It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
The protracted port dispute in Panama involving the Chinese operator CK Hutchison has revealed how strategic harbors could act as a flashpoint in global power competition. In a world where geopolitical tensions continue to rise, control over critical ports is being seen as a means to assert sea power - particularly when it comes to Chinese control.
Last week, AidData, a research lab at the College of William and Mary, released a new dataset capturing the unprecedented rise of Chinese influence in foreign ports. The report traces Beijing’s global ports footprint spanning over two decades between 2000 and 2025. Over the course of that period, Chinese entities and state-owned enterprises provided loans and grants worth nearly $24 billion for 168 ports across 90 countries.
While AidData has previously investigated Beijing’s financing of ports around the world, the 2026 update provides new data on Chinese-funded shoreside equipment, including cranes and scanners. It also includes proposed port investments which are yet to be funded, including Lobito port in Angola, Sandino port in Nicaragua and Mubarak Al-Kabeer port in Kuwait.
Notably, AidData noted that its research rarely found evidence to support the ‘debt trap’ narrative, popularly used to describe Chinese overseas ports financing.
If anything, this new report strengthens the argument that China does not seek sovereign control of overseas territory as much as it does strategic security,” said Alexander Wooley, AidData’s Director of Partnerships and Communications.
Wooley added that China’s overseas port network provide an anchor for its global maritime supply chains. The network provides a geopolitical benefit: a parallel logistics system that offers Beijing strategic independence, free from interference from rivals, and permits it to contemplate a military counter to potential blockades that could be attempted by an enemy in any future conflict.
Indeed, the report found that Chinese state-owned creditors are increasingly co-locating port financing with other investments vital for China’s national security, such as critical minerals mining. The report identified 22 Chinese-financed mines within a 500-kilometer radius of Chinese-funded seaports. Leading examples include the Port of Chancay in Peru and its proximity to the Las Bambas copper mine, as well as the Port of Morébaya in Guinea, developed by Chinese investors together with the Simandou Iron mining project.
Most importantly, the report clarifies a common misconception that Chinese port investments are focused on developing economies.
"Chinese financing for global seaports is almost evenly split between high-income and low- and middle-income countries,” said Rory Fedorochko, the report’s co-author and Program Manager at AidData. “Some $10.8 billion supports 29 port locations across 20 high-income countries including Greece, Spain, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore- for projects where the intent is generally commercial, rather than geopolitical.”
Some of the ports heavily financed by China include Hambantota in Sri Lanka ($1.97 billion), Port of Newcastle in Australia ($1.32 billion), the Autonomous Port of Kribi in Cameroon ($1.17 billion), the Port of Melbourne in Australia ($1.14 billion) and Haifa Port in Israel ($1.13 billion).
CK Hutchison and its Panama-based subsidiary, the Panama Ports Company, have taken a series of additional legal steps in the ongoing dispute over the concession to operate terminals in the ports of Balboa and Cristobal. As part of the action, the Panama Ports Company (PPC) clarified that under the already filed international arbitration, it is seeking at least $2 billion in damages, a figure it says Panama has been misrepresenting.
Before the Supreme Court decision was published finalizing the ruling that the contracts were unconstitutional, Hutchison had already said it would begin an arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. The ruling was finalized, and Panama seized the two ports on February 23 and immediately entered into temporary contracts with divisions of Maersk and MSC to operate the ports.
Both PPC and its parent company, CK Hutchison, report they have increased the legal actions, saying they will “not relent and they are not coming for some token relief.” They are calling the actions of Panama “radical breaches” while continuing to assert the actions were inconsistent with applicable law, contract, and treaty rights.
CK Hutchison, in today’s statement (March 6), continues to say Panama has a pattern of disregarding communications and discontinuing consultations. They assert it was part of a “state campaign” that had been carried out over the past year. It also accuses the state of “various inaccurate remarks,” which it says have “further aggravated the circumstances.”
The company has filed an administrative petition seeking reconsideration of the decree that empowered what Hutchison calls the “occupation” of the ports and the taking of its property and personnel.
PPC says it is seeking recourse related to the decree based on its extreme scope mandating the taking of all its property. It is also challenging the “radical implementation” of the decree, and the seizure and misuse of property, it says, is unrelated to port operations.
