Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PANDEMIC. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query PANDEMIC. Sort by date Show all posts

Thursday, July 18, 2024

TORIES CAN'T MANAGE

UK Government 'failed' public leading to more deaths, Covid-19 inquiry finds

Alasdair Ferguson
Thu, 18 July 2024 

The UK Covid-19 inquiry said there was a 'damaging absence of focus' from the Tory government (Image: Jordan Pettitt/PA Wire)


THE UK Government and the civil service “failed” the public due to “significant flaws” in preparing for the Covid-19 pandemic, a public inquiry has found.

In its first report into preparedness for a pandemic, the UK Covid-19 Inquiry said there was a “damaging absence of focus” on the measures and infrastructure that would be needed to deal with a fast-spreading disease, even though a coronavirus outbreak at pandemic scale “was forseeable”.

A major flaw, according to the inquiry, was the lack of “a system that could be scaled up to test, trace and isolate” people.


The report added: “Despite reams of documentation, planning guidance was insufficiently robust and flexible, and policy documentation was outdated, unnecessarily bureaucratic and infected by jargon.”

READ MORE: Keir Starmer told Grangemouth response is 'critical test' for Labour

The inquiry said it had “no hesitation” in concluding that the “processes, planning and policy of the civil contingencies structures within the UK government and devolved administrations and civil services failed their citizens”.

The Covid inquiry, which is being chaired by Baroness Heather Hallett (below), published its 217-page report on Thursday.

In her foreword to the report, Hallett said lessons must be learned and “never again can a disease be allowed to lead to so many deaths and so much suffering”.

The report found:

The UK “prepared for the wrong pandemic”, namely a flu pandemic. Furthermore, this flu plan was “inadequate for a global pandemic of the kind that struck”.

In the years leading up to the pandemic, “there was a lack of adequate leadership, coordination and oversight”. Ministers “failed to challenge sufficiently the advice they did receive from officials and advisers”, and they did not receive a broad enough range of scientific opinion and policy options.

Groups advising the Government “did not have sufficient freedom and autonomy to express dissenting views”, there was a lack of challenge to what was said, and the advice was often undermined by “groupthink”.

The institutions and structures responsible for emergency planning throughout government were “labyrinthine” in how complex they were.

There were “fatal strategic flaws” in the assessment of the risks facing the UK, including a future pandemic.

Emergency planning generally failed to account for how the vulnerable would be looked after, as well as those at most risk due to existing poor health, and the deprivation and societal differences already present in the UK.

There was a “failure to learn sufficiently” from past exercises designed to test the UK’s response to the spread of disease.

The “recent experiences of Sars and Mers meant that another coronavirus outbreak at pandemic scale was foreseeable. It was not a "black swan" event.

The absence of such a scenario from the risk assessments was a fundamental error of the Department of Health and Social Care and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

The UK government and devolved administrations could and should have "assessed the risk of a novel pathogen to reach pandemic scale".

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, “there was no exercising of measures such as mass testing, mass contact tracing mandated social distancing or lockdowns”.

The scenario of an emerging infectious disease reaching pandemic scale and requiring contact tracing as a first step to controlling its spread “was not considered”.

The report found that the UK’s pandemic plan for flu was written in 2011 and “was outdated and lacked adaptability”.

It added: “It was virtually abandoned on its first encounter with the pandemic.”

In her recommendations, Hallett called for a new pandemic strategy to be developed and tested at least every three years, with a UK-wide crisis response exercise.

She said the Government and political leaders should be properly held to account on a regular basis “for systems of preparedness and resilience”.

She also said external experts from outside Whitehall and government should be brought in to challenge and guard against “the known problem of groupthink”.

READ MORE: Labour MPs urge Keir Starmer to drop legal challenge against Netanyahu arrest

There were more than 235,000 deaths involving Covid-19 in the UK up to the end of 2023.

In her foreword, Hallett said: “It is not a question of ‘if’ another pandemic will strike but ‘when’.

“The evidence is overwhelmingly to the effect that another pandemic – potentially one that is even more transmissible and lethal – is likely to occur in the near to medium future.

“Unless the lessons are learned, and fundamental change is implemented, that effort and cost will have been in vain when it comes to the next pandemic.

“There must be radical reform. Never again can a disease be allowed to lead to so many deaths and so much suffering.”



Brexit preparations hit UK's pandemic planning: inquiry report

Helen ROWE
Thu, 18 July 2024 

The Covid-19 inquiry has been examining the British government's response to the pandemic (JUSTIN TALLIS)

Preparations for a possible no-deal Brexit contributed to the UK's lack of readiness for a global pandemic, a public inquiry into the government's handling of Covid-19 concluded on Thursday.

In the first of a series of reports on the UK's response to the global health emergency, the chair of the inquiry, retired senior judge Heather Hallett, laid out a string of damning criticisms.

Her 217-page report found that UK officials had been too focused on a flu outbreak, leading it to prepare "for the wrong pandemic".

The bodies responsible for emergency planning were "labyrinthine in their complexity", advice to government was often "undermined by 'groupthink'", and advisers were not given enough freedom to "express dissenting views", it added.

Witnesses told the inquiry "that a number of workstreams for pandemic preparedness were also paused due to reallocations of resources to Operation Yellowhammer" -- the government's contingency plan to prepare for it crashing out of the European Union without an agreement.

Other factors in the UK's lack of readiness included a lack of parliamentary scrutiny and bureaucracy with a failure to "identify and accurately describe the underlying problems, compounded by the use of jargon and euphemism to disguise... tasks that had not been completed", it said.

The UK suffered one of the worst Covid-19 death tolls in Europe, with criticism levelled at the government of Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson that it failed to take the threat seriously in the early stages of the outbreak.

More than 128,500 fatalities were recorded in the UK by mid-July 2021.

Other criticism included a failure to have enough protective equipment for frontline medical staff.

Hallett called for a "major overhaul" to transform how the country prepares for civil emergencies in future.

Key recommendations included a "radical simplification" of civil emergency preparedness, a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years and the creation of a single body to oversee the whole system.

The inquiry hearings were held in London in June and July 2023.

Witnesses included politicians including Johnson and former health minister Matt Hancock, scientists, civil servants and relatives of some of those who died.

har/phz/js



UK public 'failed' by governments which prepared for 'wrong pandemic' ahead of COVID-19, inquiry finds

Sky News
Thu, 18 July 2024 



The UK's citizens were "failed" by their governments' processes, planning and policy ahead of the COVID-19 pandemic, a public inquiry has found.

There were more than 235,000 deaths involving COVID-19 in the UK up to the end of 2023 and a report published today says some of the "financial and human cost may have been avoided" had the country been better prepared for the deadly outbreak in 2020.

