New Zealand 'uncomfortable with expanding the remit' of Five Eyes, says Foreign Minister


By foreign affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic
Posted 4/19/2021

Nanaia Mahuta's speech at the NZ-China Council in Wellington reframed New Zealand's approach to China.

VIDEO https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-19/new-zealand-five-eyes-intelligence-sharing-china-australia/100078834

New Zealand's Foreign Minister, Nanaia Mahuta, has sent a clear signal that the country will chart a more independent foreign policy, directly criticising efforts to pressure China through the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group.

Key points:

Ms Mahuta says the Five Eyes group should focus solely on intelligence sharing

Beijing responded furiously to previous joint Five Eyes statements criticising China

Tensions have flared between Australia and New Zealand over how to handle China

The comments are likely to further inflame tensions in New Zealand's relationship with Australia, which believes the Ardern government is undermining collective attempts to push back against increasingly aggressive behaviour from Beijing.

The Five Eyes group – which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand – was originally formed as an intelligence sharing network but has expanded its scope in the past few years.

Ms Mahuta on Monday said the group should focus on intelligence.

"That's a matter we have raised with Five Eyes partners. We are uncomfortable with expanding the remit of the Five Eyes relationship," she said.

"We would much rather prefer to look for multilateral opportunities to express our interests on a number of issues."

The comments come only days before Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne visits New Zealand for formal talks with Ms Mahuta and New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern.

Beijing has responded furiously to recent joint statements from the Five Eyes group criticising crackdowns on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and threatened reprisals.

In the last six months New Zealand has joined many of those statements, but has been conspicuously absent from some.

Tensions have also flared between Australia and New Zealand over how to handle Beijing, although most of the frustrations have been kept behind closed doors.

Earlier this year New Zealand's Trade Minister, Damien O'Connor, irritated Australian ministers and officials after suggesting that the Morrison government should show China more "respect" in order to avoid campaigns of economic punishment.

WATCH
Duration: 58 seconds

New Zealand Trade Minister Damien O'Connor suggests Australia should "be cautious with wording" when dealing with Beijing.

VIDEO https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-19/new-zealand-five-eyes-intelligence-sharing-china-australia/100078834

Ms Mahuta has not held back from criticising China — including over its treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang – since taking over the role.

But the Foreign Minister said Five Eyes had a "specific purpose" and New Zealand would issue its own statements – or look to "other partners" in the region – when it wanted to lay out its position.

"New Zealand has been very clear, certainly in this term since we've held the portfolio, not to invoke the Five Eyes as the first point of contact on messaging out on a range of issues," she said.

"They really exist outside of the remit of the Five Eyes. We don't favour that type of approach and have expressed that to Five Eyes partners."

The Foreign Minister's comments also cast doubt on moves to expand the diplomatic architecture of Five Eyes.

In recent years ministers from all five countries across several different portfolios – including defence, treasury and foreign affairs – have held Five Eyes meetings.

In a statement, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) called the Five Eyes "a vital strategic alliance and key to Australia's interests".

"Countries will choose to address issues of concern in whichever forum they determine appropriate and consistent with their respective national interest," the DFAT spokesperson said.

"We share common values and approaches to many international issues which have allowed us to deepen our cooperation during an era of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific."

Minister outlines new approach to China

Ms Mahuta made the comments after giving a major speech designed to reframe New Zealand's approach to its relationship with China.

She said New Zealand wanted to diversify its exports in order to reduce its dependence on China, saying "in terms of thinking about long-term economic resilience … there is value in diversity".

"Resting our trade relationship on just one country, long term, is probably not the way we should be thinking about things," she said.

She said New Zealand wanted mutually respectful ties with China, comparing the relationship to a "dragon and taniwha", in reference to a water-dwelling serpent in Maori mythology.

The Foreign Minister stressed the two countries would not always agree, but needed to deal with each other fairly and honestly.

"There are some things on which New Zealand and China do not, cannot, and will not, agree," Ms Mahuta said.

"It is important to acknowledge this, and to stay true to ourselves, as we seek to manage our disagreements mindful that tikanga [culture, values or customs] or underpinning how we relate to each other must be respected."

She also issued a thinly veiled warning about rising debt levels in the Pacific, although she did not single out China.

"It's no secret there's a significant level of economic vulnerability across the Pacific," she said.

"New Zealand certainty invests in the Pacific … by way of grants, not loans."

"If we're really focused on regional stability and opportunity we need to tackle this particular challenge. I hope that conversation can take place with those who seek to invest in the region."

WE SPY WITH FIVE EYES

CSIS warned Canadian company unwittingly supplying drone tech to Russia: Director

Story by Alex Boutilier • GLOBAL NEWS

David Vigneault, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), prepares to appear before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, on Tuesday, June 13, 2023.© JDT


Canada’s domestic spy agency warned a Canadian company that it was unwittingly supplying drone technology that Russia has used against Ukraine.

In 2022, a Kyiv-based think tank reported that Canadian-made components from a company called Tallysman Wireless were found in Iranian drones shot down by Ukrainian defence forces.

Speaking at a public meeting of Five Eyes spy chiefs at Stanford University in California, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director David Vigneault said he had a “very difficult” conversation with a Canadian company supplying drone parts for Russia’s war efforts.

“We essentially were able to show that person that we had discovered … that some components of high-tech guidance (technology) had been used in Russian drones to kill Ukrainians absolutely unbeknownst to that business leader,” Vigneault said.

“That engagement, us taking that information, finding the right way to have classified information to share with those individuals, a tangible example like that goes a long way.”

Vigneault said it was an example of how CSIS has increasingly been working with private sector companies and universities to counter attempts by other nations to steal cutting-edge technology and research.

In a statement, a CSIS spokesperson said Vigneault was referring to Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones “used by Russia against Ukrainian civilians” and which included Canadian components.

In recent years, CSIS has dramatically stepped up its outreach to Canadian businesses and research universities over concerns about hostile states stealing intellectual property and trade secrets. Vigneault gave a rare public speech in 2018 to the Economic Club of Canada, where he called foreign interference and espionage the “greatest threat” to Canada’s “prosperity and national interest.”

CSIS accelerated these efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Canada’s spy agencies repeatedly warned that hostile nations were attempting to hijack vaccine research and disrupt already-shaken supply chains.

Vigneault said the agency has been hampered by the “stigma” attached to what Western intelligence agencies have done since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S.


“After 9/11, you know, there are a number of practices that have been put in place in each of our organizations that may not” have stood the test of time, Vigneault said.

“But we need to overcome that.”

The Stanford event on Tuesday brought together the domestic intelligence heads of Five Eyes countries — the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — to discuss the challenges of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence on national security. It’s extremely rare for all five countries’ spymasters to gather for a public discussion.

