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Tuesday, September 03, 2024

 

Waiting for the Anarchist Guerrilla…

Waiting for the Anarchist Guerrilla…

From Act for Freedom Now!

Translated from German, originally posted to kontrapolis.info

Spring 2024, the situation is unbearable. Fascism has conquered the minds of many people, not only in the territory controlled by the German State. The rulers of many countries seem to be on a death trip; hot wars between States, wars against migration, war against the planet’s resources and social war are in a phase of enthusiasm for death, reminiscent of descriptions shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. Meanwhile, humanity has its fingers glued to smartphones, numbed by the flickering of algorithms.

As for the hot wars, many anarchists remain in the spectator position. In one of these wars, there are good reasons to join the Kurdish structures and be active against the Turkish State and its Islamist proxies. There are also good reasons to stay away from the PKK’s cult of personality and instead attack Erdogan’s interests in Europe, although the initial waves of action here have subsided considerably. The anarchist space has also not yet developed any practice against the State systems that are largely responsible for the current massacres (NATO/EU/Israel/Iran/Russia) or the war profiteers that is capable of influencing the course of history.

Now, a text published on March 2, 2024 under the title “Developing Incisive Capacity: Making Actions Count”1 raises questions that are certainly relevant to many of us:

What could equip anarchists to carry out more significant strikes, to hone a quality of action that goes beyond the symbolic? What are the current obstacles to anarchists developing a capacity for action on a significant scale, organized in small autonomous groups that can coordinate around a particular focus? In other words, what needs to happen for more anarchists to establish the necessary skills and a certain routine for attacking identified vulnerabilities?

To answer these questions not only theoretically but also practically requires nothing less than an anarchist guerrilla. For with the methods developed in the autonomous movement over the last few decades, we have come no further than exactly where we have been for some time now. In order not to indulge in lengthy analyses, which could hardly be more appropriate than issue 2 of the newspaper “Antisistema”, spring 2024, please refer to this issue.

 

A guerrilla, or at least guerrilla activities, require, among other things, that a group of people organize themselves over a longer period of time. This is where the first shortcoming of anarchist non-organization comes in: a short stay in the scene and a lack of commitment. The development of a militant life takes longer than most people spend in the radical left milieus of the western metropolises. Combined with a misinterpretation of the anarchist perspective on committed organizing, this leads to the historical fact that, with few exceptions, most guerrilla groups were communist and/or aimed at national liberation. The resistance in Spain against Franco can be seen as an example of commitment to subversion as a life’s work. Anarchist, libertarian, and communist militants waged an armed struggle against the dictatorship from 1939 to 1965, in which most of them were killed rather than fleeing to the safety of exile in France. Francesc Sabaté Llopart became synonymous with these anarchist guerrillas, a struggle whose tragic end was marked by the execution of Salvador Puig Antich in 1974.

Very little has been written about the scale of the armed struggle against Franco following the civil war. A thick blanket of silence has been drawn over the fighters, for a variety of reasons. According to Franco’s personal friend, Guardia Civil General Camilo Alonso Vega — who was in charge of the anti-guerrilla campaign for twelve years — banditry (the term the Francoists always used to describe the guerrilla activity) was of “great significance” in Spain, in that it “disrupted communications, demoralised folk, wrecked our economy, shattered our unity and discredited us in the eyes of the outside world”.

We have no reliable breakdown of the overall figures for guerrillas or for the casualties sustained by or inflicted upon the security forces and Army. If we are to have some grasp of what this unequal struggle against the Dictatorship was like, our only option is to turn to figures made public in 1968, according to which the Guardia Civil sustained 628 casualties (258 deaths) between 1943 and 1952.2

A definition of what a guerrilla actually means emerges from the realities that people have faced in seemingly hopeless wars. Andrew Mack noted that in asymmetric wars, the stronger actor loses because it “has a lower interest in winning due to being less threatened,” which is true of the Algerian FLN’s war against France. And Ivan Arreguín-Toft: “Strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries. The focus of State forces on symmetrical warfare leads to the strong actor reacting to the asymmetrical strategies of the weak actor with the wrong strategy.” The anti-colonial guerrilla groups won because they did not lose. They prevented the stronger actor from winning hearts and minds3.

Applied to today’s situation, this means that the militants of the anarchist space in Europe and the US, due to their class origins (mostly white middle class), may not be able to develop a sufficient sense of being threatened, and that this cannot be compensated for by empathy with those affected by European aggression. This is against the backdrop of Europe’s uninterrupted war against the rest of the world’s population since Columbus landed in “America” in 1492.

Looking back at old issues of Interim and Radikal or the archive of Linksunten Indymedia, it is striking that the insurrectionary texts of the last twenty years have not taken a position on how to organize with those involved in the wave-like cycles of insurrection. Affinity groups have been conceptualized as being as ephemeral as many revolts themselves. With the level of sabotage this has made possible, participation in asymmetric warfare is not feasible at this time. This does not necessarily mean the use of weapons, but the creation of conditions that allow the use of whatever means are deemed necessary. At the moment, anarchist counter-violence stands in a reactive relationship to State power. We use the means that we assume the State and society will not extinguish us for. Currently, the State is shifting the discourse on violence against Nazis from “forbidden, but it happens” to “forbidden, and you’ll be hunted down for it”. The next step would have to be a paradigm shift that would force State power to react to our counter-violence. Or for State power to accept losing control of discursive and physical space.

After the uprising in Greece in December 2008, some of those who were involved called for urban guerrilla warfare to be adopted as the main strategic direction. This development was the subject of intense anonymous debate. Some people said that the expansion of guerrilla attacks was going too far too fast, that most people were unable to make or understand this tactical leap. They also said that the anarchists would become isolated and vulnerable to violent repression. Another criticism was that Greek society had some historical references to specialized leftist guerrilla groups, while there was hardly any tradition of the anarchist model of dispersed, non-vanguardist groups. In the absence of such a framework of historical references, it was argued, the new strategy of informal and flexible formations would not succeed in winning over a larger part of the population to participation in guerrilla actions.

Years earlier, the 17 November organization had published a critique of an anti-authoritarian group, arguing that choosing more mundane targets in line with an anarchist analysis would create more fear than recognition in society because people would not understand why that particular target was being attacked. Basing the strategy on more and more people carrying out similar attacks was seen as a problem because the necessary critique of capitalism is not widespread.

