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Monday, January 12, 2026

PAKISTAN’S WINDING ROAD TO THE BOMB
Published January 11, 2026
EOS/DAWN

LONG READ

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto (left) pictured alongside Munir Ahmad Khan (centre) and Dr Abdus Salam (right) during the inauguration ceremony of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (Kanupp) on November 28, 1972 | PAEC



BHUTTO’S SUMMIT WITH SCIENTISTS

I had not yet joined the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and was working as an information officer in the Press Information Department (PID), where each information officer is responsible for servicing the media needs of one or more ministries.

On a cold January day in 1972, a colleague in the PID responsible for media projection of scientific organisations talked about a planned meeting of the country’s scientists. President [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto had called the meeting to frankly discuss what role they could play in national defence and security, he said. Where and when it was to be held, he was not sure. It would be at some undisclosed secret venue, he said.

He also said that prominent scientists and engineers had started arriving in Islamabad, waiting to be taken to the conference venue, which was known only to a few. There was confusion about the venue. When the word spread that it would be held in Quetta, some scientists actually travelled there, making their own private arrangements. In the morning, a military aircraft airlifted a precious human cargo of scientists and engineers from Islamabad. But instead of Quetta, it landed at Multan. Those who had already arrived in Quetta were herded to Multan in a special Pakistan Air Force aircraft.

No one was sure of the conference’s purpose. Some excited scientists, before leaving their homes, only told their families that they would be out of station for a few days without disclosing where they were going. Having been personally invited by the head of state, everyone felt elated.

Even though the purpose had not been officially declared, there was a sense among the scientists that Bhutto wanted to salvage the country in the wake of the loss of East Pakistan. He wanted to seek the support of the scientific community and raise the morale of the people, they conjectured.

In January 1972, at a secret meeting, Pakistan’s top scientists were tasked by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with one objective: build an atomic bomb, no matter the cost. At the heart of this endeavour was Bhutto’s handpicked nuclear expert, Munir Ahmad Khan. For two decades, Munir Ahmed Khan worked behind a thick veil of secrecy, building key nuclear structures in a race against time, sanctions and even smear campaigns. In Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey, Farhatullah Babar details the story of the unsung architect of Pakistan's atomic programme. Eos presents, with permission, excerpts from the book recently published by Lightstone Publishers…

In private conversations, they recalled that Bhutto outlined his views on foreign and security policies in his 1969 book The Myth of Independence. As a minister in [Gen] Ayub [Khan]’s cabinet, he had failed in his mission to make Pakistan nuclear. But now he was the president himself, and a great opportunity was knocking at his door.

Pakistan had not only suffered defeat at the hands of the Indian army, but it had also lost half of the country and more than half of the population. China also had not applied pressure on India’s border, and Pakistan had suffered a permanent strategic loss by the cessation of East Pakistan.




The Multan Conference was aimed at inspiring the scientists and engineers to commit themselves to delivering. The Chief Scientific Adviser to the president, Dr Abdus Salam (later Nobel Laureate), was also on board the special flight from Islamabad. A younger colleague later recalled Dr Salam saying, “I think they are going to make us bite the dust.”

Excitement grew as they neared Multan. An army bus was waiting to collect the cream of scientists as they disembarked in Multan. Shamiaanas covered the spacious lawns of Nawab Sadiq Qureshi’s — a PPP [Pakistan Peoples Party] leader and Governor of Punjab — residence in Multan, to host the first-ever face-to-face meeting between scientists and the country’s president.

The conference brought together science luminaries from all over the country, including the chairman of the PAEC, the versatile and outspoken Dr I.H. Usmani. Professor Abdus Salam had also flown in from abroad. The attendees also included Munir Ahmad Khan, a nuclear engineer with international credentials. He had flown in from Vienna, where he was in charge of the nuclear power and reactor division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It was a historic moment in Pakistan’s journey toward nuclear development. Scientists and engineers took turns addressing pressing issues in science and technology, with particular focus on how quickly Pakistan could achieve atomic capability. Criticism voiced at the conference ranged from lamenting the misallocation of funds for building physical infrastructure to issues with trained manpower and a lack of planning and motivation. Some voiced concerns about bureaucratic red tape, while others passionately demanded respect and recognition.

After several scientists had spoken, Bhutto rose to speak. The chatter in the pandal stopped. There was a pin-drop silence as eager eyes turned towards him.

Bhutto began his address by recalling with anguish the surrender and national humiliation in December 1971 and vowed to restore the lost national honour. He then told the audience that he had invited them to seek their help. He addressed them directly, face-to-face, and excited them. Only a month earlier, Pakistan had witnessed its darkest hour: the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, following a humiliating defeat in the Indo-Pakistani war. The nation’s wounds were fresh, its pride shattered. Amidst the ruin, Bhutto’s speech kindled in the gathering the spark of resolve that would forever alter the trajectory of Pakistan’s history.

Bhutto’s words resonated with the scientists. In Multan, he was not merely outlining a policy; he was igniting a movement. Masterfully blending pragmatism with patriotism, he quoted from history. He spoke about the transformative power of nuclear technology, instilling enthusiasm in the audience. He cited India’s steady march toward atomic capability as both a challenge and a provocation. Pakistan’s survival in the regional power matrix required a matching response.


Dr Mujaddid Ahmed Ijaz (extreme left), Munir Ahmad Khan (centre) and Dr Abdus Salam (extreme right) at the International Nathiagali Summer College on Physics and Contemporary Needs (INSC) in 1976 | Ijaz Family Archives



When the crowd of scientists was sufficiently charged, Bhutto directly asked how they could help meet the threat to the nation’s security. India possessed not only superiority in conventional weapons, it was also building nuclear weapons.

“Can you meet India’s nuclear challenge?” He asked them, promising “all the resources you may need.” He had challenged the scientific community at a time of the lowest national morale, and the scientists were ecstatic.

Curiosity was replaced by enthusiasm. The enthusiastic ones believed they could do it even if some of their colleagues disagreed. The atmosphere was electric, tinged with the weight of what lay ahead.

As the discussions unfolded, the pandal crackled with ideas, projections, and debates about feasibility, resources and time frames. The scientists understood that achieving nuclear capability was no small feat — it was a herculean task and a willingness to defy all odds — but they were ready. There were a few who were sceptics, also mindful of the technical roadblocks, but a shared sense of purpose united all.

MORE THAN A CONFERENCE

Scientists fell over one another to convince the president they could deliver on the promise. The president was amused as he watched them engage in a shouting match. “Yes, yes, sure, we can deliver,” the scientists shouted back in unison, almost like children on a playground, a scientist later recalled.

When a scientist claimed that Pakistan had already reached a “take-off stage” in the nuclear field, Bhutto said, “There is no such thing as the take-off stage. Either we take off or we are left behind.”

President Bhutto deplored that we had been left behind in almost every aspect of national life, especially in science, technology and education.

How long will you take to deliver, he asked them. The scientists did not expect such a pointed question from the head of state. Already charged with enthusiasm, the meeting turned into near pandemonium. Scientists made claims and counterclaims about how soon it would be done.

Some said it would take five years; others thought it would take longer. The overenthusiastic claimed to do it in less than a year, while the realistic ones said at least five years were needed. Everyone was eager to catch Bhutto’s attention.

When a young engineer jumped and almost shouted, “Five years, Your Excellency, five years!” Bhutto asked him to sit down.

On the dais, the chairman of PAEC, Dr I.H. Usmani and Dr Salam looked at each other. As a young scientist claimed that they could make the bomb in three years, Usmani nudged Professor Salam, sitting next to him, with his elbow.

Usmani, the pioneer of nuclear energy in the country, believed that Pakistan was a long way away from acquiring nuclear capability. “We will never be able to make it, we do not have the infrastructure,” he whispered in his ear, Salam later recalled to me.

When Salam asked him whether he disapproved of the quest to go nuclear, Usmani told him, “How can I refuse the president anything? I am only trying to be realistic.”

Usmani then said, “Listen, morally I can disagree with a nuclear weapon, but I will not. I know what Bhutto wants and I want to help him.”

Usmani then rose on his seat.

“With all respect, Mr President,” he said, “but I think that we should look into the eye of truth.”

At present, Pakistan does not possess a thing that justifies the optimism in this pandal, he said. “We do not have any metallurgists or a steel industry.” Usmani had the courage to speak his mind in front of the president and a charged crowd of enthusiastic scientists.

Perhaps Dr Usmani was not wrong. As head of the organisation for a decade, he knew better. There was no infrastructure in place needed to go nuclear. It took more than a decade after the Multan Conference for Pakistan to conduct its first cold nuclear tests, in March 1983, and complete its nuclear fuel cycle projects.


(Left to right) Professor Ishfaq Ahmad, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Gen K.M. Arif and Munir Ahmad Khan at the cold test site | Beyond the Bomb


A young engineer was keen to speak but was ignored each time he raised his hand to ask for the floor. Just as the next speaker was about to take the floor, Bhutto, pointing towards the young engineer, said, “No, no, that man over there.”

“Mr President, all I want to say is that we have a research institute in PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology] at Nilore. Local people call the nearby bus stop ‘Nilore Bum Factory.’ They believe that the atom bomb is the saviour. They also hope that the bomb will be produced in this building. But what are we doing here? We can make it if tasked,” he said.

Bhutto listened intently.

The young man was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, later the first project director of the uranium enrichment project at Kahuta and much more.

As the scientists differed over how soon the bomb could be made, Bhutto raised his hand and stretched out three fingers. Everyone was silent. He wanted the bomb made in three years. All eyes had turned to him.

“Can I have this from you in three years?” he then asked. “Yes, yes,” the scientists responded in chorus, vowing not to disappoint him.

The Multan conclave of scientists marked the starting point of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear programme. The dye was cast that day.

The Multan Conference marked the genesis of a long and arduous journey. Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear capability was as much a battle against external pressures as it was a test of internal resolve. In the years that followed, the country faced a barrage of international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and economic challenges. Yet, the vision set in motion that January day in Multan endured.

The Multan Conference remains a pivotal chapter in Pakistan’s history, its significance extending beyond the realm of nuclear technology. It set Pakistan on a path that continues to shape its identity and policies.

More than a chatter of enthusiastic scientists, it was a solemn promise to deliver. More than a conference, it was a defining moment.

