It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Three vessels, including the first LNG carrier in a month, were spotted making their way along the northern coast of Oman on Thursday, April 2, in an apparent breakout from the Persian Gulf. It appears Iran decided to look the other way as reports surfaced that Oman and Iran are in discussions for a protocol to manage the Strait of Hormuz.
The analysts at TankerTrackers.com had posted on Wednesday, “To our best knowledge, not a single LNG tanker departed via the Strait of Hormuz during March 2026.” They calculated that, “During entire March 2026, only 84 tankers have departed the Middle East region via the Strait of Hormuz. That's less than 3 tankers a day.”
The Sohar LNG (72,000 dwt) was spotted via its AIS signal underway on Thursday. The vessel, built in 2001 and currently registered in Panama, has been owned by Asyad Shipping since 2005. The AIS signals, which were confirmed by TankerTrackers.com with satellite images, showed the LNG carrier between two Omani crude oil tankers. All three were displaying a message that they were Omani ships as they made the transit.
The tanker Dhalkut (299,997 dwt) registered in the Marshall Islands, was at the head of the effective convoy of ships and, in its last AIS transmission, was rounding the Omani peninsula. Bringing up the rear was the tanker Habrut (319,439 dwt) also under the Marshall Island flag.
There was a difference of opinion if the three ships were laden. Bloomberg wrote in the morning that the Sohar LNG was apparently not loaded. TankerTrackers.com, however, wrote that it was laden with Emirati LNG and that the two crude tankers were carrying Saudi and Emirati crude.
Three tankers are hugging the Omani coast while all the other vessels are in the Iranian channel near Larak Island (Marine Traffic)
It was noted that they were taking a very unusual route outside the normal shipping lane. Several other ships appeared in Iran’s newly established route around Larak Island, with the normal center of the Strait of Hormuz still empty.
In a possible explanation, the Iranian state news agency IRNA reported that Iran and Oman were drafting a “protocol” to facilitate and ensure safe passage through the Strait. They wrote that the Strait “should be supervised and coordinated.” They said the purpose would be to monitor transits through the Strait of Hormuz.
There was no mention of the Iranian toll system requiring ships to pay for their safe passage. Reports are that the Iranians are requiring payments in Chinese currency or cryptocurrency.
It comes as the list of countries reported to send shipping through the Strait of Hormuz continues to grow. The Philippines Foreign Ministry reported on Thursday that it had concluded talks with Iran. It said that Iran had agreed to allow the passage of Philippine-flagged vessels and ensure the safety of Filipino seafarers. The country said it would be permitted to receive oil coming through the Strait. It is critical as the country depends on Saudi Arabia for its fuel imports.
Safeen Prestige Reportedly Sank in the Strait of Hormuz
Safeen Prestige was seen on fire in a video posted no social media
The UAE-managed containership Safeen Prestige is reported to have finally succumbed to the fire that engulfed the vessel after it was attacked by the Iranians. A month after the ship was first reported to have been struck, NAVEREA IX issued a maritime warning reporting the sinking of the vessel, which would make it the first ship confirmed to have sunk due to the hostilities with Iran.
The position is reported to be near the northernmost tip of Oman’s Musandam Peninsula. An exact timing for the sinking was not reported, but the alert was issued on April 1. It says the vessel went down in a position with a depth of approximately 120 meters (nearly 400 feet). They place the sinking approximately 6.5 nautical miles northeast of Ras Madrakah, Oman.
The report warns that some of the container debris may be floating in the area, and there is a report of an oil slick.
The ship was one of the early casualties of the war when it was struck by at least one Iranian missile on March 4. At the time, it was reported to have been about 2 nautical miles north of Oman when it was attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The first reports said there was a fire in the engine room and the crew abandoned the ship.
Built in 2013 in China, the ship was 23,425 dwt with a capacity of 1,740 TEU, including 345 reefer plugs. AD Ports Group acquired the vessel in May 2022, although according to databases, it was sold in 2024 to an Egyptian company and was operating under charter.
Abu Dhabi Ports launched its service in the Gulf as Safeen Feeders in 2020. It was linking Abu Dhabi to ports serving the UAE, the broader Gulf region, and the Indian Sub-Continent. The service was expanded in 2022 to include a route between the UAE and Red Sea with calls in Saudi Arabia and Sudan,
Videos had surfaced recently showing the vessel engulfed in a fire from end to end. A satellite picture released by the NGO United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) on March 18 showed smoke coming from a vessel that it identified as the Safeen Prestige. That raised speculation that the vessel had been struck a second time by the Iranians.
Two days after the ship was abandoned, AD Ports sent a rescue tug on March 6 as part of a salvage effort. The tug was also hit by an Iranian projectile, killing and injuring the crew aboard the tug.
Reuters released a tally of all the reported incidents in the Persian Gulf that showed a total of 22 maritime incidents since the start of the bombing campaign on February 28. It included ships that were struck and damaged, as well as ships that reported debris from the efforts to intercept the incoming projectiles.
UN Security Council Expected to Vote Down Use-of-Force Request for Hormuz
An Emirati patrol boat on display, 2025 (MZtourist / CC BY 4.0)
Three of the permanent members of the UN Security Council have signaled that they do not support a motion to authorize use of force to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, according to the New York Times. Russia and China were widely expected to oppose the measure, given their diplomatic ties to Tehran; they are reportedly joined by France, which has publicly opposed a military solution.
The proposed UN Security Counsel resolution is spearheaded by Iran's neighbors in the Gulf, and it has been the subject of intense but quiet negotiations for weeks. The latest version viewed by the Times would permit any UN member state to use all necessary means to secure transit rights through the Strait of Hormuz and to deter any further attempts to close the waterway.
The language is expected to come up for a formal vote on Friday. Any of the five permanent UNSC members could block it with a veto; with three in opposition, its odds of passage are limited.
Iran's leadership has suggested that it has no plans to give up control of the strait, which it has turned into a tollway channel administered by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Within weeks of the U.S.-Israeli attack on February 28, the IRGC took control of the strait and set up an administrative structure for its management. Per Bloomberg, it has a fee schedule; payment arrangements; vessel vetting procedures; security escorts; and exceptions for friendly nations. China, Pakistan and India have already arranged to use the transit lane for limited numbers of vessel transits, and some commercial shipowners are believed to be making their own arrangements with the IRGC as well.
