A Radical Reinvention of the Enlightenment

BY DANIEL FALCONE


FEBRUARY 2, 2024


Cover Art for the book The End of Enlightenment: Empire, Commerce, Crisis by Richard Whatmore

In this interview, exclusive for CounterPunch, Richard Whatmore discusses his latest book, The End of Enlightenment: Empire, Commerce, Crisis (Penguin, 2023). In a world that demands highly rational planning to abolish empire and combat the manifest exploitation of a capitalist society, Whatmore emphasizes that the left needs to sustain the critique of fanatical economic practices. Thinkers and writers of the 18th century like Phillis Wheatley, Thomas Paine, and Mary Wollstonecraft would find the idea of self-regulating markets to be absurd. Whatmore reminds the reader that “contemporaries saw commerce as an anarchic force, turning social relations and relations between states upside down.” Further, he indicates that, “During the end of enlightenment era, historical actors were certain that the world had to change – what existed could not be sustained – and they lost all faith in contemporary ideological solutions to the problems they faced. They sound like us.”

Daniel Falcone: Political Scientist Camila Vergara recently stated, “I got my copy of Richard Whatmore’s The End of Enlightenment, which offers a radical re-evaluation of the Enlightenment as a failed project due to the pursuit of wealth & empire. Timely critical approach to Western values, and a research treasure with more than 100 pages worth of useful notes.” I was pleased to see such an enthusiastic endorsement of your thesis. Could you elaborate on your main arguments and the purpose of the book?

Richard Whatmore: Praise from somebody I respect as much as Camila Vergara is very welcome indeed. I will try and explain the central argument of the book; it is that we have come to a point in time where most of us, including scholars of course, use the term ‘the Enlightenment’ loosely and imprecisely. One of the goals of the book is to return to 18th century conceptions of Enlightenment. I think that in the 18th century contemporaries were obsessed with avoiding wars of religion; their parents and grandparents would have had direct experience of the consequences of religious warfare and here there is a parallel to the generations which experienced world war in the 20th century, shaping subsequent political identities for several generations.

My argument is that any strategy to prevent religious warfare from breaking out amounted to an Enlightenment. So, there were multiple enlightenments, all intended to prevent religious violence, itself associated with superstition and fanaticism, from causing societal chaos. An important point is that stopping religious fanaticism might entail autocracy, controlling the thoughts and behaviour of persons living in a particular community or state. Such strategies have been called at different times Enlightened Despotism by historians.

But the more interesting relationship that developed during the 18th century was that between enlightenment and free states. Free states, it is vital to recognise, were in decline. Republics had become endangered species and republicanism as an ideology was on the wane. The most significant free state was Britain, which Montesquieu called the freest state in human history and a republic hiding beneath the form of a monarchy. Numerous commentators in the 18th century thought that Britain too was on the edge of a precipice and likely to collapse as a free state. British politics were seen to be corrupt; the population was increasingly self-interested or addicted to luxury, and politicians were becoming the servants of merchants and bankers seeking legislation to guarantee them vast profits through the establishment of commercial empires.

The public good was ignored or betrayed. For these reasons, Britain was not expected to survive. The End of Enlightenment tells the story of the attempt by figures such as Edmund Burke, Edward Gibbon, Catharine Macaulay, Thomas Paine, and Mary Wollstonecraft to save liberty and enlightenment together. They all, for differing reasons, saw themselves to have failed. But the strategies they employed are significant and remain so; some of the problems they addressed have not gone away.

Daniel Falcone: How is the book organized and what does it add to the historiographic account of Enlightenment scholarship?

Richard Whatmore: The book begins with David Hume because Hume was one of the figures who believed in the reality of enlightenment. He was certain that his own times merited congratulation because wars of religion had once more been close and had been prevented from breaking out. The example Hume gave was the French monarch Louis XIV, who with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes had revived counter-reformation Catholicism in all its evangelism and intolerance. Yet Louis XIV, rather than establishing universal monarchy on mainland Europe, was ultimately defeated militarily and Europe was not ravaged again by theological conflict turned violent. At his most optimistic, in the 1740s, David Hume thought that major states such as Britain and France would come together as what he termed ‘governments of laws rather than of men’, establishing ‘civilised monarchies’.

By the 1760s Hume’s optimism was gone. He became convinced that Britain’s addiction to public credit and commercial empire had ruined politics. Politicians were becoming servants of rich merchants, as in the case of the malign domestic consequences of the influx of wealth via the East India Company. Equally worrying for Hume was that ordinary people, especially in London, were turning xenophobic and fanatic in their lust for liberty. After explaining Hume’s change of opinion, The End of Enlightenment describes responses to Hume from figures as different as the republican revolutionary Jacques-Pierre Brissot and the Swiss-loving historian Edward Gibbon.

Daniel Falcone: I noticed that David Graeber’s posthumous work on Pirate Enlightenment where he considers how “proto-democratic practices” of Madagascar’s Zana-Malata people formed an Enlightenment adjacent project thought too long as something distinctly Euro-centric. He argued that the recoveries of non-western thought can expand our understanding of Enlightenment. More recently, Surya Parekh, authored Black Enlightenment to stretch the orthodoxy and discourse to include black authors and the race anxiety felt by European thinkers. Can you comment on how works like this impact, or relate to, you own revisionist work on the subject?

Richard Whatmore: Alas but David Graeber, brilliant though much of his work unquestionably was, had no knowledge of the history of political and economic thought in relation to the Enlightenment. He made the same mistake as many authors who want to use the late 17th/early 18th centuries as a source for utopian ideas in the present and in the process unfortunately gets the past completely wrong. There may have been practices in Madagascar that Graeber wanted to call ‘proto democratic’, but I would be careful about defining ‘democracy’ in such a way, redolent of what used to be called Whig history.

What I like about so many eighteenth-century authors is that they take ideas in action seriously. If you want to propose an idea in the past for use in the present, then you need to establish a clear alternative future for the present and a transition mechanism that gets us from the existing state of things to that alternative future. Above all, you need to identify ideas that tend to thrive, rather than only working in specific circumstances or being like endangered species going the way of the dodo. For example, if your republic keeps getting taken over by Caesar figures or republican generals like Bonaparte, you need to have a precise plan to deal with it. If you fail to do this then you are simply saying ‘wouldn’t it be great if we could live like they do’. Alas, it is very hard to change your culture and society without violent revolution, but they try exactly this with precise plans during the period I call The End of Enlightenment.

I want to make a further point that arises from Graeber’s approach. For me, you cannot link democracy in the past to democracy in conditions of commercial empire in the 18th century. The latter conditions largely subsist today in the sense we are still governed by commercial empires, even if we think we live in sovereign states or are free peoples. In the 18th century it was advisable only to draw parallels when experiences were sufficiently connected so that lessons could be learned directly. Distance or difference translated into irrelevance. In the case of the American Revolution, for example, revolutionary experience was not deemed relevant to radical politics in Europe because of the surfeit of land in America taken from the indigenous peoples. In short, in the governance of the United States, you could throw land at a problem. In Europe there was no spare land to throw and therefore American politics was entirely divorced from European circumstances as to lack imaginative purchase for reformers.