Another position was that a strategy of clandestine guerrilla warfare would lead to specialization and be spectacular. It requires such a high degree of specialization and knowledge that the vast majority of society cannot participate, as opposed to an uprising in which everyone can participate in their own way. By their very nature, guerrilla actions are spectacular due to the small number of people involved, which means that attacks are infrequent, which in turn increases the level of preparation and intensity. Their primary target is virtual reality. The way an urban revolt communicates itself is essentially immediate. However, clandestine attacks are mainly experienced through the eyes of the media. As a result, people become spectators of the struggle rather than protagonists, as is the case with riots. As the spearhead of the struggle moves further and further away from the realities of people’s lives, in the long run they are transformed even more into spectators. At the same time, the State and the media, for their part, turn the attacks into a spectacle and make them a symbol of the entire struggle. Finally, the State could simply eliminate the struggle by ordering the media to stop reporting on the attacks. Decapitated in this way, the remnants of the struggle could be enticed to collaborate with the institutional left.

Proponents of this critique point out that this is exactly what happened in Germany and Italy in the seventies and eighties. The group Ta Paidia Tis Galarias, which converted to communism from its anarchist roots, went further, claiming that “on this basis, the armed struggle finds itself in alliance with the State: both are challenged by proletarian subversive activity, the continuation of which threatens the survival of both.” The proponents of the guerrilla strategy, on the other hand, argued that if an insurrection is to develop into a revolution, it must prevail in armed struggle against the State, and it cannot do so unarmed4.

Be that as it may, as class antagonism subsided in Greece, so did the public guerrilla debate. One lesson for the future might be to be better prepared for the closing of a historical window, for occasionally this reset occurs, as in Portugal on April 25, 1974, when the dictatorship was swept away in a matter of hours by the Movimento das Forças Armadas. This overthrow came as a surprise to Portuguese society, and after initial attempts to collectivize farmland and some businesses, it was quickly forced into social-democratic channels under pressure from NATO. The armed resistance of communist groups such as the Brigadas Revolucionarias had little impact on the course of events. Although the BR had already begun attacking NATO installations in Portugal in 1971, robbing banks and engaging in gun battles with the police that left officers dead, society did not take up the fight against NATO. After the end of the colonial wars and sending the proletariat to the slaughter in them, internal peace was stablized. Nonetheless, the BR remained active until 1980 and maintained anti-colonial cooperation with the Polisario.

Preparing for historical windows is not so far-fetched, since only fifteen years after the fall of the regime in Portugal, two States in Europe — East Germany and Yugoslavia — dissolved completely. In both territories, however, this was accompanied by a rise in nationalist violence during a period of general depression for radical left militancy following the collapse of “real socialism”.

Preparing for a sudden or foreseeable situation, or even better, creating a situation yourself, is a frequently expressed idea. At this point we would like to engage with some of the ideas raised by the newspaper Antisistema. In response to the question of how we want to act (quantitatively or qualitatively?), they write:

It might be interesting to take a closer look at the three points mentioned above — energy grids, microchip factories and mining, especially deep-sea mining. […] Perhaps the multiplication of different forms of action — sabotage, mass disruption, small reproducible attacks — fueled by radical criticism on the streets and a growing disillusionment with politics can ensure that the possibility of direct action against those responsible for industrial destruction spreads.

A zine from France entitled “Blackout: Controversy about the meaning and effectiveness of sabotage” responds to the mass sabotage during the Covid lockdown by asking, “How could we undermine technological control? Could we provoke a tipping point in this situation? What scenarios did these sabotage actions open up? How could we consider effectiveness, organization, and ethics as a whole?”

It is well known that many sabotage actions in France do not come only from the anarchist spectrum, and “Blackout” attaches some importance to how we understand effectiveness:

Simultaneously, another proposal is taking shape whose strategy is to reach the infrastructural field, that is, the deep layers of power. The power of the war-research-industry complex is not unshakeable, since it relies on diffuse infrastructures. Understanding, identifying and destroying key infrastructures also means to start reconsidering the possibility of radical change. Although less spectacular, this way of action has a triple advantage: it is less seizable by repressive forces; it can concretely stop, though temporarily, the techno-industrial machinery; and it prevents any central direction from taking hold, since it is the result of the work of a multitude of small, dispersed and autonomous groups. What strategies emerge when we separate or combine anarchist, ecologist and techno-critical perspectives? How do these strategies integrate a now-decisive element: the war in Europe, which will guide and harden the grip of States on their populations.

First of all, in order to be able to speak of a strategy at all, the fight would have to be more long-term than is usually the case. Anyone who reacts to a new urgent issue every few months is only one factor in the strategy of the enemy, who is also acting. Making an impact becomes possible when a group of people can be found who are willing to commit themselves to a specific issue for a longer period of time. The anarchist guerrilla is not defined by the use of weapons and bombs, but by the decision to seriously engage in one aspect of the numerous wars. The current practice of beating up a Nazi today, smashing up a new building tomorrow, and setting fire to a company car next week is a politics of autonomous fire brigades. Better than nothing, but not enough to answer any of the questions outlined above. Last year’s intensification of worldwide attacks in support of Alfredo Cospito’s hunger strike revealed the nature of anarchist militancy. It is understood as a tactical tool — in this case as a show of solidarity — but it evaporates before it leaves any material impact on the enemy’s camp.

Determination is the strongest weapon of our enemies, not their guns or tanks. The determination of the police, military and security authorities to throw away their own lives and the lives of others at any moment stands in our way. The anarchist guerrilla will not counter this with the same cadaverous obedience, but rather with the determination to take the arduous path of resistance: conspiring with comrades despite interpersonal contradictions, pursuing long-term plans, eternal research without quick successes, moving through camera-infested cities on cold nights, etc.

About the possibilities: Either in Paris during the lockdown or in Grenoble a couple days later, the step seems to have taken, moving beyond targets with low strategic value (since they are easily replaceable) towards multiple targets that, once coordinated, considerably increase the efficiency of an offensive action. Whether it is the 100 000 people deprived of internet and phone services in Paris, or in Grenoble where we learned that an additional antenna would have shut down the metropolis’ entire network. Not that the recipe is anything new, but I find it exciting that we allow ourselves to think it, to do it, to coordinate ourselves, to hit simultaneously, and to disappear. It is a step forward, from what can be considered as low intensity conflict to what could become an open conflict. Given the way things are going, with on one side an all-technological over-controlled system and on the other, the increasingly intense destruction of what we still dared to call nature not so long ago, I sincerely believe that we do not have time anymore. No time to hope that another social movement will become uncontrollable if we break enough windows; a mass of increasingly servile people will become an angry mob. To me, not to have time anymore does not mean to rush behind every emergency (climate or social), nor to follow the increasingly rapid flux of the net, to be ‘present’ in order to spread ‘counter-information’. No. It means planning meaningful operations, to dare think in terms of strategy. With our own temporality and not that of power.5

As long as this form of guerrilla fails to materialize, Kurdish Apoism, centered around the ideas Abdulah Öcalan the founder of the PKK, will continue to attract anarchists, and others will lose themselves in the delirium of anarchist participation in the service of the Ukrainian military. Before deciding on the use of weapons, the anarchist guerrilla will have to engage with successful uprisings of the past. For example, the Arab uprising against Turkey in 1916-1918. Its main initiator, Lawrence of Arabia, said at the time:

Any kind of traditional warfare should be dispensed with and guerrilla warfare should be waged instead. This consists primarily of a negation of regular warfare. The central idea of regular war is the “encounter”. Two opponents meet at a given time to decide on victory or defeat through the orderly clash of their armies. Guerrilla warfare neither achieves a decision nor attempts to bring about an encounter with the enemy. Guerrilla warfare is a “war of evasion”. The guerrilla warrior hides from the enemy. At a safe distance, they look for the place where the enemy is weakest and attack there. Without forcing a decision, they retreat again and repeat the small attacks elsewhere. They do not wage war in the strict sense, but disturb their opponent with constant pinpricks of ambush, sabotage and raids until the latter, worn down in every respect, collapses.