Ending this new status quo by force would be "unrealistic," French President Emanuel Macron said on Thursday. "It would take an inordinate amount of time and would expose anyone crossing the strait to coastal threats from the Revolutionary Guards," he said. In addition to cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, drone boats, suicide drones and attack boats, the IRGC has access to a stockpile of mines for forcing the strait's closure.
France and dozens of other stakeholders are pursuing a purely diplomatic track. On Thursday, a coalition of 40 countries joined in a virtual meeting hosted by the UK to discuss "diplomatic and economic tools" to support the "safe and sustained" opening of the strait. Participants included the UAE, Italy, the Netherlands, and the EU, represented by top diplomat Kaja Kallas; the United States did not participate. The coalition's objective is "restoring safe, toll-free freedom of navigation" in the strait by diplomatic means.
The need to increase traffic through the waterway is getting acute for energy-importing nations. Brent physical cargoes for prompt delivery hit $141 per barrel on Thursday, and European diesel futures surged to $200 per barrel. The EU is preparing for all possibilities to adapt to a "long-lasting" energy shock with high fuel prices for a "very long time," European Union energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen told the FT this week. In lower-income nations in Asia, like Sri Lanka, fuel rationing and shortages are becoming part of the landscape.
For its part, Iran said Thursday that it is working out a plan with Oman on a long-term proposal to "monitor" the Strait of Hormuz, which would "facilitate and ensure safe passage and provide better services to ships passing through this route." Energy markets were not reassured: Brent front-month futures jumped back up eight percent overnight, returning to $109 per barrel.
Just reports of mines are often sufficient to disrupt maritime traffic. Even if ship owners, crews and insurers weren’t aware of the missile threat in the Strait of Hormuz, news reporting of sea mines in the narrow waters would likely be enough to stop commercial traffic that Iran didn’t direct through safe passages.
That goes for even the US Navy, too. A single, inexpensive mine can threaten a multi-billion-dollar warship, and no navy, regardless of technological superiority, can afford to ignore that.
Mine warfare doesn’t need to sink ships to succeed. It works by imposing unacceptable risk. So maritime access through the strait can be shaped less by firepower and more by caution, uncertainty, and slow responses of mine countermeasures forces. For this effect to endure, Iran will require the means to sustain it. To understand what comes next, we need to understand Iran’s mine warfare capability.
The country is assessed to have had a pre-war stock of 5,000 to 6,000 sea mines, though US and Israeli forces have destroyed some. Mines are classified by their positioning in the water (drifting on the surface, sitting on the bottom, or floating on or just under the surface while tethered to the bottom) and by how their charges are set off (by contact with a ship or detecting its proximity through some influence – sound, pressure, magnetism or a combination of these). Iran’s inventory includes ground influence, tethered contact, tethered influence and drifting mines.
Sea mines offer distinct advantages as a maritime weapon. They require little training or specialist support. They are easy to deploy: they can be placed in the water from civilian boats, small craft or submarines. And unlike many other naval weapons, they can be laid without direct combat interaction with an adversary, remaining dormant until activated by a passing vessel. These characteristics make mines some of the most cost-effective weapons available to a weaker and outmatched force.
Given the right conditions, they are difficult to counter. Their presence can complicate the tactical picture by restricting or denying access to naval forces and commercial shipping until countermeasures operations can be undertaken to ensure safe passage.
Mine countermeasures are methodical, resource-intensive processes. Recent efforts to modernize them have focused on keeping mine hunters and their crews outside the minefield by shifting detection and clearance to autonomous and uncrewed systems.
Advances in precision sonar have significantly improved the ability to detect and classify mine-like contacts, often at scale and from vessels operating well away from the mined area. However, while detection has increasingly moved to stand-off systems, the processes of identification and neutralization are still somewhat tied to the mine hunters.
This creates a growing operational challenge. In confined and heavily trafficked waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, conservative assumptions about safe stand-off distances can keep mine hunters tens of kilometers from suspected minefields. Autonomous vehicles may be able to search large areas, but confirming and neutralizing individual contacts still requires fairly close-in action, often with remotely operated systems working at the limits of range, endurance and control.
The result is that clearance timelines can expand from days to weeks to even months, particularly when the extent of the mine threat is unknown. As these clearance timelines extend, the burden of protecting mine countermeasures forces from attack also grows. Warships must provide this protection.
Iran has threatened to expand sea mine operations throughout the Gulf if its coast or islands are attacked. As the war progresses, mining could extend into the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait through Iran’s proxies, the Houthi militants of Yemen.
The Houthis have used sea mines before. In 2017 they laid hundreds off the Yemeni coast to deter maritime operations by Saudi-led forces during the Yemeni conflict. Houthi participation in the current war is already expanding, with recent strikes against Israel.
If Iran’s objective is to increase disorder for its adversaries, it is likely to start laying sea mines throughout the Gulf. In this confined area, shipping density is high, and most approaches to ports and harbours are vulnerable to mining (or just declaration of mining). These include the waterways serving Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Oman, too, could be targeted.
Shipping lanes in and out of those countries’ ports and harbors are well known to Iranian war planners. Shallow waters of these approaches are well suited to Iran’s influence ground mines, including the Maham-2, which is cylindrical, has an explosive capacity of 350 kg and can operate as deep as 50 meters, and the Maham-7 which is conical, contains 150 kg of explosive and can operate at 35 meters.
In deeper areas of the Gulf, Iran’s tethered mines would be effective. These can be tied to sea bottoms as deep as 100 meters. They would likely be used within established shipping lanes, anchorages and other high-traffic areas.
Iran could also deploy floating mines, which are set adrift and will move with currents and wind. Floating mines are inherently uncontrolled and pose a hazard to all shipping, including vessels from the nation that lays them.
Iran has several options available for deploying sea mines, including the use of hundreds, if not thousands, of boats. Submarines can also do the job, and Iran’s Ghadir-class midget submarines are particularly well suited to minelaying, because they can operate in water as shallow as 30 metres.
Tethered mines would most likely be deployed from boats in waters deeper than 40 meters, while ground influence mines could be laid either by midget submarines or surface craft in shallow water approaches to ports and harbours.
Floating mines could be deployed from small surface vessels or even from the shore. Once in the water, they will be carried by currents, increasing risk to friendly and neutral shipping, with their eventual location often unpredictable.