Unsurprisingly, the People’s Republic of China loomed large in the discussion.

“(This) unprecedented meeting is because we’re dealing with … (an) unprecedented threat,” said Christopher Wray, the director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who convened the Five Eyes meeting.


“There is no greater threat to innovation than the Chinese government. And it is a measure of how seriously the five of us and our services take that threat that we have chosen to come together to try to highlight that, raise awareness, raise resilience and work closely with the private sector to try to build better protections for innovation, especially in a place like Northern California, but really across all five of our countries.”

“Five or six years ago … every analyst would continue to say that, you know, investment in China was absolutely the way to go,” Vigneault said.

“You would go to Bay Street or Wall Street, you know, and that was the thing to do when we would come from the intelligence community and say, well, wait a second, there is this aspect (of Chinese investment).”

Vigneault spoke sparingly during the hour-long panel discussion on the challenges of emerging technology in national security. But the CSIS director also noted cultural difficulties in getting his agency to “think differently.”


“The question is, you know, how can we legally (and) safely operate with these technologies in our environment, with the oversight we have and so on. But that cultural reticence from our organization is something we need to break,” Vigneault said.

“The fact that we have top secret clearances, that we operate in the environment we’re very comfortable with … Breaking down these silos is one of the most important aspects that we can do, and that’s why we’re here."

CSIS chief opens up about China's interest in Canadian universities

Story by Catharine Tunney •13h


The head of Canada's intelligence agency spoke openly about China's interest in partnering with Canadian universities to gain a military edge during a conference with his Five Eyes counterparts on Tuesday.

"China has been very transparent," Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director David Vigneault said.

"Everything that they're doing in our universities and in new technology, it's going back into a system very organized to create dual-use applications for the military."

Vigneault made the comments on stage during a rare public gathering with spy bosses from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand.

The representatives of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance are meeting in California's Silicon Valley at the invitation of FBI Director Christopher Wray to discuss adversaries' use of technology and threats to innovation and research.

Vigneault said CSIS has been trying to warn Canadian universities about the People's Republic of China's motivations and is in the process of setting up a research security centre to provide advice directly to research institutions.

"We're not telling people who they should hire or not hire. But we tell them ... if you're working for one of those seven universities in the PRC associated with the People's Liberation Army, you know it's probably not a good idea if you're working in cutting-edge technology in the university," said Vigneault.

According to the Hoover Institution, which hosted Tuesday's event, a cluster of institutions in China, often referred to as the "Seven Sons of National Defence," collaborate with universities around the world to harvest research and divert it to military applications.

Vigneault said CSIS supports Canadian universities being able to attract talent from around the world, including China.

"But you also need to understand that, unfortunately, the rules of engagement, the rules of the games have changed," he said.

"They've been so bold about what they're doing, how they have been stealing intellectual property, how they have interfered in our democratic processes, how they have been engaging on campuses, of all places to interfere."
IP theft 'unprecedented'

Earlier this year, The Globe and Mail reported that 50 Canadian universities have collaborated for years with a Chinese military research university.

Since 2005, those institutions have published more than 240 joint papers with Chinese military scientists on such topics as quantum cryptography, photonics and space science, said the newspaper.


The head of Canada's spy agency says President Xi Jinping of China is transparent about wanting to use Canadian research. (Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images)© Provided by cbc.ca

In February the Liberal government announced it would ban all federal research grants for projects linked to "foreign state actors" that pose a threat to Canada's national security — and urged provinces and universities to follow suit.

Mike Burgess, head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, bluntly told the audience that "all nations spy."

"All nations seek secrets and all nations seek strategic advantage. But the behaviour we're talking about here goes well beyond traditional espionage," he told the conference.

"And the threat is that we have the Chinese government engaged in the most sustained, scaled and sophisticated theft of intellectual property and acquisition of expertise that is unprecedented in human history. And that's why we're together."
'It's not enough to cry wolf'

During an exchange moderated by former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, Vigneault also spoke of trying to engage with the Canadian business community on threats.

Recently, leaders in Canada's business community have been demanding that the intelligence service be given the power to share intelligence with companies being targeted for economic espionage.

Earlier this month, the Business Council of Canada, made up of chief executives and entrepreneurs in the country's major companies, called on Ottawa to update the CSIS Act so that private firms targeted by foreign interference actually know they're in danger.

"We need to go out of our way to give concrete examples," Vigneault acknowledged. "Because it's not enough to cry wolf."

Business Council of Canada president Goldy Hyder joined the Canadian delegation at the conference. He said Canadian businesses are more than ready to work with government to protect national security.

"In an era of renewed geopolitical rivalry, when a country's ability to continuously push the boundaries of science and technology is the foundation upon which military, economic, and cultural power now rests, deep and sustained partnerships between the private and public sectors are necessary to protect our citizens and our prosperity," he said in a post on social media.

A spokesperson for Public Safety Minister LeBlanc recently said the federal government is looking at improving information sharing but wouldn't commit to a timeline.

The Five Eyes intelligence service leaders are taking questions from reporters later tonight.

Five Eyes alliance urged to forge ties with Greenland to secure minerals

© Reuters/HANS KRISTIAN SCHONWANDT Aerial view of the Kringlerne 

rare earth deposit, near the town of Narsaq

LONDON (Reuters) - The intelligence sharing alliance known as Five Eyes should forge ties with Greenland to boost supplies of critical minerals and cut dependence on China, a think tank said on Thursday.

Greenland has huge deposits of rare earths, a set of 17 minerals used in a myriad of applications from electric vehicles to defence goods, a report by the London-based Polar Research and Policy Initiative said.

China controls about 90% of the supply of rare earths.

The Five Eyes grouping of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, should expand its framework to include "resource intelligence, technical collaboration, major project financing and supply chain integration for minerals and materials critically important to national and economic security", the report said.

It is natural for the Five Eyes to target Greenland for its mining and rare earth potential because two thirds of the 41 licence holders in Greenland's mining sector were linked to Britain, Canada and Australia, the report added.

"Greenland’s vast critical minerals reserves and the sheer number of British, Canadian and Australian companies operating in Greenland make it a new frontier for Five Eyes," said the report, made available to Reuters ahead of its release on Friday.

U.S. President Joe Biden's administration said last month it will review key U.S. supplies, including rare earths, to ensure other countries cannot weaponise them against the United States.

Two Australia-based mining companies are racing for approval for mines in Greenland to dig into what the U.S. Geological Survey calls the world's biggest undeveloped deposits of rare earth metals.

"The UK, Canada and Australia have remained relevant to Greenland over recent decades as home to some of the world’s leading clusters of energy and mining expertise," the report said.

