Judicial Challenges to the Dominance of Pakistan’s Army

By Vinay KauraFebruary 18, 2020

Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, photo via Wikipedia; and Imran Khan, photo by World Economic Forum via Flickr CC

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,451, February 18, 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The government of Pakistan, led by the PTI party, has filed a review petition before the Pakistani Supreme Court against the Court’s decision that the term of Army Chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa continue for another six months, during which time the parliament should legislate on the position’s extension or reappointment. The government argues that Bajwa’s term should be extended not for six months but for three years, and that the position’s term is none of the parliament’s business. This leaves no doubt that a civilian politician wishing to enjoy his stay at the prime minister’s residence has essentially no option but to bend to the will of the Army Chief, who is the most powerful person in Pakistan.

The real power in Pakistan resides in the army’s general headquarters in Rawalpindi, not in either the PM’s office or Parliament House in Islamabad.

Almost a month after the Supreme Court’s historic ruling on the six-month—rather than three-year, as the government wanted—extension of the term of Army Chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, the government filed a review petition that raises more than two dozen questions of law against the judgment. It pleads for the “preservation of two leading institutions” for the sake of a “healthy democracy”, implying that the judiciary should remain within its limits.

The government asserts that Bajwa’s contributions to national security are so great that the “public at large has warmly welcomed” his reappointment. The review petition also argues that “there is nothing wrong with” not codifying the procedure of the appointment of Army Chief, which has been done without legislation “for seven decades”. Accusing the high court of interfering in “the rarest of rare cases”, the government feels the judiciary has no business “upset[ting] the age-long accepted conventions and the considered policy of the government.”

Bajwa was appointed Army Chief in November 2016, and his three-year term was to have expired in November 2019. But in August, PM Imran Khan extended his tenure by another three years. This occurred two weeks after New Delhi abrogated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution regarding Kashmir, believed by Pakistan to be its “jugular vein”.

The government cited the “regional security environment” as the major reason for its decision to extend Bajwa’s service. But when the judiciary intervened, the extension became a raging controversy.

The petition challenging the Army Chief’s extension was filed by a private individual who later wanted to withdraw it, but the Court decided to examine the legality of the petition on its own. This gave rise to speculation about the invisible hand of generals junior to Bajwa who could have ascended to the position after his retirement.

When the government’s move was challenged by the Supreme Court, it came to light that many procedural errors had been committed by the government when it issued the official notification of Bajwa’s new three-year term. To the utter disbelief of the ruling establishment, the Supreme Court suspended that notification. This forced the government to issue another notification—and that one, too, was thrown into the dustbin by the Court. This put Bajwa in a tight spot and cast a shadow over Khan’s efforts to ensure his own survival.

After keeping the government and Bajwa on tenterhooks, the Supreme Court finally gave in. It granted Bajwa a conditional extension for six months and asked the parliament to pass legislation to avoid future legal ambiguities. In the process, the Court pointedly observed that it had been “labeled as agents of India and the CIA when we examined the Army Act.”

Significantly, Bajwa was part of the discussions at the PM’s house while his case was being addressed and the government’s response to the judiciary was being prepared. This led the Supreme Court to lament that “it is embarrassing that the Army Chief has to keep an eye on summaries instead of the country’s defense.”

The government had 30 days from the time of judgment; i.e., until December 28, 2019, to file a review petition. Unsurprisingly, it waited until after the retirement of Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa on December 20. It was Khosa who had given the landmark ruling.

As taking the legislative route would have meant either reaching out to the opposition and cutting political deals with leaders who are currently being hounded by the PTI government, or threatening opposition lawmakers into supporting the government, Khan and Bajwa probably saw the review petition as the easiest route. Also, the case has received widespread publicity, with almost all mainstream media outlets discussing the legal, institutional, political, and strategic fallout in minute detail following each court proceeding. The government wanted an “on-camera” hearing of the review petition.

Bajwa’s case is not an aberration. The Musharraf ruling is another instance of judicial assertiveness in a system heavily tilted in favor of the military.

Former Army Chief and dictator Pervez Musharraf usurped power in 1999 by toppling the government of then PM Nawaz Sharif; he ruled until 2008 before being forced to resign. Days before the Bajwa decision, the military had come down hard against a special court’s order regarding capital punishment for Musharraf for having suspended the constitution in 2007 and imposing a state of emergency.