Iran has a history of employing sea mines across the Gulf region, most notably during the Tanker War campaign in 1984 to 1988, part of the Iran–Iraq War. In 1987, the tanker SS?Bridgeton struck an Iranian contact mine even as it was part of a convoy escorted by the US Navy. In 1988, a mine damaged the frigate USS Samuel B Roberts; repairs cost about US$90?million.
The month of US and Israeli attacks on Iran that began on February 28 has greatly degraded Iran’s military capability, but the country can still sow minefields throughout the Gulf and get the Houthis to sow them in the Red Sea. As the war continues, the likelihood of Iran again resorting to sea mines increases by the day. Whether it has already crossed a strategic threshold at a large scale remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Iran has the capability to use mines to achieve a strategic effect.
Andy Perry is a retired Royal Australian Navy mine warfare specialist with more than 30 years of experience. He works as a maritime geospatial specialist supporting mine warfare operations.
This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
Proposals to End Gulf Conflict Could Preserve Iranian Control of Hormuz
Iranian IRGC attack boats in the Strait of Hormuz, prior to the war and the U.S. effort to destroy Iran's boat flotilla (Mehr file image)
On Tuesday, shortly after President Donald Trump proposed leaving the Strait of Hormuz as a matter for other nations to address, China and Pakistan released a peace proposal that would provide for "normal passage" - without calling for a withdrawal of Iranian administration of the strategic waterway. Both China and Pakistan have already reached initial deals with Tehran for safe transit of their vessels, acknowledging de facto Iranian supervision, and both proposals align with an extended period of Iranian control over the strait.
Officials have told the Wall Street Journal that Trump is open to ending U.S. involvement in the conflict without first taking action to remove Iran's newfound control over Hormuz. In comments Tuesday, the president appeared to confirm that the strait was not an active policy concern for his administration.
"When we leave the strait will automatically open," President Trump claimed in a conversation with the New York Post. "I don’t think about it, to be honest."
Iran has given no indication that it will give up authority over the waterway voluntarily. It has declared sovereignty over the strait, and it demands international recognition of its claim as a condition for a ceasefire. Its parliament has passed a bill formalizing regulations for administering the strait; it has partially mined the waterway to deter transits outside of an Iranian-controlled lane; and it has set up a "tollbooth" between the islands of Qeshm and Larak, reportedly charging up to $2 million per passage for safe transit rights. AIS data confirms that nearly all of the visible traffic through the strait is using this tolling arrangement and submitting to Iranian instructions.
In a social media message Monday morning, Trump suggested that future access to the strait would be up to the nations most dependent upon it, not the U.S. military. "Build up some delayed courage, go to the strait, and just take it," the president wrote. "Go get your own oil!"
The president's comments could be tactical: he has previously signaled the opposite of his intentions in military affairs, and he has moved troops into theater for a potential ground offensive, multiple analysts observed. But if Trump does pull out with Iran still in control of the waterway, foreign nations' least risky option to "get their own oil" would be to negotiate with Tehran and pay transit fees, just like at the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal. Most of the Gulf region's energy customers have no major disputes with Iran: almost all of the oil passing Hormuz goes to Asian buyers. Less than ten percent is purchased by European buyers, who have access to other alternatives and little physical exposure to Gulf oil terminals.
China is by far the most dependent upon oil shipped through the strait, and buys about four out of ten barrels passing through it (including almost all Iranian barrels). Chinese shipping interests have already reached an agreement with "relevant parties" for limited use of the waterway, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said Tuesday - a tacit acceptance of a new status quo of Iranian control.
"An Iranian regime that retains control over the Strait of Hormuz, gets paid for passage and chooses which nations can access the Persian Gulf will use this vital leverage . . . to pressure America’s European and Asian allies to lift sanctions, will coerce Gulf states, and will turn from a weakened regional pariah to the Middle East’s foremost power," warned the Wall Street Journal's senior foreign correspondent, Yaroslav Trofimov.
Iran's Gulf neighbors would be disadvantaged by Iranian control of the strait, and the UAE is reportedly concerned enough that it is urging a coalition effort to forcibly reopen the waterway. It is hoping to convince the Trump administration to lead such an operation, and has lobbied European and Asian powers as well, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Ukraine Pitches its Own Solution to the Strait of Hormuz Shutdown
Up-gunned "Sea Baby" drones operated by Ukraine's defense intelligence service (Courtesy SBU)
The Ukrainian government is offering to lend Gulf states its experience in reopening contested sea lanes, President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters on Monday. Ukraine has a battle-tested system that protects its own Black Sea shipping corridor from Russian-spec surface warfare threats, comparable to the lower end of the threat spectrum currently found in the Strait of Hormuz, and it is willing to export its knowledge to clients in the GCC.
"There is an energy crisis. They know they can rely on our expertise in this area, and we discussed it in detail," Zelensky told reporters in a group chat following his return from talks in Qatar and the UAE last week. "We shared our experience with the Black Sea corridor and how it operates. They understand that our armed forces have been highly effective in unblocking the Black Sea corridor."
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is tough to crack, and after 30 days of conflict, the U.S. has not been able to do so (nor does it expect to have an escorted-traffic scheme soon). Iran has deposited a small number of naval mines in the strait, and can target passing merchant ships with drone boats, manned gunboats and missiles to enforce its control. Since it can range the entirety of the narrow waterway with multiple classes of weaponry, the Strait of Hormuz is closed - except for traffic that Iran itself administers using a "tollbooth" passage between Qeshm and Larak Islands.
Ukraine has a sealane-defense solution that it has developed over the past four years of conflict with Russia, and the proof is in the results. Ukraine's ports receive about 200 vessel calls per month, with low casualty rates and accessible (subsidized) war risk insurance.
The Ukrainian solution is a layered air defense system to defeat airborne drones, combined with Ukraine's well-known drone-boat patrols to drive off the Russian Navy's surface fleet. Ihor Fedirko, CEO of Ukraine’s Council of Defence Industry, told Politico that "Ukraine has a ready-made ecosystem, fully systemic solution for protecting marine areas." Unlike manned escort vessels, which are in short supply and are politically difficult to lose, drone boats like those operated by Ukraine are attritable.
Iran also uses another, harder-to-defeat form of attack which is not seen in Ukraine. Iranian antiship ballistic missiles require missile defense technology to shoot down; for this threat, the GCC states possess American-made Patriot batteries and PAC-3 interceptors (if these assets can be spared from other areas).
