It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
USN Incident Reports on Truman’s Deployment Cite Preventable Errors
Issues in training, communication, and judgment were cited in the reports on the incidents during the USS Harry S. Truman 2024-2025 deployment (USN file photo)
The United States Navy released four independent reports on the key incidents that happened while the carrier Harry S. Truman and its Carrier Strike Group were deployed to the Red Sea region, including a nearly calamitous collision and the loss of multi-million-dollar fighter jets. While saying, it is fully committed to learning from the incident, they also cited the high pressure and adversity during the high-intensity deployment, which was one of the most intense for the Navy in recent years.
The Truman and its carrier group were repeatedly targeted by the Houthis with missiles and drones. The Navy emphasized the overall success of the deployment between September 2024 and May 2025, while admitting human error, bad judgment, systems issues, and fatigue contributed to the incidents. It says the focus of each investigation was the underlying procedural issues and compliance, as well as how the crews were reacting to adversity.
“The Navy is committed to being a learning organization,” said Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jim Kilby in the official statement on the release. “These investigations reinforce the need to continue investing in our people to ensure we deliver battle-ready forces to operational commanders.”
Key among the incidents was the February 12, 2025, collision between the carrier and a commercial vessel near the Suez Canal. What was portrayed as a minor “fender bender” appeared to come far closer to a major casualty. The investigating officer notes that if the timing or angle had changed even slightly, it could have been catastrophic.
Captain Dave Snowden had left the bridge of the carrier to get some rest, but left orders to call him if vessels got within 1,000 feet. The report says the carrier was traveling at speeds of 19 knots, much faster than ordered, and that the officer of the deck failed to act or alert others, including the captain, as vessels came close to the carrier. The bridge team on the carrier misjudged the direction of a turn by the merchant vessel and only summoned the captain back to the bridge when the merchant ship was 500 yards away.
The first impact was a gash 20 feet long and 7 feet wide on the hull, followed by a 15-foot gash in the structure. It damaged the aviation parachute equipment shop, which was manned by eight sailors when the impact happened, as well as unnamed storage rooms. The impact the report determined came within 100 feet of the space where the sailors were working and only yards away from a compartment where 120 sailors were sleeping. The commander of the carrier strike group noted that if it had been 100 feet forward, the impact would have pierced the sleeping compartment.
The commanding officer of the Truman was relieved shortly after the incident “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command.”
Some of the collision damage which came far closer than reported to the sailors onboard (USN)
The reports are equally hard on the “friendly fire” incident in which the USS Gettysburgshot down an F/A-18F Super Hornet and fired at a second fighter jet in December 2024. It cites a lack of training and integration between the Gettysburg and the Carrier Strike Group. They point to a lack of “forceful backup” on the cruiser, and a lack of cohesion in the group, leading to a misidentification of the two planes.
The report highlights culpability “up and down” the chain of command, saying people did not recognize or speak up about concerns and were too reliant on technology instead of judgment. It says they had “low situational awareness,” and concludes the decision to engage was “neither reasonable nor prudent.” They said it was incorrect across the “totality” of the information available to the crew.
While the “friendly fire” incident came early in the engagement, another F/A-18E Super Hornet and a tow tractor were lost overboard in April, late in the deployment. The carrier took evasive maneuvers due to an incoming ballistic missile in the Red Sea. While saying they were within standard operating procedures, the report also cites insufficient communication between the bridge, flight deck control, and hangar bay control. They also cite a failure with the aircraft bake system.
The last incident was another loss of an F/A-18F Super Hornet. It is blamed on the failure of an arresting wire on the Truman. However, they found inadequate maintenance practices, low manning levels, limited knowledge, and insufficient training were each contributing factors to the incident.
The reports emphasize the “high operational tempo and combat conditions” as contributing to a strained environment. During a briefing, Navy officials say they had learned from these high-profile incidents and pointed to the Office of Warfighting Advantage, which is tasked to make improvements in training and procedures, learning from the mishaps during the deployment.
Harry S. Truman and the strike group returned to its home port in Virginia at the end of May 2025 after one of the most demanding deployments for the Navy. The ship has only received interim repairs to make it watertight after the collision, and in August was back underway for two weeks. The Navy reports complete repair of the damage is scheduled during the ship’s upcoming Refueling and Complex Overhaul at HII-Newport News, which was due to begin after her final underway in October.
Tuesday, November 25, 2025
Struggling with your 40s? For many women, it’s perimenopause
The most notable changes a woman faces physically at this time are weight gain, a deteriorating skin texture, and exhaustion.
The forties may have gained a reputation for being the age when bad things happen to a woman’s body, but there is no magic to this number.
Every woman goes through these physiological changes in their own time. The 40s is, however, the age when perimenopause is most likely to hit women, and it is good to know what changes to expect and how to combat them.
Perimenopause can be loosely defined as the prep time that a female body takes to transition into menopause, and it is here that hormones such as oestrogen and progesterone start to destabilise.
The most notable changes a woman faces physically at this time are weight gain, a deteriorating skin texture, and exhaustion. Doctors have noted that this particular weight gain is not just visible on the scale — it settles distinctly on the hips, giving the body a more rotund look.
The loss of oestrogen and progesterone is directly responsible for saggy and more dehydrated skin, fine lines and the loss of skin suppleness due to decreasing collagen.
Dr Kazi Azmiri Hoque, RMO at the Obs Gyn Department of Meditech General Hospital, mentions, “Women can sometimes lose the softness of their face, and even the litheness of their build during this process, and gain some facial hair.”
Women hitting this age also often complain of losing hair volume, but this is not common to everyone.
One of the most important jobs of oestrogen is to keep young joints greased — women losing this hormone in their 40s, therefore, often complain of joint stiffness, bone and back pain over time, especially if they have a BMI on the higher side.
Women also lose muscle mass and strength by up to 15 per cent during this time, increasing the risk of fractures and osteoporosis.
Other effects of hitting pre-menopause include vision changes and dry eyes, a weak pelvic floor, especially for women who have given birth, sleep challenges, fatigue and consequent brain fog.
These, however, are only the tip of the proverbial iceberg of perimenopause.
Oestrogen provides a buffer against cardiovascular ageing and even insulin sensitivity. A decrease in the hormone could therefore render women more vulnerable to cardiovascular risks and strokes, and increase the risks of Type 2 diabetes.
Wild fluctuations of hormones before the last period may cause irregular periods, hot flashes and night sweats, vaginal dryness, and wild mood swings in women.
“One of the reasons women dread menopause is because they feel that this would mean the end of sexual desire and physical love, but this is far from the truth,” shares Azmiri. “In fact, libido remains unchanged and sexual relations can continue well into menopause.”
Vaginal dryness may be an issue during this time, but lubricants can help make things better. While these are all intimidating factors to consider, not every woman goes through all these factors, and definitely not all at once.
“Oftentimes, women find themselves dealing with teenage children in their 40s, or ailing parents,” confides Azmiri. “These are stressors which may manifest themselves in the form of aches and pains. Most doctors group these ailments under menopause, making it a villainous stage in women’s lives.”
However, there are several ways in which a woman can combat the negative effects of perimenopause in her 40s. She can choose to switch to a healthy lifestyle, incorporating a balanced diet, for instance.
A dietician will be especially beneficial here, as they can chalk out a phytoestrogen-rich diet including foods like flaxseeds, soy, and lentils, balance blood sugar levels, and order a reduction in nicotine, caffeine, and alcoholic beverages.
Women can also take up regular exercise, leaving behind a sedentary way of life, and practice stress management techniques such as yoga or meditation. A good sleep hygiene, such as a solid eight-hour shut-eye and a no-screens rule an hour before bedtime, can help counter fatigue and brain fog.
More than anything else, having a good sense of awareness of what is going on in your body means that half the battle is already won. Knowing and expecting, and to some extent perhaps even combating the signs of perimenopause, can make your 40s much less daunting, allowing you to embrace this milestone age as a special number, not a dreaded one.
Header Image: The image is created via generative AI.
CLEVELAND, Ohio (Nov 26, 2025) –Although research on sexuality in older adults has been growing in recent years, most of the studies are focused on partnered sexual activity and not on solo sexual behavior, including masturbation or the use of sex toys. A new study specifically investigated sex toy use during partnered sex and masturbation in older adult women. Results of the study are published online today in Menopause, the journal of The Menopause Society.
Women are less likely to masturbate than men, and masturbation tends to be negatively associated with age. Women are more likely to use masturbation as complementary to partnered sex, whereas men use it to compensate for lack of partnered sex. Although there has historically been a stigma associated with masturbation and the use of sex toys, especially for women, the reality is that there are a number of positive health outcomes that may be related to masturbation in older adults. There is also evidence that such behavior is associated with improved cognitive function, specifically better word recall.
During the COVID pandemic, there was a spike in the sale of sex toys. One U.S. study found that one in five respondents reported expanding their sexual repertoire by adding new activities, including using a sex toy with a partner, during the pandemic. There is also evidence that older women are engaging in more varied sexual acts, including sex toy use. Because penetrative sex may become more painful and difficult because of menopause and erectile problems in men, alternative modes of sexual expression, including sex-toy use, may be replacing intercourse.
Another contributing factor is that an increasing number of older women are living alone, either because of divorce, widowhood or an intentional choice to remain single. In response, sex-toy companies are increasingly designing and marketing sex toys for older adult women, including toys specifically targeting those in menopause.
In a new, one-of-the-first-of-its-kind studies involving more than 3,000 women aged 60 years and older, researchers confirmed that there was a growing prevalence of masturbation and sex-toy use in this population and that such use led to a higher frequency of orgasm. More specifically, participants reported much greater use of sex toys during masturbation than during sex with a partner. Those who reported almost always or always using sex toys during masturbation were significantly more likely to report always or almost always having an organism. The most frequently used sex toys were an external vibrator or a dildo/penetrative toy.
Of those who had partner sex, more than one-third (38.7%) reported using sex toys during partnered sex at least sometimes. Because of the prevalence of masturbation and sex-toy use, as well as their relationships to orgasm and possible improved health outcomes and well-being, the researchers suggest that older women could benefit from receiving more information from their health care professionals on these topics.
“Lack of understanding of female anatomy, the sexual response cycle, and underlying factors resulting in orgasm is common among both older and younger women. The physical and mental benefits of fulfilling sexual function are well known. By initiating conversations around sexuality in routine healthcare encounters, healthcare professionals can destigmatize the topic and provide valuable instruction on how to achieve an orgasm. Many women believe something is wrong with them because they can’t achieve orgasm with a partner, when the truth is that most women don’t reach orgasm with penetrative intercourse alone. This simple knowledge has the potential to significantly impact the high prevalence of female sexual dysfunction,” says Dr. Monica Christmas, associate medical director for The Menopause Society.
For more information about menopause and healthy aging, visit www.menopause.org.
The Menopause Society is dedicated to empowering healthcare professionals and providing them with the tools and resources to improve the health of women during the menopause transition and beyond. As the leading authority on menopause since 1989, the nonprofit, multidisciplinary organization serves as the independent, evidence-based resource for healthcare professionals, researchers, the media, and the public and leads the conversation about improving women’s health and healthcare experiences. To learn more, visit menopause.org.
