Floating Power Plants Are Opening a New Energy Frontier

By Haley Zaremba - Oct 04, 2026

• Floating power technologies offer coastal and remote communities additional ways to generate electricity without requiring large areas of land.
• 
  
• Projects and prototypes range from offshore solar installations in Taiwan to nuclear generation in Russia and wave-energy devices in Lake Michigan.
• 
  
• The technologies remain at very different stages of commercialization, but could complement conventional renewable and nuclear generation while improving local energy resilience.
• 
  

The renewable revolution is running out of space. Utility-scale solar and wind farms take up enormous tracts of land and are facing increasing legal pushback from many of the communities where their development is planned. However, an enormous expansion of clean energy resources is still needed to stay on track with any feasible pathway toward keeping global warming within 1.5º Celsius of pre-industrial averages – the threshold to avoid the very worst impacts of climate change. Moreover, the expansion of renewable energies is becoming more and more critical to global energy security as energy independence becomes the order of the hour. 

Against this backdrop, low-emissions energy production technologies that don’t take up a lot of space on land are garnering increasing investment attention for their potential to fill a void in the market. Many of these emerging technologies still take up space, but they’re moving off land and into the water in search of new frontiers. These floating power plants could become essential lifelines for coastal cities, and especially ‘population hotspots’, that need to expand their clean energy generation capacity but face increasing competition over scarce land. 

“Floating power plants can offer a permanent supply of energy, including for whole cities such as Pevek in Russia and Luanda in Angola,” The Conversation wrote in a report published earlier this week. “They can also provide temporary power for specific activities such as mining, or during emergencies including natural disasters or when infrastructure fails,” the article went on to say.

These floating power plants can come in different forms. As explained by The Conversation, they can be on ships, such as the very first floating power plant, the cargo ship SS Jacona, which was converted into a power source for the Northeast Coast of the United States way back in 1931. Or, they can be on barges, which – unlike ships – lack a motor. Or, they can simply consist of floating arrays or buoys which are fixed and non-transportable. Moreover, the way that these power plants can generate energy is extremely diverse, ranging from tidal and wave energy to solar photovoltaics to floating nuclear power plants. 

A number of prototypes are currently being tested in waters around the world. In Taiwan, where establishing energy independence is not just a matter of energy security but of national security as China attempts to annex the island, floating solar panels could offer an invaluable lifeline for the populous and land-scarce isle. A recent study found that these floating solar farms could be even more productive than land-based solar thanks to the natural cooling effects of the seawater, which increased the system’s efficiency.

“From a broader perspective, our work shows that offshore floating solar is not just a technical alternative but a strategic solution for other countries with limited land resources that can help expand their renewable energy capacity while still meeting environmental and land-use constraints,” one of the study authors elaborated in a press release accompanying the study.

These models aren’t just relevant to populous coastal cities, but also to remote regions that face challenges to connect to the grid. Russia has been operating floating nuclear power plants since 2019 in order to provide power to remote populations in Siberia. And communities in the Mediterranean, Norway, Japan, and India could be next. 

On Beaver Island, in the United States’ Lake Michigan, the University of Michigan is testing prototype devices along the island’s shoreline to convert kinetic energy from waves into electricity for the island’s small and isolated population. “It’s a combination of looking at cost savings and also wanting to be independent and not dependent on the mainland for everything,” Seamus Norgaard, who lives on Beaver Island during the summer, told Grist for an article about the University of Michigan project published earlier this month. “And then also the environmental outlook,” he went on to say.

While these technologies won’t replace traditional models, they could provide essential resilience and diversity to the global energy mix at a time when both are sorely needed. In the context of climate change and extreme global geopolitical instability leading to energy market volatility, short and local energy supply chains that don’t carry a large carbon footprint or land footprint are more essential than ever. 

By Haley Zaremba for Oilprice.com 

ICE, Trump and Africa: Secret deals, broken lives

Cover image: Reporters: ICE, Trump and Africa: Secret deals, broken lives 

© Studio graphique FMM

44.03

Issued on: 21/09/2026 
44:07 min From the show

For this edition of Reporters+, Karina Chabour investigated the dark side of US President Donald Trump’s immigration policy: How ICE deports immigrants to so-called third countries in Africa, far from the United States and often far from their countries of origin.


Most of the people deported have been living in the US for decades. They worked, paid taxes and many even have families who were left behind. Without notice, they were arrested, detained and then deported to Ghana and Eswatini: countries they don’t know and where they have no relatives, no income and no legal status.

Our reporter met individuals who now live in limbo: without papers and sometimes detained, at risk of being sent back to the very country they fled, many fearing for their lives.

Cover image: Sofia Alvarez Jurado, Forbidden Stories, Paris, September 21, 2026. © Screengrab
09:59

The Deportation Project: behind the investigation on Trump administration’s mass deportations

As part of a consortium of 26 media outlets coordinated by Forbidden Stories, RFI and FRANCE 24 spent six months investigating the secret deals struck between the administration of US President Donald Trump and several African countries. These “third countries” have agreed to host undocumented migrants detained by ICE and deported from the US.

From Ghana to Cameroon and Eswatini, our journalists spoke to the people deported to countries utterly unfamiliar to them.

Lives in limbo and US pressure on African states

Behind the broken lives of the deported, the film reveals a dark system put in place by Washington. To secure agreements with African states, the US piles on the pressure: political and financial deals, discreet bargaining, or trade and tariff incentives.

READ MORE‘Waiting for us to crack’: In Cameroon, the victims of Trump’s deportations face uncertain fates

“ICE, Trump and Africa – Secret deals, broken lives” reveals how the US is relocating deportations: how secret deals are being carried out by the Trump administration, using human lives as a negotiating tool.

With the collaboration of Caroline Dumay, Olivia Bizot, Simon Martin and Marine Pradel.

Third-country removals: Trump’s deportation policy by the numbers

INVESTIGATION

Since January 2025, the Trump administration has deported more than 25,000 people to so-called “third countries” – places that are not their countries of origin. Working with a team of 26 international media outlets, Forbidden Stories and FRANCE 24 have used information gathered by NGOs and open-source information to count and map these deportations. Our investigation shines a light on the scale of this mass deportation campaign that is being carried out under the cover of darkness.


Issued on: 21/09/2026 - 
By:The FRANCE 24 Observers/
Lise KIENNEMANN

icetracking.org

Forbidden Stories and FRANCE 24 have been working to document the scale of the Trump administration’s policy to deport people to third countries. © France Medias Monde graphic studio

For a better viewing experience on a large screen, expand the map.  