It is the first of nine reports to be published by the UK COVID-19 Inquiry and examines the state of the UK's structures and procedures in place to prepare and respond to a pandemic.

The 83,000-word document details "several significant flaws" including preparing for "the wrong pandemic".

Baroness Heather Hallett, the inquiry chair, is calling for "radical reform" as she makes 10 recommendations, including a major overhaul of how the UK government prepares for civil emergencies.

"Never again can a disease be allowed to lead to so many deaths and so much suffering," Lady Hallett writes in an introduction.

Speaking after the report's publication, she said: "I have no hesitation in concluding the processes, planning and policy of the civil contingency structures across the UK failed the citizens of all four nations.

"There were serious errors on the part of the state and serious flaws in our emergency systems. This cannot be allowed to happen again."

Key recommendations include a radical simplification of systems, holding a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years and the creation of a single, independent statutory body responsible for the preparedness and response of the whole system.

Read more: Why damning first report may be most important

The inquiry received 103,000 documents, 213 witness statements and heard from 68 witnesses for the first module in June and July last year, with hearings for later phases expected to continue until 2026.

The report states the UK "lacked resilience" in 2020 and was "ill prepared for dealing with a catastrophic emergency, let alone the COVID-19 pandemic that actually struck".

A slowdown in health improvement, widening health inequalities and high pre-existing levels of long-term illnesses, such as heart disease, diabetes and obesity, made the country "more vulnerable", while public services were "running close to, if not beyond capacity," it says.

The inquiry heard evidence on the potential impact of austerity measures and, while recognising the pressure on politicians to make tough decisions over the allocation of resources, the report says: "Proper preparation for a pandemic costs money."

"The massive financial, economic and human cost" is proof money spent is "vital" and "will be vastly outweighed by the cost of not doing so," it adds.

"Significant flaws" highlighted include preparing for "the wrong pandemic", with the focus on a flu pandemic "inadequate" for the global pandemic that struck, the inquiry found.

The report also says the institutions and structures responsible for emergency planning were "labyrinthine in their complexity", while the UK's sole pandemic strategy from 2011 was "outdated and lacked adaptability" and was "virtually abandoned" on its first encounter with the pandemic.

The lack of "a system that could be scaled up to test, trace and isolate" people was highlighted as a major flaw, while advice to ministers was often undermined by "groupthink".

"The inquiry has no hesitation in concluding that the processes, planning and policy of the civil contingency structures within the UK government and devolved administrations and civil services failed their citizens," the report says.

Lady Hallett said all her recommendations must be implemented to prepare for a future pandemic, which could be "even more transmissible and lethal" and "is likely to occur in the near to medium future".

"Unless the lessons are learned and fundamental change is implemented, the human and financial cost and sacrifice of the COVID-19 pandemic will have been in vain," she said.

"The harrowing accounts of loss and grief given by the bereaved witnesses and others who suffered during the pandemic serve to remind us why there must be radical reform."

Covid Inquiry's Damning Report Says Government 'Failed Its Citizens' By Planning For 'Wrong Pandemic'

Kate Nicholson
HUFFPOST
Thu, 18 July 2024 

Jeremy Hunt, Matt Hancock and Baroness Hallett Getty/BBC News

The government “failed its citizens” with its insufficient and outdated planning for a pandemic, the first report from the Covid Inquiry has claimed.

The 217-page report has found that, despite planning for a flu outbreak, “our preparedness and resilience was not adequate for the global pandemic that occurred”.

The inquiry suggested the UK had been planning for the “wrong pandemic”, and said the former health secretaries – Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock – failed to fix flaws in contingency planning before the pandemic hit.

It also slammed the country’s “labyrinthine” emergency planning, saying the approach to risk assessment was “flawed”.

“The UK government’s outdated pandemic strategy, developed in 2011, was not flexible enough to adapt when faced with the pandemic in 2020,” the report claimed.

It added: “There was a failure to fully learn from past civil emergency exercises and outbreaks of diseases.”

Emergency planning “failed to put enough consideration into existing health and social inequalities”, according to the report.

It claimed there was a “lack of attention” to the systems that would help test, trace and isolate the disease, while policy documents were “full of jargon and overly complex”.

The report took aim at the ministers, too, saying they “often failed to challenge the advice they did get” while their advisers “lacked freedom” to express their differing opinions, often leading to “groupthink”.

Ultimately, it concluded: “If we had been better prepared, we could have avoided some of the massive financial, economic and human cost of the Covid-19 pandemic.”

It recommended a “radical simplification” of the civil emergency preparedness and resilience systems, and “streamlining the current bureaucracy”.

When announcing the report, the chair of the inquiry Baroness Hallett added that the “UK lacked resilience” in 2020.

She noted that the country had high pre-existing levels of illness and general levels of ill health at the time as well, making it more vulnerable to the outbreak of disease.

Hallett also noted that it is a question of not if but when the next pandemic will hit – and are we ready?

She said another pandemic would be “more transmissible and lethal” and likely to occur in the near to medium future.

The inquiry was launched in 2022 by then-PM Boris Johnson, and meant to examine the decision making across the country.

This report is the first of at least nine expected.

It’s not known how long the inquiry will last, as hearings are expected to continue until at least next year.

COVID report finds government 'failed' the public

UK 'prepared for the wrong pandemic', COVID inquiry finds.

Andy Wells
·Freelance Writer
Updated Thu, 18 July 2024 


A person writes on The National Covid Memorial Wall, dedicated to those who lost their lives to COVID-19. (Getty Images)


The first report from the UK COVID-19 Inquiry has found the government "failed" the public, due to “significant flaws” in preparing for the pandemic.

The COVID inquiry, which is being chaired by Baroness Heather Hallett, published its 217-page report on Thursday, which found the UK "prepared for the wrong pandemic" – focusing on flu rather than a coronavirus pandemic.

In her foreword to the report, she said lessons must be learned and “never again can a disease be allowed to lead to so many deaths and so much suffering”. A major flaw, according to the inquiry, was the lack of “a system that could be scaled up to test, trace and isolate” people.

The report added: “Despite reams of documentation, planning guidance was insufficiently robust and flexible, and policy documentation was outdated, unnecessarily bureaucratic and infected by jargon.”

The inquiry said it had “no hesitation” in concluding that the “processes, planning and policy of the civil contingencies structures within the UK government and devolved administrations and civil services failed their citizens”.

Academics have said it is a question of “when not if” another pandemic will hit, so it is hoped that recommendations, if implemented, could put the UK in a better starting place to face a new and unknown disease – known by many as Disease X.

