A Correspondent
Published August 21, 2025
DAWN
WASHINGTON: The White House has signalled a balancing act in South Asia, saying President Donald Trump wants to shrink the US trade deficit with India, while offering to work with Pakistan to develop what he has described as its “massive oil reserves.”
An article in the Washington Post described America’s recent thaw with Islamabad as unexpected, amid a sharp deterioration in relations with New Delhi.
When Trump won reelection in November, many in Pakistan braced for a rough ride. In his first term, he had openly favoured India, castigating Pakistan for “deceit” and sheltering “terrorists”.
Yet six months into his second term — and after the most serious India Pakistan flareup in decades — the tables appear to have turned.
Trade spats and a personal falling out with Narendra Modi have pushed US India ties into crisis, while Pakistan has edged into Washington’s good books, WaPo noted.
In August, a frustrated Trump criticised India’s oil purchases from Russia, slapping 50pc tarrifs on New Delhi and launching a fierce rebuke: “I don’t care what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together, for all I care.”
Islamabad secured a 19pc tariff rate — low by regional standards, and far beneath the 50pc levy slapped on India.
Trump has also boasted of joint plans to explore Pakistan’s oil, while Pakistani officials have pitched cryptocurrency ventures and access to rare minerals.
Behind the scenes, Islamabad has hired Javelin Advisors, led by longtime Trump associates George A Sorial and Keith Schiller, and cultivated family networks.
World Liberty Financial, a crypto firm backed by the Trump family, signed a letter of intent with Pakistan’s Crypto Council in April; the visiting US delegation included Zachary Witkoff, son of real estate developer Steve Witkoff, now Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East.
But some former officials worry that Pakistan’s leadership has been blinded by its recent successes and is not attuned to the risks. “Flattery is not a strategy — it’s not long-term,” warned Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States.
According to WaPo, the army, widely viewed as Pakistan’s ultimate power broker, took charge of the outreach, dispatching Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi to Washington during inauguration week to soothe Congress.
Still, there are ambitions in Islamabad to lock in gains — notably access to American defence kit from attack helicopters to naval hardware. “We can’t go back to the golden years of the 1950s,” said former ambassador Masood Khan, “but we can build a paradigm that benefits both the United States and Pakistan.”
Published in Dawn, August 21st, 2025
WASHINGTON: The White House has signalled a balancing act in South Asia, saying President Donald Trump wants to shrink the US trade deficit with India, while offering to work with Pakistan to develop what he has described as its “massive oil reserves.”
An article in the Washington Post described America’s recent thaw with Islamabad as unexpected, amid a sharp deterioration in relations with New Delhi.
When Trump won reelection in November, many in Pakistan braced for a rough ride. In his first term, he had openly favoured India, castigating Pakistan for “deceit” and sheltering “terrorists”.
Yet six months into his second term — and after the most serious India Pakistan flareup in decades — the tables appear to have turned.
Trade spats and a personal falling out with Narendra Modi have pushed US India ties into crisis, while Pakistan has edged into Washington’s good books, WaPo noted.
In August, a frustrated Trump criticised India’s oil purchases from Russia, slapping 50pc tarrifs on New Delhi and launching a fierce rebuke: “I don’t care what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together, for all I care.”
Islamabad secured a 19pc tariff rate — low by regional standards, and far beneath the 50pc levy slapped on India.
Trump has also boasted of joint plans to explore Pakistan’s oil, while Pakistani officials have pitched cryptocurrency ventures and access to rare minerals.
Behind the scenes, Islamabad has hired Javelin Advisors, led by longtime Trump associates George A Sorial and Keith Schiller, and cultivated family networks.
World Liberty Financial, a crypto firm backed by the Trump family, signed a letter of intent with Pakistan’s Crypto Council in April; the visiting US delegation included Zachary Witkoff, son of real estate developer Steve Witkoff, now Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East.
But some former officials worry that Pakistan’s leadership has been blinded by its recent successes and is not attuned to the risks. “Flattery is not a strategy — it’s not long-term,” warned Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States.
According to WaPo, the army, widely viewed as Pakistan’s ultimate power broker, took charge of the outreach, dispatching Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi to Washington during inauguration week to soothe Congress.