The history of democracy, which used to be called the history of free states, has always been difficult. The story relayed in The End of Enlightenment remains significant because something happened that led to free states being the dominant form of state in modern times while also making so many people dissatisfied with this reality. What happened is that, altogether unexpectedly, Britain survived the eighteenth century. Indeed, Britain free states across the world, especially in Europe and South America, began to model themselves on Britain after the Napoleonic Wars. This was depressing for reformers because Britain remained what Adam Smith called a mercantile system with a corrupt economy giving too great a political voice to merchants and bankers. Worse still, socialist, or other utopian alternatives of the time faced the problem that the French Revolution had descended into Terror, failing to create a stable republic, and ultimately collapsing into the First French Empire, that restored the power of church and aristocracy vanquished in 1789.

Some observers saw the French revolutionaries to be replicating the history of radical Protestantism, creating a republican church which divided and then turned violent, establishing two separate churches which then repeated the process over and over. Recovering the history of democracy and free states, we must return to the history of Britain and its commercial empire. As Tocqueville said about the atrocities committed by the French in Algeria, he hated them at the same time as he considered them to be necessary, because France would not otherwise survive as a great state. He could see no alternative for France, no alternative future. This was why the work he never finished concerned the British in India. The tragedy of modernity was that the free state of Britain was better at war than any free state historically.

Commercial empires historically, Carthage or the Dutch Republic, have risen meteorically and then fallen to earth. Britain was different. It survived as a form of free state, but with a mercantile economy geared to empire and profit whatever the consequences for peoples in, say, Ireland or Bengal. All of this means that the circumstances and admirable distinctiveness of the Zana Malata people has very little to teach us about politics or the economy in the present, although worth relating.

Turning to Parekh’s Black Enlightenment, one of the consequences of the establishment of commercial empire was, as we all know, racism, war and grotesque violence justified by the pursuit of profit. An attempt was made in the 1780s to abolish empire, turning the entire globe into (small) communities of pacific free states. I am interested in ideas that contemporaries felt directly solved problems and how they changed their views after their ideas were perceived to have failed. Strategies for enlightenment had to face the problem that the combination of Britain as a free state with commercial empire seemed to be fostering fanaticism everywhere, including fanatic ideas about liberty turning xenophobic. Enlightenment ended because contemporaries felt they had not solved these problems. I do not think we have either.

Daniel Falcone: Why is it important to see The Enlightenment as something that changes in meaning historically? How can it?

Richard Whatmore: I hope it is clear from The End of Enlightenment that if you define enlightenment as any strategy intended to prevent fanaticism and superstition from breaking out there are both multiple enlightenments and issues concerning the relationship between a particular enlightenment and, for example, liberty, equality, and commerce. Enlightenment was different in distinct contexts. Montesquieu’s view was correct that strategies for enlightenment in one set of circumstances had to be utterly different to enlightenment in an alternative context. Strategies had to be different if reform was going to be successful in one place rather than in another. The rise of Britain as a free state and the attempt to create a new kind of Republic during the French Revolution led to what I call the end of enlightenment; wars of religion broke out in secular guise. Maintaining enlightenment became much more difficult.

Whether you were a republican, monarchist, ancient or a modern, everyone considered themselves to have failed. The 18th century ended with a war to the death between the newly free state of France and Britain. The French Republic put an end to the liberty of historic republics from the Swiss cantons to the Dutch Republic and independent republics such as Venice Genoa and Geneva. If you loved liberty, the choice appeared to be between a grotesque commercial empire sustained by corrupt trade with a xenophobic populace or fanatic French republicanism likely to descend into war-driven empire. During the end of enlightenment era historical actors were certain that the world had to change – what existed could not be sustained – and they lost all faith in contemporary ideological solutions to the problems they faced. They sound like us.

Daniel Falcone: Is there room, in your opinion, for interpretations of the Enlightenment to be firmly rooted in leftist opposition to abuses set forth by organized capital? For example, Noam Chomsky reads the Enlightenment as such.

Richard Whatmore: Noam Chomsky says that the defenders of enlightenment were anarchists, giving the example of the division of labor and its effects in making individuals lead meaningless lives characterized by what was later called alienation (Adam Smith famously makes the point without using the term). Although there is little point in seeking the origins of anarchist philosophy in the eighteenth century, Chomsky does recognize that contemporaries saw commerce as an anarchic force, turning social relations and relations between states upside down. What we have recently experienced and may be surprised at today – the rapid rise of China so soon after declarations were made at the turn of the century that the United States could be expected to be the sole global superpower – would not have surprised observers of trade in the enlightenment era. Rich countries became poor, and poor became rich, meaning that neither international relations nor domestic politics could be expected ever to be stable in conditions of the commercialization of societies. I think that it is accurate to draw parallels between portrayals of the effects of John Law’s Mississippi scheme (and the resulting South Sea Bubble), for example, and Chomsky’s description of capitalism. When Adam Smith coins the term ‘mercantile system’ to describe cabals of merchants bribing politicians to pass legislation for their profit against the public interest, I think this too is an origin point for many subsequent critiques of Britain’s version of commercial society. And it was natural in the eighteenth century to rail against private corruption in the provision of state-funded products, with self-enrichment rife from the dockyards to the army to tax collection. In a sense then, we still live in their world and I’ve no doubt that they would find the notion of self-regulating markets to be ridiculous.

I think what we have lost, and the left has lost, is the critique of certain economic practices as fanatic, being the equivalent of unleashing religious warfare upon the world. Enlightenment fears about wars of religion breaking out anew, I’ve argued, encompassed tyrants and liberty, commerce and poverty, democracy, and empire. Avoiding a world where religious fanatics rule was the core enlightenment goal, and by the end of the century, almost all the luminaries see themselves to have failed. The world was ruled by empire-builders, warmongers, money men and crooked politicians, in addition to being buffeted by the establishment of new churches both secular and religious. The eighteenth century is full of projects to abolish commerce, create purely agricultural societies and closed commercial states.

But there are also highly practical schemes to abolish empire and combat the manifest evils of commercial society, for example by establishing moderate wealth everywhere. I suppose what I’m saying is that their critiques of organized capital – for example, they would never have contemplated the control of domestic politics by individuals who had no stake in the state, being able to liquidate their assets and move across borders at a time of crisis – are even richer than the Chomskyan perspective.


Daniel Falcone is a teacher, journalist, and PhD student in the World History program at St. John’s University in Jamaica, NY as well as a member of the Democratic Socialists of America. He resides in New York City.

 

Theodor W. Adorno: An Introduction (Part 1)

 Merlin CCC December 30, 2018News & Research

Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) was a German philosopher, sociologist, psychologist, and a classically trained pianist and composer.  An only child to Maria Calvelli-Adorno della Piana (a devout Catholic from Corsica and former professional singer) and Oscar Alexander Wiesengrund (an assimilated Jew who had converted to Protestantism and a successful wine-export businessman), his childhood was marked by a love (and wunderkind proficiency) for music and a growing tendency toward intellectual nonconformism.

A founding member of the Frankfurt School and the philosophical style or approach known as critical theory, Adorno’s critiques of modern society (by way of Bloch, Marcuse, and others) significantly impacted Freud, Marx, and Hegel; and, his commitment to music and composition (in conjunction with critical theory) yielded significant contributions in aesthethics and sociology, including studies on authoritarianism and antisemitism that became models for the Institute for Social Research.  

