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Wednesday, March 04, 2026


Life After Mencho: A Shifting Landscape Of Organized Crime In Mexico – Analysis


Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (aka “el Mencho”). Image: Grok


March 4, 2026 
Geopolitical Monitor
By Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

As a phenomenon whose behavior is driven by long-range impersonal forces rather than whimsical vicissitudes, the evolution of organized crime in Mexico has proved to be quite dynamic and ductile. The latest progression of this fast-paced trajectory is the Mexican military operation in which Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (aka “el Mencho”), nominal leader of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG), was killed. As retaliation, his henchmen targeted private businesses, state-owned banks and security personnel. Cartel hitmen also disrupted transit through roadblocks in various highways, urban centers, rural communities and tourist spots across Mexico. Everyday economic cycles and recreational activities came to a halt in nearly half of the country, even in regions far away from the epicenter of these events.

This episode and its immediate aftermath have gone viral on a global scale through both mainstream channels and social media. As the dust is settling after the initial backlash wave, an atmosphere of tense calm prevails, at least for the time being, but the ghost of “el Mencho” is now haunting Mexico. To keep things in perspective, this man was no ordinary street thug. While his centrality had diminished due to ailing health, he had become Mexico’s most powerful and ruthless criminal warlord. Under his leadership, the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG) had risen —especially after the recent partition of the Sinaloa Cartel— as one of the world’s largest criminal empires. For the Mexican state, this operation represents a Zeitenwende which, after a hiatus of suspicious unresponsiveness, highlights both the material ability and the political will to engage nonstate antagonists, even if this confrontation comes with meaningful risks and costs. Once again, the gloves are off.
Profile of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel

The New Generation Jalisco Cartel was born as an offshoot of cells once tied to the Sinaloa Cartel, which later absorbed both minor regional groups from Western Mexico and paramilitary squads established to exterminate the so-called “Knights Templar.” These remnants joined forces to transform a second-rate subnational nonstate actor into a major criminal multinational empire with branches in most of Mexico, the US, Latin America, Europe, Asia, and even Africa.

The cartel’s governance model is a hybrid that integrates corporate and paramilitary components. Not unlike the diversification of the Japanese keiretsu, the CJNG was involved in various profitable operations, including drug trafficking (especially fentanyl), clandestine mining of industrial and precious metals, extortion rackets, cybercrime, fuel contraband, human trafficking, the control of cash crops, and the systematic predation of all sorts of businesses, as well as money laundering schemes. This spatial and economic expansion was facilitated by a strategy which enabled the integration of smaller surrogates. Therefore, rather than a vertical hierarchical pyramid, the CJNG is semi-decentralized network or constellation of criminal satrapies. This confederation has been strengthened through mergers, contractual partnerships and franchises. On the other hand, the CJNG has achieved substantive firepower, underpinned by the acquisition of assault rifles, RPGs, landmines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-aircraft guns, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In the hands of assassins trained by military defectors and foreign mercenaries with experience in overseas warzones such as Colombia and Ukraine, these weapons have been wielded to orchestrate attacks against the Mexican armed forces, law enforcement, rival groups, and even unarmed civilians. The cartel is also notorious for embracing technological innovations such as AI, cryptocurrencies, and social media platforms.


Although it exists primarily as a money-making machine, this organization has followed an operational playbook that borrows the asymmetric tactics of nonstate militias such as terrorists, separatists, and insurgents. In this particular arena, the CJNG shares more common denominators with the Colombian FARC, Hezbollah, Blackwater, the Wagner Group and African nonstate militias than with old-school Italian mafias, Chinese triads or the Japanese Yakuza. Through the proliferation of armed violence and psychological warfare, the growth of this group has weakened the ability of the Mexican state to ensure the monopoly of force and the full-fledged control of the country’s territorial hinterland. Based on a zero-sum logic, such development represents a threat for both national security and the Westphalian sovereignty of Mexico. Finally, the hitherto unchecked metastasis of this problem would not have been possible without the organic complicity of elite political and economic enablers. As is known, the growth of organized crime necessarily requires the secretive collaboration of “friends in high places.”
Domestic Fallout from El Mencho’s Death

The fate of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel is unclear because the governance structure of organized crime is a fertile ground for a chronic backstabbing disorder. Considering existing precedents, strategic foresight suggests that four scenarios can be envisaged: 1) a smooth consensual succession, 2) a hostile takeover, 3) a bitter power struggle followed by violent balkanization or 4) a gradual disintegration.