Still, there are ambitions in Islamabad to lock in gains — notably access to American defence kit from attack helicopters to naval hardware. “We can’t go back to the golden years of the 1950s,” said former ambassador Masood Khan, “but we can build a paradigm that benefits both the United States and Pakistan.”
Published in Dawn, August 21st, 2025
Shared future
August 23, 2025
DAWN
AT a time when significant geopolitical shifts are affecting ties between nations, it is reassuring that China has expressed its desire to stand by Pakistan, and further develop their deep, multifaceted relationship.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit, under the umbrella of the Pakistan-China Strategic Dialogue, reiterated Beijing’s commitment to improving bilateral ties. Mr Wang had earlier travelled to India and Afghanistan, stating that the South Asian states are China’s “natural partners”.
It is significant that China’s top diplomat emphasised that Islamabad was the “most important stop” on the three-nation tour. During his meeting with Pakistan’s top civil and military leaders, Wang Yi principally discussed economic and security issues, while observing that Pakistan and China have a “shared future”.
The message from China seems clear: Beijing does not want antagonistic relationships with any of its South Asian neighbours, and values a cooperative approach to addressing disputes. For example, Mr Wang reassured his Indian hosts that Beijing is committed to improving ties with New Delhi “despite setbacks”. He also told the Taliban-led Afghan regime that it needed to act against terrorist groups, while offering greater economic cooperation, including expanding CPEC to Afghanistan. Islamabad, too, was part of the discussions in Kabul, under the framework of the trilateral Pakistan-Afghanistan-China dialogue.
With the US displaying unpredictable behaviour under President Donald Trump’s watch, states around the world are hedging their bets, and updating their foreign policies accordingly. Perhaps this is one of the factors prompting India to improve ties with China, as New Delhi’s relations with the US experience turbulence. Regardless of external triggers, an integrated, prosperous and peaceful South Asia is desirable for all, and China could be the main catalyst that brings the region’s states closer.
As for bilateral relations, ties between Islamabad and Beijing — covering geopolitics, economics and defence links — should be deepened. China is a time-tested partner and friend of Pakistan, and has stood by it in difficult times, while China has also acknowledged that Pakistan has supported it “at key junctures”.
Irritants in the way of greater cooperation must be addressed. For example, Wang Yi publicly noted in Islamabad that Beijing expects Pakistan to protect Chinese citizens and projects in this country. Terrorist groups and hostile actors cannot be allowed to damage bilateral ties by harming Chinese interests in Pakistan.
Also, some states, such as the US, have said openly that they do not view Pakistan-China collaboration positively. This presents a diplomatic quandary for Pakistan, especially in light of its improving ties with the US. Islamabad must balance its ties with both states; better relations with America should not come at the cost of economic and defence cooperation with China.
Published in Dawn, August 23rd, 2025
DAWN
AT a time when significant geopolitical shifts are affecting ties between nations, it is reassuring that China has expressed its desire to stand by Pakistan, and further develop their deep, multifaceted relationship.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit, under the umbrella of the Pakistan-China Strategic Dialogue, reiterated Beijing’s commitment to improving bilateral ties. Mr Wang had earlier travelled to India and Afghanistan, stating that the South Asian states are China’s “natural partners”.
It is significant that China’s top diplomat emphasised that Islamabad was the “most important stop” on the three-nation tour. During his meeting with Pakistan’s top civil and military leaders, Wang Yi principally discussed economic and security issues, while observing that Pakistan and China have a “shared future”.
The message from China seems clear: Beijing does not want antagonistic relationships with any of its South Asian neighbours, and values a cooperative approach to addressing disputes. For example, Mr Wang reassured his Indian hosts that Beijing is committed to improving ties with New Delhi “despite setbacks”. He also told the Taliban-led Afghan regime that it needed to act against terrorist groups, while offering greater economic cooperation, including expanding CPEC to Afghanistan. Islamabad, too, was part of the discussions in Kabul, under the framework of the trilateral Pakistan-Afghanistan-China dialogue.
