In outreach, shift in US tack on Pakistan as India faces tariff heat from Trump
India’s ruling dispensation had walked on eggshells to avoid giving any offence to Trump during the special discussion in Parliament on the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor
US President Donald Trump may have dealt a double blow to India on tariffs, with a Pakistani sting in the tail.
When Trump was warning India on July 30 of enhanced and penal tariffs going into effect from August 1, Pakistani and US negotiators were successfully concluding their trade and tariff negotiations in Washington.
An ecstatic Pakistan Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, in a post on X on July 31 morning, conveyed to Trump “profound thanks” for “his leadership role” in the finalisation of this “historic” trade agreement. Two hours earlier, the Pakistani embassy in Washington had announced that an agreement had been reached.
The embassy claimed that it would result in “reduction of reciprocal tariff especially on Pakistani exports to the United States”. It went on to assert that “this deal marks the beginning of a new era of economic collaboration especially in energy, mines and minerals, IT, cryptocurrency and other sectors”.
Separately, in a post on X on July 30, Trump mentioned US-Pakistani collaboration in developing Pakistan’s massive oil reserves. He did not then disclose that a trade and tariff agreement had been reached.
Absent from the Pakistani statement is how the agreement has dealt with agricultural and dairy issues. These should be vital matters for Pakistan’s economy because, according to an official Pakistani government publication, 65 to 70 per cent of its “population depends on agriculture forits livelihood”.
This aspect is significant, for agriculture and dairy are two sticking points in finalising the India-US trade and tariff agreement.
India’s ruling dispensation had walked on eggshells to avoid giving any offence to Trump during the special discussion in Parliament on the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor.
Trump did not display a similar restraint. He called Narendra Modi his friend but did not refrain from blasting Indian trade practices. Nor has he displayed any real sensitivity to India’s concerns regarding Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism over the past few months.
Trump called Modi to condemn the Pahalgam attack. However, when India launched Operation Sindoor, Trump wanted the hostilities to end, ostensibly fearing escalation.
Since May 10, when India and Pakistan agreed on a cessation of hostilities, Trump has repeatedly claimed that he mediated the “ceasefire”. Pakistan has thanked him for his efforts while India has said that no third country played any role in bringing about the cessation of hostilities.
Maintaining a careful balance between India and Pakistan during and after Operation Sindoor, the Trump administration has refrained from accusing Pakistan of any role in the Pahalgam terrorist attack.
Trump offended India with his invitation to the Pakistan army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, to visit him at the White House for lunch and discussions in June.
To add insult to injury, he invited Modi, who was then in Canada, to pass by Washington while Munir was there. Naturally, Modi declined the offer. Perhaps to make up for this gratuitous behaviour, the Trump administration named The Resistance Front (TRF) — blamed for the Pahalgam attack — as a global terrorist organisation.
Trump’s outreach to Pakistan marks a clear shift in the US approach towards India’s western neighbourhood. It cannot be to pressure India into taking a more constructive approach on the trade and tariff agreement. It can be a marginal factor in efforts to goad India to be more positive, as the tone and tenor of Trump’s posts over the past two days suggest.
But the US would know that Delhi would hardly be guided by the concessions that Islamabad has made on this score. This is so even if Delhi would like to know the details of the US-Pakistan deal. Hence, the factors that are leading to the change, if not the transformation, taking place in US-Pakistan relations lie elsewhere.
Sections of successive US administrations have sought to balance ties between India and Pakistan. This, even though they are conscious that India has to be accorded primacy because of its growing heft in world affairs.
But they seem to segregate zones for India and Pakistan now: India to play a role in the India-Pacific, while the US seeks a greater alignment with Pakistan in India’s western neighbourhood.
Finally, these elements do not want China to have an open field in Pakistan. Trump seems to be going along with this thinking. There are, of course, also dark rumours about his family’s economic interests in Pakistan.
All in all, India-US contentions in the trade and tariff deal are only one aspect of potential problems in the relationship.
Vivek Katju is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer
India’s ruling dispensation had walked on eggshells to avoid giving any offence to Trump during the special discussion in Parliament on the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor
Vivek Katju
Published 01.08.25
TELEGRAPH CALCUTTA
US President Donald Trump may have dealt a double blow to India on tariffs, with a Pakistani sting in the tail.
