intensifying its efforts to obtain what it calls historical rights over the entire South China Sea, bearing in mind that this happened after several hours after Washington announced that it would send officials to the Solomon Islands to express US concerns about the possibility of establishing a military foothold for China in those islands.

China is not satisfied with building military bases and artificial islands in its maritime borders in the South China Sea, but its school curricula include maps showing that China’s borders touch the coasts of other countries. Chinese schoolchildren have been taught for decades that their country’s borders extend more than 1,000 miles to the coast of Malaysia. Beijing bases its claims and defense officially on the fact that Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back more than two thousand years, and therefore have a basis in international law, including the customary law of discovery and occupation and the historical name. The United States of America officially responds that the South China Sea, according to international law, is an open water called “the maritime commons of Asia”, meaning that it is for all countries. Other countries agree in this opinion, such as: Australia, Britain and Japan. The US State Department asserts that China has no legal basis for its demands, which constitute the greatest threat to freedom of the seas in modern times.

Because of the Sino-American differences regarding China’s activities around the South China Sea, the United States of America entered into joint security and defense agreements with its regional allies neighboring China in the Indo-Pacific region in the American sense or Asia Pacific in the Chinese concept, where the United States of America entered into the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership Agreement, the Quad Quadruple Agreement with Australia, India and Japan, and the controversial Aukus nuclear defense and security agreement with Australia and Britain, to ensure control of Chinese influence and expansion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

At the present time, there is a US-Chinese competition over the disputed islands in the South China Sea, with the participation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy in several maneuvers and military exercises using several different types of ships and dozens of warplanes in combat-oriented naval maneuvers in the South China Sea. , which arouses the anger, fears and provocation of Washington. This is what was confirmed by the Chinese General “Tian Junli”, who is a spokesman for the Southern Operations Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, that the Chinese aircraft carrier conducted the exercises in a professional and standard manner in accordance with internationally recognized laws and regulations.

The US response to the Chinese military deployment in the South China Sea region came by strengthening the US military’s presence in the region, in an effort to deter China, which is carrying out a process of steadily modernizing and expanding its military and nuclear capabilities in that region.

In my belief, the matter will not reach an armed confrontation between Washington and Beijing, but rather the case of “the militarization of the South China Sea and Washington and Beijing’s attempt to increase their allies in that region through agreements, alliances… etc”, which we notice from the deployment of US warships in the region surrounding the South China Sea, will continue. And that at a higher rate in recent years, in a “show of American military power” in the face of Chinese demands in the South China Sea, without the matter reaching the level of armed confrontation between the two parties.

Hence we understand, and based on the growth of China’s military power in its South Sea, there is a situation similar to “the militarization of the South China Sea in light of the Sino-American competition”, with a quasi-security agreement between the United States of America and its partners in that region, such as India, Vietnam and Singapore, to increase the pace of armament. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, Japan also tends to do the same. On the other hand, China continues to support its naval forces on an ongoing basis, within the framework of the extended Sino-American policy of response and reaction in that region and an attempt to mobilize each of them allies.

Legitimacy and Nationalism: China’s Motivations and the Dangers of Assumptions

Lewis Eves

Jan 13 2022 

LONG READ

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There is increasing anxiety in the West about China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage. This anxiety is evident in the policies of western states. The USA has described China as ‘a sustained challenge’ to the international system (The White House, 2021 p.8). Meanwhile, the UK is investing in its ‘China-facing capabilities’ and Australia is purchasing nuclear submarines to hedge against China’s presence in the South China Sea (HM Government, 2021 p.22; Masterson, 2021). Undoubtedly, China’s rise poses a challenge to the status quo. If for no other reason than that it represents an alternative to the western-centric international system (Turin, 2010). Nevertheless, representing an alternative to the status quo does not mean that Chinese foreign policy is inherently motivated by challenging the West.

Such anxious perspectives of Chinese foreign policy are rooted in realism, a theory of international relations which assumes actors to be inherently self-interested and motivated by the egoistic pursuit of power (Waltz 2001; Mearshimer 2003). According to this ontology, the potential power to be gained by acting assertively is enough to account for China’s foreign policy motivations. Social constructivism, on the other hand, posits that an actor’s motivations are rooted in the social interactions between groups within the state (Leira, 2019). Using this lens, China’s foreign policy motivations must be understood in relation to its domestic politics. Adopting a socially constructivist ontology, this article argues that Chinese foreign policy is motivated, at least in part, by domestic nationalist pressures and that, by way of the security paradox, western policies are fuelling Chinese assertiveness.

