Mali's Military Government JUNTA - 

Russia Sends Trainers, Not Mercenaries

Mark Fischer/Flickr
A view of Bamako, Mali with the Niger River in the background.

28 DECEMBER 2021
Voice of America (Washington, DC)

By Annie Risemberg

Bamako — Mali's military government has denied hiring Russian mercenaries from the controversial Wagner Group, which has been sanctioned by the European Union for rights abuses. France and 15 other Western nations last week condemned what they said was Russia's deployment of Wagner fighters to Mali. Mali's transitional government says it is only engaged with official Russian military trainers. Analysts weigh in on Russia's military involvement in Mali as French troops are drawing down.

Mali's transitional government this month denied what it called "baseless allegations" that it hired the controversial Russian security firm the Wagner Group to help fight Islamist insurgents.

Western governments and U.N. experts have accused Wagner of rights abuses, including killing civilians, in the Central African Republic and Libya.

The response came Friday after Western nations made the accusations, which Mali's military government dismissed with a demand that they provide independent evidence.

A day earlier, France and 15 other Western nations had condemned what they called the deployment of Wagner mercenaries to Mali.

The joint statement said they deeply regret the transitional authorities' choice to use already scarce public funds to pay foreign mercenaries instead of supporting its own armed forces and the Malian people.

The statement also called on the Russian government to behave more responsibly, accusing it of providing material support to the Wagner Group's deployment, which Moscow denies.

The Mali government acknowledged what it called "Russian trainers" were in the country. It said they were present to help strengthen the operational capacities of their defense and security forces.

Aly Tounkara is director of the Center for Security and Strategic Studies in the Sahel, a Bamako-based think tank.

He says it's hard to tell if the Russian security presence is military or mercenary but, regardless, would likely be supporting rather than front-line fighting.

This could allow the Malian army to have victories over the enemy that will be attributed to them, says Tounkara, which was not the case with the French forces. He says the second advantage is that victories over extremists could allow Mali's military to legitimize itself. We must remember, says Tounkara, that one of the reasons for the forced departure of President Keita, was that the security situation was so bad.

Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was overthrown in an August 2020 coup led by Colonel Assimi Goita after months of anti-government protests, much of it over worsening security.

Goita launched a second coup in May that removed the interim government leaders, but has promised to hold elections in 2022.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been pushing Mali's military government to hold elections.

ECOWAS in November expressed concern over a potential Wagner Group deployment to Mali after unconfirmed reports that the military government was in talks with the mercenary group.

Popular protests in Bamako have called for French forces to leave Mali and last year some protesters were seen calling for Russian ones to intervene.

Since French forces first arrived in Mali in 2013, public opinion on their presence has shifted from favorable to widely negative.

The French military has been gradually drawing down its anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane forces from the Sahel region.

French forces this year withdrew from all but one military base in northern Mali, saying the Malian armed forces were ready to take the lead on their own security.

But analysts say one consequence of the French leaving is that the Malian army is seeking other partners.

Boubacar Salif Traore is director of Afriglob Conseil, a Bamako-based development and security consulting firm.

"Official Russian cooperation would be very advantageous for the Malian army in terms of supplying equipment," he says. "Mali, and many African countries, notably the Central African Republic, have concluded that France does not play fair in terms of delivering arms. Every time these states ask for weapons, either there's an embargo or there is a problem in procuring these weapons. Russia can provide these weapons without constraints and it's precisely that which interests Mali."

In September, Mali received four military helicopters and other weapons bought from Russia.

The Malian transitional government's statement Friday did not elaborate on what the Russian trainers would be doing in Mali.

When asked to comment, a government spokesman would not elaborate and referred questions to the ministry of foreign affairs, which does not list any contact numbers on its website.

Month-long blackout leaves Mali's Mopti in the dark amid jihadist fuel blockade

The Malian city of Mopti has been plunged into darkness for weeks as a fuel blockade by jihadists tied to al-Qaeda cripples power supplies.


Issued on: 07/11/2025 - RFI

View of the city of Mopti, in central Mali, where a fuel blockade has left residents largely without power for the past month. © Getty Images/Friedrich Schmidt

For a month now, the people of Mopti – one of Mali’s largest and most vibrant cities – have been living in darkness. The lights went out in early October, and they have not come back on since.

The blackout is the result of a blockade imposed by jihadists linked to al-Qaeda. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims – known as JNIM – announced in early September that it was cutting off fuel supplies to much of central Mali.

Since then, armed fighters have been attacking convoys of fuel tankers, leaving towns across the country struggling to power homes, hospitals and businesses.

Mopti, a riverside trading hub of more than 560,000 people, has been among the worst affected. Power cuts were already part of daily life, but with the blockade in place, fuel has all but disappeared.

Generators have fallen silent, and solar panels are now the city’s only lifeline – powering parts of the main hospital and letting residents charge their phones for a few minutes at a time.

Jihadist fighters have surrounded Mopti, in central Mali, and terrorist groups are active in the area. © RFI/Coralie Pierret

Mali’s economy near standstill amid JNIM fuel attacks

‘Catastrophic’ crisis

“Since 7 October, we haven’t had a second of electricity,” says Mohamed Sanous Nientao, a Mopti native now living in exile. “It’s a total blackout. For residents, it’s catastrophic.”