Military dictatorships in Pakistan have often been legitimized by the US and other foreign countries. Even when civilians run the government, it is often infiltrated by retired military officials who work to ensure that the army’s core interests are preserved.

The death sentence for Musharraf broke a long tradition of ignoring high treason by military dictators. Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia-ul Haq were never subjected to such judgments. But one of the judges in the Musharraf case, Waqar Seth, overenthusiastically extended his brief by pronouncing that if Musharraf dies before being executed, his corpse should be dragged to a public square in front of Parliament House in Islamabad and hanged for three days.

Notwithstanding this judicial overreach, which goes against norms of human decency, there was nothing in the judgment that should have shocked the military establishment. But it did, simply by virtue of its having dared to challenge the military’s power at all. By dismissing the verdict as against “humanity, religion, culture, and our values”, Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor, the DG of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), made clear what the military felt about it.

The episode of Bajwa’s service extension exposes the huge imbalance in civil-military relations in Pakistan. The way Khan handled the issue marks a low point for civilian rule in the country, and ambitious generals now have a template for how to pull the strings from behind the façade of an elected government without removing it through a coup d’état.

Imran Khan is desperate to ensure the smooth extension of Bajwa’s tenure so the top military leadership will continue to shield him. The role played by the military leadership in Khan’s surprising electoral victory in 2018 has never been in doubt. Almost all opposition parties believe Khan became PM because of the military’s overt and covert meddling in the electoral process.

Bajwa’s behavior confirms the Pakistani military’s underlying assumption that it is an independent stakeholder uniquely entitled to remain free of civilian control, including that of the parliament, and its views must be respected in policy-making, particularly foreign and security policy. In these two domains it is the military that has always called the shots—mainly through its notorious intelligence agency, the ISI.

That agency has become a party to the violent conflict inside Jammu and Kashmir, helping train and equip Islamist radicals who are regularly injected into the insurgency against Indian security forces. Recently, Pakistan’s Railways Minister, Sheikh Rashid, claimed that the Kartarpur corridor on the Punjab border between India and Pakistan was Bajwa’s brainchild, and “India will remember forever the kind of wound inflicted on it.” This was a reference to fears among Indian intelligence agencies that Pakistan’s security establishment is trying to create trouble in Indian Punjab by stoking dissension among India’s minority Sikh community.

The PTI government’s incompetence and irresponsibility have allowed Bajwa to play a role in domestic politics that exceeds the military’s normal remit. Moreover, Bajwa is firmly convinced that the Pakistani army is the sole national institution to possess the dual responsibility of defending Pakistan’s ideological frontiers and territorial boundary. After a recent visit to the mausoleum of the country’s founder, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Bajwa asserted that Quaid’s “two-nation theory”—that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together as a single nation—has essentially been vindicated.

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Vinay Kaura is Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Security Studies and Coordinator of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice in Rajasthan, India.

The Economist Agrees With Me

The Economist, stalwart voice of international capitalism, agrees with me that Musharraf rigged the raid on the Red Mosque to maintain his autocratic power.

General Musharraf cites the extremist threat to justify staying on as Pakistan's president in uniform. The White House falls for it

ELECTIONS loom and Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, has chosen his campaign strategy: war. This week he declared an open season on Islamist terrorists. “We are in direct confrontation with extremist forces. It is moderates versus extremists.” His comments came after a series of attacks, mainly on the army in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), claimed more than 100 lives. He also revealed that when his term of office expires in October, he will seek re-election (indirectly, from an electoral college) without stepping down as army chief. He told senior Pakistani journalists that a purely civilian government would not be strong enough to control extremists.

More and more Pakistanis seem disenchanted with General Musharraf, now in power for eight years. His critics feel vindicated. They had predicted that he would use the violence that followed the storming of a radical mosque in the capital Islamabad earlier this month to justify extending military rule. Conspiracy theorists went further, suggesting he had engineered the showdown for just this reason.

