Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PENSION DEFICIT. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PENSION DEFICIT. Sort by date Show all posts

Wednesday, November 10, 2021

N.B. government behind financial problems of CUPE pensions, ruling suggests

Province ordered to fix $69.2 million funding shortfall

CUPE Local 1253 represents about 1,900 New Brunswick school custodians, maintenance workers and school bus drivers. Its pension plan has a $69.2 million deficit that an arbitrator blamed on the province and ordered it to fix. (Camille LaCroix/Radio-Canada)

New Brunswick Premier Blaine Higgs has made the poor financial condition of two CUPE pension plans that serve school board workers a central issue in a strike by public-sector unions, even though it was the province that drove the pension plans into financial trouble in the first place, according to a labour arbitration case.

In a decision issued June 28, experienced national labour arbitrator Elizabeth MacPherson found the province failed to meet its obligation to fully fund the pension of CUPE Local 1253, representing about 1,900 New Brunswick school custodians, maintenance workers and school bus drivers, over several years.  

That helped drive it into a $69.2 million deficit as of Jan. 1, 2018, its last full actuarial evaluation.

CUPE president Stephen Drost says members of locals 2745 and 1253 have made all of their required pension contributions and are not responsible for their poor financial condition. (Jacques Poitras/CBC News)

In her ruling, MacPherson ordered the government to begin paying $5.5 million per year as part of a 15-year plan to fix a deterioration in the pension that years of underfunding caused.

"I find that by failing to make the contributions to the Plan necessary to fund the going concern deficit identified by the Actuaries, the Employer has breached the collective agreement," wrote MacPherson, the former chair of the Canada Industrial Relations Board, first appointed in 2007 by the former government of Stephen Harper.  

"As remedy for the breach, the Employer is directed to commence making regular contributions to the Plan in accordance with the 2018 Actuarial Valuation in amounts sufficient to eliminate the going concern deficit within 15 years."  

MacPherson noted the figure of $5.5 million per year was an estimate from 2018 of what is required to fix the pension shortfall and may have to be updated when a 2021 actuarial valuation of the deficit is made available.

She is in private practice now in Ontario and was jointly picked by the province and CUPE to rule on the dispute, which came forward as a union grievance in 2018

Another grievance to be heard

A second nearly identical grievance filed by CUPE Local 2745, the union representing school administrative staff, also alleges government wrongly starved its pension plan of millions of dollars in required contributions.

That grievance is scheduled to be heard next year.

Higgs has been criticizing the financial condition of both pensions, which are two of only three defined benefit plans left among New Brunswick government employees. The third plan belongs to provincial court judges.

Defined benefit plans guarantee employees agreed-upon amounts of retirement income and benefits. Although employees and the employer both contribute to a pension fund to pay those costs, any unexpected shortfall is a financial responsibility of the employer alone.

Most New Brunswick government unions were moved from defined benefit to "targeted benefit" pension plans in 2014,  but the two CUPE locals had special wording in their collective agreements that blocked the province from switching them over.

Workers are among lowest paid 

The two plans serve employees who are among the lowest paid in government.  

According to the province's latest financial statements, members of the two unions make an average of just under $36,000 per year with retired members of CUPE Local 2745 earning average annual pensions of $8,724. Average pensions of former CUPE Local 1253 members are $11,979.

"They are no way a gold-plated pension plan," said Theresa McAllister, president of Local 2745.

The pension plans have been depicted as financial wrecks in government messaging as part of an effort to pressure the two unions to give them up for cheaper retirement plans with benefits the province does not have to guarantee.

Theresa McAllister (in pink sweater) is president of CUPE Local 2745, whose members, she says, earn under $36,000 on average, with retirees collecting average annual pensions under $9,000. (CBC)

In government news releases, the plans are described as being unsustainable and in financial "jeopardy" and last week Higgs told the legislature that winning changes to the two plans was a key government goal in its current labour fight with multiple CUPE unions

 "That is one of the stalemates in the CUPE discussion," he said

Largely government's doing

Both pension funds are in a serious deficit position, but according to MacPherson's account of what happened to the CUPE 1253 pension, this is largely government's doing for unilaterally failing to make regular "special payments" to keep the plans fully funded as it is required to do. 

MacPherson said special payments are typical in defined benefit plans.

Iris Lloyd is President of Local 1253 and said evidence gathered by the union and presented to MacPherson showed that as a deficit appeared in the plan following the financial crash of 2008, regular special payments from the province began but then suddenly stopped in 2013.  