Nientao is a businessman and former local politician who once led the Mopti branch of the UDD, an opposition party now dissolved along with all political organisations under Mali’s military-led transition. Though he is abroad, he remains in close contact with his hometown and describes a city at breaking point.

“Economically, there’s no work, so no income,” he told RFI. “We get a few hours of water distribution, but even that is uncertain. With the security situation, we’re practically cut off from Bamako. The road is controlled by jihadist groups, and with the fuel shortage, the price of a bus ticket to the capital has exploded.

“We’ve never experienced anything like this in Mopti. It’s unbearable.”

Mali under pressure to end fuel crisis as negotiations with jihadists stall

Nientao appealed to Mali’s junta for help. “We know the authorities can’t fix everything overnight,” he says. “But we’re asking for at least one hour of electricity each day. The country is under attack from an extremist force. We have to stand together, but to do that, people need food, fuel and the means to live.

“We’re now in a position where we’re begging for a single hour of power.”

Earlier this week, Mali’s interim president, Assimi Goïta, said the government was working to find solutions. “Some of the answers must also come from families,” he added, urging Malians to limit travel, show solidarity and avoid panic.

This article was adapted from an original story in French by David Baché.

France urges nationals to leave Mali temporarily amid jihadist fuel blockade

France’s foreign ministry on Friday recommended that French nationals in Mali leave the country temporarily and "as soon as possible", citing the "worsening security situation" in the West African nation battling jihadist insurgents.


Issued on: 07/11/2025 
By: FRANCE 24

People gather at a petrol station in Bamako, Mali, on November 1, 2025, amid ongoing fuel shortages caused by a blockade imposed by al Qaeda-linked insurgents. © Reuters file photo

The French foreign ministry has urged all French nationals in Mali to temporarily leave the country, where a two-month-old fuel blockade by al Qaeda-linked militants has all but paralysed the capital Bamako.

In a travel advisory on Friday, the ministry recommended that French nationals leave Mali "as soon as possible" through commercial flights and not by land, warning that main roads have been targeted by "terrorist groups".

The ministry also reiterated its formal advice against travelling to the African country "regardless of the reason".

The al Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) has since September been targeting fuel tankers, particularly those coming from Senegal and Ivory Coast, through which the majority of Mali's imported goods transit.


WATCH MORE Jihadists' fuel blockade squeezes Mali's military rulers

France's announcement comes a day after the foreign ministry in Paris told a press briefing that insecurity in Mali showed the country’s decision to turn to Russia and Moscow-linked armed groups for security assistance had proven to be a failure.

"We are following the security situation in Mali with a great deal of attention and genuine concern," foreign ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux told reporters on Thursday.

"What I could add is that we can see that the contested presence of Russia, or forces associated with it in Mali, does not in any way ensure the security of Malian women and men."

Since back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021 that led to the end of France's military presence, Mali has been ruled by a military junta that is struggling to counter various armed groups including the JNIM.

Last week, the United States and Britain announced the evacuation of their "non-essential" personnel and their families because of the deteriorating situation.

The Geneva-based shipping group MSC on Friday said it was halting its operations in Mali, citing the fuel blockade and deteriorating security.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP, Reuters)

The Feudalization Of Mali – Analysis

November 8, 2025 
Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Raphael Parens and Delina Goxho

(FPRI) — Bamako is living on the precipice. Nervous hotel owners complain about a lack of electricity, but this time it’s worse than usual. In the landlocked capital of the Sahelian country of Mali, business owners have grown accustomed to frustratingly common rolling blackouts across the region. But the blackouts are more nefarious these days, as a jihadist blockade of Mali’s highways has squeezed Bamako’s access to fuel that powers its generators and fuels its cars. The city of Bamako is hanging on, yet Mali’s statehood may have already slipped into the night.

Mali’s government has been fighting multiple wars for over a decade, but until recently, it has managed to contain violence to the country’s rural areas. The same can be said for Mali’s Sahelian neighbors, Burkina Faso and Niger. Yet today, their capitals and major cities are threatened by jihadist forces linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The Sahel has been defined by trading for much of its history. Over time, the region’s trade routes expanded from gold to enslaved people, and back to human trafficking, gold, and drug smuggling today. While these trends are concerning by themselves, they accompany developments in the region’s political fate that are particularly concerning today.

The first warning signs came, as they did across the Arab world, after the Arab Spring. A crackdown on opposition movements included the Muslim Brotherhood and its jihadist offshoots. Jihadists fleeing stringent counterterror programs in Algeria put down roots in the Sahel, upending sensitive local dynamics. They threatened a tense ceasefire between northern rebel groups and local governments, as all three groups fought to control the Sahel’s lucrative trade routes and its precious minerals.

The Malian government requested French military assistance in 2013, which proved initially successful through Operation Serval in driving jihadist forces out of central Mali and their strongholds in the north of the country. However, as occurred in Afghanistan with U.S. counterterrorism campaigns, the initial French mission was susceptible to “mission creep” —the military term for strategies that balloon beyond the capabilities of the forces involved. Operation Barkhane aimed to eradicate terrorism in the Sahel region (including Burkina Faso and Niger) and provide the Sahelian states with an opportunity to manage their own defense. Meanwhile, a UN mission (MINUSMA), featuring a broad contingent of European and American partners, aimed to uphold the fragile peace deal between rebel groups and the government. These goalsproved both lofty and difficult to achieve.