The head of the think tank, Dwayne Menezes, is also the director of the secretariat of Britain's all-party parliamentary group for Greenland.

(Reporting by Eric Onstad;Editing by Elaine Hardcastle)

3/4/20-21

Australian spy chief says he has 'no reason to dispute' Canada's claim India linked to Sikh Canadian's murder

Story by Christopher Nardi •

 
Mike Burgess, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation director general:

OTTAWA — Australia’s spy chief says he has “no reason to dispute” Canada’s statement that there are credible allegations linking the Indian government to the murder of Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar on Canadian soil.

“I’d have no reason to dispute what the Canadian government has said in this matter,” Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) director general Mike Burgess said in an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation earlier this week.

Burgess was speaking on the sidelines of a conference at Stanford University in California where the top spies from the Five Eyes intelligence sharing alliance — Canada, U.S., U.K., Australia and New Zealand — were meeting.

Canadian and U.S. officials have confirmed that shared intelligence from Five Eyes partners informed Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s bombshell statement in Parliament in September that there were “credible allegations” the Indian government was linked to Nijjar’s murder in B.C. last June.

Nijjar was shot dead by two masked gunmen as he left a Sikh temple in Surrey, B.C. He was the president of the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara and a leading supporter in the movement for a separate state for Sikhs in India called Khalistan. The Indian government had declared Nijjar a “fugitive terrorist.”

Trudeau has since remained quiet on the nature of the intelligence that led to his statement, though media outlets have reported that it is a combination of signals and human intelligence from both Canadian and Five Eyes sources.

Canadian Security and Intelligence Service director David Vigneault told reporters at the Stanford conference this week that the killing of a Canadian in Canada is “absolutely unacceptable” and partnerships like the Five Eyes alliance are critical in countering foreign interference.



A photo of murdered Sikh independence leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar is carried during a protest outside the Indian consulate in Vancouver on June 24, 2023.© Provided by National Post

CSIS spokesperson Eric Balsam declined to say whether Vigneault discussed Trudeau’s allegations regarding India with conference attendees, including his Five Eyes counterparts, behind closed doors.

“We regularly meet and share information with our partners, which significantly contributes to protecting our respective countries’ safety and security,” Balsam said in a statement.


Australia’s spy chief told ABC Wednesday that Trudeau’s claim against India is a “serious allegation.”

“There’s no doubt any allegation of any country being accused of carrying out an execution of a citizen in that country, it’s a serious allegation, and something that we don’t do and something that nations should not do,” he told Australia’s public broadcaster.

India has dismissed the allegation as absurd and is locked in a growing diplomatic row with Canada. Both countries expelled a number of each other’s diplomats.

Tensions have since escalated and this week Canada had to recall 41 of its diplomats from India overnight after Narendra Modi’s government threatened to lift their diplomatic immunity.

Speaking to reporters Friday morning, Trudeau said India’s threat was a concerning violation of international law and accused the Indian government of making life “unbelievably difficult for millions of people in both countries.”


“This is a violation of the Vienna Convention governing diplomacy. This is them choosing to contravene a very fundamental principle of international law and diplomacy. It is something that all countries in the world should be very worried about,” Trudeau said in Brampton, Ont.

“It also has very real impacts on the millions of people who travel back and forth between India. As students, as family members for weddings for businesses, for the growing trade ties between our countries,” he added. “They’re doing it by contravening a very basic principle of diplomacy.”

Canada committed to 'closer ties' with India, says Trudeau, despite Nijjar allegations

Canada-India relationship shows some positive signs, but roadblocks remain

Thursday, Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly told reporters that Canada would not be replying in kind because doing so would also be a violation of international laws governing diplomacy.

But Joly and Immigration Minister Marc Miller warned that the departure of dozens of Canadian diplomats from India would have a major impact on Canada’s ability to process visa and immigration requests in the country.

“This personnel reduction will have an impact in the short term and the medium term, I believe,” Miller said, noting that India is the top country for permanent and temporary residence applications to Canada.

Despite his department’s best efforts to redistribute the workload from the Indian embassy and consulates to other Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada offices, Miller said there will be service slowdowns.

“A portion of the work will still need to be done in (India). Consequently, delays in processing and servicing of requests are expected for requests from India,” he said.

With Help from the Five Eyes, Argentina Doomed to Lose the Falklands War

For 74 days, the U.K. and Argentina fought bitterly for a small patch of land in the South Atlantic

by Stavros Atlamazoglou

In the early morning hours of April 2, 1982, Argentinian naval commandos landed three miles south of Port Stanley, the capital of the Falklands Islands. They made their way to the small barracks that housed a contingent of British Royal Marines. Once outside the building, they broke the windows and threw tear gas canisters inside to flash out the sleeping British troops. A few hours before, the Royal Marines had been alerted to the invasion and had barricaded themselves in the governor’s house, the administrative headquarters of the Islands. In the ensuing firefight, the British Royal Marines held at bay a much larger Argentinian force for more than an hour before finally surrendering. As the sun rose on the horizon, Argentina had finally captured the Falklands Islands after centuries of dispute.

The Falklands War that lasted from April to June 1982 was a conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic. Although short, the conflict was one of the largest in terms of the forces involved since the end of World War II. Overtly, the U.K. fought the war alone. However, the United States provided key diplomatic, logistical, and intelligence support to the country. Using the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, the U.S. shared critical all-source intelligence with its ally which proved key to the eventual British victory. However, U.S. support for the U.K. was not certain. Argentina was an important South American partner for the U.S., especially in the fight against Communism during the Cold War. Nevertheless, foreign policy and national security interests prompted America’s decision to support Britain.

GOING TO WAR WITH SOME HELP

When the British government decided to recapture the Falklands, it did so with the understanding that it would receive support, even unofficial, from its most important ally: the United States. As the Beatles sang in 1967, the U.K. was sailing to war “with a little help from [its] friends.”

Although publicly the U.S. wanted to seem impartial – with the risk of offending the British – privately, President Roland Reagan was committed to supporting the U.K. if he had to. From the start of the war, his position was one of neutrality over which country had a better claim on the Falklands but of strong opposition to military aggression – that is, to Argentina.  

Once the White House committed to supporting Great Britain, even behind closed doors, the intelligence started flowing. Intelligence sharing included “compartmental, sensitive source programs,” including signals and communication intelligence. The NSA provided almost real-time, key signals intelligence to the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the U.K.’s intelligence agency, that helped the British task force protect its aircraft carriers, perhaps the most valuable assets of the British military. Although the GCHQ worked with the Royal Navy and put HMS Endurance in the area to intercept Argentinian radio traffic long before the invasion, the British could not break the Argentinian code. The NSA then stepped in and helped their GCHQ comrades. Moreover, the NSA granted the GCHQ access to its satellite interception technology. Interestingly, the GCHQ was hesitant to share intelligence about U.K. troop movements with the NSA out of fear that the State Department would leak the information as U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig tilted toward Argentina.