What is certain is that the beheading of a large-scale criminal syndicate does not mean that the metaphorical hydra has been dismantled. After all, the removal of a CEO does not mean that the company he used to run has been extinguished. In the short term, the so-called “kingpin strategy” is useful to destabilize criminal networks and to restore deterrence through the demarcation of red lines. However, the Mexican state can leverage this turning point to undermine the cartel’s hidden financial infrastructure, introduce stricter customs enforcement mechanisms and go after the group’s “fellow travelers.”

In the long run, these measures could further the decline and fall of this particular criminal enterprise. Nonetheless, as serious security professionals know, the complete structural eradication of organized crime is unlikely because there are powerful incentives that guarantee the survival of this underworld ecosystem. In the case of Mexico, these include the gravitational pull of market forces, a dispersed geographical configuration, and a flourishing cultural industry that promotes the aspirational attractiveness of the narco lifestyle for young men and women through narratives, songs, fashion, Netflix productions, Instagram influencers, and even semi-religious rituals.

Yet the dismemberment of large organizations could de facto reshuffle the balance of power in a manner that favors the authority of the Mexican government. In the long run, the degradation and fragmentation of large criminal consortiums would make the problem more manageable through state-sanctioned coercion, containment strategies, backchannel negotiations, and informal agreements for the ordered redistribution of spheres of influence. The point is that the state can turn the tables with the ability to permanently keep in check these partially de-fanged criminal rings. Although kosher solutions (i.e. the rule of law, better policing, community crime prevention) are preferable in principle, the testament of history and Machiavellian wisdom teach that an expedient and effective pacification requires unsavory decisions. Bad must begin so that worse remains behind.

For the Mexican government, the elimination of “el Mencho” is a game-changing political triumph. This milestone represents a “clean break” from the puzzling policy of “hugs, not bullets,” followed by President Sheinbaum’s predecessor. Although the precise details remain obscure, the rationale behind the previous approach has been attributed to neglect, détente, and even transactional Faustian pacts. The liquidation of this “high-value target” is also helpful to restore the socio-political legitimacy and professional reputation of the country’s military and civilian security services.


Nevertheless, meaningful risks persist, including the prospect of asymmetric retaliatory attacks calculated to sabotage governance, public order, political stability, and economic exchanges. Military headquarters, senior policymakers, governmental facilities, foreign interests, corporate nerve centers, tourist attractions, symbolic sites, power plants, crowded entertainment venues and infrastructure projects could be targeted. The upcoming organization of three matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Mexican cities opens windows of opportunity for such malicious purposes. The materialization of these hypothetical threats would lead to the loss of political capital, diplomatic credibility, economic benefits and “soft power.”

For an organization like the CJNG, the narco-terrorist attacks launched by Pablo Escobar against Colombian government officials and civilians are perhaps precedents worth replicating, especially considering its state-of-the-art expertise in kamikaze drones and targeted assassinations. In addition, the high-profile political associates of this cartel, who are being gradually sidelined by the current Mexican government, also have incentives to seek revenge. Readiness is therefore a major challenge for Mexican intelligence services, armed forces and law enforcement. On the other hand, the removal of a senior drug lord is expected to facilitate the progress of trade negotiations and the renewal of the North American geoeconomic bloc as a strong trilateral partnership conditionally undergirded by the securitization of strategic industries, supply chains, and critical minerals. For Mexican economic statecraft, access to the US consumer market as an engine of dynamism, manufacturing productiveness, industrial policies, technology transfers, and strategic-grade “nearshoring” investments remains an imperative.
International Dimension

Based on the new prescriptive strategic guidelines for national security and defense presented by the second Trump administration, the US geopolitical perimeter in the American hemisphere is now regarded in DC as a major priority. This redefinition is not just simply a new theoretical innovation masterminded by the US strategic community. Such perception is reflected in the recent capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, the attempt to control Greenland and a hawkish foreign policy approach towards pivotal regional states with varying profiles, such as Panama, Colombia, Cuba and even Canada.