Zelensky has proposed a trade to exchange Ukraine's air defense and sea-lane defense expertise for a supply of those same PAC-3 interceptors, which are in short supply and are desperately needed by Kyiv. They are valued at about $4 million each, and production is limited to about 60 units per month.
Wednesday, April 01, 2026
Death From Above: How Drones Are Reshaping Wildlife in Ukraine
The skies over the Ukrainian frontline no longer belong to the birds. In a conflict now entering its fifth year, the rapid rise of small, low-cost drones has created a new kind of aerial pressure – one that hunters and wildlife managers would recognize as a permanent “landscape of fear.”
What began with hobbyist quadcopters dropping small explosives has evolved into swarms of fiber optic kamikaze drones that are nearly impossible to intercept. According to Euromaidan Press, a Ukrainian-based newspaper, the Ukrainian military aims to produce approximately 7 million drones in 2026, with Russia attempting to match their aggressive production goals. The result is a constant mechanical hum overhead that has become as familiar as wind in the grass.
The Threat from Above
In a BBC article describing the trauma associated with the use of drones in the Ukraine conflict, Joel Gunter reported on a new condition described as “Droneophobia.” Soldiers who have returned from the battlefield are mortified by everyday noises that sound like a drone’s hum. This includes the buzzing of a bee or the motor of the lawnmower. Veterans are triggered into thinking they are being hunted from the sky.
The paranoia appears to carry over to wildlife as well. Professor Janine Natalya Clark of the University of Birmingham speaks to the environmental effects of drones on wildlife in Ukraine. In Clark’s recently published study, she notes that some birds, such as mallards and goosanders, are particularly sensitive to the sounds of war and drones, which can cause them to panic.
Clark relayed the observation of an ornithologist in Ukraine, “If these birds are disturbed and need to expend valuable energy in finding other places in which to feed, they may not be in good physical condition when it is time for them to migrate”.
The same ornithologist went on to say, “Some bird species, including forest birds, herons and white storks, do not appear to be as sensitive as others to the sound of drones and other war-related acoustic disturbances”.
Clark notes, “The environmental risks that drones present are multi-layered and not solely acoustic in nature. The visual appearance of drones is also very relevant.”
Prey species like ducks, which are always on the lookout for attacks from carnivorous birds, seem to identify drones as predators. The incessant perception of being hunted leads to changes in behavior and to unnecessary calorie expenditure.
Habitat Destruction
On top of the nonstop buzzing and overhead shadows, the payloads themselves are devastating. Drones regularly deliver thermite, RPG-7 warheads, TNT, C-4, grenades, and fragmentation devices like landmines. In practice, if it explodes, it’s being flown into the fight.
The immediate habitat destruction caused by the explosives leads to fires and land degradation, which in turn cause erosion and the introduction of chemicals into the ecosystem. In a recent YouTube video called “How to Survive Drone Warfare in Ukraine,” a Ukrainian war veteran describes the landscape as a “Charlie Brown Christmas tree environment.”
The anonymous veteran goes on to say, “Trees have been berated, and berated, and berated for the last four years now with mortars, indirect fire, drones, fires–you name it. Every tree in Ukraine in a treeline is pretty much a waist-high stump, or the remnants of a tree.”
Similar to the use of napalm in the Vietnam War, the loss of cover isn’t just cosmetic. It removes thermal protection, bedding areas, and travel corridors that game animals rely on.
A 2024 study published in the Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology found “The war has caused more than $56.4 billion in damage to the environment. There has been widespread chemical contamination of air, water, and soil, and 30% of Ukraine has been contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance.”
Heavy metals and explosive compounds will remain in the environment for decades, leading to infertility issues, reduced microbial activity, and a polluted watershed.
Fiber Optic Bird Nest’s
Drones, while being the most effective weapon of this conflict, are not without their drawbacks. Both the Russians and Ukrainians employed a form of electronic warfare with the use of “jammers”–a device that interrupts the radio frequency of the drone to the operator, knocking it out of the sky.
To counter drone losses, both forces began using fiber-optic cable. The drone is fixed with a spool of line and an explosive. The fiber optic line transmits data via light through the cable to the drone. As long as the line stays connected between the operator and drone, the payload is impervious to jamming technology.
The issue is that when the ordinance is delivered, the drone explodes as well, leaving that plastic fiber-optic cable stretched across the landscape. Reports and images being relayed from the frontline show what looks like a spider web across the landscape–similar to the bottom of a popular fishing hole and the remains of snagged fishing lines.
An article published by the Conflict and Environmental Observatory notes the ongoing conflict between wildlife and abandoned fiber-optic lines. Videos and images circulate online showing entangled and snarred birds, leading to suffocation. Reports of deer with cable woven into their antlers have been made, and a viral photo has circulated of a bird nest made in part with fiber-optic cable.
According to CEOBS, “The fluoropolymer cladding and outer layers of cables are also a concern. Fluoropolymers fall within the class of highly persistent per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), which do not readily degrade in an environment and can contaminate soil and water.”
Once these plastics are introduced into the environment, they can persist for hundreds of years.
The Horrors of War on Wildlife
War has always been hard on wildlife, but drone technology has introduced a uniquely modern suite of pressures: nonstop disturbance, precise habitat shredding, toxic legacies, and durable plastic entanglement. The front lines in Ukraine are showing us what happens when cheap, mass-produced aerial weapons meet rich biodiversity.
As hunters and conservationists, we understand that healthy game populations depend on intact habitat and low-stress environments. The Ukrainian experience offers a sobering preview of how emerging military tech can quietly erode the wild places we care about. Even if a particular conflict like this never reaches our shores, the lesson is worth noting: the tools of modern warfare don’t just affect soldiers – they reshape landscapes and the animals that live in them for decades to come.
Christopher Bancroft is a Wyoming native, writer, and photographer specializing in hunting, fishing and conservation stories. Passionate about the outdoors and the natural world, Bancroft seeks to highlight the human and environmental impacts of critical issues through authentic storytelling. Many of his previous works can be found on the MeatEater website.
Tuesday, March 31, 2026
US Military Options For Kharg Island And The Strait Of Hormuz Under Review – Analysis
The Military and Geopolitical Perspective on Iran’s Coercive Island Network
The ongoing American–Israeli campaign against Iran has been operationally effective in degrading the Islamic Republic’s destructive military capabilities. Yet Washington will face difficulty compelling Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to stand down so long as Tehran retains the ability to disrupt maritime economic activity through the Strait of Hormuz.