According to Lawrence, the fact that Arabia was a land of revelatory religion with a tremendous longing for freedom was advantageous — a kind of reflection in the mind of the barrenness of the desert. Lawrence harnessed the prophetic power for the uprising with a strategy of perpetual ambush. It was less a matter of conquering territory than of creating a desire for freedom. Of course, it should not be forgotten that Lawrence was acting in the service of the British government, but the insurgents’ desire for freedom was authentic and their determination greater than that of the Turkish colonial power.

In 2024, Germany and Europe are littered with facilities, installations, vehicles and those responsible for the massacres at the borders, in Ukraine, in Palestine, in Kurdistan, and the colonial wars on other continents…

The initiative “Switch off! The system of destruction” has provided a positive and feasible example of a framework for action that enables coordination. To hone a quality of action that goes beyond the symbolic, as formulated from the Atlanta Forest, requires strong reference to each other, both in published texts and in the informal contacts between anonymous protagonists. In order not to become prematurely frustrated with the lack of change, we should take into account the time frame of the EZLN, which prepared for the armed uprising in the jungle for ten years.

Reducing effective strikes against the war machine to a militarist perspective prevents the emergence of an anarchist guerrilla. With all sympathy for the resistance in Turkey and despite recognizing the important attacks on the AKP regime, the Halkların Birleşik Devrim Hareketi (HBDH) wants something different from us when it says “we are the vanguard of the revolution in the struggle of the peoples in Turkey and Kurdistan against AKP/MHP fascism. The HBDH will fulfill its task as a vanguard. It will raise the consciousness of the working people in the right way. It will support and lead them in organizing. It will lead and inspire actions and mobilize people for them. The HBDH is a leading force. Against AKP/MHP fascism, it represents the future, hope, determination, freedom and democracy of Turkey. The HBDH is the force that will overthrow this fascism”6 Their utopia fills the vacuum in the absence of anarchist practice that is social and armed. So, is a form of resistance against the war that impacts reality only possible at the price of the leftist power dialectic, as expressed by the Kurdish groups?

In discussions with comrades from the three internationalists, we repeatedly came across the topic of tactical alliances, which are often unavoidable in war situations in order to become a force. Bawer, who still knew Finbar from Rojava, drew parallels to the time when he fought alongside the Kurdish movement in Raqqa and described the situation for anarchists in Ukraine as follows: “The way to build your own unity as an anarchist is to shake hands with forces like the State or disagreeable groups. However, it does not mean that you lose your principles. Many Western leftists cannot stand this contradiction.”7

Indeed, enduring contradictions is a necessary prerequisite for enabling autonomous small action groups to take a step forward. However, the current tendency in some circles to dismiss contradictions as irrelevant stands in the way of achieving freedom after the end of violence. While it is obvious that Israel’s war against the Palestinian population requires armed resistance, the uncritical solidarity that often happens speaks to the inconsequential non-practice of anarchy, with its lack of perspective on the battlefields. Where war, which is to say life and death, is discussed, it is necessary to clarify one’s own ideas. When, for example, the leader of the Saraya Al-Quds — Tulkarem Brigade answers five interview questions with “God”8, this requires us in the safe global North to take a real stand instead of resorting to empty phrases (if we are serious about practical solidarity).

In order to provide an answer to the questions brought up earlier, the development of an anarchist guerrilla is proposed. This does not require a founding declaration or acronyms. It is not defined by the question of weapons or the desire to escalate violence, but is rather characterized by the determination of those involved to build a long-term committed structure that is capable of acting against the war waged from above. Only the sequence of determination — commitment — organization in a collective structure leads to further questions about the choice of means or any strategic orientation. We must also fight the incredible success that the capitalist system achieves every day by framing war in the consciousness of the masses as a war of nations and religions, thereby concealing its true nature as a class war.


Sunday, August 25, 2024

 

Tolkien’s deplorable cultus: Right-wing hobbit enthusiasts and the urgency of Marxist criticism in fantasy

Published 
LINKS.ORG.AU
Spectre lord of the rings

First published at Spectre.

Observing his readers’ unexpected exuberance over The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings in the United States in the late 1960s, a somewhat dismayed J. R. R. Tolkien referred to his fans there as “my deplorable cultus,” going on to say that these people “don’t know what they’ve been moved by and they are quite drunk on it. Many young Americans are involved in the stories in a way I am not.”1He was likely thinking of the long-haired hippie types, those scrawling “Frodo Lives!” as graffiti or wearing “Gandalf for President” lapel pins, but Tolkien probably had no idea just how wild his fans would get in the decades to come. In 2024, a number of prominent right-wingers embrace Tolkien’s work as the inspiration for their own ultraconservative worldview. While some Marxists may look upon this scene with bemusement, fantasy as a mode and a genre is far too important to allow the right-wingers to take for themselves, and that includes the works of Tolkien.

Among these hobbit-loving political and business leaders are veritable “Masters of the Universe,” including current Republican vice-presidential nominee, J. D. Vance, his mentor, billionaire Peter Thiel, and even the Prime Minister of Italy, Giorgia Meloni, who in her younger days attended “Hobbit Camps” run by neofascist Tolkien admirers and who continues to cite Tolkien’s work as the inspiration for her far-right political views. These celebrity enthusiasts are joined by a vast and possibly growing international cohort of Tolkien fanatics who openly embrace white supremacist, racist, anti-immigrant, neo-Nazi, and otherwise right-wing ideologies, many of whom take The Lord of the Rings as something like holy scripture.

Such fans are the bane of Tolkien Studies, and there have been incidents of trolling of lectures and conferences. This baleful discourse has also plagued Tolkien and fantasy fandom in the broader popular culture, as right-wing zealots have attacked film and television adaptations for their apparently “woke” casting and lack of faithfulness to the original or to what they imagine to be “reality” itself. Even those Tolkien fans or scholars who consider themselves relatively conservative in their political views have been alarmed by the ultra-right’s attempts to claim Tolkien as their own.