They are asserting that Panama entered a private storage facility and unlawfully seized documents. They are demanding immediate access to and return of property and legally protected documents and information. Investigators for Panama had confirmed they searched the company’s offices, saying it was related to new information about possible crimes.
Panama said when it took over the operations of the port terminals that it was also taking control of all the equipment and information. It, however, was careful not to claim ownership but instead said it was controlling the equipment needed to continue the operation of the terminals.
The Panama Maritime Authority reported that as of February 28, terminal operations were back to 100 percent in Balboa under the management of APM Terminals. It said that operations had been open at Cristobal under the management of Terminal Investment Limited (TiL), a division of MSC, since February 27. The authority has said the country’s intent is to hold new tenders within 18 months and that companies would be limited to operating the terminals in one port to further increase competition.
Friday, March 06, 2026
UK halts study visas from four countries to stop students claiming asylum
The British government has imposed an "emergency brake" on visas for students from Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan, in response to what it said was a surge of requests for asylum from people arriving in the United Kingdom to study.
In a change to immigration rules announced on Tuesday, the UK will also cease granting work visas to Afghan nationals.
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood said the ban – the first of its kind – was designed to close a back-door route to claiming asylum.
"Britain will always provide refuge to people fleeing war and persecution, but our visa system must not be abused," she said in a statement.
"That is why I am taking the unprecedented decision to refuse visas for those nationals seeking to exploit our generosity."
The changes are the centre-left government's latest effort to harden its immigration and asylum rules as its rivals on the right use the issue to rally support.
Student visa statistics
The new policy will apply from 26 March.
According to the Home Office, the number of people claiming asylum after arriving in the UK with a valid visa or other permit has more than trebled in the past five years. Around 39,000 such claims were filed last year, bringing the total to 133,760 since 2021.
People from Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan make up "an above average proportion" of asylum seekers accommodated at public expense, the ministry said, reporting that claims by students from the four countries had spiked.
Official figures from 2025 show that the top five nationalities with the largest number of people claiming asylum were Pakistan, Eritrea, Iran, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
The government has reported an increase in the number of applications from Pakistan and Bangladesh in particular, with over 80 percent of claimants from these countries requesting asylum after arriving in the UK on a work, study or other permit. In contrast, 83 percent of Afghan claimants arrived without documents.
A total of 12,578 people claimed asylum last year after coming to the UK on student visas, the government's statistics show. A higher number – 13,557 – applied while on a work visa.
The UK's previous right-wing government also cracked down on student visas, raising financial requirements and barring undergraduates from bringing dependent family members with them to the UK.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer's Labour government has continued the drive to bring down immigration and asylum numbers, especially as polls show rising support for hard-right populist party Reform UK.
Under changes introduced this week, the government made protection for refugees temporary and subject to review every 30 months, after Home Secretary Mahmood argued the UK's system was too generous compared to other countries in Europe.
In November, the UK threatened to block all visas for Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo unless their governments agreed to take back migrants denied permission to stay.
The Home Office has since signed agreements with all three countries to allow Britain to deport people to their territory.
Thursday, March 05, 2026
The Global Costs Of Instability In The Strait Of Hormuz – Analysis
The Strait of Hormuz has once again emerged as a fulcrum of geopolitical risk and economic disruption in the early months of 2026. On 2 March 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps declared the waterway, the narrow throat between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s crude oil and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas transit daily, effectively closed to commercial shipping and threatened to attack any vessel attempting passage. This marked Iran’s most explicit and forceful maritime stance yet, following intensifying conflict with Israel and the United States, including coordinated strikes on Iranian territory.
The immediate and palpable impact of this escalation has been a near collapse of normal shipping flows. In response to heightened risk, international tanker companies and container operators are haltingbookings and cancelling transits across the strait. At the same time, insurers are withdrawing coverage, making trade through the Hormuz commercially unfeasible. With roughly 10 percent of the global container fleet now caught in a bottleneck near Hormuz, the crisis starkly illustrates how swiftly geopolitical risk can translate into logistical paralysis.