When Trump was warning India on July 30 of enhanced and penal tariffs going into effect from August 1, Pakistani and US negotiators were successfully concluding their trade and tariff negotiations in Washington.
An ecstatic Pakistan Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, in a post on X on July 31 morning, conveyed to Trump “profound thanks” for “his leadership role” in the finalisation of this “historic” trade agreement. Two hours earlier, the Pakistani embassy in Washington had announced that an agreement had been reached.
The embassy claimed that it would result in “reduction of reciprocal tariff especially on Pakistani exports to the United States”. It went on to assert that “this deal marks the beginning of a new era of economic collaboration especially in energy, mines and minerals, IT, cryptocurrency and other sectors”.
Separately, in a post on X on July 30, Trump mentioned US-Pakistani collaboration in developing Pakistan’s massive oil reserves. He did not then disclose that a trade and tariff agreement had been reached.
Absent from the Pakistani statement is how the agreement has dealt with agricultural and dairy issues. These should be vital matters for Pakistan’s economy because, according to an official Pakistani government publication, 65 to 70 per cent of its “population depends on agriculture forits livelihood”.
This aspect is significant, for agriculture and dairy are two sticking points in finalising the India-US trade and tariff agreement.
India’s ruling dispensation had walked on eggshells to avoid giving any offence to Trump during the special discussion in Parliament on the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor.
Trump did not display a similar restraint. He called Narendra Modi his friend but did not refrain from blasting Indian trade practices. Nor has he displayed any real sensitivity to India’s concerns regarding Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism over the past few months.
Trump called Modi to condemn the Pahalgam attack. However, when India launched Operation Sindoor, Trump wanted the hostilities to end, ostensibly fearing escalation.
Since May 10, when India and Pakistan agreed on a cessation of hostilities, Trump has repeatedly claimed that he mediated the “ceasefire”. Pakistan has thanked him for his efforts while India has said that no third country played any role in bringing about the cessation of hostilities.
Maintaining a careful balance between India and Pakistan during and after Operation Sindoor, the Trump administration has refrained from accusing Pakistan of any role in the Pahalgam terrorist attack.
Trump offended India with his invitation to the Pakistan army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, to visit him at the White House for lunch and discussions in June.
To add insult to injury, he invited Modi, who was then in Canada, to pass by Washington while Munir was there. Naturally, Modi declined the offer. Perhaps to make up for this gratuitous behaviour, the Trump administration named The Resistance Front (TRF) — blamed for the Pahalgam attack — as a global terrorist organisation.
Trump’s outreach to Pakistan marks a clear shift in the US approach towards India’s western neighbourhood. It cannot be to pressure India into taking a more constructive approach on the trade and tariff agreement. It can be a marginal factor in efforts to goad India to be more positive, as the tone and tenor of Trump’s posts over the past two days suggest.
But the US would know that Delhi would hardly be guided by the concessions that Islamabad has made on this score. This is so even if Delhi would like to know the details of the US-Pakistan deal. Hence, the factors that are leading to the change, if not the transformation, taking place in US-Pakistan relations lie elsewhere.
Sections of successive US administrations have sought to balance ties between India and Pakistan. This, even though they are conscious that India has to be accorded primacy because of its growing heft in world affairs.
But they seem to segregate zones for India and Pakistan now: India to play a role in the India-Pacific, while the US seeks a greater alignment with Pakistan in India’s western neighbourhood.
Finally, these elements do not want China to have an open field in Pakistan. Trump seems to be going along with this thinking. There are, of course, also dark rumours about his family’s economic interests in Pakistan.
All in all, India-US contentions in the trade and tariff deal are only one aspect of potential problems in the relationship.
Vivek Katju is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer
Chietigj Bajpaee
Claims of ideological affinity between the world’s oldest and largest democracy won’t be enough.
THEY ARE BOTH ARYAN SUPREMACISTS
Donald Trump hosts Narendra Modi at the White House in February (White House Photo)
Published 1 Aug 2025
THE INTERPERTER
LOWY INSTITUTE
When US President Donald Trump was sworn in for his second term in January, India was among the most positive countries about the outlook for relations with the United States. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the fourth world leader to visit Washington following Trump’s inauguration. A day after the inauguration, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as part of the Quad foreign ministers meeting, and India is also set to host the Quad Summit for the first time later this year when Trump is scheduled to visit India.