Fantasy is fundamentally the literature of alterity, a means of empowering the imagination to think of the world differently. As such it remains a vital resource for the Marxist critique of all that exists, to borrow a phrase from Karl Marx, who so effectively explored the unreality of the so-called “reality” that obscures the true social relations in societies organized under the capitalist mode of production. And by positing the nonexistent as real, as the great socialist writer China Miéville has put it, fantasy “is good to think with.”2I maintain that the writings of Tolkien, who for better or worse still stands as the supremely canonical and foundational figure in fantasy, are also good to think with.

Along those lines, Marxist approaches to Tolkien are all the more necessary today, both to illuminate the potentially radical value of his work and to stand athwart the neofascists who wish to arrogate Tolkien to themselves. Marxists must “read differently,” bringing to bear the full force of a dialectical criticism that refuses facile moralism, instead analyzing the dynamic world system Tolkien’s legendarium figures forth, exposing its ideological limits while also limning its potential for helping us to imagine radical alternatives.

Reading Tolkien dialectically

The idea that Tolkien himself would approve of tech-industry millionaires who aspire to positions of power in government is absurd on its face, but then there must be aspects of Tolkien’s writings and views that do appeal to such people. For many on the political left, the embrace of Tolkien by far-right conservatives like Vance, Thiel, or Meloni is proof positive that Tolkien’s work is inherently right-wing. Many Marxist critics have long dismissed the fantasy genre — as opposed to science fiction, for instance, not to mention realism — as reactionary, and Tolkien’s writings are viewed as emblematic of the genre’s retrogressive and illiberal sensibilities.3Fantasy in its very form has been considered politically reactionary, backwards-looking, religiously oriented, and hostile to technology, all things that Tolkien’s world would seem to reinforce. Tolkien’s outsized influence on what would become a huge fantasy industry does not help the cause, as the success of The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings has only spurred the popular appeal of medievalist or romantic visions of an enchanted past.

Science fiction, by contrast, tends to be seen as a more progressive genre, characterized by what critic Darko Suvin called “cognitive estrangement,” whereby everyday reality is defamiliarized (in a good, Brechtian sense) through rational if not scientific tropes, often oriented toward technology and the future. Fantasy, in this view, offers only a mythic or religious estrangement that is inherently conservative. Even so dialectically nuanced a reader as Fredric Jameson has insisted that the two genres not be conflated.4Some left-leaning writers have resisted this tendency, most notably Miéville, who has criticized the Suvinian position as ideological in its own right and defended the uses of fantasy for radical political thought.5And, of course, there are many other left-leaning fantasy writers out there, including Angela Carter, Michael Moorcock, Ursula Le Guin, Samuel R. Delany, Octavia Butler, Terry Pratchett, and Nnedi Okorafor, to name a few.

I, myself, have tried to push against this tendency in Marxist criticism, offering a sort of Marxist reading of Tolkien that seeks to uncover the utopian as well as the ideological import of these writings, in my books J.R.R. Tolkien’s ‘The Hobbit’: Realizing History Through Fantasy (2022), Representing Middle-earth: Tolkien, Form, and Ideology (2024), and my forthcoming book on Tolkien’s Orcs. My approach in these studies is somewhat in the vein of Jameson’s The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981). Jameson himself had written an excellent study of an actual fascist writer, Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist (1979), a dialectical reading that disclosed the potentially liberatory politics latent within the archconservative’s prose. I believe that Tolkien may likewise be read in such a way that Marxists and others on the left can embrace The HobbitThe Lord of the Rings, and other writings as works worthy of analysis and of admiration, even if this may also involve reading them “against the grain,” to invoke Walter Benjamin’s metaphor.

A Marxist approach to Tolkien does not simply involve selective reading, looking for utopian needles in the vast ideological haystacks, but rather it would examine the totality of the work, disclosing the “positive” alongside the “negative” to be found there. Just as Marx himself discovered in the royalist Honoré de Balzac’s fiction the most fully fleshed out vision of bourgeois social relations available, just as Georg Lukács found in conservative Walter Scott’s historical romances the basis for a Marxian historicist worldview, and just as Jameson revealed the utopian potential in the fascist Wyndham Lewis’s vicious anticommunism, a dialectical reading of Tolkien’s work can elicit productive material for radical cultural criticism. Given the overwhelming popularity of Tolkien and Tolkien-related franchises today, in fact, Marxist criticism has a duty not to cede this entire domain to the right-wingers who wish to claim it as their own.

“The rising tide of orquerie”: Race and class in Tolkien

It should go without saying that a Marxist interpretation would not try to whitewash Tolkien’s own troubling views or the vexing problems to be found in his work, for example, the many involving race and class. Liberal fans of Tolkien, distraught by the enthusiastic response of white supremacists and other far-right hobbit fanciers, have rushed to defend the Professor. As if to confirm his anti-fascism, such readers often cite Tolkien’s description of Hitler as “that ruddy little ignoramus.”6When in 1938 he was asked by a German publisher to confirm that he was 100 percent “arisch” (that is, Aryan, with no “Jewish blood”), Tolkien’s anger was palpable: “I am not clear as to what you intend by arisch. I am not of Aryan extraction: that is Indo-iranian…. But if I am to understand that you are enquiring whether I am of Jewish origin, I can only reply that I regret that I appear to have no ancestors of that gifted people.”7This letter is frequently quoted as “proof” that Tolkien was neither profascist nor anti-Semitic, although as Robert Stuart has observed in his Tolkien, Race, and Racism in Middle-earth (2022), “philo-Semitism is just as racist as anti-Semitism, in that it ranks races hierarchically.”8And there can be no question that within Tolkien’s legendarium, the various “races” (that is, Elves, Men, Dwarves, and so on, as well as their intramural subdivisions or ethnicities), are clearly ranked in a hierarchical order.

Indeed, despite the liberal apologists’ best intentions, there is obviously much in Tolkien’s work that would support the claims by white supremacists that he is one of them. The consistently racist depictions of Orcs, for example, who are invariably “swart,” “sallow-skinned,” and “slant-eyed,” is rather striking, as is the fact that, while appearing to be human in almost all respects, the Orcs are demonized and dehumanized, constantly compared to beasts, insects, maggots, and the like, not just by individual characters but by the narrator as well. Worse, even though Tolkien’s Orcs are utterly human, perhaps all too human, with personalities, families, communities, cities, and so on, the “heroes” in Tolkien’s writings hunt and kill them even in “peacetime,” without any compunction and at times quite gleefully. There is only one reference to an Orc being taken captive in all of Tolkien’s writings, and that for questioning, after which he is summarily beheaded. Even as Frodo, Gandalf, Aragorn, and others exhibit sympathy for the treacherous Gollum, the traitorous wizard Saruman, and the wicked lackey Wormtongue, no one shows the least bit of mercy or kindness for Orcs, even Orcs who are fleeing and thus pose no immediate threat. Undoubtedly, this uncompromising mercilessness toward the ostensible “enemy” may be characteristic of many on the “New Right” as well.