Rabbiatu Kuyateh considers the United States her country: “I've known it as my home”, she said. It isn’t where she was born, however: she was born and raised in Sierra Leone but fled the civil war there in the 90s. She has now lived in the United States for more than 30 years and has raised her own family there. Kuyateh is a nurse and, throughout this time, she had a series of renewable work permits and never obtained permanent residency. “I worked hard, I paid my taxes,” she said.

But in early July 2025, she was detained during a routine appointment with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Baltimore, Maryland. After spending four months in detention, she learned that she was going to be deported to Ghana, more than 1,000 km from her country of origin.

“I said, ‘Ghana? I’m not from Ghana; what am I going to do there? I only saw Ghana on the map; I don’t know where that is, ” she told the consortium.

THE DEPORTATION PROJECT Deported to Africa: An international investigation into Trump’s migrant policy


More than 25,000 people have been expelled to third countries

Since Donald Trump took office in January 2025, more than 25,000 people have been deported to a country that is not their home country and with which they often have no ties, according to a count carried out by a team of 26 international media outlets led by Forbidden Stories. A large majority – 20,000 people – were deported to Mexico. Others – at least 5,447 people – had, by August 31, 2026, been taken on deportation flights and dropped all across the globe.

These “third-country removals” have become a core part of the Trump administration’s repressive migration policy. In recent months, they have been making an increasing number of deportation agreements with third countries, often under a cloak of secrecy.

There has been very little official communication about these deportations.

“At the beginning of the administration, they were really overt about the fact they're carrying out these flights. But over the past year, the government has been very opaque about these third-country transfers,” said Savi Arvey, director of Policy, Refugee & Immigrant Rights at the NGO Human Rights First.

To “shed light on these transfers”, the organisation relies on public flight-tracking data, as well as a network of NGOs, lawyers and on-the-ground sources. It shares its findings through the ICE Flight Monitor project, which monitors these deportation transfers, and the Third Country Deportation Watch tracker, developed with the NGO Refugees International.

Our investigation is based on their work, as well as that of the Human Rights Center at the University of Berkeley, freedom of information requests, and information gathered by journalists around the world and the lawyers of the people who have been deported. We were able to document a large number of these deportations and gather information on the number and nationality of those deported (see our methodology here).
Deportation agreements concluded with 35 countries on six continents

A total of 28 countries located on six different continents had received third-country deportees from the United States by August 31, 2026. The Trump administration had also concluded more deals enabling them to deport third-country citizens to seven other countries. (In the meantime, one of these countries, Guyana, received its first transfer of third-country citizens – six people from Cuba and Afghanistan who were transferred there in early September.)

More than 5,000 people removed on deportation flights

There have been roughly 20,000 non-Mexican nationals deported to Mexico, according to data gathered by Third-country Deportation Watch, despite the fact that there is no official agreement between the two countries. They were taken there by land routes.

The others – at least 5,447 people of 89 different nationalities – have been deported by flight. The number of flights varies depending on the country.

The second-largest number of third-country deportees were sent to Guatemala, just south of Mexico. Nearly 3,000 people have been deported there; 90% of them Mexican nationals. Four other Central American countries have also received more than 250 third-country deportees: Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama and El Salvador.

Deals with 13 African countries

But people haven’t just been deported to the Americas. “During the first Trump administration, there were agreements signed with Mexico and three Central American countries [Editor’s note: Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador],” said Arvey. “Now we're seeing that the US is going well beyond Mexico and Central America to countries in the Caribbean, countries throughout South America and countries across Africa and even in parts of Eastern Europe.”

Thirteen African nations, most in West or Central Africa, have signed third-country deportation deals with the United States – representing more than a third of the overall countries that have signed. Of them, 12 had already received third-country deportees by August 31, 2026, representing a total of 450 people. For the time being, Ghana is the African country that has received the largest number of individuals, with more than 100 people from third countries being sent there. The Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Eswatini have each received dozens of people.

Savi Arvey says that some of the agreements are being made with “countries that previously the United States did not look to partner with”, including “such a corrupt autocratic government like Equatorial Guinea”. “It seems like the goal for the United States is the deal. The profile of the country, its human rights record doesn't matter at all. ”
‘I had started a new life in the United States; I felt safe’

According to our count, the people who have been deported are from nearly 90 different countries, most from Africa or Central or South America.

Malick (not his real name) was on the same deportation flight as Rabbiatu. Born in Senegal, he came to the United States in 2023 after fleeing his country over fears about his safety. He obtained a work permit.

“I had started a new life in the United States,” he said. “I felt safe.”

Like Rabbiatu, Malick had been granted a “withholding of removal”, meaning that the United States government can’t deport you to your home country because your life or freedom would be threatened there.

The Trump administration has said on numerous occasions that they are targeting people with criminal records for deportation. In June 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) said that the policy would apply to “aliens who are so uniquely barbaric that their own countries won’t take them back, including convicted murderers, child rapists and drug traffickers".

But the reports published by different NGOs tell a different story, as do the interviews that our group carried out with 33 different people who have been deported.

“I did not commit any crime; I always abided by the law,” Kuyateh said. She’s far from the only one. Most of the people deported to African countries don’t have any criminal record, says Alma David, an American lawyer who represents dozens of deportees to Africa.

Furthermore, of the people deported to third countries who do have criminal records, many had already served their sentence – in many cases, years ago.
Poor treatment and arbitrary detention

While third country deportations are legal under US law, it is only under limited circumstances and when proper protocols have been followed to guarantee the person’s safety.

However, NGOs as well as lawyers representing the victims have been reporting on the human rights violations taking place during these transfers, including degrading treatment and arbitrary detention. In El Salvador, more than 250 men have been held in a high-security prison meant to house gangs, a place with “inhumane prison conditions", according to Human Rights Watch. The organisation also documented “constant beatings” and “cases of sexual violence".

Human rights organisations are also worried about the specific people who have been deported.

“What's been extremely worrying is the targeting of people who've been granted withholding and removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture for third-country removals, in particular to various countries in Africa, but also to Mexico,” Arvey said.

Historically, people with this legal status were generally not deported. But as part of its mass deportation campaign, the new Trump administration has started using third-country removals as a way to deport people without returning them to their home countries.

Like Malick and Rabbiatu, Soraya (not her real name) had this legal status. Soraya is Ghanaian; she fled to the United States in 2024 because of her sexual orientation. “Withholding of removal, it's protection,” she said. “I was thinking they were going to protect me rather than sending me to a third country that will not accept me. But they still brought me to Cameroon, an African country that doesn't accept LGBT.”

