Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PAKISTAN TALIBAN. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PAKISTAN TALIBAN. Sort by date Show all posts

Thursday, February 01, 2024

PAKISTAN
TTP backed by Al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban: UN

 February 1, 2024 

ISLAMABAD: The banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been receiving “significant backing” from Al Qaeda and other militant factions for executing attacks in Pakistan in addition to support from the Afghan Taliban.

This was disclosed in the 33rd report submitted to the United Nations Security Council Commi­ttee by ISIL (aka Daesh) and Al Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team. The collaboration includes not just the provision of arms and equipment but also active on-ground support for the banned TTP’s operations against Pakistan.

Islamabad has repeatedly expressed its frustration over the Afghan Taliban’s inaction against the outlawed TTP, which has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks within Pakistan.

Afghan Taliban’s failure to curb TTP’s activities has led to strained relations between the two countries. Pakistan views Kabul’s reluctance to tackle the TTP as a direct threat to its national security.

The report noted that despite the Afghan Taliban’s official stance discouraging TTP’s activities outside Afghanistan, many TTP fighters have engaged in cross-border attacks in Pakistan without facing any substantial repercussions. Citing reports, it said that some Taliban members, driven by a perceived religious duty, have joined TTP’s ranks, bolstering their operations.

Moreover, TTP members and their families are said to receive regular aid packages from the Afghan Taliban, signifying a deeper level of support.

The Afghan Taliban’s temporary imprisonment of between 70 and 200 TTP members and their strategy of moving personnel northward, away from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, is perceived as an effort to alleviate Pakistani pressure to tackle the banned TTP activities.

In mid-2023, it recalled that the banned TTP established a new base in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where a large number of individuals were trained as suicide bombers. Additionally, Al Qaeda core and Al Qaeda in the subcontinent have been instrumental in providing training, ideological guidance, and support to the outlawed TTP, illustrating the intertwined nature of these militant networks.

Reported orders from Al Qaeda to allocate resources to the banned TTP indicated a deep-rooted collaboration aimed at destabilising the region.

Furthermore, the formation of TJP (Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan) as a front to provide the outlawed TTP with plausible deniability, and the involvement of other groups like ETIM/TIP (East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkestan Islamic Party) and Majeed Brigade in joint operations with TTP, underscore the multifaceted and transnational threat posed by these militant alliances.

The report pointed out that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP) has shifted its base from Badakhshan Province to Baghlan Province, expanding its operational reach across various regions.

The group, it said, is intensively engaged in training the youth for its reserve forces and is notably enhancing the recruitment and training of women.

Concerns, it said, were mounting among regional countries due to ETIM/TIP’s active collaboration in recruitment, training, and strategic planning with other extremist groups, particularly the banned TTP, posing a significant security threat to the area.

Reports from an unnamed member state highlighted that Al Qaida’s core faction was significantly contributing to ETIM/TIP by offering both training and ideological mentorship.

Meanwhile, the Majeed Brigade, engaged in insurgency in Balochistan, is reported to have a strength of around 60 to 80 combatants, with a strategic focus on “recruiting female suicide bombers”.

It’s known for its collaboration with the outlawed TTP and ISIL-K in various domains, including training, arms procurement, intelligence exchange, and coordinated operations, although more details are being sought by some member states.

The Brigade has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks targeting law enforcement and Chinese personnel in Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, February 1st, 2024

Sunday, April 10, 2022

Sharif, frontrunner as next Pakistani PM, seen as 'can-do' administrator


Leader of the opposition Shehbaz Sharif speaks to the media at the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Islamabad

Syed Raza Hassan and Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam
Fri, April 8, 2022

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Shehbaz Sharif, the person most likely to be Pakistan's next prime minister, is little known outside his home country but has a reputation domestically as an effective administrator more than as a politician.

The younger brother of three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Shehbaz, 70, is leading a bid by the opposition in parliament to topple Imran Khan, and if a vote of no-confidence goes ahead on Saturday he is widely expected to replace Khan.

Analysts say Shehbaz, unlike Nawaz, enjoys amicable relations with Pakistan's military, which traditionally controls foreign and defence policy in the nuclear-armed nation of 220 million people.

Pakistan's generals have directly intervened to topple civilian governments three times, and no prime minister has finished a full five-year term since the South Asian state's independence from Britain in 1947.

Shehbaz Sharif, part of the wealthy Sharif dynasty, is best known for his direct, "can-do" administrative style, which was on display when, as chief minister of Punjab province, he worked closely with China on Beijing-funded projects.

He also said in an interview last week that good relations with the United States were critical for Pakistan for better or for worse, in stark contrast to Khan's recently antagonistic relationship with Washington.

There are still several procedural steps before Sharif can become Pakistan's 23rd prime minister, not including caretaker administrations, although the opposition has consistently identified him as its sole candidate.

If he does take on the role, he faces immediate challenges, not least Pakistan's crumbling economy, which has been hit by high inflation, a tumbling local currency and rapidly declining foreign exchange reserves.

Analysts also say Sharif will not act with complete independence as he will have to work on a collective agenda with the others opposition parties and his brother.

Nawaz has lived for the last two years in London since being let out of jail, where he was serving a sentence for corruption, for medical treatment.

'PUNJAB SPEED'

As chief minister of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province, Shehbaz Sharif planned and executed a number of ambitious infrastructure mega-projects, including Pakistan's first modern mass transport system in his hometown, the eastern city of Lahore.

According to local media, the outgoing Chinese consul general wrote to Sharif last year praising his "Punjab Speed" execution of projects under the huge China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative.