Nearly 10 years later, the Malian military decided that enough was enough, orchestrating consecutive coups d’état in 2020 and 2021 that fundamentally altered the country’s balance of power. European partners appeared to be lining their pockets with natural resources while failing to push jihadist and separatist groups out of Mali. With Russian media support, a Malian junta took power and pushed its European partners out, riding a wave of anti-colonial resentment towards France and nascent pro-Russian sentiment. Similar coups followed in Niger and Burkina Faso, albeit with limited initial Russian involvement.

Russian support has not saved Mali, nor has it saved its neighbors. The Russian state-backed mercenary company, Wagner Group, took the counterterror lead in Mali in early 2022, just as Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. Wagner Group immediately started killing civilians, attempting to send a message to Mali’s rural population that cooperation with jihadists was unacceptable. However, this strategy backfired, as Malian soldiers and civilians balked at atrocities like the internationally condemned Moura Massacre.

The invasion of Ukraine further complicated Wagner’s operations in Africa, as the Russian military lacked the capacity to support the organization logistically. Further, the Wagner Group had been spread thin by deployments across Africa—Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Libya. Yet, the organization’s reorientation toward Russia proved to be its true undoing. At Moscow’s behest, Wagner Group redeployed to Ukraine, where it clashed with the military over resources. This tension spilled over into a mutiny, its infamous march on Moscow, and the subsequent killing of its leaders, Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin.

From the ashes of Wagner Group, the Kremlin resurrected its own public-private expeditionary force, known as the Africa Corps. In June, this organization took over Wagner Group’s operations in Mali. It expanded into Niger and Burkina Faso, but it was continually kneecapped by the Kremlin’s prioritization of the Ukraine conflict.

The Africa Corps has failed to recover from this loss, and this limited capacity contrasts with empowered jihadist and separatist movements across the Sahel. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the local al-Qaeda branch, has been very active in Mali over the summer. First, JNIM launched a series of coordinated attacks on several military bases across the country. Then, it resorted to blocking the country’s major roads, laying siege to some important cities, and setting fire to fuel trucks coming from western and southern Mali. This strategy reflects JNIM’s new aim on the battlefield: to choke Bamako and overthrow the military junta, while simultaneously demonstrating the extent of the Malian state’s collapse. Meanwhile, not only have fuel prices spiked across Mali, but the shortage is now so severe that Bamako and other major towns have been completely paralyzed. Rumors swirling around the army suggest that military officials in Kati and elsewhere are losing their patience.

Western governments are sounding the alarm. On Oct. 24, the U.S. State Department upgraded Mali to a level 4 “Do Not Travel” warning, and other countries like the Netherlands and Canada followed suit. The potential outcomes are varied—from another military coup to an extended siege evoking images of Mogadishu in the 1990s to a complete jihadist takeover. Regardless, change is coming for Bamako, and the region may never be the same again.

While Bamako is in dire straits, its neighbors could be the next dominoes to fall. Burkina Faso now ranks at the top of the infamous Global Terrorism Index. The country’s junta government made the fateful decision to arm civilian militias, exacerbating violence. Jihadist groups have responded with drone attacks, which are also proliferating in Mali and Niger.

Niger isn’t faring any better. Nigeriens are four times more likely to die due to jihadist violence since the withdrawal of Western military support. One local cleric noted that jihadist forces “are beginning to feel legitimate, bold and entitled to the taxes, not just by force, but as if they were a recognized government.” Self-defense militias such as the zankai and the garde nomade have become the only state-supported or condoned forces in the country’s most violence-affected areas, as the military struggles to reach them.

All three countries are experiencing a collapse of the state. Jihadist and separatist insurgencies have fundamentally altered their capacity to conduct international affairs and manage sovereignty. No Sahelian government can claim full sovereignty or control over the means of violence within its borders. The Sahel is experiencing feudalization, the progressive fragmentation of the state. In this context, armed groups, rebel organizations, and self-defense militias engage in violence across different parts of the territory, and countries exist only in name.

Looking forward, prospects appear particularly bleak for the Sahel. Jihadist partial or total rule will spur mass migration, most likely into Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya. While European and American leaders are focused on Russia and China, a volatile jihadist source of insecurity is looming in West Africa. The consequences of jihadist statelets near the Atlantic and the Mediterranean can and should stir fear in Washington, Paris, Brussels, and beyond.

Yet, cooler heads are needed. African migration bans and militarily focused policies are short-term approaches that will flounder in the face of a more profound crisis plaguing the Sahel. Responsible policies must center around the failures of governance in the Sahel—enormous gaps in public infrastructure, poor access to education, and a hollowed job market—which build grievances in peripheral communities and push individuals into armed violence. From the governance side, foreign partners will need to try harder against the corrupt networks that continue to manage the Sahel’s gold and human trafficking trade, which perpetuates instability and robs these countries of resources. Part of this push will fall on states that encourage these criminal behaviors, particularly the United Arab Emirates.

For now, most analysts prefer investment in the Sahel’s littoral neighbors. A full-capacity military and political campaign in the Sahel would be an expensive endeavor at a time when foreign policy budgets are being slashed around the world.

On the other hand, a new and evolving Syrian government suggests that there is potential for normalized relations between the Global North and former jihadists. Indeed, JNIM leadership in 2021 claimed that the war in Mali would not touch French soil. Any approaches along these diplomatic lines, though, would require a re-evaluation of Western relations with former client regimes in the Sahel and a degree of communication with jihadist organizations that does not exist today.