Fears are particularly centred on the risk of "chain refoulement” – in which individuals are removed to a third country only to be sent back to their home country, where they face persecution. “In many cases, what we have seen is they are very much sending people back to countries that US immigration judges have established are dangerous for them,” said Meredyth Yoon, a US-based lawyer who represents more than a dozen third-country nationals removed to African countries.

Isatou (not her real name), a Guinean who migrated to the US to flee a forced marriage, was removed to Ghana, and then sent back to her country of origin. For her safety, we won’t say where she is now. But a few months after her removal, she told the consortium she had no choice but to hide. “I don’t go out anymore, I’m scared of coming across my family,” she said. “They ruined my life.”
‘Indirect form of return to harm’

Michael Garcia Bocheneck, interim director of Human Rights Watch's US programme, said:


“We think the government is using third-country removals to avoid the responsibilities that it has under international law not to return people to harm. (...) In many cases, it seems that the tacit assumption is that the third country will simply return them to their home country anyway. It's an indirect form of return to harm, and it's still a violation of international law.”

Carolyn Patty Blum, Clinical Professor of Law Emerita at UC Berkeley School of Law, said that in accordance with the non-refoulement principle – “a defining principle” of international law –, “no one should be forced to return to any country where they face a risk of persecution, human rights violations or torture". “Both the United States and the receiving countries violate that law by transferring people to places where they face serious risk of harm.”

Many of the deals include blanket language on ensuring migrants are not arbitrarily detained or sent to another country where they could face persecution. But the “stated ‘assurances’ of protection in the receiving country are inadequate", said Blum, who also pointed to the absence of “any methods of ongoing oversight” once the individual is outside the US.

Moreover, while some of the deals (known as “Asylum Cooperative Agreements”) include guarantees that transferred individuals can request asylum in the receiving country, other arrangements (called “Third-Country Removal Agreements”) offer no such protections. “What's been so concerning in this case is that often there's a reference to just transit,” Arvey said. “It’s very overt that the country understands that it will just serve as a transfer point. So it raises huge concerns about refoulement.”

Human rights advocates have repeatedly denounced the DHS policy of deporting individuals with little to no notice – leaving them with no real chance to contest their removal if they fear for their safety in the receiving country. On September 18, 2026, a US federal appeals court ruled that removing individuals to third countries without giving them a meaningful opportunity to raise fears of torture or persecution is illegal. The court also rejected the Trump administration's argument that general human rights assurances from third countries are sufficient.

DHS General Counsel James Percival said shortly after the decision that the ruling will not prevent “the third country deportation policy” from “continuing”. “If you claim fear in your home country, DHS has the right to send you elsewhere.”

That view is not shared by Trina Realmuto, the executive director at National Immigration Litigation Alliance, one of the groups who brought the class-action case. She told our consortium that “the decision is effective now, which means DHS cannot continue to apply its existing third-country removal policy”. However, she said that they “anticipate the government will seek Supreme Court review and could seek a stay of the decision while they do so.”
The Deportation Project: behind the investigation on Trump administration’s mass deportations


As part of a consortium of 26 media outlets coordinated by Forbidden Stories, RFI and FRANCE 24 spent six months investigating the secret deals struck between the administration of US President Donald Trump and several African countries. These “third countries” have agreed to host undocumented migrants detained by ICE and deported from the US.

From Ghana to Cameroon and Eswatini, our journalists spoke to the people deported to countries utterly unfamiliar to them.
Chilling effect

Removing people to third countries with almost no warning has also been used by the Trump administration to deter migration and encourage self-deportation, according to the lawyers and NGOs we spoke with.

“If you come to our country illegally and break our laws, you could end up in CECOT, Alligator Alcatraz, Guantanamo Bay, or South Sudan or another third country,” said Tricia McLaughlin, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spokeswoman, in August 2025, referencing the aforementioned Salvadoran prison and a now-closed detention centre in Florida.

“With countries like Palau or Eswatini, the point is that the Administration can threaten people that they will literally be dropped in the middle of nowhere,” a US official reportedly said, according to a report by Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Contacted by the consortium, the US Department of State said in a statement that they “will use all legal means” to remove individuals with no right to remain in the US and that “they do not comment on their private diplomatic communications with other governments”. At the time of publication, ICE had not responded to our questions.

The consortium also contacted the governments of the 35 countries that have concluded a deal with the US. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the interior ministry reiterated that “Mexico has not signed an agreement with the United States” to receive foreign nationals, saying it was receiving these “individuals on humanitarian grounds". The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that an agreement had been signed with the US. At the time of publication, the other countries had not responded to our questions.
‘Threats of tariffs, visa bans or cuts to assistance’

The reasons why countries agree to accept these nationals often remain murky. Even when the agreements have been made public, the quid pro quos involved are rarely mentioned.

But according to documents obtained by the Washington Post as part of this project, the US has pledged more than $ 81 million (70 million euros) to 13 governments in connection with these agreements. This includes more than 15 million dollars (13 million euros) each for Guatemala and Honduras. The administration has pledged over five million dollars to six other countries – the Dominican Republic, Eswatini, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Palau and Rwanda.

It seems, however, that these concessions are also tied to broader geopolitical or economic interests – quid pro quos that can often only be inferred from secondary agreements made alongside the transfers. The report from Senate Democrats stresses that “deportation is being used as a bargaining chip", with third countries “being pressured with threats of tariffs, visa bans, or cuts to assistance".

In the case of Ghana, for example, the foreign minister admitted following the deal that US officials had raised potential visa and tariff concessions for his country. Just days after the agreement was announced, the US lifted the five-year visa restrictions it had imposed on Ghana two months earlier.

“I think that it's fair to say that everybody is running a little scared of the US,” Bocheneck said. “I think they all know that whatever goodwill they've got with the US right now is very tenuous, and everybody's trying to do whatever they can on the political side to keep the goodwill as long as possible.”

Additional reporting: Magdalena Hervada, Léa Péruchon, Sofía Álvarez Jurado (Forbidden Stories) and Karina Chabour.

Investigation: In Cameroon, the victims of Trump’s deportations face uncertain fates

Under often-secret deals struck with third countries across Africa and Latin America, US President Donald Trump has deported thousands of people who were hoping to build new lives in the US to countries they’ve never set foot in before. Working with Forbidden Stories, FRANCE 24 investigated the stories of several African migrants whose lives were thrown into chaos by their abrupt deportation from the US to a temporary shelter in Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé.


Issued on: 21/09/2026 - 

FRANCE24

By:  David RICH

At least 44 people from more across Africa have been deported from the US to Cameroon – a country to which they have no connection. © Studio graphique FMM


“Welcome to the temporary migrant shelter.” In a residential neighbourhood in the Cameroonian capital of Yaoundé, a government compound has been transformed into a place for people with nowhere else to go.