However, the U.K. received intelligence beyond the signal intelligence stipulated by the Five Eyes agreement. The British received key intelligence on Argentinian military plans and intentions from the CIA’s A.G. Crypto operation. Moreover, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence agency that designs, launches, and operates spy satellites, relocated a satellite that was tracking Soviet movements in the Northern Hemisphere and dedicated it to the conflict. Using this raw data, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) provided the U.K. with satellite imagery of the Atlantic Ocean west of the Falklands, the Falklands, and the small islands of South Georgia. Interestingly, the U.S. provided satellite imagery to both combatants: Under a U.S.-Argentine Memorandum of Understanding that the U.S. had to honor, NASA provided satellite imagery of the same areas to Argentina.

American assistance to the British campaign went beyond the sharing of intelligence. The Reagan administration allowed British aircraft and vessels to use American bases and provided logistical support. The U.S. military was even ready to lend aircraft carriers to the British in case theirs got damaged or sunk. The British also received support at the individual unit level. Delta Force, the U.S. military’s premier counterterrorism and hostage rescue unit, gave its British counterpart, the Special Air Service (SAS), cold-weather gear, FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and satellite phones.

PICKING A SIDE

Argentina was an important U.S. partner in South America. During the 1970s, successive U.S. administrations maintained good relations with the Argentinian juntas that came and went into power. When a new junta took over in 1976, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was anxious not to let the Argentinian military officers think the U.S. was opposed to them. This junta would launch the “Dirty War” against domestic leftist opposition and other political opponents that would see thousands of people killed, tortured, disappeared, and imprisoned. But with the Cold War raging hot, the U.S. saw in Argentina a committed anti-Communist partner that could prevent a “Domino Effect” in America’s backyard. The U.S. also sold Argentina weapon systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars, though it stopped doing so in the late 1970s. When Roland Reagan was elected to office, the relations with Argentina improved further. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. chose to support the United Kingdom. The U.S. and the U.K. shared strong political and strategic interests. Reagan and Thatcher were close, and the U.S. President wanted to “[give] Maggie [Thatcher] enough to carry on.” Although Argentina was a valuable U.S. partner in South America, the Anglo-American defense and intelligence alliance towered over anything Argentina could provide the United States. Moreover, the U.S. was opposed to the use of military force and faulted the Argentinians for shooting the first shots. Further, U.S. public opinion was largely supportive of the British cause. Some even feared that Argentina would work with the Soviet Union after capturing the Falklands. In a personal letter to CIA Director William Casey, newspaperman Ernst Cuneo attached a copy of an article he had written urging to help the U.K. and prevent a Soviet opening in America’s backyard.

Another likely policy consideration that motivated support for the U.K. was the deep ties between the U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies formalized in the Five Eyes partnership. In 1985, three years after the war, the U.S. Intelligence Community conducted an evaluation of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, particularly of the UKUSA component. In the declassified but heavily redacted top-secret report, the Intelligence Community assessed the value of the relationship as “high [that] allows for a much fuller SIGINT [Signal Intelligence] effort than is possible with only U.S. resources.” The report stated that there was “heavy flow of raw intercept, technical analytical results, and SIGINT product between NSA and GCHQ, to include direct distribution of product by each party to both country users.”

However, in choosing to support the U.K., the Reagan administration faced a conundrum. Overt support would alienate Argentina. Moreover, the CIA had intelligence that indicated that the Argentinians were mobilizing intelligence and paramilitary units to “disappear U.S. citizens in Argentina if the U.S. government [adopted] the British position in regard to the dispute in the Falkland Islands.” This concern was complicated by the fact that the Argentinian junta was not in complete control of the country’s national security apparatus.

For 74 days, the U.K. and Argentina fought bitterly for a small patch of land in the South Atlantic. In the end, Britain prevailed and did so with important intelligence support from America. Against the backdrop of broader U.S. hesitancy to openly support the British position, the Five Eyes partnership played an integral role in Britain’s victory. Faced with policy and political conundrums, the Reagan administration chose to support the “Special Relationship,” as the relations between the U.S. and U.K. have been described. In the case of the Falklands War, that relationship proved very special indeed.

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and national security. He is a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University, an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and is pursuing a J.D. at Boston College Law School.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

5 EYES MEMBER WONDERS WHAT GIVES
Military concerned by Canada's absence from American-British-Australian security pact

Sun, January 15, 2023 



OTTAWA — There are concerns at the highest levels of the Canadian Armed Forces that this country won't have access to the same cutting-edge military technology as its closest allies because it is not part of a security pact between Australia, Britain and the United States.

The trilateral treaty, nicknamed "AUKUS" after the three countries involved, was announced in September 2021 in what many have seen as a bid to counter China's growing military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, where Canada has growing economic and security interests.

While much of the attention around the pact has centred on American and British plans to provide nuclear submarine technology to Australia, Vice-Admiral Bob Auchterlonie told The Canadian Press in a recent interview that isn’t the whole story.

Auchterlonie is the commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command. In that role, he is responsible for managing dozens of military operations at home and abroad while closely monitoring the threats and challenges facing Canada and the Armed Forces.

“The fact is that (nuclear submarine) technology has existed for a while, so the sharing of that is not a big deal,” he said.

“The issue is when you start talking about advanced technology in terms of the artificial-intelligence domain, machine learning, quantum, all of these things that really matter moving forward. Those are conversations we need to be in on. And the issue is: Why are we not included in this? Is it resistance to get involved? Is it policy restrictions that we have? Or are we just not going to invest? That's the question. So it is a significant concern.”

The federal Liberal government has not said why Canada is not part of AUKUS, or even whether it was invited, with Defence Minister Anita Anand’s office again sidestepping the question last week.

Anand's spokesman Daniel Minden instead referred to Canada’s participation in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, which includes Australia, Britain, the U.S. and New Zealand, as well as the North American Aerospace Defence Command and the NATO military alliance.

“Through the Five Eyes and our bilateral partnerships, we will continue to work with our closest allies to keep Canadians safe,” Minden said in an email.

The Australian High Commission and U.S. Embassy in Ottawa referred questions to their respective capitals. The British High Commission did not respond to a request for comment.

Some analysts have previously questioned whether Canada’s absence is an indication of impatience over Ottawa’s perceived failure to get tough with China.

The government has in recent months hardened its position on China in a variety of ways, including through a ban on Huawei technology in Canada’s 5G network, new restrictions on foreign ownership in critical minerals and the unveiling of an Indo-Pacific strategy.

