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Sunday, November 10, 2024

SMOKERS’ CORNER: THE NEW MANICHAEANS
Published November 10, 2024
DAWN

Illustration by Abro

Just days before this year’s US presidential election, when I was wrapping up my interviews with a cross-section of voters in some US states for a research project, I was approached by an old white man in Denver, Colorado. The man asked me who I was voting for. I told him I’m not a US citizen so can’t vote. But even before I could complete my sentence, he asked, “Are you voting for Trump?”

He then declared, “Kamala Harris is evil…she is an evil, evil person.”

“Yes,” I replied. “And Trump is an angel.” And that was it. Unable or unwilling to notice the obvious sarcasm in my reply, the gentleman seemed satisfied with my reply and moved on. I had come face-to-face with an example of how ‘Manichaeism’ shapes modern populist politics.

Manichaeism was an ancient religion in Persia. It believed that the universe was dominated by two forces (good and evil) — one represented by light and the other by darkness.



Manichaean dualism, an ancient belief in the eternal struggle between good and evil, shapes many modern populist narratives. This ‘us-versus-them’ mindset, popular in the US and global right-wing politics, fuels dangerous worldviews that can justify violence

Today, the term ‘Manichean’ is used as a disparaging term to describe someone who disregards shades of grey or who adopts a strong ‘us-versus-them’ mindset. According to the American Professor of Ethics William F May, Manichaeism reduces distinctions to a ‘cosmic struggle’ between two rival powers: good and evil. A form of Manichaeism has been particularly strong in American politics, especially among right-wing groups.

Since Manichaeism was a religion, its modern political manifestation retains much of its original metaphysical essence. For example, when politicians posit an ‘us-versus-them’ position, it is not only about formulating ethnic, racial or nationalistic binaries. Added to a valorised race/ethnicity/nation is also a ‘divinely-ordained’ purpose.

So, a valorised people, though striving to achieve political power, come to see themselves a ‘chosen people’, selected by God to fulfil His purpose. Among right-wing political groups in the US in the early 20th century, this ‘purpose’ was to sustain racial segregation to protect the country’s white races, because they were the ‘chosen people.’

Later, the same chosen people were to fight against ‘international communist conspiracies.’ Communism was explained as an ‘evil.’ For right-wing groups, America’s war against communism (during the Cold War) was a war between good and evil. The former US president Ronald Reagan (1981-88) described the erstwhile Soviet Union as an “evil empire.”

Manichaean rhetoric was also present during the rise of Nazism in Germany. The Nazis enthusiastically indulged in pseudo-history and exotic theology to add to their claims of racial superiority a metaphysical dimension. The rise of Nazi Germany was viewed by the Nazis as an outcome of a battle that they were fighting against shadowy evil powers who were out to corrupt and destroy pure Germanic races, through lowly non-white races and wicked ideologies such as liberalism and communism.

Manichaean rhetoric and mindset make secular ideas seem theological/cosmological in nature. The valorised ideas/people in this context become chosen by God and opposing ideas/people are demonised as evil or driven by satanic forces or by Satan himself. Therefore, to a lot of Trump supporters, Harris is evil.

But Manichaeism is present in modern political-theocratic doctrines as well. It is very much present in Christian nationalism, which Trump constantly evokes. It is present in the Hindutva ideology valorised by India’s right-wing ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). It also plays a pivotal role in the rhetoric of Iran’s theocratic regime, especially when addressing the country’s archenemy, the US. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the US has been referred to by the theocracy as ‘the Great Satan’ (Sheytan-i-Buzurg).

In the 1970s, Islamist parties in Pakistan often portrayed the former Pakistani prime minister Z.A. Bhutto and his government as evil because, apparently, he and his ministers were serving Satan by always being drunk and holding wild sexual orgies (‘key parties’).

Such diabolical accusations, often published in right-wing tabloids, became so common that Bhutto once decided to respond to them by announcing to a crowd: “Yes, I drink, but I don’t drink the blood of the people!” Here he was referring to the Islamists who, according to him, were ‘agents’ of rich ‘bloodsucking’ industrialists.

Not all binary thinking in politics is Manichaean, though. Binary thinking in this regard becomes Manichaean only when the ‘us’ begins to describe itself as special people chosen by God to do His work in a wretched world.

This outtake of Manichaeism is present when most populists describe the other side as evil and/or satanic. Pakistani politician Imran Khan and his fans lambasting their opponents as ‘corrupt’ is a classic populist ploy, but it’s not Manichaean as such. However, it does become this when some of his supporters begin to view Khan as an incorruptible messiah, having characteristics of some of Islam’s ancient luminaries.




Binary thinking can stall nuanced political debates. But it becomes far more dangerous when it is used to construct narratives that lead to serious violence. For instance, in the last two decades, Christian nationalists in the West and Islamist militants took Manichaean thinking to an extreme, in a bid to justify terror attacks.

Far-right militants in the West and Islamist terrorists are often swayed by narratives that are largely influenced by Manichaeism — especially by its ‘dualist cosmology’, based on the idea of a primordial conflict between light and darkness, good and evil. Class, ethnicity, nationality or material economic conditions eventually dissolve in this cosmic conflict. But race and faith don’t. The militants in this context explain the conflict as one that has been going on for centuries outside the material realm, and within a spiritual one that the sacred texts supposedly speak of.

In a 2018 essay, the psychologist Karl Umbrasas wrote that terror outfits that kill indiscriminately can be categorised as Manichaeans. According to Umbrasas, such groups operate like “apocalyptic cults” and are not held back by socio-political and moral restraints. They are thus completely unrepentant about targeting even children. To them, the children are also part of the larger problem that they are going to resolve through a ‘cosmic war.’

The moral codes of such terror groups transcend those of the modern world. So, for example, when an Islamist or far-right terrorist kills innocent men, women and children, it is likely they see the victims as part of the ‘evil’ in the cosmic war that they imagine themselves to be fighting. In fact, one can thus suggest that the current government of Israel is also very much Manichaean.

Published in Dawn, EOS, November 10th, 2024

Thursday, November 07, 2024

Which ideology?

Published November 8, 2024 
DAWN


OF all the congratulatory messages which poured in from the world’s political leaders when it became clear that Donald Trump had, in the end, quite comfortably defeated Kamala Harris in the US presidential election, the tweet by Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari stood out. The young scion of the PPP called Trump’s victory an anti-war vote, reflecting the desire of the US electorate for global peace.

The reference was obviously to Palestine and the ongoing Israeli genocide which has been backed unflinchingly by the Biden-Harris administration. But Trump did not win because he is anti-war. Some voters may have punished Harris over Palestine, but the Democratic Party’s failings extend beyond foreign wars. Bilawal’s pleasantries about a peaceful future for the world were also hyperbole because Trump is anything but a man of peace.

The real quandary is making sense of how Bilawal, who claims to be ‘progressive’, is making common cause with an arch-conservative in Trump.

Let there be no mistake: Trump is not about to dismantle the huge military-industrial complex that undergirds US imperialist power across the world. Among other things, Trump is firmly committed to Zionism, and is unmistakably anti-China.

But it is also not to be understated that Trump has spouted consistent rhetoric about unnecessary spending on wars abroad — his slogan of ‘Make America Great Again’ reflects a relatively insular vision involving less war-making around the world, blocking immigration, and generating industrial jobs by rolling back outsourcing and offshoring.


The far right is tapping into the rage of working people.

The far right thrives on slogans, of course. Trump did not do a lot of things he had claimed he would during his first term. But this is all the more reason for us to think about why certain slogans continue to garner him — and many other similar political leaders — the support that they do. The fact that a far-right Republican leader is able and willing to call for a rollback of America’s foreign wars is an indicator of how muddled the contemporary ideological landscape has become.

Ideological confusion is reaching fever pitch in this country too. Look no further than Bilawal and the PPP — a leader and party that still claims, every once so often, to be committed to leftist ideals. When election season rolls around, the slogan ‘roti, kapra aur makan’ magically reappears. Even the word ‘socialism’ sometimes drips off the tongue of PPP leaders. The party also burnishes its other ‘progressive’ credentials like its opposition to the weaponisation of religion and its unparalleled commitment to democracy.

But these claims have virtually no connection to the PPP’s actual politics. At present, the PPP and PML-N are competing to prove their loyalty to the military establishment. The PPP runs the Balochistan government which is presiding over the continuing brutalisation of Baloch youth. A few weeks ago, the Sindh government ordered a violent crackdown against progressives who were protesting the mob lynching of a doctor in Umerkot, Sindh. Earlier, Ali Wazir — who is now doing rounds in Punjab’s jails — spent months incarcerated under the watch of the Sindh government. And as far as Pakistan’s internal class war is concerned, the PPP makes no bones about the fact that it is far more committed to the IMF, big landed families, real estate moguls and other profiteers than it is to the proverbial worker and peasant.

Let’s take this analogy back to America. The preliminary details about who voted for Trump and Harris are remarkable insofar as they confirm that the Democratic Party — with its co-mparatively pro-labour history — has largely abandoned the working class, the latter voting in significant numbers for Trump. Even non-white Latino and Black working peo-ple rejected the Democratic Party des-pite Trump’s persistent anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Once upon a time, to be on the left meant to oppose unbridled capitalist profiteering, imperialist wars and to stand with the lower orders of society. Today, it is the far right that is rhetorically aligning itself with such positions, and successfully tapping into the rage of working people by peddling hate. Meanwhile, the historic social-democratic parties who could once claim to represent the class rage of the lower orders are left only to appeal to a vacuous identity politics and lament the racism and misogyny of the right.

Is there still the possibility of an ideological politics of a left-progressive vintage that reclaims class and imperialism from the hatemongers while also offering meaningful horizons on other pressing matters like the ecological crisis? We must hold out the hope that there is, but such a politics will only crystallise when the so-called ‘pro­­gressive’ old guard is exposed and displaced by genuinely anti-establishment forces.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Published in Dawn, November 8th, 2024

Monday, November 04, 2024

Jabalia death march


Muhammad Ali Siddiqi 
Published November 3, 2024 
DAWN

IT will live in history: the Jabalia death march. As reported by Al Jazeera, the fleeing Palestinians were carrying white flags while going through checkpoints, but the Israeli bombardment continued. 

Correctly did Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi tell US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that what was going on in Gaza was “ethnic cleansing”, while the Jewish Voice for Peace has compared it to the Holocaust and asked the American administration to halt arms supplies to Israel.

This paper’s issue of Oct 23, 2024, is archival material and tells us more about the misery of the Palestinian people than all words put together. The picture on the front page shows the wreckage of a house. In the background are masses of people forcefully displaced from their north Gaza homes as Israeli planes had rained bombs. They have had no food and water for weeks.