Behind its high clay-coloured walls, 20-odd people share dorm rooms sparsely furnished with bunk beds.

Several days after her arrival, Barbara* is still struggling to get her bearings.

“I feel really bad, I have no family here, I don’t know anyone, and most people only speak French,” she said in English.


The young woman had fled persecution in her homeland Ethiopia to the US, hoping to build a new life for herself. But in April this year, she was deported without warning by US immigration authorities to the Central African country of Cameroon, a country utterly unknown to her.

‘They put me on a plane, and I landed here’

Born in the state of Tigray in the north of Ethiopia, Barbara left her country after war broke out between federal government forces and the region’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The conflict is believed to have killed more than 600,000 people between 2020 and 2024.

Fleeing persecution, she travelled to Brazil at the end of 2024 before making her way to the US border by bus. The young woman was detained by border police on arrival and sent to an immigration detention centre in Louisiana.

Several months later, a judge granted her “withholding of removal”, a legal protection distinct from asylum that nonetheless prevents recipients from being deported to their home country on the grounds that they would more likely than not face persecution.

Despite this measure, Barbara would remain in the detention centre for several more months – until she was abruptly bundled on board a flight to Cameroon on April 28, 2026.

“Police came to get me and told me I had to go back,” she said. “I was so shocked. They put me on a plane and I landed here.”

Within the walls of the Yaoundé migrant centre, people from almost a dozen African countries – Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe – all have similar stories.

Soraya* said she fled Ghana after her family found out about her sexual orientation.

“In Accra, people I know are looking for me,” she said. “They want me dead.”

Soraya had also been granted a protection measure in the US – before being deported without warning.
Legal loopholes

To be granted “withholding of removal” in the US, an applicant must show that they have more than a 50 percent risk of suffering persecution in their home country for reasons of race, religion, nationality, belonging to a particular social group or for their political beliefs.

But this protection does nothing to prevent recipients from being deported to countries deemed “safe” – that is to say, where deportees wouldn’t be exposed to the same risk of persecution that they would in their homeland.

The administration of US President Donald Trump has wasted no time in launching itself at this loophole. Having promised to bring an end to what he describes as an “invasion” of migrants, Trump has struck a number of bilateral agreements with what have been dubbed "third countries".
The “temporary migrant shelter” in Yaoundé. © Forbidden Stories

The aim is clear: to expel migrants who are legally protected from being deported to their home countries, and to send a warning to those hoping to follow in their footsteps.

“It’s precisely because these people have been granted this protection in the United States that they are sent here,” said Cameroonian lawyer Joseph Awah Fru, who provides legal assistance to migrants deported to Yaoundé. “The US needed a ‘blank-slate’ country.”
Secret deals

More than 35 “deals” have been signed so far, the majority of which have been struck with Latin American countries, like Mexico, Panama, El Salvador and Costa Rica, or African states including Cameroon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Eswatini, the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea. These agreements have facilitated the deportation of more than 25,000 people.

But while the Trump administration has been stepping up the rate of deportations, the actual content of many of these agreements remains shrouded in mystery.

“Most of these are secret agreements that governments have not submitted to Parliament for approval,” said Beatrice Njeri, a Kenyan lawyer and a member of a coalition defending the rights of deportees. “There is neither openness nor transparency.”

She said that deportees often found themselves isolated in these third countries.

“They are being held in quasi-military conditions, treated as prisoners,” she said. “They usually have very limited access to a lawyer, so that they can find out what options are available to them, because governments want to force them to return to their home countries – despite the danger.”

In the case of Cameroon, the only publicly available document confirming the deal is an exchange of diplomatic notes that took place in December 2025, published in June by the US State Department.

Document : communiqué from the US embassy in Cameroon

As outlined in the note, both Yaoundé and Washington undertook to “arrange the transfer from the United States to the Republic of Cameroon of certain third-country nationals present in the United States”.

For its part, Cameroon agreed to treat these deportees in a manner consistent with its obligations under international law, and assured that they would not be subjected to persecution or torture, either in Cameroon or in any country that Yaoundé would send them on to.

The actual terms of the deal are still opaque. According to an investigation by the New York Times, the agreement appears to have been reached after Washington directly imposed financial pressure on the Central African country.

The US reportedly threatened to suspend a payment of some $30 million intended for the country office of the UN Refugee Agency. The payment finally went through on January 9 – six days before a plane carrying the first deportees from Louisiana touched down in the country.

A US government website said that the funding was intended “in support of third-country national arrangement negotiations”.

The UN refugee agency denied that the funds were earmarked for the resettlement of deportees, insisting that the money would be “allocated and used in accordance with its mandate”.

A source close to the Cameroonian government confirmed to FRANCE 24 that an agreement had been reached between Washington and Yaoundé, apparently negotiated by President Paul Biya himself, before the first deportations took place. The president's office did not respond to requests for comment.

The source said that the deal, which was struck in total secrecy, was meant to “improve” the relationship between both countries and strengthen cooperation on the economic and security fronts.

At the end of August, the two countries held an inaugural “US-Cameroon Bilateral Economic and Commercial Dialogue” in Yaoundé. During the event, the US announced an investment of $7 billion in Cameroonian industries ranging from tech, critical minerals, infrastructure and energy.

The Deportation Project: behind the investigation on Trump administration’s mass deportations


As part of a consortium of 26 media outlets coordinated by Forbidden Stories, RFI and FRANCE 24 spent six months investigating the secret deals struck between the administration of US President Donald Trump and several African countries. These “third countries” have agreed to host undocumented migrants detained by ICE and deported from the US.

From Ghana to Cameroon and Eswatini, our journalists spoke to the people deported to countries utterly unfamiliar to them.

Deported without documents

In Yaoundé, the deportees allege they were stripped of their passports by US authorities, who have held onto them since their departure.

“When we arrived, we weren’t allowed to leave the centre,” said Soraya, who was on the first flight that landed in Cameroon on January 15. “We were treated like criminals.”

Unable to move around freely, some of the deportees took drastic measures – to little result.

“We decided to go on a hunger strike in protest, and that’s why they said they were going to give us identity documents that would allow us to move around freely,” she said. “But they only gave us a piece of paper valid for just two months that we could show if we were stopped by police.”

“The migrants are housed and fed, but they have no money,” Awah Fru said. “They can leave the centre, but the authorities warned them that they would not be held responsible if something happened to them. Their freedom has been violated.”

The source close to the Cameroonian government defended the measures.

“When you don’t have your papers in a country, you are required to restrict your movements,” they said.

