BMI slashes Sub-Saharan Africa vehicle sales forecast growth to 1.9% as Iran conflict raises fuel costs

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By Brian Kenety June 30, 2026

Sub-Saharan Africa's new vehicle sales are expected to grow by just 1.9% in 2026 to around 1.2mn units, according to BMI, sharply below its previous forecast of 4.4%, as higher fuel prices, weaker currencies and rising vehicle import costs stemming from the conflict involving Iran continue to weigh on consumer demand across the region.

BMI, a Fitch Solutions company, said the region's heavy dependence on imported vehicles, automotive components and refined fuels leaves it particularly exposed to such external shocks. New vehicle sales in Sub-Saharan Africa remain among the lowest globally on a per-capita basis, with the market dominated by imported used vehicles. Affordability constraints, limited access to consumer credit and currency depreciation continue to suppress demand despite favourable long-term demographic trends.

BMI said the "material downward revision from our previous forecast" reflects the "escalating risk posed by the war involving Iran."

The revised forecast reflects the sensitivity of Sub-Saharan Africa's automotive market to global commodity prices, with higher oil prices quickly translating into more expensive transport, rising inflation and weaker consumer spending.

According to BMI, the main transmission channels are higher fuel prices, weaker currencies, rising inflation and elevated vehicle import costs, all of which are eroding purchasing power in one of the world's most price-sensitive automotive markets.

"The region remains highly exposed to external shocks given its dependence on imported vehicles, parts and refined fuels, meaning that any sustained increase in global oil prices or disruption to shipping routes would feed quickly into domestic transport and retail costs," it said.

BMI added that a broader and more prolonged conflict involving Iran would create downside risks for vehicle sales across several of the region's largest markets.

Chinese EVs gain momentum

Despite the weaker outlook for overall vehicle demand, BMI has become increasingly optimistic about electric vehicle adoption across Sub-Saharan Africa. The consultancy said aggressive pricing by Chinese manufacturers such as BYD Company Ltd (SZSE: 002594; HKEX: 1211), Chery Automobile and Great Wall Motor (SSE: 601633; HKEX: 2333) is making battery electric vehicles increasingly price-competitive with conventional vehicles.

"The consumer logic for EVs in SSA is beginning to shift meaningfully," BMI said. "Internal combustion engine (ICE)-EV price parity has been reached across most segments in several markets, driven largely by the aggressive pricing of Chinese EV exports, fundamentally altering the cost calculus for prospective buyers."

Last year, Egypt led the continent in total EV sales with around 7,900 units sold, followed by Morocco with 5,500 and South Africa with 3,800. Together, the three countries accounted for nearly 70% of Africa's total electric vehicle sales during the year.

Higher fuel prices and periodic fuel shortages, particularly in markets such as Kenya, are also making electric vehicles more attractive for commercial fleets and high-mileage users seeking to reduce operating costs, BMI noted.

Toyota Motor Corporation (TYO:7203; NYSE:TM) in early June entered Kenya's fully electric vehicle market with the launch of the bZ4X sport utility vehicle, marking the Japanese automaker's first battery electric offering in the country and signalling growing confidence in East Africa's emerging EV sector.

Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturers have become the dominant force in Africa's emerging EV market, expanding aggressively through local distributors, assembly partnerships and lower-priced models as they seek export growth outside increasingly competitive domestic and European markets.

As IntelliNews reported, BYD—China's largest carmaker, largest pure-play EV manufacturer and now the world's biggest EV producer by unit sales—increased its African market share to 35% in 2025 from just 4% two years earlier. According to the International Energy Agency's Global EV Outlook 2026, sustained disruption to oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz could further improve the economics of electric vehicles across Africa by raising the cost of conventional fuels.

BMI cautioned, however, that widespread EV adoption remains constrained by weak charging infrastructure, unreliable electricity supplies, high financing costs and the continued dominance of imported used vehicles, which account for more than 80% of four-wheel vehicle purchases in many Sub-Saharan African markets.

Global manufacturers including Stellantis (NYSE: STLA), Volkswagen and Toyota are also expanding assembly operations across Africa, although Chinese manufacturers have moved more aggressively into the battery electric vehicle segment through competitive pricing and local partnerships.

AfCFTA to support long-term industry growth

The report also highlighted the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Rules of Origin for automotive products in February 2026 as a significant long-term positive for the continent's automotive industry. The agreement establishes a common framework for tariff preferences designed to promote intra-African trade, supplier localisation and investment planning.

The rules are intended to prevent simple vehicle re-exporting between member states by requiring minimum levels of local value addition before products qualify for preferential tariffs, providing greater certainty for manufacturers considering new assembly plants and component investments.

BMI said the rules should encourage industrialisation and strengthen regional automotive supply chains over time, although implementation risks, weak logistics networks and subdued new vehicle demand will continue to limit near-term gains.

Within Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is expected to remain the region's dominant vehicle manufacturing hub, while Morocco will continue to lead vehicle production in North Africa. Kenya and Ghana could increasingly benefit through component manufacturing, vehicle assembly and upstream supply chains.