This strategic conception diagnoses that, in contemporary security environments (shaped by complex interdependence), resurgent interstate geopolitical tensions and emerging vectors of nonstate threats are increasingly entwined. In this view, Mexico is well positioned as a scalable bridge of interconnectedness through which problematic flows —synthetic opioids, illegal immigrants, triangulated Chinese goods, agents of foreign powers or nonstate actors— are infiltrating the US for hostile purposes. As US thinkers like Samuel Huntington and George Friedman have argued, the US and Mexico will likely collide due to diverging demographic and territorial interests. From this perspective, although a bit of chaos in Mexico is tolerable, a black hole of anarchy in a neighboring state with so many overlapping ties to the US is unacceptable. Washington cannot afford to let Mexico become a failed state because it fears the effects of potentially contagious spillovers, power voids and harmful externalities.

This is the context in which the official reclassification of fentanyl as a “weapon of mass destruction” and of Mexican criminal syndicates as “foreign terrorist organizations” must be understood. Under intermittent US diplomatic pressure and threats of both unilateral military interventions and coercive tariffs, the Mexican government has set aside ideological preferences and embraced a policy that blends strategic acquiescence, bilateral security collaboration, and appeasement. Out of pragmatism, the days in which there was little cooperation in the fields of defense, security, and intelligence are behind. Symbolically, the CJNG leader’s head on a silver platter is a better “sacrificial offering” than the meta-legal rendition of second-rate drug lords and has-beens. This accomplishment of this operation performatively telegraphs the US security establishment that Mexico is willing to do what is needed to restore its bona fide credentials as a reliable security partner. Furthermore, as an operational success comparable to the targeted assassinations of both Osama bin Laden or IRGC General Qassem Soleimani, the neutralization of the most wanted Mexican drug lord is a boost for the political ambitions of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. As the architects of the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, these senior GOP figures can leverage the incremental success of this new hemispheric security agenda to further their political projects.


Nevertheless, triumphalism on both sides of the border may be premature because things can get worse before they get any better. Mexican criminal organizations have proved to be exceedingly resilient. The downfall of major syndicates is usually followed by the rise of direct or indirect heirs, especially in faraway peripheral regions with a prohibitive topology. Moreover, as great powers scramble to advance their preferred versions of world order, the resulting security competition brings yet another layer of volatility and even encourages the emergence of wild cards. For example, if a regime change in Cuba occurs via a messy collapse rather than through a controlled demolition or a Richelovian deal, former regime personnel —including military and intelligence officers— may be recruited by Mexican criminal groups. Their experience with grey-zone tactics and irregular conflict in the operational theatres of contested flashpoints across the Global South (hardly transferable to legitimate business) makes them highly attractive. Aside from the self-evident economic benefits of choosing a lucrative workstream that handsomely rewards their tradecraft, there is also an incentive to join forces against the US as a common enemy.

In the worst-case scenario, such shadow symbiosis has the potential to generate a FARC-like hybrid threat in which the distinction between organized crime businesses and militant “anti-imperialist” struggle is blurred. With the firepower and cash of Mexican criminal syndicates and the Cubans’ expertise in all sorts of covert shenanigans, involvement in shady businesses and clandestine international connections, this nonstate “red menace” would be a force to be reckoned with.