The Culture Industry & the Power of Art

Adorno immigrated to the U.S. in 1937 and was horrified by a culture he thought would descend into fascism and repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th century.  Adorno’s dissatisfaction with American life was ultimately a reaction to a society which he believed was fully dominated by the economic mode of production.

This economic order created a “culture industry” where the form determined and controlled all content. The process of manufacture, reproduction and distribution of culture as an exchange ready commodity was the true content of the culture industry and all the professed content was merely a set of interchangeable and incidental cliches.

However, contrary to what he saw as a vacuous, useless culture in 20th century America, Adorno was an ardent believer in the radical transformative power of art. 

In a recent Philosophy Now article by Justin Kaushall, “Can Art Fight Fascism?”, Adorno’s aesthetic theory is explored. How can art change transform us and change how we think?  How can it reveal injustices in a system and produce political change?  For Adorno, art does this not by making explicit political statements but, rather, by transcending the ideology of mass culture and opening up space for new ways of thinking.  In a nutshell, art: protests, challenges, opens, inspires, abides.

To understand Adorno’s critique of American art and culture it is useful to first look to his critique of western philosophy.  

Adorno’s Critique of Western Philosophy & the Enlightenment

In Dialectic of Enlightenment (written with Max Horkheimer) Adorno argues that the horrors of the twentieth century were not a bug in the liberal system, but a rational end. As they write in the opening paragraph: “the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.” If the ideas of the enlightenment took hold across Europe why did Europe descend into fascism and violence?

Adorno argues against (a) commonsensical notions of history as a progressive process where the enlightenment overturns superstition and barbarism in favor of rational humanism, and (b) the marxist dialectical history which is concerned with the synthesis of opposing concepts and historical periods — in this case antiquity, myth, and religion vs. modernity, reason and science.

For Adorno, they cannot be easily separated as opposites and in retrospect (he claims) one can see the naturalistic and mythological contained within the enlightenment: “In the enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane…Under the title of brute facts, the social injustice from which they proceed is now as assuredly sacred a preserve as the medicine man was sacrosanct by reason of protection of his gods.” In other words, Adorno maintains that choices about how we organize society and distribute resources which arise from contingent political conditions, are imagined as neutral and universal facts through the application of science and rationality.

This mistake is not so much a corruption of the enlightenment from without as it is an internal tendency. Adorno characterizes the enlightenment project (as it has developed throughout history) as one which loses its ability to self reflect and dismisses critique as superstition.

For Adorno and Horkheimer the enlightenment lost its relationship to Truth (a metaphysical and thus “irrational” category) and instead became a process which is defined only by its methodology irrespective of its ends.

They write: “Knowledge consists of subsumption under principles. Any other than systematically directed thinking is unoriented (sic) or authoritarian. Reason contributes only the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements of fixed conceptual coherence. Every substantial goal which men might adduce as an alleged rational insight is, in the strict Enlightenment sense, delusion, lies, or ‘rationalization’.” So the process of unifying the particular and the general, the facts and the principle, displaces the need for any moral or metaphysical consideration, any goal behind the reasoning.

Ultimately, Adorno believed the formal style of the enlightenment outlived its purpose; the technique of deriving conclusions from axioms survived while the goal of improving society and the interior lives of humans was replaced by purely economic and political motives. Unlike earlier, ethical motivations behind reasoning, these economic goals are treated as natural – a universal feature of the world, not a result of social relations.

To condense these into a more succinct form:

1. Myth contains elements of enlightenment; enlightenment contains elements of myth.
2. The enlightenment (as its is applied by historical capitalism) mythologizes social relations which arise out of human desires or needs into mere natural facts. This obfuscates the historical conditions from which “facts” arise.
3. The dominant form of scientific rationalism central to capitalist society cannot self reflect so forms of domination are mistaken for natural, unchanging principles.

In contemporary society rationalism has turned irrational – the technological and scientific refinement of how we do what we do has obscured why we do what we do. The enlightenment must regain its powers of self reflection to see why the rational forces of technology and markets meant to liberate us from fear and superstition have instead led to global catastrophe and cultural decline.

An Important Caveat: Industrial Capitalism

Before moving on to how this phenomenon manifests in popular culture, it is important to make note of an important caveat about Adorno and Horkheimer’s theory.

Their criticism of the enlightenment is a criticism of philosophy under industrial capitalism; the irrational turn of the enlightenment is not a necessary feature but a historical development. They are, in fact, great admirers of enlightenment thought: “We are wholly convinced – and therein lies our petitio principii – that social freedom is inseparable from enlightenment thought… [however,] If consideration of the destructive aspect of progress is left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized, thought loses its transcending quality and, its relation to truth.”

Adorno and Horkheimer are most definitely not advocating a return to the past, nor do they romanticize the premodern world. This is why they apply their dialectical method of myth and enlightenment containing each other – ancient ways of understanding contained useful reflections on meaning, truth, and morality which contemporary society appears to lack, while the enlightenment contained the ability to turn matters of historical contingency or human relations into matters of fate.

Hence, to “save” the enlightenment from “blind pragmatism” we must rediscover self-reflection and critically examine what reason can accomplish and how it functions in contemporary society.

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**NOTE:  This article was authored by Merlin volunteer and scholar Jonathan Drake.  Stay tuned for more articles by him on the philosophical contributions of Theodor W. Adorno.**

Unenlightened thinking: Steven Pinker’s embarrassing new book is a feeble sermon for rattled liberals

To think of this book as any kind of scholarly exercise is a category mistake. The purpose of Pinker’s laborious work is to reassure liberals that they are on “the right side of history”.

BYJOHN GRAY

BOOKS
22 FEBRUARY 2018

SUKI DHANDA/GUARDIAN NEWS & MEDIA LTD

“Opposing reason is, by definition, unreasonable.” Steven Pinker is fond of definitions. Early on in this monumental apologia for a currently fashionable version of Enlightenment thinking, he writes: “To take something on faith means to believe it without good reason, so by definition a faith in the existence of supernatural entities clashes with reason.” Well, it’s good to have that settled once and for all. There is no need to trouble yourself with the arguments of historians, anthropologists and evolutionary biologists, who treat religion as a highly complex phenomenon, serving a variety of human needs. All you need do is consult a dictionary, and you will find that religion is – by definition – irrational.

Similarly, you don’t need to bother about what the Enlightenment was actually like. By any standards, David Hume was one of the greatest Enlightenment thinkers. It was the sceptical Scottish philosopher who stirred Immanuel Kant – whose well-known essay on Enlightenment Pinker quotes reverently at the start of the book – from what Kant described as his “dogmatic slumber”. Pinker barely mentions Hume, and the omission is not accidental. He tell us that the Enlightenment is defined by a “non-negotiable” commitment to reason.

Yet in A Treatise of Human Nature (1738), Hume wrote: “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Hume believed being reasonable meant accepting the limits of reason, and so too, in quite different ways, did later Enlightenment rationalists such as Keynes and Freud. Pinker’s Enlightenment has little in common with the much more interesting intellectual movement that historically existed.