Unless I missed it in the voluminous literature on the Der Führer era, I do not think the Luftwaffe ever rained bombs on fleeing Jewish people. The time-yellowed 1,400 pages of John Toland’s Pulitzer Prize-winning classic Adolf Hitler contain every act of bestiality perpetrated on the Jews by the Nazi regime but it mentions no such horrifying drama, which I am sure must have satisfied the sadistic instincts of racists like Yoav Gallant in the Benjamin Netanyahu cabinet.

The north Gaza trauma coincided with Israel’s latest choice of a war theatre — Lebanon. Such is Israel’s fixation with showing off its military power that it used no less than 100 jets on tiny Lebanon. The targets hit included a hospital named after one of Lebanon’s most popular prime ministers, Rafic Hariri. This was not a mistake. As I wrote in one of my pieces, it is Israel’s official policy to hit hospitals and places of worship to tell the world it doesn’t care about what the world thinks of its crimes, with the categorical support it enjoys from Western powers. (In Nuseirat in northern Gaza, Israeli forces hit a school, killing 17 people, including children. Instead of expressing regret it said it was a Hamas command and control centre which was previously a school!)


What are the prospects of peace in the region?

One can estimate the number of civilian casualties in Beirut when four apartment buildings bustling with men, women and children were flattened.

While Lebanon was in the throes of a bloodbath, the issue for the US was to make a comment that would not annoy Israel. So American envoy Amos Hochstein made a ‘safe’ statement, saying Washington was trying to end the war in Lebanon “as soon as possible”, stressing that the US was seeking a lasting resolution to the crisis.

A true indication of civilian casualties in Lebanon came from Tyre, a Unesco World Heritage site. Normally it has a population of 50,000. However, following the mass exodus in the wake of the Israeli attack on Sept 23, less than 14,000 people were reportedly left in the city.

Yet, despite the thinning of the population, casualties were still high as revealed by Tyre’s disaster management spokesman: “Seven buildings were levelled and more than 400 apartments in their vicinity damaged.” Four streets, he said were “completely blocked by debris”.

On the very first day of the blitz, codenamed ‘Northern Arrows’, 558 people, including 50 children and 94 women, were killed while 50,000 fled to Syria. No wonder Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati called the Israeli attack “a war of destruction”. However, so thorough is the Zionist control of the international media that on Oct 24, when I googled to check casualties in Tyre what I got was this: “There were no re­­ports of casualties in Tyre, where the Is­­raeli military had issued evacuation warnings ahead of the strikes.”

What are the prospects of peace in the region?

According to Da­­niel Levy, president of the US/Middle East Project, there is little possibility of peace in Palestine. According to him: “The game plan — sadly declared openly and publicly by Israel’s leaders from the get-go — was an intensification and continuation of the displacement and the denial of Palestinian rights that has gone on for decades, but in a far more gruesome way.”

He told Al Jazeera: “We are at a new place in the north of Gaza where the intention is apparently to entirely depopulate that area using war crimes of starvation, of allowing disease to spread; even the prevention of polio could not be continued.”

According to him, Israeli authorities are implementing the ‘General’s Plan’ aimed at starving, bombing, and forcibly extracting civilians out of the north of the Gaza Strip.

Postscript: Z.A. Bhutto once remarked only Islam can give peace to the holy land because it is the only religion which recognises the rights of the three communities to Jerusalem.

The writer is Dawn’s External Ombudsman.

Published in Dawn, November 3rd, 2024

Monday, October 14, 2024

COLUMN: THE FIRE OF LUCKNOW

Harris Khalique 
Published October 13, 2024


Out of the three principal centres of Indo-Persian civilisation that evolved from a fusion of multiple Vedic and Arabo-Persian cultures over centuries, Delhi and Lahore continue to be celebrated, while Lucknow is both celebrated and mourned. During the last millennium, all these cities enjoyed their share of primacy, glory, splendour and opulence, but also experienced bloodletting, conquests, loot and plunder.

Delhi and Lahore regained their significance and survived during and in the aftermath of colonialism. Lucknow could never fully recover from the colonial shock — perhaps also paying the price for being one of the fiercest battle grounds during the 1857 War of Independence against the British.

The region comprising Awadh, which includes Lucknow, is a part of the state of Uttar Pradesh (which was earlier called United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) created during the British Raj. Awadh has a legendary religious and intellectual significance in Indian history. But compared to Lucknow, the cities of Delhi and Lahore had longer histories, bigger cosmopolitan spaces and wider cultural markers to draw upon.

Lucknow had one long period of glory, which was decimated by the British. That period spanned from 1722 to 1856 when Lucknow, which earlier was the capital of the Mughal province of Awadh, became Awadh as a local Indian sultanate. Those 134 years of Awadh inscribed indelible marks on South Asian culture and history.

In post-Independence India, the city remains the capital city of the state of Uttar Pradesh but efforts to erase the historically inclusive and secular cultural milieu of Lucknow continued by constantly invoking communalism, not only incrementally but also systematically. For Lucknow, the journey from Wajid Ali Shah to Yogi Aditya Nath must have been excruciatingly painful and terribly tedious.

In the 19th century, the British particularly vilified three local rulers in India. They humiliated Bahadur Shah Zafar in Delhi, the emperor whose Mughal empire had shrunk to a city but whose two sons and eldest grandson had to be killed to establish British supremacy. The second ruler was Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab, who had contained the British to the left bank of the Sutlej river until he was alive. It was only 10 years after the death of the maharaja, in 1849, that Punjab could be annexed by the British East India Company.

The third ruler who was ridiculed was Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, whose state was indomitable in terms of both society and culture. He was a musician par excellence, a fine poet, a benevolent ruler and quite popular among his subjects. His wife, Hazrat Mahal, played a significant role in the 1857 War of Independence, after the Nawab had been exiled from Awadh.

The British and those local writers who were inspired by their brush with European modernism or those who decided to collaborate with the new colonial rulers, portrayed the emperor, the maharaja and the nawab as decadent, debauched, devious and disingenuous.

Since the victor writes the history of the vanquished, the three local Indian rulers still hold the same reputation in the imagination of not all but many native South Asians today that was propagated by the British. This remains the case even after alternative accounts of history have been made available by a range of Western and South Asian historians and writers over the last many years — beginning from Bari Alig’s seminal work Company Ki Hakoomat [The Rule of the Company], first published from Lahore in 1937.

This year, Jhelum Book Corner has published an incredible tale of Lucknow in two large volumes. It is a meticulously organised collection of writings by the late Maulana Muhammad Baqar Shams. His grandson, Vaqar Haider, who is now based in New York, has painstakingly collected, chronicled and compiled the two volumes of Shams’ writings, titled Dastan-i-Lucknow [The Lucknow Story] and Dabistan-i-Lucknow [The Lucknow School]. From ancient history to pre-Sultanate days to the rule of the nawabs in the Sultanate of Avadh to the British Raj followed by independence, the collections bring us to the 1980s.

Written in an idiomatic and lucid language, these two volumes bring together incredible details of the Awadhi habitat with Lucknow at the centre. Nothing seems to have been missed in the areas of knowledge, sociology, culture, art or sports. Scholars and their scholarship, religious schools of thought and their leaders, physicians, traders and businesspersons, artisans, artists, poets, linguists, writers, musicians, academics, theatre and its performers and jesters etc, are not only introduced to the reader, their contribution and skills are also mentioned and commented upon. There are some other good works but Shams has written the most comprehensive social history of Lucknow.

In English, the books on Lucknow’s art, culture, music, history, political economy and architecture that are worth looking at, in my opinion, include King Wajid Ali Shah of Awadh (two volumes) by Mirza Ali Azhar, published in 1982 by the Royal Book Company in Karachi, Amaresh Misra’s Lucknow: Fire of Grace — The Story of its Renaissance, Revolution and the Aftermath, first published in 1998 by Harper Collins Publishers India, and a coffee table book on the city’s history and architecture, Lucknow: City of Illusion, edited by Rosie Llewllyn-Jones under the supervision of Ebrahim Alkazi and published by Prestel in 2006.

The fire of grace is perhaps now out but it has left some glowing embers behind.

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, October 13th, 2024

COLUMN: HUMANISING THROUGH CULTURE
Published September 30, 2024

During the 1970s and 1980s, some popular slogans among politically charged progressive students in Pakistan included ‘Jamhooriyat ke teen nishaan/ Talaba, mazdoor aur kisaan [The three markers of democracy/ Students, labour and peasants]’ and ‘Loot khasoot ke raj ko badlo/ Chehray nahin samaaj ko badlo [Change the system of loot and plunder/ Don’t change faces, change the order].’ In Urdu, these slogans rhyme perfectly well.

Those were the times when the struggles for democracy and economic justice were waged in unison by students, labour movements, journalist federations and artists and writers’ associations. The Women’s Action Forum (WAF) came about in the early 1980s to challenge the anti-women laws that were enacted under Gen Zia’s martial rule and then to continue the struggle for the realisation of women’s fundamental rights, leading to their empowerment. WAF joined the existing fold of labour and student activists.

We saw a sharp decline in this unity between different class and identity movements after trade unions were suffocated to the level that now less than two percent of our labour is left with collective bargaining agency. Student unions were banned during the same martial rule and journalists and writers were systematically divided within their ranks.


Consequently, the link between literary writers and artists, journalists, labour and students became weaker and weaker. In present times, there is a demonstrated desire in some quarters to strengthen that link, but it still needs a lot of painstaking effort.

Among the very few activists of the old school left from the 1970s and 1980s who remain equally active now, one prominent name is that of Akram Kaimkhani. He was a left-wing student leader in Karachi and a pro-democracy activist after Gen Zia’s coup d’etat.

Kaimkhani was born in Tharparkar and moved to Karachi with his parents at a young age. He studied at Jamia Millia College, Malir, and the University of Karachi. Kaimkhani’s polio-affected leg, which limited his ability to run away in case of a police raid, neither had an effect on his own fervour nor inspired any sympathy in the hearts of the martial law operatives, who tortured him and kept him in prison.

After getting political asylum in the UK, Kaimkhani worked hard to make ends meet. Over the years, he managed to raise his family in a decent, respectable way. Now in his mid-60s, he continues to work long hours to run his household with dignity. All along, nothing could stop him from contributing to just political and social causes in Pakistan and the UK, and towards peace and development in the South Asian region.

From supporting struggles for democracy and economic justice to being a key volunteer for organisations such as the Edhi Foundation in London, he has invested his time, energy and finances beyond the extent of any normal person. Kaimkhani was a part of street politics and also remained a close confidante of both Mairaj Mohammed Khan and Benazir Bhutto, among other political leaders from Pakistan.

Some years ago, Kaimkhani realised that he should focus more of his energies towards promoting art, culture and literature, because they have the innate ability to humanise people of different ilks, which confrontational politics can seldom do. He had always been committed to promoting a culture of dialogue to strengthen democracy and the larger wellbeing of society.

Therefore, he spearheaded the establishment of the Faiz Foundation Trust, along with his friends from the Pakistani diaspora in the UK. They organised some outstanding cultural and literary events in pre-Covid 19 years, and brought together people from different countries, who were provided an opportunity to further the dialogue and deliberate upon issues that common people in South Asia and the developing world face.