These developments have sent shockwaves through international energy markets. Following Iran’s warnings of closure, crude oil prices surged, with Brent crude rising by 8.6 percent amid reports of halted tanker traffic and escalating tensions. Both market psychology and the potential for a direct supply shortfall are reflected in this price increase. Traders are also factoring in the potential for long-term disruption at a chokepoint that supports energy flows to Asia, Europe, and beyond. At the same time, officials and investors recognise that even a brief obstruction in Hormuz can raise input costs across the transportation, industrial, and energy sectors. Reports from shipping analytics indicate that freight costs for very large crude carriers bound for Asia have spiked, illustrating how risk repricing along one route reverberates through global transport markets. Higher insurance premiums — rising by as much as 50 percent — further embed elevated costs into the logistics ecosystem, dampening trade and squeezing profit margins for shippers and commodity buyers alike.
The significance of Hormuz as a maritime artery cannot be overstated. At about 33 km at its narrowest point, it is one of the world’s most critical chokepoints, with oil, gas, and petrochemical exports from producers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iran traversing this corridor en route to global markets. The strait’s closure thus represents not just a regional flashpoint but a systemic risk to global energy security. While the most immediate focal point of disruption has been energy, the interconnectedness of global supply chains means the spillovers extend far more broadly. Maritime freight rates, particularly for oil tankers, have spiked dramatically.
From an operational perspective, shipping companies and ports are scrambling to adapt. Carriers are exploring long reroutes around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope or seeking transhipment options that avoid the Gulf entirely, since Hormuz is essentially off-limits. These changes, however, involve clear trade-offs, including longer journey times, higher fuel consumption, and increased congestion at other hubs. These inefficiencies ripple through inventory cycles, delivery schedules, and consumer prices in importing economies, not just the cost of a single voyage.
The crisis exposes fundamental vulnerabilities in the global trade system that extend beyond economic calculations. The geographic concentration of energy exports through a narrow seaway demonstrates how systemic shocks from regional conflicts can be transmitted instantaneously. Maritime chokepoints, far from being passive conduits of commerce, are potential fault lines that governments and corporate organisations must confront. This realisation is likely to shape longer-term planning, from energy diversification strategies to naval deployments aimed at ensuring freedom of navigation.
India’s exposure vividly illustrates the geopolitical–economic nexus. Estimates indicate that almost half of the country’s monthly oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. As a major importer, India sources a significant portion of its crude and LNG via routes through the strait. With tanker movements stalled and supply chains disrupted, New Delhi has issued advisories for Indian-flagged vessels to exercise extreme caution, highlighting the risk to national trade interests and the safety of seafarers.
Similar risks exist in the Indo-Pacific region for China, the world’s largest importer of crude; a protracted closure or ongoing risk premium on Gulf crude supplies would restrict refinery throughput, strain inventories, and potentially lower export competitiveness amid higher input costs. In the European Union(EU), where energy markets remain sensitive to global oil and LNG prices, heightened volatility amplifies cost-of-living pressures and complicates monetary policy for growth and inflation control. Japan and South Korea, heavily reliant on imported energy and lacking substantial domestic resources, are especially vulnerable even to brief disruptions; delays in LNG and oil deliveries can necessitate stockpile draws and refinery slowdowns, raising production costs and increasing inflationary pressure. Together, these patterns show how chokepoint risk translates into actual economic vulnerability for major importers, strengthening the motivation for strategic reserves and diverse sourcing.
Yet even as the world reels from these impacts, debate continues over the nature and duration of the disruption. The current crisis reaffirms that maritime routes are both strategic and economic assets, linking producers with consumers across hemispheres while remaining vulnerable to geopolitical turbulence. The interplay of conflict, risk pricing, and supply-chain mechanics in the Strait of Hormuz vividly illustrates how rapidly regional hostilities can translate into global economic stress. This emphasises the need for both crisis management and structural resilience, including investment in diversified commerce corridors, alternative energy routes, and cooperative marine security frameworks, alongside strengthened diplomatic channels to lower escalation risks.
The crisis unfolding in the Middle East is arguably the most severe in decades. Beyond the battlefield, it constitutes a systemic stress test for global maritime commerce and energy supply chains, highlighting the fragility of interconnected systems and the need for robust policy responses that address both the immediate impacts and the structural vulnerabilities exposed by such disruptions.
About the author: Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
COMMENT: Iran's oil war could reshape the global economy — and Europe has the most to lose
Iran's Azadi Square with smoke behind from Israeli strike on city's old Mehrabad airport March 3. / CC: IRNA Akbar Tavakoli
Iran's retaliatory strikes on American and British oil tankers and, most dramatically, on oil storage facilities in the United Arab Emirates, have pushed an already fragile global energy market to breaking point. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively blocked. Oil and fertiliser prices are surging. Fuel costs in Britain have doubled. And the reverberations are only just beginning, with people fleeing the UAE and Qatar as fast as they can.