One of the consequences of this unhistorical approach is that Pinker repeats fallacies that have been exposed time and time again. He is an evangelist for science – or, to be more exact, an ideology of scientism. Along with reason, humanism and progress, science features as one of the core Enlightenment values that Pinker lists at the start of the book. But for him science is more than a bunch of methods that are useful in conjecturing how the world works: it provides the basis of ethics and politics.

He summarises this claim in a formula: “Entro, evo, info. These concepts define the narrative of human progress, the tragedy we were born into, and our means of eking out a better existence.” Here, “entro” denotes entropy, the process of increasing disorder that is identified in the second law of thermodynamics. “Evo” refers to the evolution of living organisms, which absorb energy and thereby resist entropy. “Info” is information, which when collected and processed in the nervous systems of these organisms enables them to wage their war against entropy.

For Pinker, the second law of thermodynamics doesn’t simply identify a universal regularity in the natural world, “it defines the fate of the universe and the ultimate purpose of life, mind, and human striving: to deploy energy and knowledge to fight back the tide of entropy and carve out refuges of beneficial order”.

There is nothing novel in scientism. The Victorian prophet of social evolution, Herbert Spencer, believed that the universe, life and society were moving from undifferentiated simplicity to a higher state of complex order. In politics, this meant a movement towards laissez-faire capitalism. In social contexts, “survival of the fittest” – an expression Spencer invented after reading Darwin’s On the Origin of Species – meant that anyone unable to stay afloat in such a society would struggle, sink and then disappear. Spencer welcomed this process, since for him it was evolution in action – the movement from lower to higher forms of life.

Pinker is an ardent enthusiast for free-market capitalism, which he believes produced most of the advance in living standards over the past few centuries. Unlike Spencer, he seems ready to accept that some provision should be made for those who have been left behind. Why he makes this concession is unclear. Nothing is said about human kindness, or fairness, in his formula. Indeed, the logic of his dictum points the other way.
Many early-20th-century Enlightenment thinkers supported eugenic policies because they believed “improving the quality of the population” – weeding out human beings they deemed unproductive or undesirable – would accelerate the course of human evolution. When Pinker touches on eugenics in a couple of paragraphs towards the end of the book, he blames it on socialism: “The most decisive repudiation of eugenics invokes classical liberal and libertarian principles: government is not an omnipotent ruler over human existence but an institution with circumscribed powers, and perfecting the genetic make-up of the human species is not among them.” But a theory of entropy provides no reason for limiting the powers of government any more than for helping the weak. Science cannot underwrite any political project, classical liberal or otherwise, because science cannot dictate human values.

Exponents of scientism in the past have used it to promote Fabian socialism, Marxism-Leninism, Nazism and more interventionist varieties of liberalism. In doing so, they were invoking the authority of science to legitimise the values of their time and place. Deploying his cod-scientific formula to bolster market liberalism, Pinker does the same. Scientism is one of the Enlightenment’s bad ideas. But bad ideas do not evolve into better ones. They keep on recurring, often in cruder and sillier forms than in the past. Pinker’s formula for human progress is a contemporary example.

To be sure, for Pinker there are no bad Enlightenment ideas. One of the features of the comic-book history of the Enlightenment he presents is that it is innocent of all evil. Accordingly, when despots such as Lenin repeatedly asserted that they engaged in mass killing in order to realise an Enlightenment project – in Lenin’s case, a more far-reaching version of the Jacobin project of re-educating society by the methodical use of terror – they must have been deluded or lying. How could a philosophy of reason possibly be implicated in murderous totalitarianism? Like the faithful who tell you Christianity is “a religion of love” that had nothing to do with the Inquisition, Pinker stipulates that the Enlightenment, by definition, is intrinsically liberal. Modern tyrannies must therefore be products of counter-Enlightenment ideologies – Romanticism, nationalism and the like. Enabling liberals to avoid asking difficult questions about why their values are in retreat, this is a popular view. Assessed in terms of historical evidence, it is also a myth.

Many Enlightenment thinkers have been avowedly or implicitly hostile to liberalism. One of the most influential, the 19th-century French positivist Auguste Comte – not discussed by Pinker – promoted a brand of scientism that was overtly anti-liberal. Human progress meant following the path of reason and moving from magical thinking to scientific inquiry. In a society based on science there will be no need for liberal values, since moral and political questions will be answered by experts.

Comte admired the Middle Ages as a time when society was healthily “organic” and unified by a single orthodoxy; but the organic society of the future would be ruled by science, not monotheism. The superstitious faith of earlier times would be supplanted by what he called “the Religion of Humanity” – a rationalist creed in which an imaginary version of the human species would occupy the place of the Supreme Being. Comte’s core ideas – reason, science, progress and humanism – are precisely those that Pinker lists at the start of this book as the central values of the Enlightenment. Interestingly, neither of them mentions freedom or toleration.

The link between the Enlightenment and liberal values, which Pinker and many others today assert as a universal truth, is actually rather tenuous. It is strongest in Enlightenment thinkers who were wedded to monotheism, such as Locke and indeed Kant. The more hostile the Enlightenment has been to monotheism, the more illiberal it has been. Comte’s anti-liberalism inspired Charles Maurras, a French collaborator with Nazism and the leading theorist of Action Française – a fascistic movement formed during the Dreyfus affair – in his defence of integral nationalism. Lenin continued the Jacobins’ campaign against religion as well as their pedagogy of terror.

Instead of acknowledging that the Enlightenment itself has often been illiberal, Pinker presents a Manichean vision in which “Enlightenment liberal values” are besieged on every side by dark forces. Amusingly, he is in no doubt as to the identity of the intellectual master-criminal behind this assault. The Professor Moriarty of modern irrationalism, the “enemy of humanism, the ideology behind resurgent authoritarianism, nationalism, populism, reactionary thinking, even fascism” can at last be revealed:

If one wanted to single out a thinker who represented the opposite of humanism (indeed of pretty much every argument in this book) one couldn’t do better than the German philologist Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche helped to inspire the romantic militarism that led to the First World War and the fascism that led to the Second. The connections between Nietzsche’s ideas and the megadeath movements of the 20th century are obvious enough; a glorification of violence and power, an eagerness to raze the institutions of liberal democracy, a contempt for most of humanity, and a stone-hearted indifference to human life.

Searching for some intellectual authority for this wild diatribe, Pinker cites Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy, where Russell denounced Nietzsche as a Romantic enemy of reason who preached a life of instinct and emotion. Published immediately after the end of the Second World War, Russell’s assessment of Nietzsche was understandably crude. Today it would not pass muster in a first-year undergraduate’s essay.

A lifelong admirer of Voltaire, Nietzsche was a critic of the Enlightenment because he belonged in it. Far from being an enemy of humanism, he promoted humanism in the most radical form. In future, humankind would fashion its values and shape its destiny by its own unfettered will. True, he conferred this privilege only on a select few.

He recognised no principle of human equality. But where does concern with equality come from? Not from science, which can be used to promote many values. As Nietzsche never tired of pointing out, the ideal of equality is an inheritance from Judaism and Christianity. His hatred of equality is one reason he was such a vehement atheist.