About the authors:

Raphael Parens is a Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is an international security researcher focused on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa and specializes in small armed groups and NATO modernization processes.

Delina Goxho is an independent security analyst who works for several European foundations and civil society organizations.

Source: This article was published by FPRI

Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
Founded in 1955, FPRI (http://www.fpri.org/) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.

 

Mali starts construction of Russia-backed gold refinery

Reuters | June 17, 2025 | 

Mali’s government has put the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex under temporary state control. (Image: Barrick.)

Mali began construction of a new Russia-backed gold refinery on Monday, which the West African country’s military leader said would take it closer to asserting control over its natural resources.

The 200-ton capacity facility, in which Mali has a controlling stake, will be built in partnership with Russia’s Yadran Group and a Swiss investment company.

Mali’s interim president Colonel Assimi Goita said last year that all mining companies will be required to process their gold domestically under a revised mining code, without providing a deadline.

That reflects a broader regional shift extending across the Sahel, where Guinea, Niger and Burkina Faso have also revised mining codes to mandate local processing, adding value to their exports and boosting the economic benefits of their resources.

“Since 1980, Mali’s gold has been exported for refining and sale to countries such as the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, and Switzerland,” Goita said at the groundbreaking ceremony for the new plant in Senou, outside the capital Bamako.

“This deprives our country of substantial revenues that could be used for the development of its economy.”

The government has not provided a deadline for the plant’s completion. Once fully operational, it will process all gold produced in Mali into dore bars before it is exported, with a capacity nearly four times Mali’s annual gold production.

Echoing comments from Goita, Yadran President Irek Salikhov said at the ceremony the refinery will become “a regional center for processing gold extracted not only in Mali, but also in neighboring countries — like Burkina Faso”.

West Africa is a major gold producer, but lacks a functional and globally certified gold refinery despite attempts to create one including by Ghana, the continent’s top gold producer.

The refinery is part of Goita’s sweeping mining reforms introduced since the military leader seized power in 2021 and severed relations with Western partners. Mali’s revised mining code, like those of neighbours Guinea, Niger and Burkina Faso, has rattled investors.

A Malian court this month put Canadian miner Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex under temporary state control, escalating an ongoing dispute over Mali’s tax claims.

Goita said the refinery would enable Mali to better track its gold production and exports. Like many African countries, it loses billions of dollars to gold smuggling due to the absence of certified gold refineries and traceability programs.

(By Tiemoko Diallo, Idrissa Sangare and Maxwell Akalaare Adombila; Editing by Jessica Donati and Jan Harvey)

Mali hopes Russia partnership will help end raw gold exports

Reuters | June 16, 2025 |

Stock image.

Mali’s government will establish a state-controlled gold refinery with Russia’s Yadran to boost bullion revenue as West African nations aim for greater resource returns amid rising commodity prices, the country’s finance minister said.

The new company, SOROMA-SA, will be 62% owned by the Malian state, with the remainder held by Yadran, Economy and Finance Minister Alousseni Sanou said.

The refinery, set to be built on a five-hectare site near Bamako’s airport, will process 200 metric tons annually, almost quadruple Mali’s current output of approximately 50 tons, Sanou said.

Mali’s National Transition Council approved the shareholding on Thursday, Sanou said, adding the company would assist miners to comply with the revised code.

Mali, Africa’s second-largest gold producer, has adopted a revised mining code boosting state stakes in mining firms, raising gold royalties, and requiring domestic gold processing, following similar policies in Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea that rattled Western investors as they pivot to Russia and China.

Mali’s two gold refineries lack certifications, such as by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), forcing miners to process gold abroad, according to the Mines Ministry. A senior Mines Ministry official, who requested anonymity, said Yadran would help secure certification, a key obstacle that has prevented the country’s existing refineries from accessing global markets.

Mali’s military leader Assimi Goita will commission the refinery’s construction later in June, according to mines ministry spokesperson.

(By Tiemoko Diallo; Editing by Maxwell Akalaare Adombila, Ayen Deng Bior and Toby Chopra)

 

Berlin and Paris concerned over Russian mercenaries in Mali

The Russian mercenary group "Wagner" is notorious; among other things, it has been accused of war crimes in Syria. Now it's allegedly set be deployed in Mali. Germany and France are threatening to withdraw their troops.

    

Malian army soldiers in Gao - will they soon be supported by Russian mercenaries?

The situation is explosive: There are indications that the government in Mali is discussing a paramilitary operation with the Russian mercenary force "Wagner". Malian and Russian authorities are said to be on the verge of signing an agreement to this effect. This was revealed by the Reuters news agency at the beginning of the week, causing a stir in European diplomatic circles.

Mali reacted promptly: The government wants to expand its relations to ensure the security of the country — nothing has yet been signed with Wagner, a spokesperson for the country's Defense Ministry said according to media reports. Not only are several thousand French soldiers stationed in Mali, but 1,000 Bundeswehr troops are also stationed in the country to combat Islamist extremists.

Military cooperation is not new

Mali and Russia have worked together in the past: In 1961, after France's withdrawal, the first Malian president Modibo Keita turned to the former Soviet Union, among others, with the request to train and equip the Malian army. This military cooperation continued until the early 1990s.