The strait, while still susceptible to Iranian threats, remains the central vulnerability in the global economy. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, a substantial share of global shipping transited this narrow maritime corridor—including roughly one-quarter of global seaborne trade, one-fifth of the world’s oil supply, one-fifth of the world’s liquid natural gas (LNG), and a wide range of other critical goods such as fertilizers. This concentration of maritime traffic along predictable sea lanes has created a structural exposure: a disruptive and hostile actor with continued access to the strait can impose disproportionate effects on a global scale. Iran’s military and strategic approach to the current conflict rests squarely on this stark geopolitical reality.
In any potential effort to disrupt Iran’s control over the strait, Kharg Island looms large. Located deep in the Persian Gulf, some sixteen miles off the coast of Iran and roughly four hundred miles northwest of the Strait of Hormuz, the island spans only about eight square miles. Despite its small size, Kharg functions as the primary hub for Iran’s oil exports and serves as an economic center of gravity underpinning the IRGC’s coercive power.
Any serious effort to dismantle Iran’s leverage over global energy flows must address the broader network of Iranian-controlled islands in the Gulf rather than focus on a single node. Qeshm Island, positioned closer to the entrance of the strait, extends Iran’s surveillance reach and supports naval drone operations and anti-ship missile coverage. The islands of Abu Musa, Larak, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb sit astride the strait’s entrance, providing Tehran additional reach along this sensitive maritime corridor. Together, these positions allow Iran to maintain persistent surveillance, deploy missile systems, and conduct interdiction efforts against passing vessels.
Even as US Marines were en route to the Gulf aboard the USS Tripoli, Washington was already shaping the battlespace and setting conditions for the opening phase of a potential campaign. US strikes have targetedhigh-value Iranian military defense infrastructure on offshore islands. Additionally, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has announced the killing of Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri, commander of the IRGC navy. Although decapitation strikes have inherent limitations, Tangsiri’s death could have a detrimental effect on Iran’s island defense plans.
A coordinated campaign against multiple Iranian positions could further alter the geometry of the war by compressing Iran’s operational space and complicating its ability to sustain maritime pressure. Seizing and holding Kharg Island for a sustained period could even serve as a catalyst for internal political instability or regime change within the Islamic Republic.
Yet the seizure of terrain, whether inside mainland Iran or on its offshore islands, would be only an initial step. Holding that ground amid persistent missile and drone salvos and a barrage of asymmetric threats would likely require a prolonged campaign. Absent robust force protection, layered air and missile defenses, counter-drone capabilities, and continuous resupply operations, any initial gains could erode quickly, leaving US forces dangerously exposed.
The Military Buildup
The USS Tripoli arrived in the Middle East on March 27 carrying thousands of Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This force package is configured for rapid-response contingencies across littoral environments and is designed for insertion, limited-objective operations, and crisis response.
The Tripoli’s design shapes how it is likely to be employed. The ship is configured without a well deck, a choice that maximizes its naval aviation capacity and allows it to operate as a high-density platform for F-35B aircraft. As a result, the vessel functions as a light carrier, prioritizing sortie generation and sustained air pressure over surface insertion capacity. The USS Boxer, a Wasp-class amphibious assault ship with the 11th MEU, has also departed San Diego for the Middle East. The two formations appear to be moving toward the region on a staggered timeline.
An MEU provides a modular, multidomain force designed for rapid combat operations. In a strike-forward configuration, embarked F-35B Lightning II aircraft can extend the force’s reach inland while supporting maritime control, including engagements against fast-attack craft. Attack helicopters can deliver persistent coverage in littoral areas, reinforcing interdiction and close-in protection. In an assault posture, an MEU can insert Marines across extended distances using MV-22 Osprey and CH-53E Super Stallion platforms, enabling distributed entry options beyond the immediate shoreline.
This maritime posture is unfolding alongside signs of parallel land-force readiness. Elements associated with rapid-response formations, including detachments from the 82nd Airborne Division, have been described in open-source reporting as part of a broader contingency posture in the region. Taken together, these developments reinforce the idea that Washington is positioning scalable and deployable forces into the Gulf for crisis response rather than preparing for immediate large-scale war. These movements expand the menu of options available to US planners.
A Dangerous Naval Threat Landscape
To date, CENTCOM’s sustained campaign has hampered Iran’s naval, missile, and drone capabilities, degrading Tehran’s ability to mass fires and coordinate effects at scale. Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic retains serious residual threats. Even in a weakened state, Iran’s layered denial architecture—mines, missiles, and drones—continues to impose real operational risks on any force operating in the Gulf.
Easy to deploy and highly effective in the narrow approaches to the Strait of Hormuz that amphibious units must traverse, naval mines represent the least expensive means of threatening a moving amphibious force. The Islamic Republic has a variety of these mines in its inventories. While none are state of the art, they remain dangerous.
Mines do not need to win the fight to be effective—they need only complicate an adversary’s efforts sufficiently to deter action. This principle has been demonstrated repeatedly in modern warfare. During the Korean War, dense minefields delayed US amphibious operations at Wonsan in 1950 and stripped the landing of its operational value. After that operation, US Admiral Allan E. Smith identified the disproportionate impact mines can have with characteristic acerbity: “We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using a pre–World War I weapon, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”
Beyond naval mines, Iran’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) pose critical threats in the theater. Satellite imagery suggests that Iran has installed a significant portion of its ASCM capabilities in subterranean launch positions on Qeshm Island.
The Islamic Republic’s ASCM baseline has long borne evidence of Chinese DNA. The Quds Force, a branch of the IRGC specializing in unconventional warfare and subversive military intelligence operations, has transferred some of these systems to Iran’s proxies across the region, including the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In 2006, Hezbollah successfully struck an Israeli Navy platform, the INS Hanit, with a Noor missile, a derivative of the Chinese C-802 ASCM.
While Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles have historically been limited to subsonic categories, expert assessments suggest that the IRGC has recently explored supersonic options, including variants equipped with ramjet power packs—air-breathing propulsion systems that compress incoming air at high velocity before combustion. More alarmingly, reporting indicates that China may have transferred YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran before Operation Epic Fury began. While no open-source intelligence confirms Iranian forces have used such weapons to date, this would mark a true capability leap for Tehran.