SEE:

Islamicists and Evangelical Christians

I Was An IslamoFascist For MI6

Harpers Silence Over Musharraf

Winning Friends

How To Create Terrorists

Say It Ain't So

Brief Cases vs Batons

Canada, Pakistan, Taliban, Balochistan, Harper, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Conservatives, politics, military, NATO, peacekeeping, Soldiers, Death, Injury, Government,Musharaff, Pakistan, ISI, intelligence, counter-intelligence, spying, Mujahedin, MI6, UK, Britain, Al-Quaeda, Bin-Laden, terrorism, India, terrorists, Kashmir, Taliban, book, autobiography, Afghanistan, kidnapping, hijacking,
Musharaff, Daniel, Peral, WSJ, , Omar, Sheikh, Rashid, Rauf, , Prof., Sayeed, London-bomobings, 9/11, 7/7, Pakistan, ISI, intelligence, counter-intelligence, spying, Mujahedin, MI6, UK, Britain, Al-Quaeda, Bin-Laden, terrorism, India, terrorists, Kashmir, Taliban, book, autobiography, Afghanistan, kidnapping, hijacking,

Our Allies The Taliban

Our alliance with Pakistan is the biggest reason we will lose in Afghanistan. Which War Minister O'Conor finally admitted, after having met with Musharraf. Coincidence? I think not.


PAKISTAN PRESIDENT PERVEZ Musharraf is supposedly a key US ally in the “war on terror.”

But is he, in fact, more of a liability than an asset in combating Al Qaeda and the increasingly menacing Taleban forces in Afghanistan?

Musharraf has been an opportunist from the start who has continued to help the Taleban (just as he had done before Sept 11) and who has gone after Al Qaeda cells in Pakistan only to the extent necessary to fend off US and British pressure.

On Sept 19, 2001, Musharraf made a revealing TV address in Urdu, not noticed at the time by many Americans, in which he reassured Pakistanis who sympathised with Al Qaeda and the Taleban that his decision to line up with the US was a temporary expedient.

To Taleban sympathisers, Musharraf directed an explicit message, saying: “I have done everything for the ... Taleban when the whole world was against them ... We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and the Taleban.”He has kept his promise to the latter.

Why the US needs the Taliban

On July 16, speaking to Electronic Telegraph of the United Kingdom, US troop commander General Frank "Buster" Hagenbeck, based at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, reported increased attacks over recent weeks on US and Afghan forces by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other anti-US groups that have joined hands. He also revealed some other very interesting information: the Taliban and its allies have regrouped in Pakistan and are recruiting fighters from religious schools in Quetta in a campaign funded by drug trafficking. Hagenbeck also said that these enemies of US and Afghan forces have been joined by Al-Qaeda commanders who are establishing new cells and sponsoring the attempted capture of American troops. One other piece of news of import from Hagenbeck is that the Taliban have seized whole swathes of the country. What is happening? Both Hagenbeck, who boasts to the media about the high quality of his intelligence, and Khalilzad, who is unquestionably in a position to know, have stated that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are being nurtured, not in some inaccessible terrain along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border but in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Balochistan province where the Pakistan Army and the ISI have a major presence. Yet, President Bush and his neo-conservative henchmen have remained strangely quiet, allowing Pakistan to strengthen the Taliban in Quetta, and, as a consequence, re-energize al-Qaeda - the killers of thousands of Americans in the fall of 2001.


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State Terrorism

All terrorism is State terrorism against the people. As this headline shows. Bush urges Pakistan to boost terror effort There are no terrorists of or for the people. They are authoritarian movements, fascists, using asymetrical forms of warfare seeking to seize state power.

I guess that headline is a boo-boo they must have meant anti-terrorism....but then again....VIEW: Religion and politics — Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

The military government therefore used coercion against the Al Qaeda-type hard-line Islamic elements in a selective manner that enabled it to maintain a working relationship with the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) that supported the Taliban, sympathised with Al Qaeda and opposed Pakistan’s participation in global efforts against terrorism. The MMA joined hands with the Musharraf government for passing the 17th constitutional amendment that legitimised most of the changes made by the Musharraf regime in the 1973 constitution. The cordial interaction between the two ran aground when President Musharraf refused to quit as army chief on December 31, 2004.