That strategy is intended to signal a marked shift in federal policy and priorities toward the region given its growing importance to Canada’s economy and security. It specifically identified China as “an increasingly disruptive global power.”

Many of those actions, such as the Huawei ban, came only after frustration from allies over long delays. Some critics have said the government still isn’t taking a hard enough line with Beijing.

Auchterlonie praised the Indo-Pacific strategy, which includes promises to deploy more naval warships and other military assets to the region while building closer defence relationships with a number of different countries.

“The strategy we have just come up with, and the fact that we have now blocked (Chinese) companies from investing in the North, has been a positive step for Canada, a real positive step,” he added. “I think we recognize the challenge we're facing.”

He also reported no noticeable change when it comes to Canada’s participation in the Five Eyes alliance.

American officials warned for years that they may withhold sensitive intelligence if Canada did not take a stronger position on China, particularly during the Trump administration and as the Liberal government repeatedly put off a decision on Huawei and 5G.

“I work with my Five Eyes partners throughout the globe, and I haven't seen a change in terms of the information-sharing piece,” Auchterlonie said. “So that is good.”

He nonetheless expressed concern about Canada's lack of involvement in AUKUS, even as he acknowledged the issue has political dimensions and it may not be his place as a military officer to express such a sentiment.

“This is probably not my lane, but the fact is: What do I do for a living?” he said.

“I am the operational side of the Armed Forces. Therefore, am I concerned? Do I want to be involved with our closest allies in things? Yes, I do. Absolutely. And I think it's critical given where you see technology moving. Canada needs to be part of that.”

This report by The Canadian Press was first published Jan. 15, 2023.

Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press

Canada to ban Huawei from country's 5G, 4G networks, in line with Five Eyes allies

Christopher Nardi , Anja Karadeglija - Yesterday 
National Post

OTTAWA — The Canadian government will ban equipment from Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from both the country’s 5G and 4G wireless networks, following a review that took three years to complete.


© Provided by National PostCanada to ban Huawei from country's 5G, 4G networks, in line with Five Eyes allies

“Telecommunication companies in Canada will not be permitted to include in their networks products or services that put our national security at risk,” Innovation Minister François-Philippe Champagne told reporters Thursday.

“Providers who already have this equipment installed will be required to cease its use and remove it.”

With the move, Canada falls in line with its allies in the Five Eyes intelligence network — the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. — who have all already banned or restricted Huawei equipment from their 5G networks.

The Liberals have been promising a decision on a Huawei ban for three years. Asked about why it took so long, Champagne said “this has never been a race. This is about making the right decision.”

Over that time, Canada’s large telecoms have been moving on building stand-alone 5G networks using equipment from other vendors, meaning the Huawei and ZTE ban is largely irrelevant to those networks. So-called non-standalone 5G networks are integrated with older 4G networks.

Both Bell and Telus will have to remove existing Huawei equipment from those older networks. Telus warned the government back in 2019 that “a full ban on Huawei for 5G will force operators to replace their existing 4G Huawei equipment — an expensive and complex proposition over an elongated timeframe.”

Innovation Canada said in a policy statement that telecom companies will have to remove 5G equipment and managed services from Huawei and ZTE by June 28, 2024, and “any existing 4G equipment and managed services must be removed or terminated by December 31, 2027.”

Canada bans Huawei from its 5G network

Champagne said Thursday the government would not be financially compensating telecoms. The National Post previously reported both Bell and Telus approached the government about the possibility of being compensated by taxpayers for the cost of removing equipment.

On top of older, previously-sold equipment, Huawei has sold slightly more than $700 million worth of equipment to telecom operators in Canada since 2018, mostly to Bell and Telus.

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, a China expert and senior fellow with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, said that two and five years to remove all the Huawei equipment is just too long.

Though she said she is “fully in favour” of the Liberals’ announcement Thursday, she said she’d hoped the government would go as far as the U.S. and outright ban all of the company’s products, such as consumer items like cellphones.

“There are other elements of what the company provides that can also be a problem,” she said.



The Huawei and ZTE ban stems from the fear that having Huawei equipment in Canada’s next-generation wireless networks is a security risk, especially considering China’s laws that state companies must cooperate with its intelligence services.

Innovation Canada said in its policy statement that the Canadian government is seriously concerned the two companies “could be compelled to comply with extrajudicial directions from foreign governments in ways that would conflict with Canadian laws or would be detrimental to Canadian interests.”

Asked what threat Huawei poses to Canada, Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino said the “examination that was conducted over the last period of time, it was thorough, it was meticulous, it was on the strength of the advice that we get from our national security partners.”

The government will also soon introduce legislative framework for protecting critical infrastructure in the finance, energy, telecom and transport sectors, Mendicino said. Critical infrastructure has become more vulnerable to cyber-attacks over the past decade as it’s been increasingly connected to the internet.

In separate statements, the opposition Conservatives, NDP and Bloc Québécois all essentially said: it’s about time.

“The Liberal government’s lack of action on this decision has been an international embarrassment,” Conservative MP Raquel Dancho said. “In the years of delay, Canadian telecommunications companies purchased hundreds of millions of dollars of Huawei equipment which will now need to be removed from their networks at enormous expense.”

The NDP’s Brian Masse said the decision was “long overdue” and ultimately may have hurt Canada’s reputation in its intelligence allies’ eyes.

“It has taken the Liberal government three years to make this decision while the other Five Eyes countries made their positions known much sooner. This delay only worked to raise serious questions at home and among our allies about the Liberal government’s national security commitments and hampered the domestic telecommunications market.

The Bloc Québécois said it welcomed the “tardy” decision, and insisted that no government money would be spent compensating telecom giants who already have Huawei technology in their systems.

Taxpayers should not have to 'subsidize' rich telecoms that chose Huawei, Conservatives say

Possible Huawei ban has telecoms asking Liberals about taxpayer compensation for new equipment

Matt Gurney: Canada’s Huawei delay is symbolic of a deeper problem

U.S. State Department cheers Canada's long-awaited ban on 5G gear from China's Huawei

The Canadian Press

WASHINGTON — The U.S. State Department says it welcomes Canada's decision to ban China's Huawei Technologies and ZTE from its next-generation mobile networks.

Innovation Minister François-Philippe Champagne revealed the long-awaited decision Thursday, a move critics say was long overdue.

In a statement, the U.S. says it supports efforts around the world to ensure consumers and customers can trust their wireless networks and providers.

It says it will continue to collaborate with Canada and other allies to ensure shared security in the 5G era.

The U.S. first began restricting domestic firms from doing business with Huawei back in 2019, and has been waiting for Canada to follow suit ever since.