There were more than 235,000 deaths involving COVID in the UK up to the end of 2023. The overall inquiry is reportedly expected to run for around seven years.
What is the COVID report?

The first report looked into the UK’s handling of the pandemic, including how it prepared for it and how it responded once COVID began to spread.

Following the report's release on Thursday, Hallett said: “If the reforms I recommend are implemented, the nation will be more resilient and better able to avoid the terrible losses and costs to society that the COVID-19 pandemic brought.”

A briefing is set to take place at the National COVID Memorial Wall following the publication of the report. (PA)


When did it come out?

The report was published at 12pm on Thursday, 18 July. Hallett's findings were live-streamed on the inquiry’s YouTube channel.

At 3pm, the COVID-19 Families for Justice, the BMA and TUC will hold a briefing at the National COVID Memorial Wall to react to the findings.

What is in the report?

The report has outlined its initial findings based on several modules that were looked at throughout the inquiry. These include the specific aspects of the pandemic response – resilience and preparedness, decision-making and political governance and the impact of the pandemic on healthcare.

The report found that in the years leading up to the pandemic, “there was a lack of adequate leadership, coordination and oversight”. Ministers also “failed to challenge sufficiently the advice they did receive from officials and advisers”, and they did not receive a broad enough range of scientific opinion and policy options.

It also found that groups advising the government “did not have sufficient freedom and autonomy to express dissenting views”, there was a lack of challenge to what was said, and the advice was often undermined by “groupthink”.

Additionally, the report found that the institutions and structures responsible for emergency planning throughout government were “labyrinthine” in how complex they were.

Flaws included emergency planning not accounting for how the vulnerable would be looked after, "failure to learn sufficiently" from past exercises designed to test the country's response to the spread of disease, and failures to assess pandemic risks facing the UK.

The “recent experiences of Sars and Mers meant that another coronavirus outbreak at pandemic scale was foreseeable," the report said.

"It was not a black swan event. The absence of such a scenario from the risk assessments was a fundamental error of the Department of Health and Social Care and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. The UK government and devolved administrations could and should have assessed the risk of a novel pathogen to reach pandemic scale”.

The UK's pandemic plan for flu was written in 2011 and was described by the report as "outdated".

In her recommendations, Hallett called for a new pandemic strategy to be developed and tested at least every three years, with a UK-wide crisis response exercise.

She said the government and political leaders should be properly held to account on a regular basis “for systems of preparedness and resilience”.


Inquiry chair Baroness Heather Hallett will report on how well the UK was able to face a deadly outbreak in the run up to 2020. (UK COVID-19 Inquiry/Getty)


Who was named?

Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock, both former health secretaries, were named by Hallett as failing to address contingency planning flaws ahead of the pandemic.

The UK was “dangerously mistaken” to believe that it was one of the best prepared countries in the world to respond to a pandemic, Hallett said.

Former health secretary Matt Hancock gave evidence to the COVID inquiry. (Getty)

In 2019, it was widely believed in Britain and abroad that the UK was “not only properly prepared but was one of the best-prepared countries in the world to respond to a pandemic,” she said.

“This belief was dangerously mistaken. In reality, the UK was ill-prepared for dealing with the whole-system civil emergency of a pandemic, let alone the coronavirus pandemic that actually struck.

Hunt told the inquiry that he was part of “groupthink” when he was health secretary, leading to a “narrowness of thinking” that failed to expand UK pandemic preparedness beyond planning for a flu outbreak.




Hancock and Hunt failed to prepare UK for pandemic, Covid inquiry finds
Robert Booth Social affairs correspondent

Thu, 18 July 2024

Campaigners from the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice group outside the inquiry last summer.Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images


The former health secretaries Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock have been criticised for their failure to better prepare the UK for the pandemic in a damning first report from the Covid inquiry that calls for a major overhaul in how the government prepares for civil emergencies.

Hunt, who was the health secretary from 2012-18, and Hancock, who took over until 2021, were named by the chair to the inquiry, Heather Hallett, for failing to rectify flaws in contingency planning ahead of the pandemic, which claimed more than 230,000 lives in the UK.

The government had focused largely on the threat of an influenza outbreak despite the fact that coronaviruses in Asia and the Middle East in the preceding years meant “another coronavirus outbreak at a pandemic scale was foreseeable” and to overlook that was “a fundamental error”.

“It was not a black swan event,” Lady Hallett said in a 240-page report that concluded: “The processes, planning and policy of the civil contingency structures within the UK government and devolved administrations and civil services failed their citizens.

“Never again can a disease be allowed to lead to so many deaths and so much suffering.”

Among the former senior court of appeal judge’s recommendations were:

The leader or deputy leader of each of the four nations should chair a cabinet-level committee responsible for civil emergency preparedness.


A UK-wide pandemic response exercise should be run at least every three years and a new UK-wide, whole-system civil emergency strategy be put in place.


External “red teams” should regularly challenge the principles, evidence and advice on emergency plans.


An independent statutory body should be established to advise the UK government and devolved administrations, and consult with voluntary groups and council-based directors of public health on civil emergency preparedness and response.

The findings about the UK’s structures and procedures in place to prepare for and respond to a pandemic are the first from the statutory inquiry into Covid-19 and are based on six weeks of hearings last summer as well as the disclosure of thousands of documents.

The report was published at the inquiry hearing rooms in west London where families who lost loved ones gathered to mark what they described as “a huge milestone”.

Related: Hubris and preparing for wrong type of pandemic: five key takeaways from Covid inquiry verdict

Thousands of bereaved families had campaigned for a public inquiry before it was announced by Boris Johnson in May 2021. At least nine more reports are due to be published on a rolling basis in the next two to three years as government, health systems, schools, councils, scientists and economists continue to grapple with the consequences of the deadly pandemic.

Hallett also said preparations for a no-deal Brexit caused work on pandemic preparedness to be paused.

In the years preceding the Covid-19 outbreak, “there had been a slowdown in health improvement, and health inequalities had widened. Public services were running close to, if not beyond capacity.

“If the reforms I recommend are implemented, the nation will be more resilient and better able to avoid the terrible losses and costs to society that the Covid-19 pandemic brought,” she said. “I expect all my recommendations to be acted on … I, and my team, will be monitoring this closely.”

There was implicit criticism of George Osborne, the chancellor from 2010-16, for the Treasury failing to plan for non-economic shocks. Hallett said it could have “identified, in advance … major economic policy options that could be deployed in the event of a pandemic”.

Osborne had told the inquiry “there was no planning done by the UK Treasury or indeed as far as I am aware, any western treasury, for asking the entire population to stay at home for months and months on end”.

Hallett said that had the UK been better prepared some of the human and financial cost may have been avoided.

“Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, there was no ministerial leadership within the UK government and devolved administrations that could consider strategy, direct policy and make decisions across the whole of government to prepare for and build resilience to whole-system civil emergencies,” she said.

Key flaws in preparedness included:

The UK being prepared for the wrong pandemic: influenza. When Hancock became health secretary in July 2018 his day one briefing said: “Pandemic flu is the government’s highest risk”.


The institutions responsible for emergency planning being “labyrinthine in their complexity”.


The government’s sole pandemic strategy (for flu) being outdated – it was from 2011 – and lacking adaptability.


A failure to appreciate the impact of the pandemic and the response to it on ethnic minority communities, and people in poor health and with other vulnerabilities.


A failure to learn from earlier civil emergency exercises and disease outbreaks.


A “damaging absence of focus” on systems such as test, trace and isolate that could be scaled up.


A lack of adequate leadership in the preceding years, with ministers, untrained in civil contingencies, not being presented with a broad range of scientific opinion. They also failed to sufficiently challenge the advice they got, which in any event was beset by “groupthink”.

On lockdowns, Hallett highlighted Hancock’s evidence that the standing 2011 flu strategy was not for preventing a pandemic having a disastrous effect, but “a strategy of dealing with the disastrous effect of a pandemic”. The strategy gave no consideration to legally mandated lockdowns as a response and Hallett said they must in future “be considered properly in advance of a novel infectious disease outbreak” alongside ways to “prevent a lockdown”.

She said all health secretaries who adhered to the 2011 strategy, which included Hunt, bore responsibility “for failing to have these flaws examined and rectified”.

“This includes Mr Hancock, who abandoned the strategy when the pandemic struck, by which time it was too late to have any effect on preparedness and resilience.”

Hancock had told the inquiry he was “assured that the UK was one of the best placed countries in the world for responding to a pandemic” and that he viewed the World Health Organization, which ranked the UK as a world leader, as “an authoritative source”.

Hallett said “there were a great number of ministers who could have done more by asking questions about it. Mr Hunt accepted that ‘collectively we didn’t put anything like the time and effort and energy’ into understanding the dangers of pathogens and challenging the consensus. This inquiry agrees.”

Former government ministers who were cross-examined in this first module of the inquiry on the UK’s resilience and preparedness included the prime minister, chancellor and health secretary in the years before the pandemic – David Cameron, Osborne and Hunt respectively – and the health secretary, chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Cabinet Office minister who were in charge immediately before and during Covid – Hancock, Michael Gove and Oliver Dowden.

Even before the findings were released the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice group was calling for urgent reforms from the new Labour government, including the appointment of a secretary of state for resilience and civil emergencies; a standing scientific committee on pandemics, crisis training for ministers and officials, and the establishment of a “red team” to challenge pandemic preparations.

A spokesperson for the group said: “Plans for a pandemic were fatally inadequate; they were outdated, poorly communicated across the government, disregarded the impact of inequalities and were primarily concerned with pandemic flu. Such pandemic planning as there was did not address inequalities, and nothing was done to mitigate vulnerabilities caused by structural discrimination, institutional racism or health inequalities. Our loved ones, colleagues and communities paid the price for that failure.”

The Covid inquiry is to produce a report on political decision-making, and evidence will be taken this autumn on the impact of the pandemic on the health systems of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Next year witnesses will be asked about vaccines and therapeutics. Investigations are under way on: procurement, the test, trace and isolate system, and the care sector. Future investigations into children and young people, and the economic response have been announced.

Saturday, February 29, 2020

PANDEMIC PROTECTION PROTOCOLS


IN 2009 I HELPED DEVELOP THE EDMONTON PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD PANDEMIC PROTOCOLS FOR CUSTODIAL AND FOR CLEANING/DISINFECTION AS WELL AS LEADING THE TRAINING OF OVER 900 CUSTODIANS, SUPPORT, FOOD AND SCIENCE STAFF  IN DEALING WITH THE H1N1 OUTBREAK


      BEFORE PANDEMIC TRAINING


IN LIGHT OF COVID-19 OUTBREAK REVIEW THESE PROCEDURES HERE WHICH EVOLVED OUT OF H1N1. THEY WERE BUILT ON THE RESULTS OF THE EARLIER SARS OUTBREAK WE EXPERIENCED.

IN DEVELOPING THE EPSB STANDARD WHICH HAS A HIGH EFFICACY WE RESEARCHED WORLD WIDE TO FIND PROCEDURES USED.

WE CAN THINK OF H1N1 AS THE PRACTICE RUN FOR THIS PANDEMIC

          AFTER PANDEMIC TRAINING


Pandemic H1N1 Resources | IPAC Canada
https://ipac-canada.org › pandemic-h1n1-resources

Laboratory testing has found the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus to be resistant to amantadine and rimantidine and susceptible to the prescription antiviral drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir, although isolated cases of resistance have occurred.


The Impact of the H1N1 Pandemic on Canadian Hospitals - CIHI
https://secure.cihi.ca › free_products › H1N1_AIB_final_EN

protect against the pandemic H1N1, and there was no vaccine available at ... included clear data-sharing protocols among levels of government, development.

pandemic influenza a (h1n1) - World Health Organization
www.who.int › resources › publications › swineflu › h1n1_donor_032011

Mar 1, 2011 - Rapid containment of pandemic influenza: strategy and protocol. The purpose of ... of WHO treatment guidelines for pandemic H1N1 influenza.

2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus) | Pandemic ... - CDC
https://www.cdc.gov › flu › pandemic-resources › 2009-h1n1-pandemic

Jun 11, 2019 - In the spring of 2009, a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus emerged. It was detected first in the United States and spread quickly across the United ...

Pandemic Influenza - OSHA
https://www.osha.gov › Publications › OSHA_pandemic_health

19. Engineering Controls for Aerosol-Generating. Procedures for Patients with Pandemic. Influenza. 19 ... Surveillance and Protocols. 40 ... Lippincott-Raven, New York. pp. 1397-445. ... that their facilities had clear policies and protocols,.

Prevention and Control of Influenza during a Pandemic for All ...
https://www.canada.ca › phac-aspc › cpip-pclcpi › assets › pdf › ann-f-eng

by F Annex - ‎Related articlesThese guidelines have been endorsed by the Public Health Network Council. 9. ... Annex F. 19 i. The novel pandemic influenza strain and first human cases of influenza caused by the ... Philadelphia: Lippincott-Raven; 1998. p. 299-324. 86.