The immediate consequences are stark enough: 800-plus Iranians are dead and a growing number of Americans, Kuwaitis, Lebanese, Israelies and others. Even if hostilities were to cease tomorrow - purely hypothetical scenario - the damage to freight rates and insurance premiums would persist for months, if not years. Ships and their cargoes are insured separately, and underwriters have no appetite for risk in what has become the most volatile chokepoint in global trade. Every barrel transiting the Persian Gulf now carries a hefty geopolitical surcharge, and that cost will be passed directly to consumers at a record-breaking speed. Probably the fastest increase since the 2020 Coronavirus (COVID-19) spike.
The latest numbers speak for themselves. Roughly 20% of the world's natural gas and up to 30% of its oil passes through the narrow mouth of the Hormuz Strait, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and on to the Indian Ocean. Of the cargo that reaches the Indian Ocean, some 80% is bound for South-East Asia - principally China, India, Japan and South Korea. Only 15-20% heads to Western Europe and elsewhere, but don't let that calm readers in London into thinking that risk price is spreading far and wide.
This matters enormously. China absorbs between 30% and 40% of that 80% share. India takes a substantial portion of the remainder. These are the two great locomotives of global economic growth, and both now face a sharp and unavoidable increase in the cost of energy. Beijing may have stockpiled strategic reserves and developed alternative supply routes - including the Power of Siberia pipeline and shipments via Vladivostok - but restructuring supply chains is a process, not an event. In the near term, the hit is real.
The likely outcome is not collapse but deceleration. China's growth rate could slip from 5% to 4%, still impressive by Western standards, but a meaningful slowdown for an economy on which much of the developing world depends. India faces a similar trajectory. And when the world's primary growth engines lose momentum, the drag is felt everywhere. Countries teetering on the edge of positive growth risk tipping into contraction, with all the social and political instability that entails.
Europe's position is particularly precarious, as Tucker Carlson remarked on his latest podcast this week. On paper, only 10-15% of Persian Gulf energy supplies are destined for European markets. But context is everything. The continent entered the winter heating season with underground gas storage already below 30%. The Netherlands, once a pillar of European gas security, has seen reserves plummet to a catastrophic 11%. With a month and a half of winter still ahead, every percentage point of supply matters.
For Britain, the unlucky Chancellor of the Exchequer, Racheael Reeves, was blindsided by events (again) despite careful planning for the spring financial statement. British homes are particularly vulnerable at the moment, as around 20% of the country's gas supply comes from Qatar as liquid natural gas (LNG), which could add around GBP500 to households' annual bills, already under immense pressure. For them, a sigh of relief, however, as spring appears to be a saving grace as thermostats turn down.
There is no evidence that summer will bring relief for the rest of Europe. The EU's increasingly brutal heatwaves drive air-conditioning demand that rivals winter heating loads. The continent faces the unenviable task of replenishing its depleted reserves amid sustained global supply disruption - and must do so while drawing down strategic stocks once considered untouchable.
On currency markets, predictions of a dollar crash appear premature. The greenback remains anchored to the fundamentals of the American economy, which continues to post roughly 3% growth with inflation contained below 4%. The United States' $921bn trade deficit - near its post-2022 record - is a structural vulnerability, not an acute crisis. The dollar's real weakness is not economic but political: Washington's aggressive use of dollar-denominated sanctions has accelerated de-dollarisation, not because the currency is unsound, but because it is feared as a weapon.
The gold market tells a more revealing story. Prices have surged past $5,500 per troy ounce, with some analysts forecasting $5,600 in the near term. Gold's role as the ultimate safe haven is being reaffirmed in spectacular fashion, and these elevated levels are unlikely to retreat even if a ceasefire materialises.
For oil-producing nations outside the conflict zone, the picture is mixed. Higher prices mean higher revenues, and the prospect of increased supply volumes to China, India and - eventually - a chastened Europe is commercially attractive. But no economy is hermetically sealed. Higher global energy prices feed through into domestic inflation, squeeze industrial margins and invite tighter monetary policy. For countries already struggling with anaemic growth, the net effect may be negative even as headline oil revenues climb.