And let's not forget the porous border between Pakistan and Afhganistan, the so called tribal areas which were the source of CIA missles for drugs exchanges during the anti-Soviet jihad. The area iswhere Canadian troops are currently; Kandahar. Where the Taleban Train

Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, lies about 200 kilometres southeast of Kandahar, across a porous border. Many of my fellow countrymen have made the journey here. In fact, some sections of the city seem to be populated almost entirely by Taleban who fled after the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Over the last year, Kandahar has seen an alarming rise in suicide bombings and attacks on troops and government installations. In the past three months alone, there have been more than 20 acts of violence, leaving dozens dead, hundreds wounded, and an entire province terrorised. Quetta provides a ready supply of young men prepared to wreak havoc in Afghanistan, local observers tell me. There are eight major madrassas or Muslim religious schools in Quetta, each with over 1,000 students or "taleban" in the original sense of the word. In addition, there are hundreds of private madrassas, some with just 100 students, often occupying unmarked, rented houses.
It is these private schools that are a major source of the fighters who are now carrying out insurgent operations inside Kandahar, according to these observers.

Another reason to say a pox on both your houses, Canadian Troops Out Now!

Afghan villagers won't say who axe-wielding attacker of Canadian was

Afghanistan was the “Hobbesian” state that was kosher for interference by its neighbouring countries so that each could secure itself against the fallout of its endemic internal chaos. In Pakistan today — thanks to decades of jihad that kept the borders as porous as possible — many regions resemble Afghanistan. There is practically no writ of the state in most of Balochistan and most of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Foreign raiders may attack this territory to get at the elements that bother them, just as we went into Afghanistan looking for strategic depth. What is unforgivable is the lack of information — and the possible withholding of it — at the crucial moment when the politicians are in denial and the Musharraf government is on the defensive. *

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Kashmir dilemma

Owen Bennett-Jones

The writer is author of The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle for Power in Pakistan.


IN the darkest days of the conflict in Northern Ireland, there seemed to be no imaginable solution. The centuries-old dispute between the Catholics and Protestants — those who wanted to be part of Ireland and those who wanted to remain with the UK — was just too deep. But in 1998 Tony Blair did secure a peace deal and even though that historic achievement is now threatened by Brexit, it nonetheless prompts the question: might a deal on another apparently irresolvable dispute — Kashmir — be possible too?

Two Pakistani leaders — Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf — have considered making the sort of compromise that might have led to a breakthrough. In the early 1960s, the US used the leverage over New Delhi it had acquired by supporting India vis-à-vis China, to tell Nehru he should be willing to hold direct talks with Pakistan on Kashmir. The first round of discussions took place in Rawalpindi in December 1962, followed by four more rounds in Delhi, Karachi (twice) and Calcutta.

Few thought that much would come of the negotiation but the dialogue revealed that Bhutto was capable of being more flexible than might have been expected. The young foreign minister indicated that Pakistan might be willing to settle for some adjustments to the ceasefire line in Kashmir — indeed, he asked India to make some suggestions for adjustments — and he also considered the idea that the issue at the heart of the dispute, the status of the Kashmir Valley, could be blurred by demilitarisation, soft borders, joint administration, free movement or Kashmir’s status being internationalised in some way. But by the time the talks reached a sixth round, both sides were reverting to their established positions and US pressure in Delhi softened, meaning Nehru saw no need to compromise.

Half a century later, Musharraf, after backchannel talks, proposed a package with some similarities to what was discussed by ZAB. First, there was agreement in principle on demilitarisation. Pakistan would withdraw troops from Azad Kashmir and reduce cross-border militancy if India took troops out of the Kashmir Valley. Furthermore, Pakistan would be willing to deepen the degree of self-governance in Azad Kashmir if India made similar arrangements on its side of the LoC. But alongside the self-governance there would be a joint mechanism involving the governments of India and Pakistan which would meet two or three times a year to facilitate issues such as trade, free movement and, crucially, water. The proposals eventually collapsed in the face of nationalist opposition in India.

Is some backchannel diplomacy exploring the options?

A comparison of the two sets of talks shows that the process became far more detailed under Musharraf than had been the case with the ZAB-led talks. As for the substance, some elements were clearly different. In the 1960s talks, the ceasefire line would remain important whereas in the Musharraf period the whole effort was to reduce the significance of the LoC. Nevertheless, there were also many shared elements including demilitarisation and the idea of a blurred constitutional status.