BHUTTO SELECTS MUNIR AHMAD KHAN

Amidst fervent exchanges at the Multan Conference, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once again raised his hand to signal that he had an announcement to make. The chatter in the pandal fell silent, all eyes fixed on him.

Turning towards Munir Ahmad Khan, seated on the podium, Bhutto declared, “From today, Munir Ahmad Khan will be the new chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.” Munir Ahmad Khan was thus entrusted with the responsibility of advancing the nuclear programme, aligning it with Bhutto’s bold vision.

Bhutto’s faith in Munir Ahmad Khan seems to have been rooted in their past association, which began when Munir Ahmad Khan worked at the IAEA in Vienna. He had established himself as a distinguished nuclear engineer and shared a common vision with Bhutto about the role of nuclear technology for the country’s development and survival.

In December 1965, Bhutto, then Pakistan’s foreign minister, accompanied President Ayub Khan during an official visit to London. Bhutto orchestrated a meeting of Munir Ahmad Khan with President Ayub, aiming to persuade the latter to invest in nuclear reprocessing technology. Despite Munir Ahmad Khan’s compelling arguments, Ayub remained unconvinced, placing reliance on China’s “nuclear umbrella” in case Pakistan needed it. After the meeting, a disappointed Munir Ahmad Khan was reassured by Bhutto: “Do not worry—our turn will come.”

That turn came in 1972. Bhutto, now the president of Pakistan, positioned Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of PAEC, signalling a new chapter in the pursuit of his ambition of making Pakistan a nuclear power.

Following Munir Ahmad Khan’s appointment, Dr I.H. Usmani, who had served PAEC with great distinction for over a decade, resigned from his position. While Dr Usmani laid the groundwork for scientific development, Munir Ahmad Khan was tasked with a transformative mission: to translate Bhutto’s vision of a nuclear Pakistan into reality.

In his address, Bhutto noted what he called a “process of erosion” which he said had set in the country as a result of the events of December 1971. He wanted it addressed urgently. In the realm of science and technology, he wanted to launch a “crash programme” to nurture indigenous talent. He wanted to create a pool of at least a hundred scientists, bringing home expatriate Pakistani talent, and instituting prestigious awards for the talented. He wanted to ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were powered by its own people.

THE UNSUNG HERO

Munir Ahmad Khan’s emphasis on secrecy and a low profile was one of the reasons for his remaining unsung. But this was not the only reason. He remained unsung also because his criticism of the tendency to seek personal projection at the expense of the nuclear programme displeased a powerful lobby that cherished personal publicity.

He was uncomfortable when some contemporaries liked to advertise their achievements and flaunted nuclear capabilities, terming it irresponsible. He said that scientists, bureaucrats and generals in other countries do not publicly make tall claims about their capabilities. No scientist in India, Israel or any other country had publicly made such claims.

A former army chief publicly made some claims in the mid-nineties that appeared to him unwise. With carefully chosen words, he strongly criticised him in a newspaper article. He said that what the ex-army chief had said amounted to Pakistan making a fool of the US president for continuing to certify, on the advice of the US Embassy in Islamabad for three years from 1987 to 1990, that Pakistan did not have nuclear capability or a device. He predicted that such irresponsible rhetoric would cost Pakistan dearly.

Naturally, those in high places seeking personal publicity did not like it and turned against him.

When, in May 1988, Pakistan demonstrated nuclear capability, individual scientists in another organisation scrambled to claim credit for bomb-making, cherishing the spotlight. In doing so, some scientists excelled over others. The PAEC scientists were trained in his [Munir Ahmed Khan’s] nursery with a rigid code of restraint for two decades. They remained tight-lipped even at that time of national celebrations.

While there was no one to speak for him, his detractors had a field day. When he retired, he launched a vigorous campaign advocating to curb nuclear rhetoric. He and his associates in the PAEC paid a heavy price for this restraint. He endured all this with grace.

Despite his remarkable achievements in bringing Pakistan to the world nuclear map, he was not lauded. His achievements were not recognised during his lifetime. For 20 years, the cold nuclear tests that were carried out under his watch had remained a guarded secret.

He denied himself and the team limelight through self-projection, adhering to the strict secrecy codes. He did not advertise his achievements to safeguard the safety and security of the nuclear programme. He believed that advertising personal achievements would damage the programme by attracting adverse international response.

In his memoirs, Professor Riazuddin, the quiet theoretician behind the bomb, has said: “All the strategic nuclear infrastructure was completed during the tenure of Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of the PAEC. Thus, all the key elements, except uranium enrichment, were already in place, including conducting cold tests and building tunnels in the Chagai mountain for carrying out underground nuclear tests when needed. In spite of all this, he didn’t get the credit he deserved and remains an ‘unsung hero.’”

He had raised the bar of secrecy so high that it deprived his team of due recognition. When in office, he never mentioned in public the word “cold nuclear tests”, let alone reveal that it had indeed been successfully carried out way back in the early 1980s.

His detractors ensured that Munir was not honoured in his lifetime. While others were decorated with the highest civil award twice, Munir Ahmad Khan was denied it. [Asif] Zardari had long been aware of Munir Ahmad Khan’s work, since his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was prime minister. During his first term as president, he posthumously awarded the unsung hero in 2012 with the highest civil award, the Nishan-i-Pakistan. His family received the award.

In a world often seduced by the allure of spectacle, the power of restraint is the most profound virtue, but it does not come without a cost. Munir Ahmad Khan’s life and the price he paid demonstrated this truth. He exemplified it throughout his career in his disdain for self-promotion and his advocacy for nuclear discretion. His steadfast belief that nuclear capabilities must never be flaunted distinguished him as a leader of extraordinary foresight. He was willing to pay a price for it.

His ethical philosophy was that nuclear capability is not a status symbol but a grave responsibility. It needed strategic silence and avoiding rhetoric that could provoke adversaries or attract unnecessary global attention. He clearly understood that self-promotion in this sensitive domain was counterproductive and dangerous. The success of Pakistan’s nuclear programme lay in the collective effort of a well-knit team in complete secrecy, not in individual accolades.

He never sought cheap popularity, denied himself newspaper headlines, and declined to advertise the Commission’s achievements. He kept a low profile and disliked anyone making provocative, inflammatory statements to grab headlines.

The brandishing of nuclear capability was anathema to him. He believed that bravado, brandishing nuclear capability or advertising achievements did not serve the national interest. A natural consequence of this worldview was that he and his team were not acknowledged for their work.

His commitment to restraint placed him at odds with those in positions of power. But he was not deterred and continued to be vocal in condemning nuclear rhetoric. Later, when talking about the former army chief’s public statement, he said, “Farhatullah, it was more than a lapse in judgment; it was a breach of trust.”

He viewed such declarations as reckless and an invitation to international sanctions. He foresaw adverse diplomatic fallout and the damage it could inflict. His frustration stemmed not only from the immediate consequences but also from the long-term implications of eroding the trust of global powers.

Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see the day when his warnings against the dangers of irresponsible nuclear behaviour proved true.

The world was shocked when, in 2006, Gen Pervez Musharraf disclosed in his memoirs, In the Line of Fire, how a clandestine proliferation network had been in existence in Pakistan for a long time, and blamed one lone individual for it. The network had actually been busted by the CIA in 2003, and Musharraf was forced to acknowledge it in his 2006 memoirs. Ignoring Munir’s warnings cost the nation dearly.

The legacy of restraint was both his formidable strength and a great burden. While it was meant to shield Pakistan’s nuclear programme from external threats, it also allowed his detractors to dominate the narrative. His posthumous recognition, with the highest civil award, was a bittersweet moment for his family and colleagues. It was a long-overdue acknowledgement of his role in placing Pakistan on the global nuclear map while also underscoring the quiet pain of a life spent in service without recognition.

His life is a powerful reminder of humility and restraint in leadership. When egos clash and ambitions run high, quiet dedication to the collective good is his enduring legacy. Prioritising responsibility over recognition and wisdom over bravado while remaining personally self-effacing shall resonate as his legacy.

Excerpted with permission from Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey by Farhatullah Babar, published by Lightstone Publishers

The writer is a former senator and served as the director of information at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) under Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan

Published in Dawn, EOS, January 11th, 2026
‘Good night and good luck’

Political and media landscapes are witnessing their own version of McCarthyism.
Published January 11, 2026 
DAWN

The writer is a security analyst.


MCCARTHYISM is a ghost that survives within political and institutional systems. It thrives on witch-hunts, rejects scrutiny, and shields itself with distorted logic, manufactured fears, and convenient lies. It brands itself as the custodian of ‘true patriotism’, while relegating all dissenters to the category of the less loyal. Today, this spectre is once again dominating parts of the world, including the US and Pakistan.

George Clooney’s Good Night, and Good Luck captures this phenomenon by revisiting the confrontation between journalist Edward R. Murrow and Senator Joseph McCarthy during the 1950s. The term ‘McCarthyism’ itself emerged from the senator’s methods, which included wild accusations hurled without proof, careers destroyed on suspicion, and a climate of fear promoted to silence critical voices.

Yet the film does not unfold McCarthy’s character as much as it peels back the layers of the newsroom. It shows how editorial boundaries, commercial pressures, and fear of losing business gradually suffocate journalistic courage. It reminds us that compromises do not arrive abruptly but creep in quietly. But it also shows that there is always a way out, a path that begins with vigilance, integrity and the refusal to accept intimidation.

Though set in the 1950s, Good Night, and Good Luck resonates with today’s local scenario in which political and media landscapes are witnessing their own version of McCarthyism where narratives are policed, loyalties questioned and fear weaponised. The film invites us to reflect not only on history, but on our own moment.

Political and media landscapes are witnessing their own version of McCarthyism.


An op-ed piece cannot do a full film review, and there is no plan to act as spoiler for those who have the film on their watch list. However, Cole Porter’s famous 1940s’ song, I’ve Got My Eyes On You, which also has the line ‘I’m checking all you do from A to Z’ has been masterfully used in the film and one can easily understand the context.

These are difficult times for journalism, especially the kind that once stood firmly against McCarthyism. The challenge intensifies when the media landscape drifts towards sensationalism and embraces the notion, as referenced in the film, that ‘yellow is better than red’. Those who attempt to expose strong-arm tactics today face familiar reprisals: loss of advertisements, government pressure, accusations of being unpatriotic, and even direct threats.