Higgs was minister of finance at the time and the end of special payments triggered a downward spiral in the pension's financial position from which it has not recovered.    

New Brunswick Premier Blaine Higgs says a decision from a labour arbitrator that the province owes CUPE 1253's pension plan $69.2 million is not why he's pushing for the plan to be changed. (Government of New Brunswick)

The former government of Brian Gallant did make a $10.1 million retroactive payment in 2018 to try to shore up the plan but it remains in a significant hole.

"Premier Higgs back in 2013 decided to stop making payments into our pension plan and therefore we were able to prove that he purposely underfunded our pension plan by that $69.2 million," Lloyd said in an interview. 

"You really have to talk to Premier Higgs about why these plans are in the shape they are in." 

In her decision, MacPherson said the province was wrong to withhold special payments from the plan that were needed for it to remain financially healthy.

"Because this is a collectively bargained pension plan, the Employer is not free to simply ignore or amend the provisions of the Plan text or otherwise act unilaterally, as it has been able to do with pension plans applicable to other bargaining units that are solely controlled by the Employer," MacPherson wrote. 

"Any changes to this Plan, including the parties' respective obligations under the Plan, must be negotiated by the Employer and the Union."

Future of arbitration case

The province has filed for a judicial review of MacPherson's decision. 

Asked Monday about MacPherson's ruling, Higgs said it is unclear who is to blame for the two pensions' poor financial position.  

"We can all have our different views on whether it was funded properly or not, but I'm not an actuary," said Higgs.

He also denied his goal in changing the pension plans is to escape the expense of MacPherson's funding order. 

"Absolutely not." he said

Tuesday, December 01, 2020

WAGE THEFT
UK
Is my pension ruined if a retail empire crumbles?

Kevin Peachey - Personal finance correspondent
Tue, December 1, 2020
Topshop interior

The collapse of Topshop owner Arcadia is likely to result in a cut in the value of thousands of shopworkers' pensions.

The retailer's demise has led to calls for Sir Philip Green and Lady Green, who run and own the company respectively, to fill the financial gap.

However, as with any business that goes bust, there is a system in place to protect the majority of pension payouts to ensure staff do not lose out entirely.

What happens to pensions when a business folds?

When you work for a company, you are offered membership of a pension scheme, into which the employer makes a contribution and you add to via your pay.

If that businesses collapses, then the contributions stop. A new owner may take on the pension scheme, or - in many cases - certain types of pension scheme go into a rescue scheme called the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).

It pays pensioners already receiving their company pension, and protects those who have yet to reach pension age.

The PPF is paid for, in part, by a levy on other pension funds.

Do all pensions go into the PPF?


No. Anyone with a defined contribution pension has built up a pension pot which belongs to them. This is often managed through a separate investment company and will not go to the PPF.

The individual can decide how it is invested and what to do with it when they reach retirement.

The PPF gets involved with so-called defined benefit pensions - when the employer effectively gives a pension promise about how much you will receive at retirement. This is often based on your final salary, or an average of your career salary.

The PPF usually takes on a failed company's pension scheme and makes payments (officially compensation) to its members.

Topshop owner Arcadia goes into administration

Arcadia's two defined benefit pension schemes are now expected to go into the PPF, after assessors have gone through the books of the schemes.

In a statement, the trustees of the schemes said: "Because Arcadia Group Limited is in administration, the schemes are now expected to enter a Pension Protection Fund (PPF) assessment period.

"The trustees will now liaise closely with the administrators while continuing to work with the Pensions Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund to ensure the best return possible is achieved from asset sales and to make sure the schemes' entry to PPF assessment is as seamless as possible."

How much will pension scheme members get?


That depends on your stage in life.

The PPF promises to pay your pension in full, if you are already receiving pension payments. However, there are some caveats.

The first is that the pension may not increase in value each year as much as expected. This increase is pegged to the rising cost of living as measured by inflation. The PPF uses the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) measure of inflation, which is generally lower than another measure - the Retail Prices Index (RPI) - used by many active pension schemes.

The annual increase only relates to pension accrued since 1997. Any pension built up before that is not increased in line with inflation which is a further blow to older members, and those who worked at the shops more than two decades ago, particularly those who are approaching retirement now.

Ripped up pension statement

For people yet to receive their pension because they are too young, or those who have retired early, the PPF only pays 90% of their pension promise when they hit pension age.

There is a cap on how much someone can receive each year. At present, at the age of 65, that limit is £37,315 a year.

Taken together, all this means, on average, a person with a pension administered by the PPF may receive about 75% to 80% of what they would have expected to have received.
What state are the Arcadia pension schemes in?