Anti-ship missiles, however, are only effective as the kill chains that enable them. In 2025, the US Department of State publicly accused Chinese satellite companies of providing the Houthis with targeting data. Moreover, ongoing monitoring suggests that the IRGC has long sought access to military-grade data flow from companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Additionally, reports that Russia has provided Tehran with targeting data to support its operations against US forces have already made headlines. In any potential marine assault scenario, it would be naïve to assume that China and Russia would remain idle or decline to provide Tehran with real-time actionable intelligence.
ASBMs present an additional challenge for US forces in any effort to seize Kharg Island. Unlike high-end ASCMs, ballistic missiles do not hug the sea or maneuver extensively. Instead, they rely on speed. Some exit the atmosphere and reenter on a steep terminal trajectory, compressing reaction times and striking a target at extreme velocity.
Interception windows against such projectiles are narrow, and the effects of ASBM warheads are correspondingly severe. Yet physics cuts both ways. Ships are moving targets by nature, and a ballistic missile lacking terminal sensors or real-time updates can easily miss a maneuvering vessel.
Once again, the decisive variable in such operations is the kill chain, a systematic, sequential process for identifying, tracking, targeting, engaging, and destroying an enemy. Persistent drone coverage fused with disciplined signals intelligence can convert speed into accuracy. In confined waters, volume can accomplish what imprecise weapons cannot. A coordinated salvo layering ASBMs with loitering munitions and ASCMs increases the probability of a successful strike and taxes defensive magazines.
Iran’s proxy network has demonstrated a willingness to employ ASBMs. In 2023, the Houthis fired ASBMs at the vessel Maersk Hangzhou. The US Navy destroyers USS Gravely and USS Laboon intercepted the inbound missiles, whereupon the engagement shifted to close quarters. Houthi boats closed to within meters of the merchant vessel, prompting US naval helicopters to counterattack, destroying multiple platforms and killing ten enemy fighters.
In 2024, the Houthis also struck the Greek-owned bulk carrier Zografia. Open-source intelligence suggests that the weapon the Iranian proxy employed was an ASBM—probably a Khalij Fars, the anti-ship derivative of the Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile.
Finally, Iran retains naval drones, or unmanned surface vessels (USVs). These robotic platforms have scored kills on commercial vessels during Operation Epic Fury, and have also constituted a key part of the Houthis’ campaign in the Red Sea. Visual evidence suggests that Iran has deployed naval drones in underground sites along its coastal areas and islands. Open-source battle damage assessments show that repeated attacks on these hardened underground ASCM and USV facilities have failed to destroy them entirely, in part due to limited penetration into the core architectureprotecting these installations. Air Assault Options and Likely Concepts of Operations
At present, the Pentagon is weighing the deployment of up to 10,000 additional ground troops to the Middle East. Such a move would expand the range of military options available to US President Donald Trump. In the meantime, open-source tracking suggests that strategic US drones have conducted frequent surveillance flights above Kharg Island.
While Iran’s coastal islands offer suitable shores for amphibious landings, US forces could likely insert Marines more effectively by air. In any operation targeting Kharg or Iran’s other islands, US forces would likely approach at low altitudes using tilt-rotor aircraft such as the MV-22, the Marine Corps variant of the V-22 Osprey. Elements from the 82nd Airborne Division and select Special Forces detachments would likely join these raids.
Almost certainly, any such campaign would be preceded or accompanied by a strategic-scale shock elsewhere in Iran—perhaps including a massive attack on the country’s electrical grid that could cause widespread blackouts. In addition, while high-command decapitation strikes would not paralyze the IRGC, targeting sector commanders in the Hormuz area and senior leaders of Tehran’s naval forces could open a window for US forces to strike Kharg.
Although US strikes have largely degraded Iran’s strategic air-defense network, residual elements of Tehran’s asymmetric systems remain active and could strike with little warning. High-end Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) would continue to pose a persistent threat to low-flying aircraft, while more unconventional systems—such as the 358 loitering “air-defense” drone—introduce an added layer of unpredictability to any US air-assault effort.
Together, these threats would complicate US air-assault operations, particularly during the most vulnerable phases of insertion and resupply. Notably, by the end of 2025, Iran had officially made a move to acquireRussian Verba high-end MANPADS, systems capable of imposing serious risks on air assault platforms operating at low altitude.
Once on the ground, any forcible-entry formations would disperse to secure critical infrastructure on Kharg Island or other target locales. This move would force Revolutionary Guard units into a stark choice: strike Iran’s own key economic infrastructure to dislodge invading forces, or hold fire and risk losing control of the regime’s primary export nodes.
If an expeditionary force successfully completes forcible-entry operations on Kharg and secures the island’s export infrastructure, the campaign will transition from seizure to consolidation. The principal task in this phase would be to hold the island and prepare it for follow-on forces. This effort would prioritize force protection under sustained Iranian interdiction. At that stage, the IRGC would likely initiate layered fires, including drones and ballistic missiles, to degrade the US foothold on the island.
The IRGC could then attempt to shift its ground-warfare efforts to irregular operations, using residents and oil workers as human shields. Recent operations in Iraq have demonstrated this approach, with Iranian paramilitary groups there using first-person view (FPV) drones, mirroring a key trend in the war between Russia and Ukraine. A similar concept of employment (CONEMPS) should be anticipated in the Revolutionary Guards’ island-defense efforts, alongside the use of tactical weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that could produce asymmetric effects.
Sustainment Under Fire: From Seizure to Vulnerability
If US forces are successful in seizing Kharg Island or other similar objectives, their operation would shift into the sustainment phase. During this period, three Iranian capabilities could threaten US marines and airborne troops.
The first is Iran’s supply of short-range ballistic missiles: road-mobile, solid-fueled, and relatively precise Fateh-110 derivatives, including the Fateh-313, the Zulfiqar, and other variants optimized to strike fixed positions, logistics hubs, and airfields with minimal warning. Iran also possesses an anti-ship variant of this ballistic missile family, a capability which should not be underestimated.
The second threat comes from Iran’s Shahed family of drones. Russian combat experience in Ukraine has demonstrated how these munitions can be effective as expandable strike systems. Ongoing Russian–Iranian adaptation of Shahed drones likely points to the emergence of variants that can carry expanded payloads, including heavier and thermobaric warheads, in innovative concepts of operations (CONOPS).