Ukrainians and Russians alike are making massive use of aerial drones in their conflict. But from underground bunkers, the Ukrainians are also piloting terrestrial drones. Wheeled or tracked, these devices have become essential for logistical and rescue missions.
For Ukrainian soldiers, movement around the front line is becoming ever more perilous. The primary threat comes from aerial drones, which Moscow is using with increasing intensity. To try and limit troop movement at the front, companies have developed terrestrial drones – remote-controlled vehicles capable of undertaking logistical missions. These include delivering vital supplies, such as food and ammunition, or evacuating the wounded from the front line to the rear. They are more expensive and rarer than their airborne equivalents, but their use is constantly increasing.
Kate Bondar, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the FRANCE 24 Observers team:
“The most common mission for ground vehicles is logistics. From my conversations with the Ukrainian military, it’s from 60 to 70 percent [of missions]. For resupply, basically, you transport the ground drone as close as possible to the combat zone using a pickup truck. And once it's at the right distance, you let it reach the position of the soldiers who need resupplying.
High price, slow pace
The deployment of terrestrial drones in Ukraine was made possible largely through Starlink, SpaceX's satellite internet service. Starlink allows the devices to be controlled from up to 100 kilometres away.
But Bondar said these drones are not without their flaws:
“Most of these systems have batteries, and batteries emit heat, and that’s how they get detected."
Terrestrial drones are therefore a prime target for aerial drones, especially given their relatively slow speed. Another disadvantage is that they are expensive to manufacture, unlike aerial drones such as FPV (first-person view) drones, which are being used massively by Russia and Ukraine.
However, unlike aerial drones, their ground-based counterparts possess a greater resilience to jamming. Once jammed, an aerial drone will fall to the ground. In contrast, on the ground, if the link between the pilot and the ground drone is interrupted, the vehicle can simply wait before resuming its route once communication is restored.
The Russia-Ukraine War is not just a geopolitical earthquake—it is a tactical and technological inflection point. While many initially focused on tanks and artillery, the war’s defining feature has become the mass deployment of cheap, disposable, and networked technologies—especially drones, loitering munitions, and small-scale electromagnetic warfare systems.
In Ukraine, we are witnessing an Uberization of warfare—the use of low-cost, on-demand, and ubiquitous weaponry—alongside the dawn of the robotization of war. In World War II, Germany introduced the concept of blitzkrieg, combining new equipment with the idea of mobile warfare. Today, drone swarms—capable of saturation, connectivity, real-time surveillance, and precision targeting—are not only a tactical revolution, but also a profound disruption of operational art, much like blitzkrieg once was. Moreover, a major shift in the acquisition and technology-development processes made this tactical revolution possible. This revolution—sometimes called a crowdfunding war—should be both a wake-up call for those in charge of defense procurements and a call for a revolution in military affairs.
Yet questions remain about the true strategic impact of drone warfare. Indeed, the rapid development of counter-drone measures raises doubts about the long-term dominance of aerial drones as a decisive tool in future conflicts.1
Land, Sea, and Aerial Drones in Ukraine
On land, both militaries increasingly use wheeled and tracked ground drones for logistical tasks such as delivering supplies, transporting spare parts, and evacuating people who are wounded.2 A handful of armed variants exist, but their operational impact remains marginal. Their effectiveness is constrained by the difficulty of navigating rough and uneven terrain near front lines and by their high vulnerability to aerial drones, which dominate the battlefield and can easily detect and neutralize them.
At sea, Ukraine employs naval drones, which are primarily kamikaze surface and underwater drones equipped with anti-ship missiles. Kyiv no longer has a conventional navy—Russia destroyed its entire fleet in 2022—but it has nevertheless succeeded in pushing the Russian navy out of the western part of the Black Sea. The Russian fleet has lost around 20 vessels as a result. These low-cost naval drone systems, which can bypass traditional naval defenses, have proven to be an effective asymmetric tool in contested waters.
In the air, these systems have undergone their most significant and spectacular developments, reshaping tactics on both sides. Three main categories of drones are currently operating on the Ukrainian battlefield:
1. Medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones
MALE drones—primarily the Bayraktar TB2—had their moment of glory at the beginning of the conflict when they could destroy armored columns. Today, however, they have been largely relegated to surveillance missions over the Black Sea, as they are highly vulnerable to Russian air defenses.
2. One-way attack (OWA) drones and pre-programmed loitering munitions
Both militaries mainly use these long-range suicide drones, designed to strike deep into enemy territory, often hundreds of kilometers away, to target infrastructure. These systems function as low-cost cruise missiles, and the most emblematic—and notorious—is the Iranian Shahed, which Russia and Iran manufacture at a joint plant in Yelabuga, Tatarstan. The Ukrainians use several types of longe-range OWA drones of their own, including the Liutyi. Yet these drones are not particularly sophisticated, and their warheads are relatively small. They are ineffective against hardened infrastructure, slow, and vulnerable to air defenses. Between 70 and 90 percent are intercepted and destroyed in flight. Their real strength lies in their numbers and volume—they overwhelm defenses through mass deployment.
3. Mini and micro tactical drones
These weigh less than 150 kilograms (roughly 330 pounds)—in many cases less than 25 kilograms (55 pounds)—and they typically have a range of around 15 kilometers (9 miles). The militaries use them in a wide variety of missions, particularly for reconnaissance. These drones are now omnipresent along the front lines for close-contact operations, making it nearly impossible for troops or equipment to remain hidden. They provide real-time intelligence, target acquisition, and battlefield awareness at the tactical level. They are also used in kinetic roles and are equipped with explosive charges. This includes bomber drones and first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drones, which pilots operate while wearing virtual reality headsets. These systems were central to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, a coordinated drone strike against Russian air force bases and facilities.
Other drone variants have also emerged, expanding the scope of battlefield applications:Dragon drones, which have flamethrowers Mother drones, which (like Russian nesting dolls) can carry and deploy FPV drones or act as radar relays
Mine-laying drones and mine-hunting drones
The number of use cases continues to multiply along with the sheer volume of drones deployed on the battlefield. An estimated 10,000 drones per day are now being used. A Tactical Warfare Revolution
Since February 2022, the conflict in Ukraine has served as a vast laboratory for the use of drones on a high-intensity battlefield. Within months, these systems became indispensable, reshaping doctrines, saturating defenses, and driving a permanent technological war of attrition.
Three Phases of Drone Development
The first phase of drone development, in 2022, was mass deployment. Ukraine launched its Army of Drones program through crowdfunding, which distributed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) down to the company level and trained thousands of operators. The drone quickly became a tactical survival tool, used for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment.
Russia, initially more reluctant, later developed parallel networks. In the early stages, it relied almost exclusively on heavy military drones such as the Forpost3 and Orion.4 Russian doctrine, shaped by Western concepts, focused on achieving air superiority through a centralized combination of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and deep strikes designed to saturate the theater of operations.
However, this approach revealed significant weaknesses. By concentrating drones within specialized units and keeping them largely disconnected from battalions and frontline formations, Russia created a rigid, top-down system. This lack of integration reduced reactivity, limited tactical flexibility, and exposed the entire structure to vulnerabilities—particularly when faced with more agile, decentralized, and adaptive models of drone warfare.
The second phase, between 2022 and 2023, saw the rise of strikes and counterstrikes. Both sides strengthened their air and electromagnetic defenses, leading to massive attrition of drone fleets. MALE drones virtually disappeared from the tactical battlefield, and kamikaze systems and loitering munitions—such as Russia’s Lancets or the Iranian Shaheds, which were deployed in swarms—began to dominate. The battlefield became a saturated space where a drone’s lifespan was measured in flights. During this phase, both sides steadily increased their use of drones, with Ukraine losing roughly 10,000 per month by mid-2023.5 In line with the Soviet doctrine of deep strikes, these drones were launched in massive waves, often alongside highly capable cruise missiles, including hypersonic missiles. Cheap drones overwhelm air defenses so that more advanced missiles can more easily hit their targets.
Finally, from 2023 onward, FPV drones became the new standard for Ukraine. Comparable to miniature anti-tank missiles, they have been produced by the tens of thousands each month. Ukraine integrated them into assault brigades with dedicated UAV companies. As a result, the battlefield has become highly transparent to a depth of 10–20 kilometers (about 6–12 miles). The FPVs’ effectiveness against troop concentrations and heavy vehicles is remarkable despite jamming and the massive need for trained operators. In some Ukrainian units, up to 60 percent of assets deployed in assaults now consist of drones.6
Each of these phases was defined by a relentless contest of innovation and countermeasures.
An Extremely Low-Cost Force Multiplier with Massive Tactical and Operational Impact
Drones have been successful in Ukraine largely because of their remarkable cost-effectiveness. However, costs vary dramatically by category—from a few hundred dollars for improvised FPV and consumer quadcopters, to tens of thousands for purpose-built loitering munitions like the Lancet, and millions for large MALE or high-altitude long-range (HALE) drones or other weaponized systems. Yet the vast majority of drones used in Ukraine fall at the very low end of this spectrum: €300–€5,000 ($350–$5,800) per unit. This low cost is precisely what makes them strategic—they provide a technological effect delivered at minimal cost, and are deployable at massive scale.
Initially, Ukraine relied on commercial off-the-shelf drones (primarily Chinese DJI models) and components. Yet it rapidly developed a domestic production base, integrating technologies drawn from everyday consumer electronics, such as smartphones, with genuine military capabilities in navigation, communication, and autonomy. Crowdfunding on the United24 platform makes this production possible.7
The rapid proliferation of low-cost, easy-to-produce drones—most notably loitering munitions such as Iran’s Shahed-136—has become a force multiplier that fundamentally reshapes the battlefield. These platforms provide affordable, continuous real-time surveillance over extended periods, allowing commanders to maintain situational awareness at scales previously possible only with far more expensive systems. At the same time, they confer asymmetric strike capabilities that are accessible to resource-limited states and non-state actors alike, so precision attacks become easier to launch. Swarm tactics can overwhelm conventional air defenses: massed, inexpensive drones saturate sensors and interceptors, forcing adversaries to take costly and complex countermeasures or accept persistent vulnerability. In short, cheap drones marry technological utility with sheer quantity, changing the calculus of both reconnaissance and strike in modern conflict.
This saturation effect is operationally transformative. Swarms of low-cost drones overwhelm radar and interceptors, draining high-value air-defense ammunition and imposing disproportionate costs on the defender. In many sectors of the front, tanks and armored vehicles have ceased maneuvering altogether, remaining concealed or dug in to avoid instant detection and destruction. Today, drones are responsible for up to 75 percent of combat losses on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides.8 These systems have not replaced traditional airpower, but they have profoundly disrupted the conduct of ground combat.
Today, Ukraine’s drone ecosystem has become a powerful engine of innovation,9 bringing together young soldiers and tech “geeks,” more than 300 startups dedicated to drone development, and a philosophy rooted in an economy of means and rapid responsiveness to frontline demands.