For weeks now, Awah Fru has been making frequent visits to the centre to try to ensure the deportees’ rights are upheld. On August 5, the lawyer lodged an appeal on behalf of 36 migrants deported to Cameroon between January and May 2026 with the Yaoundé Administrative Court. He is seeking to suspend the agreement with the United States on the grounds that the deportations put them at risk of persecution and torture.

“From the moment that Cameroon agreed to welcome these people onto its territory, it has the responsibility to protect them like refugees,” he said. It’s a campaign that the lawyer has waged by himself – and not an easy one.
Constant pressure

During his first visit to the centre on February 17, Awah Fru and the four journalists accompanying him were briefly detained by the judicial police – an act that only deepened the climate of fear among the deportees, who largely refuse all contact with the media.

While in detention, the journalists were forced to delete the videos they had recorded and were warned by the police not to do any more work on the story. The source close to the government described their detention as “an unfortunate incident by a handful of overzealous police”.

“There’s no omerta around this case,” they insisted.

Despite these assurances, the Cameroonian government still hasn’t responded to FRANCE 24’s application for a media visa, submitted for this investigation.

Because of this, the testimonies of the deportees had to be recorded remotely.

The source close to the government insisted that Cameroon was a “welcoming country” where the deportees “are treated well”. The migrants have reportedly been visited by multiple officials from the justice and foreign affairs ministries.

They have also met with representatives from the UN Refugee Agency and the UN’s International Organization for Migration.

'Deportation machine': How Donald Trump and ICE are changing America

Cover image: 'Deportation machine': How Donald Trump and ICE are changing America

 © AFP
17:30

The latter agency plays a crucial role in the lives of those held in the detention centre – particularly those who decide to return to their home countries.

“The IOM representatives don’t tell us that they’re going to force us to return to our home countries, but that they can help us if we wish to do so,” one of the deportees said. “The government representatives, on the other hand, tell us that we must return to our home countries.”

“Where someone asks us to help them return to their country of origin, or to another country where they have the legal right to stay, we do so only after individualised counselling and protection screening,” the agency said in a statement, adding that the decision needed to be “freely” made.

“Our commitment in no way constitutes an endorsement of the decisions that led to the deportation of these people,” a spokesperson added.
‘They’re just waiting for us to crack’

Despite the difficult situation they’ve been put in, both Barbara and Soraya hope that with their lawyer’s help they can be granted asylum in Cameroon.

“I’ve heard there are human rights issues here,” Barbara said. “But if I go back to my country, I know what will happen – I have no choice.”

“Here, we wake up and each day is like the day before it,” Soraya said. “We have to beg for everything – they’re just waiting for us to crack and agree to go home. But most of us can’t go home. That’s true for me too, even though I know Cameroon isn’t any safer for me.”

In a grim irony, Soraya has been deported to a country where the laws against homosexuality are even more repressive than in her homeland. Homosexual acts are punishable by up to five years in prison in Cameroon, compared with three years in Ghana.

Among the first deportees sent to Cameroon, two other women – both from Morocco – were like Soraya and granted protection measures in the US due to their sexual orientation. Both women decided to return to their home country despite the risks, choosing to live in hiding rather than remain locked up in a strange land.

Gisèle, another deportee in the centre who fled the fighting between the DR Congo and Rwanda, has abandoned her plans to seek asylum in Cameroon for health reasons. Suffering from a thyroid condition, she has never been able to obtain her medication at the centre in Yaoundé, despite her repeated requests.

Worried that her health would only get worse, she finally agreed to be sent back to the DR Congo after five months behind the centre’s walls.

*Names have been changed at the interviewees’ request.

This article has been adapted from the original in French by Paul Millar.

The Deportation Project: our full coverage

Deported to Africa: An international investigation into Trump’s migrant policy

‘Waiting for us to crack’: In Cameroon, the victims of Trump’s deportations face uncertain fates

Interactive map: Third-country removals - Trump’s deportation policy by the numbers

Scrollytelling: Flight to Ghana - Expelled From the US to a Country They’d Never Been to (coming soon)

‘I had never heard of Eswatini’: Deported to a country that rejects them (coming soon)

BY: Karina CHABOUR

Trump’s war on Huawei spreads through Africa

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By bne IntelliNews September 20, 2026

A $99.6mn US government loan to Africell in Angola would be unremarkable beside the sums being spent on Africa’s telecoms infrastructure were it not for what Washington wants the money to buy.

The Export-Import Bank of the United States announced this month that it would finance American and European network technology for the US-owned mobile operator. Reuters described the loan as part of the Trump administration’s effort to counter Huawei overseas, citing an estimate from Counterpoint Research that the Chinese company supplies about 52% of Africa’s 5G infrastructure.

Five days later, another arm of the US government widened the picture. The US International Development Finance Corporation approved an equity investment in WIOCC Group, whose fibre networks, wholesale connectivity and data-centre infrastructure span 30 African countries. DFC said the investment would support US technology companies and advance American strategic interests on the continent.

The two transactions fit a broader US approach to competing with Huawei despite lacking an American equivalent. Rather than trying to replace the Chinese group with a single US supplier, Washington is using public finance to support an alternative ecosystem built around European network equipment, American technology and non-Chinese digital infrastructure.

The Africell loan addresses the equipment side of that approach by financing Africell’s purchase of alternative network technology. The WIOCC investment suggests that the same strategic logic is extending to fibre, data centres and wholesale connectivity, infrastructure on which US technology companies depend. Neither deal amounts to an African telecoms strategy on its own, but together they show how Washington’s long confrontation with Huawei is acquiring a more financial dimension.

From pressure to finance

Donald Trump’s campaign against the Chinese group began much earlier. During his first term, the administration restricted Huawei’s access to US technology and launched the Clean Network initiative, pressing governments and operators to exclude suppliers Washington considered security risks. Eswatini became the first African country to join the programme in early 2021.

US officials argued that Huawei’s presence in critical communications networks created espionage and data-security risks because of the company’s relationship with Beijing and its obligations under Chinese law. Huawei has consistently rejected allegations that its equipment could be used for spying.

Africa presented a harder commercial problem.

Huawei had already spent years supplying equipment across the continent, building relationships with operators and governments and becoming embedded in existing networks. Unlike in markets where governments were prepared to restrict Chinese vendors, African operators also had to contend with the economics of expanding coverage in countries where capital was scarce and average revenue per customer was often low.

Washington recognised some of that problem even during Trump’s first term. When Eswatini joined the Clean Network, senior State Department official Keith Krach said EXIM had been given authority to finance 5G projects using equipment from trusted non-US suppliers such as Ericsson (STO: ERIC B; NASDAQ: ERIC), Nokia (HEL: NOKIA; NYSE: NOK) and Samsung Electronics (KRX: 005930; LSE: SMSN). US financing, he argued, could help close the cost gap with Huawei and ZTE (SZSE: 000063; HKEX: 0763).