Recently, Kaimkhani, along with podcaster Yousuf Abraham, chartered accountant Anjum Raza and physician Dr Umar Daraz mobilised political workers, artists, writers, journalists, culture aficionados and professionals of South Asian origin, along with his other British comrades, to establish the Voices of South Asian Art and Literature (VSAAL) in London.

VSAAL, after coming into being, took only a few months to organise, on September 14, the First South Asian Festival at the prestigious Bloomsbury Theatre in the heart of London, which I too attended. The Bloomsbury Theatre was filled to capacity for the event. Leading Indian dance and theatre curator and promoter Mira Misra Kaushik managed the event.

There was a panel discussion on the composite heritage of South Asian languages, involving writer Jami Chandio, British-Italian academic Prof Francesca Orsin and poet Uruj Asif. It was candid and sharp. Veteran journalist and trade unionist Mazhar Abbas spoke to another accomplished journalist and broadcaster Javed Soomro on current politics, journalism and censorship in South Asia.

There was a discussion led by British-Indian broadcaster Pervaiz Alam on a book by Dr Salman Akhtar, which does a psycho-literary analysis of four master poets Akhtar is related to — Muztar Khairabadi, Jan Nisar Akhtar, Javed Akhtar and Asrar-ul-Haq Majaz. There was a launch of a book of poetry by Dr Razi Mohammed. Author and lawyer Saif Mehmood from Delhi made an exquisite presentation on Urdu poet Mir Taqi Mir and Bangla poet Qazi Nazrul Islam.

A session was dedicated to veteran journalist, filmmaker, author and former secretary-general of the Progressive Writers Association, Hameed Akhtar, to mark his 100th birth anniversary. Leading actor (and Akhtar’s daughter) Saba Hameed and poet Iftikhar Arif recounted their memories of the times when Hameed Akhtar lived a life with pure ideological commitment and spent three terms in prison. Saba Hameed also read excerpts from her father’s witty pen portrait, written by himself.

The conversations on languages, literature and culture were followed by music performances of singers from South Asia. The mood in the crowd confirmed that it is the composite South Asian cultural heritage that unifies us across our ideological divides. If pursued consistently, it can perhaps make feuding states in the region shed their egos and come together for the sake of common people and their long-lasting prosperity.

The columnist is a poet and essayist. His latest collections of verse are Hairaa’n Sar-i-Bazaar and No Fortunes to Tell

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, September 29th, 2024

Sunday, October 06, 2024

 

Inconvenient Truths: The Shia Salah al-Din and 10/7


HE WAS A KURD

Salah El Din – Salah El Din El Ayoubi – Saladin and Richard the Lionheart

Jerusalem’s hard-fought liberation, now in process, is a recapitulation of the Christian Crusades of the 11th-13th centuries, this time, not by the knight on a white horse of legend, but through the long march of guerilla warfare by the much maligned Shia. This follows on the liberation of Iran from its Judeo-Christian yoke in 1979 and Iraq 25 years later, ironically by the US, forming the second Shia majority state. But it is the Shia minority of Lebanon that holds the keys to Jerusalem. Their 40% of the Lebanese population punches well above their weight in a fractious country split among Christians, and Sunni and Shia Muslims.

Hezbollah was forged in the heat of Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s. The then-rag-tag militia killed over 600 Israeli soldiers, forcing Israel to retreat in humiliation, its first such defeat ever, and by a nonstate actor, a very bad omen, which Israel’s almost daily murder of Palestinians every since cannot erase, and which culminated in 10/7, Israel’s own private 9/11, bringing us to Israel’s carpeting bombing of Lebanon.

It is the Shia of Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen we have to thank for preventing Israel’s genocide against the Palestinians from proceeding smoothly. Sunnis will have to wake up if they don’t want to be left behind by their Shia brothers, their self-satisfied Sunni hegemony cracked open, exposed as the ‘sick man’ of the Middle East, i.e., undermined by imperialism, the same compromised role that destroyed the Ottomans, created post-Ottoman puppet Sunni states, and planted in Palestine a cursed tree, the Quran’s poisonous zaqqum, rooted in the center of Hell, aka the Jewish state.

The Saudis long ago were compromised through a voluntary pact with first British then US imperialism but, until the rise of Muhammed Bin Salman (MBS), were at least keeping up the trappings of Islamic ritual, jealously guarding the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The quietist Saudis effectively blackmailed the Palestinians into accepting an interminable Israeli murderous occupation and creeping (now galloping) theft of their lands, financing Palestinian refugees, but with no promise of liberation, effectively working with not against the enemy.

Now MBS has let the westernizers loose in his kingdom, discarding the hijab, promoting concerts of trashy western rock music, buying British football teams (Newcastle United in 2021). Trump’s Abraham Accords were supposed to lead to a new Middle East with Israel and Saudi Arabia as the kingpins. With October 7 (10/7), the bottom fell out of MBS’s fantasy of a Saudi-Isreali hegemony over the Middle East, leaving the Palestinians in permanent limbo or exile. It didn’t seem to matter to the Saudis and Gulf sheikhs, who long ago lost interest in Palestine. In thie face of this complete betrayal of the Palestinians, of Islam itself, the Shia are the only Muslims to resist the sacrilege of permanent Jewish rule over Palestine and the destruction Islam’s holy sites to build a Third Temple.

Orthodox Sunni Muslims have always feared the moral purity which Shiism was founded on, in opposition to the more worldly, pragmatic Sunni majority. This very productive, though at times deadly, stand-off between the two strands of Islam began with Muhammad’s young cousin Ali being the first convert to Islam after the Prophet’s wife Hadija, Ali’s heroic military career defending the religion during the early, perilous battles immortalized in the Quran, through to the murder of him and his family by power-hungry rivals. The draw of idealism and justice has kept Shiism alive, and from what we see today, it is the saving grace of Islam, pushing back today against deadly secularism. Ultimately, the Sunni will have to admit that the Shia are not just an inconvenient footnote (like MBS et al would have liked to make of the Palestinians).

20th century ummah challenges

All Muslims will agree that the unity of the ummah is the first, most urgent, priority. The Shia, though outliers, strive for this even more, as they face hardline Sunnis who consider them apostates and would be happy to cut them loose or wipe them out. The official Sunni position has wavered over the centuries, but generally grudgingly accepts them. The imperialists of course were happy to use ‘divide and rule’, and they quickly turned a peaceful ummah into quarreling sectarians in India, Pakistan, Iraq, wherever they had the chance.1 This only really worked for post-Ottoman Iraq and Lebanon, both with large Shia communities mixed (peacefully) with Sunni. But the 20th century was one of increasing division, chaos, everywhere in the ummah. It is still on life support, held together now by the Shia thread, the ‘Shia crescent’, the only link the ummah has to Jerusalem and the Palestinians as they face annihilation, their Sunni brothers helpless or unwilling to save them.

The British official who fashioned the new Iraq in the 1920s, Gertrude Bell, had no time for Shia, who were the majority then as now, but Gertrude had no time for democracy for the dark-skinned. I don’t for a moment doubt that the final authority must be in the hands of the Sunnis, in spite of their numerical inferiority; otherwise you will have a mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil. She knew how the ulama in Iran had defeated the Shah on his westernizing mission, the famous tobacco fatwa of 1890 that forced the shah to cancel the British concession, and supported the constitution movement for democracy in 1905. The British had no interest in creating a radical Shia majority state and put in place a Sunni puppet king.

Iraq’s long and violent history since then finally undid Gertrude’s machiavellian scheming in 2003, bringing to an end a truly disgusting Sunni dictatorship, and the advent of the first Shia-majority state, the positive effects of which are still being discovered. We can thank the US imperialists (even a broken clock is right twice a day) for stumbling on a winning formula for Islam (and for themselves, for the world). By genuinely promoting electoral democracy (along with opening Iraq to foreign exploitation of Iraq’s oil), it started the ball rolling on Sunni-Shia relations everywhere, including US client number one, the Saudi dictator-king, with his truly downtrodden Shia, who sit on Saudi oil and get only repression, disenfranchisement and lots of beheadings as thanks.

The 20th century path that brought us to our present apocalyptic scenario was long and tragic. The Ottoman ‘sick man of Europe’ collapse at the end of WWI, invaded by the British and French (their Russian allies had already collapsed leaving more spoils for the victors). The end of the caliphate? For atheist Turkish dictator Mustafa Kemal that would have been fine. The Muslim ummah, both Sunni and Shia, anticipated this and had already rallied in its defense with the Khilafa Movement in 1919-1920, supported by other anti-imperialists, including Gandhi and India’s Hindus, who saw the British divide-and-rule as the poison that kept Indians subjugated.

Kemal got his way in 1924, accusing Indian Muslim leaders, who came all the way to Ankara to beg the Turkish strongman to maintain the caliphate, of foreign election interference. As if the caliphate was a Turkish plaything The shock wave reverberated around the world culminating in the World Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in 1931 at the behest of Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, bringing together Muslim leaders from around the world. A truly historic moment in the history of the ummah. But the caliphate was already a pipe dream, with growing Jewish immigration to British Palestine, the intent being to create a Jewish state, an imperial outpost to control the Middle East.

Everywhere, the Muslim world was occupied now by nominally Christian world empires, British, American, French, Dutch, the House of War (vs the ummah, the House of Peace), the the financial strings predominantly in Jewish hands, accounting for the plum Palestine being selected as a future Jewish state, purchased by the elite Jews who financed the British empire. Except for Shia Iran, which was never fully occupied and given an imperial make-over. But Iran also had its atheist modernizer, Reza Shah, who, having tricked the ulama into giving him their blessing initially, left them alone though marginalized. Though he weakened the religious establishment, outlawed the veil, and built industry and infrastructure, he was not so fanatically anti-Muslim He was anti-imperialist, and when WWII broke out, he was deposed by the British to prevent the shah from sending oil to the Germans. That occupation wrankled, and all the foreign devils, British, Russia, American were given the boot when the war ended.

It was the Shia ulama of Iran who were the only ulama to resist imperialism,2 supporting the first genuinely independent prime minister, Mossadeq, in 1951 in his effort to kick the British out and take control of the economy. The normally quietist, conservative religious elite had been radicalized despite themselves. When the US moved in to foment a coup in 1953, the invaders were able to get a few religious leaders to bless their scheming, but this blatant imperialist act galvanized all Iranians, and eventually led to the overthrow of the second and last Pahlavi shah in 1979. Newly religious Iran was joined by newly religious Turkey with the coming to power of Recep Erdogan in 2000, who refers to his followers as ‘grandchildren of the Ottomans’. Traditional Sunni-Shia rivals, Turkey and Iran are far from bosom buddies, but the current crisis of the ummah means that differences are put aside.