There are an estimated 10,000 people with defined benefit pensions from Arcadia - the majority in the Arcadia Group Pension Scheme and the rest in the Arcadia Group Senior Executives Pension Scheme.

In recent times, these defined benefit schemes were closed to new members of staff who work for Arcadia's brands such as Topshop, Dorothy Perkins and Burton, so most of those affected are more long-serving workers or people who have left, or already retired.

At present, the pension scheme does not have the money to pay all future pension obligations. This deficit, according to pensions consultant John Ralfe, is £350m. This is large, but not unprecedented.

Some, but not all, of this shortfall can be made up by a £50m promise from Arcadia-owner Lady Green, and by administrators selling certain properties owned by the company, Mr Ralfe said.
Should the Green family pay up?

There have been calls for the Greens to make up the shortfall. If this were to happen, members would receive all of the pension they were promised.

Sir Philip Green and Lady Green have a widely-publicised fortune

Labour MP Stephen Timms, who chairs the Work and Pensions Committee, said: "Whatever happens to the group, the Green family must make good the deficit in the Arcadia pension fund."

This demand is based on what Mr Timms and others would regard as a moral obligation from the Greens who have huge wealth based on a £1.2bn dividend Sir Philip took from Arcadia and paid to his wife, tax-free in 2005.

There is also the backdrop of a scandal when BHS went bust with the loss of 11,000 jobs and a large pension deficit. Sir Philip reached a deal with the Pensions Regulator to inject £363m into that scheme, after having been accused of earlier selling the business for £1 to avoid pension obligations, something he vigorously denied.

This time, at this stage, there appears to be no legal case which could be pursued by the regulator to oblige the Greens to make any further payment into the pension scheme.

The Pension Protection Fund said: "Insolvency events are a concerning time for employees and scheme members and we want to assure the members of Arcadia's defined benefit pension schemes of our ongoing protection. The robust negotiations at the time of the CVA last year have ensured that both schemes are now in a better financial position."

Saturday, March 24, 2007

AIM High

Having been burned with government bureaucrats running the Alberta Government Venture Capital fund (VenCap) it was sold off by the Ralph regime to Onex corporation in 1995.
It had potential, and even with a deficit its shares were worth $8 on the TSX. Which was not bad for the time. But the debt and defict hysteria led the government to sell off this potential golden goose.

In terms of publicly-funded venture capital funds, Alberta’s experience has not been positive. Vencap was established by the Alberta government with funding of $240 million and the objective of investing in venture capital. Vencap experienced many of the same problems as LSVCCs – a lack of good investments and a reluctance to take risks. As a result, a relatively small percentage of Vencap’s equity ended up in new Alberta ventures. The Alberta Opportunity Company faced similar problems in operating a program to support investments in start-up knowledge-based industries.


Yet its deficit was still underwritten by the Heritage Trust fund five years later, the Ralph regime was panic driven, selling off all government services it could at fire sale prices..

December 2000: All of the loans made to provinces from 1977 to 1982 have been paid back on time and without any missed payments. The only project loans left on the Heritage Fund books are Vencap and Ridley Grain Ltd. for a total of $98.8 million, which represents 0.8% percent of the Heritage Fund's total portfolio.



The Government is
a risk averse regime that would rather underwrite private capitalists than use it's own capital.

Institutional investors key to growth of city's tech sector

Unlike other provinces and public pension funds, including the federal CPP, Alberta was more interested in selling off government assets and services to the private sector, than developing its capital base with the Heritage Trust fund and its other investment funds.

Risk adverse, wanting to divest itself of any economic responsibility, "we are not in the business of business", the government finally has realized it is a capitalist state and should be investing its social capital. However its social capital is not just the Heritage Trust fund, but public sector pension funds as well.



In a move predicted to earn up to an extra $500 million a year, the Stelmach government plans to create a new provincial Crown corporation to oversee $70 billion worth of financial assets.

The Edmonton-based investment powerhouse will be the fifth-largest pool of managed capital in Canada.

It would be exceeded in size only by the Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec ($143.5 billion), the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board ($111 billion), the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan ($96.1 billion), and the B.C. Investment Management Corp. ($76.3 billion).

AIM Corp. would assume responsibility for managing the $16.3-billion Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, several public endowment funds -- including the Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research -- and a basket of public-sector pension funds.

The latter includes the $13.5-billion Local Authorities Pension Plan (LAPP), the province's largest public pension fund, and the $5.7 billion Public Service Pension Plan, among several others.