The geopolitical implications are perhaps the most consequential of all. A Europe pushed to the wall on energy security will find it increasingly difficult to sustain support for Ukraine (US isn't helping). With reserves dwindling and prices climbing, the fiscal and political space for continued military and economic assistance is shrinking by the week. What is clear is that Iran's strikes have altered the calculus for every major economy on earth. This is not a regional skirmish with localised consequences. It is a systemic shock to the architecture of global energy trade, and its effects will be measured in slower growth, higher prices and harder choices for years to come.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis may yet prove to be the United States' "Suez Crisis" and Europe's final jolt to break free from Washington's increasingly insane actions.
Iran war: How exposed are European economies?
Copyright Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent gas prices surging by 60%, putting additional strain on Europe's already-depleted winter inventories and prompting economists to revise their 2026 growth and inflation outlooks.
Dutch TTF natural gas futures — Europe's benchmark price — hit €50 per megawatt-hour on Thursday morning, up 60% since US and Israeli strikes on Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz
The move is the continent's sharpest energy shock since the 2022 crisis, and it is landing on a market that was already dangerously exposed: gas inventories across Europe stand at their lowest seasonal levels in years.
With the strait — which carries roughly a fifth of the world's oil trade — still closed, economists and energy analysts warn that even a brief disruption could inflict damage on European growth, push inflation back above target and potentially force the European Central Bank (ECB) to revisit interest rate paths they had only recently stabilised.
Why the Strait of Hormuz matters for Europe
Around 20% of global oil supply and roughly one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass through the strait, making it one of the most strategically important energy corridors in the world.
For Europe, the stakes are considerable. Qatar supplies approximately 15% of the continent's total LNG imports, making unimpeded passage through the strait a matter of energy security.
Europe’s exposure to Gulf energy flows has increased considerably since the continent dramatically reduced imports of Russian fossil fuels after 2022.
Bridget Payne, head of energy forecasting at Oxford Economics, said trade disruption rather than lost production is currently the primary concern.
She estimates oil supply could be disrupted by around 4 million barrels per day over the coming quarter.
While Gulf producers have spare capacity to offset Iranian supply losses, Payne warned that alternative shipping routes can only handle about one-third of the oil normally passing through Hormuz.
Europe entered March with unusually low gas storage levels. Inventories across the continent stood at roughly 30%, with Germany — Europe’s largest economy — reporting reserves as low as 21.6%.
Oxford Economics warned that disruptions to Qatari LNG exports could force Asian buyers to compete more aggressively with Europe for cargoes, potentially making it harder for European countries to refill gas storage ahead of next winter.
Inflation and growth risks rising
Higher energy prices are expected to feed through into inflation across Europe.
"Europe's depleted gas stores and reliance on transport routes via the Middle East point to heightened risks of a larger inflationary supply shock. That could become an additional drag on our already below-consensus forecast for 2026 GDP growth," said Oliver Rakau, chief Germany economist at Oxford Economics.
Oxford Economics expects the conflict to raise eurozone headline inflation by 0.3–0.5 percentage points in 2026, pushing it to around 2.3%.
Higher energy costs could also reduce household purchasing power, trimming economic growth.
Rakau estimates the shock could lower eurozone GDP growth by around 0.1 percentage points to roughly 1.0% this year.
Economists at Goldman Sachs said the conflict in Iran has already prompted revisions to their forecasts for economic growth, inflation and central bank policy.
“We are making changes to our growth, inflation and central banks forecasts in light of the evolving conflict in the Middle East,” said Sven Jari Stehn, chief European economist at Goldman Sachs.
Goldman Sachs also estimates that higher energy prices would trim economic growth by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points this year across the eurozone, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.
However, the outlook could deteriorate if energy prices rise more sharply or remain elevated for longer.
In a downside scenario, oil prices could remain near $80 (€74) per barrel while gas prices stay around €70 per megawatt-hour, according to the bank's estimates.
In a severe scenario, oil could reach $100 (€92) per barrel and gas €100 per megawatt-hour.
In more severe scenarios, the impact could be much larger.
Headline inflation by late 2026 could be nearly two percentage points higher in a downside scenario and as much as 3.6 percentage points higher in a severe shock.
Goldman said it would expect the ECB to deliver two 25 basis point rate hikes in the second half of 2026 in the severe downside scenario, should energy price increases generate significant second-round effects on core inflation.