The second stumbling block for Muslims was the secular reaction to imperialism, Arab nationalism, now competing with Turkish and Persian nationalisms, fashioned as secular identities, undermining a united Islamic identity, central to the ummah. Egypt’s Nasser and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein are the two most notorious nationalist leaders, who led their countries in a death spiral of violent repression of Islam, corruption and failed military ventures.

Nationalism was foreign to Muslims, never the defining ideology, and these nationalist movements failed, with chauvinistic Sunni radicals morphing into violent pseudo-Islamic movements – al-Qaeda, ISIS and Islamic State–Khorasan Province.

With the current US-Israeli genocide of Palestinians, the ummah is coming together again, realizing this is the make-or-break moment for Islam, and that these nationalisms are evaporating in the heat of crisis. Even the perfidious MBS casually announced that there would be no Israeli-Saudi new order until the Palestinians have a real state. The ice is cracking, moving, as Palestine’s spring takes shape out of the Israelis’ ashes and rubble.

Turkey and Iran had secular capitalism imposed from the top to keep the imperialists at bay. Egypt had a brutal British occupation until the 1950s, creating the same secular capitalism as Turkey and Iran, but then came socialistic dictator Nasser in 1951, injecting a new political element. Sadly, he too refused to acknowledge Islam as the bedrock of society, a more genuinely socialistic way of life, his secular vision collapsing with Israeli invasion, leaving Egypt, the largest Middle East country, far weaker now than either of its two Middle East rivals. The Arab states have all remained puppets of imperialism and remain cool to, even resentful of the new Shia vitality and presence. But the Arab masses support the Shia defiance of US-Israel, despising their Quisling leaders.

Puppets and fledging actors

Iran’s revolution in 1979 was bad news for the Saudis, leading to even greater repression of its Shia. Saudi suspicions and fear of Shia have been a terrible ordeal for the 10% of Saudis who are Shia, and a powerful Shia state would naturally push for justice. So instead of making peace with their Shia (and thus, with the new Iran), in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait) spent $25b (i.e., gave US weapons producers $25b) in support of the brutal, mad thug, Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). When Saddam invaded Kuwait, cashing his US-Saudi IOU for sacrificing half million Iraqi Sunnis-Shia to kill a half million Shia Iranians, Saudi Arabia was unhappy. Not only had Saddam failed to crush Shia Iran, his defeat would mean an angry Shia state next door, which could easily invade and overthrow him.

So King Fahd invited the US forces into the kingdom to invade Iraq and keep the Saudi kingdom as head honcho of the Muslim world. I repeat: King Fahd allowed American and coalition troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabian forces were involved both in bombing raids on Iraq and in the land invasion that helped to ‘liberate’ Kuwait, the so-called Gulf War (1990-1991). The ummah, the House of Peace, invaded and occupied by the House of War. MBS’s current free and easy secularism makes sense after all, but not for the ummah.

Why would the US have gone to all the trouble to invade Iraq as part of ‘liberating’ Kuwait, and then leave the (truly odious) dictator Saddam in power? Ask weakling King Fahd, whose fear of a Shia-majority Iraq next door was even greater than his fear of a cowed, murderous Saddam. Pan-Arab nationalism – RIP.

This enduring Sunni-Shia stand-off is the imperialists’ trump card. All the Arab countries are in varying degrees still US puppets, and persecute their Shia because they, the so-called rulers, are weak and fear the implicit critique of their weakness that the morally uncompromised Shia represent. Nigeria, Bahrain, Indonesia, Malaysia have all driven wedges between Sunnis and Shias when it was politically useful. The Sunni masses, looking for a way out of the imperialist straitjacket but educated to despise Shia, looked not to solidarity with all Muslims to fight the looming imperial enemy, but inward to past Sunni experience, the early four Rightly Guided Caliphs, for their inspiration. They downplay the fact that the finally one was Ali, the inspiration of the Shia as sole legitimate caliph of the whole lot. In the 1980s-1990s, frustrated Sunnis coalesced around radical Saudi Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda, various ISIS caliphate dreamers in central Asia, the Caucasus, Africa, internationally, with an unIslamic jihad condoning mass civilian deaths as a key tactic.

This element continues to plague the Sunni world, the whole world. It has undermined the efforts to rebuild Iraq after the 2003 invasion. The Ba’thists were outlawed, leaving the minority Sunni with nothing, so they preferred chaos and road bombs, but Shia long-suffering patience grudgingly brought together ‘good’ Sunni and all the Shia to fight the latest (Sunni) terrorists, ISIS et al.

10/7 was an earthquake, not just for Israel but for Islam, the Sunni-Shia tremors finally syncing on that explosive day, pushing the Sunni establishment into Shia arms. All people of goodwill now rout for the Shia Hezbollah in their battle with Israel to protect the heart and soul of Islam. Paradoxically, this challenge was anticipated by the renewal of relations between the Saudis and Iran in March 2023, anticipating 10/7, an admission that Shia power could not be ignored in the new world order taking shape under China and Russia, quite apart from the central role Iran was now playing in protecting the Palestinians from total annihilation, with the Saudis watching with alarm from the sidelines as their position at the head of the Muslim world was being usurped by events on the ground, including from its own despised 10% Shia, now demanding the same rights as citizens that the Sunnis have.

Democracy really is the answer

It’s finally clear: Arab nationalism has been a flop, as has been Pakistan nationalism, where the 20% Shia must constantly fight Sunni chauvinists. Indian nationalism is worse, following the path of Israel, a racist Zionized Hindutva ideology that exclused all Muslims, Sunni or Shia. Sunni chauvinism under imperialism, taking refuge in nationalism, always undermines the ummah, unless the Shia are a sizable minority or majority, and the government is sufficiently representative. I.e., democratic.

In hindsight, I would argue the road to the liberation of Jerusalem began with Iran’s revoluton in 1979, which put Palestine liberation at the top of its international agenda. The war launched by Iraq was supposed to steamroll through a weakened Iran, as ordered by Saddam’s backers Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, the US and Europe. (What a cynical, bizarre coalition!) Ayatollah Khomeini was brilliant and charismatic, but a poor politician, refusing to end the war when Saddam offered, hoping to liberate Iraq, leading to 100,000s more deaths and seriously weakening and tarnishing the revolution. His hubris was immortalized in telling anecdotes. My favorite: Pakistani dictator Zia had urged the shah in 1977 to crack down even harder on the rebels. When Zia met Khomeini as the shah’s successor a few years later, Khomeini merely asked politely for Zulfikar Bhutto’s life (Zia was Bhutto’s successor) to be spared. No dice. On the contrary, Zia advised Khomeini not to tangle with a superpower. Khomeini retorted he would never do such a thing and in fact always relied in the superpower. Ouch! That only made Zia persecute his Shia even more.

Arab secular states can’t unite when they are headed by dictators like Assad, Nasser, the Jordanian and Saudi king-dictators. Corrupt dictatorships don’t make good allies. The need for democracy is obvious. Iraq hopefully can be the model for Sunni and Shia learning to work together again under a robust electoral democracy. Sunni and Shia lived more or less till Saddam and sons really began their madness.3

The end of Saddam moved the Shia-Sunni ‘battle lines’ 200 miles west, now running through Baghdad, which was precisely what Gertrude Bell, Saddam and the imperialists had all tried to prevent. History takes its revenge. The chauvinistic Sunni hegemony of the Muslim world is finished. The Sunni hegemons tried to overthrow Khomeini and failed. The same battle took place 12 years later in Iraq and failed again due to Shia patience in the face of Sunni-inspired terror. Thousands of Saudi and Jordanian youth went to Iraq after 2003 to fight the occupation (and looming Shia hegemony) and die, just like they did in their misguided jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Their violent self-sacrifice only digging the Sunni world deeper into a state of humiliation. 85% of ISIS in Syria working alongside the US imperialists are Saudi. They are there solely to fight the ‘sons of al-Alqami’, referring to the Shia vizier when the Mongols razed Baghdad in 1258.

Now the Sunni are exposed as helpless in the face of Israeli genocide of the Palestinians, are actually helping ‘protect’ US-Israel from Iranian bombs intended for Israel. The Sunni world is humiliated, betraying Islam, kowtowing to not just the US but US-Israel. To defeat (Sunni-inspired) ISIS, the ‘good’ Iraqi Sunnis even had to welcome help from not just Iraq Shias (the army) but also Iran. It is high time to bury the hatchet of envy and suspicion, and join the Shia, if only because they hold the fate of the ummah in their hands.

The ‘bad’ Sunnis (regime elites) are still supporting the US-led war on terror. Their goal is still to wreck the new, Shia-led Iraqi state and keeping the lid on their own pressure-cookers, looking over their shoulders at the (failed) Arab Spring of 2011. The Sunni elites do US-Israel’s work for it. At the same time, they are angry with the US for complicity in Shia revival, undermining House of Saud, contributing to the decline in its religious legitimacy. MBS’s secular turn is more a parody of soft power, which only undermines (Sunni) Islam. The Saudi treatment of its own Shia mirrors Israeli treatment of Palestinians.4 Sadly, it is only because Palestinians have some shred of legal independence as part of the post-WWII internationally agreed policy of decolonization that this instance of apartheid is being fought openly. Anti-Muslim apartheid is actually alive and well but hidden behind national borders (China, Myanmar).

What remains of the insurgency in Iraq today is an alliance of Jordanians, Saudis and Iraqi Ba’thists. Syria and Saudi are both ripe for change, with Iraq and Iran as their models, but especially Iraq, with its more open, competitive elections and its large Shia population. The main legacy of the Iraq invasion was to make the Shia case, which means fighting Sunni extremism and terrorism, exposing the US Global War on Terror (GWOT) as a fraud (produced more (Sunni) terror), cementing Shiism as the adult in the room, holding the Islamic faith secure by a string, open to democracy.

21st century the Shia century?

This is already happening. Islamic Iran from the start allied with all anti-imperialist countries. Its revolution echoes the idealism of the Russia revolution of 1917, both of which were met by invasions by western powers and/or proxies, and both succeeding against all odds, based very much on ideological zeal for the good of mankind. Both also became authoritarian states, with elections but with limited choice. Iran’s elections are much more credible, and the election of reformers like Khatami and now Pezeshkian show there is room for real public debate. As with all countries victim to US ire, survival trumps all finer nuances, which are put on hold. Show me who your friends are, and I’ll tell you who you are. Iran’s allies are the anti-imperialist good guys.