Canadian Pandemic Influenza Preparedness ... - Canada.ca
https://www.canada.ca › public-health › services › flu-influenza › preventi...

by M Vearncombe - ‎Related articlesDec 5, 2017 - Prevention and control for health care settings: Canadian Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Planning ... These guidelines have been endorsed by the Public Health Network Council. ... with symptoms and an epidemiological link to a laboratory-confirmed case. ... Philadelphia: Lippincott-Raven; 1998.

Transcript for the CDC Telebriefing Update on COVID-19 ...
https://www.cdc.gov › media › releases › t0225-cdc-telebriefing-covid-19

3 days ago - This document is called Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza United States 2017. It draws from the findings of ...

Pandemic Preparedness Resources - CDC
https://www.cdc.gov › coronavirus › 2019-ncov › php › pandemic-prepar...

Feb 15, 2020 - Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) ... 52 pages] · Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza — United States, 2017 ...

Community Mitigation Guidance for COVID-19 ... - CDC
https://www.cdc.gov › 2019-ncov › preparing-individuals-communities

2 days ago - During an outbreak in your community, CDC recommends the ... is available in: Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic ...

Tuesday, October 18, 2022

Huge Study Details How The Pandemic Fundamentally Changed People's Personalities


Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, personality-typing giant Truity collected anonymous data for a two-year-long study that would make bold assertions about the pandemic's impacts on users' psychology and personalities.



A crowd with masks on© blvdone/Shutterstock

Truity's CEO Molly Owens, a personality researcher who has previously spoken to The List about the Enneagram personality typing system, reflected on the study's findings and what they might mean for our post-pandemic personalities. "Thanks to what we believe to be the largest dataset of Big Five scores ever collected," Owens shared, "we were able to identify some fascinating shifts in personality measures over the course of the pandemic."

Owens understands the mass trauma of a global pandemic as influential on a deeper level, moreso than everyday interactions or social influences. "Although we typically understand personality as something that is relatively fixed for any given person, research also indicates that environmental forces can shift our behaviors and beliefs."

The study ultimately gave experts answers to what traits the sampled population -- which included 2.8 million users -- exhibited in increased or decreased increments in direct proportion to the pandemic's worsening or improving death toll and hospitalization numbers, available via the COVID-19 Tracking Project.

Oddly enough, the classic answers to "How has the pandemic changed you?" aren't necessarily backed up by the study's findings. Truity's CMO Abby Lunardini summed up that, "Contrary to popular anecdotal feedback about people becoming more Introverted during the pandemic, the relationship between extraversion and pandemic trends were in general found to be statistically insignificant." So, what did this study find?

Some Personality Changes Can Be Linked To Burnout


A tired nurse© Supamotion/Shutterstock

The study's measured personality traits included conscientiousness, neuroticism, agreeableness, and openness, which its collaborators provided definitions for in order to nail down just what had changed in participants' personalities and approaches to their lives. The full study can be found on PsyArXiv, and its author Cameron Berg has given The List their perspective on its findings.

"The COVID-19 pandemic has exhibited significant psychological and behavioral impacts, but a precise account of the way that the pandemic has altered human personality is still uncertain," the researcher began. "We saw striking correlations between pandemic data and personality traits -- including the fact that individuals have steadily grown less conscientious and more neurotic over time since the beginning of the pandemic."

The study's definition for conscientiousness is as follows: "Conscientiousness is associated with achievement-striving and industrious behavior," via Abby Lunardini, Truity CMO. The study's results concluded that a mass decrease in this trait supports the case that burnout is, indeed, a looming risk in times of increased stress and over-work.

Researchers also found an increase in neuroticism that had a positive correlation to worsening pandemic factors, such as rising hospitalizations and death tolls. The study defined neuroticism as "a person's sensitivity to negative emotions, including fear, sadness and anxiety," per Truity. The source continued, "Neuroticism scores increased most strongly in response to longer-term, cumulative worsening of the pandemic (e.g. cumulative COVID deaths). The finding provides empirical support for widespread reports of the emotional exhaustion and long-term stress that many associate with the pandemic, particularly with respect to health-related risk-taking."

Creativity Took A Hit During The Worst Of The Pandemic


A man in a mask on the computer© illpaxphotomatic/Shutterstock

The study also measured levels of agreeableness in participants, which were sourced anonymously from Truity. The definition used by the platform was as follows: "Agreeableness roughly describes the extent to which a person prioritizes the needs of others over their own," via Abby Lunardini, Truity CMO.

This trait was seen to increase most during shorter-term worsened pandemic conditions. That included hospitalization spikes, which the study characterized as a transient factor, or one that could change quickly. An increase might have manifested in more community-based efforts, such as supporting healthcare workers or sourcing equipment or funding, which Truity deems the "we're-all-in-this-together mentality" that requires agreeableness to function.

Openness is the last reported measure of personality change in the study. "Openness roughly describes a person's motivation to think abstractly and pursue beauty in things like art, music and culture," our source from Truity shared. "During these same challenging periods, people appear to have been significantly less motivated to be creative, exploratory and beauty-seeking."

Though we've heard stories of incredible artistic accomplishments during the pandemic -- Taylor Swift releasing her surprise album, "Folklore," in August 2020, for example -- for the most part, the study reflected a resistance to openness, or the "cerebral" quality necessary for artistic exploration and experimentation. But in moments when the pandemic improved, there was a measurable increase in openness, supporting the theory that a fight-or-flight pandemic response wasn't conducive to creativity or artistic thinking.

Our Post-Pandemic Challenges Aren't All In Our Heads


Multiple heads© Black Salmon/Shutterstock

Ultimately, our source from Truity shared that data from this study, in conjunction with COVID-19 data, has far-reaching applications in measuring the psychological changes we have experienced during the pandemic. "Machine learning regression models indicate that metrics of the COVID-19 pandemic can be used to explain roughly half of the personality changes exhibited over the course of the pandemic," Truity's Abby Lunardini shared.

Of course, there will always be lingering questions surrounding how a globally shared trauma and unimaginable death toll will impact our psyches in the long-term, as well as our relationships with family and friends. However, the research happening now will begin giving us the answers to just how much the past two years have changed us collectively. Cameron Berg, the study's lead researcher concluded, "These findings are among the first to suggest that, at the population level, specific periods of the COVID-19 pandemic exhibited measurable and durable impacts on human personality."

Truity's CEO Molly Owens also summarized the data's findings that acute changes in the pandemic have had a measurable impact on personality factors including conscientiousness, neuroticism, agreeableness, and openness. "What we have seen with this research is that the pandemic has actually done this at the population level -- making people less resilient to stress and less likely to engage in organized, goal-directed behaviors."

So, when we reflect on the past two years and the ways we have and haven't recovered our old selves, there will be an increasing amount of data to support us.