Yet vigilance makes all the difference. Logic, objectivity and professional reporting covering all essential angles of a story remain possible, though not without hardship. Whether in Gaza during Israel’s genocidal campaign against Palestinians, the recent events in Venezuela or the tragic incident in Minneapolis that law enforcement and President Donald Trump attempted to cover up, segments of the media have continued to perform their professional responsibilities despite immense pressure.

The world over, those subscribing to the tenets of McCarthyism, in every age, remain obsessed with the idea that hidden forces or subversive actors are out to destroy a nation. They believe only a coercive approach can confront such imagined threats. Witch-hunts become their tool; ‘witchcraft’ their political art. For those unfamiliar with the origins of this mentality, Europe’s experience between the 15th and 17th centuries is instructive. That era saw widespread accusations of witchcraft amid political instability, famine, disease, economic crises, and religious conflict. The clergy scapegoated ‘witches’ — mostly poor women — and Heinrich Kramer, a priest, authored the Hammer of Witches, a manual that claimed that the devil targeted women, especially those who defied husbands and social norms. Kramer weaponised fear with pseudo-logic, legitimising the witch trials that haunted Europe for nearly two centuries.

The ‘McCarthyism’ of any age depends on the same logic of ‘witchcraft’ and witch trials. If journalists or media groups anywhere come under pressure, the reason is often simple: they are challenging the McCarthyism of their time.

Pakistan has a long history of confronting a similar state-led approach — from sanctions and censorship under the Press and Publications Ordinance of 1960, which empowered the state to shut down newspapers and arrest journalists, to the pre-publication censorship imposed during the Bhutto and Zia regimes, and later the clampdowns, bans, and channel closures witnessed under Nawaz Sharif and Gen Pervez Musharraf. Since then, restrictions have only become more layered, whether under the PTI government or the PDM-led administrations.

Although a large proportion of media groups and even well-known journalists have compromised at various stages, a small but resilient community of journalists, along with a few strong-nerved media owners, has continued to challenge these pressures. Zameer Niazi documented much of this struggle, but in recent years, two important accounts have emerged from senior journalist Hussain Naqi. The first is his memoir, Mujh Se Jo Ho Saka, and the second is a compilation of an extended interview conducted by Dr Syed Jaffar Ahmed, published under the title Jurat-i-Inkaar. Both works capture not only Naqi’s personal journey but also the collective struggle that defines Pakistan’s political, social and journalistic history over the last seven decades.

This is, in many ways, a Pakistani version of Good Night and Good Luck, a narrative that deserves equal praise and could well be adapted into a screenplay. Hussain Naqi’s story makes one truth abundantly clear: subscribers to the McCarthy approach in successive Pakistani regimes have believed that the media is responsible for creating political instability and chaos. They succeeded in silencing the press for years, sometimes for entire decades, yet the country never escaped chronic instability.

Instead of reassessing their approach, they continue to rely on the same tactic of suppressing dissent, a strategy that has never produced the desired outcomes, nor is likely to in the future. The title of the film is borrowed from the famous line in Romeo and Juliet, ‘Good night, good night! Parting is such sweet sorrow”. But the film also subtly invokes another Shakespearean truth: “The fault … is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”


Published in Dawn, January 11th, 2026



Muhammad Amir Rana is a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.


Monday, December 29, 2025

Bangladesh's first female prime minister Khaleda Zia dies aged 80

Bangladesh’s former prime minister and opposition leader Khaleda Zia has died at the age of 80, her party said Tuesday, just months before elections many expected would return her to power. Her death ends a turbulent political career marked by imprisonment, ill health and a dramatic comeback attempt following the fall of her longtime rival Sheikh Hasina.


Issued on: 30/12/2025 
By: FRANCE 24

Khaleda Zia speaks during a press conference in Dhaka in March 2015. © Munir Uz Zaman, AFP

Bangladesh's former prime minister Khaleda Zia, who many believed would sweep elections next year to lead her country once again, died on Tuesday aged 80, her Bangladesh Nationalist Party said.

"The BNP Chairperson and former prime minister, the national leader Begum Khaleda Zia, passed away today at 6:00 am (0000 GMT), just after the Fajr (dawn) prayer," the party said in a statement.

"We pray for the forgiveness of her soul and request everyone to offer prayers for her departed soul," it added.

Despite years of ill health and imprisonment, Zia vowed in November to campaign in elections set for February 2026 -- the first vote since a mass uprising toppled her arch-rival Sheikh Hasina last year.

The BNP is widely seen as a frontrunner.

But in late November she was rushed to hospital, where, despite the best efforts of medics, her condition declined from a raft of health issues.

Nevertheless, hours before her death, party workers had on Monday submitted nomination papers on her behalf for three constituencies for the polls.

During her final days, interim leader Muhammad Yunus called for the nation to pray for Zia, calling her a "source of utmost inspiration for the nation".

BNP's media chief Moudud Alamgir Pavel also confirmed Zia's death to AFP.

Zia was jailed for corruption in 2018 under Hasina's government, which also blocked her from travelling abroad for medical treatment.

She was released last year, shortly after Hasina was forced from power.

There had been plans earlier this month to fly her on a special air ambulance to London, but her condition was not stable enough.

Her son, political heavyweight Tarique Rahman, only returned to Bangladesh after 17 years in self-imposed exile on Thursday, where he was welcomed back by huge crowds of joyous supporters.

READ MORE'Symbol of hope': Exiled Bangladesh opposition leader and PM hopeful Rahman returns ahead of polls

Rahman will lead the party through the February 12 general election, and is expected to be put forward as prime minister if his party wins a majority.

Bangladesh's Prothom Alo newspaper, who said that Zia had "earned the epithet of the 'uncompromising leader'", reported that Rahman and other family members were by her side at the time of her death.

"The lives of politicians are marked by rises and falls," the newspaper wrote on Tuesday.

"Lawsuits, arrests, imprisonment, persecution, and attacks by adversaries are far from uncommon. Khaleda Zia endured such ordeals at their most extreme."

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)


The rise and fall of Bangladesh's first woman PM Khaleda Zia

DW
30/12/2025

Bangladesh's first female prime minister, Khaleda Zia, who was once praised for restoring democracy and empowering millions of women, has died at the age of 80.



Khaleda Zia first came to power in 1991 (File photo: 2018)Image: Munir Uz Zaman/AFP/Getty Images

Khaleda Zia, who served as prime minister of Bangladesh for three terms, died on Tuesday morning at the age of 80.

Zia and her Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) were once hailed for playing a crucial role in transitioning the South Asian nation from military rule to democracy.

She served as prime minister of Bangladesh between 1991 and 1996, and between 2001 and 2006. She was the first woman to serve as prime minister of Bangladesh.

Zia had been sentenced to several years behind bars prior her death for alleged involvement in corruption charges that her party said were politically motivated.
Rise to politics

Zia entered politics after her husband, former president Ziaur Rahman, was assassinated in May 1981 during a military coup. Rahman had fought for Bangladesh's independence war from Pakistan in 1971, and formed the BNP party a few years prior his assassination.

Zia, who was a housewife at the time with no experience in politics, soon became one of the country's top leaders for her civilian political resistance against the then military regime.

Zia established a solid political alliance by including political parties from both the left and the right with her center-right party. She successfully forced the military regime to give up power by leading nationwide movements for democracy.

On February 27,1991, Zia's party won 140 of the 300 directly-elected seats during the national election and became the country's first female prime minister.
Empowering women

Zia helped increase literacy rates among girls and boosted job opportunities for women by providing free education and scholarships. She introduced daily free meals for students at schools across the country with help from foreign donors. During her tenures, those efforts have seen millions of girls enrolled in primary and secondary schools.

Zia also contributed to expanding the country's export-oriented garment industry.

"Now as Prime Minister, Mrs. Zia, in contrast with Benazir Bhutto when she first became Prime Minister of Pakistan, is aggressively promoting education and vocational training, especially of girls, and expanding small-scale, no-collateral lending to increase the self-sufficiency of women," journalist Barbara Crossette wrote in the New York Times in November 1993.

US Forbes magazine, which included Zia as one of the 100 world's most powerful women for several years during her leadership between 2001 and 2006, wrote, "Once a shy and withdrawn housewife, Zia has revitalized the education sector, particularly for young girls."

Laila Noor Islam, a professor at Dhaka University, told DW Zia will be remembered for changing the social and political landscape of Bangladesh.

"People will remember her for introducing the parliamentary system of democracy in her country, for creating export-oriented readymade garment factories where hundreds of thousands of women got jobs, for introducing free primary education for all, and developing the caretaker government system for conducting free and fair national elections," she said.

Archrival Sheikh Hasina


Soon upon entering politics, Zia became the archrival of Sheikh Hasina, the top leader of the center-left Awami League (AL) party and in power since 2008.

They are often called "the Battling Begums" – "begum" refers to a Muslim woman of high rank – for their longs-standing rivalry, which split the country's political arena into two, one led by Hasina's AL, the other by Zia's BNP.

"When I hear the name Khaleda Zia, what comes to mind is "Hasina's rival." Zia and Hasina have had such a long and bitter rivalry, and it's been amplified by the fact that they've dominated Bangladeshi politics for so long," Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, told DW.

"And given that their respective families comprise the country's two political dynasties, the rivalry also is embedded in the core political history of Bangladesh," he added.

Corruption allegations

Zia was convicted in a graft case in February 2018 and later in a separate corruption case. The politician was accused of misusing her power by embezzling some $250,000 (€240,000) in donations meant for an orphanage trust.

The BNP maintains the cases were fabricated to keep Zia out of politics, allegations denied by Hasina's government.

Over the past decade, more than 180,000 legal cases have also been filed against nearly four million BNP members, according to the party's count. The data shows that more than 600 party members have been abducted, and around 3,000 were victims of extrajudicial killings at the hands of authorities during the same period.

In 2020, her prison sentence was converted to house arrest before she was released again in 2024 after the fall of her rival Sheikh Hasina's government.

Political downfall

Zia, an advocate of democracy, slowly lost her ground by failing to form solid political resistance against the Hasina government.