In contrast to the Arab states, with their muddled Islamo-nationalisms, which have failed to fashion a Sunni identity independent of imperialism, and which still exclude Shia. A shame that Shia find better allies on the secular left, with largely common political, economic and cultural goals, above all peace. Like the Jews at the heart of Bolshevism, Iraq’s Communist Party was full of Shia intellectuals (e.g., poet Muzaffar al-Nawwab). The Iraqi town Shatra in the Shia south was nicknamed Little Moscow. The Shia have a natural affinity for the secular left, supporting the underdog. The Iraqi Communist Party was reorganized after the Iraq war and its leader Hamid Majid Musa was part of the governing body the US set up. The communists wanted peace as do all communists, Islamic Iran and Iraq want peace (salam) more than anything. Neither the communists nor the ummah were/are aggressive, expansionist. Both offer(ed) a way of life that doesn’t have war built in as its engine. The communist alternative was social/state ownership and planning. The Islamic alternative is a mix of state direction/ownership and limited capitalism. There are no billionaires who aren’t emigres already. That kind of money lust is alien to a devout society or a communist one.

Iran and Hezbollah are suffering Israel’s truly Satanic war crimes alongside their Palestinian brothers. Meanwhile the Gulf and Saudi sheikh-dictators, the Egyptian no-pretense-dictator, the Jordanian British-installed-king sit on the sidelines cursing the Palestinians for disturbing their sleep. They actually come to Israel’s aid – Egypt and Jordan are official allies of Israel – when Iran tries to hurt poor little Israel, as they already did in April 2024. The US is well aware that the Jordanian and Egyptian masses are very unhappy, but it relies on its local puppet dictators to keep the lid on the pressure-cooker, and is very cautious about exporting one-man-one-vote after its painful and expensive experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the former once again Taliban, the latter in league with Iran against the Great Satan, which just happens to include itself, US-Israel. So don’t hold your breath for US pressure to make its dictators relinquish power. 2011 was a close call, not to be repeated.

As for the Palestinians, they were completely left out of the negotiations about their future following the 1973 Egypt-Israel war. Sold out by (atheist, Sunni) Sadat with an empty promise. The past half century has been unremitting hell for the Palestinians, who were kicked out of Jordan in the 1970s, many ending up in southern Lebanon, living with the Shia there. This is the origins of Musa al-Sadr’s Amal and after his assassination, Hezbollah. This happened during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, forging of a new force to confront Israel, which was given a huge boost with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Suddenly there was a ‘Shia crescent’, a genuine quasi-state opposition to Israel that functioned outside the imperial constraints.

Musa al-Sadr represented the best of the Shia tradition, an activist cleric engaged in the life of his community, unafraid to speak truth to power. He earned a law degree from (shah-era) Tehran university. His Amal militia ran social services and acted as a political organization, a challenge to the fiction of pan-Arab unity and the unyielding reality of Sunni hegemony. Iran’s IRGC was organized by veterans of Amal training camps. Amal represented a political threat to the Arab and Palestinian establishment, and his assassination by Gaddafi was clearly a Sunni move to quash a Shia upstart.5 But he (and Israel’s brutal occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s) inspired the formation Hezbollah, which killed 654 Israeli soldiers in a few years and pushed a humiliated Israel out of Lebanon in 1985.

‘Good’ Sunnism is reviving but more in the emigre communities, largely in the US/Canada, Europe, Australia/ New Zealand, where there are now communities of mainstream Sunni and Shia as well as sects (Ismaili, Yazidi, Ahmadiya, Bahai’s). This young, well educated, assertive diaspora radically challenges the Sunnia world, as a new generation of Muslims takes electoral democracy for granted, and were able to gain equal rights as citizens in the ‘House of War’, which meant fight for Palestine against Israel. Effectively the need for young, educated workers to fuel its capitalist machine ended up importing the ‘enemy’ to the heart of imperialism. As these mostly Sunni Muslims spread their message of ‘goodwill to all men’, colonized, persecuted Palestine has gradually gained the edge over colonizer, persecutor Israel. They are joined by a growing community of converts, as people find out about Islam from friendly, law-abiding neighbors. Islam is the fastest growing religion everywhere.

The Shia are Islam’s ‘wandering Jews’ but without the usury, so they have a presence on all continents, mostly persecuted (or just ignored) by Sunni majorities (but not everywhere). The Sunni too are like the Jews with their world network, a persecuted minority (but not everywhere). In fact, Sunni emigres are free to criticize Israel and their own native Muslim-majority countries in the West, where, say, in Egypt or Pakistan that could land them in jail or worse. As with the Jews, the spread of both Sunni and Shia presence virtually everywhere creates a powerful network for mutual support, to ensure both Shia and Sunni, emigre and domestic, are vital parts of the ummah, all devoted to defending Palestine and liberating Jerusalem. A kind of benign Judaism.6 Democracy brings power to Shia majorities and give voice to minorities, resisting Sunni terrorists. The goal remains the liberation of Jerusalem, but the center of gravity has shifted from Saudi Arabia, Egypt to Iran and Iraq, now stretching from Lebanon and Syria along the Shia axis of resistance.

The US allies with the pragmatic Sunni dictators, hates, targets Shia, but they are the best defense against real terrorists (Saudi/ Jordanian ‘jihadists’, ISIS, US-Israel). Standing up to tyranny is never popular with tyrants. By overthrowing Saddam, the US unwittingly paved the way for the Shia revival. Ayatollah Sistani brilliantly used the opening to guarantee democratic Shia hegemony in Iraq as a model for a renewed Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, in short, the Muslim ummah. The Iraqi Shia proved that it is possible to work with the US and not compromise. Sistani refused to meet with US officials: Mr Bremer, you are American I am Iranian. Leave it up to the Iraqis to devise their constitution. He challenged US plans to hand power to Allawi, Chalabi. Insisted on one-person, one-vote. When the US refused, he called for large demos over five consecutive days until the US relented.7

Iraqi Shia abandoned the Iraqi nationalism of Saddam. The renewed nationalism is firmly nonsectarian, uniting the ummah. This is a powerful message to the other Arab states. It is fitting that Palestine has brought the Sunni to the Shia-led defense of Jerusalem. Israel can be defeated only by a united ummah which acts wisely, with restraint, indefatigable. It is also a message to Israel and the Palestinians about inventing a new nationalism based on peace and reconciliation.

ENDNOTES:

  • 1
    To give the US occupiers of Afghanistan 2001–2022, they made sure Afghan Shia, the Hazars, were given full rights in the new constitution, where the state was carefully dubbed Islamic, reflecting the new identity-politics imperialism.
  • 2
    Sunni Sufis resisted imperialism (Algeria, Caucasus) but never the Sunni establishment. Grand Mufti of Egypt Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) was a westernizing reformer. His legendary friend (Shia) Jamal al-Afghani was anti-imperialist but didn’t manage to do much.
  • 3
    Democracies are not immune from this as Biden’s pathetic defense of his son shows how family concerns can seriously undermine any legacy of good the leader accomplishes.
  • 4
    They have no public voice, all 300 Shia girls’ schools have Sunni headmistresses, they sit on the oil wealth and get only low paid jobs, scholars get their heads chopped off, etc.
  • 5
    Probably out of jealousy, as he saw himself as the savior of Palestine. See Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, 2006, p 113.
  • 6
    This could be why Israel so detests Iran. Initially, Israel was admired by Iranian intellectuals. Jalāl Āl-e-Ahmad visited Israel in 1962 and recorded his experiences in The Israeli republic (1962). But when he observed the treatment of Palestinians, he soured and Iranians broadly criticized ‘westoxification’, anticipating the revolution’s clear anti-imperialism. Only Iran really ‘gets’ imperialism.
  • 7
    Vali Nasr, op.cit., p175.RedditEmail
Eric Walberg is a journalist who worked in Uzbekistan and is now writing for Al-Ahram Weekly in Cairo. He is the author of From Postmodernism to Postsecularism and Postmodern Imperialism. His most recent book is Islamic Resistance to ImperialismRead other articles by Eric, or visit Eric's website.

Monday, September 23, 2024

THE DREADED ISI

Pakistan appoints Lt General Asim Malik as head of powerful spy agency


Lt Gen Asim Malik to replace Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum as Director General of ISI and will take charge on Sept.30, 2024.
Photo / X

Tariq Butt, Correspondent

Lt General Muhammad Asim Malik has been appointed as the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi) to take charge of the position on September 30, the state-run Pakistan Television (PTV) announced on its official X account.

The new appointee is currently serving as the adjutant general at the General Headquarters (GHQ) of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, the statement said.

He will be replacing Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum, who was picked up for the position in 2021 by then-prime minister Imran Khan on the insistence of the then army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa.

In October 2021, then-Major General Asim Malik had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and was then appointed the adjutant general.

During the course of his military career, he served in the Balochistan infantry division and commanded the infantry brigade in Waziristan, the PTV said and highlighted that he had been awarded a Sword of Honour during his army service.

Other than that, Gen Malik also served as the chief instructor at the National Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad and as an instructor at the Command and Staff College Quetta.

The military officer is a graduate of Fort Leavenworth in the United States and Royal College of Defence Studies in London, the statement added.

He belongs to a military family and his father Ghulam Muhammad was also a lieutenant general in the Pakistan Army.

The outgoing ISI chief retired from the army service last year, but was retained in this post after he was given extension in service.

The post of ISI director general, usually a serving military officer, is one of the most powerful positions in Pakistan, at the intersection of domestic politics, the military and foreign relations.

While the ISI chief technically reports to the prime minister, he is controlled by Pakistan’s army chief.


The shadow games of Pakistan's ISI

Friday, 23 August 2024 | Bhopinder Singh


Often accused of overstepping its professional bounds, ISI has become a player in domestic politics, international intrigue, and personal vendettas

Spy novelist John Le Carre describes spies as complicated and lonely beings, living double lives. Such seclusion makes deception, intrigue and unrequited ambition, their default mode. The fact that they know the deep and dark secrets but are still expected to comply by restrains occasionally leads them to flex their ‘privilege’ (read, confidential information) towards reckless ends. Because they are dangerously privy to so much dirt, they fear their ambition.

Like the proverbial Ceaser’s wife, must always be above suspicion – but often aren’t.Pakistan’s notorious spy agency Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) is infamous for going beyond its professional remit and dabbling in domestic politics, commercial interests or even partaking in cross-border dalliances, beyond their approved mandate. If the Pakistani Army Chief is the real power (pretence of civil politicians, notwithstanding), arguably the second most powerful person is the DG-ISI. Supposed loyalty to the Army Chief or to the PM (in times when the Army takes a backseat and politicians have an upper hand) is implicit, though, in the Pakistani narrative, backstabbing is common.

Ironically for such a powerful ‘number two’ post, there have been 29 DG-ISIs so far, and only one has ascended to the post of Army Chief i.e., the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir. It is reflective of the slippery slope that the post entails which invariably ends up making some power centres in Pakistan unhappy about their conduct e.g., Clergy, Politicians, Americans/Chinese or even their alma mater, the Pakistani ‘establishment’.

Even the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir was abruptly moved out as the DG-ISI as the then PM Imran Khan felt uncomfortable with his conduct (karma later evened out the equation as Imran finds himself languishing in the jail today). Seemingly the profile is for a loyal, unquestioning and low-key DG-ISI who does the job is satisfied with obscurity (shouldn’t be overambitious) and effectively rides into the sunset after retirement, without much fuss. Given the opportunity, lure and access, many do try to take their chances.