During his confirmation hearing in September, U.S. ambassador to Canada David Cohen suggested Washington was growing impatient with the delay.

"We welcome Canada's decision," the State Department said in writing Friday in response to a query from The Canadian Press.

"The United States supports efforts to ensure countries, companies, and citizens can trust their wireless networks and their operators. We continue to collaborate with allies like Canada to ensure our shared security in a 5G future and beyond."

That anodyne comment stands in contrast to what Cohen told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year before he was confirmed as President Joe Biden's envoy to Canada.

"We are all waiting for Canada to release its framework for its overall China policy," Cohen said, describing the autocratic regime's ambitions as an "existential threat'' to the U.S.

He also promised to take part in discussions to "make sure that Canada's policies reflect its words in terms of the treatment of China."

At the time, Canada was walking a tightrope with China, having arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. extradition warrant while working to free two Canadian citizens detained in retaliation by the regime.

Just days later, however, Wanzhou was released after the U.S. Department of Justice announced a deferred prosecution agreement in her case. The two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, were freed by China hours later.

Earlier this week, Ottawa also announced the end of another irritant that was believed to be a symptom of the Huawei tensions: a three-year Chinese ban on imports of Canadian canola.

In March 2019, a few months after Wanzhou's arrest, China blocked canola from two Canadian companies, ostensibly after pests were detected in shipments from Canada.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published May 20, 2022.

SEE

 LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for Five Eyes 

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for Huawei 

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for NORTEL 

HUWAEI HACKED NORTEL IN THE NINTIES, THEN IN THE TWO THOUSANDS WHEN NORTEL WENT BROKE THEY BOUGHT UP ITS TELECOM PATENTS

Five Eyes countries working to fight critical minerals dumping, Canada minister says

Reuters | April 23, 2024 | 

Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Ontario. Credit: Adobe Stock

Canada and its Five Eyes Alliance partners are working on put forward a response to tackle the price manipulation of critical metals, Canada’s Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland said on Tuesday.


The US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have what is called the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network and the finance ministers from these countries met last Thursday for the spring session of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington.

Freeland said that she and her counterparts from the Five Eyes Alliance discussed last week on how these countries could “friendshore” their critical minerals supply chain to fight the dumping of critical minerals in the international market by large producing countries, such as China and Indonesia.

The World Economic Forum describes ‘friendshoring’ as a trade practice where supply chain networks are focused on countries that are regarded as political and economic allies.

Freeland said Canada and its allies believe that nickel and other rare earth minerals are intentionally flooded in the market with the purpose of driving Canadian and companies from allied countries out of business.

“Canada is actively working what we can do to discuss collective responses,” she said, adding that economic security needs to be part of national security. Freeland was addressing the media at the annual First Nations Major Projects Coalition conference in Toronto.

Canada has listed 31 metals as critical minerals, which are necessary towards future energy and technology transition.

Dumping is an anti-competitive trade practice in which a country exports certain products at a price lower than what is sold in its home country.

In March this year, Canada’s Natural Resource Minister Jonathan Wilkinson had echoed similar concerns regarding price manipulation and dumping of metals used in electric vehicles.

Canada as part of its effort to encourage investments in the critical metal and electric vehicle supply chain has offered investment tax credits in its recent annual budget that is set to attract interest from global car makers such as Honda.

Freeland said that while the US has the Inflation Reduction Act, legislation aimed at investments in clean energy that transformed the global investment landscape, Canada’s investment policy is the only one in the world that gives the US “a run for its money”.

(By Divya Rajagopal)

Canadian spy chief stresses co-operation on research security at Five Eyes summit

The Canadian Press
Tue, October 17, 2023 

OTTAWA — The head of Canada's spy service says the way to shield advanced technology from adversaries like China and Russia is to educate researchers and scientists about the risks, not tell them what they should or should not do.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service director David Vigneault told an international conference Tuesday that representatives of Canada's largest research universities were reluctant to openly discuss security issues when he met with them five or six years ago.

Vigneault said the relationship has evolved to the point where research institutions are now asking CSIS how they can work together.

Vigneault is participating in a summit in Palo Alto, Calif., on advancing economic security and public safety with counterparts from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

Representatives of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance gathered at the invitation of U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation director Christopher Wray, along with entrepreneurs, government officials and academics.

CSIS says threats to innovation in areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing include intellectual property theft, coercion and the use of collaborative and open research efforts for nefarious purposes.

During a panel discussion with the other intelligence leaders on Tuesday, Vigneault said CSIS is warning institutions that certain Chinese partnerships with western researchers on cutting-edge technology are aimed at gleaning know-how useful to Beijing's military.


He noted Canada has issued research security guidelines aimed at protecting institutions and intellectual property.

"We will not want to tell people what they should do or should not do, but we want to give them as much clarity as possible," Vigneault said.

All nations spy, seek secrets and try to gain strategic advantage, but China's behaviour goes well beyond traditional espionage, said Mike Burgess of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.

"The Chinese, to their credit, are very clear about where they want to innovate and what they need in their own national sovereign interest, which is fine and entirely appropriate," Burgess said.

"The problem with that is they're engaged in wholesale intellectual property theft and the acquisition of expertise, through means which (are) exploiting our open and collaborative DNA."

The Five Eyes partners collectively issued guiding principles Tuesday for researchers, urging them to be aware of the threats and to take steps to secure their business environments, products, partnerships and expansion plans.

Ken McCallum, director general of Britain's MI5, said it "would be crazy for any of us to try to close down the fundamental openness" of universities.

"But you probably don't want a PhD student in advanced robotics to be sponsored by the (Chinese) People's Liberation Army in your university," McCallum said.

"So this is not about changing the dial on the overall default towards open collaboration, joint research, that sort of expeditionary attitude that academia must rightly prize, but it is about having your eyes open to the most egregious forms of risks."

Vigneault recalled "a very difficult discussion with a business leader in Canada" in which CSIS shared intelligence about guidance system components being used in Russian drones to kill Ukrainians.

"A tangible example like that goes a long way," he said.

Following their panel discussion, the intelligence leaders were slated to sit down with business figures to talk about expanding and strengthening private-public partnerships to better protect innovation and the security of the five countries and their citizens.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published Oct. 17, 2023.

Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press

Canada’s Scattered and Uncoordinated Cyber Foreign Policy: A Call for Clarity



by Josh Gold, Christopher Parsons and Irene Poetranto

August 4, 2020


In mid-July, Canada joined the United States and U.K. in attributing COVID-19 vaccine-related hacking to the Russian government. In response, Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan called for reinforcing a “common understanding of rules-based norms,” and for deterrence against foreign actors. Yet despite Canada’s attempts to play a leading role in upholding global peace and security – as illustrated by its (failed) June 2020 bid for a U.N. Security Council seat – Canada lacks a clear and holistic international cyber strategy.