Drones are designed to meet real, immediate operational requirements, with design loops often completed in a matter of days or weeks—not months. There are no excessive technical specifications, no long procurement cycles, and typically no maintenance plans. Drones are treated like ammunition: single-use, expendable, and entirely focused on delivering a specific effect at a specific time. Each month, 200,000 are delivered to Ukrainian troops—up from 20,000 a month in 2024. Looking ahead, Ukraine can produce more than 4 million drones annually—an industrial mobilization effort that signals just how central unmanned systems have become to modern warfare.10 The Cognitive Dimension of Drone Warfare
Beyond their tactical utility, drones exert a disproportionate influence in the realm of cognitive warfare—shaping perceptions, morale, and decision-making at both the military and political levels. Their ubiquity and unpredictability create a sense of constant exposure: no place, from the front lines to rear areas, is entirely safe. This psychological saturation erodes soldiers’ endurance, instills fear in civilian populations, and forces adversaries to divert disproportionate resources to defense.
Attacks using so-called spiderweb tactics—swarms of small, networked drones that surround and harass enemy positions—illustrate how drones can immobilize troops not just physically, but mentally, creating the impression of trapping them in an inescapable net. The audacity of such attacks—like Israel’s beeper attacks—demonstrates that no part of a nation’s territory is a sanctuary. They underscore the vulnerability of open-air air force bases, which are exposed targets in an era of precision strikes and low-cost drone incursions. Likewise, the recent drone strike against Poland,11 though limited in scale, had an outsized psychological and political effect, demonstrating the permeability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s borders. This event also showed that low-cost systems could trigger debates about escalation, deterrence, and alliance credibility. So while the physical damage was minor, the cognitive impact was major.
This development highlights an important paradox. While drones have not yet achieved strategic disruption in the Clausewitzian sense (they do not decide wars or redefine their political logic—see below), they do play a strategically significant cognitive role. By amplifying uncertainty, weaponizing viral imagery, and challenging perceptions of security, drones shape the information environment in ways disproportionate to their material power.
In that sense, drones may be comparable to airpower in its earliest psychological form—when bombers were valued as much for their ability to terrorize cities as for their actual destructive capacity. Drone warfare thus straddles the line: tactically revolutionary, strategically bounded, but cognitively destabilizing.
Toward an Algorithmic War of Attrition
Increasingly, militaries are integrating drones with artificial intelligence, especially to guide them automatically during the terminal flight phase when they approach their target—a phase highly vulnerable to electromagnetic jamming. These developments mark early steps toward drone autonomy and, more significantly, the rise of low-cost battlefield robotization. The Ukrainian command, constrained by limited human resources, has been compelled to advance autonomous systems. The Saker Scout drone, developed by a Ukrainian startup, exemplifies this evolution: It identifies targets and thermal signatures, though it does not initiate strikes independently. Other platforms go further, integrating autonomous navigation with final guidance, achieving strike success rates of 70–80 percent.12
The dronization of warfare requires militaries to rethink of command-and-control (C2) chains. Indeed, drones’ capabilities are quickly outpacing the capacity of traditional C2 chains. As the number and pace of precision strikes and ISR tasks grow, conventional human-led C2 becomes a bottleneck. Modern drone warfare will therefore force a shift: C2 architectures will need to embed AI technologies to manage sensing, targeting prioritization, tasking, deconfliction, and maneuvering at machine speed—while preserving appropriate human authority and legal accountability. Dronization demands a faster, more distributed, and more autonomous C2 than legacy chains—but it should still have human accountability. The practical path combines sensor fusion, AI decision-support, resilient communications, strong cybersecurity, and explicit legal and ethical guardrails. Done right, AI enables commanders to manage scale and pace while retaining control over the most consequential decisions; done wrong, it risks brittle automation, unintended escalation, and legal exposure.
What matters most, however, is how quickly an adversary adapts.
The Strategic Dimension of Drone Warfare, or Lack Thereof
Traditionally, the operational art depended on a clear chain: strategy set objectives, operational planning structured campaigns, and tactics delivered battles. With drones, tactical actors (small units or even individuals) now have operational reach. A drone team can strike logistics nodes 50 kilometers (31 miles) behind the front, blurring the boundary between tactical action and operational effect. Drones have transformed the operational art by reshaping the way operations are conceived and executed: eroding surprise, collapsing depth, flattening hierarchies, and accelerating the tempo. They make the operational environment more transparent, more saturated, and more fluid than ever before—but stop short of rewriting strategy itself. So far, drones have not altered the fundamental political nature of war—Clausewitzian theory still applies. They have not replaced the need for territorial control, nor have they eliminated the centrality of manpower, logistics, and morale. In Ukraine, despite their massive tactical impact—enabling real-time surveillance, precision strikes, and unprecedented saturation of the battlefield—drones have not decisively shifted the overall course of the war. Neither side has gained a strategic breakthrough solely through their use.
This situation highlights a crucial distinction: drones are a tactical revolutionbut are not yet a strategic disruption. They enhance lethality, amplify firepower, extend reach, expand situational awareness, and accelerate the pace of operations, but they do not by themselves deliver victory or alter the balance of power. Their effects remain bound by traditional strategic imperatives: holding ground, sustaining forces, and breaking the enemy’s will.
Historical parallels make the limits clearer. Blitzkrieg in World War II fundamentally changed how militaries fought wars by combining speed, mechanization, and airpower into an integrated strategy that reshaped entire campaigns, the balance of power. Nuclear weapons redefined the very logic of conflict by introducing deterrence on a global scale, changing not just tactics but also the structure of international relations itself. Drones, by contrast, have not reached this level of transformation. Their effects remain confined within existing strategic frameworks: wars are still decided by territory, industrial capacity, alliances, and ultimately political will.
Furthermore, the rapid emergence of counter-drone measures underscores their limitations. Just as armor led to anti-tank weapons and aircraft spurred air defenses, drones are already being met with electromagnetic warfare, jamming, and intercept systems. Far from being a decisive revolution, drone warfare appears to be part of the iterative cycle of innovation and adaptation that has always characterized military history.
Vulnerabilities and a Constant Race Against Obsolescence
The pace of innovation and counter-innovation is so rapid that any operational advantage can be eroded within weeks. A military therefore has to continuously update its platforms, or they will otherwise become irrelevant. In practice, adaptability—in software, tactics, and production—matters more than sheer numbers. So drone warfare is less a competition over who can develop a one-time technological breakthrough, and is more about who can perpetually upgrade and update the fastest.
Drones quickly become obsolete.
The adaptation cycle between offense (the sword) and defense (the shield) is extremely short—militaries can often develop effective countermeasures in mere weeks. This constrains the long-term dominance of drones, ensuring that they remain a tool that is powerful—yet not transformative at the strategic level.
New counter-drone defense systems are rapidly being developed, such as Russia’s Repellent-1 or Israel’s Iron Beam, which use lasers and jamming technologies. To remain operationally relevant, drones have to constantly evolve. Most are modular systems, with airframes that change very little over time. The real innovation—and vulnerability—lies in their software. Every four to six weeks, updates are required across critical systems—communication protocols, navigation systems, and flight control algorithms—to stay ahead of evolving electromagnetic warfare tactics, including jamming and signal interference.
Most drones are vulnerable to jamming.
Drones are still remotely piloted and have very limited autonomy. Claims about fully autonomous drones like the Russian Lancet-3 or Ukrainian Saker Scout are exaggerated. Ukrainian developers have created object recognition and terminal guidance technologies, but these tools are currently limited in complexity and trustworthiness. Tethered drones are less susceptible to electromagnetic warfare as their wired connection shields them from jamming and interference, but this technique presents other vulnerabilities.
In this sense, drone warfare is a continuous software arms race where agility, not just quantity, determines success.
Drones involve production and scaling challenges.
Ukraine’s drone innovation has been largely startup-driven and artisanal, whereas Russia has moved to industrial production. Although Ukraine often fields more advanced and better-performing systems, it risks being overwhelmed by Russia’s sheer manufacturing capacity.
Maintaining an edge in drone warfare requires investment not only in software development—artificial intelligence, autonomy, and communication systems—but also in industrial-scale production. Yet mass production alone is not enough. For drones to remain effective, manufacturing needs to stay flexible and adaptive, continuously evolving in response to changing battlefield conditions and the rapid development of counter-drone measures. The future of drone warfare will be determined not just by innovation at the design stage, but by the ability to scale, adapt, and sustain production at an industrial level.
Drone warfare presents human resource challenges.
Drone warfare is not just about producing drones—it is also about producing the people who can operate them effectively, at scale, and through constant technological change. This may prove as decisive as industrial capacity in shaping who holds the long-term advantage.
The need for numerous operators presents a major constraint on drone warfare. Unlike many other weapons systems, many drones—especially commercial quadcopters adapted for military use—require individual operators for piloting, targeting, and coordination. Training a single operator takes from three to four weeks, which may seem modest, but when scaled across thousands of systems, the burden on manpower and training infrastructure becomes significant.
Because drones need human operators, several challenges emerge:High demand for operators. The proliferation of drones means that armies need large numbers of trained personnel. Each destroyed or lost drone requires not just hardware replacement but also the reallocation of trained operators.
Skill retention and turnover. Many drone operators come from civilian or volunteer backgrounds (e.g., gamers, hobbyists, engineers). While this brings innovation and agility, it also leads to issues of retention, burnout, or rotation back into civilian life. Maintaining a consistent, professionalized cadre is resource intensive.
Cognitive and psychological load. Operating drones is mentally taxing. Constant surveillance, real-time decision-making, and remote lethality blur the lines between combatant and observer. Operators may be physically distant from the battlefield, but psychologically they remain deeply exposed, contributing to fatigue and stress.
Training vs. innovation gap. Rapid technological evolution means that operators must continuously adapt to new systems, software updates, and countermeasure environments. A four-week training cycle is only the baseline; sustaining competence requires ongoing education, which further strains resources.
Organizational integration. In countries like Ukraine, where drone innovation is highly decentralized, training and integrating thousands of new operators from startups, volunteer groups, and the military create a coordination challenge. In Russia’s more centralized model, the rigidity of doctrine slows training adaptation, limiting operator effectiveness.
Implications for Western Militaries
Drones have transformed modern warfare, making rapid integration, adaptability, and scalable innovation as crucial as platform sophistication and firepower. Therefore, Western militaries need to learn from the Russia-Ukraine War and rethink doctrines, operational models, and force development.
Addressing the Challenges of This New Warfare
In Ukraine, we are witnessing the rise of mass-produced, technologically capable systems at an affordable price. This symbolizes the reconciliation of two concepts once thought contradictory: mass and technology.
Drones have redefined ground tactics, creating battlefield transparency, saturating defenses, and paralyzing large-scale maneuvers. In an order of the day.13 issued on April 23, 2025, French Chief of Staff General Pierre Schill called on the cavalry to reinvent itself. Praising its historic power, he recalled that it has long been the arm that unbalances the enemy and whose intervention secures victory. Yet the advent of drone warfare has relativized the strength of armored forces, with fronts increasingly static and maneuvers slowed. A growing gap is emerging between the costly sophistication of combat vehicles and the inexpensive, rugged means available to destroy them.
Western militaries thus need to decide: Should drones remain limited to optimizing existing forces, or should they be integrated as an organic tool of maneuver, as in Ukraine?