The war is also disrupting global logistics networks, adding further uncertainty for European trade.
According to Freightos research head Judah Levine, military strikes and retaliatory attacks in the region have already forced several shipping companies to suspend bookings to Persian Gulf ports.
"The US-Israel strikes on Iran and subsequent Iranian retaliation are driving significant logistics disruptions in the region which could start to be felt more broadly if the conflict stretches on," said Levine.
The Strait of Hormuz handles approximately 2% to 3% of global container volumes, and around 100 container vessels are currently stranded in the Persian Gulf.
Some of the world’s largest carriers, including Hapag-Lloyd and MSC, have halted bookings to and from Gulf ports, while CMA CGM has stopped accepting shipments to the region entirely.
The crisis has also revived concerns about the Red Sea.
The Houthis, who paused attacks on commercial vessels in October, have threatened to resume strikes, prompting the few carriers who had returned to that route to divert back around the Cape of Good Hope, further increasing transport costs.
Meanwhile, disruptions to major Gulf aviation hubs have reduced global air cargo capacity.
Qatar Airways Cargo, Emirates SkyCargo and Etihad together account for roughly 13% of global air freight capacity and play a key role in connecting Asia and Europe.
With many flights grounded and regional airspace closed, freight forwarders are beginning to charter direct flights between Asia and Europe, a shift that is already pushing up transport costs.
Freight rates from Southeast Asia to Europe have risen more than 6% in recent days, according to the Freightos Air Index.
Currency markets reflect rising risk aversion
Financial markets are also reacting to the geopolitical uncertainty.
European currencies have weakened as investors move toward safe-haven assets such as the US dollar and gold.
According to Michał Jóźwiak, market analyst at financial services firm Ebury, the euro has fallen about 1.8% against the dollar since the conflict intensified.
The sell-off has been even more pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Hungarian forint has weakened nearly 5% against the dollar, while the Polish zloty has dropped around 3.5%, marking one of the sharpest weekly moves since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022.
Further weakness in European currencies could also amplify inflationary pressures by increasing the cost of imports.
A fragile energy balance
For Europe, the unfolding conflict underscores the vulnerability of its post-Russia energy model.
While the continent has significantly reduced its reliance on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, much of that supply has been replaced by seaborne LNG.
This shift has made Europe more exposed to disruptions along global shipping routes and to geopolitical tensions in key transit regions such as the Middle East.
With gas inventories already low and the seasonal refilling of storage facilities under way, any prolonged disruption to energy flows from the Gulf could quickly ripple through European markets and economies.
What are Europe's oil route alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz?
Many European countries like Italy, Greece, Spain, Poland and Belgium rely on the Strait of Hormuz for imports or refining. Experts say the closure of this corridor will not cut off Europe’s oil supply, but will continue to drive up oil prices and disrupt markets.
As military escalation surges in the Middle East, Iran's announcement of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent crude oil and natural gas prices soaring.
Faced with rising energy costs at home, European leaders are scrambling to avoid a cascading energy crisis, and are especially concerned about mitigating the price shock already being felt in markets.
Many European countries like Italy, Greece, Spain, Poland and Belgium rely on the Strait of Hormuz for imports or refining. Experts say the closure of this corridor will not cut off Europe’s oil supply, but will continue to drive oil prices and disrupt markets.
Lying between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the Strait is a narrow shipping corridor largely under Iranian control, and serves as one of the world’s most critical energy choke points for oil, accounting for 20% of global production.
Johannes Rauball, a senior crude analyst at the real-time data and market intelligence firm Kpler, estimated Hormuz-related disruptions to last another three to four weeks, keeping Europe exposed to elevated prices and volatility, with crude prices currently carrying a risk premium of around $15 (€13) per barrel.
"(Prices) will begin stabilizing once credible prospects of US–Iran talks emerge, or if flows via the Hormuz restart. We expect most of the risk premium to fall when negotiations look tangible, and largely disappear once a structured agreement is reached," Rauball told Euronews.
The European Commission is convening technical experts on Wednesday to address the new energy crisis, which severely complicates the bloc's ongoing battle to cut high electricity prices in a bid to re-industrialise the EU27's competitiveness.
While the bloc's oil imports are diversified, with Norway (14.6%), the United States (14.5%), and Kazakhstan (12.2%) ranking as the top three major suppliers, several EU countries do import oil from Gulf producers.