This article proceeds as follows. Firstly, by presenting the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) twin-pillar model of legitimacy and its increased reliance on nationalism to maintain its regime’s legitimacy. It then outlines China’s nationalist movement and its foreign policy agenda, using the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute to show how nationalist pressure affects the CCP’s foreign policy decision-making. Consideration is then given to the CCP’s social controls, showing that the CCP is unable to mitigate nationalist pressure via its propaganda infrastructure. The final section then presents the security paradox concept and how the West’s realist assumptions and anxious policies are fuelling Chinese assertiveness.

Pillars of Legitimacy

After Mao’s death, the CCP could no longer rely upon a cult of personality to provide popular support for its regime (Coble, 2007). Rather, the CCP has since premised its regime legitimacy ‘upon the twin pillars of nationalism and economic prosperity (Reilly, 2004 p.283). This model of legitimacy predicates the CCP’s regime security upon its ability to improve the economic conditions of the Chinese people and its ability to protect and pursue China’s national interests.

Certainly, the CCP has closely associated itself with China’s economic success and national interests. The CCP-owned People’s Daily, for example, regularly praises the CCP for fostering China’s ‘thriving and diverse economy’ (Cai, 2021). It goes as far as to praise specific CCP economic policies such as the 13^th Five Year Plan, which is credited with growing China’s digital economy by 16.6% from 2016-20 (People’s Daily Online, 2021a). Also published were calls to support the CCP in protecting national interests from foreign intervention. For example, by purchasing Xinjiang Cotton against the backdrop of international condemnation of China’s treatment of Xinjiang’s Uighur population (People’s Daily Online, 2021b).

Notably, Chinese president Xi Jinping invoked both pillars when speaking at the CCP’s 100^th-anniversary celebrations. Stating that ‘only socialism with Chinese characteristics can develop China’ (BBC News, 2021) In this statement, the CCP and its specific brand of socialist ideology are presented as essential to China’s economic development. Meanwhile, Xi also made an overtly nationalistic pledge that the CCP will:

never allow anyone to bully, oppress or subjugate China. Anyone who tries to do that will have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people (Xi via BBC News, 2021).

Evidently, the CCP is eager to associate itself with economic development and protecting the Chinese nation. Doing so in accordance with the twin pillar model to maintain its regime legitimacy.

However, an emerging issue with the twin pillar model is that the CCP increasingly struggles to ensure economic prosperity. Central to the economic pillar are Deng Xiaoping’s liberal economic reforms. Since their introduction in the early 1980s, per capita income has increased by 2500% and over 800 million Chinese have been saved from poverty, conferring popular support for the CCP’s economic stewardship (Denmark, 2018). Yet, structural economic challenges including a declining labour force, low per-capita productivity, and an over-reliance on manufacturing result in barriers to sustained growth (World Bank, n.d.). Consequentially, 373 million Chinese continue living in some degree of relative poverty (Ibid.).

As economic prosperity becomes harder to guarantee, the integrity of the economic pillar is weakened. This is an issue of which the CCP is aware. China’s growth rate in 2018 was 6.6% (Kuo, 2019), significantly below both China’s highs of over 10% growth in the 2000s, and the necessary rate needed to maintain high levels of employment (World Bank, n.d.). This led to concerns among CCP officials that rising unemployment might lead to social unrest (Kuo, 2019). This included Premier Li Keqiang, who publicly acknowledged ‘public dissatisfaction’ over China’s stagnating economic performance (Bradsher and Buckley, 2019).

Given the economic pillar’s weakness, the CCP must rely more upon the nationalist pillar to carry the burden of its regime legitimacy. Hence, the CCP has been less likely to constrain popular expressions of nationalist in recent years (Abbott, 2016). In 2005, tens-of-thousands of Chinese nationalists protested Japanese textbooks for their omission of atrocities committed against China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Watts, 2005). Protesters attacked Japanese businesses and property, including Japan’s embassies and consulates (Yardley, 2005). Some local CCP branches and low-level officials encouraged the demonstrations, but the central CCP discouraged the nationalist demonstrations (Watts, 2005). These efforts included deploying riot police, shutting down public transport and the Minister of Public Security declaring the protests illegal and citing concern for Sino-Japanese relations as the reason for this crackdown (Yardley, 2005).