A recent study for the government concluded a stand-alone organization would be the best way "to achieve investment excellence," Alberta Finance said in a brief news release.

"The proposal follows best practices for top public sector investment funds such as the Canada Pension Plan, the B.C. Investment Management Corporation and the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan."


During the Ralph regime everything not making money was sloughed off and contracted out or privatized. In order balance out the reduction in royalties and taxes coming in from the Oil industry, in the nineties the PC's found that like many governments they were carrying pension debt. As the third party to the Local Authorities Pension Plan(LAPP) which covers all MUSH employees and management in Alberta, they never contributed to the plan, rather like other governments they put all pension earnings into general revenues.

In the late nineties with a deficit and debt crisis, they looked at the debt they owed the LAPP and hived it off in plans to allow the contributors, employees and management as well as MUSH employers, to run it. Without of course the governments missing contribution. This left the LAPP in a deficit situation, causing its members to have to pay for the governments debt owed them.

In return for paying down the governments debt to the LAPP the members of the plan were offered investment autonomy, with moves to privatize the plan under membership control. Which was not a bad thing. It removed statist bureaucracy and red tape at a time when the market was booming, and as a fund managed by employee representatives from unions, management and professional associations, and employers. The board was in place, and hired its own CEO,and investment managers, as well as holding a series of input meetings with the membership, both for feedback and for an explanation as to how the funds would be managed.

In a short five years the LAPP was out of debt and the members actually paid less then was expected and in fact got a payback for overpayment's of the government debt. The reason? Bre-X. While the Bre-X swindle saw many make fortunes on the largest run of a penny stock to a $200 share in the shortest period in Canadian mining history, even for the mining scandals of the sixties, many also lost fortunes as the shares collapsed under the salting scandal that ensued. But not the LAPP they made money off Bre-X, and other investments. Because they were autonomous and now were no longer risk adverse, that is they were investing to make up the deficit, while maintaining the capital for their fiduciary responsibility to their retirees.

Once out of debt and making money, as they have for a decade, the government realized it was selling the golden goose if it allowed full autonomy, it reigned in its plans to privatize the LAPP. It remained under autonomous management but was still a subject to regulation by the Finance Department.

Had it been allowed full autonomy it would have made even more money. As it was with partial autonomy, and its own investment policies and managers it went from a deficit to $13. 5 Billion in assets.

Seeing it had a golden goose again, the Government has refused out right autonomy and has moved away from privatization of LAPP. Which may be the reason for it not wanting to talk about how it is looting public pension funds to underwrite its new investment corporation.

I almost missed it, but there it was, posted on the Alberta finance department's website.

The cryptic, one-page news release outlined a bill, introduced in the legislature Tuesday, to create a new provincial Crown corporation called Alberta Investment Management Corporation, or AIM Corp.

It will boast roughly $70 billion in assets.

That was it. There was no fanfare. No press conference. No grandiose quotes about the cosmic significance of this bold initiative from Alberta Premier Ed Stelmach, or Finance Minister Lyle Oberg. In fact, the latter didn't even respond to my followup call Wednesday. A department flack did.

The release itself was so blandly written it appeared designed to put reporters to sleep.

There is an irony here in that the ultimate capital partner in government P3 projects is not private hedge funds, nor private industry, but public pension funds. The Alberta government will find itself funding its own P3 projects with its new AIM Corporation. Just as governments world wide are being funded by Canadian institutional pension funds. And these same pension funds are crying about not having more government real estate and infrastructure projects in Canada to invest in.