The latter path demands a profound transformation: an agile civil-military model; rapid innovation cycles embracing not only tech innovation but also new doctrine based on a multi-domain approach integrating the effects of drones; and an army capable of absorbing large numbers of reservists and operators.
Without such a transformation, Western technological superiority could quickly become a weakness when confronted by adversaries capable of flooding the skies with cheap, disposable swarms. Responding requires a paradigm shift: instead of investing in rare, exquisite platforms, belligerents are betting on “cheap, fast, many.”
The Need for an Industrial Revolution
The Russia-Ukraine War shows the need for speed in the adaptation cycle. Every innovation almost immediately triggers a countermeasure. The battlefield has become a space of permanent research and development, where superiority is measured by the ability to innovate and produce at scale not only drones but also counter-drone systems. The conflict has triggered a race among nations to adapt their defense industries for large-scale drone production, battlefield integration, and counter-drone measures. The United States,14 Turkey, and Israel—not to mention China, which was already the largest producer of commercial drones—have developed supply chains and production capabilities tailored to meet this new demand.
The war in Ukraine has exposed long-recognized weaknesses that militaries have ignored, which raises multiple issues. How relevant are current Western capabilities and programs in light of the rapid evolution of drone warfare? Can traditional defense planning cycles keep pace with the tempo of innovation emerging from the field?
In France, for example, armament processes remain slow and overly centralized, shaped by an industrial logic based on long timelines. They are also often burdened with unrealistic requirements concerning French control of components, software, and digital transformation, or by the complexity of European partnerships. Acquisition mechanisms are equally rigid, and until recently, actors outside the traditional defense industrial base were not considered as suppliers.
For years, France treated drone programs as conventional programs and required heavy specifications that constrained agility, rapid innovation, and field experimentation. Moreover, France faces a delay of nearly 15 years in combat drone development due to an operational culture that prioritizes human control over firepower and manned airpower, often at the expense of adapting to new paradigms. Despite its delay, France has now entered the drone race with two priorities: (1) developing effective protection against hostile systems and (2) fostering startup creativity to build drone capabilities. This shift, anchored in a targeted €5 billion ($5.8 billion) investment, reflects both an acknowledgment of strategic vulnerabilities and a determination to stimulate innovation. The policy has unleashed a surge of initiatives. The French Army’s Future Combat Command has launched an ambitious equipment plan that includes the creation of drone pilot schools, while the Defense Airborne Drone Pact seeks to structure a low-cost drone industrial base—drawing not only on traditional defense players but also on civilian industries such as the automotive sector.
The Russia-Ukraine War shows that Western militaries need nothing less than an industrial revolution in armaments.15 They should invest in the modular, open-source, rapid manufacturing of drone and counter-drone technology, while also accelerating traditional procurement cycles. This transformation should rest on three complementary pillars:
1. Creativity and ExperimentationEncourage rapid prototyping, field testing, and integration of civilian technologies.
Foster innovation ecosystems that connect startups, engineers, and frontline operators. Embrace a culture of iterative design in which failure accelerates adaptation rather than hindering it.
2. Mass Industrial ProductionShift from artisanal or startup-driven approaches to large-scale manufacturing capacity.
Secure supply chains for critical components and raw materials to ensure continuity under pressure. Invest in modular designs that can be mass-produced while allowing upgrades.
3. Flexibility and AdaptabilityBuild industrial processes that can pivot rapidly in response to new threats or countermeasures.
Shorten acquisition cycles to match the pace of battlefield innovation. Maintain a balance between standardized platforms and the ability to integrate new payloads, software, and tactics.
What is at stake is not simply catching up, but redefining the balance between protection, innovation, and industrial scalability in a domain where agility and mass production increasingly determine operational superiority.
Only by reconciling creativity, scale, and flexibility can states sustain technological and operational superiority in future wars. The revolution in armaments is not merely about producing more but about producing smarter and faster while remaining resilient to the relentless pace of innovation.
Beyond Drones: Toward a Doctrinal Revolution
Drones alone are not transforming the battlefield. Instead, they are disrupting the battlefield by working with other weapon systems as a networked whole. For example, both Russia and Ukraine have paired unarmed drones with artillery, which dramatically accelerates targeting timelines and enables responsive, precise, ground-based fires. Drones have become the critical link in what Russia calls its reconnaissance-strike complex—the network that acquires, processes, and transmits targeting data to artillery units.
Because artillery remains the decisive weapon of this war, drones have assumed a vital enabling role as spotters, identifying targets and adjusting fires by feeding data through virtual battle networks, such as Kropyva and Strelets. Increasingly, this role is carried out not by a single drone but by stacks of drones operating in the same airspace, each with distinct functions. The result is a highly distributed, resilient kill chain—driven by a decentralized and agile C2, which is far harder to disrupt. This evolution highlights the need for a doctrinal revolution, not just new technology
From the three Ds to air and information superiority. Once defined as handling “dirty, dull, dangerous” tasks, drones now reshape the very meaning of airpower. Air superiority is no longer only about jets and helicopters; it is also about achieving drone superiority—outmatching the adversary in numbers, resilience, and electromagnetic warfare dominance.
From kill chains to kill webs. Rigid, linear targeting models are insufficient against an adaptive, contested environment. The future lies in kill web architectures—decentralized, data-driven, and resilient to attrition—that are capable of integrating drones seamlessly with ground fires, electromagnetic warfare, cyber operations, and space-based assets.
Rethinking defense. Traditional air defense systems were never designed to counter mass drone swarms. Ukraine and its allies have had to improvise, combining electromagnetic jamming, AI-assisted targeting, and layered interception strategies. These adaptations point to the urgent need for multi-domain defense doctrines that integrate drones not as adjuncts but as central actors.
Drones are forcing militaries to move from platform-centric to network-centric warfare, multi-domain operations in which adaptability, integration, and resilience matter as much as firepower itself. On the conceptual level, the French armed forces have launched several exploratory efforts—one focused on drone swarms and another on deep-strike operations—and have reflected more broadly on the robotization of the battlefield. These initiatives reflect a growing recognition that drones are not merely tactical enablers but drivers of doctrinal and operational change. Still Pending Questions and New Political-Strategic Dilemmas
Even as drones reshape the operational art of war, fundamental questions remain unresolved:
Responsibility. Who is accountable in the event of mishaps, accidents, or unintended autonomous attacks?
Thresholds for force. Does the ability to strike without immediate political risk lower the threshold for the use of force?
The doctrinal gap. Traditional militaries are still lagging in formulating doctrines for the mass deployment of drones, leaving a gap between theory in staff colleges and practice on the battlefield.
Ethical and trust questions. While the reality of AI on the battlefield is still far removed from the scenarios imagined in Terminator or Black Mirror, key debates center on maintaining human control and ensuring accountability. Building trust in AI technologies also presents major challenges, from the integrity of data and algorithms to the growing exposure of these systems to cyber threats.
The future of drones. Are drones truly the future of warfare, or merely a transitional phase? The development of sophisticated countermeasures—electromagnetic warfare, directed-energy weapons, and systems like Iron Beam—could eventually render the air drone obsolete.
Conclusion: Between Innovation and Obsolescence
Drone warfare may or may not represent the future of combat, but it is undeniably the reality of today’s wars and a pressing challenge to national security. Ignoring its doctrinal implications risks repeating the mistakes made with tanks after World War I—focusing narrowly on platforms while failing to grasp their revolutionary impact on operational art. Therefore, the strategic question is not over whether drones will last, but on two other issues. First, how can militaries harness their disruptive potential, adapt to their vulnerabilities, and integrate them into a truly multi-domain doctrine that is resilient to technological change? Second, how can procurement agencies create a new ecosystem able to face the challenges of this new industrial revolution and the expectations of soldiers in the field?
Drone warfare may or may not be a revolution in military affairs, but it certainly offers a strong reminder: true revolutions lie not in the platform itself, but in the doctrines, organizations, and military and industrial strategies that integrate it. Whether drones become the future of war or only a passing phase, the challenge is to transform their tactical disruption into lasting operational and strategic effect.
About the author: Tsiporah Fried is a visiting senior fellow at Hudson Institute, focused on transatlantic relations, European defense and military strategy, and defense and tech innovation.
Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom.
Monday, October 20, 2025
Trump urged Zelenskiy to cut a deal with Putin or risk facing destruction, FT reports
PUTIN'S SOCK PUPPET
Reuters Sun, October 19, 2025 Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy meets with U.S. President Donald Trump (not pictured) over lunch in the Cabinet Room at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., October 17, 2025. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
(Reuters) -U.S. President Donald Trump urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to accept Russia's terms for ending the war between Russia and Ukraine in a White House meeting on Friday, warning that President Vladimir Putin threatened to "destroy" Ukraine if it didn't comply, the Financial Times reported on Sunday.
During the meeting, Trump insisted Zelenskiy surrender the entire eastern Donbas region to Russia, repeatedly echoing talking points the Russian president had made in their call a day earlier, the newspaper said, citing people familiar with the matter.
Ukraine ultimately managed to swing Trump back to endorsing a freeze of the current front lines, the FT said. Trump said after the meeting that the two sides should stop the war at the battle line; Zelenskiy said that was an important point.
The White House did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment on the FT report.
Zelenskiy arrived at the White House on Friday looking for weapons to keep fighting his country's war, but met an American president who appeared more intent on brokering a peace deal.
In Thursday's call with Trump, Putin had offered some small areas of the two southern frontline regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for the much larger parts of the Donbas now under Ukrainian control, the FT report added.
That is less than his original 2024 demand for Kyiv to cede the entirety of Donbas plus Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in the south, an area of nearly 20,000 square km.
Zelenskiy's spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent outside business hours on whether Trump had pressured Zelenskiy to accept peace on Russia's terms.
Trump and Putin agreed on Thursday to hold a second summit on the war in Ukraine within the next two weeks, provisionally in Budapest, following an August 15 meeting in Alaska that failed to produce a breakthrough.
(Reporting by Anusha Shah in Bengaluru; editing by Philippa Fletcher)
Trump’s Private Blow-Up With Zelensky Revealed
Laura Esposito
DAILY BEAST Sun, October 19, 2025
Win McNamee / Getty Images
Another meeting between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky has reportedly ended with a fiery shouting match—this time behind closed doors.
Trump was pressuring his Ukrainian counterpart to accept Russia’s terms for a ceasefire during an explosive White House meeting on Friday, according to the Financial Times, reportedly telling Zelensky that Russia would “destroy” Ukraine if he didn’t agree.
Multiple sources told the outlet that the meeting—where Zelensky was hoping, but ultimately failed, to secure long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles—quickly descended into a “shouting match” with “cursing all the time.” Donald Trump hosted President Zelensky at the White House this summer to discuss a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. / Alex Wong / Getty Images
According to sources, the scene resembled that of Zelensky’s infamous Oval Office visit in February, where he was was berated by Vice President JD Vance for not voicing enough thanks for U.S. help in the war against Russia, before a shouting match ensued.
Zelensky was also accused of being “disrespectful” to the U.S. for not wearing a suit and tie and was reportedly all but forced out of the White House.
This time, Trump demanded that Zelensky surrender the entire Donbas region to Russian President Vladimir Putin, sources said.