Fuelling this optimism is the high degree of bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening the bilateral relationship. There was also a belief that the Modi and Trump’s worldviews were aligned. Both are strongman populist leaders who regard China and radical Islam as existential threats, and share a common mistrust of the liberal media and civil society. The two are also economic nationalists at heart. One could even argue that India was Trumpian before Trump given India’s protectionist tendencies and transactional foreign policy. Moreover, India was in the unique position of being neither a US ally or adversary, so it didn’t face Trump’s wrath of not pulling its weight (like NATO members) or being seen to pose an existential threat to the United States (like China).
Developments this week demonstrate a degree of irrational exuberance in New Delhi’s expectations of the India-US relationship.
Trump’s announcement of 25% tariffs on India and his acerbic statements – of India as a “dead economy” that does “very little business” with the US with “the most strenuous and obnoxious non-monetary Trade Barriers of any country” – are likely to be bluster as the US seeks to extract concessions from India in order to secure a favourable trade deal. Trump’s social media statements do not equate to official government policy.
Nonetheless, this is a wake-up call for New Delhi, particularly when seen in the context of other recent actions by the Trump administration.
Just as Trump abandoned the United States’ more conciliatory approach towards China in his first term, this may be the beginnings of similar scrutiny of US engagement with India.
Amid efforts to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump has also threatened secondary tariffs on India for its trade with Russia. New Delhi is a leading buyer of Russian crude and more than 50% of India’s in-service military platforms are of Russian origin. He has also threatened 200% tariffs on pharmaceutical imports – which holds significance for India as a leading supplier of generic drugs to the United States – and 10% tariffs on BRICS member states for pursuing so-called “anti-American” policies. Washington has also announced sanctions on several Indian entities and individuals for trading with Iran.
Further souring relations with the United States is Trump’s position on recent India-Pakistan hostilities where he claims that he helped to broker the ceasefire between both countries in May (denied by New Delhi) while deepening relations with Islamabad (by hosting Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir at the White House in June and pursuing resource and cryptocurrency deals with the country). Trump’s announcement of a trade deal with Pakistan on the same day as he announced tariffs on India has added insult to injury.
New Delhi had appeared relatively sanguine about Trump’s return. The announcement of Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs in April was met with cautious optimism in New Delhi amid a belief that this would facilitate a degree of trade diversion away from China and other countries (in South and Southeast Asia) whose supply-chains are heavily exposed to China. India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal referred to Trump’s tariffs as the “opportunity of a lifetime”. Vindicating this view, Apple announced that it was shifting production of its US market iPhones from China to India.
New Delhi remained positive amid expectations that India would be among the first countries to secure a trade deal with the United States. There was also a view among some in New Delhi that Trump’s tariffs could be a blessing in disguise by acting as a catalyst to accelerate India’s much-needed economic reform agenda, just as previous external shocks – from India’s 1991 balance of payments crisis to economic sanctions following India’s nuclear tests in 1998 – triggered the country’s first-generation reforms.
Now the mood has shifted. New Delhi fears that Washington could seek to “do a deal” with China. Despite the deepening India-US relationship over the last three decades, there has always been an underlying fear of strategic abandonment in both countries. Trump’s latest outburst will not change the direction of travel in the India-US relationship overall – that of a cautious embrace. But the shine has undoubtedly come off.
Even if a trade deal is secured, New Delhi can no longer rely on claims of the US as a “natural ally” amid an ideological affinity between the world’s oldest and largest democracy. Just as Trump abandoned the United States’ more conciliatory approach towards China in his first term, this may be the beginnings of similar scrutiny of US engagement with India. Washington may increasingly question why the US has stuck its neck out for India time and time again – from a civil nuclear agreement to supporting India’s G20 presidency and candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council – while India maintains close relations with countries with which the United States (and West) have a history of difficult relations, including Russia and Iran.
Ironically, this scrutiny may create a self-fulfilling prophecy as Trump’s actions vindicate India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. This has been evidenced by recent discussions about reviving the long dormant Russia-India-China trilateral and Modi’s likely participation the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in China this month. In this context, the damage may be done as New Delhi comes to see that the India-US relationship is not as special as it perceived it to be.
When US President Donald Trump was sworn in for his second term in January, India was among the most positive countries about the outlook for relations with the United States. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the fourth world leader to visit Washington following Trump’s inauguration. A day after the inauguration, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as part of the Quad foreign ministers meeting, and India is also set to host the Quad Summit for the first time later this year when Trump is scheduled to visit India.