"Khaleda Zia has made a lot of mistakes in the last decade. Boycotting elections led to missed opportunities. More importantly, she opted to play the role of a disruptive and confrontational opposition without seeking a middle ground, and this led to a lot of burned bridges," Kugelman said.

"It also led to her party resorting to violence at times, which didn't help its cause. Additionally, her decision to align herself with Islamist political parties [at times], especially those with hardline elements cost her and her party support from those that uphold the idea of a secular and moderate Bangladesh," he added.

Asif Nazrul, a professor at Dhaka University, believes Zia's downfall should also be attributed to her unwillingness to gain the confidence of India and foreign diplomats who could have pushed Hasina to conduct a fair and inclusive national election.

"Zia's decision not to meet Indian President Pranab Mukherjee in Dhaka in 2013, and refusing the offer of Sheikh Hasina regarding election-time government in the same year, have heavily cost her political career," Nazrul told DW.

"She has failed to win the heart of Dhaka-based elite intellectuals and western diplomats," he added. "Her failure to stop the people in BNP and its allies in harboring separatists fighting the Indian government in the past also made her weaker over time."

But Zia's fight for democracy will be remembered for years to come, said Nazrul.

"Zia could have flown to other countries during political uncertainties in 2006 and 2007, and during her trial in the last years,” Nazrul said. "She was aged and very ill, and despite knowing the likelihood of her suffering, she did not bow to the Hasina government and took any chance of leaving the country."



Arafatul Islam Multimedia journalist focusing on Bangladeshi politics, human rights and migration.

Monday, December 22, 2025

PAKISTAN

THE ASSASSINATION OF LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

 First prime minister of Pakistan


Farooq Babrakzai 
Published December 21, 2025 
EOS/DAWN


(Figures: from left to right) Former prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan, his killer Said Akbar, and Maj Gen Akbar Khan — who plotted a coup against Liaquat Ali Khan. (Background) The public rally at Rawalpindi’s Company Bagh on October 16, 1951, during which Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated

In a mystery, the sleuth must be believably involved and emotionally invested in solving the crime. — Diane Mott Davidson

On Tuesday, 16 October, 1951, around 4 pm, the first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, was going to address a public meeting in Company Garden in Rawalpindi. As he walked to the microphone and uttered the words“Baraadaraan-i-Millat” [Brothers of the Nation], a man named Said Akbar, sitting on the ground near the dais, fired two bullets at him in rapid succession with a 9mm semi-automatic pistol.

Chaos and mayhem suddenly erupted in the meeting. Khan Najaf Khan, the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had personally supervised the security arrangements, yelled in Pashto, “Who fired the shots? Shoot [him]!”. Within seconds, a police inspector, Mohammad Shah, came running with his service revolver drawn and shot Said Akbar five times at close range, in such a haphazard manner that he missed one shot altogether.

As Said Akbar was lying on the ground dying, he was also stabbed more than 26 times with spears by Muslim League volunteers. The recording equipment of Radio Pakistan was on and captured the sounds of the firing and the chaos for one minute and 13 seconds, and then fell silent. The entire shooting episode ended within 48 seconds. The recording is available online. Liaquat Ali Khan was taken to the Combined Military Hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.


The assassin, Said Akbar, was my father, who had come to Rawalpindi from Abbottabad on 14 October.


One of Pakistan’s founding fathers and the country’s first prime minister was assassinated at a public gathering 74 years ago. Despite the formation of an Inquiry Commission and two other police investigations — one by Scotland Yard — until today, there has been no satisfactory closure regarding those tragic events. Now, the son of the assassin has penned his own investigation into the events in the shape of a book, which provides, for the first time ever, his family’s perspective as well as delves into the weaknesses of the official accounts and spans Pakistan’s tumultuous history — from the first war over Kashmir, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and internal friction within the new state’s functionaries. 

Eos presents, with permission, excerpts from The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952 by Farooq Babrakzai, published by Vanguard Books…




INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

Neither the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) nor the police personnel had any prior knowledge of Said Akbar’s presence in Rawalpindi, let alone at the public meeting. All police and CID claims about keeping Said Akbar under surveillance in Rawalpindi for three days prior to the murder, upon close examination, turned out to be false; stories that were fabricated after the tragedy. No CID or police official was able to establish Said Akbar’s identity in the public meeting.

Soon after the incident, Inspector Abrar Ahmad went around checking hotels in Rawalpindi Saddar to see if Said Akbar had stayed in any of them, when, after two hours, he got lucky at Grand Hotel, where Said Akbar was staying. The hotel clerk immediately identified and confirmed that the body was that of Said Akbar, who was staying at the hotel. That led police to Abbottabad and, by nightfall, with the help of a few men from the neighbourhood, they arrived at Said Akbar’s home.

Said Akbar’s eldest son, 11-year-old Dilawar Khan, was with the father in Rawalpindi, and was sitting in front of him in the public meeting. He heard the shots and saw the prime minister fall. He turned around to ask father why the prime minister had fallen and what was happening and saw the chaos erupting and people attacking his father. He got scared and ran away, leaving his shoes behind.

The assassination of the prime minister was a sudden, unexpected and shocking event for Pakistan. In the days following the incident, when the police and the CID officials started to examine the circumstances of the crime, they had no prior information about the incident, no relevant intelligence reports, and no leads to follow.


A copy of the only photo of Said Akbar that survived the searches conducted by the police. The picture shows him dressed like a Khaksar | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952



COMMISSION OF INQUIRY


On 25 October 1951, the government appointed a ‘Commission of Inquiry’, consisting of Mr Justice Mohammad Munir, judge of the Federal Court, as the president, and Mr Akhtar Hussein, Financial Commissioner, Punjab, as his associate. The Commission examined 66 witnesses in 38 sessions, 23 in Lahore and 15 in Rawalpindi. Four months later, on 28 February 1952, the Commission submitted its report to the chief secretary, Government of Punjab. From the final version of the report, 73 names, clauses and sentences were omitted, mostly for security reasons. This obfuscated the report and made it look quite weak.

The Commission looked at five major factors to see if they had any bearing on the assassination. It examined at length various documents about Said Akbar, from January 1947, when he and his older brother, Mazrak Zadran, surrendered to the British authorities in North Waziristan, till October 1951.

These pertained to their detention under the Bengal Regulation III of 1818, which determined their official status, starting in British India and then in Pakistan, and records of all the places they visited in Pakistan. Nearly all of this was irrelevant to the tragedy in Rawalpindi as the Commission did not find any valuable clues in Said Akbar’s travels, his contacts with people, and his lifestyle.

Next, the Commission examined the security arrangements at the public meeting, the circumstances under which the prime minister was killed, and recorded statements by witnesses. In some cases, after much rambling discussions, the Commission concluded that certain CID and police personnel made false statements. High-ranking officials, such as Khan Najaf Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Rawalpindi, gave evasive answers to questions of the Commission. It was Najaf Khan who suggested, supervised and approved the security arrangements at the public meeting.

Other officials either lied or gave exaggerated accounts to the Commission to protect themselves. Inspector Mohammad Shah, who had shot and killed Said Akbar, was not questioned by the Commission.



The weapon Said Akbar used for the assassination was a semi-automatic pistol of this model, German-made 9mm Walther P38, which he had bought from a tribesman in 1948, who was returning from the war in Kashmir | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952



POSSIBLE MOTIVES


The Commission also examined possible motives for the crime. It considered three: first, that Said Akbar killed the prime minister in a fit of insanity, but could not find any evidence to support it.

Second, he did so out of resentment over the prime minister’s policy regarding Kashmir. In fact, some time in the summer of 1951, Said Akbar had volunteered to raise a lashkar [band of fighters], pay for their food and other expenses, and lead them in the jihad to liberate Kashmir, but the Commission considered Said Akbar’s offer a “hoax” and rejected it.

Third, that he did not like the un-Islamic lifestyle of the prime minister and because his wife, Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, did not observe purdah [veil] in public. But this also turned out to be a baseless story.

It then examined various theories of conspiracy to see if Said Akbar was part of any of them but did not provide details of any conspiracy and discarded each of them and, in fact, stated its inability to uncover any conspiracy.

Police searched Said Akbar’s home three times and took away all items they considered important, including books, documents, air gun, money, mother’s gold, photos etc. A summary of the items was given in the Inquiry Report.

The public was not satisfied with the findings of the Commission because it failed to fulfil its own mandate and provide transparent answers to the very questions it was tasked to investigate. The two important questions for which the Commission could not find answers were: what was Said Akbar’s motive? And if the murder was the result of conspiracy, then who were his accomplices?

POLICE INVESTIGATIONS


The task of the Commission was to examine the circumstances of the crime, and not to identify any individuals who might be implicated, because that was the task of criminal investigation by police.

There was only one police investigation conducted in 1951-2, in Lahore, when our family was taken there. We were kept there for about five months, during which time mother was questioned through an interpreter. It was this investigation that the Inquiry Commission alluded to but gave no details, as it was on-going at that time.

Scotland Yard’s official Cecil Edwin U’ren referred to the same investigation as “headed by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein, Superintendent of Police, CID, Lahore, and his team.” He quoted extensively from the Munir-Hussein Inquiry Report, but did not include any information from Chaudhry Hussein’s report and, what is more, did not even discuss his own conclusion with him.

The public and the media raised further questions about the U’ren report. The prime minister’s widow, Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, strongly reacted to the U’ren Report and raised several questions, but no one in Pakistan, whether the police, politicians or journalists, provided satisfactory answers.

The report by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein and his team allegedly got destroyed when the plane carrying the police Inspector General Etezazuddin, crashed in August 1952. But curiously, Scotland Yard’s official Cecil Edwin U’ren was given access to it in 1954-5. That is because the documents pertaining to the investigation were safe and available. All the statements about the documents being destroyed were deliberate attempts by the government to protect unnamed army officers and government officials, and divert public attention from the case.

Said Akbar's eldest son, Dilawar Khan (pictured above in 2019 at the age of 79 in the suburbs of Abbottabad), was sitting in front of Said Akbar when he killed Liaquat Ali Khan | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952


MY INVESTIGATIONS


The Inquiry Report at best described the circumstances under which the prime minister was killed. It provided sufficient background information for me to see the gaps and discrepancies in the description of events and flow of information. The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan was the result of a well-planned conspiracy by the plotters. Said Akbar indeed had accomplices in Abbottabad, in Rawalpindi, and right at the public meeting on 16 October, 1951.