Third, US forces attempting to hold Iran’s offshore islands could be threatened by heavy ballistic missile warheads equipped with submunitions. These weapons are designed for saturation rather than precision. In an island battle space, these systems could blanket critical areas, stress US naval air defenses, and degrade operational tempo.
Against these threats, the energy infrastructure on Iran’s islands remains both the key objective and the most acute vulnerability. Any Iranian strike against this infrastructure on Kharg Island would not only shape the tactical fight locally, but also transmit immediate shocks to global energy markets.
Access Under Fire: Pathways and Strategic Tradeoffs in the Strait of Hormuz
Any operation targeting Iran’s island oil infrastructure would begin with a shaping phase—cyber and electronic warfare efforts to disrupt sensors and networks, followed by precision strikes to degrade air defenses and isolate the objective. Without these preparations, US forces would enter a contested battle space with high exposure. Any US campaign in the region would likely center on two decisive islands: Kharg and Qeshm.
Kharg is Iran’s economic center of gravity. Seizing it would place Tehran’s oil exports under direct pressure, generating coercive leverage rather than territorial gains. The approach to taking Kharg would likely rely on vertical insertion from regional bases, minimizing the exposure of large amphibious platforms in the Strait of Hormuz.
The potential payoff to capturing Kharg is significant, but so too is the risk of escalation. Even if US forces secured the island, the IRGC would retain the capacity to retaliate across the Gulf by striking the region’s energy, water desalination, and civilian infrastructure. This could expand the conflict into a broader economic war.
Qeshm, by contrast, is the IRGC’s primary denial hub. It anchors Iran’s ability to threaten maritime traffic with missiles, drones, mines, and fast-attack craft supported by hardened and often underground infrastructure. Taking Qeshm is also most likely the harder fight. The island’s size, terrain, and proximity to the mainland favor the defender. Iranian reinforcement efforts there would likely be continuous. Even if seized, holding Qeshm would impose a heavy burden for a relatively limited strategic return.
Ultimately, the decisive challenge in taking either island is one of sustainment. Seizing ground is feasible, but holding it is more difficult. Continuous resupply, medical evacuation, and air- and missile-defense efforts would strain US capacity, while US bases in the region would remain vulnerable to Iranian strikes. Distributed Iranian operations, including decentralized missile and drone units, would enable Tehran to exert persistent, multi-directional pressure on any opposing forces.
Yet, while Iran retains control of the Strait of Hormuz, it retains the strategic leverage necessary to help it forestall geopolitical defeat. Washington’s path to victory runs through the strait, in one form or another.
About the author: Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions. He specializes in open-source defense intelligence, geopolitical assessments, international weapons market trends, as well as emerging defense technologies and related concepts of operations.
Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom.
Iran Claims $20K Shahed-136 Drone Destroyed $300M U.S. E-3 AWACS; China, India Race to Copy Design
Russia’s extensive use of the low-cost Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in Ukraine has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in modern warfare, altering the economics and tactics of new-age fighting.
In its most recent and, perhaps, the biggest victory, the Shahed-136 reportedly destroyed a US Air Force (USAF) E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in a strike at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on March 27, 2026.
Photos posted to social media showed that the rear fuselage of E-3 #81-0005 is completely burned out and destroyed, with debris scattered around the aircraft.
Subsequently, Iran published satellite images of the E-3 on the taxiway at Prince Sultan Air Base, both before and after the strike. According to open source reporting, at least six E-3 Sentry aircraft had been deployed to the Saudi base before the incident.
The E-3 Sentry is critical for spotting incoming barrages of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, and aiding in anchoring the aerial war in coordination with other platforms. And while the aircraft’s damage cannot be fully assessed at this time, the attack is a major setback for the USAF, as the service had just 16 of these critical AWACS platforms remaining in its inventory.
Some observers speculate that the attack mirrored Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb” in its execution. Yaroslav Trofimov, the Chief Foreign-Affairs Correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, wrote on X: “Considering that the E-3 AWACS plane seems to be on the taxiway at Prince Sultan base, and how precisely it was hit in the radar dome area, I am wondering whether Iran managed to pull off its own Spiderweb operation with remotely piloted FPV drones (perhaps using the Saudi cellphone network.) This strike also required a high level of satellite ISR that Iran probably can’t get on its own. Russia?”
However, Iran later confirmed that the strike was conducted using the Shahed-136 drone.
“This $20,000 low-cost #Shahed 136 destroyed a $700 million E-3 #AWACS as it attempted to flee the runway,” Iran’s social media handles stated. Additionally, a photo of a Shahed-136 appeared online showing E-3 kill markings, although its veracity could not be independently established.
Destroyed E-3 Aircraft: Via: X
The Shahed-136 is a low-flying, slow-moving, GPS-guided unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) intended for saturation attacks and overwhelming enemy defences. They rose to prominence when Russia started fielding the Shahed-136 drones in the fall of 2022 and have been extensively used to hit Ukraine’s energy and military targets.
In fact, as part of a US$1.75 billion agreement in 2023, Iran allowed Russia to manufacture these drones domestically. Known as Geran-2 in their Russian variant, they are manufactured at the Alabuga drone factory and at an unidentified location in Izhevsk.
The Shahed-136 quickly became one of the most significant weapons in the Russian arsenal for two reasons: it has a range of about 2,000 to 2,500 kilometres, and a low radar cross-section and heat signature, which makes it slightly harder to intercept.
However, the main reason behind Russia’s large-scale adoption of the Shahed-136 as a primary weapon for attacking Ukraine is the cost inflicted upon the enemy. One piece of this drone costs about $20,000 to $50,000, whereas the interceptor missile to neutralize it costs $2 to $4 million per piece, creating a massive price differential and making the war very expensive for Kyiv.
Jolted by heavy swarms of Shaheds, Ukraine has now developed a host of interceptors to down these drones without draining its limited Patriot interceptor stockpile. This includes the Sting drone developed by Wild Hornets, the P-1 Sun developed by Skyfall, and the Bullet drones developed by General Cherry, as detailed in a EurAsian Times article.
Adding to these, Ukraine’s Defence Ministry has now codified and authorised the locally-made JEDI Shahed Hunter unmanned aerial system for operational use.
Image Via Ukrainian Ministry of Defence.