Country outlook remains mixed

Among the region's largest markets, BMI maintained its forecast for South African vehicle sales to decline 1.6% in 2026 as higher fuel costs weaken demand. By contrast, Nigeria's market is expected to expand 7.6%, supported by easing inflation and increased domestic fuel supply following the ramp-up of the Dangote refinery.

Angola is forecast to record 6.0% growth on improving macroeconomic conditions, while Tanzania's vehicle market is expected to expand 6.3%, supported by rising disposable incomes, urbanisation and continued road infrastructure investment.

BMI said the region's short-term outlook will remain closely tied to developments in global energy markets. Over the longer term, however, falling EV prices, greater regional integration under AfCFTA and increasing localisation of vehicle assembly are expected to reshape Africa's automotive industry, even if near-term demand remains constrained by economic uncertainty.

Morocco's long reach

Morocco has consolidated its position as Africa’s largest automotive manufacturing hub, producing 559,645 vehicles in 2024, up 5% year on year, and is projected to exceed 600,000 units in 2025, according to industry estimates. This compares with South Africa's output of 599,755 vehicles in 2024, down 5% year on year, ending its long-standing position as the continent's leading vehicle producer.

The North African country also hosts early electric vehicle assembly operations by Chinese and European manufacturers, providing an established EV production base. By comparison, South Africa has yet to establish local production of fully electric passenger vehicles, with its automotive industry remaining focused on internal combustion engine and hybrid models.

Morocco's logistics advantages include short shipping routes to European markets and lower transport costs. Policymakers have pursued an expansive EV strategy that includes tax exemptions, reduced import duties and an expanding public charging network with close to 1,000 charging points nationwide.

"Its proximity to Europe—South Africa's largest export market for vehicles—gives Morocco a geographical advantage in terms of supply chains and shipping costs. The country is also ahead of South Africa in EV production, producing 40,000 to 50,000 units in 2024, with plans to increase this. South Africa has not yet produced a single fully electric car," local outlet MyBroadband wrote.

ANGOLA

The Billion-Dollar Debt Deals Exposing an Oil Giant

By Alex Kimani - Jun 26, 2026

• Sonangol has raised billions of dollars in loans and bonds as it struggles with weak cash generation from its core oil business.
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• Much of the company's profitability comes from dividends and external investments rather than upstream and downstream operations.
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• Asset sales, corporate restructuring, and a planned 2027 IPO are central to Sonangol's strategy to restore financial health.
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Last week, Angola's state oil company, Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola (Sonangol), secured a $2.65-billion financing deal with a consortium of international banks to fund the company's operating expenses and capital investments. The financing was heavily backed by a syndicate of foreign lenders including Société Générale, First Abu Dhabi Bank, Standard Bank of South Africa and Absa, while local Angolan banks, including Banco Fomento de Angola (BFA), Banco Millennium Atlântico and Banco Angolano de Investimentos (BAI), chipped in with $105 million. 

The deal is the latest in a series of financing deals completed by Sonangol since the beginning of the current year, with the company having secured a $1.75 billion facility from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) in January to support its working capital needs and crude trading operations, shortly before it raised $750 million in international markets through a five-year bond carrying a 10% coupon in the same week. Sonangol is still hunting for more capital, with the company currently seeking an additional $4.8 billion from Chinese and European lenders to cover a funding deficit for the planned $6.6-billion Lobito Refinery.

Unfortunately, a deeper dive into Sonangol's flurry of financing deals uncovers major weaknesses in the Angolan oil model.  

While the massive capital raise from international banks appears like a big seal of approval of Sonagnol’s operations, it actually underscores how a lack of core profitability, diversification into unrelated business and declining production are choking the country's energy champion.

First off, Sonangol’s core Oil & Gas operations are barely profitable. The company reported a respectable net profit of 862.4 billion Kwanza ($940 million) for its 2025 financial results; however, Sonangol’s upstream exploration and production(E&P) operations generated a miniscule Kz97.1 billion ($105 million) in actual profit despite generating generated a massive Kz4 trillion ($4.36 billion) thanks to to astronomical costs, asset depreciation and taxes. The company’s downstream refining and distribution segment fared even worse after posting a Kz820.3 billion ($895 million) loss in a single year. 

Fully 53% of Sonangol’s profits in 2025 did not come from its core business, but rather from dividends paid by external corporate stakes in Portugal’s Galp Energia (OTCPK:GLPEF), Millennium BCP bank and the Angola LNG project. Sonagol owns a 22.8% stake in the Angola LNG project alongside Chevron Corp. (NYSE:CVX), with a 36.4% stake, while BP Plc (NYSE:BP), TotalEnergies (NYSE:TTE), and Eni S.p.A. (NYSE:E) each own a 13.6% stake apiece. Designed to process up to 1.1 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day and deliver 5.2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) per year, the $12-billion facility is supplied with associated natural gas from various offshore fields--including those operated by Chevron--and processes it into liquefied natural gas for the global market. The project plays a crucial role in eliminating the flaring of associated gas from offshore oil production fields, redirecting it instead into a commercialized clean energy export.