European officials told the Financial Times that Trump repeated many of Putin’s talking points “verbatim” during the meeting, telling Zelensky he was losing the war and that “If [Putin] wants it, he will destroy you.”
The outlet reported that “Zelenskyy was very negative” after the meeting, according to one official, and that European leaders were “not optimistic but pragmatic with planning next steps.”
The tense encounter came after Trump reportedly spoke with Putin by phone and seemingly welcomed the Russian dictator back in his good graces.
On Truth Social, the dictator-curious Trump wrote Putin congratulated him on the “Great Accomplishment of Peace in the Middle East,” and suggested that his “Success in the Middle East will help in our negotiation in attaining an end to the War with Russia/Ukraine.”
He added that “High Level Advisors” from the United States and Russia would meet next week at an as-yet-undisclosed location, and that he would then meet personally with Putin in Budapest, Hungary, “to see if we can bring this ‘inglorious’ War, between Russia and Ukraine, to an end.” Trump rolled out the red carper for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, in August. / Contributor / Getty Images
Ironically, the talks are set to take place in the same city where Russia once signed an agreement promising it would never invade Ukraine.
When asked who chose to hold the meeting in Budapest, a location with great historical significance to both Russia and Ukraine, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt simply told HuffPost, “Your mom did.”
The Daily Beast has reached out to the White House for comment.
Trump says he expects Putin to keep some Ukrainian land in latest U-turn: ‘I mean, he’s won certain property’
John Bowden Sun, October 19, 2025
THE INDEPRNDENT
Donald Trump told a Fox anchor that he expected Ukraine to make territorial concessions in any peace agreement his administration could potentially orchestrate between Kyiv and Moscow to bring the nearly four-year war between Russia and Ukraine to an end.
In an interview that aired on Sunday Morning Futures with Maria Bartiromo, the U.S. president indicated that under the terms of a deal authored by the White House, Russia would likely be allowed to retain territory it has occupied since February of 2022.
Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin by phone for two hours on Thursday, then met the following day with Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House where all public signs of the tension between the two men which had erupted at a meeting this spring had vanished. Privately, however, the Financial Times reported on Sunday that the conversation between Trump and Zelensky repeatedly devolved into a “shouting match” with the U.S. president warning his counterpart that Russia would “destroy” his country if he didn’t accept territorial concessions.
On Sunday, Bartiromo asked Trump whether he’d gotten a sense from Putin during that conversation that he was “open to ending this war without taking significant property from Ukraine?”
Cutting in, Trump responded, “I did, I did.” But his answer shifted as the Fox host finished her question and asked whether Putin would return Ukrainian territory.
Donald Trump told Fox News that Ukraine would likely need to recognize Russian territorial gains in a ceasefire (Sunday Morning Futures)
“Well, he's gonna take something. I mean, they fought and, he, uh, he has a lot of property. I mean, you know ... he's won certain property,” Trump said, before sarcastically quipping: “You know, we’re the only country that goes in, wins a war and then leaves.”
As peace talks with Russia stalled over the summer, Trump hardened his stance against Moscow and seemed to be coming around to an assumption that many in Washington’s foreign policy establishment have held since 2022 — that Vladimir Putin isn’t interested in peace without significant further Ukrainian concessions beyond what has played out on the battlefield. In the past week, however, Trump has renewed his efforts aimed at securing a peace agreement as he has become emboldened by the shaky truce struck by the White House between Israel on Gaza. On Sunday, that ceasefire seemed to be wavering as both sides traded accusations of violations.
In September, Trump wrote that Ukraine could “take back their country in its original form and, who knows, maybe even go further than that!” in a Truth Social posting. In other statements, he signaled interest in mounting further pressure on Moscow, including through a congressional sanctions package or the sale of further arms such as Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine.
The Tomahawk, much sought after by Mr Zelensky, has a range of about 1,600km (995 miles) but experts warned that it could take years to provide the equipment and training necessary for Ukraine to use them effectively. The Ukrainian leader made the request to Trump during his visit to the White House on Friday; Zelensky sees further U.S. military aid including the delivery of new weapons systems as the most effective course of action for putting pressure on Russia to return to the negotiating table.
“Yeah, I might tell him [Putin], if the war is not settled, we may very well do it. We may not, but we may do it,” the president said earlier in October. “Do they want to have Tomahawks going in their direction? I don’t think so.”
He backed off that latter idea after threats from Russia and his conversation with Putin on Thursday, and with his latest statement will likely leave many in Washington wondering whether his position truly evolved at all. Putin called the issue a red line for U.S.-Russia relations, while his close ally Aleksandr Lukashenko, president of Belarus, warned it would risk “nuclear war” in Europe.
After his conversation with the Russian leader Trump also agreed to meet with Putin in Budapest on an undisclosed upcoming date.
After Zelenskyy meeting, Trump says Ukraine, Russia should declare victory
Kathryn Watson Sat, October 18, 2025
CBS NEWS
Washington — After his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House Friday, President Trump said both Russia and Ukraine should declare victory and "let history decide!"
Zelenskyy told reporters after the meeting that he and Mr. Trump decided not to publicly discuss whether the U.S. will provide long-range weapons, including Tomahawks, citing the "escalation" that could bring in Russia's war on Ukraine. Zelenskyy's comment came mere hours after Mr. Trump expressed openness to trading U.S. Tomahawks for Ukrainian drones.
"We decided that we don't speak about it because nobody wants — the United States doesn't want escalation," Zelenskyy said.
Mr. Trump said in a Truth Social post Friday that his meeting with the Ukrainian leader was "very interesting, and cordial."
He continued, "I told him, as I likewise strongly suggested to President Putin, that it is time to stop the killing, and make a DEAL! Enough blood has been shed, with property lines being defined by War and Guts. They should stop where they are. Let both claim Victory, let History decide!"
Mr. Trump's meeting with Zelenskyy took place a day after the president spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin and then announced that he and Putin would meet soon in Budapest.
The president expressed some reservations about reducing the number of Tomahawks that the U.S. possesses, though long-range weapons were expected to be a major point of discussion for Mr. Trump and Zelenskyy.
"Tomahawks are a big deal," Mr. Trump told reporters during the meeting with his Cabinet and Zelenskyy. "But one thing I have to say, we want Tomahawks, also. We don't want to be giving away things that we need to protect our country."
"Hopefully, we'll be able to get the war over without thinking about Tomahawks. I think we're fairly close to that," Mr. Trump said. Advertisement
After Zelenskyy suggested Ukraine might give the U.S. Ukrainian drones in exchange for the Tomahawk missiles, a reporter asked Mr. Trump if it was a trade that interested him.
"We are, yeah," the president responded. "They make a very good drone," he replied.
Zelenskyy and Mr. Trump shook hands when the Ukrainian president arrived at the White House, and a reporter asked the president if he believes he can persuade Putin to end the war. "Yup," Mr. Trump responded.
In their meeting, Mr. Trump was seated across from Zelenskyy, who wore a military-style jacket for the occasion. Mr. Trump complimented him, saying, "I think he looks beautiful in his jacket."
"It's an honor to be with a very strong leader, a man who has been through a lot," Mr. Trump said in the meeting, adding he thinks they're making "great progress" in ending the war. Advertisement
Zelenskyy congratulated Mr. Trump on the "successful ceasefire" in the Middle East, but he added that he thinks Putin is "not ready" to end the war with Ukraine.
Mr. Trump brought up the possibility that Zelenskyy could join his upcoming meeting with Putin in Budapest, but then added that the meetings "may be separated." A date has not yet been set for Mr. Trump's meeting with the Russian leader.
A reporter asked the president if he's concerned Putin may just be trying to buy more time with the Budapest meeting. "Yeah, I am," Mr. Trump said. "But you know, I've been played all my life by the best of them. And I came out really well. So, it's possible, yeah."
Mr. Trump had previously said the Tomahawks would be a "new step of aggression" in the Russia-Ukraine war. They'd enable Ukraine to strike deep within Russia.
"I might say 'Look: if this war is not going to get settled, I'm going to send the Tomahawks,'" Mr. Trump told reporters earlier this week. "We may not, but we may do it."
The last time the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents met in person was in late September, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. Mr. Trump and Zelenskyy spoke twice over the weekend, on Saturday and Sunday, ahead of Mr. Trump's whirlwind Middle East trip to mark the Israel-Hamas peace deal.
Russia has given no indication it wants to end the war. And Ukrainian authorities said there had been another large-scale Russian strike hours before Mr. Trump spoke with Putin on the phone.
"The massive overnight strike — launched hours before the conversation between Putin and President Trump — exposes Moscow's real attitude toward peace," Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. Olga Stefanishyna said in a statement Thursday. "While discussions about ending the war continue, Russia once again chose missiles over dialogue, turning this attack into a direct blow to ongoing peace efforts led by President Trump."
Mr. Trump in recent months has expressed frustration with Putin over the failure to end the war, though on a separate front, first lady Melania Trump said last week that she has worked with the Russian leader's team to return Ukrainian children to their families. Mr. Trump said the first lady took up that initiative on her own.
U.S. and Russian advisers will be meeting next week in a location that hasn't been disclosed yet ahead of the anticipated Trump-Putin meeting. The president indicated that initial meetings leading up to the meeting with the Russian leader would be led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Trump pushes for fighting in Ukraine to stop - split Donbas for now
DPA Mon, October 20, 2025
US President Donald Trump (L) welcomes Ukrainian President Vladamir Zelensky ahead of their meeting at the White House. Andrew Leyden/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
US President Donald Trump on Sunday said he thinks Ukraine and Russia should freeze the front line and end the conflict, which would include dividing the eastern Donbas region as a result.
"We think that what they should do is just stop at the lines where they are - the battle lines...go home, stop killing people, and be done," he told reporters aboard the presidential aircraft Air Force One.
When asked whether Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he should cede the Donbas to Russia, Trump said, "No. We never discussed it."
Zelensky met with Trump in Washington on Friday.
The Financial Times, citing unnamed sources, reported that Trump had allegedly urged Zelensky during their meeting on Friday to give up the entire Donbas to end the war.
Such a move would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to achieve one of his key objectives in the war that Putin started in February 2022.
Stop now, negotiate later
Trump said he thought some 78% of the land had already been "taken by Russia," adding that he wants a halt on the battlefield and the two sides should deal with the details later.
"The rest is very tough to negotiate." Asked what he thought should be done with the Donbas region, Trump said "Let it be cut the way it is. It's cut up right now."
"They can negotiate something later on down the line."
Trump made his comments on his return flight from Florida to Washington.
Before 2014, the industrial region of Donbas had a population of approximately 6.5 million and was the core of Ukraine's heavy industry, rich in coal and iron. However, many mines and factories were already outdated at that time.
Trump pushed Zelenskyy in vulgar 'shouting match' to cede land or be 'destroyed': report
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during the 80th United Nations General Assembly, in New York City, New York, U.S., September 23, 2025. (REUTERS/Al Drago)
In a private meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday, President Donald Trump urged him to concede a significant amount of territory to Russia or face destruction, a meeting that devolved into a “shouting match” with Trump “cursing all the time,” according to insiders who spoke with the Financial Times in its report Sunday.