This work is driven by numerous questions that are explored in the chapters of the book. These are questions that have been asked multiple times since 1951, but not answered truthfully. For example, why would Khan Najaf Khan yell an order in Pashto at the public meeting in Rawalpindi, to shoot the person who fired the shots?

How did Dilawar Khan, Said Akbar’s son, come up with the story that his father had seen Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi in a dream on 13 October, 1951, who told Said Akbar to kill Liaquat Ali Khan? In fact, it was the police who repeatedly instructed Dilawar what to say and how to answer investigators’ questions.

Because the police had to find a motive for the crime, they invented the story of Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi and put it in Dilawar’s head. The police created that story from a document taken from Said Akbar’s home during one of the searches, which had names of Muslim warriors, including Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi, written on it.

Over the decades, the Liaquat Ali Khan murder turned into a mystery, the result of some deep-rooted conspiracy, which no one seriously attempted to solve. The major reason was the investigation report by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein that was deliberately never made public, and no other truthful statements came from the government. The Munir-Hussein inquiry and that by U’ren of the Scotland Yard went in two different directions, while exploring the same incident.

The former did not answer the questions it formulated to explore. The latter concluded that Said Akbar committed the crime because he was socially isolated, void of any reasoning, and had inherited some kind of criminal genes.

For me, it has been like solving a dozen separate but related puzzles, in which each one the actors played different roles. But when connected, the small puzzles make a giant puzzle, one that sheds light on the dark corners of the tragedy and attempts to provide transparent answers.

KASHMIR AND SAID AKBAR

The goal of the book is to find the hard and transparent answers of the case in plain and easy language. It attempts to inform and educate the readers and let them rethink and have a fresh look at history.

It neither glorifies Liaquat Ali Khan as a martyr nor condemns Said Akbar as the assassin. Here Liaquat Ali Khan is presented as a politician who had both his loyal followers and rivals in the government, but he also committed blunders, particularly his decision to accept the ceasefire agreement in Kashmir, which also sealed his fate.

The prime minister was a refugee from India, and Said Akbar was a refugee from Afghanistan, who had no personal grudge against the prime minister and no motive to kill him. He had no cultural roots in Pakistan and was not savvy in Pakistani politics. But he became interested in the Kashmir war solely because the social and political atmosphere in Pakistan was awash with pro-Islamic and anti-Hindu speeches, media stories and Friday’s sermons in mosques.

The constant clamour of jihad to liberate Kashmir from Hindu-domination naturally influenced young Said Akbar, who had seen Kashmiri refugees in Abbottabad and the Pashtun tribesmen who went to fight in Kashmir.

Religion played a nominal role in Said Akbar’s life in Afghanistan as, over the centuries, Islam had been adapted and blended with Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of social and moral conduct. Being a good Pashtun naturally meant being a good Muslim. In Pakistan, he became interested in religion starting in mid-1949 and began to learn about Islam, but his goal was personal and pragmatic, not scholarly.

He sought meaning in his life, to make sense of the social and political turmoil in Pakistan, and to understand the fervour of jihad in Kashmir through religion and Iqbal’s poetry. These provided the justification for jihad in a simple and pragmatic sense.

It is important to note that the ceasefire agreement in Kashmir came into effect on 1 January, 1949, and hostilities stopped. However, Said Akbar’s interest in jihad started in mid-1949. Curiously, this is also the period when Maj Gen Akbar Khan, ringleader of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, first spoke openly about overthrowing Liaquat Ali Khan’s government.

Said Akbar knew many tribal fighters from his Zadran tribe, some of whom visited him. It was during this period that Said Akbar became acquainted with men who were active in the war in Kashmir, and those who hated the ceasefire agreement that the prime minister had accepted, and therefore lost the chance to march on to Srinagar.

Some of these people eventually persuaded Said Akbar, in the summer of 1951, to assassinate the prime minister and, in the process, became his accomplices and facilitators.

I have taken it upon myself as my moral and ethical duty to uncover the truth to the best of my ability. It is something that I owe to the people of Pakistan, to my family, and to myself, while living thousands of miles away in the United States.

THE RAWALPINDI CONSPIRACY

Political assassinations are well-planned, meticulous operations by the plotters, their accomplices, facilitators, and those who carry out the deeds. Secrecy is the key to the success of such operations. Whether the crime is successfully committed or it fails, the news, stories and conspiracies later become part of public discussions. The plotters and accomplices remain hidden from the public eye. That is what happened in October 1951.

The Rawalpindi Conspiracy was the first coup attempt to topple the government of Liaquat Ali Khan and eliminate him. But it failed. On 9 March, 1951, the ringleader, Maj Gen Akbar Khan, and his collaborators were arrested. That was because, earlier in February, an insider of Akbar Khan’s group, Inspector Askar Ali, CID Peshawar, informed I.I. Chundrigar, governor of North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), who informed the prime minister.

The documents of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy presented in the court showed that “late Hon’ble Liaquat Ali Khan, along with his personal attendants… would be called and cleared.” That is, arrested and executed. The list also included the name of the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen Ayub Khan, who “was shocked that he was to be shot.” When the first attempt failed, many officers thought of taking a bold action.

In the second week of May (1951), Maj Hassan met some other officers in Rawalpindi who were also apprehending arrest, and there was some talk of confronting the authorities and taking some desperate step. But the idea was given up. There was no leadership, and the suspected officers were far too demoralised and isolated from the top command to undertake the dangerous course of mutiny.

The trial of those accused in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy started on 15 June, 1951 and, four months later, on 16 October, 1951, the prime minister was assassinated in the same city.

I came across the Munir-Hussein Inquiry Report (1952) in the Asia Collection of Hamilton Library at University of Hawai’i at Manoa, in 1998. Since 2007, I have read the Report many times and re-read parts of it more than 30 to 35 times, taking copious notes on small individual events. In the process, it started to dawn on me that there were discrepancies in the recording of many events.

In 2010, I bought a copy of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. Many events described in the book coincided with changes in Said Akbar’s life, and some of the people mentioned in the book were also known to Said Akbar.Liaquat 


Ali Khan stands to the left of Maj Gen Akbar Khan, who points with his stick towards the Pandu area in Kashmir in January 1949: Maj Gen Akbar Khan would eventually become the ringleader of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, a coup attempt to topple the government of Liaquat Ali Khan and eliminate him | The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952


THE U’REN REPORT

In November 2016, I went to London to visit the British Library and Scotland Yard, looking for a copy of Cecil Edwin U’ren’s Report (1955). After a few days of searching, I was told that the report was in the National Archive. About a month later, the National Archive put the photocopy of the report on a website and allowed me access to it for a fee.

I finally downloaded a photocopy of the report as it was published in Dawn on 25 June, 1955, along with other related documents, and the response by Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, the widow of the prime minister to the U’ren Report. The report is a photocopy of the columns in Dawn and does not have chapters and page numbers.

U’ren concluded that Said Akbar alone plotted to assassinate Liaquat Ali Khan, and that no one else was involved in any conspiracy. His report exonerated the police officials, satisfied the politicians, but very cleverly avoided getting involved in the controversies of the case. He expressed sympathy with police personnel for the undue duty-related stress they had to suffer during the investigation. He spuriously questioned Inspector Mohammad Shah, who had shot and killed Said Akbar, and did not even meet Khan Najaf Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police.

The only valuable piece of information in the U’ren Report was that the police investigation conducted in 1951-2 was not destroyed in the plane crash in August 1952, because U’ren was given access to it in 1954-5.

U’ren considered Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein a highly competent police officer, whose team had conducted the only criminal investigation of the case. However, he did not quote any information from Chaudhry Hussein’s report. In other words, the U’ren report did not uncover a single piece of fresh and relevant evidence. His own conclusion was based on evidence that was skewed and faulty and had no bearing on the assassination of the prime minister. In short, his conclusion amounted to another cover-up.

Epilogue

There are also other sides to the story. Journalists and writers continue to write on Liaquat Ali’s murder and narrate at length his life and achievements as prime minister, and how his widow, Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, was later sent abroad as ambassador. But there has never been a shred of objective information about Said Akbar before October 1951, and about his family after that.

Hasan Zaheer, author of The Time and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, stated:

In March 1995, I wrote to the former prime minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, requesting permission to consult the official records of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and related background materials for this study. I thank her for graciously acceding to my request.

I personally would like to examine the investigation report by Chaudhry Mohammad Hussein and his team and other related documents of the assassination of the prime minister, which have been collecting dust in some government archives. However, in the current political atmosphere of Pakistan and the fact that I am an American citizen, it would require authorisation by high government officials and sincere cooperation of others. Something I cannot count on.

I realise that certain events are described more than once in different chapters of the book because each chapter analyses one or more related questions of the case and describes the characters and the different roles they played in the tragedy. All events eventually culminated in the killing of Liaquat Ali Khan and Said Akbar in less than a minute.

The author is the third son of Said Akbar, the assassin of Liaquat Ali Khan, and was born in North Waziristan. He lived and studied in Abbottabad, Kabul, Beirut and Honolulu, where he completed his doctorate in linguistics. He has taught in Hawai’i, Muscat and Beijing and at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. He currently lives in California in the US

Excerpted with permission from The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan: 1947-1952 by Farooq Babrakzai and published by Vanguard Books

Published in Dawn, EOS, December 21st, 2025


Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Making martyrs

November 19, 2025 
DAWN

AS far as the anointed go, saints in the Sufi tradition have it easy. You could be declared one in life and then continue to dispense generosity and blessings from the afterlife. Martyrdom, on the other hand, has a significant drawback: it must be earned with one’s life, as the ‘immortal’ status can only be awarded posthumously, in all traditions. It’s strange, then, that martyrdom, a status considered far higher than any other, can be granted to anyone these days.

The right-wing, MAGA influencer Cha­r­lie Kirk, who was shot dead at a rally on the University of Utah campus in September this year, is being fashioned as a martyr. The NYT recently ran a piece on the req­uired ingredients for a good martyr, especially for conscription into an immediate political purpose. It listed public, dramatic, and innocent deaths, a cause attached to them, and a movement to glorify and capitalise on them, as a must for this recipe.