But Sonangol's problems do not end there. 

The company’s statutory audit board recently warned that Sonangol’s internal cash reserves can cover only 18% of its immediate financial needs, with the cash crunch highlighted by the Kz8.2 trillion ($8.96 billion) owed to Sonangol by third parties and by the Angolan state itself.

That said, much of Sonangol’s woes can be traced back to the systemic corruption by Angola’s government. For years, the Angolan government used Sonangol as a de facto sovereign wealth fund, forcing the state oil company to accumulate stakes in roughly 65 non-core businesses.

The company was burdened with stakes in everything from aviation (Sonair) to medical clinics (e.g., Girassol clinic). These non-strategic holdings have proven to be a severe financial drain, costing the company billions in losses over a long stretch. Poor cash flows have forced Sonangol’s oil production to steadily decline due to the natural depletion of mature offshore fields and delayed upstream investments, with national crude output falling to just 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd) from its 2 million bpd peak in 2008. Much of the remaining prospective acreage is located in ultra-deepwaters, requiring high capital expenditures.

Thankfully, there’s still hope for Angola’s largest company. To refocus on its energy operations, Sonangol is lining up the sale of more than 70 non-core subsidiary shareholdings spanning real estate, aviation, banking, and telecommunications. 

The company is restructuring its massive debt burden to ensure liquidity and is actively pursuing partnerships with international majors (such as Chevron) to develop new deep-water assets. 

Further, the Angolan government is giving Sonagol more free rein to compete with its international peers. Until recently, Sonangol acted as both an oil operator and the state's concessionaire; however, the transfer of regulatory and licensing powers to the National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG) has freed up Sonangol to bid on and manage oil blocks on an equal footing with international operators. 

The ultimate goal of the restructuring drive is to float up to 30% of Sonangol on the stock market, with an IPO planned for 2027. Management is targeting a phased public listing, initially on the Luanda Stock Exchange with plans for subsequent listings on major international markets like the U.S and the U.K.

By Alex Kimani for Oilprice.com

Blood minerals and memory: the Great Lakes in focus

Issued on: 23/06/2026  

RFI

SPOTLIGHT ON AFRICA
Play - 28:34

This week, Spotlight on Africa turns to the Great Lakes region. First, a new Global Witness report reveals how coltan is being smuggled out of the Democratic Republic of Congo, amid the ongoing conflict in the east, through Rwanda and on to companies worldwide. Then, artist Grada Kilomba discusses her journey to create a unique monument for Paris commemorating the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Grada Kilomba esteve em Paris para inaugurar o memorial às vítimas do genocídio dos tutsis no Ruanda. © Melissa Chemam

This month, a new report from the NGO Global Witness has revealed how coltan is being smuggled out of the Democratic Republic of Congo and sold to companies worldwide via Rwanda, amid the devastating conflict in the country's eastern provinces.

Coltan, short for columbite-tantalite, is a mineral from which the metals tantalum and niobium are extracted, both classified as critical raw materials by companies from the United States, the European Union, China and Japan.

The report finds that conflict minerals from the war-torn east of the DRC are present in everyday technology products made by major global companies. It also links the illegal trade to Rwandan firms and to leading international brands including Amazon, Ericsson and Sony, which source minerals from eastern DRC.

The trafficking is linked to the M23 militia, accused of widespread sexual violence, summary executions and torture.

Survivors of a landslide at an open pit coltan mine in Rubaya are seen at home on 30 January, 2026. AFP - -

It took the British non-governmental organisation more than a year of documentary and field research to establish the exploitation network.

A separate Global Witness investigation from April 2025 had already revealed that coltan linked to the conflict in eastern DRC had likely entered the European Union market through international commodities trader Traxys. Earlier reports had also implicated companies including Apple, dating back to 2022.

For this latest investigation, the NGO spent months cross-referencing its findings with surveys conducted by the United Nations and other non-governmental organisations.

Alex Kopp, the report's author and an expert at Global Witness, is our first guest.

DRC takes on Apple: can conflict mineral mining be stopped?

Rwanda monument

The artist Grada Kilomba was commissioned to create a monument for the city of Paris commemorating the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

The monument comprises two black brass steles bearing an engraved tribute to the hundreds of thousands of men, women and children massacred between April and July 1994.

It was unveiled in the heart of Paris on 2 June 2026, in the presence of the two countries' presidents, Emmanuel Macron and Paul Kagame.

French President Emmanuel Macron, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Rwanda's First Lady Jeannette Kagame during the inauguration ceremony of a double stele artwork by artist Grada Kilomba, a new memorial site paying tribute to the victims of the Rwanda's genocide at the Habib-Bourgiba esplanade along the River Seine, in Paris, France, on 2 June, 2026. REUTERS - Sarah Meyssonnier

Kilomba is a Portuguese artist of African heritage, with roots in São Tomé and Angola.