The diplomat also said Sharif and his party would be friends of China in government or in opposition.

On Afghanistan, Islamabad is under international pressure to prod the Taliban to meet its human rights commitments while trying to limit instability there.

Unlike Khan, who has regularly denounced India's Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Sharif political dynasty has been more dovish towards the fellow nuclear-armed neighbour, with which Pakistan has fought three wars.

In terms of his relationship with the powerful military, Sharif has long played the public "good cop" to Nawaz's "bad cop" - the latter has had several public spats with the army.

Shehbaz was born in Lahore into a wealthy industrial family and was educated locally. After that he entered the family business and jointly owns a Pakistani steel company.

He entered politics in Punjab, becoming its chief minister for the first time in 1997 before he was caught up in national political upheaval and imprisoned following a military coup. He was then sent into exile in Saudi Arabia in 2000.

Shehbaz returned from exile in 2007 to resume his political career, again in Punjab.

He entered the national political scene when he became the chief of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party after Nawaz was found guilty in 2017 on charges of concealing assets related to the Panama Papers revelations.

The Sharif family and supporters say the cases were politically motivated.

Both brothers have faced numerous corruption cases in the National Accountability Bureau, including under Khan's premiership, but Shehbaz has not been found guilty on any charges.

(Reporting by Syed Raza Hassan and Gibran Peshimam; Editing by William Mallard and Mike Collett-White)


Explainer-What political upheaval in Pakistan means for rest of the world


 PTI chairman Imran Khan gestures while addressing his supporters during a campaign meeting ahead of general elections in Karachi

Fri, April 8, 2022
By Jonathan Landay and Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam

WASHINGTON/ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan faces a no-confidence vote in parliament on Saturday which he is widely expected to lose.

If that happens, or he resigns before then, a new government would be formed most likely under opposition leader Shehbaz Sharif, but it was unclear how long it could last or whether elections expected to take place later this year would bring greater clarity.

The nation of more than 220 million people lies between Afghanistan to the west, China to the northeast and India to the east, making it of vital strategic importance.

Since coming to power in 2018, Khan's rhetoric has become more anti-American and he expressed a desire to move closer to China and, recently, Russia - including talks with President Vladimir Putin on the day the invasion of Ukraine began.

At the same time, U.S. and Asian foreign policy experts said that Pakistan's powerful military has traditionally controlled foreign and defence policy, thereby limiting the impact of political instability.

Here is what the upheaval, which comes as the economy is in deep trouble, means for countries closely involved in Pakistan:

AFGHANISTAN


Ties between Pakistan's military intelligence agency and the Islamist militant Taliban have loosened in recent years.

Now the Taliban are back in power in Afghanistan, and facing an economic and humanitarian crisis due to a lack of money and international isolation, Qatar is arguably their most important foreign partner.

"We (the United States) don't need Pakistan as a conduit to the Taliban. Qatar is definitely playing that role now," said Lisa Curtis, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security think-tank.

Tensions have risen between the Taliban and Pakistan's military, which has lost several soldiers in attacks close to their mutual border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to do more to crack down on extremist groups and worries they will spread violence into Pakistan. That has begun to happen already.

Khan has been less critical of the Taliban over human rights than most foreign leaders.

CHINA

Khan consistently emphasised China's positive role in Pakistan and in the world at large.

At the same time, the $60-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which binds the neighbours together was actually conceptualised and launched under Pakistan's two established political parties, both of which are set to share power once he is gone.

Potential successor Sharif, the younger brother of three-time former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, struck deals with China directly as leader of the eastern province of Punjab, and his reputation for getting major infrastructure projects off the ground while avoiding political grandstanding could in fact be music to Beijing's ears.

INDIA

The nuclear-armed neighbours have fought three wars since independence in 1947, two of them over the disputed Muslim-majority territory of Kashmir.

As with Afghanistan, it is Pakistan's military that controls policy in the sensitive area, and tensions along the de facto border there are at their lowest level since 2021, thanks to a ceasefire.

But there have been no formal diplomatic talks between the rivals for years because of deep distrust over a range of issues including Khan's extreme criticism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for his handling of attacks on minority Muslims in India.

Karan Thapar, an Indian political commentator who has closely followed India-Pakistan ties, said the Pakistani military could put pressure on the new government in Islamabad to build on the successful ceasefire in Kashmir.

Pakistan's powerful army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa said recently that his country was ready to move forward on Kashmir if India agrees.

The Sharif dynasty has been at the forefront of several dovish overtures towards India over the years.

UNITED STATES

U.S.-based South Asia experts said that Pakistan's political crisis is unlikely to be a priority for President Joe Biden, who is grappling with the war in Ukraine, unless it led to mass unrest or rising tensions with India.

"We have so many other fish to fry," said Robin Raphel, a former assistant secretary of state for South Asia who is a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank.

With the Pakistani military maintaining its behind-the-scenes control of foreign and security policies, Khan's political fate was not a major concern, according to some analysts.

"Since it's the military that calls the shots on the policies that the U.S. really cares about, i.e. Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons, internal Pakistani political developments are largely irrelevant for the U.S.," said Curtis, who served as former U.S. President Donald Trump's National Security Council senior director for South Asia.

She added that Khan's visit to Moscow had been a "disaster" in terms of U.S. relations, and that a new government in Islamabad could at least help mend ties "to some degree".

Khan has blamed the United States for the current political crisis, saying that Washington wanted him removed because of the recent Moscow trip. Washington denies any role.