The idea is therefore not entirely new. What is becoming more visible is the use of public capital to put it into practice.

Africell offers an unusually convenient starting point. It describes itself as Africa’s only US-owned mobile-network operator and has operations in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and The Gambia. Africell says its Angola business has attracted more than 8mn customers, while the group currently reports more than 15mn subscribers across its four markets.

Its network also already follows the kind of supplier model Washington would like to encourage. Nokia announced in 2021 that it would provide radio, core and IP technology for Africell’s Angola launch. US financing can therefore support European network hardware alongside American components, software and other technology.

The missing US champion

The structure of the global equipment market helps explain that approach.

The global radio access network (RAN) industry remains extraordinarily concentrated. Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, ZTE and Samsung accounted for 96% of worldwide RAN revenue in the first half of 2026, according to Dell’Oro Group. Two of those companies are Chinese, two European and one South Korean. None is American.

That leaves Washington reliant on a combination of public financing, European radio equipment and American semiconductors, software, cloud and networking technology.

Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) technology fits into the same strategy. By making interfaces between network components more interoperable, Open RAN is intended to reduce operators’ dependence on tightly integrated systems from a single supplier. US policymakers across successive administrations have put substantial funding behind open and interoperable networks, including through the $1.5bn Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund launched under the Biden administration. The Trump administration has since redirected part of that effort towards AI-native network architecture.

The administrations have differed in approach, but the attraction for Washington is consistent. A more fragmented network architecture creates room for US technology companies even if they do not manufacture complete mobile networks.

Huawei’s installed-base advantage

Huawei’s advantages, however, extend beyond the architecture of its equipment.

Chinese lenders historically played a significant role in financing African communications infrastructure. Boston University’s Chinese Loans to Africa database estimates that Chinese lenders committed about $15.7bn to African information and communications technology projects between 2000 and 2023. The model helped finance infrastructure in markets where governments and operators could otherwise struggle to raise capital.

That source of finance has since receded sharply. Boston University found no new Chinese loan commitments to African ICT projects in 2024, describing the sector as increasingly market-driven. Overall Chinese lending to Africa is also far below the levels reached during the early years of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The decline in sovereign lending does not amount to a broader Chinese retreat from Africa. IntelliNews reported in August that Chinese Belt and Road investment announcements in Africa reached a record $33.5bn in the first half of 2026, with the model increasingly shifting from state-backed lending towards direct corporate investment in productive assets.

The change therefore concerns the form of Chinese capital more than its disappearance. For Huawei, however, financing is only part of the advantage.

Huawei has retained an advantage that does not depend on cheap credit: its installed base.

Mobile networks are built incrementally. Existing 4G equipment influences how an operator moves into 5G, and changing vendors can require new hardware, integration work and retraining. An incumbent supplier able to offer a relatively straightforward upgrade therefore begins with an advantage before financing terms are even discussed.

The $99.6mn Africell loan tackles one part of that equation by reducing the financing constraint around alternative suppliers. It does not solve the switching problem for operators whose networks already rely heavily on Huawei.

Nor is Africell representative of the biggest commercial test. As a US-owned challenger already using Nokia equipment, it is unusually aligned with Washington’s objectives.

Persuading one of Africa’s large incumbent operators to change procurement strategy would be considerably harder. Such companies operate across multiple countries, have billions of dollars invested in existing infrastructure and generally buy equipment from several vendors. Network decisions have to satisfy commercial requirements that extend well beyond geopolitical preference.

Beyond the mobile network

The difficulty of dislodging an incumbent network supplier helps explain the significance of Washington’s push elsewhere in Africa’s digital infrastructure, even if the investments are not explicitly presented as substitutes for competition in mobile-network equipment.

DFC had already invested $50mn in pan-African digital infrastructure company Cassava Technologies before its latest WIOCC transaction. The agency explicitly presented that investment in terms of strategic competition, arguing that support for African fibre, data centres and digital services could expand the position of US and allied technology companies.

Its September investment in WIOCC pushes the same approach further across an infrastructure footprint covering 30 African countries. DFC called it its largest digital investment to date and said WIOCC’s networks were used by American technology companies expanding on the continent.

The strategy therefore reaches beyond who supplies a mobile operator’s antennas. Fibre networks, data centres and wholesale connectivity increasingly determine where cloud services and other digital businesses can expand. Huawei itself operates well beyond traditional telecom equipment, including in cloud computing and enterprise technology.

That infrastructure is becoming more economically important as Africa’s cloud and data-centre market expands. IntelliNews reported in January that Africa still accounted for only about 1% of global data-centre capacity, but capacity was forecast to grow rapidly as cloud adoption and internet use increased, with South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Egypt emerging as leading markets.

Africa’s commercial calculus

Describing all this simply as a US-China contest can obscure the calculations being made in African capitals and boardrooms.

Telecom operators need affordable equipment, financing, spectrum, fibre links and reliable electricity. Many are still spending heavily to increase ordinary 4G coverage even as richer markets debate advanced 5G services. Currency weakness and high borrowing costs can make capital expenditure particularly difficult.

The same constraints apply further down the digital-infrastructure chain. The Africa Data Centres Association says power availability has overtaken connectivity as the principal obstacle to data-centre expansion on the continent, meaning the effectiveness of new capital will also depend on access to reliable electricity at commercially viable sites.

That commercial pressure helps explain why African governments and operators are unlikely to treat technology procurement simply as a choice between geopolitical blocs. Dare Leke Idowu of the University of Johannesburg argues that African governments are increasingly hedging between the US and China, selecting partners according to infrastructure needs, domestic priorities and financing conditions rather than committing to either technology ecosystem.

Those conditions favour whichever supplier — Chinese, European, American or otherwise — can offer the best combination of price, financing, reliability and support. Washington’s security campaign can influence the political environment in which those decisions are taken, but it cannot by itself change their economics.

The growing use of EXIM loans, DFC equity and support for alternative network architectures suggests Washington is increasingly trying to compete on that terrain as well.

Huawei enters the contest with an extensive installed base and decades of relationships across the continent. The US enters without a Huawei of its own.

Its answer is to finance a coalition instead.

Whether that financing can alter the procurement decisions of Africa’s larger telecom operators will be the harder commercial test.

 

DRC mining growth exposes power, rail and processing bottlenecks

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By Jason Mitchell September 18, 2026

The Democratic Republic of Congo sits on mineral resources whose untapped value has been widely estimated at around $24 trillion, although the frequently cited valuation is based on older estimates and has surely grown. The DRC’s ability to exploit that wealth increasingly depends on whether infrastructure investment can keep pace with mining growth.