JEDI Shahed Hunter is a vertically launched multi-rotor interceptor drone. It has four powerful electric motors, a large battery, and a sturdy, lightweight frame.
The drone, which weighs slightly more than 4 kilograms, has a payload capacity of up to 500 grams, which is sufficient to destroy an attack drone, as noted by the Ukrainian Defence Ministry in its latest announcement. It can reach altitudes of up to 6 kilometres and accelerate to speeds surpassing 350 kilometres/hour.
JEDI Shahed Hunter automatically receives radar data, enabling the interceptor drone to engage and eliminate the target swiftly.
The ground control station ensures flight coordination, reliable communications, and precise target engagement, as per the Ukrainian Defence Ministry. The interceptor drone can automatically locate, track, and focus on a target. Furthermore, it has thermal and daylight-imaging cameras, allowing it to operate day or night.
While the per-unit cost of the JEDI Shahed Hunter was not disclosed, multiple reports have suggested that most Ukrainian interceptor drones cost between $1,000 and $2,000, significantly lower than the Shahed-136 drones and the expensive interceptor surface-to-air missiles typically needed to shoot them down.
In fact, these Ukrainian interceptor drones have done so well against the Shaheds that Gulf countries and the US seem to be eyeing them as they face a barrage of drones from Iran in the ongoing West Asian conflict. However, Ukrainian companies are not allowed to sell these cutting-edge systems, particularly as the country needs them for domestic use amid intensified Russian aerial attacks.
Shahed Variants Are Being Developed Globally
Russia was the first country to fully adopt and manufacture the Shahed domestically with help from its long-term partner and ally, Iran.
However, others have taken a fig leaf from the Ukraine War to develop their own iterations of drones that resemble the Shahed-136 in both design and capabilities.
An unexpected developer and user of a Shahed 136-clone is the United States, which has developed a drone called LUCAS (Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System).
As previously reported by EurAsian Times, the LUCAS is based on a Shahed-136 captured a few years ago. There is no clarity on where it was captured, but we know Kyiv’s forces have recovered the drone, in some cases almost entirely intact.LUCAS was developed by the US Department of Defence (DoD) in July 2025 and has been deployed for Operation Epic Fury against Iran since early March 2026.
The LUCAS by SpektreWorks
It is a small, fixed-wing, delta-wing drone designed for terminal dives and long-range loitering. It is smaller and lighter than the Shahed and has a payload capacity of 8 to 18 kilograms, compared to the Shahed-136’s 40 to 50 kilograms. However, the open architecture and modular design of the LUCAS drone support a variety of payloads, such as explosive warheads, electronic warfare modules, and reconnaissance sensors, making it adaptable to a broad range of mission scenarios.
Similar to the drone from which it is derived, LUCAS offers a far more affordable offensive option, costing just between $30,000 and $35,000 per unit. It can also be easily scaled for use in a protracted war. Interestingly, the LUCAS is also more cost-effective than the Shahed-136 as it can be reused in various configurations, including for reconnaissance.
Another country that has developed a drone that is oddly similar to the Shahed-136 is the People’s Republic of China.
In 2023, videos emerged of a Chinese version of Iran’s famous Shahed-136 kamikaze drone, the Sunflower-200, being tested at firing ranges in China. The Sunflower-200 appeared to be a direct copy of the Shahed-136 in terms of design, with similar capabilities and intended roles. However, some experts have noted that the Chinese drone is lighter than the Shahed-136, allowing it to take off more quickly, even vertically.
Although the system remains shrouded in secrecy, which is inherent to all Chinese weapons, some estimates suggest that the drone has a range of about 1,500 to 2,000 kilometres, a payload capacity of 40 kilograms, and a speed of 160 to 220 kilometres/hour.
China has also developed the Loong M9 strike kamikaze drone, believed to be similar to the Shahed-136. Currently under testing, the Loong M9 has a take-off weight of 200 kilograms and a payload capacity of 50 kilograms. It can carry both explosive warheads and optical reconnaissance modules for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) missions.
According to reports, the drone has a range of over 1,600 kilometres and a loitering time of about 8 to 9 hours. The drone is allegedly more resistant to electronic warfare, as it can operate without GPS and has a secure data transmission channel—making it suitable for a conflict in the Western Pacific.
Notably, a recent South China Morning Post report refers to the Chinese ASN-301 drone as a “distant cousin” of the Iranian Shahed-136. It states that the Chinese one-way attack drone shares the aerodynamic delta-wing shape of the Iranian drone, and is based on a similar technological source.
Both drones have a low-aspect-ratio tailless delta wing with a cylindrical fuselage, a spherical optoelectronic nose payload, and a rear-mounted pusher propeller. However, the Chinese drone is smaller than its Iranian counterpart and is better suited to serve as an anti-radiation loitering munition rather than a simple kamikaze drone.
In addition to Russia, the US, and China, another country that has developed a Shahed-like loitering munition drone is India.
Two Indian defence firms have created drone systems that resemble Iran’s Shahed-123 kamikaze drone. According to recent reports, “Project KAL” and “Sheshnaag-150” are being developed in India to enhance deep-penetration attack capabilities. Both drones are currently undergoing testing.
The long-range indigenous kamikaze drone developed under “Project KAL” has an endurance of about 3 to 5 hours, enabling it to gather intelligence, conduct reconnaissance, and adjust flight routes before precision strikes. It is designed to deliver high-explosive payloads that target vital enemy infrastructure, including strategic sites, logistics centres, and radar systems.
Meanwhile, “Sheshnaag-150” is a swarm-capable drone with a cargo capacity of up to 40 kilograms and an endurance of roughly five hours. It is intended for long-range missions beyond 1,000 kilometres and coordinated attacks.
Learning from the lessons of a war taking place in its own backyard for over four years, Poland has been finalising the development of its own version of the Shahed-136, as recently disclosed by Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz in an interview with Polish Radio. The new drone, which will be manufactured in both training and military versions, has a delta-wing shape.
It will have a wingspan of 2.2 meters, a length of 2.6 meters, and a maximum takeoff weight of 85 kilograms, according to preliminary specs. It will have a range of about 900 kilometres, a speed of 185 kilometres/hour, and a payload capacity of 20 kilograms.
However, this is an incomplete list of Shahed-like drones under development globally by countries looking to bolster their combat capabilities, with an eye on high-impact, low-cost systems that can be quickly scaled and modified.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Destroyed E-3 Aircraft: Via: X