The message of Pinker’s book is that the Enlightenment produced all of the progress of the modern era and none of its crimes. This is why he tries to explain 20th-century megadeaths by reference to Nietzsche’s supposedly anti-Enlightenment philosophy. Here he has shifted his ground. In The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011), Pinker represented the Hemoclysm – a term referring to the early 20th-century spasm of mass killing, which he uses to lump together the two world wars, the Soviet Gulag and the Holocaust – as not much more than a statistical fluke. What explains this change of view? Pinker cites no change in the historical evidence that is available on the subject.

Instead, there has been a shift in the mood of liberals. Less than a decade ago, they were confident that progress was ongoing. No doubt there would be periods of regression; we might be in one of those periods at the present time. Yet over the long haul of history, there could be no doubt that the forces of reason would continue to advance. Today, liberals have lost that always rather incredible faith. Faced with the political reversals of the past few years and the onward march of authoritarianism, they find their view of the world crumbling away. What they need at the present time, more than anything else, is some kind of intellectual anodyne that can soothe their nerves, still their doubts and stave off panic.

This is where Pinker comes in. Enlightenment Now is a rationalist sermon delivered to a congregation of wavering souls. To think of the book as any kind of scholarly exercise is a category mistake. Much of its more than 500 pages consists of figures aiming to show the progress that has been made under the aegis of Enlightenment ideals. Of course, these figures settle nothing. Like Pinker’s celebrated assertion that the world is becoming ever more peaceful – the statistical basis of which has been demolished by Nassim Nicholas Taleb – everything depends on what is included in them and how they are interpreted.

Are the millions incarcerated in the vast American prison system and the millions more who live under parole included in the calculus that says human freedom is increasing? If we are to congratulate ourselves on being less cruel to animals, how much weight should be given to the uncounted numbers that suffer in factory farming and hideous medical experiments – neither of which were practised on any comparable scale in the past?

It would be idle to pursue such questions. The purpose of Pinker’s laborious graphs and figures is to reassure his audience that they are on “the right side of history”. For many, no doubt, the exercise will be successful. But nagging questions will surely return. If an Enlightenment project survives, what reason is there for thinking it will be embodied in liberal democracy? What if the Enlightenment’s future is not in the liberal West, now almost ungovernable as a result of the culture wars in which it is mired, but Xi Jinping’s China, where an altogether tougher breed of rationalist is in charge? It is a prospect that Voltaire, Jeremy Bentham and other exponents of enlightened despotism would have heartily welcomed.

Judged as a contribution to thought, Enlightenment Now is embarrassingly feeble. With its primitive scientism and manga-style history of ideas, the book is a parody of Enlightenment thinking at its crudest. A more intellectually inquiring author would have conveyed something of the Enlightenment’s richness and diversity. Yet even if Pinker was capable of providing it, intellectual inquiry is not what his anxious flock demands. Only an anodyne, mythical Enlightenment can give them what they crave, which is relief from painful doubt.

Given this overriding emotional imperative, presenting them with the actual, conflict-ridden, often illiberal Enlightenment would be – by definition, one might say – unreasonable. Judged as a therapeutic manual for rattled rationalists, Enlightenment Now is a highly topical and much-needed book. In the end, after all, reason is only the slave of the passions.

John Gray’s new book, “Seven Types of Atheism” will be published in April by Allen Lane.

Enlightenment Now: the Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress

Steven Pinker

Allen Lane, 576pp, £25

https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/books/2018/02/unenlightened-thinking-steven-pinker-s-embarrassing-new-book-feeble-sermon

Science Is Not Your Enemy

An impassioned plea to neglected novelists, embattled professors, and tenure-less historians

Steven Pinker/August 6, 2013

UIG VIA GETTY IMAGES

The great thinkers of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment were scientists. Not only did many of them contribute to mathematics, physics, and physiology, but all of them were avid theorists in the sciences of human nature. They were cognitive neuroscientists, who tried to explain thought and emotion in terms of physical mechanisms of the nervous system. They were evolutionary psychologists, who speculated on life in a state of nature and on animal instincts that are “infused into our bosoms.” And they were social psychologists, who wrote of the moral sentiments that draw us together, the selfish passions that inflame us, and the foibles of shortsightedness that frustrate our best-laid plans.

These thinkers—Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Leibniz, Kant, Smith—are all the more remarkable for having crafted their ideas in the absence of formal theory and empirical data. The mathematical theories of information, computation, and games had yet to be invented. The words “neuron,” “hormone,” and “gene” meant nothing to them. When reading these thinkers, I often long to travel back in time and offer them some bit of twenty-first-century freshman science that would fill a gap in their arguments or guide them around a stumbling block. What would these Fausts have given for such knowledge? What could they have done with it?

WATCH: Leon Wieseltier's rejoinder: Science doesn't have all the answers

We don’t have to fantasize about this scenario, because we are living it. We have the works of the great thinkers and their heirs, and we have scientific knowledge they could not have dreamed of. This is an extraordinary time for the understanding of the human condition. Intellectual problems from antiquity are being illuminated by insights from the sciences of mind, brain, genes, and evolution. Powerful tools have been developed to explore them, from genetically engineered neurons that can be controlled with pinpoints of light to the mining of “big data” as a means of understanding how ideas propagate.



One would think that writers in the humanities would be delighted and energized by the efflorescence of new ideas from the sciences. But one would be wrong. Though everyone endorses science when it can cure disease, monitor the environment, or bash political opponents, the intrusion of science into the territories of the humanities has been deeply resented. Just as reviled is the application of scientific reasoning to religion; many writers without a trace of a belief in God maintain that there is something unseemly about scientists weighing in on the biggest questions. In the major journals of opinion, scientific carpetbaggers are regularly accused of determinism, reductionism, essentialism, positivism, and worst of all, something called “scientism.” The past couple years have seen four denunciations of scientism in this magazine alone, together with attacks in Bookforum, The Claremont Review of Books, The Huffington Post, The Nation, National Review Online, The New Atlantis, The New York Times, and Standpoint.

The eclectic politics of these publications reflects the bipartisan nature of the resentment. This passage, from a 2011 review in The Nation of three books by Sam Harris by the historian Jackson Lears, makes the standard case for the prosecution by the left:



Positivist assumptions provided the epistemological foundations for Social Darwinism and pop-evolutionary notions of progress, as well as for scientific racism and imperialism. These tendencies coalesced in eugenics, the doctrine that human well-being could be improved and eventually perfected through the selective breeding of the "fit" and the sterilization or elimination of the "unfit." ... Every schoolkid knows about what happened next: the catastrophic twentieth century. Two world wars, the systematic slaughter of innocents on an unprecedented scale, the proliferation of unimaginable destructive weapons, brushfire wars on the periphery of empire—all these events involved, in various degrees, the application of sceintific research to advanced technology.

The case from the right, captured in this 2007 speech from Leon Kass, George W. Bush’s bioethics adviser, is just as measured:


Scientific ideas and discoveries about living nature and man, perfectly welcome and harmless in themselves, are being enlisted to do battle against our traditional religious and moral teachings, and even our self-understanding as creatures with freedom and dignity. A quasi-religious faith has sprung up among us—let me call it "soul-less scientism"—which believes that our new biology, eliminating all mystery, can give a complete account of human life, giving purely scientific explanations of human thought, love, creativity, moral judgment, and even why we believe in God. ... Make no mistake. The stakes in this contest are high: at issue are the moral and spiritual health of our nation, the continued vitality of science, and our own self-understanding as human beings and as children of the West.