There is a curious case of one DG-ISI who did get appointed as the Army Chief, but his tenure was only for a few hours and the same does not go in official records as having become the Pakistani Army Chief. Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt was a typical DG-ISI who went across the Afghan border to meet the dreaded leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, to negotiate – he was in the thick of the dark corridors and machinations of the Pakistani State.

Ziauddin had direct access to the other competing power centre i.e., PM Nawaz Sharif, and was a willing accomplice in Sharif’s attempt to remove Pervez Musharraf as the Army Chief. Before the coup(or countercoup as Musharraf calls it), ‘General’ Ziauddin was hastily appointed the Army Chief and then immediately dumped by the Pakistani Army which refused to back their DG-ISI’s ambition. Spymaster’s gambit failed. Ziauddin was not the first or the last of DG-ISIs to harbour personal ambition beyond what was warranted constitutionally. The shadowy likes of Lt Gen Akhtar Rahman, Hamid Gul, Shamsur Kallu, Zaheerul Islam etc., operated with questionable interests. Yet another one who is in the news for harbouring extraconstitutional ambitions and paying the price for the same is the former DG-ISI, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed. Forced into premature retirement over his dubious role amid the recent turf war between the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (led by previous and current Army Chiefs i.e. Qamar Bajwa and Asim Munir, respectively) against the Imran Khan dispensation – he has been brought back to public news for having misused his then powerful position and arm-twisting people in some realty deal.

While he was earlier afforded a relatively face-saving ‘early retirement’ (though everyone knew better), he could be embarrassingly court-martialed to score fresh brownie points against the deposed Imran Khan dispensation (which Lt Gen Faiz Hameed is popularly believed to be identified with). Many acts of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed did suggest a rather megalomanic, cavalier and overreaching conduct that did not behove the role of spymasters, but perhaps the personal ambition had got the better of him. As the roll of the dice played out, the narrative changed and with it, he too was ousted. Only he is back for a possible second round of infamy and disrepute if the current dispensation has its ways.Whereas the unhinged politicians like Imran Khan who are desperately trying to save their skins and ingratiate themselves to the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (after realising that they are not going anywhere) have disowned and thrown Lt Gen Faiz Hameed under the proverbial bus! Instead of backing their henchman who did their bidding, Imran said, “if Faiz Hameed was involved, it should be investigated” and he welcomed the enquiry!

The whole saga says a lot about the unprofessionalism and complete absence of loyalty in overall governance, as exemplified by Lt Gen Faiz Hameed or by Imran Khan – the former was disloyal to his institution, and the latter to his word. As Israeli Michael Bar-Zohar notes in Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service, “Dirtiest actions should be carried out by the most honest men”, perhaps former DG-ISI Faiz Hameed wasn’t one and will pay the price, again.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views are personal)

Unity, faith, discipline – The ISI of Pakistan

Global Defense Insight
January 28, 2022


ISI was established by Australian army commander Major-General Walter Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8. Later, he became the chief of Australia’s Secret Intelligence Service. Cawthrone based ISI’s design on the British intelligence service MI-6 and the United States’ CIA.

Author Hein G. Kiessling’s book “Faith, Unity, Discipline – The ISI of Pakistan” gives readers a fascinating historical look into the secret world of one of the most admired and dreaded secret services of the modern age.

Kiessling explains ISI’s start and how it was first charged with carrying out foreign operations. He also goes into great detail on the pivotal events that changed the path of history and made ISI what it is today.

The author reflects on the ISI’s early failures, like Operation Gibraltar, which used irregulars to incite an uprising in Kashmir. Although General Ayub Khan approved the ideas, they did not pay off for Pakistan.

The writer explores the role of the ISI in East Pakistan. Its first attempt to inject religion into politics, which ended in failure, was to get enough support for Jammat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. While the Indian RAW, on the other hand, not only completed its core objective of dismembering Pakistan but also posed a threat to the ISI’s emergence as a secret organization.

For years, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was an underdeveloped and unknown organization. It became well-known in 1979 when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in support of their communist ally’s government. To defend the mujahideen against the Soviets, the organization collaborated with the CIA, an American intelligence agency by providing weapons and funding.

Since then, the ISI has expanded its sphere of influence throughout the region. The directorate’s support in Indian-held Kashmir, assistance to the Afghan Taliban, and potential ties to Al-Qaeda are all fiercely debated topics. It also puts the spotlight on the ISI’s participation in the country’s nuclear program and its covert role in the Dr. A.Q. Khan case.

This book provides an excellent overview of the ISI’s participation in internal politics and foreign counter-intelligence operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and North East India, among other places. It details the events of the 1990s when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto established an information-sharing network between the ISI and Pakistan’s foreign office for policy research and other purposes.

The author further claims that ISI wields diplomatic power through the appointment of former military generals as ambassadors.

One of the book’s most intriguing parts is its debunking of the misconception that ISI is a rogue organization. The author argues that such an idea does not exist and ISI is a well-established organization with a robust command structure overseeing the directorate’s operations.

Because there is little public discussion about ISI’s actions, the author’s attempt to dispel some of the agency’s clouds is pushed back.

The material in the book comes from the author’s personal networking with ISI professionals, as well as secondary source data, particularly from Indian academics that view ISI through a RAW lens. This book, on the other hand, succeeds in explaining the workings of intelligence as well as Pakistan’s politics and overall policies.

‘ISI didn’t plan the Taliban victory. The US facilitated it,’ says Adrian Levy

Open Conversation with Adrian Levy, author


Ullekh NP  | 27 Aug, 2021


(Illustration: Saurabh Singh)

Adrian Levy has never stayed back this long in London since he was 16, he says. The Covid-19 pandemic has confined him to his London home from where he currently gives interviews on the latest among several books he has co-authored with Cathy Scott-Clark who, these days, is tied up with an upcoming project: on the American use of torture. Like their previous works, their new book Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the R.A.W. and the I.S.I. is an explosive volume that talks about the men and methods of the bitterly rival external intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The 360-page book offers valuable insights into various operations launched apparently by ISI and RAW, the 2019 Pulwama attack, the Pathankot airbase attack of 2016, the Parliament attack and also about people and assets.


There is much more in the book than what has often been said about the two agencies.

The duo, known for their superb investigations, have authored books and made films on jihad, geopolitics, strategy and foreign policy, among others. Their books include The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight; The Meadow: The Kashmir Kidnapping That Changed the Face of Modern Terrorism; The Siege: The Attack on the Taj; Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy.

In his conversation with Open, Levy dwells on the Afghan situation, the role of spy agencies in that country and warns against knee-jerk reactions on the part of the media and analysts to run into judgments on events, saying these could be profoundly damaging. As with terror attacks, he says it is important to understand the distinction between intelligence failures and the intent to allow things to run their course. Excerpts:

How many years did it take you to finish this book?

It’s a continuum for Cathy and myself. Each book is an overlapping enterprise rather than one book or film ending and another beginning. Work goes on concurrently and so it is more horizontal than vertical. For example, when we were doing The Meadow (the 2012 book about the 1995 kidnapping of tourists in Kashmir by an unnamed group to secure the release of dreaded Pakistani militant Maulana Masood Azhar), we had the idea of the Western hostage-taking in mind to look at the wider issue of disappearances. But we couldn’t do it for many years. Finally, after the earthquake happened in Kashmir (in 2005) and the security came down, we got to see the landscape of Kashmir.



Now, building relationships takes a long time. It is a decades-plus-long effort. Cathy must have worked from 1994 to until now, but in terms of specifics, the work on this started in 2009 when we were doing The Siege (on the 26/11 Mumbai attacks). We had this idea then of making a South Asian version of the Israeli film called The Gatekeepers, which is an intriguing, well-made, educative and entertaining documentary feature that got the Israeli security agency Shin Bet to open up. It gave a conflicting, overlapping narrative of oral history, not substantiated by paperwork, how they (members of Shin Bet who agreed to talk) saw the Israeli-Palestinian issue. We had this idea to make a film in which one of us would be on this side of the LoC and the other on the other side. We started conversations in 2009 with everybody, but on either side, not one person wanted to be on camera (from ISI or RAW).

The issue with spies is that they don’t want to be accountable to anyone. We kept working on it, with new RAW chiefs, new ISI chiefs, telling them to own the narrative. Owning the narrative is what Americans had done exceptionally well. But everyone in India and Pakistan rejected it although we kept pleading. So instead of a film we decided to write an oral book based on inputs from all of those we spoke to about ISI and RAW. We were working on the book intensely for four years, travelling to India and Pakistan. But most of these people who spoke to us were people we knew since 1994.



When did you meet Major Iftikhar whom you describe in the book as the nom de guerre for an ISI operations officer?

We met him three years ago, but everyone else who provides the infrastructure were relationships we began when we were kids (laughs) and so they were genial. A lot of meetings, by the way, happened in the Gulf states, Thailand, a proxy territory for a lot of spy agencies. Some meetings took place in France, Germany, Syria, the US and England. These meetings overlapped with another project that is coming up: on American use of torture. We have an extremely thin level of budgeting and so we manage multiple projects together. Otherwise, it would be practically and economically impossible for two people who do freelance work and are not supported by institutions to do such projects.

Do Iftikhar and Monisha (the RAW agent who is a source for the authors) have multiple identities?

Yes. We keep interviews that go back to 1994. All the interviews are taped and transcribed, but we agreed to use trade names. Iftikhar was one of the identities he (the ISI operative) had used. He had five identities all the way from Korea in 1994 up until his vanishing. In fact, Iftikhar was his favourite nom de guerre. Monisha had several identities. She was not in clandestine service. She was an analyst.



In David Muntaner’s 2015 film CIA vs KGB: Battleground Berlin, CIA officers admit that KGB was slightly superior to them because of their ideological drive and commitment. Is that kind of faith-based passion at play between ISI and RAW?

It is a super-interesting question. I have got many different takes on that. I believe that it is true that both outfits take on a different mantle as the time changes. If you take a micro timeline, that is from 9/11 onwards, you can see that there is an evolution of ideology and character within those organisations. It will be tempting initially and incorrectly to say that India is taking on its ideological foe in ISI, which stands for an austere and extreme interpretation of Islam. That is to assume that RAW doesn’t have any politics. I touch upon this because that (giving such a perception) is one of RAW’s biggest achievements. Its projection of itself as benign and vanilla is something it does very effectively.


Owning the narrative is what Americans had done exceptionally well. But everyone in India and Pakistan rejected it. So instead of a film we decided to write a book based on inputs from all of those we spoke to about ISI and RAW. We were working on the book intensely for four years, travelling to India and Pakistan

Both organisations have gone on interesting journeys. Both involve inculcation by a faith and a certain kind of worldview, a deepening of a religious-social worldview. It is certainly true of RAW and certainly true of ISI. Let’s not forget that a new kind of nationalism is emerging in India encouraged by the US post-2001. Therefore, the forces that become corrosive in Pakistan become corrosive in India, too. And yet the story is not told that way. You have jealousies on both sides.