Saudi Arabia accounted for 6.8% of the bloc's total imports in the first 9 months of 2025, according to EU data, with Spain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands the bloc's top importers.
Iraq has already recorded oil production shut-ins as a result of the military strikes, Rauball said. Other Gulf states — including the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar — have roughly 10–20 days of flexibility before shut-ins are required, assuming normal production rates.
Alternative oil routes
Baird Langenbrunner, Research Analyst at the Global Energy Monitor, said there are two viable oil pipelines that could serve as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.
The first option is the Saudi East-West crude oil pipeline, which has a capacity of 5 million barrels per day. It runs east-to-west across Saudi Arabia from the Abqaiq processing center to Yanbu on the Red Sea
"Yanbu wasn’t designed to be Saudi Arabia’s main export hub, so its infrastructure and tanker-loading capacity will likely constrain actual throughput," Langenbrunner told Euronews.
Parallel pipeline infrastructure along this route could be temporarily converted to carry extra oil, Langenbrunner added, increasing the total takeaway to 7 million barrels per day.
"That would compete with carrying other important liquids to Yanbu," Langenbrunner added.
The second alternative is the Habshan–Fujairah oil pipeline in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which could transport crude oil to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman, but Langenbrunner pointed out it has a much lower daily capacity of 1.8 million barrels.
"The UAE already uses it as a routine export route, because it bypasses insurance and security costs of transiting the strait, and there’s not much spare capacity to use," the energy analyst added.
The recently built Goreh-Jask Crude Oil Pipeline in Iran would, in theory, be capable of bypassing the Strait, he explained, but not without complications.
"This pipeline sits in Iran, which was already under heavy US sanctions and whose infrastructure is under direct military attack. In addition, its confirmed capacity is around 300,000 barrels per day, quite small compared to what the strait handles each day," Langenbrunner said.
Ultimately, only a small fraction of what normally flows through the Strait could transit alternative pipeline routes, compared to the 20 million barrels per day that transit that corridor.
All the while, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman has ground to a near halt after vessels in the area were hit as Iran retaliated against US and Israeli strikes.
Shipping insurers have announced they are cancelling war risk coverage after the Iranian armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said the Strait was closed, and tankers are also likely to avoid transiting the Red Sea via the Suez Canal to reach Europe.
"For volumes that can’t go through pipelines and rely on ships, an alternative is to re-route tankers around the Cape of Good Hope to reach Europe, which adds substantial time and cost to transit," Langenbrunner said. "And this only helps oil not already trapped in the Persian Gulf."
North Sea, North Africa and Latin America
North Sea production remains one of Europe’s most secure alternative supply sources.Crude from offshore fields in Norway and the UK can be shipped directly by tanker to European ports.
The US and West Africa also offer viable substitutes, with producers such as Nigeria and Angola shipping crude directly to Europe along Atlantic tanker routes.
North Africa, particularly Algeria and Libya, provides very short-haul Mediterranean supply routes into Southern Europe. These shipments avoid major global chokepoints and benefit from minimal transport distance. But political instability, especially in Libya, poses recurring risks to sustained supply.
Caspian and Central Asian producers such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan offer additional diversification. Their crude typically travels by pipeline to Black Sea export terminals before being shipped through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean.
Latin American suppliers, notably Brazil and Guyana, can deliver crude to Europe via Atlantic tanker routes that avoid Middle Eastern chokepoints altogether.
Pauline Heinrichs, Lecturer in War Studies at King's College London, said that if Europe wants to take security strategy seriously, it will need to reduce the insecurity from fossil fuel dependency.
“Our security strategy is currently reduced to responding to fossil fuel-induced crises, and I mean that both in terms of fossil fuels themselves, but also the powers that depend on fossil fuels to support their power, including the United States," Heinrichs said.
Thursday, February 26, 2026
Jesse Jackson (1941-2026): An Assessment of a Civil Rights Icon
JESSE JACKSON’s DEATH has brought about a look back at his life and what it shows about progress and retreat for civil rights and freedom. [1] Jackson was a bridge from the civil rights icon Martin Luther King, Jr, to today’s activists against the Trump MAGA white nationalist movement.
Today the victories of the civil rights revolution of the 1960s — the winning of civil rights (1964), Voting Rights (1965) and other laws ending legal segregation and discrimination — are being reversed. We are experiencing a counterrevolution against equality for peoples of color, with African Americans a special target.