“If [Putin] wants it, he will destroy you,” Trump reportedly told Zelenskyy in the closed-door meeting, according to who the Financial Times described as a “European official with knowledge of the meeting,” speaking with the outlet on the condition of anonymity.
According to the insiders who spoke with the Financial Times, Trump “threw Ukraine’s maps of the battlefield” during the tense meeting, urging Zelenskyy to surrender parts of the eastern Donbas region which still remain under Ukrainian control. The concession Trump proposed would be in exchange for Russia ceding small regions near the southern and southeastern Ukrainian cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, respectively – the former now under Ukrainian control and the latter under Russian control.
But for some Ukrainian officials, surrendering the Donbas region was a nonstarter.
“To give [the Donbas] to Russia without a fight is unacceptable for Ukrainian society, and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin knows that,” said Oleksandr Merezhko, who chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, speaking with the Financial Times.
An unnamed official told the outlet that Zelenskyy was “very negative” following the meeting, while noting that European leaders were “not optimistic but pragmatic with planning next step
Zelenskyy Says He’s ‘Ready’ To Meet Trump, Putin In Budapest For Peace Talks
President Donald Trump participates in a bilateral meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, Tuesday, September 23, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that he’s “ready” to sit down for peace talks in Budapest as he expressed doubts about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to end the more than three-year-long war in Ukraine.
“I’m not sure that Putin is ready just [yet] to finish this war,” Zelenskyy said during a pre-taped interview with NBC that aired on October 19. “I think that maybe he wants to come back with aggression.”
The Ukrainian president said that he believes Putin prefers to postpone “real peace negotiations” and is reluctant to meet with him because that would require agreeing to specific positions and potential concessions to end the war.
Zelenskyy then called for added pressure on the Russian leader, saying that Putin is “afraid of sanctions” and secondary sanctions that would squeeze the Russian economy.
The comments come after US President Donald Trump welcomed Zelenskyy to Washington on October 17 to discuss future peace negotiations.
Zelenskyy arrived for his third meeting at the White House this year prepared to discuss a potential arms deal in which Ukraine would supply the US military with drone technologies in return for long-range Tomahawk missiles, but Trump appeared to have cooled to the idea of providing Ukraine with the weapons.
Instead, the US president urged Russia and Ukraine to immediately cease fighting, saying enough blood had been shed, and announced he plans to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest in the coming weeks. No date has been set for the summit.
During his interview with NBC, Zelenskyy reiterated his openness to engage in bilateral or trilateral peace talks with the United States and Russia at the table.
He also said that fighting on the battlefield should stop along the current contact line between Russian and Ukrainian forces and a cease-fire should be in place to begin peace talks.
“If we want to stop this war and go to peace negotiations,” Zelenskyy said, “we need to stay where we stay and not give something additional to Putin because he wants it.” What Comes Next As Negotiators Eye A Summit In Budapest?
The Washington Post reported on October 18 that Putin demanded that Kyiv surrender full control of the Donetsk region, a strategically vital area of eastern Ukraine that is partially occupied by Moscow, as a condition for ending the war during an October 16 phone call with Trump.
Trump has not publicly commented on Putin’s demand and appeared not to endorse it in his public statement after meeting with Zelenskyy at the White House.
“They should stop where they are. Let both claim Victory, let History decide!” Trump wrote on social media on October 17.
The Financial Times, citing people familiar with the matter, on October 19 reported that Trump told Zelenskyy during their White House meeting to accept Russia’s terms for ending the war, including ceding of the Donetsk region.
According to the report, Trump warned Zelenskyy that Putin had threatened to “destroy” Ukraine if it didn’t agree. The White House has not commented on the FT report.
Territorial concessions are expected to be part of any eventual peace deal for Ukraine, but it’s uncertain what Putin might agree to — or what Kyiv could legally offer. Ukraine’s constitution mandates a nationwide referendum to approve any change to the country’s territory, a vote that cannot be held under the martial law imposed since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
A key reason for Zelenskyy’s trip to Washington was the possibility of Ukraine receiving Tomahawk missiles, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 2,500 kilometers.
Trump appeared to have considered sending Tomahawks to Kyiv for weeks as he grew increasingly frustrated over Putin’s refusal to negotiate an end to the war but then appeared to rule out the possibility — at least for now — after his call with the Russian president.
Zelenskyy claimed that issue of Tomahawk missiles is “very sensitive for the Russians” and that Putin is “afraid that the United States will deliver [them] to Ukraine” because it would allow Kyiv to strike strategic military sites and infrastructure that could derail Russia’s war effort.
“It’s good that President Trump didn’t say ‘no,’ but for today, he didn’t say ‘yes.’” Zelenskyy said.
Ahead of the potential summit in Budapest, US and Russian officials will reportedly be planning more lower-level meetings in advance than had taken place in preparation for the Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin in August. What Is the Latest From Ukraine?
Ukrainian drones attacked a gas plant on October 19 in Russia’s Orenburg, the largest facility of its kind in the world, and forced it to suspend its intake of gas from nearby Kazakhstan, according to the Central Asian country’s energy ministry.
This marks the first reported strike on the plant, which forms part of the Orenburg gas chemical complex that is operated by the state energy giant Gazprom and handles intake from both the Orenburg oil and gas field and Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field.
An oil refinery in the Samara-region city of Novokuibyshevsk, nearly 1,000 kilometers from the front line, was also hit by Ukrainian drone strikes, according to Ukraine’s General Staff.
“There has been an increase both in the range and in the accuracy of our long-range sanctions against Russia,” Zelenskyy said in a video address, referring to the recent strikes. “Practically every day or two, Russian oil refineries are being hit. And this contributes to bringing Russia back to reality.”
In recent months, Kyiv has intensified its attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, which appear to be causing fuel shortages and price increases inside Russia.
The oil depot in Novokuibyshevsk was also hit last month, with Ukraine’s General Staff reporting substantial damage to its infrastructure at the time.
Meanwhile, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhya were among the cities hit by guided bombs dropped by Russian jets late on October 18, according to Ukraine’s air defense forces.
Russian drones were also reported over the Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Ten people were injured in Dnipropetrovsk region, local authorities on the morning of October 19, while an energy facility was hit in Chernihiv region, causing a power outage for around 17,000 residents in the north of the country.
Russian forces on October 19 launched a massive strike on a coal mine in the Dnipropetrovsk region, the company and the regional press service of DTEK reported. The exact nature of the attack was not immediately described.
“On the eve of the start of the heating season, the enemy again hit the Ukrainian energy sector. During the attack, 192 employees of the mine were underground,” the mining company said in a statement, later adding that all workers were rescued without serious injuries.
Russia’s relentless nighttime strikes often focus on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, aiming to cut off heating and electricity for civilians as winter approaches in a bid to undermine morale. RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.
Ukraine’s credibility crisis: corruption perception still haunts economic recovery
The share of Ukrainians that think their country is "hopelessly corrupt" has risen to 56% according to a recent survey by KIIS. / bne IntelliNews
Despite an active reform narrative and growing international engagement, corruption remains the biggest drag on Ukraine’s economic credibility. A recent survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) found that 40% of Ukrainians still believe their country is “hopelessly corrupt,” down only slightly from 47% last year, according to Kyrylo Shevchenko, former Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine.
Shifting in perceptions on corruption are one of the core challenges facing Bankova (Ukraine’s equivalent of the Kremlin) and Ukraine’s reconstruction. On paper reforms have yet to translate into systemic change.
“Every dollar of aid is turned into a political risk,” says Shevchenko. “Until corruption is tackled systemically, the Ukrainian economy will keep bleeding credibility faster than it rebuilds.”
And perceived corruption has undermined US support for Bankova. As part of the emergency $61bn aid package released last April, a line item for some $25mn to cover auditing costs was included to check that US support was not being stolen.
A team of US accountants were sent to Ukraine earlier this year to check the books. And Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy further undermined confidence after he tried to ram through a controversial law that gives unlimited power to the General Prosecutor that civil rights groups say will gut Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms on July 22. The passage of the law sparked the first anti-government protests since the war with Russia began and Bankova was forced to rapidly back off and return the autonomy of the anti-corruption organs with another law within days.
Nevertheless, over the past year Ukraine has made some progress, says Shevchenko. The High Anti-Corruption Court (ACC)) has issued several high-profile rulings, and digital public procurement tools like ProZorro have improved transparency in some areas. Yet enforcement remains patchy, elite impunity persists, and corruption continues to shape everything from wartime logistics to reconstruction contracts, according to Shevchenko.
The gap between Western expectations and domestic implementation is growing harder to ignore. “Corruption continues to drain investments, block EU integration, and erode donor confidence,” he said. While Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in 2022, Brussels has repeatedly flagged insufficient progress on judicial independence, rule of law, and the de-oligarchizing agenda.
Even among Ukrainians, belief in reform is fragile. The same KIIS survey shows that nearly half the country doubts real change is happening, suggesting that years of unfulfilled promises and high-profile scandals have left a deep institutional scar.
“Public trust remains fragile, with only some improvements,” Shevchenko notes. “Talk of reform is not enough. Delivery is everything.”
The stakes could not be higher. The EU is finalising a multi-year €50bn aid package, while the International Monetary Fund is reviewing a $15.6bn Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Donors increasingly condition their support on measurable anti-corruption benchmarks, including independent audits and personnel reform in the judiciary, customs, and security services.
According to observers, the rationale for Law 21414 that would have gutted the anti-corruption bodies and put corruption investigations under the direct control of the General Prosecutor, a Zelenskiy appointee, was investigations by National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) were focusing on people inside Bankova’s inner circle that the president wanted to head off.
The law was suspended, but according to reports, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), which is also under Zelenskiy’s direct control, continued to pressure NABU offices with investigations and inspections.
Meanwhile, investor interest remains cautious. Ukraine is viewed as a high-risk frontier market, despite post-war rebuilding opportunities in energy, logistics, and defence-related industries. But without legal protections and institutional clarity, few are willing to commit long-term capital.
“Donornomics only works when credibility compounds,” Shevchenko said. “Ukraine needs a corruption-proof recovery—not just for the sake of its partners, but for the future of its own citizens.”
Until that happens, Ukraine’s economy will remain suspended between Western lifelines and domestic gridlock. Reform will need to outpace scepticism—for both markets and the millions of Ukrainians still waiting for real change.
Ukraine, European Leaders Anxiously Eye Trump-Putin Summit After White House Meeting – Analysis
Russia's President Vladimir Putin with US President Donald Trump.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to Washington hoping to get a commitment on new weapons, but instead met an American president newly intent on brokering a peace deal to end the more than three-year war in Ukraine.
Zelenskyy left his October 17 meeting with US President Donald Trump withoutreceiving much-sought Tomahawk cruise missiles. He now finds himself preparing for a new phase of US-led diplomacy as American and Russian officials lay the groundwork for a potential agreement at an upcoming summit between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest.
“Let both claim Victory, let History decide!” Trump wrote on social media after his meeting with Zelenskyy, saying he had told both leaders this week that “it is time to stop the killing, and make a DEAL!”