In a famous letter, Tolkien explicitly describes the Orcs’ appearance: “The Orcs are definitely stated to be corruptions of the ‘human’ form seen in Elves and Men. They are (or were) squat, broad, flat-nosed, sallow-skinned, with wide mouths and slant eyes: in fact degraded and repulsive versions of the (to Europeans) least lovely Mongol-type.”9It is easy enough to imagine Orcs as being “Oriental” in some sense, hence a threat to “the West.” In fact, by a perverse ruse of history, some Russian ultra-nationalists have in recent years embraced the idea of themselves as Russian Orcs, championing brutal force to counter the Western influence. Those who wish to claim that Tolkien was not himself racist, or that his works do not exhibit racism, are not very convincing under these circumstances. Moreover, the exoticizing and Orientalizing of the enemy obviously provides fodder to the anti-immigrant and white supremacist arguments of many on the far right in Europe and the Americas.

Notwithstanding the racist characterization of Orcs in his writings, Tolkien often imagines orkishness in the real world as defined by attitudes and values more than by racial or national character. Using the term metaphorically in a wartime letter, for example, Tolkien wrote that “There are no genuine Uruks [Orcs], that is folk made bad by the intention of their maker,” adding that “there are human creatures that seem irredeemable short of a special miracle, and that there are probably abnormally many of such creatures in Deutschland and Nippon — but certainly these unhappy countries have no monopoly: I have met them, or thought so, in England’s green and pleasant land,” elsewhere noting that “we started out with a great many Orcs on our side.”10In fact, orkishness for Tolkien is often associated with technology, automation, and industry. In The Hobbit, he suggests that orcs likely “invented some of the machines that have since troubled the world, especially the ingenious devices for killing large numbers of people at once.” (As it happens, Gandalf had just killed “several” orcs at once, leaving “a smell like gunpowder,” and just a few pages later Gandalf kills the Great Goblin and many dozens of orcs along with him.)11There is terrible irony in the fact that the founders and principle investors of Palantir Technologies and Anduril Industries, with their vast network of connections to various military organizations, should be devotees of Tolkien, who himself would have undoubtedly considered them the enemy.

Tolkien at times used the term “Orc” to refer to those who operated noisy machinery, announcing “there is an Orc!” when a motorcycle roared past, for instance. “Still you never quite know what is going on under the head of an apparent orc on a motor bike,” Tolkien once wrote. Tolkien also wrote of receiving a fan letter from a worker in a Siemens factory, which he described as from an “Orc,” for apparently merely working for such a company was enough to make someone an Orc. The Siemens factory in question produced massive cables for the telecommunications industry, so perhaps that too has something to do with it — the corporation for which this English “Orc” worked was literally an agent of capitalist globalization! If anything, the industries of Silicon Valley and their ilk, devoted as most are to high tech, artificial intelligence, software, telecom, and transnational commerce, would almost certainly represent the most “evil” forces in the Middle-earth of our own day, in Tolkien’s view. Far from representing wise wizards like Gandalf or doughty hobbits like Sam, these right-wing Middle-earth fanatics like Thiel and Vance would have been part of what Tolkien once called “the rising tide of orquerie.”12

Right-wing hobbit fanciers

As elaborated in a recent Politico article, “‘Hillbilly Hobbit’: How Lord of the Rings Shaped JD Vance’s Worldview,” the junior senator from Ohio and current vice-presidential nominee has long cited Tolkien’s work as an inspiration for his political awakening. Naming Tolkien as his favorite author, Vance in 2021 explained, “I’m a big Lord of the Rings guy, and I think, not realizing it at the time, but a lot of my conservative worldview was influenced by Tolkien growing up.”13While extolling the virtues of simple, rustic, “traditional” lives, with the hobbits of the Shire as stand-ins for out-of-work Appalachian miners or Midwestern family farmers, Vance also seems to imagine himself as a Gandalf, a gifted, well-educated tech “wizard” who can inspire the small folk to greatness while also paternalistically looking out for them.

Vance is among the latest figures in a multinational panoply of right-wing political leaders and businessmen who claim Tolkien’s ideas as the source of their own. Vance’s mentor, Thiel, has frequently mentioned Tolkien’s influence as well as (more bizarrely) that of his former Stanford professor René Girard. Thiel has founded a number of investment funds and other companies named after terms found in Tolkien’s legendarium, including Palantir Technologies, Mithril Capital, Valar Ventures, Lembas LLC, Rivendell One LLC, and Arda Capital. Thiel, along with Vance, were also key investors involved in the founding of Anduril Industries, a defense contractor. (For those not familiar with Tolkienian terminology, the palantír is a “seeing stone,” much like a crystal ball that operates at times as a form of telecommunication; mithril refers to a pure form of silver, the most valuable of all precious metals in Middle-earth; the Valar are the god-like beings, the “Powers” of the world, modeled somewhat on the Norse pantheon; lembas is the elven “way-bread,” a substance that is almost magically sustaining and healthful; Rivendell is the common name of Elrond’s elven enclave, a site of great learning and restoration in Tolkien’s universe; Arda is the name for the planet Earth itself, the world as we know it; and Andúril is the elvish name Aragorn gives to his sword, a name translated as “Flame of the West.”) Needless to say, perhaps, but these names are not merely homages to a favorite novelist’s fiction, but are calculated to symbolize the corporate mission of each entity. Palantir Technologies is deeply involved in the business of surveillance and data collection, for example, so the lost “seeing stones” of Númenor are particularly suggestive in that context.

Apparently recruited by Thiel while still at Yale Law School, Vance worked for Mithril Capital before founding — with a large investment from Thiel himself — Narya Capital, an investment fund named for the elven ring of power worn by Gandalf in The Lord of the Rings. Narya is the Ring of Fire, whose magical properties include the ability to inspire others, which suggests that in the story itself, Gandalf’s own prodigious powers as a wizard were enhanced and focused through his use of this ring. Presumably, Vance imagines his own Ivy League-formed powers to be strengthened by the sorcery of finance capital, which as Marx himself observed can involve the most phantasmagoric elements of necromancy, turning dead labor into living capital, and through leverage, generating massive effects from relatively small investments.

Vance and Thiel are more famous than most, but in recent years there has been a large and burgeoning movement of the “new right,” alt-right, white supremacist, and neofascist ideologues embracing Tolkien, drawing upon his stories and their popularity to justify their views of racial purity and European-American dominance. Members of such movements have plagued Tolkien studies and fandom, along with medieval studies and other areas, often emerging in more mainstream media in connection with popular culture and the “culture wars” attendant thereto. For example, the “diverse” casting of the Amazon Prime series The Lord of the Rings: The Rings of Power, which features actors of color playing elves, dwarves, and protohobbits, called forth a firestorm of protest from fans, some of whom openly identified with fascist or neo-Nazi perspectives, who castigated the producers for their “woke” program. Beyond criticizing the sort of choices that go into any film or television adaptations, however, some of these Tolkien fans were questioning not merely the faithfulness to Tolkien’s own writings but also the degree to which nonwhites have any claim to Tolkien’s world at all.