Since 2010, the Canadian government has recognized the need to develop a cyber foreign policy to ensure that cybersecurity policies align with broader foreign policy and security objectives. The 2018 National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) acknowledged that it will align with a “cyber foreign policy in Canada’s international agenda.” Two years later, Canada still lacks a cyber foreign policy. This is unlike Canada’s allies and adversaries, which have released strategies outlining their interests and values in cyberspace – and how they plan to promote and defend them.

A comprehensive and well-developed cyber foreign policy is needed to replace the Canadian government’s current ad hoc, spasmodic approach. A consistent articulation of its foreign policy position in cyberspace is necessary for Canada to promote and defend its interests effectively. Moreover, Canada’s cyber foreign policy must be developed transparently, and this policy must reflect enduring Canadian values, such as respect for human rights and other democratic principles.

Cyber Foreign Policy: Why Bother?

In 1947, Canada’s foreign minister Louis St. Laurent said that a foreign policy “must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population.” But when it comes to cybersecurity – especially its international dimensions – the Canadian government has not clearly articulated what it should be promoting and defending, let alone why. Such an articulation is necessary because cybersecurity is inherently a discussion of political philosophy; not all actors share the same understanding of what is, or should be, the object of security, nor is there necessarily a shared understanding of what constitutes a threat.

As a liberal democracy built upon respect for human rights and the rule of law, Canada depends on the security of these ideals both at home, and abroad. As political scientist Ronald Deibert has argued, an open and distributed cyberspace through which citizens around the world can share ideas freely is a “critical and inseparable component of [Canadian] ideals.”

Cyberspace, however, challenges how Canada might support these ideals in a domain increasingly characterized by censorship, the development of militarized cyber commands, ascriptions of domestic and international security to intelligence services, and reliance on offensive computer operations. Articulating Canada’s first principles in the context of cyberspace would help clarify what Canadian interests are, and what they mean, in a digitalized world. Only after defining such interests can the government focus on what must be protected or secured, and how best to do so – including how to promote these interests globally and multilaterally. Values and goals must be comprehensively defined to truly constitute a strategy; anything else is instead a collection of tactical interventions. While technology and the realities of the cybersecurity landscape change rapidly each year, fundamental Canadian values and ideals do not.

Many of Canada’s closest allies, such as the United States, U.K., Australia, and the Netherlands, have released strategies to clarify their specific foreign policy goals that pertain to digital technologies and their use, both in terms of security and defense, and also in a human rights context. The Canadian government has yet to do the same.

Canada faces a challenge, whereby its membership in the Five Eyes alliance (with the United States, U.K., Australia, and New Zealand) brings immense security value, while simultaneously carrying significant responsibilities, restrictions, and possible contradictions with certain Canadian values, such as human rights. For example, Canada’s involvement in mass surveillance activities can be seen as infringements upon the rights – including privacy rights – of non-Five Eyes citizens, and such surveillance activities now threaten the abilities of Five Eyes countries to process European data for routine commercial activities. A Canadian cyber foreign policy must lend clarity to how Canada would navigate both generalized human rights infringements that are linked to mass surveillance, as well as specifically how such surveillance will be conducted without endangering Canada’s economic well-being.

Recent Policy and Legislative Developments

The Canadian government has been developing cybersecurity policy, but not as comprehensively as is needed. The 2018 NCSS updated the previous 2010 Strategy, but it remains vague, high-level, and without substance; in its 40-pages the NCSS does not once mention “democracy” or “human rights,” despite their pertinence as core Canadian principles. The 2019 National Cyber Security Action Plan outlines specific initiatives that are intended to implement the 2018 NCSS, and broadly stresses the need to advance Canadian interests in cyberspace internationally. The Action Plan recognizes that “[t]he international dimension of cyber security has not been the focus of Canadian action to date, despite the fact that … cyber security is an inherently transnational issue.” Further, the Action Plan acknowledges that the federal government should “take a leadership role to advance cyber security in Canada” while also coordinating with allies “to shape the international cyber security environment in Canada’s favour.”

In this context, Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC’s) cyber policy team is developing an “International Cyber Strategy.” Although it was supposed to be completed by 2019, this has not happened by the time of writing. Few details are known about the expected Strategy, including what it will look like, the extent to which it will be public, or whether civil society or other stakeholders will be consulted during the policymaking process (it does not appear that they have been thus far).

In addition to work on policy and strategy, legislation was passed in 2019 to better enable state actors to mitigate, respond to, or overcome national security threats. Specifically, the National Security Act, 2019, (also known as Bill C-59), was a major and omnibus update to Canada’s national security legislation. Among other things, the Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act) within C-59 enables the CSE – Canada’s foreign intelligence and cybersecurity agency – to conduct defensive and “active” cyber operations abroad, while simultaneously expanding the range of actions the agency can carry out from its historical mandate. These new powers raise new implications for human rights, political transparency, and global security, and are made all the more manifest given the European Union’s opposition to both mass surveillance capabilities and also the lack of redress for Europeans caught up in Five Eyes dragnets.

International Engagement, Diplomacy, and a “Gendered” Focus

While Canada engages enthusiastically in international processes to develop rules in cyberspace, and particularly emphasizes gender dynamics therein, its current approach is inadequate. Canada participates in international and regional cybersecurity fora alongside allies, where it expresses and develops its positions in cyberspace with like-minded states, while also engaging with less-friendly states to seek agreement on areas of mutual interest – and to understand their positions more broadly. In groups such as the Freedom Online Coalition, Internet Governance Forum, G7, and the United Nations’ Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) processes, Canada aligns itself with the positions of other liberal democratic countries.

Canada has also disbursed over CA$13 million to global cyber capacity building projects since 2015 to train local officials in legal, technical and policy fields (see here at 4:15:10). Per GAC, such efforts form a critical part of Canada’s strategy to “influence countries to share our vision of preserving an open, secure and multistakeholder-led Internet.” However, given that Canada lacks a public cyber foreign policy, it is unclear how these measures align with broader Canadian objectives, such as efforts to promote democratic and human rights-based cybersecurity policy and practices to counter the narrative of authoritarian control promoted by other states.

Under the Trudeau government, foreign affairs have been guided by feminist-forward policies targeted toward achieving gender equality and empowering women (for specific examples, see here, here, here, and here). Within the realm of cybersecurity, GAC has funded research on the gendered dimensions of cybersecurity and organized events on the topic. At the second formal U.N. OEWG session in February 2020, GAC joined other nations to sponsor dozens of government officials and civil society representatives from developing countries to attend the meeting under the auspices of a “women in cyber” fellowship program. This program helped the OEWG meeting make U.N. history, as it was the first meeting in the First Committee in which there was a gender balance among those who delivered remarks.