Your book quotes Monisha saying that Lodhi Road (RAW headquarters) is dominated by IPS officers who think Muslims are duplicitous. How do you think such an attitude would restrict intel gathering against ISI?

I am not in the business of writing a transformative policy document. I am reporting (laughs). I will make an observation though. India’s Intelligence Bureau (the main internal intelligence agency), for example, has a certain number of Muslims but senior positions are mostly not filled by them with the probable exception of Asif Ibrahim. The organisation, according to insiders—and it is not my view—suffered incalculably because of that. If you look at all spy organisations across the world, they invest a lot in communities they investigate. In that sense, the transformation of the CIA, MI5, MI6 is all radical. In places like India, such reforms are only on paper.

The result of this attitude could be dangerous. Again, it is very easy to look at everything through the narrow prism of post-2014 politics when BJP returned to power. Actually, it involves a much longer timeline, all the way through various other governments. RAW officers tell you that the organisation does not reflect the humongous gifted communities of India and that it would benefit from being a truly representative security establishment.

Who do you think are the most effective, storied and feared officers of RAW and ISI?

It would be true to say much against the common beliefs that RAW and ISI have both been hugely effective. And yet, because they resist telling stories, what you tend to hear is hugely negative, such as big episodes of infiltration, collapses, the failures like 26/11, etcetera. There are many, many heroes. At a very senior level, I always found that (the late RAW chief) B Raman’s influence just cannot be overstated. He is an extraordinary person who brought in extraordinary changes, professionalism and rigour to RAW.



KC Verma is among such a breed of people who did the impossible, politically as well. A very good example of short-termism is that after 26/11 lots of people said to me that we never imagined the unimaginable. That’s just rubbish, right? What do the security services do? They imagine the unimaginable every day. People like Verma and Raman imagine the unimaginable and try to go into the unimaginable space, including the outreach to Iran, the outreach to China, the balancing of America, Iran and China, the outreach to Russia and so on. They played hugely sophisticated, big-country games that are never really well-documented. The courting of Israel is a story in its own right.

The illicit relationship with Israel, which took place in the 1990s at a time when it couldn’t even be acknowledged, goes right up to Pegasus today. So, I’ve named some of those people. Anyone who is really interested in this psychology of jihad, who is really interested in the pathology of political movements, wants to be with these people. You want to understand how and what are the influences that lead to the cell splitting, the creation of new ideologies and flavours. There is an enormous knowledge base in RAW and it is never shared with its own people.

What do you think is the role of ISI in the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan?

I think there are some useful handholds: in November 2001, ISI under General Ehsan ul Haq manoeuvred Saudi royals to front a deal to protect the Taliban and that was backed by the Tony Blair government, in parts, in the UK. They warned—collectively—that the movement could not be defeated and should be incorporated into what the US intended to do in Afghanistan.

That proposal was taken by the Saudi royal family and Blair to Dick Cheney who rejected it outright—just as he rejected a side deal with Iran which in 2002 and 2003 offered the bin Laden family and top military commanders in their custody, in return for normalisation of relations with the US. Cheney said then that Iran would fall after Iraq and the Taliban, and the US was not prepared for any deals or normalcy as it invaded Baghdad.

The Taliban victory is inspirational for Islamists, Islamic states but also for anti-imperialists. Taliban are not Al Qaeda. I fear the chaos more than the Taliban. In ungoverned spaces, terror groups could grow as happened in Libya and Syria. So, there’s an argument to help the Taliban quickly govern and increase their capacity

That deal was never forgotten by ISI—and Ehsan’s legacy would live on until 2006-07, when ISI and CIA parted ways, the relationship having soured completelyas ISI would not relinquish the idea. For its part, the US—by now distracted by civil war in Iraq—would not embrace it and could not persuade Pakistan to relinquish its strategic interests.

What we see here is not so much Pakistan’s manifest destiny or even long-haul planning but the abject failure of US policy to launch an impossible low-intensity war in Afghanistan, and then further dilute it with an illegal invasion of Iraq—and finally abandoning both Iraq and Afghanistan, while neighbours in Pakistan continued to hold on to their ambitions.

Imagine if Bush-Cheney had embraced the Saudi-Pak plan at the start and also taken control of the bin Laden family and Al Qaeda military commanders. How many lives would have been preserved? Impossible to know, but a painful thought.

ISI did not plan this victory. And what we are seeing is not the fall of Saigon. It is the failure of Kabul to rule all of Afghanistan, and for a centralised army to represent an ethnocentric nation. Kabul did not equal Afghanistan, ever. Taliban prevailed because the governors of provinces decided not to oppose them, and not to support corruption in Kabul, rather than acceding to the Taliban or their goals and ideals. Provincial governments voted against Kabul and enabled it to be encircled and occupied today. ISI did not do this. The US facilitated it.

How influential do you think RAW is in the Panjshir Valley, the seat of anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan?

ISI was attempting to make outreach here—but stumbled over the fact that a corps of officers, all forged in the 1980s war against the Soviets, held sway over Afghan policy. RAW was doing the same, and had contacts but inside the Panjshir Valley there seems to have been a feeling that these links would not amount to anything substantial—in terms of political capital, actual capital or mentoring.



If you look at spy organisations across the world, they invest a lot in communities they investigate. In that sense, the transformation of the CIA, MI5, MI6 is radical. In India, such reforms are only on paper. The result could be dangerous. RAW officers tell you that the organisation would benefit from being a truly representative security establishment

The outcome in Kabul is extraordinary—mostly for what it tells us about the US. The campaign to rout Al Qaeda became a war against the Taliban who were not responsible for 9/11. Seeking vengeance, the US lost its way and—instead of reassuring a terrified world post-9/11 and selling the idea of secular democracy—has worked to undo rules-bound systems.

Talibs are from Afghanistan and have regained power in their country upturning a meandering American project. They are not a terrorist movement but a group with stringent precepts and beliefs. So, let’s wait to see what they have become and what they want to achieve. Previously they have not sought influence or power outside Afghanistan. India, for example, was not their enemy. What is also unknown is what their attitude will be to the foreign radical elements in the country—the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Pakistan Taliban, and Sunni fighters from Iran and China. Will they continue to win shelter? Will they be allowed to recoup and strike from Afghanistan?

The Taliban victory is, of course, inspirational—for Islamists, Islamic states but also for anti-imperialists. But will it grow movements inside the country or inspire others elsewhere? We don’t know is the short answer. Taliban are not Al Qaeda. There was a fraternal relationship, mentoring by Al Qaeda. And Taliban leaders have been ambiguous in their statements. I fear the chaos more than the Taliban. In ungoverned spaces, terror groups could grow as happened in Libya and Syria. So, there’s an argument to help the Taliban quickly govern and increase their capacity. More government and greater authority rather than a lawless vacuum are preferable.



'Faith, Unity and Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan' reveals the agency's clandestine dynamics

Shantanu Mukharji • 
December 10, 2016,

A book on the ISI is hitting the stands, which exposes every detail of the ISI setup and its functioning




Ordinarily , intelligence agencies involved in espionage and counter-espionage the world over are cloaked in deep mystery with people having negligible or no knowledge of their structure and working. Even if some segments of the society have knowledge, they are distorted and garbled .

For Indians, the Pakistan Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is seen as a monstrous and dreaded outfit threatening to harm India by fomenting multiple destructive problems. This belief is deep seated in the Indian mindset. But such a perception is not wide off the mark. A book on the ISI is hitting the stands, which exposes every detail of the ISI setup and its functioning. Authored by Hein Kiessling, the book dispels all the misgivings surrounding the ISI and it adequately deals with all the questions about Pakistan’s unwieldy intelligence body which have perhaps not been answered as yet — making it a most readable book on the subject

The author, Dr Kiessling, has lived in Pakistan for thirteen long years (1989- 2002) enabling him to develop a close relationship with the ISI hierarchy and top leadership of Pakistani polity and military. A scholarly personality with history and political science as his forte, Kiessling is a PhD from a well known Munich university. Given his long exposure in Pakistan and close professional interactions with powerful players who mattered , he is best suited to come out with this magnum opus on the ISI.

The highlight of the book in the Indian context is ISI’s direct involvement in funding the Khalistani movement including sheltering of the Sikh extremists in Pakistan. The book adds that ISI threw itself into its Khalistan adventure from the early ’80s. Terrorist training camps for young Sikhs were set up in Karachi and Lahore. ISI had chalked out a three pronged blueprint: to precipitate the alienation of the Sikhs from mainstream India; emphasised the need to subvert the state machinery and trigger off mass agitation launching a reign of terror in Punjab. Further , ISI contributed to the high number of fatalities in Punjab by supplying sophisticated weaponry, adding to the arsenal of Sikh militants .

Continuing his revelations on the ISI machinations, Dr Kiessling writes that ISI had instructed one of the Khalistanis to receive training at a flying college in Mumbai, aimed at crashing at an off shore oil rig. This shows how deeply embedded the notorious ISI was way back in the ’90s, to strike at critical Indian infrastructure.

Glaring revelations are also mentioned in the book about active ISI complicity in the Indian Northeast. In 1990, ISI undercover operatives stationed in Pakistani embassy Dhaka got in touch with Naga insurgent groups — NSCN and ULFA — and commenced supply of arms to the Naga ultras and organised training to ULFA cadres in Pakistan. Several such batches were trained in arms and that eventually saw unleashing of terror in Assam and adjoining places. The Pak embassy Dhaka emerged as the hub of Indian Northeast operations. China too collaborated with ISI in the joint anti India (Northeast) activities which, inter alia, included funding, supply of weapons and providing safe havens to Northeast insurgents, wanted in India.

In the book under review , Kiessling has provided minute details about covert ISI operations in Kashmir, Northeast and Punjab. Readers would find the contents interesting to read themselves rather than to judge by this review alone.

Speaking about the budget of ISI, the author estimates the ‘official’ budget quantum stands today at a whopping USD 300 million. This is in addition to various other channels generating colossal extra funds for the ISI activities from drug trade, counterfeit money, foreign donations etc.

This book is recommended not only for the intelligence community but for all academics and students of Geopolitics to know the truth about the clandestine dynamics the ISI is engaged in to subvert and penetrate the Indian system . There is comprehensive mention of Indian RAW as well, but readers may like to discover themselves the ‘facts’ contained therein.

On the whole, this is worth a read as its 300-plus pages give some insight into the working of this draconian intelligence outfit targeting a diverse range of objectives employing most lethal means. Academically, the book carries the history of the ISI, profiles of their erstwhile chiefs, supported by illustrated plates .

The reviewer is a retired IPS officer and a senior fellow with the Indian Police Foundation. Follow him on Twitter: @Shantanu2818


ISI controlled Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound: Book

The Abbottabad hideout of Osama bin Laden was under ISI control and a Pakistan Army doctor treated the most dreaded terrorist in the world before he was killed in a daring raid by US commandos in 2011.