Indeed, to the chagrin of many liberal, left-leaning, or even apolitical fans, the association of Tolkien with fascism has become something of a fait accompli, at least in certain circles, given the ardor of the right-wing enthusiasts. Most prominent, perhaps, is Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who honed her ideological perspective in “Hobbit Camps” run by neofascists who were also attempting to restore Mussolini-like regimes in Italy and elsewhere. As The Washington Post reported last year, “for Meloni and a horde of fantasy-loving politicians in Italy’s far right, nothing is more precious than the works of Tolkien, in whose writing they see themselves as a ragtag fellowship battling the Lidless Eye of the European left. Italy’s post-fascist far-right hosted ‘Hobbit Camps’ for young conservatives as far back as the 1970s.”14Guardian article noted that, in her own book, Meloni claims that her favorite character “is the peace-loving everyman Samwise Gamgee, ‘just a hobbit.’” A few pages later she’s implicitly likening Italy to the lost kingdom of Númenor and citing the character Faramir’s call to arms in The Two Towers. Ultimately, she seems to view Tolkien’s work as a didactic antiglobalization fable, a hyperconservative epic that advocates a full-blown war against the modern world in the name of traditional values.”15In November 2023, Meloni’s government launched a massive exhibit at Rome’s National Gallery of Modern and Contemporary Art on Tolkien’s work and memorabilia.

Meloni, for her part, was obviously deeply involved in Italian neofascist Tolkien communities early on, attending Hobbit Camp — she has referred to it as a “political laboratory” — already in the early 1990s. But it seems that the rapid spread of Tolkien’s influence among right-wing groups and individuals came only after December 2001, with the release of the Peter Jackson-directed adaptation The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, followed by the next two installments (The Two Towers and The Return of the King) hitting theaters in 2002 and 2003. The timing was serendipitous, as this was arguably the first international blockbuster film and franchise to emerge after the attacks of September 11, 2001, with The Two Towers released on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by the “coalition of the willing” who were to be combatting what President George W. Bush had dubbed “the Axis of Evil.”

Suddenly, an epic adventure in which wise leaders working with simple “small folk” in the attempt to overcome a vast and evil empire bent on covering the world in darkness took on additional resonance for many viewers. For some, undoubtedly, the “clash of civilizations” heralded by Samuel P. Huntington could be easily transcoded onto Middle-earth, with the Easterlings, Southrons, the peoples of Mordor, and above all Orcs (that is, servants of an “evil” Sauron) being opposed to the very existence of the “free peoples of the West,” who quickly became coded as white, Christian, capitalist, and “freedom-loving.” This timing made a right-wing interpretation of Tolkien’s works all the more salient.

It did not help that the films are far less nuanced than the novel upon which they are based, presenting a much more simplistic good-versus-evil scenario than that to be found in Tolkien’s own writings. Far be it for me to suggest that the right-leaning Tolkien super-fans like Vance do not read, but I think it is noteworthy that their sense of what “Tolkien” thinks seems to stem more from Jackson’s film adaptations (2001–2003) than from the novel itself, first published in three volumes in 1954 and 1955 (then released in its authorized paperback edition in the U.S. in 1965). Even Thiel, who has cited Tolkien as a formative influence in his life, managed to found or cofound numerous companies and funds — including Fieldlink (later renamed Confinity), PayPal, and Clarium Capital Management — that did not have Tolkien-inspired names in the years before the Jackson movies appeared; Palantir Technologies was founded only in 2003, by contrast. In Vance’s case, he would have only been seventeen years old when the first film was released, but then many of us read Tolkien in or even before high school. Still, he likely “came of age” amid the coincidental maelstrom of post-9/11 geopolitics and Lord of the Rings’s pop-cultural dominance.

“Dynamiting factories and power-stations”

As for Tolkien’s own personal political beliefs, which likely changed slightly over the years, Tolkien certainly opposed communism, socialism, or other left-wing programs, yet some anarchists have claimed him.16Most likely, Tolkien favored a political order somewhat like that of the Shire at the beginning of the Fourth Age (that is, after the conclusion of The Lord of the Rings), in which a relatively autonomous, culturally homogenous, somewhat isolated, and mostly self-governing community existed as part of a larger kingdom, where a distant and largely disinterested, though powerful, monarch saw to it that a status quo was maintained. In a letter dated November 29, 1943, Tolkien wrote,

My political opinions lean more and more to Anarchy (philosophically understood, meaning abolition of control not whiskered men with bombs)—or to “unconstitutional” Monarchy. I would arrest anybody who uses the word State (in any sense other than the inanimate realm of England and its inhabitants, a thing that has neither power, rights nor mind); and after a chance of recantation, execute them if they remained obstinate!…Give me a king whose chief interest in life is stamps, railways, or race-horses; and who has the power to sack his Vizier (or whatever you care to call him) if he does not like the cut of his trousers.

Lamenting the “frightful landslide into Theyocracy,” Tolkien adds that “the special horror of the present world is that the whole damned thing is in one bag. There is nowhere to fly to.” The interconnectedness of nations and peoples is part of the problem with the modern world, in Tolkien’s view, which leads him to write these somewhat devastating lines: “There is only one bright spot and that is the growing habit of disgruntled men of dynamiting factories and power-stations; I hope that, encouraged now as ‘patriotism,’ may remain a habit! But it won’t do any good, if it is not universal.”17Undoubtedly there are those among the right-wing Tolkien enthusiasts who would champion these notions of patriotic industrial sabotage or terrorism, but it seems unlikely that captains of industry and their allies (like Thiel or Vance) would do so. If nothing else, it would be very bad for their businesses and for the “working-class” people employed in those factories.

Tolkien’s own political and religious views are generally understood to be conservative, based in large part on his devout Roman Catholic values and his mistrust of modernization, reform, and “progress.” But he was not a supporter of fascism. If anything, as Stuart has suggested, Tolkien’s profound traditionalism may have made him more conservative than the fascists, who were after all quite modernist in their own ways, not to mention the fascists’ far-right appeal to a nationalist populism that would have seemed vulgar in comparison to Tolkien’s more aristocratic social sensibilities. In Tolkien’s legendarium, for instance, hereditary elites like Galadriel, Elrond, and Aragorn are the ones fit to rule, plus Dain among the Dwarves, Théoden or Bard among “Men.” And even in the relatively more democratic Shire, the “betters” among the hobbit families (the Tooks, the Brandybucks, the Bagginses) are recognized as such by their ostensible inferiors. Notably, when Sam ascends beyond his initially lowly station at the end of The Lord of the Rings, he adopts the name “Gardner” for his clan, dropping the plebian “Gamgee.”