When Narendra Modi won his first election in 2014, some Pakistani military strategists argued that his coming to power could work to Pakistan’s benefit. They argued that the very fact that Modi was a hard-liner would mean he would be in a position not only to do a deal but also deliver it. Similarly, it would be difficult to imagine any civilian politician in Pakistan securing a settlement on Kashmir because the army would doubtless accuse them of selling out. Only the army could deliver the army.

Read: Kashmir question

On the face of it, however, Modi seems even less likely than his predecessors to do a deal. Not only is he a more nationalist politician but he has also, if anything, advanced India’s demands. His removal of Article 370 represented a hardening of India’s position. And the idea that India might accept the LoC as an international border has given way to suggestions that India is interested in advancing its claims on Azad Kashmir.

For all of that, some of those who have worked with Gen Bajwa say the army leader believes that there is little point in continuing with a strategy in Kashmir that doesn’t work. And President Alvi recently hinted to TV host Adil Shahzeb that Imran Khan is prepared to adapt his thinking on Kashmir. All of which raises the question: is something going on? Is some backchannel diplomacy already exploring the options? If that is the case, then when it comes to the nature of any possible deal, the history of the ZAB and Musharraf initiatives suggests some of the elements have probably already been discussed by the two countries and are, in a sense, already out there.

A deal may look impossible. But that was what they said about Northern Ireland too.

The writer is author of The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle for Power in Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, July 6th, 2021

I Was An IslamoFascist For MI6

My pal Rambling Socialist picked up on the fact that the master of self deception, President Musharraf of Pakistan in his new book claims that Omar Saeed Sheikh was a British Spy for MI6.

Now considering how many things he has said in his new autobiography that have been challenged for their truthfulness, which of course doesn't mean they aren't true, this would be a greater embarassment than his allegation the U.S. strong armed him into supporting their attack on Afghanistan.

Despite his show trial in Pakistan there is no evidence that Omar killed WSJ Reporter Daniel Pearl. The Hindu : Omar Sheikh arrested, says Pearl is alive

But true to form he had arranged his kidnapping, which was Omar's speciality, and until Pearl none of his victims had been harmed. Which does smack of the kind of black ops double cross that is typical of security agencies and their moles. And it is interesting that Omar got close to the leadership of Al Qaeda in Pakistan while working for Pakistan's Intelligence Service.

Indian authorities also told the US that the trail led back from Omar Sheikh to the then Chief of ISI, Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad who was subsequently forced to retire by Pakistan resident Pervez Musharraf. The Indian authorities provided the FBI with the details, including Omar Sheikh’s mobile numbers. Mumbai Bomb Blasts – Intelligence And Counter-Intelligence

He was already under arrest when Pearl was killed. Which gives credence to this allegation obtained by rendition and torture.

U.S. Contends Qaeda Leader Executed Pearl

US officials say that Khalid Shaik Mohammed, then Al Qaeda's top operational commander, personally executed American reporter Daniel Pearl, who was abducted in Pakistan in January 2002; Mohammed is now in US custody but officials do not say if Mohammed has confessed to murder; British-born Islamic extremist Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh is appealing death sentence for role in kidnapping and three other extremists were also found guilty


His trial may have been more of a case of shutting up someone who could embarass the Pakistan security services using the murder of Daniel Pearl as a convinant excuse. Musharraf would know. As an editorial in the Tribune and Indian newspaper stated in 2002; Omar Sheikh’s bombshell

Omar Sheikh has been living in Pakistan for more than two years and he is a British citizen and hence should have been under close police watch. His claims of daring action could be an exaggerated boast to entrench his leadership in the so-called jehadi groups, as the Pakistani authorities say. But it could also be a government defence of distancing itself from the terrorists and shielding its lack of action during all these years when this British citizen was in Pakistan plotting terrorists attacks in an important neighbouring country. Any country interested in democracy will know the dilemma of a military dictatorship trying to damage India.

As fellow blogger Xymphora says;

Of course, Musharraf would say something like that, as it takes the heat off his own country for some of the things that Omar Sheikh has allegedly done, all supposedly on behalf of Pakistani military intelligence. On the other hand, Musharraf’s story fits. Omar Sheikh was from a well-to-do family, educated at a public school, and had excellent marks. Athletic, aggressive, and intelligent. A young Muslim male at a time when such an agent might well be useful. A text-book mark for British intelligence recruitment. Like all alleged terrorists, he suddenly turned into a violent Islamist religious extremist, and ended up in an Afghan training camp (where Aukai Collins knew him as Umar).