The word ‘shaheed’(martyr) inspires awe, passion, admiration, and absolute respect. Before any competing words, tropes, and honorifics are introduced, consider the context of this piece: the transcendence of this Arabic word into not just the vocabulary of non-Arabic speakers but also into their body politic, narratives, identities and collective conscience. As long as it was attached to an Abu this and a Bin that, it could be hung on the obsession of ‘Islamist fundamentalists’ with the promised afterlife, as opposed to the ‘rationalist fascists’’ rejection of anything beyond the material world. The lines seem to be blurring now.

Street-corner banners could be seen in Surrey, British Columbia, proclaiming ‘Shaheed Jathedar Hardeep Singh Nijjar’. Singh was a Sikh separatist shot dead in Canada in front of the Guru Nanak Gurdwara in June 2023. The Indian government claimed that lax policing and appeasement of domestic votes had made Canada a safe space for ‘jihadists’. Some may see it as cultural appropriation, and others as their handlers’ stamp on Sikh separatist movements for invoking shahadat. It’s important to remember, however, that in Sikh history, the fifth Guru, Arjun, is considered the first shaheed. He was tortured to death during the Mughal emperor Jehangir’s reign for refusing to renounce his faith.

The origin of the word ‘shaheed’ comes from ‘shahadat’, which means to bear witness. In the context of martyrdom, it is closely tied to monotheistic faith and, by extension, the concept of the afterlife. Sacrificing one’s life to fulfil duties stemming from the verbal shahadat grants the individual the status of Shaheed — the highest a believer can aim for — promising eternal life and companionship of the holiest on the Day of Judgement. While this idea has inspired some who believe they are fighting for a just cause to face unimaginable challenges, its misuse has also led to the rise of suicide bombers.

It’s strange that martyrdom can be granted to anyone these days.

Invoking martyrdom turns victims into heroes whose reward is hoped to be in the afterlife, making current calls for justice seem petty. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s execution in 1979, although widely regarded as a judicial murder, has not been overturned by a court of law. In the court of public opinion, at least among his supporters, he has long been considered a shaheed. A university established to honour his legacy includes the suffix ‘Shaheed’ in its name, as does a political party founded by his son after he broke ties with his sister, Benazir. Yet, his most notable creation, the Pakistan Peoples Party, recently sought to have a resolution passed by the National Ass­e­mbly declaring ZAB a ‘national martyr’. Strangely, his nemesis and tormentor, Ziaul Haq, the military dictator under whom Bhutto was executed, is also portrayed as a shaheed. The MQM has designated a graveyard in Karachi as Shuhuda Qabristan (martyrs’ cemetery), where party workers and leaders, particularly those who suffered violence, are buried.

As we consider the idea of supreme sacrifice and eternal redemption in the afterlife, it’s natural to think about the exemption from prosecution in this life that beneficiaries of immunity might enjoy. While our parliament has currently limited such exemptions to a few individuals, the Israeli Knesset, in March 2023, debated a bill from far-right factions calling for immunity from prosecution for all soldiers. The reason behind this proposed exemption is that all soldiers risk their lives, and the fear of legal action and consequences might prevent them from performing their duties without fear. The bill was put on hold. Opponents of the proposal, including the attorney general, pointed out that such legislation could leave exempted individuals vulnerable to international prosecution, including at the International Court of Justice.

The writer is a poet. His latest publication is a collection of satire essays titled Rindana.

shahzadsharjeel1@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, November 19th, 2025

Friday, November 14, 2025

 

Forging the steel of unity: Left politics in contemporary Pakistan

Jahmoor graphic

First published at Jamhoor.

Jamhoor has published two articles that explicitly attack the position and politics of the Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP), particularly our stance during the recent Indo-Pak war. While both articles took an unnecessarily hostile and polemical tone to mischaracterize HKP’s position, they nonetheless provide an opportunity for dialogue on the ideological and political divergences within Pakistan’s Left. I engage in this debate in the spirit of propelling the discussion forward on how to reconstruct a Left capable of meeting the challenges of the contemporary moment.

In this article, I make three broad interventions. First, I respond to Ayyaz Malick’s criticism of our positions, exposing the ahistorical and, ultimately, apolitical character of his argument. Second, I engage with Syed Azeem and Umar Ali’s polemic, demonstrating how it represents a messianic form of politics that takes flight from any concrete reality (or even possibility), an analytical framework that can only end in disappointment and dissolution. Both perspectives, I argue, only worsen the paralysis and disorientation of the Left at a moment when the decaying imperialist system is preparing for wars of annihilation in the global South and social movements struggle to forge popular unity. Finally, I argue that the way forward for the Left in Pakistan is to simultaneously address the concerns of sovereignty, imperialist intervention and internal repression, with all the contradictions that such a task entails.

Contradictions abound

Mallick’s article levels a number of allegations against HKP without either justifying his claims or addressing the key issues at stake. The title of his essay, “Anti-Imperialism and Geopolitical Binaries,” encapsulates his central charge: that we “reduce everything happening” to geopolitical rivalries between the US and China. Yet, he offers no proof for this sweeping claim. This lack of evidence for what is presumably his primary argument stems from the simple fact that HKP’s position on the Indo-Pak war was not based on the US-China rivalry. Instead, it was a response to the very real threat posed to the region by Indian belligerence and grounded in Pakistan’s right to self-defense. His mischaracterization then enables a series of further accusations, including calling our multi-ethnic leadership “Lahori Left,” “jingoistic” and “chauvinist”, and participates in the long tradition of sectarianism that has crippled the Left in Pakistan.

Let us briefly recount the core of his analysis. He claims that a “sub-imperialist power” (India), endowed with both the ambition and the capability (hence, sub-imperialist) to establish regional hegemony and guided by an ideology (Hindutva) he deems worse than Zionism, launched an attack on a neighbouring country (Pakistan) — a state whose political economy is shaped by opportunistic rent-seeking and which has a sordid record of internal repression, primarily in its peripheries. Note that he describes Hindutva as an ideology worse than Zionism, a force that has not only perpetrated genocide in Gaza, but has also participated in the destruction of several countries across the Middle East. As with most wars of aggression since the onset of the unipolar order, we are faced here — in the case of both Zionism and Hindutva — with hegemonic powers seeking to establish hegemony over countries ruled by repressive governments. This is hardly an ideal configuration, but historical contradictions seldom appear in neat moral binaries. Actual history unfolds through such contradictions — constantly in motion, colliding and recombining — producing unexpected situations that demand difficult, and at times tragic, political choices.

Any serious political commentator can decipher that the primary question raised by this collision of contradictions is whether the weaker country, despite its neo-colonial structure, retains the right to defend itself. No answer to such a question would be ideal. Does the Iranian government, with its long record of repression against Leftists, women and minorities, have a right to defend itself when attacked ferociously by a genocidal Zionist entity, backed by the US? Did this right not also extend to Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and other states that were far from ideal? What should be the stance of the Left when a (sub-)imperialist power unleashes its violence to turn these civilizations into vast wastelands?

One can immediately identify the difficult nature of these questions, and why they have long divided the Left, as the challenge of sustaining external sovereignty collides with ongoing struggles for internal justice. But this is precisely the contradictory terrain upon which history unfolds, the ground from which events erupt that demand decisions from political actors. The perplexing element of Mallick’s writing, however, is that he simply evades the key question confronted by the Left in the aftermath of Indian aggression. By his own account, an Israel-backed sub-imperialist power (worse than Zionism) attacked Pakistan in pursuit of regional hegemony. Yet, astonishingly, this historical conflagration does not, for him, merit a concrete political stance beyond polite calls for “peace and self-determination,” abstractions that no one can dispute in principle (HKP both called for peace and welcomed the ceasefire). He unfortunately retreats into the comfort of “safe scholarship,” avoiding the inconvenient necessity of decision when confronted with an actual historical situation. 

The Haqooq-e-Khalq Party did not evade this question. On each of these occasions, our party has upheld the right of countries to defend their sovereignty against foreign aggression. While we called for peace throughout the conflict with India and welcomed the ceasefire, we were pleased when Pakistan was able to curb the attack (with Chinese support) by a government led by genocidal maniacs whose spokespersons were calling for turning Pakistan into Gaza. India’s use of Israeli-made drones deep into Pakistani territory left little doubt about its intent. Similarly, we were not ashamed to cheer when Iranian missiles hit targets in Israeli territories, which provided a brief moment of joy to Palestinians enduring genocide as the world shamefully watched. Intellectuals should not pretend that they were the only ones calling for peace while others were excited about the prospect of war between the two nuclear-armed rivals. The bitter truth is that, faced with a belligerent, fascistic, and expansionist neighbour intent on aggression—and with no peace movement in India to challenge its belligerence — the restoration of military equilibrium by the Pakistan Air Force was the only means of securing even a tenuous peace in the region. 

It is difficult to see what conclusion other than upholding Pakistan’s right to self-defense could follow from Mallick’s own analysis of the balance of forces involved. Yet, he substitutes the urgency of decision with oscillation between pedantic analysis of Pakistan’s political economy as an opportunistic rentier state and impassioned rhetoric about the corrosive impacts of military intervention in the political sphere, particularly in the peripheries. His underlying suggestion seems to be that by recognizing the right to self-defense, the Left relinquishes its own right to criticize the state. Yet, he provides no justification for this claim, relying instead on sweeping statements — such as accusing HKP of “war patriotism” that supposedly takes “no consideration” for the concerns of those in the periphery.

This is an extraordinary accusation, which Mallick does not even attempt to justify beyond rhetorical hyperbole. By what principle of politics, let alone of dialectical thought, does upholding a country’s right to self-defense automatically mean forfeiting any “consideration” of the state’s excesses? Did the Soviet Union’s alliance with Britain and the US (two regressive imperialist powers) in the fight against Nazi annihilation mean that it thereby forever lost the right to fight imperialism? Did Mao’s decision to join forces with the Kuomintang government to defend China’s sovereignty against Japanese invasion permanently disqualify him from attacking the militarism, warlordism, and feudalism exemplified by that same Kuomintang? Or, to take another example, did extending support to the French partisans defending their territorial sovereignty against Nazi forces amount to endorsing French colonialism then ravaging Africa and East Asia

Indeed, in each case, the fulfillment of the immediate objectives of wartime alliances at the end of the Second World War gave rise to the re-emergence of older conflicts: the onset of the Cold War, the acceleration of the Chinese civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and the intensification of anti-colonial revolts against British, French, and Portuguese colonial rule. If such tactical alliances, which included the sharing of military and intelligence resources, did not foreclose the possibility of future conflicts, why would HKP’s public statements on a 3-day conflict prevent us from critiquing and resisting militarized forms of capitalism in Pakistan?