(Additional reporting and writing by Sanjeev Miglani; Editing by Mike Collett-White and Nick Macfie)

Wednesday, September 29, 2021

ORDER FROM CHAOS
The agonizing problem of Pakistan’s nukes

Tuesday, September 28, 2021
BROOKINGS


“This is a new world,” President Joe Biden declared, when justifying his pullout from Afghanistan and explaining his administration’s war on global terrorism in an August 31 speech. It will go “well beyond Afghanistan,” he alerted the world, focusing on “the threats of 2021 and tomorrow.”


Marvin Kalb
Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy

The president will not have to look too far. Bordering Afghanistan, now again under Taliban rule, is Pakistan, one of America’s oddest “allies.” Governed by a shaky coalition of ineffective politicians and trained military leaders trying desperately to contain the challenge of domestic terrorism, Pakistan may be the best definition yet of a highly combustible threat that, if left unchecked, might lead to the nightmare of nightmares: jihadis taking control of a nuclear weapons arsenal of something in the neighborhood of 200 warheads.

Ever since May 1998, when Pakistan first began testing nuclear weapons, claiming its national security demanded it, American presidents have been haunted by the fear that Pakistan’s stockpile of nukes would fall into the wrong hands. That fear now includes the possibility that jihadis in Pakistan, freshly inspired by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, might try to seize power at home.

Trying, of course, is not the same as succeeding. If history is a reliable guide, Pakistan’s professional military would almost certainly respond, and in time probably succeed; but only after the floodgates of a new round of domestic warfare between the government and extremist gangs has been opened, leaving Pakistan again shaken by political and economic uncertainty. And when Pakistan is shaken, so too is India, its less than neighborly rival and nuclear competitor.

Pakistani jihadis come in many different shapes and sizes, but no matter: The possibility of a nuclear-armed terrorist regime in Pakistan has now grown from a fear into a strategic challenge that no American president can afford to ignore.

Former President Barack Obama translated this challenge into carefully chosen words: “The single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short term, medium term and long term,” he asserted, “would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.” (Author’s italics).

The nation that has both nuclear weapons and a dangerous mix of terrorists was — and remains — Pakistan.

No problem, really, Pakistan’s political and military leaders have quickly assured a succession of anxious presidents. Whether it be Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehreek-e-Labaik, al-Qaida, or the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura — these terrorist organizations have always been under our constant surveillance, checked and rechecked. We keep a close eye on everything, even the Islamic madrassas, where more than 2 million students are more likely studying sharia law than economics or history. We know who these terrorists are and what they’re doing, and we’re ready to take immediate action.

These official assurances have fallen largely on deaf ears at the White House, principally because one president after another has learned from American intelligence that these same Pakistani leaders have often been working surreptitiously with the terrorists to achieve common goals. One such goal was the recent defeat of the Kabul regime, which had been supported by the U.S. for 20 years. During this time, the victorious Taliban secretly received political and military support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Shortly after 9/11, for example, the terrorist mastermind, Osama bin Laden, escaped U.S. capture, in part because sympathetic of ISI colleagues. Bin Laden fled to the one place where his security could be assured — Pakistan. In 2011, when the U.S. finally caught up with bin Laden and killed him, Obama chose not to inform Pakistani leaders of the super-secret operation, even though the target was down the street from a Pakistani military academy, fearful that once again bin Laden would be tipped off and escape.

Related Books



Deadly Embrace
By Bruce Riedel 2012



Pakistan Under Siege
By Madiha Afzal 2018

The U.S. has learned over the years not to trust Pakistan, realizing that a lie here and there might be part of the diplomatic game but that this level of continuing deception was beyond acceptable bounds. That Pakistan was also known to have helped North Korea and Iran develop their nuclear programs has only deepened the distrust.

Indeed, since the shock of 9/11, Pakistan has come to represent such an exasperating problem that the U.S. has reportedly developed a secret plan to arbitrarily seize control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal if a terrorist group in Pakistan seemed on the edge of capturing some or all of its nuclear warheads. When repeatedly questioned about the plan, U.S. officials have strung together an artful, if unpersuasive, collection of “no comments.”

Even though U.S. economic and military aid has continued to flow into Pakistan — reaching $4.5 billion in fiscal 2010, though on other occasions capriciously cut — America’s concerns about Pakistan’s stability and reliability have only worsened. Since the debacle in Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s barely disguised role in it, serious questions have been raised about America’s embarrassing predisposition to look the other way whenever Pakistan has been caught with its hand in a terrorist’s cookie jar. How long can America look the other way?

The anguishing problem for the Biden administration is now coming into sharper focus: Even if the president decided to challenge Pakistan’s dangerous flirtation with domestic and regional terrorism, what specific policies could he adopt that would satisfy America’s obvious desire to disengage from Afghan-like civil wars without at the same time getting itself involved in another nation’s domestic struggles with terrorists? Disengagement has become the name of the game in Washington.

One approach, already widely discussed, is that the U.S. can contain the spread of terrorism in South Asia by relying on its “over-the-horizon” capabilities. Though almost every senior official, including Biden, has embraced this approach, it’s doubtful they really believe it’s a viable substitute for “boots on the ground.”

Another possibility would be the Central Intelligence Agency striking a new under-the-table deal with the ISI that would set new goals and guidelines for both services to cooperate more aggressively in the war against domestic and regional terrorism. Unfortunately, prospects for such expanded cooperation, though rhetorically appealing, are actually quite slim. Veterans of both services shake their heads, reluctantly admitting it is unrealistic, given the degree of distrust on both sides.