Published: April 28, 2016 
By Press Trust of India


Washington, Apr 28: The Abbottabad hideout of Osama bin Laden was under ISI control and a Pakistan Army doctor treated the most dreaded terrorist in the world before he was killed in a daring raid by US commandos in 2011, according to a new book. In fact, the doctor Amir Aziz, of the rank of major, who lived in a compound near bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, was rewarded by the CIA with a share of the USD 25 million bounty the US had put up because a DNA sample had conclusively proved the al-Qaeda leader’s identity.

In his latest book, ‘The Killing of Osama bin Laden’, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh claims that ISI got hold of bin Laden in 2006 after paying bribes to some of the tribal leaders. At the time he was said to be very ill. “Early on in his confinement at Abbottabad, the ISI had ordered Amir Aziz, a doctor and a major in the Pakistani army, to move nearby to provide treatment,” Hersh claims, basing his account on a conversation he had with an unidentified retired Pakistan Army official. (ALSO READ: Pakistan was aware of US operation that killed Osama Bin Laden : US Journalist)

And all this while the Pakistani leadership in particular the army chief and ISI boss repeatedly told the US that they did not know the whereabouts of bin Laden. “It’s understood in Washington that elements of the ISI believe that maintaining a relationship with the Taliban leadership inside Afghanistan is essential to national security. The ISI’s strategic aim is to balance Indian influence in Kabul.

“The Taliban is also seen in Pakistan as a source of jihadist shock troops who would back Pakistan against India in a confrontation over Kashmir,” Hersh said in his book that hit stores early this month. “The Pakistanis also know that their trump card against aggression from India is a strong relationship with the United States. They will never cut their person-to-person ties with us,” a senior retired army official is quoted as saying.

Hersh claims that the CIA came to know about bin Laden’s hideout from a senior Pakistani intelligence official who betrayed the secret in return for much of the USD 25 million reward offered by the US. The said official is now living near Washington along with his family.

Hersh said his information collected from US intelligence and other sources was vetted by former ISI head Asad Durrani.



Pakistan's ISI, a hidden, frustrating power for U.S.


By Reuters
October 8, 2010
By Michael Georgy

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Top U.S. defense officials are concerned some elements of Pakistan's main spy agency may be interacting improperly with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, a Pentagon spokesman said on Thursday.
Colonel David Lapan said Pakistani army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, himself a former spy chief, was aware of U.S. concerns about the military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and shared some of them.

Here are some questions and answers about the ISI, the most powerful intelligence agency in Pakistan, a country the United States sees as indispensable to its efforts to tame a raging Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

HOW POWERFUL IS THE ISI?
The shadowy military intelligence agency has evolved into what some describe as a state within a state.
Widely feared by Pakistanis, it is believed to have a hidden role in many of the nuclear-armed nation's policies, including in Afghanistan, one of U.S. President Barack Obama's top foreign policy priorities.

The ISI is seen as the Pakistani equivalent of the U.S. Central Agency (CIA) -- with which it has had a symbiotic but sometimes strained relationship -- and Israel's Mossad.
Its size is not publicly known but the ISI is widely believed to employ tens of thousands of agents, with informers in many spheres of public life.
Hardline elements within the ISI are capable of being spoilers, no matter what position a Pakistani government might take, a reality the U.S. and Afghan governments should take into account if they attempt to exclude Pakistan from negotiations with the Afghan Taliban.

WHAT ABOUT THE ISI'S PAST?

Created in 1948, the ISI gained importance and power during the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and is now rated one of best-organized intelligence agencies in the developing world.

The ISI along with the United States and Saudi Arabia, nurtured the Afghan mujahideen, or Muslim holy warrior guerrillas, and helped them win the war. It helped to plan many of their operations and was the main conduit for Western and Arab arms. It later helped create the Taliban.

Although Pakistan officially abandoned support for the Taliban after joining the U.S.-led war against al Qaeda and Taliban, critics, including Western military commanders in Afghanistan, say it has maintained its ties with, and support for, the Afghan Taliban. The military denies supporting the Taliban but says agents maintain links with militants, as any security agency would do, in the interests of intelligence.

Analysts say the main preoccupation of the ISI, and the Pakistani military, is the threat from nuclear-armed rival India and it sees the Afghan Taliban as tools to influence events, and limit India's role, in Afghanistan.

The ISI was heavily involved in the 1990s in creating and supporting Islamist factions that battled Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region. Some of those groups have since joined forces with the Pakistani Taliban to attack the state, including the ISI. That militants alliance may be the biggest threat to Pakistan's long-term security, analysts say.

WHAT ABOUT THE ISI'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP?

Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha is the director general of the ISI and a close ally of Kayani. Pasha is seen as anti-Taliban, unlike some of his predecessors, and analysts suggest he is using the ISI to broker some sort of deal between factions of the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government. Although he is seen as relatively moderate, the ISI is almost certain to come under a new wave of pressure as the United States gets increasingly frustrated with the army's perceived reluctance to go after Afghan Taliban fighters who cross the border to attack Western forces in Afghanistan. But the strategic interests of the ISI, headquartered in a sprawling, well-guarded complex in Islamabad, will invariably come first, analysts say.

(Additional reporting by Chris Allbritton; Editing by Zeeshan Haider and Robert Birsel)


The ISI, Pakistan's notorious and feared spy agency, comes in from the cold

In its own land the agency is viewed with awe and dread. Now it is opening up – a little – to western journalists



Declan Walsh
Islamabad
THE GUARDIAN
Wed 5 Aug 2009 


The entrance is suitably discreet: a single barrier near a small hospital off a busy Islamabad highway. Bougainvillea spills over long walls with barbed wire; a plain-clothes man packing a pistol questions visitors. Further along, soldiers emerge to check for bombs.

Then a giant electric gate slides back to reveal a sleek grey building that would not look out of place on a California technology campus. With one difference: nothing is signposted.

Welcome to the headquarters of the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, Pakistan's premier spy agency. Powerful and notorious in equal measure, for decades the ISI has operated behind a dense veil of secrecy, impervious to allegations of election rigging, terrorist training, abduction and assassination. Many Pakistanis call it the "state within a state".

Now, though, the ISI is coming in from the cold. Over the past year the agency has invited a stream of western journalists into its swish, modern nerve centre. Over tea and PowerPoint briefings, spies give details of some of Pakistan's most sensitive issues – the Taliban insurgency, the hunt for al-Qaida, the troubled relationship with India.

"We've started to open up a little," said an ISI official authorised to speak to the press. "In the past, irrespective of whether we did something, we were getting blamed for it. Now we want to reach out and get our point of view across."

Yet rehabilitating the ISI's image would tax the most inventive spin doctor. For 30 years its covert operations have been at the sharp end of Pakistani policy, supporting Islamist extremists fighting Indian soldiers in Kashmir, and boosting the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.

At home the agency is viewed with awe and dread. It is the eyes and ears of military power, with huge phone and email monitoring capability and a wide network of informers.

Some Pakistanis refer to its agents – who often wear white shalwar kameez – as "the angels". Under President Pervez Musharraf they abducted hundreds of people, some of whom were allegedly tortured.

Recently, though, it has been the agency's turn to be on the receiving end.

Last May suicide bombers hit an ISI office in Lahore, killing a colonel; in the tribal areas militants have killed 57 agents and wounded 86. Security is tight at the Islamabad headquarters, where last month the ISI asked its next-door neighbour – the city authority – to move to another neighbourhood.

Influencing the local press has always been part of ISI operations, usually through bribes, blandishments or intimidation. But it rarely reached out to the foreign press, until now.

"This is totally unprecedented," said Stephen Cohen, a Pakistan expert at the Brookings Institution policy research organisation in Washington. "It seems to be part of a new openness in the military. They're worried about caricatures of Pakistan, especially in the foreign press, such as people saying the country is going to break up in three months."

The briefings, which take place about once a week, belie the agency's gritty image. Reporters are shepherded into a wood-panelled conference room with soft armchairs, a long table and a wall-mounted screen.


Officials in business suits, who could pass for middle management in any company, introduce themselves without full name or job title.

During the interview liveried servants ferry in trays of tea and fried snacks, served on ISI crockery. Smoking is allowed.

Officials speak openly, but journalists expecting them to gush state secrets may be disappointed. Every talk is carefully vetted in advance. "We're opening up but it's not a total glasnost," said the unofficial spokesman.

The ajar-door policy got off to a rocky start last year when the newly appointed ISI chief, Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha, told Der Spiegel that the Taliban had a right to "freedom of opinion". The agency later said he misspoke. Now, though, it is paying dividends. Two weeks ago a front page lead in the New York Times, highlighting Pakistani concerns with the US military surge in Afghanistan, was sourced from an ISI briefing.

The agency was pleased. "That was the first time [the journalist] carried both sides of the argument," said the ISI official. "I think we are getting there."

The bolder media policy is part of a wider global trend. The CIA and MI6 have always maintained relationships with selected journalists, an engagement whose importance has increased amid the furore over torture and abduction allegations.

For journalists, the challenge is to sift fact from propaganda. In a recent briefing to the Guardian, ISI officials suggested Indian officials had orchestrated last November's Mumbai attacks. The Indians wanted to cover up an investigation into Hindu extremism, they said.

Days later Ajmal Kasab, the only surviving gunman from the massacre, told an Indian court how he had been trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani jihadi outfit with links to the ISI.

In the briefing the ISI also accused New Delhi of supplying arms and explosives to the Pakistan Taliban, even though the Taliban has killed Indians inside Afghanistan.

"Circles within circles," said an ISI official when asked to explain the apparent contradictions. "It makes an excellent plot for a Le Carré novel."

Western officials quietly support some ISI contentions, such as covert Indian support for nationalist rebels in Baluchistan. But more than anything the briefings reveal how the ISI's world view is framed by its decades-old enmity with India.

"They tell you a lot about themselves even when they don't know it," said Bruce Riedel, a retired CIA official, Obama adviser and trenchant ISI critic. The contradiction at the heart of agency policy, he said, is its support for Islamist militants: "That can't be removed by clever briefings."

Still, the old cliches about the spy collective being a "state within a state" or a "rogue agency" are out of date. These days it is said to be firmly in the grip of the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, who previously ran the agency for three years.

But the new openness does underscore the country's fragile balance of power. Two weeks ago The Hindu reported that the ISI's Pasha had invited Indian diplomats to deal with him directly, bypassing President Asif Ali Zardari's government.

"Formally, Zardari has a lot of power. But on the ground he's not too strong right now," said analyst and newspaper editor Najam Sethi.

Despite its new openness, the ISI remains in the shadows. One question stands out: as well as improving its image, is it ready to really change its stripes? At headquarters, nobody can give a straight answer. Circles within circles, as they say.