In stark contrast, the CCP did relatively little to stop anti-Japanese protests in 2012. This time, nationalists in over 180 Chinese cities gathered in the tens-of-thousands to protest Japan’s nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Gries et al., 2016), an island chain in the East China Sea claimed by China but administered by Japan. Notably, senior CCP officials failed to comment on the protests while the dispute was ongoing (Buckley, 2012). Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations were higher in 2012 compared to 2005 (Gries et al., 2016), meaning it is challenging to isolate China’s economic performance as a variable accounting for the difference in the CCP’s response. However, it is notable that China’s economic growth rate slowed by roughly one-third from 11.39% in 2005 to 7.86% in 2012 (World Bank, n.d.). Accordingly, as per the twin-pillar model, the CCP’s reluctance to constrain the nationalistic anti-Japanese protests was to be expected, any anti-protest measures risking the nationalist credentials upon which the CCP increasingly relied as the economic pillar faltered.

Chinese Nationalism and the CCP’s Foreign Policy

The CCP’s reliance on the nationalist pillar confers considerable influence upon China’s nationalist movement. This in turn requires the CCP to acquiesce to the nationalist agenda in its foreign policy to maintain its legitimating nationalist credentials. Chinese nationalism is not a unified movement but consists of groups and organisations sharing a common Chinese nationalism sensitive to what it considers affronts to the Chinese nation and vocal in its activism against said affronts (Reilly, 2004; Coble, 2007; Johnston, 2017). Some of these groups and organisations have formal links with the CCP, for example, the Communist Youth League and nationalists working in local CCP branches (Watts, 2005; Kecheng, 2020). Others operate more independently of the CCP, such as nationalists among the Chinese diaspora and most of China’s online activist groups (Modongal, 2016; Fang and Repnikova, 2018).

These groups subscribe to a broad nationalist agenda and expect the CCP to use China’s growing economic and military strength to pursue China’s interests (Abbott, 2016). Specifically, they demand justice for historical repression, recognition of China commensurate with its newfound strength, that the CCP mobilise against threats to Chinese sovereignty, and that China’s sphere of influence be respected (Boylan et al., 2020). This agenda was evident in the recent US-China trade war. Nationalists called for sanctions in response to what they perceived as a US attempt to reject China’s status as a leading global economy, comparing US tariffs to the repressive economic restrictions imposed upon China by western imperialists in the 1800s (Ibid.).

Understanding the nationalist agenda and the CCP’s reliance on the nationalist pillar for regime legitimacy is significant. This is because the CCP must adhere to the nationalist agenda in its foreign policy to live up to its nationalist credentials (Coble, 2007). This is apparent in how, against the backdrop of China’s slowing economy, nationalist pressure has coincided with a hard-line stance from the CCP in China’s foreign relations. An example of this can be found as early as the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute (also known as the Trawler Incident). This dispute began after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese coastguard vessels in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, after which Japan arrested the trawler’s crew. Initially the CCP responded relatively benignly, limited to Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu issuing a statement requesting that Japan ‘refrain from so-called law-enforcement activities in the East China Sea’ (Johnson 2010).

However, nationalistic anti-Japanese protests began in the days following the incident. The protesters called upon the CCP to take further action against Japan. One protester outside the Japanese embassy explained: ‘I want our government to be stronger. They shouldn’t let the Japanese bully us on our own soil!’ (Lim, 2010). Meanwhile, a protester in Shanghai summarised the protests as follows: ‘We came here to appeal for fairness and for the right to ask for our captain back. We regret the government’s weakness in diplomacy’ (Al Jazeera, 2010a).

Evidently, the China nationalist movement, in response to a perceived affront in the form of the trawler incident, sought to pressure the CCP into resolving the dispute in accordance with the nationalist agenda. The day after the protests started, and also only a day after their initial statement, Spokeswoman Jiang announced naval deployments to the East China Sea. This demarcated the first instance of regular Chinese patrols in the region since the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s (Green et al., 2017). In the following weeks, as the nationalistic anti-Japanese protests continued, China also suspended diplomatic contacts with Japan and ceased rare earth exports essential to Japanese manufacturing (Hafeez, 2015). Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also threatened Japan with retaliation while in New York for a UN conference (Al Jazeera, 2010b).