But even if Biden, despite knowing better, decided to continue to look the other way, hoping against hope that Pakistan would be able to contain the terrorists and keep them from acquiring nuclear warheads, he will find that Prime Minister Imran Khan is not a ready and eager ally, if he ever was one. Lately he’s been painting the Biden administration as damaged goods after its hurried exit from Afghanistan. And he has been rearranging Pakistan’s regional relationships by strengthening his ties with China and extending a welcoming hand to Russia. Also Khan may soon discover that his pro-Taliban policy runs the risk of backfiring and inspiring Pakistani terrorists to turn against him. To whom would he then turn for help?

Khan, who won his mandate in 2018, surely knows by now that he runs a decidedly unhappy country, beset by major economic and political problems, waves of societal corruption and the no-nonsense challenge coming from domestic terrorists eager to impose a severe Islamic code of conduct on the Pakistani people. Sixty-four percent of the population are under the age of 30 and more desirous of iPhones and apps than of religious zealotry.

Pakistan is a looming problem with no satisfactory solutions. For Biden, no matter what policies he pursues, it remains a recurring nightmare, the stuff of a paperback thriller: a scary mix of terrorists who may one day be able to seize power and, with it, control over the nation’s stockpile of nuclear warheads — all of this happening in a shaky, strategically-located country that was once an ally.

Since the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, geostrategic relationships on the Asian subcontinent have been undergoing important changes. Pakistan has tilted its future towards a closer relationship with China, while its principal adversary, India, has tightened its ties to the United States, both of them sharing an already deep distrust of China. In this increasingly uneasy atmosphere, the U.S. remains concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile falling into terrorist hands. If this seemed to be happening, the U.S. would feel the need to intervene militarily to stop it. Pakistan would likely turn to China for help, setting the stage for the U.S. and China, because of Pakistan’s nukes, to head towards a direct and possibly deadly confrontation which neither superpower wants or needs.

Saturday, August 10, 2024

Pakistan presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. in the war on terror

Since the United States pulled their troops out of Afghanistan in 2021 there has been a noticeable lack of intelligence being produced out of that region compared to when there were boots on the ground.


ByRishi Singh
August 10, 2024
Photo by Pixabay on pexels

Since the United States pulled their troops out of Afghanistan in 2021 there has been a noticeable lack of intelligence being produced out of that region compared to when there were boots on the ground. The US now relies on the ‘Over the Horizon’ approach, focusing on drone strikes to target terror groups in Afghanistan, particularly ISIS – Khorasan (ISIS-K) However, while ISIS-K has been in the spotlight lately, there is a growing fear over the resurgence of Al-Qaeda. Naveen Khan paints a sobering picture regarding Al-Qaeda’s future in her recent article called “Core Al-Qaeda Poses a High Threat to the United States.” It highlights that today Al-Qaeda has access to resources and the freedom to operate that they had not had since pre 9/11. She even asserts that Al-Qaeda could have the operational capacity to strike the United States within 12 to 36 months. 

Pakistan offers a unique opportunity for the United States to gain information and intelligence that it no longer has access to. On June 27th Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said that Tehreek-e-Taliban – Pakistan (TTP) hideouts in Afghanistan can be targeted under Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. This announcement comes after months of Pakistan trying to engage in talks with Afghanistan about ramping up counter terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, where Pakistan claims the TTP has used to plot attacks. Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan the number of terrorism incidents has been increasing, see Figure 1 below. 

Figure 1: According to GRID (GTTAC Research Incidents Database) from 2019 to June 2024

Figure 1 shows the number of terrorism incidents in Pakistan from 2019 through June 2024. The graph shows stable numbers of attacks in Pakistan in 2019 and 2020. However, following the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan there is a clear trend of increasing attacks in the region that could easily hit 800 incidents in 2024, around a 300% increase. The attacks have led Pakistan to accuse the Afghan Taliban of providing a safe haven for the TTP to launch and plan their attacks in Pakistan. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif says TTP hideouts in Afghanistan can be targeted under Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. While these operations have not yet started, it is imperative that the US supports Pakistan’s efforts as Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K have been free to operate. The United Nations (UN)  recently released a report regarding the TTP on July 12th, “The Taliban do not conceive of TTP as a terrorist group: the bonds are close, and the debt owed to TTP significant,” The UN Security Council states the TTP has become the largest group that now operates freely in Afghanistan with around 6000-6500 fighters. Pakistan now faces an existential threat without having the proper resources to effectively deal with the threat at hand. 

Pakistan needs to seek tangible support from other countries. However, neighboring superpowers like Russia and China may be unwilling to provide such assistance. They view the new Taliban regime as an opportunity rather than a threat to their national security. China sees the new regime as an opportunity to create new energy and mining projects while exploring investment options. Russia has played with the idea of removing the Taliban from their list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and opening diplomatic relations with the Taliban government. This leaves the United States as the best option for support, especially when pitching the rising threat of ISIS-K. The increasing numbers of claimed ISIS-K attacks shown in Figure 2 are worrisome and have become more than just a regional threat.