The country is already the world’s second-largest copper producer after Chile and by far the largest source of cobalt, while new investment is opening up lithium and zinc resources alongside established gold, tin and tantalum production.

The scale of the expansion has been rapid. The US Geological Survey estimates that the DRC produced 3.2mn tonnes of mined copper in 2025 and holds reserves of around 80mn tonnes. Cobalt output reached around 230,000 tonnes in 2025, equivalent to about 73% of global mine production. The country holds an estimated 6mn tonnes, or half of the world’s cobalt reserves.

Mining is already driving the wider economy. Mining output grew by 10.1% in 2025, helping real GDP expand by an estimated 5.5%, according to the World Bank. Growth is forecast to average 5.1% between 2026 and 2028, with the pace of mining expansion expected to moderate as some major projects mature.

Infrastructure is becoming the main constraint. The country has vast hydropower resources, but electricity supply remains unreliable, while poor roads and railways increase the cost of developing and operating mines.

China already has a powerful position in the country. Growing US and European investment is increasing competition over infrastructure and mineral supply chains, with the Lobito Corridor emerging as a major focus.

China dominates mining investment

Chinese investment has been central to the rapid expansion of the mining industry, spanning major copper and cobalt operations, processing capacity, supporting infrastructure and, increasingly, lithium.

CMOC (SSE: 603993; HKEX: 3993), the Chinese mining group, shows the scale of that investment. It owns 80% of Tenke Fungurume and 71.25% of Kisanfu, two of the largest copper-cobalt operations in the country. Its Congolese mines produced 741,100 tonnes of copper and 117,500 tonnes of cobalt in 2025. Tenke Fungurume has an annual copper production capacity of more than 450,000 tonnes, while Kisanfu can produce more than 200,000 tonnes.

Chinese investment is also significant at the Kamoa-Kakula copper mining complex. Zijin Mining (SSE: 601899; HKEX: 2899) owns 39.6%, alongside Canadian mining company Ivanhoe Mines (TSX: IVN; OTCQX: IVPAF) with 39.6%, the Congolese government with 20% and Crystal River Global with 0.8%. Kamoa-Kakula produced around 389,000 tonnes of copper in 2025.

Zijin is also developing the Manono lithium project with Congolese state interests, extending its presence beyond the Copperbelt.

China’s dominance extends further down the value chain. The DRC dominates global cobalt mining, yet China accounts for around 75-80% of global cobalt processing. Copper is different, with substantially more refining already taking place domestically.

Western companies remain important. Glencore (LSE: GLEN; JSE: GLN), the Switzerland-based commodities and mining group, produced a combined 247,800 tonnes of copper at KCC and Mutanda in 2025, 10% more than a year earlier, alongside 33,500 tonnes of cobalt. Production strengthened during the second half as higher-grade ore and improved recoveries lifted output.

Competition between the US and China goes well beyond ownership of individual mines. China has established mining and processing assets, strong commercial ties and is a major buyer of Congolese minerals. The US and its partners are responding by financing infrastructure and developing alternative supply chains. The government hopes this competition will bring the investment needed to support further mining growth.

Gaylor Montmasson-Clair, co-founder and director of Southern Transitions, said in June that intensifying competition among China, the US and Europe for copper supplies was strengthening the negotiating position of African producers. He argued that countries such as the DRC and Zambia had an opportunity to use that leverage to capture more processing and manufacturing activity rather than remaining primarily suppliers of raw materials.

Power deficit threatens further growth

Power is one of the biggest constraints. The DRC has enormous hydroelectric potential, yet an unreliable grid and inadequate transmission infrastructure mean some of its largest mines have had to secure much of their own electricity supply.

Matt Tilleard, chief executive of CrossBoundary Energy, estimates that the DRC mining sector faces a power deficit of around 1 GW, underscoring the scale of additional generation required as copper and other mineral production expands.

The Inga site alone has estimated hydroelectric potential of around 42,000 MW, although successive expansion plans have faced repeated delays.

Kamoa-Kakula demonstrates the scale of the challenge. Ivanhoe helped finance the refurbishment of Turbine 5 at the Inga II hydroelectric plant, restoring 178 MW of generating capacity. Kamoa initially secured an additional 50 MW, with its allocation expected to rise towards 150 MW as transmission upgrades are completed. These include improvements to substations at Inga and Kolwezi designed to increase power delivery and grid stability.

A 60 MW uninterruptible power supply has also been installed to protect Kamoa’s smelter from voltage fluctuations. Separately, Ivanhoe said in August that commissioning was under way on two hybrid solar-and-battery facilities comprising 433 MWp of photovoltaic capacity and 1,107 MWh of storage, designed to provide 60 MW of continuous baseload power. The 233 MWp CrossBoundary Energy component was reported commissioned in September.

The pressure will increase as production and processing expand. Ivanhoe expects Kamoa-Kakula’s total power requirement to rise from 208 MW at the end of 2025 to 347 MW by the end of 2028.

Electricity problems extend beyond copper. Grid reliability is an explicit risk at Kipushi, the major zinc operation near the Zambian border, where backup generation capacity has been increased to around 20 MW. The mine nevertheless produced a record 70,177 tonnes of zinc in concentrate in the second quarter of 2026, equivalent to an annualised rate of around 280,000 tonnes, against full-year guidance of 240,000-290,000 tonnes.

Kibali, one of Africa’s largest gold mines, has no national grid connection. Barrick Mining (NYSE: B; TSX: ABX), the Canadian gold and copper producer that operates the mine, developed three hydropower stations with a combined capacity of around 43 MW. A 16 MW solar plant and battery storage system were commissioned in 2025, raising renewable energy to 85% of Kibali’s power mix and allowing the operation to run entirely on renewable electricity for six months of the year.

Processing push raises infrastructure demand

Greater domestic processing is becoming another source of infrastructure demand. The 2018 Mining Code requires mineral production to be processed or transformed domestically, subject to exemptions. More recent measures have tightened government control over how copper and cobalt leave the country.

A joint ministerial order dated June 29, 2026 prohibited exports of copper and cobalt concentrates, although strategic exemptions can be granted for up to one year.

The government’s cobalt policy has become even more interventionist. A temporary export ban introduced in February 2025 followed a sharp fall in cobalt prices amid global oversupply. It was replaced by a quota system allowing up to 96,600 tonnes of contained cobalt annually in 2026 and 2027, including 9,600 tonnes reserved for national strategic purposes. The measures are intended to restrict supply and support prices while encouraging greater value addition.