Raised in Portugal, she has worked in Germany, Brazil, England and beyond, using performance and installation to explore the history of African and black people across centuries and continents, including the slave trade.

She was selected through a rigorous process to design this monument, the first of its kind in France. She travelled to Rwanda to meet survivors and conduct her own research before completing the project, titled "The Archive".

Her creative process led her to reflect on France and Europe's responsibility in the tragic events.

Grada Kilomba is the second guest in this episode.

This episode was mixed by Vincent Pora.

By:Melissa Chemam

 

India’s Imports of Russian Oil Set for New Record High

By Tsvetana Paraskova - Jun 22, 2026

India is set to import a record-high volume of Russian crude in June as the Hormuz crisis and the U.S. waivers on Russia’s barrels have pushed the world’s third-largest crude importer to gorge on Moscow’s oil again.

India has imported 2.6 million barrels per day (bpd) of Russian crude oil so far in June, according to preliminary vessel-tracking data from commodity analytics firm Kpler cited by Indian media.

So far this month, Russian crude has accounted for as much as 53.5% of all Indian oil imports, per the data.   

India’s full-month imports of Russian crude are set for a record-high of 2.35 million bpd in June for any month ever, Kpler has estimated. This would exceed the previous record of 2.2 million bpd from May 2023. 

Going forward, Russian crude will remain a key source of supply for India even if the U.S. does not extend the waiver for Russian crude already loaded on tankers, analysts say.

Last week, as it announced the memorandum of understanding with Iran, the U.S. quietly let the waiver on Russian oil sales expire without renewing it.

“India’s imports remained strong through June, supported by continued discounts and steady refinery demand,” Sumit Ritolia, manager, modelling and refining at Kpler, told Financial Express.

“Regardless of whether the US waiver is extended, we expect India’s imports of Russian crude to remain robust, even if not at record-high levels.”

India turned en masse to Russian oil in 2022, when the U.S. and the EU imposed sanctions on Moscow due to the invasion of Ukraine. Four years later, India is a major buyer of Russia’s crude, and Russia is India’s single-largest oil supplier.

As supply from the Middle East crashes, India is also buying growing volumes of crude from West African producers Nigeria and Angola, as well as from South American producers Brazil and Venezuela.

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com

INVESTIGATION

Mozambique journalists face killings and silence as repression deepens

Mozambique's journalists are facing growing pressure after years of killings, disappearances and attacks that have gone unpunished. Violence against reporters intensified after disputed 2024 elections, while a long-running system of intimidation has reached a new peak. This sixth instalment of Mozambique Exposed – an investigation coordinated by Forbidden Stories to which RFI contributed – examines how that climate of fear is reshaping the country's media.


Issued on: 18/06/2026 - RFI

Four Mozambican journalists have been killed or have disappeared since 2020, while others were attacked covering the country's post-election crisis in 2024. No one has been held to account. © Baptiste Condominas

Albino Sibia's final words were broadcast live on Facebook as he lay dying after being shot while covering a protest in southern Mozambique.

"They shot me and they're still shooting... I'm dying."

On 12 December 2024, the 30-year-old blogger was filming police firing tear gas during a demonstration in Ressano Garcia, a Mozambican town on the border with South Africa, when he was shot twice in the back.

Demonstrations contesting the results of the October 2024 general election, which triggered months of unrest, were in full swing at the time.

"Mozambican journalists paid a heavy price for covering the post-election crisis," said Muthoko Mumo, Africa programme coordinator at the Committee to Protect Journalists.

Mozambique's branch of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (Misa) filed a legal complaint over violence against journalists during the unrest that followed the election.

"Proceedings were opened. Misa was heard in February 2025 but since then, nothing has happened," journalist Slaide Muthemba, the press freedom organisation's spokesperson in Maputo, told RFI.

Climate of fear

The post-election unrest lasted nearly four months and marked the peak of a long-running crackdown on press freedom and liberty of expression.

Mozambique is one of the few African countries never to have experienced a change of government since independence. Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Front, has ruled the country since 1975.

"What happened during the post-election crisis was something we had never seen before," Luis Nachote, coordinator of the Mozambique Centre for Investigative Journalism, told RFI.

"Over the past 10 years, we have faced severe restrictions. There have been many cases of people being arrested and disappearing."

Four journalists have been killed or have disappeared since 2020.

Among them was Joao Chamusse, editor-in-chief of the online newspaper Ponto por Ponto, who was found dead at his home in Catembe, on the outskirts of Maputo, on 14 December 2023. His phones and computer were gone.

Community radio journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco disappeared after being taken away by men in uniform in 2020. Online journalist Arlindo Chissale, from Pemba in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, disappeared in similar circumstances in 2025.

Rich in gas, rubies and lithium, Cabo Delgado is central to Mozambique's economic future. But the province has also been the scene of an insurgency by a terrorist group known locally as Al-Shebab and linked to the Islamic State (although with no connection to the Somali militant group of the same name).

The conflict has killed more than 6,500 people and displaced nearly 1 million.