These are zealous prosecutors indeed. But their cases are weak. The mindset of science cannot be blamed for genocide and war and does not threaten the moral and spiritual health of our nation. It is, rather, indispensable in all areas of human concern, including politics, the arts, and the search for meaning, purpose, and morality.



The term “scientism” is anything but clear, more of a boo-word than a label for any coherent doctrine. Sometimes it is equated with lunatic positions, such as that “science is all that matters” or that “scientists should be entrusted to solve all problems.” Sometimes it is clarified with adjectives like “simplistic,” “naïve,” and “vulgar.” The definitional vacuum allows me to replicate gay activists’ flaunting of “queer” and appropriate the pejorative for a position I am prepared to defend.

Scientism, in this good sense, is not the belief that members of the occupational guild called “science” are particularly wise or noble. On the contrary, the defining practices of science, including open debate, peer review, and double-blind methods, are explicitly designed to circumvent the errors and sins to which scientists, being human, are vulnerable. Scientism does not mean that all current scientific hypotheses are true; most new ones are not, since the cycle of conjecture and refutation is the lifeblood of science. It is not an imperialistic drive to occupy the humanities; the promise of science is to enrich and diversify the intellectual tools of humanistic scholarship, not to obliterate them. And it is not the dogma that physical stuff is the only thing that exists. Scientists themselves are immersed in the ethereal medium of information, including the truths of mathematics, the logic of their theories, and the values that guide their enterprise. In this conception, science is of a piece with philosophy, reason, and Enlightenment humanism. It is distinguished by an explicit commitment to two ideals, and it is these that scientism seeks to export to the rest of intellectual life.


The Linder Gallery, c.1622-1629, Cordover Collection, LLC

The first is that the world is intelligible. The phenomena we experience may be explained by principles that are more general than the phenomena themselves. These principles may in turn be explained by more fundamental principles, and so on. In making sense of our world, there should be few occasions in which we are forced to concede “It just is” or “It’s magic” or “Because I said so.” The commitment to intelligibility is not a matter of brute faith, but gradually validates itself as more and more of the world becomes explicable in scientific terms. The processes of life, for example, used to be attributed to a mysterious élan vital; now we know they are powered by chemical and physical reactions among complex molecules.

Demonizers of scientism often confuse intelligibility with a sin called reductionism. But to explain a complex happening in terms of deeper principles is not to discard its richness. No sane thinker would try to explain World War I in the language of physics, chemistry, and biology as opposed to the more perspicuous language of the perceptions and goals of leaders in 1914 Europe. At the same time, a curious person can legitimately ask why human minds are apt to have such perceptions and goals, including the tribalism, overconfidence, and sense of honor that fell into a deadly combination at that historical moment.

Many of our cultural institutions cultivate a philistine indifference to science.

The second ideal is that the acquisition of knowledge is hard. The world does not go out of its way to reveal its workings, and even if it did, our minds are prone to illusions, fallacies, and super- stitions. Most of the traditional causes of belief—faith, revelation, dogma, authority, charisma, conventional wisdom, the invigorating glow of subjective certainty—are generators of error and should be dismissed as sources of knowledge. To understand the world, we must cultivate work-arounds for our cognitive limitations, including skepticism, open debate, formal precision, and empirical tests, often requiring feats of ingenuity. Any movement that calls itself “scientific” but fails to nurture opportunities for the falsification of its own beliefs (most obviously when it murders or imprisons the people who disagree with it) is not a scientific movement.

In which ways, then, does science illuminate human affairs? Let me start with the most ambitious: the deepest questions about who we are, where we came from, and how we define the meaning and purpose of our lives. This is the traditional territory of religion, and its defenders tend to be the most excitable critics of scientism. They are apt to endorse the partition plan proposed by Stephen Jay Gould in his worst book, Rocks of Ages, according to which the proper concerns of science and religion belong to “non-overlapping magisteria.” Science gets the empirical universe; religion gets the questions of moral meaning and value.

Unfortunately, this entente unravels as soon as you begin to examine it. The moral worldview of any scientifically literate person—one who is not blinkered by fundamentalism—requires a radical break from religious conceptions of meaning and value.

To begin with, the findings of science entail that the belief systems of all the world’s traditional religions and cultures—their theories of the origins of life, humans, and societies—are factually mistaken. We know, but our ancestors did not, that humans belong to a single species of African primate that developed agriculture, government, and writing late in its history. We know that our species is a tiny twig of a genealogical tree that embraces all living things and that emerged from prebiotic chemicals almost four billion years ago. We know that we live on a planet that revolves around one of a hundred billion stars in our galaxy, which is one of a hundred billion galaxies in a 13.8-billion-year-old universe, possibly one of a vast number of universes. We know that our intuitions about space, time, matter, and causation are incommensurable with the nature of reality on scales that are very large and very small. We know that the laws governing the physical world (including accidents, disease, and other misfortunes) have no goals that pertain to human well-being. There is no such thing as fate, providence, karma, spells, curses, augury, divine retribution, or answered prayers—though the discrepancy between the laws of probability and the workings of cognition may explain why people believe there are. And we know that we did not always know these things, that the beloved convictions of every time and culture may be decisively falsified, doubtless including some we hold today.



In other words, the worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview given to us by science. Though the scientific facts do not by themselves dictate values, they certainly hem in the possibilities. By stripping ecclesiastical authority of its credibility on factual matters, they cast doubt on its claims to certitude in matters of morality. The scientific refutation of the theory of vengeful gods and occult forces undermines practices such as human sacrifice, witch hunts, faith healing, trial by ordeal, and the persecution of heretics. The facts of science, by exposing the absence of purpose in the laws governing the universe, force us to take responsibility for the welfare of ourselves, our species, and our planet. For the same reason, they undercut any moral or political system based on mystical forces, quests, destinies, dialectics, struggles, or messianic ages. And in combination with a few unexceptionable convictions— that all of us value our own welfare and that we are social beings who impinge on each other and can negotiate codes of conduct—the scientific facts militate toward a defensible morality, namely adhering to principles that maximize the flourishing of humans and other sentient beings. This humanism, which is inextricable from a scientific understanding of the world, is becoming the de facto morality of modern democracies, international organizations, and liberalizing religions, and its unfulfilled promises define the moral imperatives we face today.

Moreover, science has contributed—directly and enormously—to the fulfillment of these values. If one were to list the proudest accomplishments of our species (setting aside the removal of obstacles we set in our own path, such as the abolition of slavery and the defeat of fascism), many would be gifts bestowed by science.

The most obvious is the exhilarating achievement of scientific knowledge itself. We can say much about the history of the universe, the forces that make it tick, the stuff we’re made of, the origin of living things, and the machinery of life, including our own mental life. Better still, this understanding consists not in a mere listing of facts, but in deep and elegant principles, like the insight that life depends on a molecule that carries information, directs metabolism, and replicates itself.