After the meeting, which Zelenskyy described as productive, the Ukrainian president spoke by phone with European leaders — including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Finland’s president, and the prime ministers of Britain, Italy, Norway, and Poland — and said he was counting on Trump to pressure Putin “to stop this war.”
The European leaders reaffirmed their support for Kyiv on the call and said that they will continue work on developing a peace plan for Ukraine, as well as options to increase pressure on Moscow through sanctions and the use of frozen Russian state assets.
“The most important thing now is to protect as many lives as possible, ensure security for Ukraine, and strengthen us all in Europe. This is precisely what we are working towards,” Zelenskyy later said about the call on his Telegram channel.
But analysts and Ukrainian lawmakers told RFE/RL that the lack of a commitment on Tomahawk missiles, another summit between Putin and Trump, and the US president’s apparent softening rhetoric towards Putin after spending weeks threatening sanctions and potential weapons deliveries has raised anxiety levels in Kyiv.
While Volodymyr Dubovyk, associate professor of international relations at Odesa University, told RFE/RL that Trump’s softening tone towards Ukraine compared to earlier meetings with Zelenskyy this year reflects a “positive dynamic,” others do not share his optimism.
“I am surprised to hear that my colleagues have high hopes for this season of negotiations,” Solomiia Bobrovska, a Ukrainian lawmaker who sits on the parliament’s National Security Committee, told RFE/RL, referring to the White House meeting and a summit slated for the coming weeks in Budapest.
“If we can shift Trump’s complacency for Russia even a millimeter away and closer towards Ukraine, then that is will be good,” she added.
From Tomahawks To A Summit In Hungary
A similar unease is shared by Oleksandr Sushko, the executive director of the Kyiv-based International Renaissance Foundation.
“Trump appears to be only partially on [Ukraine’s] side,” he told RFE/RL. “Therefore, it is very important to remain sober and restrained here.”
In the weeks leading up to his meeting with Zelenskyy, Trump had mused about sending Kyiv Tomahawk missiles as he appeared to sour on Putin over his refusal to negotiate a deal to end the war.
A key reason for Zelenskyy’s hastily organized trip to Washington was the possibility of Ukraine receiving the missiles, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 2,500 kilometers.
But an October 16 phone call between Putin and Trump, which occurred while the Ukrainian president was in transit to the United States, changed that with a future meeting between the two leaders set for the coming weeks in the Hungarian capital.
At a press conference after his White House meeting, Zelenskyy was asked about the missiles and what he had been told by US officials.
“We want [them] very much… we need them,” he said. “Nobody canceled this dialogue, this topic.”
Later, Trump reiterated that he wants the United States to hold on to its weaponry. “We want Tomahawks also. We don’t want to be giving away things that we need to protect our country,” he said.
Zelenskyy also said he is open to bilateral or trilateral talks to end the war.
“I don’t rule out that [long-range weapons] will be used someday, but [they] will definitely not be used in the coming weeks,” Viktor Shlinchak, chairman of the board of the Institute of World Politics, told RFE/RL. All Eyes On Budapest
Trump’s decision to organize another high-profile summit with Putin has somewhat changed the calculus for Kyiv, Heorhiy Chizhov, head of the Kyiv-based Center for Promoting Reforms, told RFE/RL.
“[Trump] thinks he can win, that he can get Putin to the negotiating table,” Chizhov said.
Asked by a reporter on October 17 if he thinks Putin is trying to buy time, Trump replied that he has been “played” all his life by “the best of them,” but said he thinks Putin wants to make a deal.
According to Russian foreign-policy advisor Yury Ushakov, Putin had warned Trump that allowing Ukraine to purchase the Tomahawks “won’t change the situation on the battlefield but would cause substantial damage to the relationship between our countries.”
US officials are reportedly planning more lower-level meetings with their Russian counterparts than had taken place ahead of the Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin in August.
The American side will be led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio instead of special envoy Steve Witkoff, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Trump has so far been cautious about ratcheting up pressure on Putin, but his administration also expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine to help it strike targets inside Russia and imposed steep tariffs on one of Moscow’s top trading partners, India, over its purchases of Russian oil.
In early October, the Trump administration also sanctioned Serbia’s largest oil and gas supplier, which is majority-owned by Russian state energy giant Gazprom.
Russian officials also appear to be preparing their own offerings to present to the US side in talks.
Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, revived the idea of building a tunnel under the Bering Sea to connect Russia and the United States though Alaska and suggested that Elon Musk’s Boring Company build it.
Zoriana Stepanenko is a correspondent for Current Time and RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service.
Reid Standish is RFE/RL’s China Global Affairs correspondent based in Prague and author of the China In Eurasia briefing. He focuses on Chinese foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and has reported extensively about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s internment camps in Xinjiang. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Reid was an editor at Foreign Policy magazine and its Moscow correspondent. He has also written for The Atlantic and The Washington Post.
RFE RL
RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.
Hungary offers Putin safe passage for Budapest summit despite ICC arrest warrant
Hungarian PM Viktor Orban with state news radio Kossuth Radio. / Viktor Orban (Facebook)
Preparations for organising the planned summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are progressing at full speed, Prime Minister Viktor Orban told state media on October 17, state news agency MTI writes. Despite the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant against Putin, Hungarian authorities have stated the Russian president will face no legal risk during the visit.
Orban told Kossuth Radio that Marc Rubio and his Russian peer will aim to settle any remaining unresolved matters in the coming week, and then the two leaders can meet in Budapest a week later, he said. The prime minister confirmed had held phone talks with President Putin to discuss the upcoming meeting, while Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto discussed details with US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Sergei Lavrov.
The prime minister said there had been "no real alternative" to Budapest as the venue for the meeting, noting that Hungary was "the only pro-peace country in Europe" and that it was Budapest that advocated keeping diplomatic channels open.
He said the upcoming summit was "not about Hungary, but about peace", describing it as a major diplomatic achievement that Budapest had been selected to host such a high-level event.
The EU had already spent €180bn on the war, and ending the conflict could "double or triple" Hungary's economic growth. The temporary inconveniences caused by hosting the summit were therefore "worth it", he said, adding that "nothing is as profitable as peace".
"If they were looking for a secure place in terms of peace and things will be in order technically, they will not be surprised by any political events, so they were looking for a predictable environment, then Budapest seems like a logical choice," he said.
The prime minister said he was told by Trump on October 16, that a meeting of the US secretary of state and the Russian Foreign Minister was on the agenda.
When asked about picking Hungary as the location, Trump said at a joint press conference with Ukraine's leader on October 17, that "Hungary has a leader we like. "We love Viktor Orban, he loves him, I love him," referring to Putin.
The US president said Budapest was chosen as the venue because Hungary is "a safe country, very well run," and "free from many of the problems other countries face," and that Orban would be "a very good host."
When asked why Hungary remains reliant on Russian energy despite US pressure on other countries, Trump said Hungary's dependence stems from its "special situation" as a landlocked country that relies on a single oil pipeline.
Trump's White House aides were not that cordial to US media. When HuffPost asked who suggested Budapest for the venue, given that Russia promised not to invade Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest memorandum, Karoline Leavitt responded, "Your mum did."
By October 19, more details emerged from the Friday meeting between the US President and the Ukrainian leader. The Financial Times reports that Donald Trump has urged Volodymyr Zelensky to accept Russia's conditions and has reportedly pressed Zelensky to hand over the entire eastern Donbas region to Russia. Trump reiterated several arguments similar to those made by Putin in a phone conversation the previous day, financial website Portfolio.hu recalls.
The Financial Times said Putin, during his October 16 with Trump, offered to cede small parts of the southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions in exchange for the much larger Donbas territories currently under Ukrainian control. This represents a scaled-back version of Moscow's 2024 demand for Kyiv to surrender all of Donbas as well as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, a total area of roughly 20,000 sqkm.
In an interview with NBC News' Meet the Press, the Ukrainian leader said he is prepared to attend the planned peace talks in Budapest and called on Donald Trump to adopt a tougher approach towards Russia. The Ukrainian leader described Putin as a "terrorist" but expressed readiness for direct talks, saying, "If we really want just and lasting peace, we need both sides." Zelensky also reaffirmed that Ukraine would not cede additional territory, insisting peace talks must be held "not under missiles, not under drones."
In spite of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin, Hungary will not detain him during his planned visit, Hungary's chief diplomat said.
Szijjarto stated that the Hungarian government guarantees Putin unhindered entry and exit from Hungary and will ensure the success of his negotiations. He emphasised that no consultation with other parties is required, as Hungary is a sovereign state.
Likely routes could involve detours through Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia, or through Turkey, Greece and Montenegro, as overflight through Ukraine or Poland is seen as impossible, BBC writes.
Speaking to MK.ru, Russian security expert Alexander Kotz suggested a route crossing the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Serbia, possibly via Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the safest option for Putin.
According to EU officials, member states may individually grant overflight or landing permission to Putin if he chooses not to travel through Ukraine or via a Balkan detour. Politico noted that under EU sanctions law, national authorities can make exceptions to the Russian airspace restrictions if such flights are deemed necessary for humanitarian or compatible purposes.
Local media, citing security experts say Budapest has had experience hosting high-profile events, but the summit poses unprecedented security challenges.
Preparations for the summit are underway in Budapest. The operation involves Hungarian police, counter-terrorism units, armed forces, cyber experts, and the US and Russian security services. Preparatory talks begin this week, and the capital will face road closures and transport disruptions during the summit.
The official venue is yet to be announced, with multiple locations under consideration.
WAIT, WHAT?!
Belarus asks for talks with Kyiv, as Lukashenko seeks to end Belarus’ isolation
Belarus President Lukashenko has opened the door to direct talks with Kyiv as he continues a drive to improve relations with the West and reduce his dependence on the Kremlin. / bne IntelliNews
Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko has opened the door to direct dialogue with Kyiv as part of negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, as he launches a diplomatic drive to break the republic’s isolation and total dependence on Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The head of Belarus' State Security Committee (KGB), Ivan Tertel, told state television on October 19 that his agency is prepared to engage with Ukraine “to find a consensus” and prevent further escalation.
“Our president works as much as possible in order to stabilise the situation in the region,” Tertel said, referring to Lukashenko, the country’s long-serving and internationally ostracised leader. “And we’ve managed to balance the interests of the parties in this extremely complicated situation with a tendency towards escalation.”
“I am convinced that only via quiet and calm negotiations, by looking for a compromise, we will be able to resolve this situation,” Tertel added, pointedly noting that “a lot depends on the Ukrainian side”.
The call for talks comes after Minsk sent letters to various EU member states offering to open a dialogue last week. Belarus is bidding for better relations with the EU after making notable progress in improving ties with the Trump administration, according to diplomatic sources cited by Reuters.
The diplomatic olive branches come after ties with the US have dramatically improved in recent months. US mediation was instrumental in bringing off a number of political prisoner releases. The most high profile are the release of 16 prisoners, including Sergey Tikhanovsky (Siarhei Tsikhanouskiy), the husband of Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya), in June following a US-brokered pardon after envoy Keith Kellogg met with Lukashenko in Minsk. Another 52 prisoners were released in September after more US mediation. However, some 1,300 people remain in jail, according to human rights groups.