In fact, HKP members proudly remain among the most prominent Left critics of the current hybrid regime, from opposing the Pakistani state’s suicidal policies in Afghanistan to providing legal aid to persecuted PTI political workers; from exposing exploitative mineral deals with the US to organizing with Sindhi and Punjabi farmers against the establishment-backed resource grabs in the name of corporate farming. Recently, we organized protests against Pakistani state repression in Kashmir as part of our firm commitment to the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination. Our criticisms of the Pakistani military do not make us Indian agents, just as upholding Pakistan’s right to self-defense does not make us its allies. It merely means that, rather than remaining captive to fixed analytical categories, we are responding to contradictions as they collide and transform in an actual historical situation. Those who find this delicate dialectic too exhausting — and who desire an absolute Manichean division between good and evil—will never develop a strategic orientation adequate to a terrain riven by multiple contradictions. Or to quote Lenin, “whoever wishes to see a pure social revolution will never live to see it.

Messianic expectations

Before commenting on the substance of Azeem and Ali’s argument, it is again important to underline the unfortunately hostile and accusatory tone of the article. For example, they present HKP’s participation in elections as evidence that the party has “sidelin[ed] ongoing people’s struggles” in order to “enter mainstream national politics in Pakistan as a ‘big-tent’ progressive and social democratic party.” Proof of this supposed shift? None whatsoever. A quick glance at our social media platforms is enough to show the kinds of activities we have been engaged in over the past year. In any case, no Left group in Pakistan (including HKP) can credibly claim to have become the vector of people’s struggles in the country, let alone to have developed hegemony in society. Thus, we must be guided by humility and camaraderie as we rebuild a Left decimated by state repression and debilitating sectarian attitudes.

Let us then focus on two key differences with our comrades that are crucial to the reconstruction of the Left. The first concerns their dismissal of the Left’s central role in Pakistan’s mass struggles for democracy as “tailism,” “NGOism” or “liberalism”. In particular, they single out the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a popular front against the counter-revolutionary, US-backed dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, as emblematic of this supposedly compromised politics. Consider how they suggest that the “traditional Left’s” incorrect positions led it to “eventually merging with the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in the 1980s and arriving at their final ideological destination of NGOs and human rights by the 1990s and 2000s.”

Again, we are not provided any reason to believe why participating in a mass alliance for democracy against a brutal military dictatorship somehow necessitated NGOs as the “final destination” of the Left. This logical leap appears even more suspect when one considers the rich history of sacrifice, including imprisonment and martyrdom, made by Left activists throughout the 1980s. Yet this dismissal offers a window into our divergence on the question of democratic rights, which seems to underlie the thinking of the two LUMS professors.

The history of democratic struggles has never rested on the generosity of feudal or bourgeois classes or their imperialist backers. Even in Europe, the expansion of mass democracy — including the extension of suffrage to workers, women, and minorities — was won through militant organizing from below, and was often met with severe state repression. Lenin was keenly aware of this when he criticized the British Left for its disinterest in electoral politics, regarding such abstention as a form of escapism from the terrain of actually existing struggles. The question of democratic rights is even more contentious in the postcolony, where the ruling classes’ preferred mode of governance is to suspend juridical rights, a condition re-inforced by countless CIA-backed military coups against democratically elected governments across the global South.

The situation in Pakistan is no different, as Washington identified the military as its preferred strategic partner in the region in the 1950s, setting in motion the decimation of left-wing and progressive organizations in the first decade of the nascent state. This explains why the first wave of mass struggles against the authoritarian Ayub regime was led by Left-wing student groups and trade unions. Pakistan’s current Constitution emerged from these struggles for dignity and equality, combined with the courage of Bangladeshis in resisting the genocidal violence unleashed by the state. This fragile achievement was reversed by the US-backed Zia dictatorship, which made the formation of the MRD a historical necessity in the renewed fight against authoritarianism.

For us, the MRD’s ability to unite trade unions, oppressed nationalities, and the women’s movement in a federal struggle for social justice represents an ideal formation—one that came closest to building an alternative, popular hegemony in Pakistan. The courageous women’s movement, represented by the Sindhiyani Tehreek in Sindh and the Women’s Action Forum in Punjab, fought against the dictatorship’s regressive laws despite a monstrous crackdown and the relentless demonization of women activists. It is both disrespectful and counterproductive to view these struggles, which claimed over a thousand lives in Sindh alone, as a sideshow to some imagined “authentic” Leftist struggle happening elsewhere. In truth, they constitute an essential part of the very tradition that has made the survival of Left forces possible today.

To reject these battles, arising from the everyday experiences of the oppressed, as mere “tailism” or “social movementism” is not only to betray our own history but also to refuse engagement with the burning questions of the present, as the hybrid regime dismantles the hard-won juridical and political rights of our people. Without participating in these concrete struggles for dignity, we exit the terrain of history, reduced instead to moral posturing in anticipation of an absolutely pure socialist politics that will never arrive.

The second disagreement concerns geopolitics, where the authors characterize India as a Brahmanical-fascist state and China as a social-imperialist and expansionist one. To make the latter claim, they point to sharpening contradictions in the peripheries around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, and to the Chinese state’s reluctance to support revolutionary movements in South Asia. China’s internal dynamics, including its adherence to socialism, require a separate debate altogether. Yet, it is pertinent to note here that the US containment policy against China does not stem from concerns for democracy or human rights. As Jason Hickel has recently demonstrated, US antagonism stems from China’s success in improving life standards (wages have risen eightfold since 2005), ending its subordination as a peripheral source of cheap labour and raw materials, while simultaneously achieving technological parity with the West. Overcoming these two structural pillars of imperialism, wage differentials and technological inferiority, represents an unprecedented achievement for a country of the global South. The clumsily executed trade tariffs, the escalating tech wars, and the dangerous military encirclement of China are thus counter-revolutionary measures geared precisely at reversing the remarkable gains made by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party.

Yet, it is bewildering to witness Azeem and Ali equate China and the US as imperialists. Imperialism is not merely a set of exploitative contracts between governments; it is an entire architecture of military, economic and cultural domination designed to annihilate the sovereignty of the colonized to facilitate capital accumulation in the metropole. No understanding of imperialism is possible without considering the destructive military conquests of Africa, Asia and the Americas, the opium wars, the slave trade, and the decimation of societies that refused to surrender. In the contemporary moment, imperialism cannot be conceived in a political register without considering the centrality of NATO (and its 800 military bases), the CIA, the IMF and the World Bank—key elements of a distinct architecture geared towards breaking the will of the people, whether through structural adjustments, regime change, sanctions or outright war. We must be particularly sensitive to this destructive core of imperialism at a moment when the US-Zionist alliance has destroyed several states across the Middle East for refusing to yield to Western diktats, with the people of Gaza paying the heaviest price in a televised genocide.

The Chinese state neither has the military architecture (with only a single overseas base) to obliterate other states, nor has it used its considerable economic influence to impose regime change, structural adjustments or economic sanctions. Erasing these basic material and historical facts evacuates politics from analytical categories, reducing concepts such as imperialism to mere descriptions of asymmetry in inter-state relations. The consequence of this erasure is strategic disorientation, as exhibited in the article. For example, the authors make a grand proposal that the Pakistani Left should “align with the masses of Pakistan in waging a genuine anti-imperialist struggle against Western imperialism, Indian aggression, and Chinese expansionism and social imperialism.” To make things clear, they reject calls for an “abstract peace” in favour of “revolutionary militant people’s struggles,” a euphemism for the People’s War strategy of Maoist groups in India which they cite approvingly.

This is an apocalyptic vision for the Pakistani Left. Rather than prioritizing the expansion of democratic rights, the reconfiguration of the internal political economy to defeat parasitic ruling classes, the renegotiation of CPEC projects to center working-class and local concerns, or the strategic use of the economic shift towards Asia to advance the prosperity for our people, the authors propose waging simultaneous war on Indian, Chinese, and Western imperialism (why not add Iran and Russia?). Since we know that wars are not fought on sentiment alone, one may ask the innocent question: who would fund the weapons, technology, training and logistics that the proposed “people’s militias” would require to fight this epic war? More pertinently, how would this region-wide conflagration avoid falling into the strategic calculus of the Pentagon, which seeks to intervene in and exploit such regional cleavages to turn the global South into a theater of permanent devastation? We are offered no answers.

The strategy then seems to reject “piecemeal” politics of “social movementism” in favour of “deep organizing” that will prepare for a final battle that takes on the combined military might of India, Pakistan and China to bring salvation for the oppressed. There is little consideration of the logistics of this strategy, nor is any evidence presented to indicate that such a war is supported by any significant section of the “people’s movements” currently underway in Pakistan. Thus, this proposal is merely an escape from the material realities that constrain the terrain of Left politics in Pakistan, a classic case of messianic expectation replacing strategic analysis.

A new strategic orientation: What are we fighting for?

In the realm of politics, strategic thinking cannot limit itself to fighting the status quo. Instead of merely focusing on what we are fighting against, we must also clarify what it is that we are fighting for. It requires a sober analysis of the global, national, and regional situation that both constrains and opens opportunities for the reconstruction of the Left. Perhaps a historical situation, analogous to our contemporary moment, can aid in illuminating the path forward.

In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, the young general leading the Kuomintang nationalists, was at the pinnacle of his fame and power. After years of war and political turmoil since the collapse of the Qing dynasty, he managed to unite the country as a modern Republic. His forces were supplied weapons by both the US and the Soviet Union, ideological rivals who sought to enhance their influence in Asia. In the midst of the dizzying shifts and chaos in the global order during the inter-war period, China appeared as an unexpected candidate for regional stability and progress.