Science has also provided the world with images of sublime beauty: stroboscopically frozen motion, exotic organisms, distant galaxies and outer planets, fluorescing neural circuitry, and a luminous planet Earth rising above the moon’s horizon into the blackness of space. Like great works of art, these are not just pretty pictures but prods to contemplation, which deepen our understanding of what it means to be human and of our place in nature.



And contrary to the widespread canard that technology has created a dystopia of deprivation and violence, every global measure of human flourishing is on the rise. The numbers show that after millennia of near-universal poverty, a steadily growing proportion of humanity is surviving the first year of life, going to school, voting in democracies, living in peace, communicating on cell phones, enjoying small luxuries, and surviving to old age. The Green Revolution in agronomy alone saved a billion people from starvation. And if you want examples of true moral greatness, go to Wikipedia and look up the entries for “smallpox” and “rinderpest” (cattle plague). The definitions are in the past tense, indicating that human ingenuity has eradicated two of the cruelest causes of suffering in the history of our kind.

Though science is beneficially embedded in our material, moral, and intellectual lives, many of our cultural institutions, including the liberal arts programs of many universities, cultivate a philistine indifference to science that shades into contempt. Students can graduate from elite colleges with a trifling exposure to science. They are commonly misinformed that scientists no longer care about truth but merely chase the fashions of shifting paradigms. A demonization campaign anachronistically impugns science for crimes that are as old as civilization, including racism, slavery, conquest, and genocide.

Just as common, and as historically illiterate, is the blaming of science for political movements with a pseudoscientific patina, particularly Social Darwinism and eugenics. Social Darwinism was the misnamed laissez-faire philosophy of Herbert Spencer. It was inspired not by Darwin’s theory of natural selection, but by Spencer’s Victorian-era conception of a mysterious natural force for progress, which was best left unimpeded. Today the term is often used to smear any application of evolution to the understanding of human beings. Eugenics was the campaign, popular among leftists and progressives in the early decades of the twentieth century, for the ultimate form of social progress, improving the genetic stock of humanity. Today the term is commonly used to assail behavioral genetics, the study of the genetic contributions to individual differences.

I can testify that this recrimination is not a relic of the 1990s science wars. When Harvard reformed its general education requirement in 2006 to 2007, the preliminary task force report introduced the teaching of science without any mention of its place in human knowledge: “Science and technology directly affect our students in many ways, both positive and negative: they have led to life-saving medicines, the internet, more efficient energy storage, and digital entertainment; they also have shepherded nuclear weapons, biological warfare agents, electronic eavesdropping, and damage to the environment.” This strange equivocation between the utilitarian and the nefarious was not applied to other disciplines. (Just imagine motivating the study of classical music by noting that it both generates economic activity and inspired the Nazis.) And there was no acknowledgment that we might have good reasons to prefer science and know-how over ignorance and superstition.



At a 2011 conference, another colleague summed up what she thought was the mixed legacy of science: the eradication of smallpox on the one hand; the Tuskegee syphilis study on the other. (In that study, another bloody shirt in the standard narrative about the evils of science, public-health researchers beginning in 1932 tracked the progression of untreated, latent syphilis in a sample of impoverished African Americans.) The comparison is obtuse. It assumes that the study was the unavoidable dark side of scientific progress as opposed to a universally deplored breach, and it compares a one-time failure to prevent harm to a few dozen people with the prevention of hundreds of millions of deaths per century, in perpetuity.

A major goad for the recent denunciations of scientism has been the application of neuroscience, evolution, and genetics to human affairs. Certainly many of these applications are glib or wrong, and they are fair game for criticism: scanning the brains of voters as they look at politicians’ faces, attributing war to a gene for aggression, explaining religion as an evolutionary adaptation to bond the group. Yet it’s not unheard of for intellectuals who are innocent of science to advance ideas that are glib or wrong, and no one is calling for humanities scholars to go back to their carrels and stay out of discussions of things that matter. It is a mistake to use a few wrongheaded examples as an excuse to quarantine the sciences of human nature from our attempt to understand the human condition.To simplify is not to be simplistic.

Take our understanding of politics. “What is government itself,” asked James Madison, “but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?” The new sciences of the mind are reexamining the connections between politics and human nature, which were avidly discussed in Madison’s time but submerged during a long interlude in which humans were assumed to be blank slates or rational actors. Humans, we are increasingly appreciating, are moralistic actors, guided by norms and taboos about authority, tribe, and purity, and driven by conflicting inclinations toward revenge and reconciliation. These impulses ordinarily operate beneath our conscious awareness, but in some circumstances they can be turned around by reason and debate. We are starting to grasp why these moralistic impulses evolved; how they are implemented in the brain; how they differ among individuals, cultures, and sub- cultures; and which conditions turn them on and off.

The application of science to politics not only enriches our stock of ideas, but also offers the means to ascertain which of them are likely to be correct. Political debates have traditionally been deliberated through case studies, rhetoric, and what software engineers call HiPPO (highest-paid person’s opinion). Not surprisingly, the controversies have careened without resolution. Do democracies fight each other? What about trading partners? Do neighboring ethnic groups inevitably play out ancient hatreds in bloody conflict? Do peacekeeping forces really keep the peace? Do terrorist organizations get what they want? How about Gandhian nonviolent movements? Are post-conflict reconciliation rituals effective at preventing the renewal of conflict?



History nerds can adduce examples that support either answer, but that does not mean the questions are irresolvable. Political events are buffeted by many forces, so it’s possible that a given force is potent in general but submerged in a particular instance. With the advent of data science—the analysis of large, open-access data sets of numbers or text—signals can be extracted from the noise and debates in history and political science resolved more objectively. As best we can tell at present, the answers to the questions listed above are (on average, and all things being equal) no, no, no, yes, no, yes, and yes.

The humanities are the domain in which the intrusion of science has produced the strongest recoil. Yet it is just that domain that would seem to be most in need of an infusion of new ideas. By most accounts, the humanities are in trouble. University programs are downsizing, the next generation of scholars is un- or underemployed, morale is sinking, students are staying away in droves. No thinking person should be indifferent to our society’s disinvestment from the humanities, which are indispensable to a civilized democracy.

Diagnoses of the malaise of the humanities rightly point to anti-intellectual trends in our culture and to the commercialization of our universities. But an honest appraisal would have to acknowledge that some of the damage is self-inflicted. The humanities have yet to recover from the disaster of postmodernism, with its defiant obscurantism, dogmatic relativism, and suffocating political correctness. And they have failed to define a progressive agenda. Several university presidents and provosts have lamented to me that when a scientist comes into their office, it’s to announce some exciting new research opportunity and demand the resources to pursue it. When a humanities scholar drops by, it’s to plead for respect for the way things have always been done.

Those ways do deserve respect, and there can be no replacement for the varieties of close reading, thick description, and deep immersion that erudite scholars can apply to individual works. But must these be the only paths to understanding? A consilience with science offers the humanities countless possibilities for innovation in understanding. Art, culture, and society are products of human brains. They originate in our faculties of perception, thought, and emotion, and they cumulate and spread through the epidemiological dynamics by which one person affects others. Shouldn’t we be curious to understand these connections? Both sides would win. The humanities would enjoy more of the explanatory depth of the sciences, to say nothing of the kind of a progressive agenda that appeals to deans and donors. The sciences could challenge their theories with the natural experiments and ecologically valid phenomena that have been so richly characterized by humanists.