Figure 2: According to GRID (GTTAC Research Incidents Database) from 2019 to June 2024

Figure 2 shows the recent trends associated with Islamic State in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The attacks shown in the figure are incidents that have been claimed by the two groups. It is important to note the increasing trend among ISIS – Khorasan (ISIS-K). ISIS was a group that was believed to have been largely defeated following western counter terrorism efforts in the Middle east and Western Asia. As the trends suggest, there has been a recent resurgence with more attacks being claimed including the deadly attack in Moscow on March 22 that killed 130 people and injured hundreds more. In 2024, a new ISIS faction was created known as Islamic State – Pakistan Province (ISIS-PP) that has already claimed four attacks. The safe haven the Taliban state has created in Afghanistan for terror groups has shown its effect not only regionally but globally as well. 

Following the announcement of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, the United States should seize the opportunity for more intelligence on top commanders of the different groups. With the over the horizon approach, decapitation has become the default method for their efforts. By obtaining more and timelier information it will benefit the United States’ efforts to limit the growth of ISIS-K and Al-Qaeda groups. The United States must remember the importance of preventative measures before history has a chance to repeat itself. The exchange of intelligence could provide the United States with the ability to better monitor the growing threats in the region as well as strengthen national security ties with Pakistan.

Rishi Singh
Rishi Singh
My name is Rishi Singh, I recently graduated from George Mason University with a degree in Global Affairs and a minor in Intelligence Studies. My studies focused on the Theory and Social Dynamics of Terrorism. I currently work at the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (gttac.com) with a focus on Pakistan and Southeast Asia. My job works on documenting and analyzing the terrorism trends in the assigned regions.

Friday, February 04, 2022

Khan’s Afghan relief fund faces fire on all fronts

Pakistan leader’s plan to funnel funds to the Taliban to avert an Afghan humanitarian disaster clashes with a newly assertive central bank

By FM SHAKIL
JANUARY 25, 2022

Afghan refugees are arriving in droves in neighboring Pakistan. Photo: AFP

PESHAWAR – The Pakistan government’s bid to raise funds for Afghanistan’s cash-strapped government has been shot down by the suddenly autonomous State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), due to concerns that financing the Taliban regime could trigger international sanctions.

The SBP has advised against domestic and foreign donations to the government’s Afghanistan Relief Fund, telling the finance ministry that funneling funds to the Afghan government without involving “international organizations of repute” could result in sanctions from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-money laundering and terror finance watchdog.

Pakistan has been on the FATF’s “grey list” since June 2018; the Paris-based watchdog is set to review Pakistan’s performance on various metrics next month. Pakistan has not yet met two key FATF action items, including the prosecution and confiscation of assets of UN-designated terrorists, to be removed from the grey list.


The SBP’s stand against the government’s relief fund plan marks perhaps the first time the central bank has flexed its autonomy since legislation was tabled towards making it more independent. The SBP is undergoing some autonomy-enhancing reforms under a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a US$6 billion extended fund facility.

The government’s cabinet has already approved the SBP Amendment Bill 2021, but the parliament has yet to pass the legislation. The SBP autonomy bill legislation has drawn mixed reactions from politicians and specialists, with opposition parties reportedly opposing the bill on concerns the amendment would make the bank more powerful than the parliament.

Economists and experts, on the other hand, say that greater SBP autonomy is in line with international banking practices and would serve as a bulwark against fiscal irresponsibility and politically motivated financial decisions. That’s already starting to happen in the eyes of certain local observers.

Dr Kaiser Bengali, a leading local economist, tweeted on January 23, “Three cheers for “autonomous” SBP. First, it rejects the Government plan for Afghanistan {relief} Fund. Now, it has warned private banks of the risk of the Federal Government defaulting on its loans. Remarkable! SBP is treating Federal Government like a juvenile delinquent.”

A money changer counts Pakistani Rupee notes in Karachi in a file photo.
 Photo: Agencies

“In the past whenever they [the government] overdrew the budgetary ceiling and expended excessively without having fiscal space, they needed to go to the central bank for borrowings,” said Farrukh Saleem, an Islamabad-based Pakistani political scientist, economist and financial analyst. “Now the government cannot do this and would need to be fiscally disciplined or take loans from the private banks on market rates,” he said.


The government’s desire to funnel relief funds to Afghanistan to mitigate a humanitarian catastrophe that could quickly and massively redound on Pakistan through new waves of refugees, economic migrants and Islamic militants has put it on a collision course with the SBP.

An International Labor Organization (ILO) report released on January 19 said that a downward economic spiral has thrown more than half a million people out of work in Afghanistan, with women chiefly hit by the rise in unemployment. (Afghanistan’s population is recently estimated at 39 million.)

The ILO report said that Afghan companies were struggling to stay afloat and that thousands of Afghans were fleeing the country each day. It predicted more dire prospects in 2022.

With many of those fleeing headed for Pakistan, in late December the government approached the SBP through its finance division to open a collection account for its Afghanistan Relief Fund. It proposed that disbursements from the new fund to the Taliban could be made through banking channels.

The SBP countered that the transfer of funds directly to Afghanistan “through banking channels could be challenging.” It proposed instead that disbursements from the fund could be made through international relief organizations or extended by the government as “in-kind” support to help Afghans who now face acute food shortages.


The central bank asserted that opening fund accounts at overseas bank branches would require the authorization of foreign regulatory bodies, a time-consuming and cumbersome process – particularly in light of Pakistan’s FATF “grey list” designation.

Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government has tried to soften the world’s stance on the Taliban, which most countries have declined to give formal recognition as the country’s government, and restore badly needed foreign assistance that contributed the lion’s share of the previous, US-backed Ashraf Ghani government.