See

P3

Your Pension Dollars At Work

P3= Public Pension Partnerships



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Monday, May 18, 2020

Ken Eady understands the challenges a defined benefit pension plan can present for plan sponsors, particularly when they find themselves in financial difficulty.
“Healthy companies aren’t always too crazy about the liability, so it can become a heavy weight to carry when there is trouble maintaining financial status. That’s why they seem to generally be in decline. Nobody is starting new DB plans,” says Eady, who sits on the board of the Store and Catalogue Retiree Group, an independent organization representing the interests of Sears Canada Inc. pensioners.
“But on the other side of the ledger, there are the promises these companies made,” he adds. “A pension is not some gift you got for being a nice guy or a good employee. From the beginning of your employment, it was part of the deal that when you retire, the pension would be there for the rest of your life.”
Eady knows the ins and outs of the pension promise better than most people. By the time he retired in 2003, he had made his way up to becoming a senior executive in Sears’ human resources department, working out of its downtown Toronto headquarters. For much of his 30 years of service, the features of the company pension and benefits plans formed a key part of his pitch to new and prospective hires.
“It was to attract people, and for most companies at that time, not just Sears, it was a cost of doing business,” says Eady. “But never in all the time that I spoke about that promise did it occur to me that it might not be kept. Maybe I’m naive, but if that’s the case, then I’m not the only one.”
With the company having entered bankruptcy protection in June 2017, Eady and 17,000 fellow defined benefit plan members are now staring at a potential 19 per cent cut to their future pension payments as a result of a $267-million deficit.
“If laws can’t protect against that, then they need to be strengthened,” says Eady.
The Sears saga
Eady joined the company in happier times. By the early 1970s, Sears was thriving, with two decades of history already behind it in Canada. Its U.S. parent company had teamed up with a local retailer, Simpsons, to bring its department store and mail-order catalogue business north of the border in 1953.
Eady says he had few concerns when he retired. Despite a reported drop in same-store sales starting in 2005, the pension plan appeared insulated from the trouble. As recently as 2008, Sears Canada’s annual report disclosed a $219-million surplus in the main defined benefit plan. That was the year the company closed the plan to new members.
That surplus would be the last, with the global financial crisis gobbling it up and spitting out a $48.5-million deficit the following year. The figure piqued the interest of the retiree group, which stepped up its advocacy as the writing began to appear on the wall for Sears Canada in the subsequent years.
With the group having predicted the company’s demise in 2013, it began urging both Sears Canada and the Financial Services Commission of Ontario to wind up the pension plan before things got worse. In the meantime, it started writing to politicians of all stripes about the retirees’ concerns.
Despite those concerns, the company took advantage of Ontario’s solvency relief measures in 2016 to reduce the amount — to $13.9 million that year from $20.2 million, with further reductions in 2017 and 2018 — of the special payments it was making to cover the pension shortfall. At the same time, a new management team attempted an ultimately unsuccessful reinvention strategy before Sears Canada finally sought protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and announced a plan to shut 60 stores and lay off nearly 3,000 workers in June 2017.
In line with an order of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the company suspended its special payments at the end of September 2017, while the restructuring process played out, and ceased providing post-retirement benefits, which included life insurance, medical and dental coverage. In the meantime, Morneau Shepell Ltd. took over administration of the pension plan.
A look at the guarantee funds
In March 2018, Sears Canada retirees got a measure of good news in the provincial budget, when Ontario’s governing Liberals announced that the pension benefits guarantee fund, a government run insurance program for plans with insolvent sponsors, would boost its monthly coverage limit by 50 per cent to $1,500 from $1,000. It also backdated the change to ensure Sears pensioners would be eligible for the extra money.
Assuming the predicted Sears figures turn out to be accurate, the fund would cover the 19 per cent shortfall for the first $1,500 of every pensioner’s monthly cheque. For those receiving larger payments, anything over $1,500 would still be subject to the 19 per cent reduction.
“It’s a worthwhile investment, but the weakness of it is that it only applies in Ontario, whereas the Sears collapse has had an impact on people from coast to coast. There were stores in Victoria, B.C., St. John’s, Newfoundland, and everywhere in between,” says Eady, noting no other province has a similar scheme.
Wanda Morris, vice-president of advocacy at CARP, a national retiree organization, says Ontario’s pension guarantee fund is a worthy idea.
“The problem is the order of magnitude,” she says, pointing to the U.S. equivalent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., whose maximum guarantee is US$5,420 per month for someone aged 65. The limit is on a sliding scale, depending on retirees’ ages when they begin receiving benefits, such that younger people receive a smaller guarantee.
Britain’s Pension Protection Fund, set up in 2004, says it generally covers 100 per cent of the pension for those who had already retired when the plan sponsor went bust. For those who retired early or are yet to stop working, the fund guarantees 90 per cent of their promised value, up to a cap of 3,250 pounds per month (about $5,700).