Growing repression

"The post-election crisis frightened the regime and it responded very harshly," said Borges Nhamirre, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, a South African think tank. "Today, its control over the media is even stronger."

Demonstrations, the creation of Anamola – the party of opposition figure Venancio Mondlane, the defeated presidential candidate and driving force behind the protest movement – and the war in Cabo Delgado have all become taboo subjects, he told RFI.

"If you want information on these subjects, you have to search online. You won't find anything in the traditional media."

Online platforms have instead become an important space where many young Mozambicans exchange information.

"Communication through the internet and social media ended up raising awareness among young people. That's what triggered the mass outrage during the post-election crisis," explained journalist and sociologist Helder Leonel.

Leonel has hosted the weekly radio programme Hip Hop Time for 20 years. It has become a hub for rap and alternative culture in Mozambique.

"Through WhatsApp groups and memes shared on social media, a narrative emerges that runs counter to the one pushed by those in power," he said.

The Mozambican government or senior Frelimo figures have stakes in the country's three telecoms operators, Mcel, Vodacom and Movitel. Many young people have responded by finding ways around those controls, most commonly by using a VPN, or virtual private network, to hide their online activity.

Journalists disappear as intimidation grips Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region

Voice that won't fade

Alternative voices gathered on 6 May at the former home of rapper Azagaia in Matola to honour the musician, who died of an epileptic seizure three years earlier.

Azagaia became a symbol of dissent after authorities censored his 2008 song Povo no poder ("People in Power"), which has since become an anthem for many young Mozambicans.

"It's still almost impossible to hear it on the radio," Leonel said. Different versions of the song have nevertheless been viewed more than 1.5 million times on YouTube.

Marches held across several Mozambican cities after Azagaia's funeral in March 2023 were violently dispersed by security forces. At least 19 people were injured in Maputo, including two who were seriously hurt.

Activists, artists, journalists and academics came together at the house, which has since been turned into a library.

Outside, dozens of books were laid out on a table, including Traveller's Baggage by Portuguese writer and 1998 Nobel literature laureate Jose Saramago, biographies of former Mozambican president Samora Machel and US activist Malcolm X, and a comparative study of the first presidents of Angola and Senegal, Agostinho Neto and Léopold Sédar Senghor.

Above the entrance was written: "O verbo que nao se cala" – "the word that never falls silent".

Mozambique police accused of using spy networks to pursue government critics

Mozambique's criminal police are under growing scrutiny as political repression continues more than 18 months after disputed elections triggered unrest. Civil society groups denounce abductions and killings by security forces, with particular attention focused on the National Criminal Investigation Service, known as Sernic. This fifth instalment of Mozambique Exposed – an investigation coordinated by Forbidden Stories to which RFI contributed – examines claims that Sernic has become a form of political police serving Mozambique's ruling party.


Issued on: 17/06/2026 - RFI

More than 18 months after Mozambique's disputed October 2024 election, civil society groups accuse security forces of carrying out abductions and killings. Rights defenders say the National Criminal Investigation Service, known as Sernic, has played a central role in the repression. © Baptiste Condominas/RFI
By:RFI
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At 8.40pm on 23 January 2025, Simiao Carvalho was walking through Choupal, a neighbourhood behind the airport in Maputo, Mozambique's capital.

Protests linked to the disputed October 2024 general election had shaken the capital that day, as they had many times in previous months. Demonstrators continued to challenge the results of the vote, which had sparked months of unrest across the country.

"I was accompanying a friend to check that his boss's shop had not been vandalised," Carvalho tells RFI.

Three white and grey Toyota Hilux vehicles suddenly pulled up behind him, and 12 men got out, he recalls. "They were dressed in civilian clothes and had black face coverings."

Three other young men were nearby, also helping protect their boss's shop. "Go home!" the masked men shouted.

"When we turned our backs, they started shooting," Carvalho says.

A bullet struck his foot and he hid behind a low wall for hours before relatives helped him reach hospital.

How Cabo Delgado's riches became fuel for the Islamist insurgency in Mozambique

Agency under scrutiny

"It's always Sernic that persecutes us," said Amilcar Francisco, an activist with the opposition party Anamola, referring to Mozambique's National Criminal Investigation Service.

Francisco says he was forced into an unmarked white car by a group of men in late April and beaten with iron bars on a patch of wasteland.

"One of them I knew," he adds. "He is part of the service. He is a short man with a beard. I don't know his name. You only observe Sernic people from a distance."

Sernic is officially tasked with investigating criminal cases and operates with what its website describes as administrative, technical and tactical autonomy.

Human rights defenders see it differently and describe the agency as a form of political police working for the government.

"Sernic is one of the most powerful services in the country," explains Borges Nhamirre, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies.

"It's more powerful than the army because it is politically very connected to Frelimo."

Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Front, has ruled the country since its independence from Portugal in 1975. Sernic's predecessor, the Criminal Investigation Police, operated until 2017.

Mozambique's current interior minister led that force between 2010 and 2015.