As usual with all these ‘terrorists’, all his old friends now say they have trouble imagining such a thing happening to him. He was supposedly radicalized in Bosnia, but Bosnia seems to have been both a school for Islamic terrorists, and the foundation for NATO/German/French/British/American shenanigans in manipulating Islamist terrorist groups in the proto-WarOnTerror phony fight as a ruse for the ClashOfCivilizations-leading-to-NewMiddleEast crapola. So either it is a legitimate 180 degree personality change, or he is fitting into the role he has to play to infiltrate Islamist terrorist organizations on behalf of British intelligence. Which do you think it is?

So lets take a look at who Omar is.....

BBC NEWS | UK | Profile: Omar Saeed Sheikh
Omar Sheikh, 27, was born in London, attended the London School of Economics and was a close associate of Maulana Azhar Masood - founder of the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) group, which India blames for an attack on its parliament in December 2001.Omar Sheikh was reportedly a contemporary of England cricket captain Nasser Hussain at the private Forest School, in Snaresbrook.

After passing four A-levels with good grades, Omar Sheikh enrolled at LSE in October 1992.

But he left before the end of his first year of an undergraduate degree in statistics.

Reports suggest he visited Bosnia as an aid worker and soon after, he moved to Pakistan

In 1999, while serving a prison sentence for terrorist offences, an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to Kandahar in Afghanistan.

And in exchange for the 155 hostages on the plane, Omar Sheikh was freed from jail.

A Sheikh and the money trail

After his release, Sheikh spent time making contact with several terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and Taliban head Mullah Mohammad Omar. While Azhar went on to form the Jaish-e-Mohammad, focussed on Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh concentrated on building international contacts for the Islamic Right through his old network in the U.K. Although he had received arms training at the Salam Fassi camp at Miranshah, Pakistan, in 1993, guns were no longer part of his job. Osama bin Laden, say Indian officials who have monitored Sheikh's career, played a key role in this career move. Indian intelligence believes that Sheikh, who helped set up a website propagating jehad, was also tasked to help create a secure, encrypted web-based communications system.

rediff.com: Omar Sheikh: A deadly whirlpool of terror

The story of Sheikh's father is typical of any successful Pakistani migrant to the west, and that of Sheikh typical of a modern day jihadi.

Saeed Ahmed Sheikh, Omar's father, was born in Dhoka Mandi village near Lahore and lived there till his early 20s before migrating to London sometime in 1968 to pursue Chartered Accountancy course.

After being an accountant with a record company for a short while, Saeed Ahmed Sheikh started his own wholesale garment business under the name 'Perfect Fashions'.

At present, his company earns over half a million pounds annually.

His family owns a house (bought in 1977) in London, some shops and land.

Omar Sheikh is the eldest of the three children, and was born on December 23, 1973 in London.

His younger sister, Hajira Sheikh, was confirmed to be a medicine student till recently at Oxford, while his younger brother, Awais Sheikh, was a student of A level in Oxford.

All the three children are known to be brilliant, and are recipients of scholarships.

Omar Sheikh did his schooling at Nightingale Primary School and later at Forest School at Snaresbrook. Present English cricket team captain Nasser Hussain was his classmate at school.

In 1987, Omar's father wound up his business and moved back to Lahore, but returned to London soon after in 1990, after he had a fall out with his cousins.

During his stay in Lahore, Omar went to Aitchison College. Indian agencies said that Omar was known for his temperamental behaviour and he had enough quarrels that forced his father to call him back to London. Omar went back to Forest School and finished his Senior Cambridge in 1992.

During his Forest School days, Omar had a short-lived romance with an English girl, Sarah, about whom he spoke affectionately to Indian interrogators.

Omar is a combination of complex interests, according to intelligence agencies.

He was a chess champion during his days at London School of Economics, where he was also reputed for his brilliant academic abilities. He is also a keen arm wrestler, and took part in the 1992 World Arm Wrestling Championships in Geneva.

A martial arts enthusiast, Omar's prowess was seen by Indian police officers, who nabbed him in mid 90s, when he was holding five foreigners captive outside Delhi.