At a minimum, Morris says the British and U.S. examples should inspire every Canadian jurisdiction to cover at least the year’s maximum pensionable earnings, which for 2018 is $55,900 or $4,658 per month.
But Norma Nielson, a recently retired professor of insurance and risk management at the University of Calgary’s Haskayne school of business, warns against any clamour for guarantee funds.
By creating its pension guarantee fund in 1980, the Ontario government undertook a natural experiment in the area, she says. In a 2007 study, Neilson found that the existence of the fund was either the cause of, or showed high correlation with, lower solvency funding levels in that province in comparison to other Canadian jurisdictions.
“Sponsors were basically able to get away with investing less in the plan, which is what we describe as a moral hazard,” says Nielson.
She notes such funds often start with a flat-fee levy on defined benefit plans based on the size of their membership but says most, including Ontario’s guarantee fund, have switched to a risk-based assessment in the interest of fairness.
Malcolm Hamilton, a senior fellow at the C.D. Howe Institute, sees guarantee funds as a form of political cover for governments that want to minimize the appearance of a taxpayer bailout for failing private plans.
“They can pretend it’s all self sufficient and that public support isn’t inevitable,” says Hamilton.
But Hamilton says the charade is harder to keep up as the number of defined benefit plans dwindles while the premium levied on those remaining surges.
“The bottom line is that there is no viable way for healthy pension funds to support unhealthy ones, so eventually some public subsidy is going to be required. If you look at the U.K. and the U.S. ones, they’re all basically insolvent,” says Hamilton, who spent most of his 40-year career as an actuary at Mercer.
In 2017, Britain’s Pension Protection Fund reported a 120 per cent funding ratio, or a surplus of six billion pounds ($10.5 billion), for plans currently under its control for which it’s already paying benefits. While that looks promising, its PPF 7800 index, which tracks the funding position of all of the roughly 5,600 plans that are potentially eligible for future entry, recorded a total deficit of 115.6 billion pounds ($200 billion) as of March 2018. The fund, then, could face a significant challenge if it started to see a significant number of new claims.
In the United States, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. reported a US$65.1-billion deficit in its multi-employer plan and a US$10.9-billion shortfall in its single-employer insurance program at the end of the 2017 fiscal year.
Hamilton says Ontario’s less generous version could allow the province to muddle through what he sees as the dying days of private sector defined benefit plans.
“With any luck, there won’t be too much money taxpayers have to throw at it,” he says. “There aren’t that many DB plans left, and they could get lucky if higher interest rates take the pressure off. In any case, it’ll be minor compared to government subsidization of public sector plans.”
Disclosable events and other interventions
In another apparent nod to Sears pensioners, Ontario’s budget also promised to develop a so-called disclosable events regime that would force plan sponsors to alert regulators to certain corporate developments. The note about the issue in the budget referred to events “such as significant asset stripping or the issuance of extraordinary dividends.”
Sears Canada retirees have hired a litigation investigator to explore the possibility of claims linked to almost $3 billion in dividends paid by the company to shareholders as it sold off many of its key Canadian assets between 2005 and 2013, which continued even as the pension plan slipped into the red. Sears Canada has insisted that all of its transactions were within the law.
Eady hopes the regime that emerges will mirror the one in the United States, which allowed the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. to negotiate a veto over the sale of certain properties held by Sears’ U.S. parent company in 2016. When the U.S. federal agency finally gave the green light to the sale of the assets, it did so in return for a US$400-million cash injection into the company’s underfunded U.S. pension plan.
“Earlier intervention is necessary and desirable,” says Eady.
Jeff Sommers, a partner in the pension and benefits practice group at Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP, says the government plan is light on details at this stage but notes his clients, which include both public and private plan sponsors and administrators, will be watching developments closely.
“I can see the logic, but imposing those kinds of obligations is not going to be well-received by many sponsors,” he says.
At the federal level, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has remained noncommittal about legislative responses to the Sears Canada situation, but two members of Parliament are trying to force his hand with private member’s bills aimed at boosting the priority of pension plan members in bankruptcy proceedings.
The law as it stands classifies the unfunded portion of a pension plan as an unsecured debt, putting pension plan members behind secured creditors such as banks and bond holders. Bloc Québécois MP Marilène Gill wants to create a super priority for pensioners that places them at the front of the queue, while New Democratic Party MP Scott Duvall’s less radical proposal suggests putting them on par with secured creditors.
Ian Lee, an associate professor in the Sprott school of business at Carleton University, says either version risks reducing the availability of capital to companies with defined benefit pension plans and, therefore, hastening their decline in the private sector.
“As a former banker, I can tell you that banks are not in the business to give away money. If they thought their collateralized loans were not, in fact, going to be as secure because of a change in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, then clearly, they will become more conservative in their lending,” he says.