A handout picture made available by the Iranian Red Crescent on August 19, 2021, shows Afghan refugees gathered at a border region. 
Photo: Mohammad Javadzadeh / Iranian Red Crescent / AFP

The international community, including the US, has responded to the Taliban’s takeover and Ghani’s ouster by force by freezing its overseas assets, cutting aid and offering only limited relief for humanitarian purposes.

In early December, Pakistan engaged various Muslim countries by hosting the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Islamabad, but the summit did not generate meaningful humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

Saudi Arabia pledged US$365 million to establish by March a Humanitarian Trust Fund and Food Security Program managed by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). This was in addition to the $30 million Pakistan had already committed for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.

Pakistani pundits believe that the Taliban’s revenue from various sources will exceed $3 billion per year but the insurgents-cum-rulers seem reluctant to expend their resources to minimize the sufferings of the Afghan population.

The United Nations also estimates that the Taliban has increased their revenues in the five months of their rule. Deborah Lyons, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, said that the Taliban collected a surprising $1 billion in exports in the last five months.

The Khan government’s relief fund plan, already stymied by the SBP on regulatory grounds, is also under political fire for raising donations that the Taliban would likely pocket rather than distribute to suffering Afghans.

“[The Taliban] are neither a state nor a government but are a mob who occupied Afghanistan by force,” Mohsin Dawar, chairman of the National Democratic Movement (NDM), a Pakistan National Assembly member and a Pashtun Tahafuz Movement activist, told Asia Times.

“You cannot expect from such a crowd that they would perform as a government and make budgeting for the uplift of the population.”

Follow FM Shakil on Twitter at @faq1955

Sunday, September 26, 2021

Hoping for miracles

Abbas Nasir
Published September 26, 2021 - 


The writer is a former editor of Dawn.


WHILE the ramifications of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan are far from clear at this point, what can be said with certainty is that Pakistan appears ill-equipped to deal with the challenges that regional developments can potentially throw up.

Claiming vindication of the military strategists’ long-held view and policy on Afghanistan is one thing; buckling down to what changes that ‘win’ can bring and the need for fleet-footed policy responses is altogether another.

The US rightly got slammed for the manner in which it announced its departure from Afghanistan and executed the pullout. The Taliban saw it as a huge win with some justification as they had faced the US military might for two decades.

The Taliban fought the hi-tech juggernaut with small arms, improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. Even if they found a few sanctuaries, succour and counsel in the erstwhile tribal areas of neighbouring Pakistan, during those 20 years, the win was theirs and theirs alone.

Pakistan will be exposed to international recrimination if the Taliban revert to their old ways.


Since they see the win as theirs alone, they don’t seem to be in the mood to listen to anyone including Pakistan, long seen by the international community as a benefactor and protector of the Afghan militant group with extraordinary influence over it.

The reality was evident when a senior Taliban leader in an address whose clips were shared on social media responded harshly to Prime Minister Imran Khan’s call for an inclusive government in Kabul. He used rather strong language and called into question the latter’s democratic credentials.

Of course, this is not to say Pakistan has zero leverage over the Taliban but merely to underline the complexity of the Afghan situation with different elements of the militant group such as the military and political pulling in different directions.

The success of the Taliban’s military and terror campaign, experts said, was also due to decentralised command structure. From recruitment, training to planning, targeting and executing attacks a lot was left to the local commanders.

Now that the task is to run the country and present a unified whole, that autonomy is proving difficult to curtail as is evident in old-style Taliban system of summary ‘justice’ ie brutal punishments and confining women, even schoolgirls, to quarters in so many areas of the country.

Understandably, this may be the view of the apologists who also maintain that the reborn Taliban leadership is not anything like what the world witnessed when they took power in 1996. Pakistan is among those nations that are pumping out this message daily.

Pakistan may be advocating global engagement with the ‘changed’ Taliban and arguing for Western funds to flow to Afghanistan to ward off hunger that large swaths of the population will soon be facing so that a flood of refugees doesn’t come knocking at its door soon.

But in the process it is also giving an undertaking of sorts that the Taliban will behave in a certain manner over the coming months and in the future. Ergo, leaving itself exposed to international recriminations if Kabul’s new rulers revert to their old ways.

In these columns over the past weeks, we have already discussed the new US priority: encirclement of China. Whether the Taliban defeated the US or the latter decided to refocus its energies and priorities on its new enemy is difficult to tell.

What is not is that from AUKUS to the Quad contacts and initiatives, the Biden administration now seems to have its sight set on one goal. As it tries to restrict China’s growing footprint in the Asia Pacific region and beyond, the US sees India as one of its main partners.

Pakistan’s astute military planners, I am sure, are already gaming multiple scenarios and the policy responses to those. However, one major piece is missing from the jigsaw. The importance of that piece can’t be mentioned enough.

It is the need for a consensus within the country on both the challenges and the response to those. National security and large chunks of foreign policy decisions are being made by the military, more than in the past, in the incumbent set-up which some of its key supporters call hybrid.

Neither parliament nor key opposition leaders have been consulted in any meaningful way in the past so many weeks. The odd briefing to a handful of parliamentary committee members at GHQ is not the same as seeking input from elected members representing the popular will.

However, that is proving difficult as with two years to go before elections, the governing party is not willing to lift its foot off the confrontation pedal as it believes that castigating and hounding the opposition for even uncommitted sins is a winning formula.

And if doing that vitiates the environment and divides society, it is a small price to pay. While the PTI government is easier to blame because of its leaders’ inflammatory statements and its visible persecution of opposition leaders, its backers are not.