The fact that the CCP pivoted from a diplomatic response to naval deployments within one day, and that this pivot coincided with nationalist pressure upon the CCP, shows nationalism’s affect upon Chinese foreign policy in action. The rapid change in response to Japan resulting from the CCP wanting to uphold its nationalist credentials regardless of the implications for Sino-Japanese relations.

Of course, it is plausible that the CCP simply desired to take a strong stance against Japan and that anti-Japanese sentiment merely offered the pretext for the CCP to flex its newfound military strength. Taffer (2020), for example, presents the trawler incident as an attempt by the CCP to test the USA’s commitment to its Japanese ally. However, the CCP made efforts to repair Sino-Japanese relations after the flashpoint of the dispute passed. These included the resumption of rare earth exports and mild discouragement of anti-Japanese protests once nationalist pressure subsided in the following months (Green et al., 2017). This indicates that the CCP did not want to damage Sino-Japanese relations, but rather that nationalist pressure forced the CCP to act in accordance with the nationalist agenda. Thereby safeguarding its nationalist credentials as per its increasing reliance upon the nationalist pillar to secure its regime legitimacy.

The Limits of the CCP’s Control

Reilly (2011) argues that the CCP practices effective social control over its nationalist movement by leveraging China’s propaganda infrastructure to direct and disperse nationalist sentiment as needed. If true, this would mean that the CCP faces no pressure to adhere to the nationalist agenda. It could merely adapt its propaganda messaging to counter nationalist pressure without appeasing the nationalist agenda in its foreign policy decision-making.

Yet, the CCP has failed to restrict nationalist activism against foreign actors, illustrating the limits of the CCP’s control over China’s nationalist movement. For example, in 2020, against the backdrop of international condemnation of events in Hong Kong, the CCP struggled to crackdown on a nationalist anti-foreign smear campaign on social media (Lo, 2020). Notably, the Communist Youth League, a nationalistic youth movement affiliated with the CCP, provocatively endorsed a ‘social media crusade’ against foreign governments sympathetic towards Hong Kong (Kecheng, 2020). This shows that the CCP struggles to exert social control over nationalist organisations it has formal links with, let alone the broader Chinese nationalist movement.

The limitations of the CCP’s crackdown on the nationalist social media campaign, and thus limitations of the CCP’s social controls over China’s nationalist movement, were most prominent in May 2020. Chinese nationalist hacktivists hijacked the Twitter account of the Chinese embassy in Paris, posting a picture depicting the USA as the personification of death, trailing blood along a corridor and knocking at Hong Kong’s door with the caption ‘who’s next?’ (Lo, 2020). This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the response from the Chinese embassy was to rapidly delete the post and issued formal apologies to France and the USA (Keyser, 2020). These actions are inconsistent with a CCP truly motivated to assert China’s national interests to the detriment of its foreign relations, but consistent with a CCP struggling to control China’s nationalist movement.

Secondly, and most importantly, this example shows Chinese nationalists to be hijacking the CCP’s propaganda infrastructure to pursue their foreign policy agenda. This points to a reality in which, rather than the CCP having social control of China’s nationalist movement through its propaganda infrastructure, Chinese nationalists find ways to escape the CCP’s social controls. It also shows that they are willing to respond independently of the CCP to perceived affronts to the Chinese nation if they feel the CCP fails to do so adequately.

Given the limitations of the CCP’s social controls, the CCP cannot merely adapt its propaganda messaging to offset nationalist pressure. Rather, it must contend with the dilemma of either acquiescing to the nationalist agenda, even to the detriment of China’s foreign relations, or risking its nationalist credentials and thus regime legitimacy. This demonstrates that domestic nationalist pressures are a significant factor in China’s foreign policy decision-making despite the CCP’s propaganda infrastructure.

Why Does it Matter?

Understanding the nationalist pressures on the CCP’s foreign policy decision-making is important for two reasons. Firstly, from an academic standpoint, it serves as a case study in working past initial assumptions about an actor’s motivations. Whereas western policymakers anxiously assume China’s motivations in accordance with realism, this article has presented an alternative explanation. By looking at an actor’s foreign policy as a product of its domestic politics, it is possible to provide a more meaningful explanation of their foreign policy motivations. In this case, that China is motivated, at least in part, by the CCP’s desire to uphold its legitimating nationalist credentials in the face of pressure to adhere to the foreign policy agenda of its nationalist movement.