With the US displaying unpredictable behaviour under President Donald Trump’s watch, states around the world are hedging their bets, and updating their foreign policies accordingly. Perhaps this is one of the factors prompting India to improve ties with China, as New Delhi’s relations with the US experience turbulence. Regardless of external triggers, an integrated, prosperous and peaceful South Asia is desirable for all, and China could be the main catalyst that brings the region’s states closer.
As for bilateral relations, ties between Islamabad and Beijing — covering geopolitics, economics and defence links — should be deepened. China is a time-tested partner and friend of Pakistan, and has stood by it in difficult times, while China has also acknowledged that Pakistan has supported it “at key junctures”.
Irritants in the way of greater cooperation must be addressed. For example, Wang Yi publicly noted in Islamabad that Beijing expects Pakistan to protect Chinese citizens and projects in this country. Terrorist groups and hostile actors cannot be allowed to damage bilateral ties by harming Chinese interests in Pakistan.
Also, some states, such as the US, have said openly that they do not view Pakistan-China collaboration positively. This presents a diplomatic quandary for Pakistan, especially in light of its improving ties with the US. Islamabad must balance its ties with both states; better relations with America should not come at the cost of economic and defence cooperation with China.
Published in Dawn, August 23rd, 2025
A big test ahead
Muhammad Amir Rana
Pakistan’s establishment does not see any major challenge in balancing its close ties with China while exploring new avenues with the US. It’s also not overly worried about growing China-India ties, knowing their relationship has never been truly strategic and remains uncertain in the near future. Pakistan’s confidence is anchored in its robust defence partnership with China and remains largely intact, even in scenarios where Beijing and New Delhi might coordinate strategies to outmanoeuvre US President Donald Trump.
Chinese diplomacy, however, tends to be far less vocal than Washington’s, and is often conveyed through understated gestures. The Chinese foreign minister’s recent visit to Islamabad centred on security, CPEC and new initiatives. Significantly, just a day earlier, he had been in Kabul for a trilateral security meeting.
Media reports suggest that while China and Afghanistan have advanced discussions on joining the BRI, momentum to extend CPEC into Afghanistan has cooled. The Taliban, meanwhile, appears eager to cultivate an exclusive relationship with Beijing, independent of Pakistani influence, and China has agreed to connect Afghanistan through Central Asia via direct links. This is a signal that Rawalpindi and Islamabad would do well to interpret with care.
Published in Dawn, August 24th, 2025
Muhammad Amir Rana
Published August 24, 2025
DAWN
The writer is a security analyst.
SINO-Pak relations initially evolved within a geo-economic framework after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, over time, security considerations have increasingly overshadowed economics, leaving the relationship struggling between the two domains. On the other hand, Pakistan-US relations have historically been strategic and security-centric, but today, they also face the challenge of balancing security with geo-economic priorities.
Ultimately, the real test lies with Pakistan’s establishment — whether it chooses to prioritise geo-economics or maintain deeper, security-centred strategic ties with both global powers. Nevertheless, these options will inevitably come with conditions attached.
Apparently, China’s foremost concern remains security. At the same time, the US emphasises the economic dimension, framing its engagement as both an opportunity for financial advantage and a means to elevate Pakistan’s political profile, particularly in the context of the changing politics of South and West Asia. Pakistan’s geography is undoubtedly a strategic asset, complemented by its aspiration to project itself at a level comparable, if not equal to, India’s military, strategic and political stature, at least in a sustainable sense.
Two perspectives emerge in this regard. One holds that maintaining strong ties with both China and the US can help Pakistan achieve this status. The other, less popular but arguably more pragmatic, view contends that without ensuring political stability and sustained economic growth at home, such ambitions will remain elusive.
Maintaining an exclusive relationship with both China and the US is a delicate task.
However, maintaining an exclusive relationship with both is delicate, especially when there is a contrast in the approach towards and expectations from each other. The phrase ‘de-securitisation of bilateral relationship between the US and Pakistan’ is echoing in Islamabad. But, it remains unclear whether the two nations, which have maintained close security-related ties for over 75 years, will suddenly shift the paradigm, especially when other avenues for cooperation are limited in scope.