As for being a conservative, Tolkien was not particularly loyal to the Tories, many of whom he felt were part of the problem; he opposed the imperialism of the British Empire, pointing out that “I love England (not Great Britain and certainly not the British Commonwealth (grr!)).” Remarking on a wartime photo of the Allied leaders, Tolkien says that “our little cherub,” Winston Churchill, “actually looked the biggest ruffian present,” even as Churchill was sitting next to “that bloodthirsty old murderer Josef Stalin.” Indeed, Tolkien’s real fear is of the “Americo-cosmopolitanism” to come, “when they have introduced American sanitation, morale-pep, feminism, and mass production” throughout the whole world.18

Today’s conservatives like Vance might well agree about American “feminism” (whatever that meant in 1943), but it is hard to believe that the founder of Narya Capital Management would be opposed to mass production and a global marketplace. Indeed, the far-right Tolkienians seem to be blithely selective in their uses of Tolkien’s work and ideas, embracing at times a romantic anticapitalism that lauds the “common man” in a preindustrial epoch, while at others insisting on support for the heaviest of heavy industries (mining, steel, automobiles, nuclear power, etc.) as well as championing the high tech sectors — Silicon Valley is, after all, the utopian “Shire” for Thiel and his minions — and seeking ever greater influence worldwide. The rhetoric of antiglobalization remains part of the populist message, of course, but it is difficult to imagine that people running Palantir Technologies, Mithril Capital, or Anduril Industries, veritable agents as well as beneficiaries of globalization, are themselves opposed to this worldwide financial, military, and industrial system.

Beyond good and evil

Where the far-right Tolkienians are perhaps most at home in Tolkien’s work can be found in their sense of moral certitude. Tolkien’s critics have accused him of establishing a world of overly simplistic good versus evil, with little room for nuance or interpretation, and these right-wing Tolkien fans often champion that aspect as a strength in both his work and his worldview. That is, the “moral clarity” of Tolkien can overcome the ambiguities and complexities of modern, and later “postmodern,” politics and culture, thus allowing wise Gandalf- or Galadriel-like leaders, along with their earnest common-folk acolytes like Frodo and Sam, to know what is right and what is wrong, and to act accordingly.

Yet here is where the misreading of Tolkien is most pronounced. Notwithstanding the many times words like “good” and “evil” appear in his writings, Tolkien consistently recognized the ambiguities and uncertainties with respect to the ethical dimension. Most importantly, he denied that evil even exists, while noting that most of what we take to be “evil” in the world derives from noble sentiments and good intentions.

“I do not deal in Absolute Evil. I do not think there is such a thing,” Tolkien explained, adding “I do not think that at any rate any ‘rational being’ is wholly evil. Satan fell. Morgoth fell before the creation of the physical world.” Sauron, who comes as close to an “evil” being as there is in The Lord of the Rings, was not evil at heart, but rather, “He had gone the way of all tyrants: beginning well, at least on the level that while desiring to order all things according to his own wisdom he still at first considered the (economic) well-being of the other inhabitant of the Earth.” Tolkien then points out that Sauron fell victim in part to his own good intentions, which were to rehabilitate Middle-earth, to bring harmony and order to a state of desolation and chaos, and to improve the lives of the people in the world. Tolkien observes that “When he [Sauron] found how greatly his knowledge was admired by all other rational creatures and how easy it was to influence them, his pride became boundless,” and as we know from Proverbs, “pride goeth before destruction and a haughty spirit before a fall.”19

Ironically, perhaps, Vance seems to model himself after this vision of Sauron, although he clearly would not think of himself as such. When Vance imagines himself as a Gandalf, a wise leader looking out for the interests and well-being of the “small folk” of various Shire-like rural communities such as those in Appalachia, he is in fact embracing Sauron’s position, at least as Tolkien understands it. Within The Lord of the Rings, part of the reason that Gandalf, as well as Galadriel and Aragorn, reject the opportunity to use the One Ring is that they realize that with such power they could not help but dominate others to the ultimate detriment of all, including themselves. It is not that the ring itself is evil — another bizarre idea introduced in Jackson’s films that is not present in the novel — but that it enhances the power of its users to make their will more speedily effective. Tolkien was canny enough to know that even a “good” person using such power, using it for the good, would “fall” into what (in retrospect, at least) would be seen as evil. There is an element here of the old saws about “the road to hell” and “power corrupts,” of course, but the main point is that Tolkien is not in fact dividing his world between forces of good and evil, but between those who desire to attain power (including the power to “do good”) and those who would abjure it. Indeed, in a 1959 letter responding to a reader’s query about what would have happened had Gandalf taken the ring, Tolkien wrote, “Gandalf as Ring-Lord would have been far worse than Sauron,” largely because he would have been “self-righteous,” thus more dangerous; “Gandalf would have made good detestable and seem evil.”20This is a fair warning to any Gandalf admirers who seek economic or political power in this, our all-too-real world, a caveat that the right-wing Tolkien admirers appear unlikely to heed.

In fact, it seems that many of the far-right Tolkien enthusiasts have translated key elements of The Lord of the Rings into a would-be hegemonic political and economic program for the US and the world today. This plan simultaneously posits a profoundly elitist, ultramodern power structure alongside a populist, demotic appeal to tradition. In this way, the right-wing Tolkien fanatics can envision themselves as both Gandalf and Sam Gamgee with equal aplomb, thus embodying the most powerful “good” being in the world with the most lovable and simplest everyman character, one who is working-class to boot. In this model, they can simultaneously envision themselves as ordinary people and as powerful wizards, whose elite educational backgrounds (Yale, Stanford, and so on) signify their greater “wisdom,” and whose mastery of the technological domains (Silicon Valley, venture capital, defense industries, and so on) exemplify their well-nigh “magical” abilities to operate effectively in a complex and dangerous world. These great masters are able to rouse and inspire the common people, which is to say hobbits, in the rural backwaters (that is, the Shire) through various related movements (for example, the Tea Party, Make America Great Again, the War on Woke, and now anti-DEI), which in turn convinces these “small folk” that they are essential to “saving the world” from whatever threatens it. Sauron and the One Ring, along with Saruman’s industrialism, increased immigration of “Swarthy Men” and “squint-eyed Southerners,” and the threat of Orcs (and “half-Orcs”!), become figures for liberalism, globalization, “diversity, equity, and inclusion,” and so forth.