Secondly, in terms of the practise of international relations, it shows how the realist assumptions of western policymakers and their respective China policies risk becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. This is in accordance with the security paradox concept. Also known as the security dilemma, the security paradox refers to a cycle in which two sides, through their efforts to mitigate their own uncertainty and insecurity, trigger uncertainty and insecurity in the other (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). As this cycle progresses tensions may escalate to the point that conflict emerges despite, paradoxically, neither side necessarily holding any ill-will towards the other at the start of the paradox (Ibid.). An example of a security paradox is the Anglo-German naval arms race during the prelude to World War I. In this, Germany’s maritime ambitions caused Britain to expand its navy, in turn lea ding Germany to accelerate its naval programme and thus Britain to develop larger battleships, and so on (Maurer, 1997).

A similar mechanic can be observed today regarding the West and its policies towards China. Western states, anxious about China’s rise and growing assertiveness, are enacting policies in preparation of a Chinese challenge to the status quo. Purchasing nuclear submarines and investing in ‘China-facing capabilities’. While understandable given their anxiety and realist assumptions, these policies risk provoking Chinese nationalists. Thereby generating pressure on the CCP to enact the assertive foreign policy the West wants to avoid. Likely leading to further western policies that risk being interpreted as an affront by Chinese nationalists. If unchecked, this could lead to hostility despite both the West and the CCP merely attempting to mitigate their own insecurities.

That western policies are provoking Chinese nationalists is clear to see. Minister Yang Xiaoguang of the Chinese embassy in London has explained that the Chinese people have expressed ‘antipathy and opposition’ to the UK’s plans to China policy (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2021). This indicates domestic nationalist pressure on the CCP to respond to the UK’s policy. Similarly, in response to American posturing and Australia’s acquisition of nuclear submarines, Chinese nationalists briefly began calls for the CCP to declare war on AUKUS (Davidson and Blair, 2021). These examples both highlight how, in response to western policy, China’s nationalist movement is pressuring the CCP to adhere to its foreign policy agenda. In doing so, making the case that the West is, by way of its China policies, creating the assertive China that fuels their own anxieties.

Conclusion

Evidently, China’s foreign policy motivations are influenced by domestic nationalist pressures and western policy. This is apparent considering the twin-pillar model. As economic prosperity has become harder for the CCP to guarantee, it has had to increasingly rely upon nationalism for legitimacy. This confers considerable influence upon China’s nationalist movement. China’s nationalist movement subscribes to a broad nationalist agenda, which it wants the CCP to adhere to in its foreign policy decision-making. This has affected China’s foreign policy in practise, apparent as early as 2010 when the CCP quickly pivoted to align more closely to the nationalist agenda during the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Some have argued that the CCP’s control over China propaganda infrastructure confers effective control over China’s nationalist movement. However, as discussed, the CCP’s social controls over Chinese nationalists are in fact limited. With nationalists even bypassing said propaganda infrastructure and directly pursuing their foreign policy agenda when they consider the CCP to failed to rectify affronts to the Chinese nation.

Understanding the domestic pressures motivating Chinese foreign policy showcases the importance of moving beyond realist assumptions and highlights how we can achieve a fuller understanding by considering the domestic when we study the international. It also shows that western foreign policies are, by way of the security paradox, generating the assertive China that western policy was intended to mitigate. As the West provokes Chinese nationalists, they are pressuring the CCP to enact more assertive foreign policies, in turn causing further anxiety in the West. Further study into how China’s domestic politics informs its foreign policy could offer additional insights motivations. It could also inform western policies towards China. Lessening the risk of provoking Chinese nationalists and thus better mitigating western anxieties.

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Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Continuity and Change: China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea
• Is China Under-Exploiting One Legal Avenue in the South China Sea?
• Testing the Waters in the South China Sea
• China and the ‘Thucydides Trap’
• Contesting American Power: Beijing’s Challenge in South China Sea Disputes
• India’s Incremental Balancing in the South China Sea

ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)

Lewis Eves is a PhD researcher and Associate Lecturer at Sheffield Hallam University, specialising in International Security Studies and Sino-Japanese relations. His current research focuses on the role of history as an underlying political issue that may lead to renewed tensions and hostility in the relationship between China and Japan. He previously studied MA International Security Studies and BA International Relations and History at the University of Leicester and is an alumnus of the Ambitious Futures programme for university leadership.

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