“The knock-on consequences would be horrific.”
CARP doesn’t believe the repercussions of a priority change would be quite so dramatic. In Morris’ view, the current law doesn’t do enough to account for the needs of shortchanged pensioners.
“These people are vulnerable, and they’re not at an age where they can simply go back to work or cut back on their spending. They’ve planned around what they were promised,” she says.
“Banks and other investors are in a position to absorb more risk.”
In the meantime, Sears Canada retirees are placing their hopes in complicated arguments about whether the pension liability amounts to a deemed trust, which may elevate their priority in the CCAA proceedings.
PUTTING A RING ON IT
Faced with a large pension deficit, U.S.-based Sears Holdings Corp. entered into an agreement with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. in March 2016 to take a number of actions to shore up its plan. The agreement provided for a ring-fencing arrangement that meant the company couldn’t sell or encumber 140 Sears properties without the U.S. federal agency’s approval. In November 2017, the federal agency released the 140 properties from the ring-fencing arrangement. In exchange, Sears agreed to pay US$407 million into the pension fund from proceeds derived from selling or encumbering the properties. The 2017 agreement provided Sears with relief from contributions to the pension plans for two years, other than a US$20-million supplemental payment due in the second quarter of 2018.
Questioning the DB guarantee
Michael Armstrong, an associate professor at Brock University’s Goodman school of business, says the Sears Canada situation and the others that will inevitably follow should prompt a shift in the way employers sell defined benefit pension plans to employees. Workers also need to educate themselves about the realities of the pension promise, he suggests.
“Instead of fighting so hard as unions and employees for DB plans, we should realize they’re not really guaranteed,” he says.
That goes for public plans as well as private ones, he says, pointing to the City of Detroit’s decision to cut pensions as part of its bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, he has performed a risk assessment of his own pension at Brock. “It’s likely universities are going to be around for a long time. But on the other hand, if they ever did run into trouble, they can’t hike their prices or dig into profits. It’s not as insecure as if I worked for an auto manufacturer, but it’s also not as solid as if I worked for the federal government,” says Armstrong.
“DB plans are not risk-free, and that needs to be taken into account,” he adds.
Michael McKiernan is a freelance writer based in St. Catharines, Ont.
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In 2009, when Vincent Morin walked through the doors of Air Canada as the vice-president of asset allocation and strategy for its investment division, he faced a tough situation.
The company’s eight defined benefit pension plans, which buy units of a single master trust fund, were facing a $2.6 billion deficit. In the following years, the deficit grew, reaching $4.2 billion in 2012.
Tackling the investments
As of year-end 2019, all of the airline’s Canadian pension plans are at least 100 per cent funded on a solvency basis.
“When I joined, the mandate was to create a whole new strategy [that was] much more focused on liability-driven investing and reducing the risk coming from the pension plan, because it became a very big enterprise risk management issue at Air Canada,” says Morin.
Back in 2009, the pension plans’ fund was in a traditional portfolio of 60 per cent equities and 40 per cent bonds, all managed externally. Morin and his team led the investment turnaround through many small steps, which included adding fixed income exposure and building an alternative portfolio comprised of real estate, infrastructure, private equity, private debt and other sub-asset classes. The team also implemented a portable alpha — or hedge fund — program to try to generate additional returns on top of the traditional asset classes.
Getting to know
Vincent Morin
Job title: President of Trans-Canada Capital Inc.
Joined Air Canada: In September 2009 and launched TCC in 2019
Previous roles: Investment consultant at Mercer Canada
What keeps him up at night: The current coronavirus crisis and its unknown short- and long-term impacts on the global economy and asset prices
Outside of the office he can be found: At his cottage, skiing or travelling
In terms of asset mix, the investment fund currently sits at 87.5 per cent fixed income, 10 per cent equities, 20 per cent alternatives and 10 per cent hedge funds, totalling more than 100 per cent because it uses leverage.
“Over time, gradually, I think we did over 30 different steps in de-risking the plan and changing the asset allocation,” he says. “You just cannot move that big a plan. It was a very big boat to turn around.”
Opportunities in fixed income
With fixed income yields at historic lows and 87.5 per cent of the investment fund’s portfolio invested in the asset class, it pursues a liability-driven investment strategy and is a very active manager. In addition, it keeps a pure separation between alpha and beta, notes Morin. “Beta is the benchmark. It’s built to make sure that there’s good and sound risk management done to match our liabilities’ structure.”
The portfolio is largely comprised of long-term, investment-grade Canadian bonds and doesn’t take big bets on duration, but the fund does arbitrage trades and curve trades globally without taking any foreign currency or high-yield bond risk. For example, if the team believes there’s an interesting point on the curve in France, it will play it, he says. “It will be a long-short position, so there’s no actual exposure to France’s interest rates, but we’ll try to arbitrage that market and be able to capture some return on this.”