While the prominence of gender considerations in Canada’s cyber foreign policy is admirable and important, these ad hoc efforts remain incomplete elements of a larger unarticulated whole. A gendered cybersecurity strategy must go beyond research and discrete initiatives, to emphasize coherent policies which are clearly integrated within a larger agenda – of which gender is one consistent element. For example, if it is to be credibly gender-focused, Canadian cyber foreign policy must also send clear signals on the importance of gender and human rights across a wide range of security issues, including defense, offense, and deterrence.

A Murky, Seemingly Military-Dominated Cyber Defense Strategy

Canada has recognized that defending its interests and values in cyberspace requires more than just diplomacy, a position reflected in Bill C-59. In addition, the 2017 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) defense policy announced that it would “assume a more assertive posture in the cyber domain,” for example “by conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries.” Yet the CAF’s decision saw no public discussion and has had the effect of the military and intelligence agencies leading cyber policy. These agencies’ activities threaten to contradict or undermine Canadian diplomatic efforts, including work at the U.N. focused on promoting peace and stability in cyberspace.

Canadian military activities in the “cyber domain” are developing further, such as joining the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, a NATO-accredited think-tank and research center, in the near future. NATO is fast developing its cyber operational doctrine and has opened a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium. Nine NATO members – but not yet Canada – have officially offered the Alliance their cyber capabilities in the event a cyber operation is needed in response to an attack.

In September 2019, Canada joined 26 other states in affirming a “Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace,” declaring that signatories “will work together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable” for malign behavior and stressing that “[t]here must be consequences for bad behavior in cyberspace.” It is unclear what this joint statement entails, or its relation to a like-minded “Cyber Deterrence Initiative,” as described in the 2018 U.S. National Cyber Strategy. But what is evident is that Canada increasingly values imposing consequences on malign actors, further demonstrated in an October 2019 briefing note to Prime Minister Trudeau which states that Canada’s position on foreign cybersecurity threats is that “[r]ules and norms in cyberspace are critical, but they must be supplemented by measures to impose costs on hostile actors” (emphasis added). The briefing note adds that a key pillar of Canadian cybersecurity strategy includes developing “coordinated mechanisms among like-minded countries to hold malicious actors to account and impose costs on them.” The nature of these “costs,” and the extent to which they will follow international law, is unknown – sending unclear signals to Canadians, as well as Canada’s allies and adversaries.

All 27 signatories of the Joint Statement are U.S. and NATO allies, which raises credibility questions as to potential bias among the group in calling out the malicious behavior of others, versus similar actions undertaken by its own members. If the Canadian government hopes to promote international cooperation for global cybersecurity, it may need to go beyond solutions reliant on camps of like-minded nations.

The State of Affairs: Gaps in Consistency, Clarity, and Coordination

Canada has generally adopted rights-affirming foreign policy positions but has experienced challenges in implementing them. For example, the Canadian internet filtering firm Netsweeper Inc. receives federal and provincial government support despite research by the Citizen Lab showing that the company’s technology is often used to undermine human rights through internet censorship. Furthermore, Bill C-59’s CSE Act includes language that some have interpreted as permitting interference in judicial processes or electoral outcomes in certain contexts. The mere prospect of such interference may provide a veneer of legitimacy to adversarial nations that do interfere in foreign judicial or electoral systems, including Canada’s.

Moreover, unlike key allies, Canada has not clearly outlined how it believes that international law applies – or should apply – in cyberspace, despite publicly calling for other U.N. member states to do so (see here at 1:01). By contrast, a growing number of countries, including Australia and the Netherlands, have published position papers expressing their interpretations of the applicability of international law to cyberspace. In the absence of clear communication concerning what Canada will (and will not) do as a matter of law or policy, allies and adversaries alike may not fully appreciate the Canadian government’s position. This absence makes it difficult for Canada to clearly signal its foreign policy intentions to other countries, which can hamper efforts to set norms and establish deterrence.

In terms of defense and security, available documents indicate that Canada is aligning itself with U.S. cybersecurity approaches, including offensive capabilities. Along these lines, the CAF published a Joint Doctrine Note on cyber operations in 2017, but this document adheres to Canada’s lack of transparency on such issues and, thus, remains classified – in contrast with U.S. and U.K. military cyber doctrine documents. Any decisions by the Canadian government to align itself with, or to adopt, more aggressive cyber operations akin to those of the United States are thus being made without substantive public input. Such decision making processes raise questions as to the public’s ability to debate and influence policy; secrecy surrounding strategic approaches – and opacity around cybersecurity policy more broadly – prevents the Canadian public from holding the government to account for its policy decisions, and questions the extent to which policy has a public license. If Canada is following U.S. approaches, it is doing so without articulating how this approach accommodates Canadian foreign policy values, goals, exigencies, and realities.

The Continuing Need for a Clearly Articulated Set of Cyber Principles

Principles that are embedded in a comprehensive cyber foreign policy should bring together the Canadian government’s existing focuses on international coordination, integration of gender considerations into security policies, and development of offensive cyber capabilities. But a holistic policy must go further, ensuring that Canadian interests and principles are both defended and projected abroad – such as those of democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law.

Efforts to develop cyber foreign policy should not be secretly siloed within government and must, instead, include consultations with a broad cross-section of stakeholder groups, including civil society and the private sector. The United States undertook such consultations over the course of its “Cyberspace Solarium Commission,” which included over 200 meetings with private sector representatives and more than 25 with academics. In GAC’s purported development of its International Strategic Framework for Cyberspace, there has been no non-governmental consultation to date. Domestic stakeholder engagement is needed to tap into expertise residing outside of government, and to ensure that adopted policies address any significant concerns raised during consultations.

Canada could become a leader in the development of norms, principles, and values that accompany the intensifying use of digital technologies. Currently, however, allied and competitor nations alike must compile and assess Canada’s piecemeal policies and divine how they might extend to the government’s broader range of foreign policy practices. This is an ineffective way to explain a nation’s intentions, its red lines, or its ambitions; nor does it enable Canada to clearly work with allies to shape the international space. Canada needs a holistic cyber foreign policy if it is to be an effective middle power that can clearly explain how and when it will exert its power.

As Canadian foreign policy comes under broad scrutiny after Canada’s failed bid for a U.N. Security Council seat, the development of a comprehensive and sound cyber foreign policy is an important opportunity for reset and renewal. The time to start is now.

(Author’s Note: The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments provided by Paul Meyer, Ronald Deibert, and anonymous commentators. Any errors remain solely with the authors.)
Image: Sean Gladwell, Creative # 1224364251 via Get