Yet, this apparent stability proved to be the calm before the storm. Chiang refused to undertake the internal reforms necessary to modernize the economy, dismantle the parasitic classes (feudals and warlords) that monopolized the country’s resources, institutionalize democratic reforms, or address the sharpening ethnic divides across China. To make matters worse, he unleashed a brutal crackdown on all forces advocating social reform, beginning with the mass murder of Chinese Communists in Shanghai in 1927 and culminating in the brutal campaign of suppression during the heroic Long March.

Eventually, the decadent order sapped the vitality out of the national project, forcing Chiang’s forces to face humiliating defeats at the hands of the invading Japanese forces. Mao joined forces with the Kuomintang to face the “principal contradiction” represented by the Japanese imperial forces in the mid-1930s, but he was clear that the nationalists were hopelessly inadequate to shoulder the burden of defending China’s sovereignty. A national sovereign project could only be sustained if it was premised upon the popular classes and sought to radically transform China’s internal political economy, a task bequeathed to the Chinese Communist Party.

It is this dialectical method that utilizes the gap between the opportunities opened by history and their betrayal by the ruling classes that propels revolutionary movements forward. Consider contemporary Pakistan, which has now established a security umbrella that is unprecedented in the Muslim World and being simultaneously courted by the West, China and the Middle East. It could provide the conditions of possibility for a sovereign project that positions Pakistan as a gateway for different civilizations, becoming an engine for economic activity and bringing desperately needed peace and prosperity to the people of the region. Yet, much like Chiang’s Republic, the hybrid regime in Pakistan (and the parasitic classes it represents) is singularly incapable of undertaking reforms that can usher in the new era.

The obscenely luxurious lifestyles of the elites are sustained by Pakistan’s rentier political economy, fueled by debt and dollar wars that eschew any serious economic reforms. The country has historically rented its geostrategic location to the US in order to receive cheap dollars that are washed away in speculative projects (such as real estate) or whisked away in secret foreign assets. This myopic strategic thinking has resulted in ongoing deindustrialization, necessitating new loans to pay the older ones, placing the country’s financial policies under the tutelage of viceroys from the IMF, who impose conditions that further strangle the economy. Yet, while this vicious cycle of war, debt and structural adjustment allows bonanzas for the elites, it results in death, destruction and immiseration for the people of Pakistan.

The simultaneous rise in inflation and unemployment has pushed poverty levels to almost 40 percent, with 25 million children out of school (10 million of them in Punjab alone). The peripheries suffer not only the wrath of economic deprivation, but also destabilization from the fallout of misguided security policies, which have destroyed lives and livelihoods, while placing these regions under a permanent state of emergency. Moreover, the lack of industrial planning is being compensated for through the plunder of natural resources, as exhibited by the Pakistan Green Initiative that aims to sell Sindh’s water, Punjab’s lands, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s and Balochistan’s minerals, and Gilgit-Baltistan’s tourism industry to the highest international bidder. For local populations, this translates into perpetual displacement and exploitation, with the military’s relentless might unleashed against those daring to resist the expropriation of their lands and resources.

No stable form of hegemony, let alone an independent foreign policy, can be built upon an unproductive, loan-dependent rentier system. The Pakistani state’s vacillation between the US and China, the prime minister’s nauseating sycophancy towards Trump over Gaza, the constant tensions with Afghanistan, and the botching of CPEC all reveal the incoherence of a decaying order. It is thus crucial to avoid confusing the country’s right to self-defense against foreign aggressors with an acceptance of state excesses on the domestic front. In fact, with the specter of war and destruction looming as the US attempts to use Pakistan in its China containment policy, the need for intensifying internal struggles and building a country-wide mass front is more urgent than ever before.

Yet, the key question is what could be the basis for this alliance? I have already indicated that the old alliance between the Left and ethnonationalists is now hopelessly inadequate for this task. As Umair Javed has recently shown, the 18th Amendment has precipitated the integration of political elites from the peripheries into provincial structures of power and patronage, creating concentrated loci of power and resources at the provincial level, a departure from the 1960s struggle against the One-Unit system that neatly pitted each provincial leadership against the center. Moreover, the demographic shifts, particularly the displacement and centrality of Pashtun migrant labour in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, and the destruction of economic infrastructure in South Punjab after repeated floods, are increasingly pitting oppressed groups against one another rather than against the state. The ethnic tensions in Sindh, the brutal murder of Punjabi, Seraiki and Pashtun workers in Balochistan, the disputes over the census in both provinces, and the PML-N’s conscious attempts to stoke Punjabi majoritarianism are reflections of ethnic fault lines turning into open conflict, weakening the possibility of popular democratic struggle against the establishment and economic elites.

The divergence is acute on the global front as well. For example, various liberal and ethnonationalist groups welcomed US presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan, supported US drone strikes, and lobbied Washington for sanctions on Pakistan. More recently, a militant group announced support for Indian strikes on Pakistan and sought Modi’s help in dismembering the country, while other sections of the same group have been accused of seeking support from Israel. Even if one momentarily brackets the (gigantic) moral dilemmas that arise out of these alignments, it is a nonviable policy even at a strategic level. The US neither has the will nor the capacity to provide long-term support to its “allies” in different parts of the world. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, all victims of US military bombardment, were reduced to wastelands as part of the US crusade for “democracy” and “human rights,” demonstrating how its ability to destroy far exceeds its capacity to rebuild. Moreover, the US embrace of the Pakistan military—Trump declared Asim Munir his “favourite Field Marshal”—is further proof that a reliance on external forces for liberation is a colossal mistake.

Are we then permanently condemned to our own silos, oscillating between militarized violence, imperialist aggression, religious bigotry and outbursts of ethnic hatred? Fortunately, significant historical trends point toward a different path. The economic and social interdependence of the country’s different regions reveals shared interests and common aspirations for democratization, prosperity, and social justice. The very material subsistence of working masses across Pakistan depends upon the equitable distribution of land, agricultural output, water, revenue, and other natural and economic resources. Politically, Punjab and Sindh long served as bastions of support for the PPP’s left-wing populism, with hardly any Punjabi leader matching the popularity attained by Sindh’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In recent years, Imran Khan’s vocal opposition to drone strikes and incessant military operations has turned him into an unbeatable force across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, far outpacing traditional nationalist forces, while also enjoying considerable support in other provinces. Still more recently, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee’s struggle received overwhelming support from different sections across Punjab, with even mainstream political figures joining its cause. As ever, the people remain ahead of the intellectuals, who continue to be imprisoned within their analytical categories.

The material basis for these emerging solidarities is the pervasive economic crisis and political crackdown across the country, exemplified by the blatant theft of the people’s mandate in Punjab in the 2024 elections and the continued incarceration of PTI’s leadership. One need not agree with the political orientation of the PTI to decipher that it points to a real possibility of a country-wide political formation, a task the Left has practically surrendered to the Right.

It is time to reclaim a universalist project that mobilizes the shared aspirations of the vast majority of our people. This task entails rebuilding a popular front that simultaneously fights for the sovereignty of the country, the democratization of its politics, and the economic prosperity of its people. The defense of sovereignty implies a resolute anti-imperialist line that not only resists economic and military imperialist intervention against Pakistan, but also pushes Pakistan towards regional cooperation with its neighbors. Similarly, the struggle for democracy, including the fight against the military’s stranglehold over the electoral process, media, judiciary, security policy and parliament, is a central feature of the dialectics of liberation in Pakistan. This battle also includes an end to inter-provincial disparities, genuine local democracy, as well as advancing the rights of women and minorities in the face of reactionary assaults.

The vision for a shared prosperity necessitates wresting power from the parasitic classes addicted to wars and the IMF, increasing our surplus capacity through robust industrial planning and investment in sustainable human development, and transforming the country into a gateway to a prosperous Asia. To address historical faultlines, the concerns of smaller provinces must be centered in any development policy, including the recognition of the rights of each province over its natural resources. Indeed, socialism is incomplete if it is not geared towards addressing historical grievances and economic unevenness produced by militarized forms of capitalism.

Finally, this project will require a renewed engagement with existing categories to reinscribe them with new meanings Terms such as Pakistan, Islam or democracy cannot be left vacant for the elites or the Right to use as emotive vehicles for reactionary agendas. There is no reason for us to accept that those ruling elites who sold the country’s future repeatedly to the highest bidder have any right to distribute certificates of loyalty to political dissidents. On the other hand, it was precisely the Left that insisted on Pakistani sovereignty whenever the state moved into the US security and financial ambit, leading to the famous National Student Federation slogan Kaun Bachaye ga Pakistan? Tulba Mazdoor aur Kissan! (Who will save Pakistan? Students, workers and peasants!). Similarly, Islam carries an ideological density within the region’s psyche that cannot be wished away. Recent scholarship by Layli Uddinand Asmer Safi reminds us of the vast intellectual and political work in the sub-continent that developed an affinity between Islam and socialism, and that can still aid us in illuminating the path forward.

These terms are not fixed categories but sites of struggle upon which a new national popular project can be created. We must not disarm ourselves in the ideological battle by rejecting these terms in favour of a pristine politics outside all existing nomenclature. Instead, our method must be dialectical, one that utilizes contradictions immanent to these categories in order to transform their inner content. More concretely, one can imagine new ways of being Pakistani and being Muslim that are not beholden to the suffocating definitions of the state or the bigotry of the reactionary Right, just like one can imagine resisting the military establishment without positing the collapse of the country into competing exclusionary ethno-nationalist statelets as the only viable destination for progressive politics. Such a project would have the potential to unite the largest possible coalition of people within Pakistan and present a credible alternative to the crumbling status quo.

Eventually, however, the steel of unity is forged in the fire of ongoing battles for dignity. From protecting the ecologies of Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan to defending the devastated rural world of Punjab, from challenging enforced disappearances in Balochistan to resisting military excesses in the former FATA, and from organizing workers, women and students to defending Kashmir’s right to self-determination, each battle is an iteration of the heroic attempt to reclaim our common humanity. The forbidden encounters and unexpected solidarities that emerge within these movements point the way forward.

The task for a political organization is to weave together these different threads into a common political project that seeks to overthrow the existing state of affairs. It is a herculean task indeed, but we always knew that revolution was no dinner party.

Ammar Ali Jan is a historian and general secretary of the Haqooq-e-Khalq Party in Pakistan. He is a cabinet member of the Progressive International.