'Spies everywhere'

"Sernic is the armed wing of the regime," Nhamirre says. "They track people down in the streets, in bars." Part of that work relies on telecommunications surveillance.

Mozambique has three phone operators.

MCEL is state-owned. Movitel is 70 percent owned by Viettel, a Vietnamese telecoms company controlled by Vietnam's defence ministry, while 20 percent is held by SPI, a Frelimo holding company.

Vodacom is 85 percent owned by its South African parent company, with the rest held by private interests close to the government.

"Data protection is extremely weak in Mozambique," Nhamirre says. "Nobody uses phone lines. People prefer WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram."

A dense network of human informants also helps Sernic, Francisco adds.

"I'm sure the person who betrayed me is a member of our party," he says, rubbing his injured leg. "They have spies everywhere."

Mozambique was governed under a one-party Marxist-Leninist system after independence, and researchers say the government has built an information network across the country.

Among its local links are neighbourhood chiefs, known as chefes de quarteirao.

"They are the people you must notify if you move house," Carlos Quembo, a researcher at Amnesty International, tells RFI. "You explain where, when and why."

Several sources told the journalists behind the Mozambique Exposed investigation that neighbourhood chiefs are systematically drawn from Frelimo and often lead local party meetings.

One neighbourhood chief interviewed by the consortium acknowledged sometimes sharing information with the authorities.

Missing businessman

The disappearance of businessman Americo Sebastiao on 29 July 2016 shows the level of impunity critics say Sernic, and its predecessor, have enjoyed.

Sebastiao, who worked in the timber sector, was abducted in Sofala province in central Mozambique.

A judicial source in Portugal told the consortium that Portuguese police supplied Sofala's regional prosecutor with several leads that could have advanced the investigation.

"Sebastiao's bank card was used for nearly 10 days after his abduction," the source said. "Police recovered bank surveillance footage that could have identified the people using the card."

Portuguese investigators also provided the phone number of a man known as Aviao, whom their inquiry had identified as one of the coordinators of the kidnapping.

Contacted by the consortium on that number, Sergio Aviao acknowledged that he is a member of Sernic. He was also serving as a police officer in Sofala province when Sebastiao was abducted.

Mozambican authorities never followed up with Portuguese police, the judicial source said. The investigation never led to a resolution and Portuguese officers were never sent to Mozambique.

"The issue is sensitive and could affect relations between two states," the source said.

Neither Sernic nor the Mozambican authorities have responded to requests for comment.

This article has been adapted from the original version in French by Gaëlle Laleix, reporting from Cabo Delgado.

It is the fourth instalment of Mozambique Exposed, an investigation coordinated by Forbidden Stories, a global non-profit network of investigative journalists. The project is based on nearly 100 interviews and five months of reporting by 30 journalists from 10 media organisations, including RFI and Les Observateurs de France 24 (France), Evident Media (United States), Expresso (Portugal), M28 Investigates (Rwanda), Paper Trail Media (Germany), SourceMaterial (United Kingdom), ZDF (Germany) and Zitamar News (Mozambique).

De Beers finds Gen Z driving diamond demand rebound

Cecilia Jamasmie | June 12, 2026 | 

Mined diamond sales are increasing across US independent jewellers, says the report. (Image courtesy of De Beers.)

American consumers are showing renewed interest in natural diamonds, offering a potential boost to Africa’s diamond-producing nations after several difficult years for the industry.

Generation Z members — those born between 1997 and 2012 — are leading the resurgence, accounting for 23% of US natural diamond demand by value despite representing only 18% of the population, according to De Beers’ latest US Diamond Acquisition Study.

New findings from the survey of 18,500 women in the United States, the world’s largest diamond jewellery market, found Gen Z buyers are spending an average of $4,080 per purchase, far above the $2,250 spent by Baby Boomers. The study also found 11% of respondents ranked natural diamond jewellery as their most desired luxury gift, ahead of lab-grown diamonds at 8%, coloured gemstones at 5% and plain gold jewellery at 4%.

“Natural diamonds continue to hold a unique place in consumers’ minds as meaningful and aspirational purchases,” the report found, as younger buyers increasingly seek jewellery tied to personal milestones and achievements.

From: De Beers’ The Diamond Report.

The trend carries important implications for African producers. Botswana, Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Lesotho supply a significant share of the world’s natural diamonds and stand to benefit directly from stronger demand in the US market.

The study found younger consumers are expanding diamond purchases beyond traditional engagements and weddings. While bridal jewellery still accounts for 45% of Gen Z demand, buyers are increasingly purchasing diamonds to mark promotions, career achievements, birthdays and other personal milestones, or simply as self-rewards.

That shift helped lift average natural diamond jewellery prices by 25% to $4,063 from $3,242 in 2023, while average stone sizes increased to 1.86 carats from 1.65 carats.

From: De Beers’ The Diamond Report.

“Consumers are spending more per piece than ever before, but how and why consumers buy diamonds is evolving,” Diana Mitkov, lead researcher within Diamond Demand Insights & Analytics at De Beers Group, said. “Traditional life milestones such as getting engaged are no longer the only value driver for the industry; consumers are increasingly marking a wide range of occasions with natural diamonds and are looking for distinct pieces that feel personal to them.”