This, despite the fact that in a hybrid set-up responsibility has to be shared by all partners for all actions. Talking of responsibility, the opposition is not blameless either. It is terribly fragmented and now seems to be fighting for crumbs off the ‘head table’ and is content with what it can pick up.

The main opposition PML-N and its top leaders have played the ‘good cop, bad cop’ game so many times that it has lost its utility. If I were a supporter of the party I’d be totally confused regarding its direc­­tion and whether to offer a fight or flight response.

The PML-N has chosen to appease a few it deems powerful at great cost. The most obvious being treated no better than a doormat more or less like the PPP also chose to do so. With new regional realities and the country’s economy tanking, one is left at the mercy of unaccountable institutions, decision-makers and hoping for miracles.

The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, September 26th, 2021

Monday, April 04, 2022

Explainer-What political upheaval in Pakistan means for rest of the world



By Jonathan Landay and Gibran Naiyyar 
2022/4/4 

WASHINGTON/ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan blocked a no-confidence vote he looked sure to lose on Sunday and advised the president to order fresh elections, fueling anger among the opposition and deepening the country's political crisis.

His actions have created huge uncertainty in Islamabad, with constitutional experts debating their legality and pondering whether Khan and his rivals can find a way forward.

The nuclear-armed nation of more than 220 million people lies between Afghanistan to the west, China to the northeast and nuclear rival India to the east, making it of vital strategic importance.

Since coming to power in 2018, Khan's rhetoric has become more anti-American and he has expressed a desire to move closer to China and, recently, Russia - including talks with President Vladimir Putin on the day the invasion of Ukraine began.

At the same time, U.S. and Asian foreign policy experts said that Pakistan's powerful military has traditionally controlled foreign and defence policy, thereby limiting the impact of political instability.

Here is what the upheaval, which many expect to lead to Khan's exit, means for countries closely involved in Pakistan:

AFGHANISTAN

Ties between Pakistan's military intelligence agency and the Islamist militant Taliban have loosened in recent years.

Now the Taliban are back in power, and facing an economic and humanitarian crisis due to a lack of money and international isolation, Qatar is arguably their most important foreign partner.

"We (the United States) don't need Pakistan as a conduit to the Taliban. Qatar is definitely playing that role now," said Lisa Curtis, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security think-tank.

Tensions have risen between the Taliban and Pakistan's military, which has lost several soldiers in attacks close to their mutual border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to do more to crack down on extremist groups and worries they will spread violence into Pakistan. That has begun to happen already.

Khan has been less critical of the Taliban over human rights than most foreign leaders.

CHINA

Khan has consistently emphasised China's positive role in Pakistan and in the world at large.

At the same time, the $60-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which binds the neighbours together was actually conceptualised and launched under Pakistan's two established political parties, both of which want Khan out of power.

Opposition leader and potential successor Shehbaz Sharif struck deals with China directly as leader of the eastern province of Punjab, and his reputation for getting major infrastructure projects off the ground while avoiding political grandstanding could in fact be music to Beijing's ears.

INDIA

The neighbours have fought three wars since independence in 1947, two of them over the disputed Muslim-majority territory of Kashmir.

As with Afghanistan, it is Pakistan's military that controls policy in the sensitive area, and tensions along the de facto border there are at their lowest level since 2021.

But there have been no formal diplomatic talks between the rivals for years because of deep distrust over a range of issues including Khan's extreme criticism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for his handling of attacks on minority Muslims in India.

Karan Thapar, an Indian political commentator who has closely followed India-Pakistan ties, said the Pakistani military could put pressure on a new civilian government in Islamabad to build on the successful ceasefire in Kashmir.

On Saturday, Pakistan's powerful army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa said his country was ready to move forward on Kashmir if India agrees.

The Sharif political dynasty has been at the forefront of several dovish overtures towards India over the years.

UNITED STATES

U.S.-based South Asia experts said that Pakistan's political crisis is unlikely to be a priority for President Joe Biden, who is grappling with the war in Ukraine, unless it led to mass unrest or rising tensions with India.

"We have so many other fish to fry," said Robin Raphel, a former assistant secretary of State for South Asia who is a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank.



With the Pakistani military maintaining its behind-the-scenes control of foreign and security policies, Khan's political fate was not a major concern, according to some analysts.

"Since it's the military that calls the shots on the policies that the U.S. really cares about, i.e. Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons, internal Pakistani political developments are largely irrelevant for the U.S.," said Curtis, who served as former U.S. President Donald Trump's National Security Council senior director for South Asia.

She added that Khan's visit to Moscow had been a "disaster" in terms of U.S. relations, and that a new government in Islamabad could at least help mend ties "to some degree".

Khan has blamed the United States for the current political crisis, saying that Washington wanted him removed because of the recent Moscow trip.

(Additional reporting and writing by Sanjeev Miglani; Editing by Mike Collett-White)

Saturday, November 11, 2023

Pakistani police cracking down on migrants are arresting Afghan women and children, activists claim


ADIL JAWAD
Sat, November 11, 2023 



Human rights lawyer Moniza Kakar, center, speaks during a news conference at Karachi Press Club, in Karachi, Pakistan, Saturday, Nov. 11, 2023. Kakar said police in Sindh launch midnight raids on people's homes and detain
 Afghan families, including women and children. (AP Photo/Fareed Khan)

ASSOCIATED PRESS

KARACHI, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistani police are arresting Afghan women and children in southern Sindh province as part of a government crackdown on undocumented migrants, activists said Saturday.

More than 250,000 Afghans have left Pakistan in recent weeks as the government rounded up, arrested and kicked out foreign nationals without papers. It set an Oct. 31 deadline for undocumented migrants to leave the country voluntarily.