Around 1000 members of the German armed forces are involved in the 

UN Minusma mission in Mali

"Most of the military in power in Mali were trained in Russia and are close to the Kremlin," analyst Mahamadou Konaté tells DW. He warns: "We should be careful not to send these mercenaries into action, also because of the risk that they could commit massive human rights violations."

Signals are already coming from France about a possible troop withdrawal from Mali. Involvement of the private Russian company Wagner in Mali would be "incompatible" with maintaining a French force, according to Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian. The German Foreign Office also expressed great concern.

German troops in Mali — how much longer?

Germany's Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (CDU) wrote on Twitter that such agreements between Mali and Russia would contradict "everything that Germany, France, the EU, and the UN have been doing in Mali for eight years," and also indirectly threatened to withdraw troops as well.

"Russia's interest in further arms sales is of course great," Christoph Hoffmann, a member of the Bundestag representing the FDP, told DW. He added that the German government must now maintain intensive contacts with Mali in order to salvage the situation. He added that Germany would not continue to be involved in the EU mission if there was a real commitment from the Wagner Group. Katja Keul, a member of the Green Party, also considers this "out of the question". 

Denis Tull, a researcher with the Foundation for Science and Politics in Berlin, also expressed concern, saying that if the partnership with Mali is confirmed, it would be a "considerable gamble." When the Central African Republic called in Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group to help in 2018, Paris immediately suspended its activities in the country, he said.

According to Tull, the Malian government's current talks with Russia could also be an attempt to increase pressure — just weeks before the Africa-France summit scheduled for October — and to show France that other alliances are also possible.

Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer threatens the withdrawal 

of the Bundeswehr troops if Russian mercenaries operate in Mali

In Mali's capital Bamako, Thomas Schiller, head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, has called for a dialogue between the countries concerned. At the same time, however, he emphasized that Mali and other African countries are sovereign states. "It is not our job to tell Africans what is good for them. It is up to them to define that, and to reform their political system and their army," Schiller told DW.

Kremlin denies mercenary deployment

He said he was not surprised: there have long been rumors of greater Russian involvement in Mali, especially in the area of security training for the armed forces, possibly also through arms deliveries. The problem, he said, is that these claims have never been verified.

Russian mercenaries in the Central African Republic as life guards for 

President Faustin Archange Touadéra

Reuters reported an agreement to send up to a thousand Russian mercenaries to Mali. When DW approached the Kremlin for confirmation, this report was denied by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Reports surfaced on some Russian websites that claimed that more than 1,200 Russian mercenaries are already in Mali. However, these media platforms are considered dubious and, according to DW research, are apparently controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin — a close confidant of Vladimir Putin — who is said to head the Wagner Group.

UN accuses Wagner of war crimes

UN experts accuse the mercenaries from Russia of committing war crimes in Central African Republic (CAR). They recently submitted their report to the UN Security Council. In July, an investigation by "The Sentry" — an activist group that investigates money flows related to atrocities — and CNN revealed possible war crimes by mercenaries in CAR. The Russian mercenary group is also active in Libya and Syria. At least in Syria, it is also accused of serious human rights violations.

CONTESTED SPACE

Mali: 'Africa's Afghanistan' sees France withdraw troops and terror groups run amok

Paul Tilsley
Thu, August 18, 2022

It is being called Africa’s Afghanistan, a land where militants linked to both al Qaeda and ISIS jihadists fester, reaping terror, death, displacement and despair. Named the world’s terrorism hotspot, a third of all terrorism-related deaths in 2021 spilled blood over this country’s dusty plains.

Some 2,700 have been killed in West Africa’s Mali in the first six months of this year, up 40% on last year. As the mayhem escalates in this region known as the Sahel, this week the last unilateral Western peacekeeping force was pulled – or was it pushed – out. Mali’s military junta is now letting Russia’s shadowy Wagner mercenary group reportedly run amok, with an ever-growing catalog of human rights abuses against Mali’s people.

"Is Mali Africa's Afghanistan?" Jasmine Opperman, a security consultant specializing in extremism and political violence, discussed with Fox News Digital. "Looking at its history, looking at the complexities of the driving forces, looking at international actors’ involvement aggravating the security situation and acting as a trigger mechanism for extremism, I think we can definitely conclude that based on the similarities, Mali can be considered as Africa's Afghanistan."

A protester holds a placard reading "France, gardener of terrorism" during a demonstration celebrating France's plans to withdraw troops from Mali, in Bamako, on Feb. 19, 2022. The last of the French troops left this week.

(Florent Vergnes/AFP via Getty Images)

AFRICA: THE NEW GROUND ZERO FOR JIHADI TERROR GROUPS, EXPERTS SAY


Former colonizing power France withdrew the last of its 5,100 peacekeeping troops this week, with the insults of an ungrateful Mali regime freshly ringing in its ears, saying France’s President Macron should "permanently abandon his neocolonial, paternalistic and patronizing posture to understand that no one can love Mali better than Malians," spokesman Col. Abdoulaye Maiga said on local TV.

Mali has turned to Russia for help, allowing Moscow’s Wagner PMC or private military company to do its dirty work: "Violence against civilians in Mali has increased significantly since the Wagner Group’s arrival in December 2021," Catrina Doxsee, associate director and associate fellow of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Fox News Digital.