Africa benefits

The findings arrive at a critical time for southern African producers. Botswana, whose economy remains heavily reliant on diamond exports, has faced slowing growth amid a prolonged downturn in global diamond demand. Other producing nations have also felt pressure as lab-grown diamonds gained market share and weakened prices for mined stones.

However, De Beers said natural diamonds continue to dominate the market’s value segment. Data from 950 independent US jewellers showed natural diamonds accounted for 85% of diamond jewellery sales value in 2025, compared with 15% for lab-grown stones.

The results suggest stabilizing demand in key consumer markets could provide relief for producing nations already facing constrained supply growth. Global natural diamond production is expected to decline over time as few major new mines enter operation and existing deposits mature.

For African economies that depend heavily on diamond exports, royalties and mining employment, sustained US demand could provide a valuable tailwind after several years of uncertainty.

Winning youth

The industry is also adapting its marketing strategy to appeal to younger consumers. De Beers and Signet launched the “Worth the Wait” campaign in October 2024, targeting so-called Zillennials with messaging centred on milestones, individuality and the enduring value of natural diamonds.

Meanwhile, producers and industry groups are investing heavily in broader promotional efforts. In June last year, a coalition of diamond-producing countries and De Beers signed the Luanda Accord, committing 1% of rough diamond revenues to a marketing fund managed by the Natural Diamond Council. The council has since launched new educational campaigns and retail training programs aimed at strengthening the case for natural diamonds.

From: De Beers’ The Diamond Report.

The effort reflects a broader challenge facing the industry. Younger consumers increasingly demand proof that products are ethically sourced and environmentally responsible. Danish jeweller Pandora switched entirely to lab-grown diamonds in 2021, citing sustainability concerns alongside lower prices.

The growing interest from Gen Z suggests natural diamonds retain significant appeal, but future growth may depend less on tradition and rarity than on demonstrating transparency, responsible sourcing and tangible benefits for producing communities.

An Unwarranted War, a Global Economic Drag

The lingering energy shock is morphing from the Asian epicenter to a global economic drag. The US/Israel war imposes a fatal penalty on global growth.

by Dan Steinbock | Jun 11, 2026 |

When the US-Iran conflict escalated earlier this year, the immediate concern centered on oil prices and the Strait of Hormuz.

But the real danger was never confined to crude oil. The crisis has evolved into a broader energy, logistics, fertilizer, food and financial shock.

What began as a regional conflict has become a structural drag on the global economy.

Prolonged pain

Recent warnings by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank underscore the same point.

Even if military hostilities continue to ease, energy systems, shipping networks and commodity supply chains will require many months – and in some cases years – to normalize. The result is likely to be a weaker global economy in the second half of 2026 and throughout 2027.

Global Energy Shock Impact Trends 2026 H2 – 2027
Sources: IEA, IMF WEO, World Bank, Reuters, author’s assessment.

The core issue is persistence. The IMF warns that prolonged energy disruptions could push the world toward recessionary conditions. The World Bank expects rising energy prices in 2026, while the IEA reports tightening supplies, falling inventories and continuing refinery disruptions.

The world faces a prolonged period of elevated energy costs, fragmented trade routes, higher insurance premiums, supply-chain restructuring and slower productivity growth.

US: Resilient but increasingly stagflationary

The United States is better positioned than most advanced economies because of domestic energy production and continued AI-led investment. Yet, higher fuel, petrochemical and transport costs are already feeding through the economy.

Gasoline prices remain well above pre-war levels, while energy-intensive industries face sustained cost pressures.

Growth is likely to remain positive through 2027, but below pre-conflict expectations. Inflation may prove more persistent than policymakers anticipated.

The principal risk is not recession but a stagflationary environment characterized by slower growth, elevated prices and tighter financial conditions.

By targeting Iran’s strategic capabilities while expanding military deployments across the region, the US has contributed to a prolonged risk premium in global energy markets.

At the same time, it has left Europe, Japan, South Korea and much of the developing world highly vulnerable to the resulting energy shock.

China: Economic exposure, strategic beneficiary  

As the world’s largest energy importer, Beijing remains vulnerable to disruptions in Gulf oil and LNG supplies. Higher energy prices, weaker external demand and increased transport costs will likely moderate Chinese growth through 2027.

But Beijing has spent more than a decade preparing for precisely such contingencies. Diversified energy imports from Russia, Central Asia and Africa, extensive strategic petroleum reserves, large-scale renewable investments and expanding regional trade networks provide buffers unavailable to most Asian economies.

More importantly, the crisis reinforces China’s long-standing argument that excessive dependence on Western-dominated maritime routes and financial systems constitutes a strategic vulnerability.

As Gulf states, Asian economies and many Global South nations seek greater economic resilience, China is positioned to benefit through expanded infrastructure investment, energy partnerships and trade integration.