Nevertheless Belarus remains a key ally of Moscow and Lukashenko is a frequent visitor. Belarus has also hosted Russian military assets since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 including Russian missiles and nuclear weapons.
Kyiv has not officially responded to the offer.
Lukashenko walks a rhetorical tightrope
Earlier this month, Lukashenko lashed out at Ukraine’s refusal to negotiate with Moscow, warning that “Ukraine may cease to exist as a state” unless President Volodymyr Zelenskiy “sits down, negotiates, and acts urgently”.
At the same time Lukashenko has offered to host a potential bilateral or trilateral meeting between Putin, Zelenskiy and US President Donald Trump – an offer that Bankova has rejected out of hand.
Since the 2020 presidential election — widely condemned by the EU and US as fraudulent — Belarus has faced heavy sanctions and pariah status among democratic nations. The situation worsened after Belarus allowed Russian forces to use its territory to launch part of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
According to Reuters, Belarusian diplomats recently met with European officials. One European diplomat confirmed a meeting with former Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Ambrazevich, who reportedly suggested Belarus could be included in wider talks about European security architecture, Reuters reports.
Washington has taken the lead in the rapprochement, brokering several political prisoners released from Belarusian jails. In return, the Trump administration agreed to lift some sanctions on the Belarusian state airline, Belavia that will allow Minsk to buy US-made plane parts again.
Trump’s envoy, retired General Keith Kellogg, later confirmed that the aim of the renewed dialogue was “to ensure lines of communication” with Putin.
“The goal is not to rehabilitate Lukashenko, but to widen the channels through which we can pressure Moscow,” a US official familiar with the talks said privately, Reuters reports.
Despite these diplomatic stirrings, Belarus remains deeply entwined with Moscow’s strategic ambitions. Last month, Russia and Belarus conducted the joint quadrennial Zapad-2025 military exercises – a show of military strength, involving an estimated 100,000 troops in exercises to simulate a conflict with Nato forces.
“Belarus may be testing the waters to become a ‘neutral’ channel for negotiation—without ever actually changing sides,” one analyst said, reports TheKyiv Independent.
Tertel’s comments on Belarus One come just days after Belarusian diplomats were seen stepping up contact with EU envoys amid renewed speculation over a potential Russia-US summit in Budapest.
The Transparency Doctrine: How Democracies Learned To Pre-Bunk War – Analysis
"Little Green Men" soldiers in Crimea. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
October 20, 2025 By Aritra Banerjee In 2014, when “little green men” appeared in Crimea, the world was caught off-guard. Russia’s denials, obfuscations, and media manipulation muddied the waters long enough to make annexation a fait accompli. Eight years later, in the winter of 2021-22, the same state prepared for another incursion — but this time, its opponent’s information playbook had changed.
Throughout January and February 2022, Washington and London released an extraordinary series of intelligence assessments detailing Russia’s build-up, likely pretexts, and even fake videos that Moscow intended to stage. The world knew the war was coming before it began. What seemed like a radical breach of intelligence culture — governments revealing secrets rather than guarding them — was a calculated act of strategic communication.
As Jānis Sārts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) in Riga, explained, the decision aimed “to alert the world and to make it more complicated for Russia to stage the pretext for war.” In effect, NATO allies decided to foretell the lie before it could be told. From Secrecy to Strategic Disclosure
For decades, intelligence orthodoxy treated information as something to protect, not deploy. Secrecy implied control; revelation implied risk. But in the era of hybrid warfare, ambiguity itself became a weapon. Adversaries like Russia learned to operate in the grey zone — manipulating half-truths, manufacturing confusion, and eroding trust faster than democracies could verify facts.
By 2017, after Russian interference in the U.S. and European elections, NATO’s StratCom community had begun to rethink that equation. Sārts recalls testifying before the U.S. Senate that year, urging a new mindset: “In 21st-century information warfare, the traditional approach to intelligence — briefing leaders but keeping information classified — no longer works.”
That intellectual shift drew from the work of Dr Neville Bolt, Founder and Director of the Sympodium Institute for Strategic Communications, following two decades as Director of the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications (KCSC) and Reader in Strategic Communications at King’s College London.
Dr Bolt, who also serves as Editor-in-Chief of Defence Strategic Communications — NATO’s peer-reviewed academic journal — argues that strategic communication is not a collection of messaging tools but a “mindset — a way of understanding the world where politics now takes place inside the information environment.”
The Western intelligence community finally operationalised that theory in early 2022. Controlled transparency replaced quiet briefing. Truth became an instrument of manoeuvre.
Pre-Bunking in Action
Between late 2021 and mid-February 2022, the U.S. and U.K. issued near-daily warnings: Russia would stage atrocities, fabricate videos, or provoke border incidents. Each statement forced the Kremlin to rewrite its script in real time. When the invasion began on 24 February, Moscow’s justification — “genocide in Donbas” — looked hastily improvised and conspicuously hollow.
The pre-bunking strategy achieved three immediate effects:It stripped Russia of surprise. Every possible false flag had been publicised in advance.
It compressed global interpretation time. By the time Russian state television rolled out its storyline, audiences were already inoculated.
It accelerated alliance cohesion. Western capitals coalesced around a single, pre-validated narrative of aggression.
The risks were real. With limited evidence they could reveal, U.S. officials endured hostile questioning at press briefings. Yet that discomfort was a price worth paying. As Sārts observed, “It looked uncomfortable, but it worked.” The Kremlin’s vaunted information dominance failed at the opening whistle.
Information Timing, Audience Trust, Strategic Effect
Strategic communication often fails because it treats words as content rather than manoeuvre. Timing is the first variable: pre-bunking succeeds only when disclosure precedes the adversary’s narrative window. Audience trust is the second: the public must already believe the communicator’s integrity for transparency to carry weight. Strategic effect is the third: the goal is not merely to inform but to alter the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus.
In February 2022 all three aligned. By telling uncomfortable truths early, democracies generated cognitive shock in Moscow, narrative compression among Western audiences, and strategic synchronisation among allies. The manoeuvre turned openness into deterrence.
Russia’s Message Creep
Contrast this clarity with Russia’s performance. As Professor Bolt points out in another context, “mission creep breeds message creep.” The same pathology that undermined Western narratives in Afghanistan—constantly shifting goals—afflicted Russia’s information war. Its justifications shifted from protecting Russian speakers to denazification, then to resisting NATO expansion, then to fighting Western decadence. Each revision diluted credibility.
Worse, the Kremlin’s top-down propaganda machine proved incapable of adaptation. Its secrecy culture, once an advantage, trapped it in its own echo chamber. Deprived of honest feedback, the regime doubled down on delusion. In the language of StratCom, it lost the feedback loop that sustains narrative authority. Ukraine’s Real-Time Counter-Narrative
If the U.S. and U.K. supplied intelligence, Ukraine supplied authenticity. Within hours of the invasion, President Volodymyr Zelensky recorded a short video outside his office: “We are here.” No polished lighting, no staging — just defiance. It cut through the fog of war faster than any press release could.
Sārts calls this the “humanisation of the war.” Ukrainians turned strategic communication into a whole-of-society effort. Every citizen with a smartphone became a sensor, witness, and messenger. Symbols emerged organically — the Snake Island defiance, the sunflower-seed grandmother, the blue-and-yellow memes that flooded timelines.
While Russia’s state-run television pushed sterile narratives, Ukraine’s lived imagery made its story emotionally incontestable. Each viral clip was a micro-pre-bunking act: reality broadcast before distortion could take root.
Leadership as Narrative Architecture
In Neville Bolt’s typology, strategic communication operates through words, images, and actions — but the action of leadership unites them all. Zelensky’s leadership was both message and medium. By staying in Kyiv, refusing evacuation, and addressing parliaments directly, he aligned policy, posture, and persona into a single story of resistance.
Even his informality — fatigue clothes, smartphone videos — served as semiotics of authenticity. It made Western leaders’ rehearsed statements look sterile. In contrast, Vladimir Putin’s long tables and pre-recorded meetings became symbols of isolation and paranoia. Both men performed strategy through imagery; only one resonated.
Pre-Bunking Beyond Europe
The logic of controlled transparency has wider relevance. Democracies in the Indo-Pacific face similar grey-zone pressures — from territorial incursions and cyber intrusions to information warfare that blurs peace and conflict.
For India, which operates in a complex information battlespace involving China and Pakistan, selective disclosure can serve as an instrument of deterrence. Early, credible publication of satellite data, intelligence summaries, or diplomatic assessments can pre-empt adversarial narratives during border crises or disinformation spikes.
The challenge is cultural as much as procedural. Bureaucracies accustomed to secrecy must learn to calibrate revelation. Public trust, already fragile, must be maintained by accuracy and consistency. Pre-bunking works only when audiences believe both the messenger and the motive.
Japan’s communication around the Fukushima disaster in 2011, for instance, demonstrated the cost of hesitation: delayed transparency eroded public trust for years. Conversely, New Zealand’s proactive crisis communication model — factual, timely, empathetic — shows how openness reinforces authority. The EurAsian takeaway: transparency, managed well, is power.
Toward a Doctrine of Strategic Openness
If democracies are to institutionalise what succeeded in 2022, they need doctrine. A national StratCom framework for “strategic openness” would set:Thresholds for disclosure — when classified information serves deterrence more than secrecy.
Inter-agency coordination — linking intelligence, defence, diplomacy, and media spokespeople.
Temporal sequencing — how early warnings transition into crisis communication without fatigue.
Ethical guardrails — ensuring truth, not propaganda, underpins disclosure.
Such doctrine would turn episodic success into sustained capability. It would also answer critics who fear that openness endangers sources: managed transparency is not recklessness; it is risk management for narrative dominance.
The Information Deterrent
Strategic communication’s power lies not in volume but in velocity and coherence. The 2022 pre-bunking campaign demonstrated that information, timed correctly, can alter the strategic environment before the first shot is fired.
In that sense, pre-bunking is deterrence by narration. It denies the enemy plausible stories, constrains their manoeuvre, and rallies allies faster than conventional diplomacy. It also reclaims moral ground: democracies no longer have to choose between truth and security — the two can reinforce each other.
Neville Bolt reminds us that every action, even inaction, communicates. By choosing to speak early, democracies finally acted strategically within the information environment rather than outside it.
The Age of Strategic Truth
The Cold War prized secrecy as power; the information age prizes credibility. In a battlespace where deception is constant and attention is scarce, truth — timely, contextual, and deliberate — becomes an instrument of statecraft.
For NATO in 2022, that truth denied Russia its narrative initiative. For democracies elsewhere, it offers a template: communicate first, communicate honestly, and communicate with purpose.
Transparency will not end wars, but it can shape how they begin — and, sometimes, prevent them from starting at all.
Aritra Banerjee is a Contributing Editor, South Asia at Eurasia Review with a focus on Defence, Strategic Affairs, and Indo-Pacific geopolitics. He is also the co-author of The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. Having spent his formative years in the United States before returning to India, he brings a global perspective combined with on-the-ground insight to his reporting. He holds a Master's in International Relations, Security & Strategy from O.P. Jindal Global University, a Bachelor's in Mass Media from the University of Mumbai, and Professional Education in Strategic Communications from King's College London (King's Institute for Applied Security Studies).