Doxsee added: "The military junta in Mali, which gained power through a coup in 2021, has prioritized its own power and self-preservation above stability or civilian well-being, and it likely views the Wagner Group’s presence primarily as a tool for 'coup-proofing.' Since Russia and its affiliated PMCs have little concern over human rights abuses, they are appealing partners for an illiberal regime like Mali’s junta."

BLINKEN FLIES INTO 'SUPERPOWER' BATTLEGROUND IN AFRICA

The Russians are far from discreet. As the final French troops flew out of the northern Gao airport this week, two cargo planes landed and reportedly Russian military teams openly unloaded weapons.

Mali is said to be the most dangerous assignment in the world for its 12,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force. "Since its deployment in 2013, more than 250 peacekeepers have lost their lives, 159 of them in hostile incidents, including IED attacks," the spokesperson for the United Nations' Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) told Fox News from Bamako, Mali.

A U.N. armored vehicle that had been hit by an improvised explosive device

 is parked in the U.N. mission in Mali on Nov. 5, 2021.

 (Amaury Hauchard/AFP via Getty Images)

ISIS and al Qaeda relentlessly attack U.N. troops both out on patrol and back at their barracks. "The biggest threat remains the attacks by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines against our convoys and patrols to protect civilians, especially in the northern and central parts of the country," the spokesperson said. "The mission camps have also become targets of terrorist armed groups using direct and indirect fire attacks against the U.N."

RUSSIA WAR WILL HAVE 'SHATTERING' EFFECT ON FOOD SHORTAGES IN AFRICA: 'YOU'RE GOING TO SEE GOVERNMENTS FALL'

MINUSMA’s own so-called explosive ordnance disposal teams search for and deactivate IEDs, but intelligence gathering is perhaps hampered in this deeply devious arena by a United Nations charter that prohibits clandestine intelligence work.

In a 2017 report on peacekeeping in Mali, Researchgate, a scientific research group, noted what it said was a clash of cultures between countries supplying their troops to the U.N.: "Marrying the Western and African capabilities turned out to be challenging due to incoherent procedures, systems, levels of experience as well as reporting mechanisms. In addition, information-sharing from classified NATO databases proved difficult", the report stated.

The Mali government doesn’t make it easy for the U.N. to help them. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock accused the regime of having "torpedoed time and again" Berlin’s efforts.

Annalena Baerbock, Germany's foreign minister, talks to soldiers 

at Camp Castor in Gao, Mali, where the German military is involved in the U.N. mission. 

(Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images)

This week, Germany suspended most of its operations in Mali, after the government denied flyover rights for Germany’s U.N. aircraft. In the last few days, Egypt has suspended its participation in Mali after seven of its soldiers were killed, and the local regime is still holding 49 Ivory Coast U.N. troops who were arrested when they turned up for duty in Bamako a month ago.

Ominously, last week the Institute for Security Studies’ Martin Ewi briefed the U.N. Security Council that Islamic State fighters fleeing Syria are "finding safe havens on the continent," and that Africa may be "the future of the caliphate".

Opperman is concerned the U.S., as in Afghanistan, may get drawn in: "We have a situation in Mali where superpowers have been sucked in or are withdrawing, we have seen now with France stepping aside, with Russia moving in, and who knows how the U.S. will respond to this."

INSIGHT: How two former employees are driving Mali’s hardball talks with Barrick

Reuters | February 1, 2025 

Loulo-Gounkoto complex. (Image by Barrick Gold).

Two former company executives with inside knowledge of Barrick Gold’s operations in West Africa are helping to drive Mali’s demands for a payment of around $200 million from the Canadian miner, according to people familiar with the talks.


Mamou Toure and Samba Toure, key members of the government’s negotiating team, both used to work in Mali for Randgold, a mining company that is now part of Barrick.

Mali’s military-led government, which in December seized three metric tons of gold from Barrick worth about $245 million, has given the miner until Saturday at midnight to respond to its demands.

It wants Barrick to pay 125 billion CFA francs ($199 million) in back taxes, according to a source familiar with the situation.


If a deal is finalized, Mali would return the seized gold and release four Barrick executives detained since late November, the source said.

Barrick has publicly rejected the charges against its employees, without specifying what they are. According to a court document reviewed by Reuters, they include money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Barrick did not answer questions about the status of the talks and Mali’s mines ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

The dispute has ramifications for global miners and other foreign investors who poured billions of dollars into West Africa and are now forced to play by a new set of rules as the military governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso seek a bigger share of mining revenues.

“The standoff with Barrick is a snapshot of just how far military-led governments in the Sahel are willing to go to compel foreign operators to comply with new regulations that align with their pursuit of resource nationalism,” said Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst for Francophone Africa at Control Risks.

Reuters spoke to more than 20 people – including mining executives, consultants, diplomats and people with direct knowledge of the talks – to form a picture of the negotiations. The sources requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation.

The two Toures are among a small group of key players on the Malian side, which also includes junta leader Assimi Goita and Minister of Finance and Economy Alousseini Sanou, according to nine people familiar with the matter.

The men, while they share a surname, are not related. Samba Toure, the older by decades, was the more senior of the two at Randgold, where he was West Africa operations director. Mamou was underground manager for the Loulo mine.

But it is Mamou who is now the more influential negotiator for Mali, due in part to his close relationship to the powerful finance minister Sanou, the sources said.