Indeed, Pakistan scored a significant boost when it secured a deal with the US on 19 per cent tariffs, opening the door to the expansion of its exports with reduced competition. For much of the past two decades, however, Pakistan’s trade relationship with Washington has been marked by a structural imbalance; the US imports more from Pakistan than it exports, leaving an annual deficit that has averaged between $2 billion to $3bn.
Lower tariffs mean Pakistan must recalibrate its trade strategies. On the surface, its recent negotiations for textile concessions and the decision to import, according to reports, a billion dollars’ worth of US crude oil appear to be tactical measures to ease the strain. Similarly, discussions on crypto cooperation and energy resources exploration carry a futuristic tone, holding some potential to generate political capital and sustain bilateral confidence.
Nevertheless, neither country can detach itself from the broader framework of security cooperation, whether in counterterrorism or regional stability. Washington’s decision to designate the Majeed Brigade of the Balochistan Liberation Army a foreign terrorist organisation — Islamabad’s long-standing demand — reflects an unusual convergence of interests in this sphere.
Yet, a serious test for Pakistan could arise if Washington, in tandem with Saudi Arabia, presses it to endorse the Abraham Accords. Such a move would almost certainly come with binding conditions, foremost among them a recalibration of Pakistan’s Iran policy. Within this context, Balochistan assumes added significance, not only for its role in regional geopolitics but also for the allure of its untapped rare earth mineral reserves.
Outside these contexts, if the US genuinely seeks to de-hyphenate security from its relationship with Pakistan, the question remains: how can this be achieved while engaging primarily with Pakistan’s defence establishment, which by its very nature prioritises security? Successive civilian governments have attempted to reframe their ties with Washington on non-security grounds.
The last serious effort came under the PPP government after 2008, when, in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, the party mistakenly thought that it could alter the trajectory of bilateral relations. The attempt backfired. The Kerry-Lugar Bill, which was supposed to broaden cooperation beyond security, instead became a flashpoint, straining US-Pakistan ties and unsettling the civil-military balance at home.
Another perspective available in the geopolitical domain is that the developments of 2025 do not represent a pivot away from India but a diversification of Washington’s approach to South Asia.
For Pakistan, the opportunity is unprecedented: a chance to reduce overreliance on China, broaden its partnerships, and restore a measure of strategic balance. Yet history warns of how often such openings have been squandered by short-term thinking, institutional fragility and shifting global priorities. The test lies not in the signing of agreements but in their consistent implementation.
If Islamabad can deliver reforms and Washington sustains its commitments, the deal may indeed evolve into a long-term framework of cooperation. If not, it risks becoming just another episode in the long and uneasy history of Pakistan-US relations, full of grand announcements, followed by quiet disappointments.
SINO-Pak relations initially evolved within a geo-economic framework after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, over time, security considerations have increasingly overshadowed economics, leaving the relationship struggling between the two domains. On the other hand, Pakistan-US relations have historically been strategic and security-centric, but today, they also face the challenge of balancing security with geo-economic priorities.
Ultimately, the real test lies with Pakistan’s establishment — whether it chooses to prioritise geo-economics or maintain deeper, security-centred strategic ties with both global powers. Nevertheless, these options will inevitably come with conditions attached.
Apparently, China’s foremost concern remains security. At the same time, the US emphasises the economic dimension, framing its engagement as both an opportunity for financial advantage and a means to elevate Pakistan’s political profile, particularly in the context of the changing politics of South and West Asia. Pakistan’s geography is undoubtedly a strategic asset, complemented by its aspiration to project itself at a level comparable, if not equal to, India’s military, strategic and political stature, at least in a sustainable sense.
Two perspectives emerge in this regard. One holds that maintaining strong ties with both China and the US can help Pakistan achieve this status. The other, less popular but arguably more pragmatic, view contends that without ensuring political stability and sustained economic growth at home, such ambitions will remain elusive.
Maintaining an exclusive relationship with both China and the US is a delicate task.