The United States remains the predominant military actor in the crisis, but China is emerging as one of its principal geopolitical beneficiaries.

Europe: The most vulnerable advanced region       

Europe remains the weakest link among advanced economies. The continent has not fully recovered from the energy consequences of the Ukraine conflict.

The Iran-related shock has compounded existing vulnerabilities by raising LNG competition, industrial costs and fertilizer prices.

Germany illustrates the challenge. Its manufacturing sector faces a second major energy shock within five years. Industrial competitiveness is likely to deteriorate further, while fiscal constraints limit governments’ ability to cushion households and firms.

Southern Europe may perform somewhat better due to tourism, but energy costs will continue to restrain investment.

For Europe as a whole, 2027 may bring stagnation rather than recession. Yet stagnation itself represents a significant deterioration relative to earlier expectations.

European geopolitics revolves around an imagined Russian attack, yet the region’s economic fundamentals are being undermined by the protracted energy shock.

Asia: Still the epicenter   

Asia remains the region most exposed to the lingering crisis. The transmission mechanisms identified earlier – oil, LNG, trade logistics and financial spillovers – have intensified rather than disappeared.

The most vulnerable major economies are Japan, South Korea, India and many Southeast Asian importers. All depend heavily on imported hydrocarbons. Higher energy bills worsen trade balances, pressure currencies and reduce household purchasing power.

India faces a more difficult balancing act. Strong domestic demand and favorable demographics remain strengths, yet sustained oil prices near or above $90 per barrel would raise inflation and fiscal pressures. The country’s growth rate will likely remain among the world’s highest, but below its potential.

Across Asia, the crisis is reinforcing long-term trends toward energy diversification, regional trade arrangements and reduced dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints.

Middle East: Huge structural damage 

In the Middle East, oil-exporting states benefit from higher prices but suffer from geopolitical instability and disrupted export routes.

The Gulf monarchies – particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – possess financial buffers that allow them to absorb short-term volatility. Yet, infrastructure damage, shipping disruptions and investment uncertainty are imposing significant costs. Full normalization of regional energy logistics could take years.

Iran remains the principal economic casualty. Even if hostilities diminish, sanctions, damaged infrastructure and capital flight will weigh on growth for years. Reconstruction needs will be immense.

The broader regional consequence is the acceleration of economic diversification. Gulf states will intensify efforts to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon exports, while simultaneously investing in alternative trade corridors and logistics networks.

Since fall 2023, a set of unwarranted wars in the Middle East has severely penalized the colossal modernization initiatives in the Gulf.

Latin America: Mixed effects, darkening skies                     

Latin America faces a divided outlook. Commodity exporters such as Brazil benefit from higher agricultural and resource prices. Yet gains are partly offset by weaker global demand and tighter financial conditions.

Mexico faces indirect exposure through slower US growth and manufacturing demand.

Argentina illustrates the vulnerability of heavily indebted economies. Higher energy costs and global financing pressures complicate stabilization efforts.

More broadly, countries with large fuel-import bills will face renewed inflationary pressures.

Overall, Latin America is unlikely to experience a major crisis, but the region’s recovery trajectory will slow amid darkening skies. It is the target of the Trump administration’s lethal imperial dreams – from Panama, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua to Argentina, even Colombia.

Africa: The disproportionate victim     

Africa may suffer the greatest relative damage. The World Bank and IMF have repeatedly warned that poorer economies bear a disproportionate burden from higher fuel and fertilizer costs.

For many African countries, the energy shock rapidly becomes a food-security shock. Rising transport, fertilizer and import costs feed directly into consumer prices and poverty rates. Countries such as Egypt, Kenya and Senegal face growing external financing pressures.

Even resource exporters like Nigeria and Angola confront governance and investment challenges that limit the benefits of higher oil prices.

The most concerning issue is food security. There are deep interconnected vulnerabilities linking natural gas, fertilizer production and agricultural output. The consequences could extend well beyond 2027.

Global outlook through 2027         

The most likely outcome is neither global recession nor rapid recovery. Instead, the world appears headed toward a prolonged adjustment period characterized by Brent crude averaging roughly $85–100 per barrel, plus persistently elevated LNG and shipping costs.

These translate to higher food and fertilizer prices, slower global trade growth, renewed inflationary pressures and lower business investment due to uncertainty.

Persistent Disruption Impact.
Sources: IEA, IMF WEO, World Bank, national sources, author’s assessment.

Under this baseline, global growth is likely to remain near or in the proximity of 2.8–3.1% through 2027; below pre-conflict expectations but above outright recession levels.

The principal danger lies in a prolonged energy disruption or renewed military escalation, which could push oil prices toward the $110–125 range envisioned in adverse IMF scenarios and substantially increase recession risks. The era of relatively cheap, secure and politically predictable energy flows is fading.

What is emerging instead is a more regionalized, more expensive and more geopolitically contested energy system – one whose economic consequences will extend well beyond the battlefield and well beyond 2027.

The original version was published by China-US Focus on June 5, 2026.

Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internationally recognized visionary of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (US), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net