Thursday, November 23, 2023

The Swedish Left Failed the Vulnerable During the Pandemic

Sweden’s “hands-off” COVID-19 response was hailed by libertarians abroad but also by most left-wingers at home. Far from enlightened, the Swedish left’s approach combined deference to authority with a disturbing faith in national exceptionalism.


Three nurses carry COVID-19 vaccines through the hallways of a nursing home in Gothenburg, Sweden, on January 7, 2021. (Fredrik Lerneryd / Getty Images)

BYMARKUS BALÁZS GÖRANSSON NICHOLAS LOUBERE
11.19.2023
JACOBIN

“When the next pandemic comes knocking — and it will — we must be ready to answer decisively, collectively, and equitably,” World Health Organization director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told a packed assembly in Geneva on May 25. He made his remarks twenty days after the WHO stopped classifying the COVID-19 pandemic as a global health emergency.

As we enter this new phase of the pandemic and survey the destruction the SARS-CoV-2 virus has wrought on global health and livelihoods over the past three years, we are left with more questions than answers. Many of these questions have serious implications for how we react to threats to our collective existence going forward, with the realities of our age of chronic crisis becoming clearer with each passing year, as heat records are broken, wildfires ravage the landscape and choke our air, and the environment progressively becomes more hostile to human life on this planet.

In this context, figuring out the most effective ways for us to face shared crisis together, in solidarity, is arguably one of the most important tasks that the global left faces. Here, the infamous case of the Swedish response to the pandemic stands as a stark example — and a cautionary tale. How did a country ruled by a social democratic party, supported by the Left Party in parliament, and nominally committed to legislating egalitarian and proworker policies end up being the poster child for an approach to the pandemic based on mass infection and natural herd immunity — an approach which left the working class and marginalized segments of society to fend for themselves as a deadly and unknown virus swept through the population?

The Swedish pandemic response stands as a testament to the folly of basing our responses to global crises primarily on domestic political considerations, as well as to the danger that leftist movements become unmoored from their own basic values and principles.

The Right Embraces Sweden

For many left-wingers in Sweden with international connections, the pandemic has been a surreal experience. In the early months, we waited for the Swedish Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) and high-profile voices on the Left to put pressure on the government and the Public Health Agency to change course from their plan to allow the vast majority of the population to be infected in order to gain supposed “herd immunity” prior to the arrival of vaccines.

Instead, the Swedish left — with a few notable exceptions — embraced the herd immunity approach and joined in attacking critics of the government’s pandemic response. As the months wore on and the toll of this pandemic strategy became clear, the Swedish left’s stance inexplicably became more entrenched. At the same time Sweden was becoming a darling of the far right, an example that pervaded antimask and antilockdown protests globally.For many left-wingers in Sweden with international connections, the pandemic has been a surreal experience.

Repeatedly, the international radical right has praised Sweden’s handling of the pandemic and held it up as a model for other countries to follow. Brazil’s right-wing, authoritarian ex-president Jair Bolsonaro, Florida’s Republican governor Ron DeSantis, and Donald Trump’s former pandemic advisor Scott Atlas are just a few of the many right-wingers who have praised Sweden’s response.

The same is true for libertarian, neoliberal, and neoconservative think tanks such as the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER), the Cato Institute, and the Brownstone Institute. These bodies that otherwise like to rail against climate policies and economic redistribution have often held up the Swedish approach as a shining exemplar of pandemic policy, using it to criticize proactive policies of infection control.


Indeed, the authors of that most notorious right-wing pandemic manifesto, the Great Barrington Declaration, drafted at the AIER headquarters in 2020, were deeply influenced by Sweden’s pandemic approach. The Swedish American epidemiologist Martin Kulldorff, who later left his professorship at Harvard University for a job at the newly established libertarian think tank the Brownstone Institute, wrote to Sweden’s state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell in May 2020, thanking him for Sweden’s “wise and epidemiologically sound COVID-19 work”, which he called a “model for the rest of the world.” Similarly, the Indian American epidemiologist Jay Bhattacharya, another Great Barrington Declaration initiator who also advised against mass vaccination in India prior to the deadly Delta outbreak in early 2021, has repeatedly praised the Swedish COVID-19 strategy on Twitter. More recently, he has campaigned for Ron DeSantis in his bid for the US presidency.

Neoliberal Foundations


There are many reasons why the international radical right has been enamored with the Swedish pandemic response. The Swedish authorities’ skepticism towards face masks, their reluctance to introduce basic infection control measures, and their resistance to the closure of private businesses (though some public establishments, including high schools and universities, were closed in Sweden, a fact that is rarely highlighted in Sweden or abroad) have naturally curried favor with the Right. The Swedish response, incorrectly described in some circles as a success story, has been a useful example for those opposing state-led contagion control measures.

But there is also a deeper ideological affinity between the Swedish approach and the global right, indeed one that precedes the pandemic. In an award-winning journal article, Swedish researchers Carl Rådestad and Oscar Larsson have traced the unfolding neoliberalization of Swedish crisis management since the 1990s. They note that an ever-greater share of responsibility has been placed on the shoulders of individuals in a process they term “responsibilization,” as individuals have been “expected to take responsibility for their own safety.”

Swedish authorities have sought to justify such individualization of responsibility on the grounds that it can free up public resources. But it must also be seen in the context of a broader effort to shed some of the state’s former responsibilities. As French philosopher Émilie Hache has pointed out, the concept of personal responsibility is a key element of neoliberalism and has repeatedly been invoked in Western countries to justify attempts to scale back the state’s responsibilities.

During the pandemic, talk of personal responsibility had a prominent place in official Swedish rhetoric on the pandemic response. Public bodies insisted time and time again that the SARS-CoV-2 contagion should be handled, not through TTI (testing, tracing, and isolation), improved ventilation, quarantining of the sick, the introduction of a pandemic app, or other measures that could be carried out under the state’s auspices, but rather through the voluntary compliance of individuals with the authorities’ infection control advice.

When Britta Björkholm, head of the Department of Contagion Control and Public Health Protection at the Public Health Agency, was asked in April 2021 why the agency did not put more measures in place despite a growing number of COVID-19 cases and escalating pressure on the health services, she answered that it had chosen to rely on informing and convincing the public. In her view, voluntary compliance with public infection control advice “has the absolutely greatest effect.” In the spirit of neoliberal crisis management, a collective, systemic crisis was to be managed through private efforts.