However, maintaining an exclusive relationship with both is delicate, especially when there is a contrast in the approach towards and expectations from each other. The phrase ‘de-securitisation of bilateral relationship between the US and Pakistan’ is echoing in Islamabad. But, it remains unclear whether the two nations, which have maintained close security-related ties for over 75 years, will suddenly shift the paradigm, especially when other avenues for cooperation are limited in scope.
Indeed, Pakistan scored a significant boost when it secured a deal with the US on 19 per cent tariffs, opening the door to the expansion of its exports with reduced competition. For much of the past two decades, however, Pakistan’s trade relationship with Washington has been marked by a structural imbalance; the US imports more from Pakistan than it exports, leaving an annual deficit that has averaged between $2 billion to $3bn.
Lower tariffs mean Pakistan must recalibrate its trade strategies. On the surface, its recent negotiations for textile concessions and the decision to import, according to reports, a billion dollars’ worth of US crude oil appear to be tactical measures to ease the strain. Similarly, discussions on crypto cooperation and energy resources exploration carry a futuristic tone, holding some potential to generate political capital and sustain bilateral confidence.
Nevertheless, neither country can detach itself from the broader framework of security cooperation, whether in counterterrorism or regional stability. Washington’s decision to designate the Majeed Brigade of the Balochistan Liberation Army a foreign terrorist organisation — Islamabad’s long-standing demand — reflects an unusual convergence of interests in this sphere.
Yet, a serious test for Pakistan could arise if Washington, in tandem with Saudi Arabia, presses it to endorse the Abraham Accords. Such a move would almost certainly come with binding conditions, foremost among them a recalibration of Pakistan’s Iran policy. Within this context, Balochistan assumes added significance, not only for its role in regional geopolitics but also for the allure of its untapped rare earth mineral reserves.
Outside these contexts, if the US genuinely seeks to de-hyphenate security from its relationship with Pakistan, the question remains: how can this be achieved while engaging primarily with Pakistan’s defence establishment, which by its very nature prioritises security? Successive civilian governments have attempted to reframe their ties with Washington on non-security grounds.
The last serious effort came under the PPP government after 2008, when, in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, the party mistakenly thought that it could alter the trajectory of bilateral relations. The attempt backfired. The Kerry-Lugar Bill, which was supposed to broaden cooperation beyond security, instead became a flashpoint, straining US-Pakistan ties and unsettling the civil-military balance at home.
Another perspective available in the geopolitical domain is that the developments of 2025 do not represent a pivot away from India but a diversification of Washington’s approach to South Asia.
For Pakistan, the opportunity is unprecedented: a chance to reduce overreliance on China, broaden its partnerships, and restore a measure of strategic balance. Yet history warns of how often such openings have been squandered by short-term thinking, institutional fragility and shifting global priorities. The test lies not in the signing of agreements but in their consistent implementation.
If Islamabad can deliver reforms and Washington sustains its commitments, the deal may indeed evolve into a long-term framework of cooperation. If not, it risks becoming just another episode in the long and uneasy history of Pakistan-US relations, full of grand announcements, followed by quiet disappointments.
Pakistan’s establishment does not see any major challenge in balancing its close ties with China while exploring new avenues with the US. It’s also not overly worried about growing China-India ties, knowing their relationship has never been truly strategic and remains uncertain in the near future. Pakistan’s confidence is anchored in its robust defence partnership with China and remains largely intact, even in scenarios where Beijing and New Delhi might coordinate strategies to outmanoeuvre US President Donald Trump.
Chinese diplomacy, however, tends to be far less vocal than Washington’s, and is often conveyed through understated gestures. The Chinese foreign minister’s recent visit to Islamabad centred on security, CPEC and new initiatives. Significantly, just a day earlier, he had been in Kabul for a trilateral security meeting.
Media reports suggest that while China and Afghanistan have advanced discussions on joining the BRI, momentum to extend CPEC into Afghanistan has cooled. The Taliban, meanwhile, appears eager to cultivate an exclusive relationship with Beijing, independent of Pakistani influence, and China has agreed to connect Afghanistan through Central Asia via direct links. This is a signal that Rawalpindi and Islamabad would do well to interpret with care.
Published in Dawn, August 24th, 2025
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