The expulsions mostly affect Afghans, who make up the majority of foreigners living in Pakistan. Authorities maintain they are targeting all who are in the country illegally.

Human rights lawyer Moniza Kakar said police in Sindh launch midnight raids on people’s homes and detain Afghan families, including women and children.

Since Nov. 1, she and other activists have stationed themselves outside detention centers in Karachi to help Afghans. But they say they face challenges accessing the centers. They don’t have information about raid timings or deportation buses leaving the port city for Afghanistan.

“They’ve been arresting hundreds of Afghan nationals daily since the Oct. 31 deadline, sparing neither children nor women,” Kakar said.

Last December, Afghan women and children were among 1,200 people jailed in Karachi for entering the city without valid travel documents. The arrests brought criticism from around Afghanistan after images of locked-up children were circulated online.

In the latest crackdown, even Afghans with documentation face the constant threat of detention, leading many to confine themselves to their homes for fear of deportation, Kakar said. “Some families I know are struggling without food, forced to stay indoors as police officials continue arresting them, regardless of their immigration status.”

She highlighted the plight of refugee children born in Pakistan without proof of identity, even when their parents have papers. Minors are being separated from their families, she told The Associated Press.

A Pakistani child who speaks Pashto, one of Afghanistan's official languages, was detained and deported because his parents were unable register him in the national database, according to Kakar.

The head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Hina Jilani, said Pakistan lacks a comprehensive mechanism to handle refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented migrants, despite hosting Afghans for 40 years.

She criticised the government’s “one-size-fits-all approach” and called for a needs-based assessment, especially for those who crossed the border after the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in 2021.

Violence against Pakistani security forces and civilians has surged since the Taliban takeover. Most attacks have been claimed by the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP, a separate militant group but a close ally of the Afghan Taliban.

On Saturday, the TTP claimed responsibility for an attack that killed three police officers and injured another three in northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan.

Pakistan accuses the Taliban of harboring militants from groups like the TTP — allegations that the Taliban deny — and said undocumented Afghans are responsible for some of the attacks.

Jilani highlighted the humanitarian aspect of dealing with Pakistan’s Afghan communities, saying they shouldn’t be solely viewed through a security lens.

The Sindh official responsible for detention and deportation centers in the province, Junaid Iqbal Khan, admitted there were “initial incidents” of mistaken identity, with documented refugees and even Pakistani nationals being taken to transit points or detention centers. But now only foreigners without proper registration or documentation are sent for deportation, Khan said.

Around 2,000 detainees have been taken to a central transit point in the past 10 days, with several buses heading to the Afghan border daily through southwest Baluchistan province.

Khan said he wasn’t involved in raids or detentions so couldn’t comment on allegations of mishandling.

Pakistan has long hosted millions of Afghans, most of whom fled during the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation. More than half a million fled Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover.

___

Riaz Khan contributed from Peshawar, Pakistan.

Saturday, September 09, 2006

Our Allies The Taliban


Our alliance with Pakistan is the biggest reason we will lose in Afghanistan. Which War Minister O'Conor finally admitted, after having met with Musharraf. Coincidence? I think not.


PAKISTAN PRESIDENT PERVEZ Musharraf is supposedly a key US ally in the “war on terror.”

But is he, in fact, more of a liability than an asset in combating Al Qaeda and the increasingly menacing Taleban forces in Afghanistan?


Musharraf has been an opportunist from the start who has continued to help the Taleban (just as he had done before Sept 11) and who has gone after Al Qaeda cells in Pakistan only to the extent necessary to fend off US and British pressure.


On Sept 19, 2001, Musharraf made a revealing TV address in Urdu, not noticed at the time by many Americans, in which he reassured Pakistanis who sympathised with Al Qaeda and the Taleban that his decision to line up with the US was a temporary expedient.

To Taleban sympathisers, Musharraf directed an explicit message, saying: “I have done everything for the ... Taleban when the whole world was against them ... We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and the Taleban.”He has kept his promise to the latter.

Why the US needs the Taliban

On July 16, speaking to Electronic Telegraph of the United Kingdom, US troop commander General Frank "Buster" Hagenbeck, based at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, reported increased attacks over recent weeks on US and Afghan forces by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other anti-US groups that have joined hands. He also revealed some other very interesting information: the Taliban and its allies have regrouped in Pakistan and are recruiting fighters from religious schools in Quetta in a campaign funded by drug trafficking. Hagenbeck also said that these enemies of US and Afghan forces have been joined by Al-Qaeda commanders who are establishing new cells and sponsoring the attempted capture of American troops. One other piece of news of import from Hagenbeck is that the Taliban have seized whole swathes of the country. What is happening? Both Hagenbeck, who boasts to the media about the high quality of his intelligence, and Khalilzad, who is unquestionably in a position to know, have stated that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are being nurtured, not in some inaccessible terrain along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border but in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Balochistan province where the Pakistan Army and the ISI have a major presence. Yet, President Bush and his neo-conservative henchmen have remained strangely quiet, allowing Pakistan to strengthen the Taliban in Quetta, and, as a consequence, re-energize al-Qaeda - the killers of thousands of Americans in the fall of 2001.


Also See:

Afghanistan

War




The image “http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/4319/673/320/2006-08-31-Troops.jpg” cannot be displayed, because it contains errors.


Find blog posts, photos, events and more off-site about:
, , , , , , , , ,

, , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,



Tags