From a left-wing perspective, this is obviously deeply problematic. To claim that protection from a deadly contagion is a matter of personal responsibility is to seek to individualize a collective problem, while willfully ignoring those members of society who are unable to protect themselves and others. A solidarity-based pandemic approach would have emphasized society’s shared responsibility to protect vulnerable and exposed people. But in Sweden, the Social Democratic/Green coalition government delegated responsibility for people’s lives and health to individual citizens — that is, people who faced very different socioeconomic conditions and had wildly divergent abilities to protect themselves and others.To claim that protection from a deadly contagion is a matter of personal responsibility is to seek to individualize a collective problem.

As has been amply documented, the Swedish authorities made matters worse by designing their infection control advice with the white-collar middle class in mind — a group who could generally work from home and who were socially less exposed to the virus anyway. Infection control advice such as work from home if you can, stay at home if you have symptoms, and keep a distance from others was far easier for those who were not required to be physically present for work, who had flexible working hours, lived in more spacious homes, and did not work in a service profession.

Journalist Martin Klepke of the left-wing newspaper Arbetet has in a number of articles pointed out the overwhelmingly middle-class bias of the Swedish pandemic strategy. Swedish workers, he has noted, were thrown under the bus when the infection control advice issued by the Public Health Agency completely failed to take their professional and social situation into account. For example, while others could work from home or avoid crowded public transport by travelling outside of rush-hour periods, many workers had to commute to work on poorly ventilated, jam-packed public transportation. This happened even as the Public Health Agency urged people to keep a distance — but refused to mandate or even recommend mitigation measures like face masks.

This deeply inequitable pandemic approach has left telltale black marks in the statistics. As of June 2022, 1 in 621 Swedes had died from COVID-19, according to statistics from the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. The same figure for Swedes with personal assistance was 1 in 169. Today’s figures are unknown, since the National Board of Health and Welfare has stopped publishing the statistics.

Meanwhile, several reports have documented that foreign-born people and blue-collar workers have been at greatest risk of dying from COVID-19. For instance, a report from the Center for Epidemiology and Community Medicine concluded in November 2020 that “income is the socioeconomic factor most clearly associated with the risk of dying from COVID-19.”

Neoliberal Pandemic Management on the Swedish Left


Despite the deeply problematic aspects of the country’s pandemic response, the Swedish left has generally refrained from criticizing it. Klepke and a handful of others are the only left-wingers of note who have questioned it.

In fact, not only has the Swedish left refused to criticize the country’s pandemic strategy, but prominent left-wingers have heaped praise on it. Karin Rågsjö, the Left Party’s public health policy spokesperson, called state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell a “bureaucrat with the halo of a hero.” Left Party member of parliament Hanna Gunnarsson unironically tweeted “All power to Tegnell, our liberator,” a reference to a children’s book by Astrid Lindgren, where Tengil, a bloodthirsty dictator, is hailed as a liberator by his deferential subjects. Lena Mellin, a political pundit for Sweden’s largest left-wing newspaper Aftonbladet called Tegnell “the Swedish people’s guide to the galaxy,” while another journalist at the same newspaper described him as “a hero in an adventure movie.” Another columnist in Aftonbladet wrote a sexually charged adoring piece, which mused on Tegnell’s “wonderful torso . . . his flat bust,” and the author’s own love of “academic men with colored sweaters on top of long-sleeved shirts,” a reference to Tegnell’s usual attire. The political editor-in-chief of Aftonbladet, Anders Lindberg, has missed few opportunities to praise Sweden’s handling of the pandemic on the pages of his social democratic newspaper, while accusing critics of being conspiracy theorists for correctly pointing out that the pandemic strategy aimed to achieve an imagined herd immunity through natural infection, which Tegnell himself has admitted.

Why has the Swedish left celebrated a pandemic response that has been explicitly based on the neoliberal principle of personal responsibility and has systematically disregarded marginal and vulnerable groups?

One explanation lies in the personal ties between the Left Party and the Public Health Agency. In a remarkable conflict of interest, the party’s health spokesperson Karin Rågsjö was also employed by the Public Health Agency (she was on a leave of absence for her political work and ended her employment with the Public Health Agency in April 2021). In disclosed emails between Rågsjö and her colleagues at the Public Health Agency, Rågsjö repeatedly showered praise on the agency for its handling of the pandemic and on occasion had very harsh words for critics. It is obviously problematic that the person who represented the Left Party line on pandemic policy was also employed by the government agency in charge of that same response.

Second, in Sweden during the pandemic there has been the rise of a brand of left-wing or progressive nationalism. Swedish political scientist Gina Gustavsson has noted that support for Sweden’s pandemic response has had a strong nationalist dimension and has often been couched in rhetoric of national exceptionalism. The cult of Anders Tegnell, with its bizarre manifestations including fawning articles, tattoos, food, clothing, and even Christmas decorations depicting an angelic Tegnell, is part and parcel of this nationalist outpouring that has helped to solidify support for the Public Health Agency among leftists.

Finally, in Sweden the pandemic was initially portrayed less as an acute and unprecedented public health threat than as a crisis of distrust in the authorities. Many left-wing Swedes had fresh memories of the disinformation that had occurred during the election of Donald Trump as US president and the Brexit debate in the UK in 2016 and came to view deference to the Public Health Agency — which was widely perceived as a nonpolitical expert state body — as a means of guarding against such politicized disinformation. Conversely, people who criticized the Public Health Agency’s handling of the pandemic were described as behaving irresponsibly and even harmfully, and representing a threat to national security. For many progressive Swedes, refraining from criticizing the Public Health Agency was regarded as a public duty — even though the agency was pursuing a deeply ideological pandemic policy.The Swedish left has, by and large, ended up on the same side of the global pandemic debate as the far right globally.

As a result of this deference to the Public Health Agency, the Swedish left has, by and large, ended up on the same side of the global pandemic debate as Trump, Bolsonaro, Nigel Farage, the AIER, the Cato Institute, and other representatives of the far right globally, whose positions on the pandemic also aligned with those of the Swedish Public Health Agency. Swedish leftists have adopted much the same stances on face masks, legal restrictions on businesses, and other proactive infection control measures as the global radical right, not because of any ideological kinship with the latter but because they uncritically decided to throw in their lot with the Swedish Public Health Agency.
A Lesson for Future (and Present) Collective Crisis

As we sink further into the age of collective crisis, and before the next pandemic breaks out, it is instructive to review the failures of the Swedish left during the COVID-19 pandemic. What lessons can the Left in Sweden and elsewhere learn from these failures for next time?

One important lesson is that the Left needs to orient itself internationally in the event of a global, collective crisis. During the pandemic, many people on the Left in Sweden seemed unaware that the Swedish handling of the pandemic was seen as a model by neoliberals, libertarians, and other groups on the far right globally. Instead, the Swedish left positioned itself entirely in relation to domestic concerns, making no attempt to build a common international left-wing platform on the pandemic with leftists abroad, let alone pursue common practical solutions to the crisis.