Black history is denied. Confederate flags rise again in military bases. Is the return of Jim Crow segregation next?
The counterrevolution, which began in full throttle in the 1980s, continues to unfold under Trump’s authoritarian regime.
Born in Jim Crow South
Jackson was born in South Carolina, in the Jim Crow South. He became a close associate of King. We recall the iconic photograph of the civil rights leaders standing on the balcony where King was assassinated the next day. That was when King had gone to Memphis, Tennessee in 1968 to support striking sanitation workers.
King always spoke out for labor rights as well as civil rights. He was criticized by others in the movement who thought he went too far. Most major voices criticized King for speaking out against the Vietnam War in 1967, so soon after President Johnson signed the civil and voting rights acts.
King always argued legal equality was not enough for Blacks after centuries of super exploitation and oppression. He always compared Blacks starting a track race as being 50 yards behind better off whites. Affirmative action programs were necessary to move toward full equality. Today affirmative action lives on as Diversity, Equity, Inclusion (DEI) programs, programs that the Trump government strongly opposes.
Jackson identified with King’s determination and militancy. King appointed him to lead the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) office in Chicago.
In 1971 Jackson set up in Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) after leaving SCLC over differences with King’s replacement. PUSH continued the civil rights agenda that King had founded.
In 1984, Jackson set up the Rainbow Coalition as he prepared for a run for the presidency as a Democrat. His Rainbow Coalition campaign was based on the concept of a country based on hope (popularized by Barach Obama who was elected the first Black president 20 years later). The Rainbow Coalition represented ethnic diversity and stood against white nationalism.
Between his Operation PUSH to his presidential campaign in the 1980s, Jackson remained an outspoken critic of racist politics, even endorsing independent Black politics while supporting former comrades running for office in the Democratic Party. He demanded the hiring and advancement of Blacks in industry, banking and higher education, all institutions that in the Jim Crow era had been off limits.
Unlike many other civil rights leaders at the time, Jackson said African Americans might vote for Republican candidates if the Democratic Party did not work for its rights. His framework was always protecting the rights and well-being of African Americans. That’s why during his 1984 presidential campaign Jackson spoke up for Gay and Lesbian rights and for women’s equality.
Like King on Vietnam, Jackson spoke on international issues. He praised the Sandinistas after the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution, went to Cuba to help free some detained Americans and met with Cuban President Fidel Castro.
Jackson backed the anti-apartheid movement against South Africa and later met Nelson Mandela.
He voiced support for the freedom for the Portuguese colonies of Angola Mozambique and Gunia Bissau. He did so while official U.S. policy backed the military junta in Portugal.
Jackson’s activism stayed within the framework of the capitalist system. He supported building a strong Black middle class and threatened Wall Street firms that did not take affirmative steps of inclusion. He drew on the boycott tactic adopted during the Jim Crow era as a silent club against the big companies.
Independent Black Politics
While nodding to independent Black politics, King rejected that path. After his assassination, it was still not clear if Black participation in the political system was possible. There were few Black elected officials.
The left wing of the Black Power and civil rights movement (Black Panthers, League of Revolutionary Black Workers and African nationalists openly spoke against capitalism) advocated an independent Black freedom movement and party.
An important gathering occurred in Gary, Indiana, in 1972. Gary had elected one of the nation’s first Black mayors, Richard Hatcher. Many future Black elected officials and leaders came to the convention. Many on the left were also present, including myself. Some 10,000 delegates attended.
Jackson attended and gave a fiery speech. He spoke out even if the Democratic Party did not.
Jesse Jackson was a hero to millions. Even those of us on the socialist left praised his integrity and outspoken views on issues like Black Lives Matter and police violence.
Jackson was a living link to two periods. The first covered the legal segregation of the first 200 years of a country that never was the true democracy it proclaimed. The founding fathers (a majority of whom were slave owners) only considered that whites were U.S. citizens.
The second period only comes in the second half of the 20th century, with the passage of civil rights legislation. That’s when the country became a true capitalist democracy. It discarded legal segregation and belatedly began to recognize the talents of African Americans and other people of color. It is the 50 years of integration that Trump as an authoritarian ruler seeks to reverse.
Within the framework he accepted, Jackson’s life story represents what’s possible in a life dedicated to winning equality and freedom.
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