The team has had significant success in fixed income. The asset class’ active value-add has been above one per cent on average over a 10-year period, highlights Morin. Plus, since fixed income makes up 87.5 per cent of the fund, the value added in dollar terms is equal to the value-add targeted by the fund from its alternative book. A value-add above one per cent is also significant when expected yields are at two per cent, he adds.
Trans-Canada Capital
By turning Air Canada’s large pension deficit into a surplus, the investment team solved a problem for the company. It also shifted the team responsible for the airline’s pension investments to a new subsidiary called Trans-Canada Capital Inc.
While TCC will continue to manage the investments for Air Canada’s pensioners, it will also make certain funds available to other institutional investors. “We built a great track record over the years, a very different approach than we could see in the market,” says Morin, who is president of TCC.
The team believed it had something to offer to other investors, he adds, noting that, as the fund reduced risk, opening up its investments to others would allow the investment team to continue growing, retain its talent and also diversify Air Canada’s activities.
TCC is offering two fixed income strategies and two hedge fund strategies for institutional investors to buy into, and it plans to expand its offerings.
TCC’s internal hedge fund, launched in February 2019, is its flagship fund. It originally started with the Air Canada investment team using sophisticated transactions to implement its tactical asset allocation. The team was executing these trades using options, volatility contracts and over-the-counter derivatives, says Morin. “At some point, we realized early in the process that what we are managing . . . looks much more like a hedge fund than an actual tactical asset allocation book; better implementation, better diversification, a lot of breadth as well, looking
at different markets.”
Opening up the hedge fund
While the TCC team manages assets for Air Canada’s defined benefit plans, they’re members of its defined contribution arrangement.
The investment team has been using an internal hedge fund strategy for the DB plan since 2013, but it launched a formal fund in 2017 so employees could participate with their own assets.
While it wasn’t mandatory for employees to invest, everybody did, since they could access investments — such as complex derivatives transactions with low trading costs — they couldn’t reach as individual investors.
Next, the team focused on portfolio construction for this strategy. Today, it includes quantitative strategies, systematic strategies, fundamental analysis and alternative value transactions. In 2013, the internal hedge fund began operating as a segregated account; in 2017, it became a separate investment vehicle.
In September 2019, TCC launched a fund of hedge funds. “We have a 10 per cent allocation to external hedge funds and we repackaged it to be able to offer that approach to potential external clients.”
The fund is market agnostic and aims to have no correlation with equity markets, says Morin. “The last thing we want to do is to bring a portable alpha program, which will react exactly in the same direction if there’s a market correction. If it reacts in the same direction as the equity market when there’s a crash, it doesn’t do its job.”
Currently, TCC has $2 billion invested through external hedge funds and $1 billion invested in its internal strategy, notes Morin. “We know what we’re good at. We also know what we are not good at. So what we cannot realistically do internally we’ll give a mandate to an external manager to do.”
Final destination
The Air Canada pension plans are maturing quickly, with about 60 per cent of liabilities tied to retirees and the DB plans mainly closed to new entrants.
At some point, it will make sense to lock in the benefits for pensioners instead of continuing to take risk, says Morin, noting this influenced the airline’s decision to start its own life insurance company to purchase annuities.
Many pension funds are buying annuities to lock in the pension promise. In fact, according to a report by Willis Towers Watson, Canada’s group annuity market hit $5.2 billion in sales in 2019, up from $4.6 billion in 2018 and $3.7 billion in 2017.
While annuitizing is a natural move for many DB pensions, the Air Canada plans are valued at about $21 billion, making their total size much larger than many plans. Indeed, the airline’s plans were paying out more than $750 million in annual pension payments two years ago; and when looking at the 2018 annuity market, the biggest insurance company active in the space was paying a similar amount in total pension payments, notes Morin.
As well, despite the active growth in Canada’s annuity market, he believes the Air Canada plans will be difficult to annuitize because of their total size. “The transactions are bigger, but the liabilities have grown over the past few years, and there’s some scarcity as well in the fixed income world to find interesting securities . . . to back those liabilities.”
In addition to market capacity, pricing is also a consideration, notes Morin. “You can purchase a big amount of annuities, but we believe the structure we are proposing will result in a better price for the plans.”Air Canada has applied to the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions for approval to launch its life insurance company. If approved, the company will operate as a subsidiary of Air Canada with capital seeded by the airline. And TCC will manage assets for the life insurance company, in addition to the assets for the pension plans.
While the mandate would be different for the pension plan assets and the life insurance company assets, fixed income will be core to both, says Morin.
Yaelle Gang is editor of the Canadian Investment Review.
Copyright © 2020 Transcontinental Media G.P. This article first appeared in Benefits Canada.