Conversely, leftists elsewhere failed to take Swedish leftists to task for their support for a neoliberal pandemic response that became the poster child for right-wing attempts to torpedo infection control in other countries. Vocal criticism from international and foreign leftist groups would have forced the Swedish left to look outward and possibly made them more inclined to review their support for the Swedish pandemic response. Yet the Left around the world, mirroring the mistakes of the Swedish left, also turned inward during the pandemic, engaging primarily in domestic debates.

In the case of future pandemics and other collective crises (such as the climate crisis), left-wingers around the world need to recognize their shared responsibility for combating them and mobilize internationally around common goals. They need to pause and consider how best to translate basic left-wing principles, such as community and solidarity, into practical policies and find ways to work more effectively together internationally.

Hopefully, the mistakes of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sweden can provide a point of reflection and a cautionary tale going forward. If the global left fails to root itself in basic leftist principles and an international outlook based on solidarity — choosing instead to position itself in relation to parochial domestic political battles — there is no future for a global leftist movement in the coming age of chronic crisis.

An earlier version of this article appeared in Swedish in the Swedish left-wing magazine Flamman.

CONTRIBUTORS

Markus Balázs Göransson is a senior lecturer in war studies at the Swedish Defence University.

Nicholas Loubere is an associate professor in the study of modern China at the Lund University Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies in Sweden.

Wednesday, June 16, 2021


Academic Medicine Faculty Perceptions of Work-Life Balance Before and Since the COVID-19 Pandemic

 

Original Investigation 
Medical Education
June 15, 2021
JAMA Netw Open. 2021;4(6):e2113539. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.13539
Key Points

Question  How is the COVID-19 pandemic associated with academic medicine faculty perceptions of work-life integration?

Findings  In this survey of 1186 medical, graduate, and health professional school faculty, more faculty considered leaving since the COVID-19 pandemic than before. Faculty with children, particularly female faculty with children, were more likely to consider leaving since the pandemic.

Meaning  These findings suggest that the stressors of integrating work and life are higher in female faculty than male faculty, highest in women with children, and may have been heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Abstract

Importance  How the COVID-19 pandemic has affected academic medicine faculty's work-life balance is unknown.

Objective  To assess the association of perceived work-life conflict with academic medicine faculty intention to leave, reducing employment to part time, or declining leadership opportunities before and since the COVID-19 pandemic.

Design, Settings, and Participants  An anonymous online survey of medical, graduate, and health professions school faculty was conducted at a single large, urban academic medical center between September 1 and September 25, 2020.

Main Outcomes and Measures  Self-assessed intention to leave, reducing employment to part time, or turning down leadership opportunities because of work-life conflict before and since the COVID-19 pandemic.

Results  Of the 1186 of 3088 (38%) of faculty members who answered the survey, 649 (55%) were women and 682 (58%) were White individuals. Respondents were representative of the overall faculty demographic characteristics except for an overrepresentation of female faculty respondents and underrepresentation of Asian faculty respondents compared with all faculty (female faculty: 649 [55%] vs 1368 [44%]; Asian faculty: 259 [22%] vs 963 [31%]). After the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, faculty were more likely to consider leaving or reducing employment to part time compared with before the pandemic (leaving: 225 [23%] vs 133 [14%]; P < .001; reduce hours: 281 [29%] vs 206 [22%]; P < .001). Women were more likely than men to reduce employment to part time before the COVID-19 pandemic (153 [28%] vs 44 [12%]; P < .001) and to consider both leaving or reducing employment to part time since the COVID-19 pandemic (leaving: 154 [28%] vs 56 [15%]; P < .001; reduce employment: 215 [40%] vs 49 [13%]; P < .001). Faculty with children were more likely to consider leaving and reducing employment since the COVID-19 pandemic compared with before the pandemic (leaving: 159 [29%] vs 93 [17%]; P < .001; reduce employment: 213 [40%] vs 130 [24%]; P < .001). Women with children compared with women without children were also more likely to consider leaving since the COVID-19 pandemic than before (113 [35%] vs 39 [17%]; P < .001). Working parent faculty and women were more likely to decline leadership opportunities both before (faculty with children vs without children: 297 [32%] vs 84 [9%]; P < .001; women vs men: 206 [29%] vs 47 [13%]; P < .001) and since the COVID-19 pandemic (faculty with children vs faculty without children: 316 [34%] vs 93 [10 %]; P < .001; women vs men: 148 [28%] vs 51 [14%]; P < .001).

Conclusions and Relevance  In this survey study, the perceived stressors associated with work-life integration were higher in women than men, were highest in women with children, and have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The association of both gender and parenting with increased perceived work-life stress may disproportionately decrease the long-term retention and promotion of junior and midcareer women faculty.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has altered the ways we live and work with far-reaching impacts on all sectors of society. In the United States, 9.8 million jobs were lost between February and December 2020.1 This job loss has disproportionately affected women, who accounted for 46% of the prepandemic workforce but have experienced 54% of pandemic-related job losses.2 Structural inequalities further affect parents who have significantly increased their time spent on household and childcare duties by an additional 27 hours per week.1 This change has disproportionately affected mothers of young children, who have experienced a 4- to 5-fold decrease in work hours than working fathers since the pandemic.3

The COVID-19 pandemic has not spared the field of medicine, magnifying both the unique and universal stressors faced by physicians and medical scientists. Even before the pandemic, the US health care system had put a great deal of stress on health care workers through systems of high workload, high administrative burdens, inefficiency, emphasis on high productivity, and a culture of constant availability.4,5 Gender differences in pay parity, promotion, and work distribution have unevenly affected female physicians, leading more female physicians to reduce their working hours to part time or leave the field of medicine entirely.6 In academic medicine, women were already underrepresented in senior leadership positions before the pandemic. Although women make up 41% of all full-time academic medical school faculty, they account for 18% of academic chairs, 18% of deans, and 25% of full professors.7 The COVID-19 pandemic threatens to cause a regressive effect on the positive trends in gender equity and success in academic medicine unless action is taken.

To better understand how the COVID-19 pandemic is associated with faculty work-life conflict within our large urban academic medical institution, we conducted a campus-wide faculty survey to evaluate the perceived stress of the pandemic and maintaining work-life balance has affected faculty intention to leave, consideration of reducing their employment to part time and turning down leadership opportunities.

READ HERE

Academic Medicine Faculty Perceptions of Work-Life Balance Before and Since the COVID-19 Pandemic | Coronavirus (COVID-19) | JAMA Network Open | JAMA Network