In opposing such enemies, these wizards and the hobbits seek the return of the king — in the US in 2024, that’s Trump, naturally, but in any case a “strong” executive leader — who will then preside over various fiefdoms that will actually be “corporate monarchies,” seemingly autonomous locales that are in fact postmodern variations of the old “company towns,” now more or less under the dominion of billionaires like Elon Musk or Peter Thiel, or else their designees and assigns (since God knows they don’t have the time, energy, or competence to run governments). There is certainly a neofeudalist aspect to this, hence the rhetoric of romantic anticapitalism even among these titans of industry and abject apologists for capitalism, but ultimately the model is that of a corporate oligarchy in which “ordinary” Americans are ruled with an iron fist formed by an invisible hand, right down to the meticulous policing of borders, workplace policies, home ownership, privacy, and so forth.21Tolkien’s medievalist fantasy vision thus becomes a part of the plan for an utterly postmodern, twenty-first century reorganization of society in general.

Conclusion

When Tolkien referred to his American enthusiasts as his “deplorable cultus,” he was not objecting to the perceived liberalism or left-wing views of these American readers — in any case, we know that many who were thought of as hippies became, or turned out to be, quite right-wing themselves. Rather, he was registering their fundamental misunderstanding of his work, which had a mostly melancholy tone and thus did not merit the spirited exuberance of many of its fans. It was a “heroic romance” without a hero, or rather, with so many heroes acting in various uncoordinated ways which ultimately leads to the unexpectedly happy ending, what Tolkien called the eucatastrophe, but which also created a more prosaic world devoid of enchantment in its wake. Tolkien hints throughout The Lord of the Rings at something like Divine Providence, but as Jameson has pointed out, this is ultimately a vision of History itself, hence well suited to a Marxist critical perspective that could “rewrite certain religious concepts — most notably Christian historicism and the ‘concept’ of providence, but also the pretheological systems of primitive magic — as anticipatory foreshadowings of historical materialism.”22Jameson famously asserted that “History is what hurts,” and ultimately, in Tolkien’s own view, The Lord of the Rings is a story about History, the “long defeat” (as Galadriel calls it), which is why even in apparent triumph an aura of mourning and loss is pervasive.

For Tolkien, a conservative Roman Catholic skeptical of modernization in all its vicissitudes, the image of reality in Middle-earth (that is, the world we live in) as the Vale of Tears is understandable. But for those of us who find this world objectionable in other ways, such as in the dominance of the wealthy and powerful over others, might see in the transformation of the social order preferable alternatives. Tolkien, perhaps despite himself, makes possible a vision of a world in which les damnés de la terre du milieu (“the wretched of Middle-earth”) can make for themselves a life worth living. The right-wing embrace of Tolkien is rooted in establishing and maintaining an order that resists change, but even Tolkien knew that change is inevitable. While he may have mourned that fact, Tolkien also opens up the imaginative spaces in which to celebrate its potential for building a better world, a world without “Big Bosses,” as Tolkien allows even his orcs to dream of in The Lord of the Rings.

Tolkien is not himself a Marxist (far from it!), but his work is well suited to a Marxist analysis that may disclose elements of the political unconscious and counter-narratives implicit in the texts, which in turn may stand in opposition to the facile and self-serving misreadings of Tolkien’s right-wing fans. It may not be possible to rescue Tolkien from his far-right admirers, fascist hobbit campers, and palantíri-obsessed corporate Big Brothers, but there is ample space within Tolkien’s own writings for alternative interpretations. The left cannot cede the literature of alterity and of the imagination, of which fantasy in general and Tolkien in particular represent crucial forms, to those on the right who ultimately seek to foreclose the imaginative and the political possibilities available to us. The deplorables who make up Tolkien’s present-day cultus ought not be given the final say in the matter, nor should they be permitted to forge and wield their own rings of power.

Robert T. Tally Jr. is a professor of English at Texas State University. His recent books include The Fiction of Dread: Dystopia, Monstrosity, and Apocalypse (2024), Representing Middle-earth: Tolkien, Form, and Ideology (2024), The Critical Situation: Vexed Perspectives in Postmodern Literary Studies (2023), J. R. R. Tolkien’s ‘The Hobbit’: Realizing History Through Fantasy (2022), and For a Ruthless Critique of All That Exists: Literature in an Age of Capitalist Realism (2022).

  • 1

    Humphrey Carpenter, J. R. R. Tolkien: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 233.

  • 2

    China Miéville, “Editorial Introduction: Marxism and Fantasy,” Historical Materialism 10, no. 4 (January 2002): 46.

  • 3

    See, for example, John Molyneux, “A Marxist View of Tolkien’s Middle-earth,” Jacobin, January 11, 2023, https://jacobin.com/2023/01/jrr-tolkein-lord-of-the-rings-marxist-critique.

  • 4

    For example, introducing a chapter titled “The Great Schism” in which he distinguishes fantasy from SF, Jameson says, “We must now lay this misunderstanding to rest.” Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (New York: Verso, 2005), 56.

  • 5

    See Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre, ed. Gerry Canavan (Bern: Peter Lang, 2016), 19–22; Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, 56–57; and China Miéville, “Cognition as Ideology: A Dialectic of SF Theory,” in Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction, eds. Mark Bould and China Miéville (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2009), 231–48.

  • 6

    J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien:Revised and Expanded Edition, ed. Humphrey Carpenter (New York: William Morrow, 2023), 77.

  • 7

    Ibid., 48.

  • 8

    Robert Stuart, Tolkien, Race, and Racism in Middle-earth (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 237.

  • 9

    Tolkien, Letters, 393.

  • 10

    Tolkien, Letters, 129, 113.

  • 11

    Tolkien, The Hobbit (New York: DelRey, 1982), 62, 60.

  • 12

    Tolkien, Letters, 367.

  • 13

    Adam Wren, “‘Hillbilly Hobbit’: How Lord of the Rings Shaped JD Vance’s Worldview,” Politico, July 19, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/19/lord-of-the-rings-jd-vance-00169372

  • 14

    Anthony Faiola and Stefano Pitrelli, “Tolkien’s Biggest Fan? Italy’s Giorgia Miloni Opens a New Exhibit,” Washington Post, November, 17, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/16/tolkiens-biggest-fan-italys-giorgia-meloni-opens-new-exhibit/

  • 15

    Jamie Mackay, “How Did The Lord of the Rings Become a Secret Weapon in Italy’s Culture Wars?” Guardian, November, 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/03/the-lord-of-the-rings-italy-giorgia-meloni-tolkien

  • 16

    See, for example, Joel Cornell, “Tolkien the Anarchist: Middle-earth, Chomsky, and the Search for the Everyday Shire,” Culture Crush, February 27, 2020,  https://www.theculturecrush.com/feature/tolkien-the-anarchist.

  • 17

    Tolkien, Letters, 90–91.

  • 18

    Tolkien, Letters, 92.

  • 19

    Tolkien, Letters, 350.

  • 20

    Tolkien, Letters, 468.

  • 21

    I am indebted to Tolkien scholar Craig Franson for his insights into this phenomenon.

  • 22

    Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 285.