Copper is already further along this path. Refined copper production reached an estimated 2.8mn tonnes in 2025, according to the US Geological Survey. Kamoa-Kakula has added a 500,000-tonne-a-year direct-to-blister copper smelter, the largest in Africa, which produced its first anodes in December 2025. The facility also produces sulphuric acid for sale to other Copperbelt mines.

Cobalt presents a different picture. The DRC accounts for roughly three-quarters of global mine production, while China handles almost 80% of global processing. Much of the material leaves as cobalt hydroxide and other intermediate products before undergoing further processing abroad.

Capturing more of that value domestically will require dependable electricity, water and transport links for smelters, refineries and other processing plants.

Lobito opens an Atlantic export route

The Lobito Corridor has meanwhile moved from a proposed alternative export route to an operating railway carrying Congolese minerals to the Atlantic. In early 2026, Kamoa-Kakula shipped its first 99.7%-pure copper anodes by rail to the Port of Lobito in Angola for onward shipment to Europe. The rail journey averages around seven days, compared with more than three weeks by truck to Durban or Dar es Salaam.

Investment is now focused on turning those initial shipments into a much larger regional freight system. The US International Development Finance Corporation agreed a $553mn loan in December 2025, alongside $200mn from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The $753mn package supports rehabilitation of Angola’s roughly 1,300-km railway and the Lobito mineral terminal.

DFC expects the upgrades to increase capacity from about 400,000 tonnes to 4.6mn tonnes a year and reduce critical-mineral transport costs by as much as 30%.

The larger expansion extends beyond Angola. Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), the pan-African infrastructure investor leading development of the wider corridor, plans 315 km of new railway in the DRC and 515 km in Zambia, connecting mining regions to the existing Benguela line.

AFC is preparing to raise $3bn-$5bn, with the financing round due to start in the third quarter of 2026 and financial close targeted for the fourth quarter of 2027. Completion is planned for 2030, although that timetable remains dependent on financing, construction and coordination across the three countries. At least ten African and international lenders are already in discussions.

The gap between current traffic and those ambitions remains large. Lobito Atlantic Railway, the private rail concessionaire, carried close to 200,000 tonnes of international cargo in 2025, only a fraction of planned future capacity. Flooding in Angola disrupted traffic in 2026, highlighting the need for greater resilience as volumes increase.

The Congolese section has also moved forward. In August, the DRC awarded Mota-Engil (Euronext Lisbon: EGL) a 30-year concession covering the roughly 1,004-km Dilolo-Sakania railway through Kolwezi, Tenke and Lubumbashi. The agreement covers financing, rehabilitation, modernisation, operation and maintenance of the line. Mota-Engil has put investment over the concession period at as much as $1.8bn.

The Congolese government wants Lobito to develop beyond a mineral export railway, using improved transport and power links to support local processing, industry and trade along the corridor.

US-China competition reshapes transport routes

The geopolitical contest is also playing out in transport. Lobito is central to Washington’s attempt to build critical-mineral supply chains less dependent on China. Beijing is backing a $1.4bn rehabilitation of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, strengthening another route towards the Indian Ocean.

In practice, Western- and Chinese-backed infrastructure will form part of the same regional transport network. Chinese-backed mines can use Lobito when it offers competitive costs and transit times, while minerals will continue moving east and south through alternative corridors.

For miners, several reliable routes would improve capacity, resilience and bargaining power. The test for the DRC is whether geopolitical competition produces functioning cross-border infrastructure rather than another cycle of financing commitments and feasibility studies.

Manono tests infrastructure beyond the Copperbelt

The infrastructure challenge becomes more difficult as mining expands beyond the established Copperbelt. Manono in Tanganyika province provides an early test. Zijin Mining’s Manono Lithium joint venture started production at its processing plant in May 2026, a month ahead of schedule. Trial exports began in June, followed by the first officially certified lithium shipment in July.

Zijin is targeting 30,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent in 2026, while the project’s eventual design capacity is about 1mn tonnes of spodumene concentrate a year from 5mn tonnes of ore.

Bringing Manono into production has required substantial investment beyond the mine itself. The nearby Mpiana-Mwanga hydropower station has been rehabilitated by Katamba Mining at a cost of more than $80mn, restoring installed capacity to around 40 MW. The first turbine came online in late 2024, with further capacity increases planned. Zijin has also invested in roads, bridges and supporting infrastructure.

Initial lithium exports are being trucked roughly 440 km to Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika before continuing through Tanzania towards China, highlighting the logistical complexity of developing a major mineral resource far from established export corridors.

Further processing is planned, with a smelter and other downstream facilities expected to begin operating by the end of 2026. However, the project remains subject to a legal dispute with AVZ Minerals, the Australian mining company whose previous licence was revoked. KoBold Metals, the US-backed mineral exploration company holding an adjoining Manono licence, has said it will not begin development until related ownership disputes are resolved.

Transport infrastructure will become increasingly important if new mining regions emerge. The road network extends for more than 150,000 km, but only a small proportion is paved, while the roughly 5,000-km rail network is fragmented and largely requires rehabilitation.

Conditions are tougher still in the east. Tin, tantalum and other minerals there move through more fragmented, often artisanal supply chains that face the same transport and infrastructure deficits, compounded by insecurity.

Aviation also plays an important role in connecting remote mining centres given the poor condition of much of the road network. Upgrades are under way or planned at Kolwezi, Lubumbashi and Kalemie, while Kolwezi is being developed towards international-airport status.

Manono illustrates how the economics of future discoveries will depend on more than ore grades. New mineral provinces will require power, roads, aviation links and viable routes to export markets, adding substantially to development costs.

The scale of the opportunity nevertheless remains exceptional. Copper production has already risen to 3.2mn tonnes a year. Cobalt, lithium and zinc provide additional growth.

So far, major miners have often solved infrastructure problems themselves. Kamoa-Kakula has invested in power and processing, Kibali operates its own energy system, and Zijin has helped develop power and transport infrastructure around Manono. That model works for large, high-margin deposits but is harder to replicate across a broader mining industry.

Investment now under way could begin to change that. Lobito is targeting freight capacity of 4.6mn tonnes a year, its wider rail expansion is planned for completion by 2030, and new transmission, renewable-power and processing projects are being developed alongside mine expansion. China is simultaneously investing in alternative transport infrastructure, including the $1.4bn TAZARA rehabilitation.

Competition between China, the US and other investors could accelerate that build-out. By 2030, projects such as Lobito will show whether enough power, rail and processing capacity has been added to keep pace with mining growth. The mineral resources and investor interest are already there; infrastructure will determine how much of that opportunity can be realised.