While in a Ghaziabad hospital, after being arrested by Delhi and Uttar Pradesh Police, he punched a deputy superintendent of police, and threatened to track down and kill the constable who had slapped him back.

Later at the Meerut jail, he kicked the jail superintendent, and was shifted to high security Tihar jail in Delhi, after the Uttar Pradesh Police categorised him as 'dreaded'.

During his LSE days, Omar dabbled in shares and equities and was earning up to 1000 pounds a day from a chain of retail customers he had set up using his father's business base.

Moved by a documentary on Bosnia (Destruction of a Nation) in 1992, Omar Sheikh took to jihad and went to Bosnia on a trip with 'Convoy of Mercy'.

Indian officials believe that he had tacit support from his father.

According officials, Omar was in contact with Maulana Ismail of Clifton Mosque in North London, who inspired him to join Harkat-ul-Ansar and come to Kashmir.

An Indian intelligence official told rediff.com that psychologists who interacted with him during his stay in Indian jails believe that he is an 'anti-Zionist and anti-Christian who believes that Muslims can never be friends with Christians and Jews'.

"He feels it is the duty of every Muslim to take up jihad and strengthen the Muslims wherever they were in minority," the official said.

He certainly had the classic English School Boy upbringing so appealing to the British Secret Service historically. Of course their use of British Upper Class twits as the basis of the secret service has also backfired, as we saw during the Cold War. So why not set up a double agent/mole within the new Mujahedin movement.

DANIEL PEARL & THE LONDON BLASTS

Pearl 's kidnapping and murder was orchestrated by Omar Sheikh, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, who had studied for some time in the London School of Economics. He discontinued his studies and joined the HUA during the war in Bosnia , where the HUA had sent a contingent to help the Bosnian Muslims in their fight against the Serbs. This contingent was sent by the Government of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, who was then the Prime Minister, at the request of the Clinton Administration.. The contingent, which was raised and got trained by Lt.Gen.(retd) Hamid Gul, former Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who himself used to visit Bosnia, had a large number of British Muslims of Pakistani origin.

Omar Sheikh surrendered to a former officer of the ISI and a close personal friend of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who was posted as Home Secretary in Lahore , was tried along with other accomplices and sentenced to death by a lower court. The sentence has not so far been carried out. An appeal against the sentence filed by Omar is pending before a higher court, which has been adjourning the hearing again and again. On July 14, the hearing was adjourned for the 32nd time.

In the meanwhile, Omar continues to be as active from jail as he was when he was a free man. He reportedly keeps in touch with his friends and followers in the UK , advising them on their future course of action. Statements purported to have been issued by him from jail calling upon the Muslims of the world to retaliate against the US for its desecration of the Holy Koran are being disseminated every Friday in many Pakistani mosques controlled by jihadi terrorist organisations.

In fact the South Asia Analysis Group a non profit non commercial think tank speculates Omar was the source for the recent arrests in London.

Bojinka 2006:Focus on Omar Sheikh, Rashid Rauf & Prof. Sayeed ...

Pakistan and the Terror Nexus
There are those who might doubt the word of Musharraf, and who can blame them? But in fact I documented Omar Sheikh Saeed's simultaneous intelligence connections to the CIA, ISI and MI6 in The War on Truth and The London Bombings. Details have come forth from an intriguing combination of American, British and Pakistani government sources.

Readers of my 7/7 work will begin to see an unnervingly familiar pattern here. As I explained on "Generation 7/7", a Channel 4 learning documentary that has been aired several times since the 7/7 anniversary (including last week), the suspected 7/7 mastermind al-Qaeda fixer Haroon Rashid Aswat is also an MI6 double agent according to American intelligence officials. When former Justice Department prosecutor John Loftus came on Fox News last year and revealed the extent to which MI6 had been protecting Aswat from our own police services and the CIA, the official story shifted suddenly and inexplicably. Police spokesmen, who had previously described in detail the telephone records of Aswat's extensive conversations with alleged chief London bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan, summarily denied that Aswat had any connection at all to 7/7. The shift in reporting happened precisely to conceal the embarrassing revelation that the failure to apprehend Aswat, was due to the active obstruction of attempts to apprehend him, by our very own MI6. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed

See:

Musharraf

Pakistan


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