It was Mamou’s consultancy Iventus that won the contract to audit foreign mining companies in Mali, which led to a new mining code in 2023 and renegotiations of the miners’ contracts. Samba now works for him at the consultancy.

“It’s Mamou who is currently the boss,” said one person who formerly worked with them both, adding that Samba’s experience and technical knowledge was nevertheless crucial in decision-making. “The decisions come much more from Samba than from Mamou.”

In response to Reuters‘ detailed questions, Mamou said that for decades gold production had not benefitted the people of Mali as it should have. Mali is Africa’s second-largest gold producer.

“It is only natural that the state ask for a rectification,” he told Reuters. “The state has made a great effort to reach an agreement, which is why all the other companies have reached an agreement with the state.”

Samba Toure did not respond to a request for comment.
Acrimonious talks

While other Western miners – including Canada’s B2Gold, Allied Gold and Australia’s Resolute – have struck deals with Mali in recent months, Barrick’s negotiations have dragged on acrimoniously.

The military governments in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are using legal disputes, arrests and nationalizations, as well as threats to deepen their ties with Russia, to assert greater control over their gold and uranium wealth.

But Ochieng of Control Risks said that did not mean Western operators were unwelcome. “Several Western mining companies have been allowed to expand operations and take on new assets provided they comply with the latest regulations and taxation demands,” she said.

After seizing power in 2020, Mali’s junta pledged to scrutinize its mining sector so the state would benefit more from gold prices running at all-time highs.

Some companies, like B2Gold, reached an agreement swiftly. Others, like Australia’s Resolute, whose CEO was detained while in Mali for talks, took longer.


B2Gold told Reuters it was proceeding with planned investments this year at its Fekola gold complex after reaching the deal. Resolute on Thursday told an investor call that it hoped its deal paved the way for better collaboration with Mali’s government as it develops the Syama mine.

Relations with Barrick, however, deteriorated last year. After authorities arrested four Malians working for Barrick in September, the company paid 50 billion CFA francs ($80 million) and they were released. But Mali, which is seeking a total of around $350 million, demanded further payments.

Mali represents 14% of Barrick’s gold output and the company generated $949 million in revenue from its operations there in the first nine months last year.

In early November, Bristow told Reuters the company had offered Mali 55% of the economic benefits from its Loulo-Gounkoto mine complex – similar to an agreement the miner struck with Tanzania about five years ago.

But when Barrick did not pay a second tranche, Mali accused the company of breaking its commitments and demanded the remaining sum be paid at once rather than in tranches. It began blocking Barrick’s exports in early November.

Discounting VAT credits, Mali says Barrick has 125 billion CFA francs left to pay.

When no payment came, four employees were detained again in late November and Mali issued an arrest warrant for Barrick CEO Mark Bristow on Dec. 5.

Nevertheless, contacts continued behind the scenes. One source who spoke to Barrick senior management told Reuters on Dec. 6 that Barrick was close to paying a second tranche of 50 billion CFA. But no payment was made and the conversations stalled. Formal talks resumed on Tuesday.

Freddie Brooks, metals & mining analyst at BMI, a FitchSolutions company, said that under Bristow’s leadership Barrick had probably the highest tolerance for operational risk of any major miner.

“If they can’t negotiate a compromise with Mali’s military junta, it won’t be for lack of trying,” he said.
Clashes with Bristow

Samba Toure quit Randgold around nine years ago after a quarrel in an online meeting with Bristow, who was CEO of that company at the time, according to someone who has worked with both Toures.

The rift deepened after Samba handed in his resignation and was not allowed to dispose of his vested Randgold share options, domiciled in London.

Mamou Toure had already left Randgold in 2015, following a dispute with Bristow over the use of foreign contractors, one of the sources said.

Barrick did not respond to a request for comment on the circumstances of the Toures’ departures.


When the government announced its plans to audit the mines, Mamou won the consultancy contract with his firm Iventus Mining. It was Samba Toure who directed the audits, two sources said.

After Mali created a state-owned mining company, SOREM, in 2022, Samba was named chairman of the board, with Mamou appointed as a director.

The influence of the Toures is not unchallenged, however. Last summer, junta leader Goita grew frustrated with the negotiations and brought in the director of state security, Modibo Kone, one of the five colonels-turned-generals who lead the junta, one source said. A second source confirmed Kone’s involvement in the talks.

On at least one occasion, the finance minister has also taken over negotiations and instructed Mamou to stand down after he went too far in his demands, according to one source familiar with the talks.

Five sources said that the mines minister, a technocrat with no ties to the military, has been sidelined. However, Mamou denied that, noting the ministry has two representatives on the negotiating commission. The commission takes its orders from the mines ministry as well as the finance ministry, he said.

Mali’s finance ministry and presidency did not respond to requests for comment. It was not possible to reach the state security service.
Special forces raid

With exports banned and Barrick’s mines producing up to half a ton of gold weekly, stockpiles were rising in its secure “gold room” at the Loulo-Gounkoto mine complex.

As of Dec. 27, Barrick held just over 3 tons in its vaults, according to a Jan. 2 court order seen by Reuters, which authorized its seizure.

At mid-morning on Jan. 11, a helicopter landed at the mine complex’s landing strip unannounced. Four special forces soldiers, a customs agent, two officers of the state mining directorate, and other plainclothes officials disembarked and presented paperwork to Barrick staff authorizing them to seize the gold, one of the sources said.