Fuelling this optimism is the high degree of bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening the bilateral relationship. There was also a belief that the Modi and Trump’s worldviews were aligned. Both are strongman populist leaders who regard China and radical Islam as existential threats, and share a common mistrust of the liberal media and civil society. The two are also economic nationalists at heart. One could even argue that India was Trumpian before Trump given India’s protectionist tendencies and transactional foreign policy. Moreover, India was in the unique position of being neither a US ally or adversary, so it didn’t face Trump’s wrath of not pulling its weight (like NATO members) or being seen to pose an existential threat to the United States (like China).
Developments this week demonstrate a degree of irrational exuberance in New Delhi’s expectations of the India-US relationship.
Trump’s announcement of 25% tariffs on India and his acerbic statements – of India as a “dead economy” that does “very little business” with the US with “the most strenuous and obnoxious non-monetary Trade Barriers of any country” – are likely to be bluster as the US seeks to extract concessions from India in order to secure a favourable trade deal. Trump’s social media statements do not equate to official government policy.
Nonetheless, this is a wake-up call for New Delhi, particularly when seen in the context of other recent actions by the Trump administration.
Just as Trump abandoned the United States’ more conciliatory approach towards China in his first term, this may be the beginnings of similar scrutiny of US engagement with India.
Amid efforts to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump has also threatened secondary tariffs on India for its trade with Russia. New Delhi is a leading buyer of Russian crude and more than 50% of India’s in-service military platforms are of Russian origin. He has also threatened 200% tariffs on pharmaceutical imports – which holds significance for India as a leading supplier of generic drugs to the United States – and 10% tariffs on BRICS member states for pursuing so-called “anti-American” policies. Washington has also announced sanctions on several Indian entities and individuals for trading with Iran.
Further souring relations with the United States is Trump’s position on recent India-Pakistan hostilities where he claims that he helped to broker the ceasefire between both countries in May (denied by New Delhi) while deepening relations with Islamabad (by hosting Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir at the White House in June and pursuing resource and cryptocurrency deals with the country). Trump’s announcement of a trade deal with Pakistan on the same day as he announced tariffs on India has added insult to injury.
New Delhi had appeared relatively sanguine about Trump’s return. The announcement of Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs in April was met with cautious optimism in New Delhi amid a belief that this would facilitate a degree of trade diversion away from China and other countries (in South and Southeast Asia) whose supply-chains are heavily exposed to China. India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal referred to Trump’s tariffs as the “opportunity of a lifetime”. Vindicating this view, Apple announced that it was shifting production of its US market iPhones from China to India.
New Delhi remained positive amid expectations that India would be among the first countries to secure a trade deal with the United States. There was also a view among some in New Delhi that Trump’s tariffs could be a blessing in disguise by acting as a catalyst to accelerate India’s much-needed economic reform agenda, just as previous external shocks – from India’s 1991 balance of payments crisis to economic sanctions following India’s nuclear tests in 1998 – triggered the country’s first-generation reforms.
Now the mood has shifted. New Delhi fears that Washington could seek to “do a deal” with China. Despite the deepening India-US relationship over the last three decades, there has always been an underlying fear of strategic abandonment in both countries. Trump’s latest outburst will not change the direction of travel in the India-US relationship overall – that of a cautious embrace. But the shine has undoubtedly come off.
Even if a trade deal is secured, New Delhi can no longer rely on claims of the US as a “natural ally” amid an ideological affinity between the world’s oldest and largest democracy. Just as Trump abandoned the United States’ more conciliatory approach towards China in his first term, this may be the beginnings of similar scrutiny of US engagement with India. Washington may increasingly question why the US has stuck its neck out for India time and time again – from a civil nuclear agreement to supporting India’s G20 presidency and candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council – while India maintains close relations with countries with which the United States (and West) have a history of difficult relations, including Russia and Iran.
Ironically, this scrutiny may create a self-fulfilling prophecy as Trump’s actions vindicate India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. This has been evidenced by recent discussions about reviving the long dormant Russia-India-China trilateral and Modi’s likely participation the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in China this month. In this context, the damage may be done as New Delhi comes to see that the India-US relationship is not as special as it perceived it to be.
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