In some disciplines, this consilience is a fait accompli. Archeology has grown from a branch of art history to a high-tech science. Linguistics and the philosophy of mind shade into cognitive science and neuroscience.


READ: The argument continues: Pinker and Wieseltier, Science vs. Humanities, Round III

Similar opportunities are there for the exploring. The visual arts could avail themselves of the explosion of knowledge in vision science, including the perception of color, shape, texture, and lighting, and the evolutionary aesthetics of faces and landscapes. Music scholars have much to discuss with the scientists who study the perception of speech and the brain’s analysis of the auditory world.

As for literary scholarship, where to begin? John Dryden wrote that a work of fiction is “a just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions and humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind.” Linguistics can illuminate the resources of grammar and discourse that allow authors to manipulate a reader’s imaginary experience. Cognitive psychology can provide insight about readers’ ability to reconcile their own consciousness with those of the author and characters. Behavioral genetics can update folk theories of parental influence with discoveries about the effects of genes, peers, and chance, which have profound implications for the interpretation of biography and memoir—an endeavor that also has much to learn from the cognitive psychology of memory and the social psychology of self-presentation. Evolutionary psychologists can distinguish the obsessions that are universal from those that are exaggerated by a particular culture and can lay out the inherent conflicts and confluences of interest within families, couples, friendships, and rivalries that are the drivers of plot.

And as with politics, the advent of data science applied to books, periodicals, correspondence, and musical scores holds the promise for an expansive new “digital humanities.” The possibilities for theory and discovery are limited only by the imagination and include the origin and spread of ideas, networks of intellectual and artistic influence, the persistence of historical memory, the waxing and waning of themes in literature, and patterns of unofficial censorship and taboo.



Nonetheless, many humanities scholars have reacted to these opportunities like the protagonist of the grammar-book example of the volitional future tense: “I will drown; no one shall save me.” Noting that these analyses flatten the richness of individual works, they reach for the usual adjectives: simplistic, reductionist, naïve, vulgar, and of course, scientistic.

The complaint about simplification is misbegotten. To explain something is to subsume it under more general principles, which always entails a degree of simplification. Yet to simplify is not to be simplistic. An appreciation of the particulars of a work can co-exist with explanations at many other levels, from the personality of an author to the cultural milieu, the faculties of human nature, and the laws governing social beings. The rejection of a search for general trends and principles calls to mind Jorge Luis Borges’s fictitious empire in which “the Cartographers Guild drew a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, coinciding point for point with it. The following Generations ... saw the vast Map to be Useless and permitted it to decay and fray under the Sun and winters.”

And the critics should be careful with the adjectives. If anything is naïve and simplistic, it is the conviction that the legacy silos of academia should be fortified and that we should be forever content with current ways of making sense of the world. Surely our conceptions of politics, culture, and morality have much to learn from our best understanding of the physical universe and of our makeup as a species.

Steven Pinker is a contributing editor at The New Republic, the Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, and the author, most recently, of The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined.

Read More:
Science, Scientism, Philosophy, Humanities, TNR Best Of 2013, Culture

Against disenchantment

The move away from myth and toward reason is an ancient human impulse. But must enchantment be the enemy of enlightenment?

Saint George and the Dragon (c1909-10), by Odilon Redon. Courtesy the Barnes Foundation, Philadelphia

Jason Josephson Storm
is chair and associate professor in the department of religion at Williams College in New England. His latest book is The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences (2017).

Edited by Sam Dresser


Enlightenment’s programme was the disenchantment of the world… The disenchantment of the world means the extirpation of animism… the Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effigies human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals.

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944)

The past few years have seen a resurgence of interest in the Frankfurt School – a group of German sociologists, philosophers, cultural theorists, psychoanalysts and their students – whose work is now synonymous with critical theory. Most of the initial members of the Frankfurt School came together in the 1920s at the Institute for Social Research in the German city of Frankfurt. Because most of the early members were Jews, many either perished or fled Germany when the Nazis came to power. The cross-fertilisation of critical social science with philosophy was particularly fertile ground. Today, their studies of ‘the Authoritarian Personality’ and Right-wing populism, and their denunciations of the ‘poverty’ of consumer culture, have come to look downright prescient.

Two of the Frankfurt School’s most important members were the philosophers Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and Theodor Adorno (1903-69). They initially met in 1921 in a seminar on gestalt psychology at the Goethe University in Frankfurt where Adorno was an undergraduate and Horkheimer a PhD student. But their intellectual relationship really blossomed under their shared experiences as German émigrés in the United States during the Second World War years, leading to some of the sustained critiques of late-capitalist society that have made the Frankfurt School famous. As Alex Ross recently put it in The New Yorker: ‘If Adorno were to look upon the cultural landscape of the 21st century, he might take grim satisfaction in seeing his fondest fears realised.’

The single most important work produced by the Frankfurt School was the book that Horkheimer and Adorno co-authored, the monumental Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944, revised 1947), an attempt to diagnose the maladies of modernity by understanding how modernity could have produced the horrors of fascism and Stalinism alike.

To risk a broad overview for the uninitiated, Horkheimer and Adorno construct their text around the unfolding dialectical opposition between ‘enlightenment’ (Aufklärung) and ‘myth’ (Mythos). The roots of this antagonism can be found in a dilemma that could as easily be psychological as historical. Humans, who see nature as outside of ourselves, are presented with a choice: either we can elect to submit to a mysterious, mythological world full of magic and frighteningly capricious spirits; or we can elect to subdue nature. By choosing the second option and turning nature into an object to control, humanity was caught in its own trap. Chasing the domination of nature, humans began to dominate each other. Rather than being liberated into a new kind of autonomy as they had hoped, people were instead turned into objects or, more properly, into abstractions, mere numbers and statistics, leading to a new backlash of irrational forces. As Horkheimer and Adorno summarised it, ‘enlightenment reverts to mythology’. The objectification of nature had directly led toward the objectification of humanity; the concentration camps and Gulag followed.

To make sense of this narrative trajectory, we need to know that, despite a whole crowd of scholars who see themselves as defending the historical Enlightenment from Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique, the Dialectic of Enlightenment portrays ‘enlightenment’ not primarily as a particular historical period, but as an ancient human impulse ‘aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters’ over nature. They identify its modern patriarch as the 17th-century empiricist Sir Francis Bacon, evoking the scientific revolution.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment provides an account of the ascendancy of enlightenment explicitly keyed to the ‘disenchantment of the world’, which they suggest first and foremost meant ‘the extirpation of animism’ and the end of belief in magic, spirits and demons. As Horkheimer and Adorno argue, ‘the mind, conquering superstition, [was supposed] to rule over disenchanted nature’. Magic and spirits had to go if the world was to be amenable to systematic and rational interpretation. To be sure, they also described what they saw as a contemporary ‘regression’ to myth and magic in capitalistic commodification and fascist politics as a kind of backlash to enlightenment, but they generally presumed disenchantment as the return’s precondition

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