“They shipped a first quantity and came back in the evening for a second shipment,” the source said, adding that it was all over by 7:00 pm.

For now, the gold seized from Barrick’s mines is sitting in the vaults of the state-owned Banque Malienne de Solidarite in Bamako. The bank declined to comment.

Barrick, which confirmed the seizure of the gold, says it has suspended operations at Loulo-Gounkoto.

The Jan. 2 order said the seizure was a preventative measure as part of the charges of money laundering and other unspecified financial crimes that have been levelled at Bristow and other Barrick employees under Mali’s laws.

Barrick is resisting the government’s demand to migrate to the new 2023 mining code largely because of increased taxes under the code, two sources said.

Pending next year is the renewal of Barrick’s mining permit. The government has signalled it could refuse it.

One source, who has consulted for the Malian government, said the government was seeking leverage for that negotiation, while the company wanted to clinch a long-term renewal under favourable terms.

“I think they don’t trust each other, but no one has an interest in a break-up,” the person said.

Some investors, however, are anticipating a tough road ahead for Barrick in Mali, including the possibility the company could lose its assets.

“The market has already factored in all the risks on Barrick shares, and the possibility that not much of production is going to come from Mali anytime soon,” said Martin Pradier, materials analyst at Toronto-based Veritas Investment Research Corporation, which covers Barrick.

($1 = 626.7500 CFA francs)

(By Portia Crowe, Divya Rajagopal, David Lewis, Tiemoko Diallo and Fadimata Kontao; Editing by Silvia Aloisi, Veronica Brown and Daniel Flynn)

Mali gold mine accident kills more than a dozen, including women and children

Reuters | February 1, 2025 |

Legacy artisanal workings at Compass Gold’s Tarabala prospect in Mali. Credit: Compass Gold

Thirteen artisanal miners, including women and three children, were killed in southwest Mali on Wednesday after a tunnel in which they were digging for gold flooded, the national union of gold counters and refineries (UCROM) said on Saturday.


The incident occurred at an open-pit gold mine near the village of Danga in the Kangaba Cercle in Mali’s southwestern Koulikoro region, UCROM Secretary General Taoule Camara said via telephone.

The sluice gates of a muddy water reservoir broke and spilled into a tunnel in which women and children were digging out earth to search for leftover gold particles.

“It is serious. There were a lot of women. We spent all day yesterday clearing away the water to start looking for the bodies,” Camara said earlier this week, when a death toll was still unavailable.

Artisanal mining is a common activity across much of West Africa and has become more lucrative in recent years due to growing demand for metals and rising prices.

Deadly accidents are frequent as the artisanal miners often use unregulated digging methods.

More than 70 people were killed in January last year after a shaft collapsed at an artisanal gold mining site in the Kangaba Cercle.

(By Tiemoko Diallo and Sofia Christensen; Editing by Jan Harvey)


Resolute Mining CEO quits following detention in Mali

Cecilia Jamasmie | February 3, 2025 

Terry Holohan. (Image courtesy of Resolute Mining.)

West Africa-focused gold producer Resolute Mining (ASX: RSG) announced on Monday the resignation of its chief executive officer, Terry Holohan, who was detained in Mali for 10 days in November.


Holohan, along with two other Resolute employees, was held in Bamako, the country’s capital, amid negotiations with Mali’s military government over operational terms. The detentions ended after the miner agreed to pay $160 million in installments to settle a tax dispute. Holohan subsequently took a temporary leave of absence in December.

Resolute said Holohan’s resignation was effective immediately. Acting CEO Chris Eger will now assume the role on a permanent basis, while interim chief financial officer, Dave Jackso,n has also been appointed full-time, the company said.

Eger said last week that the ordeal in Mali was “the most challenging [time] the company has ever faced”. He added that the settlement agreement was a step toward “paving a path forward” for the company. However, efforts to reengage with the Malian government have been hindered, as officials remain preoccupied with discussions involving other mining companies, Eger noted.

West Africa squeeze

Mali, under military control since a 2021 coup, has intensified demands on international miners such as Barrick Gold, B2Gold, Allied Gold, and AngloGold Ashanti. The 2023 mining code introduced by the government grants preference shares in mining projects and requires an annual “foundation payment” to support community development.

Despite these challenges, Resolute remains focused on optimizing operations. In 2024, the company ramped up production at its flagship Syama mine and initiated the second phase of the operation’s development, which is expected to come online this year.

However, Resolute has delayed some planned investments, including a $100 million sulphide conversion project aimed at doubling processing capacity from 2.4 million tons per annum (Mtpa) to 4Mtpa

.

Syama gold mine. (Image courtesy of Resolute Mining.)

The Malian government holds a 20% stake in the project, which processes approximately 2.4 million tons of ore annually.

Beyond Mali, Resolute is prioritizing opportunities in Guinea and the Ivory Coast, while navigating the increasingly complex political environment in West Africa. The company stated that its priorities for 2025 include “creating value in Guinea and the Ivory Coast and actively managing an increasingly complicated political landscape.”

Shares in Resolute closed 0.7% lower on Monday at 38 Australian cents, giving the company a market capitalization of A$789 million ($486 million). The stock has fallen by more than 50% since October 2024, when Mali’s fiscal and regulatory environment began to deteriorate.