For the most hardline and ideologically charged factions of the ruling coalition, increasingly alienated by the “impure” pragmatism of the Mexican head of state and the alignment of her administration to Washington’s orbit, the rise of this golem would be a good opportunity for revanchism. For extra-regional great powers interested in challenging the Americans, this revolutionary joint venture would mean a chance to fuel agitation in the most relevant state for US homeland security. This criminal mutation, under the theatrical facade of “popular resistance”, would deepen Mexico’s security crisis with a counterinsurgency nightmare. It is in Mexico’s best interest that the State Department and the upper echelons of the Cuban military apparatus manage to achieve a deal that ensures hemispheric security and regional stability.

This article was published by the Geopolitical Monitor.com

Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.

Friday, October 25, 2024

What drove Hamas on Oct 7 and what drives them still?

A look into the group's origins and history may explain the violent nature of the ongoing conflict.



Mikail Ahmed Shaikh 
Published October 24, 2024
DAWN


The attacks of October 7, 2023, saw over 1,000 people killed in Israel, while over 250 were taken hostage by Hamas. Israel was caught off guard, as was the rest of the world. Nobody saw it coming, nor did anyone see the Israeli military’s retaliatory scorched-earth campaign in the Gaza Strip
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It’s been over a year since that day, during which time Gaza has borne witness to one of the bloodiest conflicts in the region in decades.

Over 42,000 people have been killed in Gaza, with Israel no closer to rescuing the hostages, although the Israeli military assassinated Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in October, who was the alleged mastermind of the October 7 attacks.

Meanwhile, South Africa has filed a “genocide” case against Israel with the International Court of Justice, while the International Criminal Court has applied for arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes.


A Palestinian boy sits as people search the rubble of the Harb family home destroyed in overnight Israeli strikes in the Al Bureij refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip, on June 18, 2024. — AFP/File

Attempts at truce talks and mediation have thus far failed and with an extensive bombing spree in Lebanon having followed — which killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah — there is a very real fear of the conflict expanding into a regional conflagration.

So, it warrants asking why Hamas attacked Israelis in the first place. An attack that led to one of the most violent asymmetric conflicts of the 21st century.

According to a 2023 analysis by Joe Macaron for Qatari state-run broadcaster Al Jazeera, Hamas’ attack was triggered following “growing demands for a response” to far-right Israeli policy in the occupied West Bank, especially surrounding illegal settlements.

“The rising tensions in the West Bank caused by these policies necessitated the shift of Israeli forces away from the south and into the north to guard the settlements,” Macaron writes. “This gave Hamas both a justification and an opportunity to attack.”

Moreover, Macaron argues that the normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations was an additional motive for the attack since the process “further diminished the significance of the Palestinian issue for Arab leaders who became less keen on pressuring Israel on this matter”.


A view of a junction shows the aftermath of a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in the Sderot area, southern Israel on October 7, 2023. — Reuters

On the other hand, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organisation, argues, “One of Hamas’s goals was simply to kill Israelis,” citing a report by The Washington Post which reported that attackers had written instructions to do so.

The CSIS piece also suggests that Hamas was driven by revenge for past Israeli violence and the illegal occupation of the West Bank.

Alternatively, a senior Hamas official told Al Jazeera in October 2023 that the group took hostages and expressed hope that the kidnappings would ensure the release of “all” Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

“We managed to kill and capture many Israeli soldiers,” said Hamas deputy chief Saleh al-Arouri. “Our detainees in [Israeli] prisons, their freedom is looming large. What we have in our hands will release all our prisoners. The longer fighting continues, the higher the number of prisoners will become.”

But the answer to why the attack was launched on Israel perhaps lies in the group’s past, in how Tel Aviv or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood influenced the genesis of the group to control the Palestinian sphere of influence before it eventually became powerful enough to outgrow its creators.



October 7


Fighters from the Palestinian group Hamas attacked Israeli towns on Oct 7, 2023, killing and capturing scores of civilians and soldiers in a surprise assault.

The worst attack on Israel for decades unleashed a conflict that both sides vowed to escalate. According to the Rand Corporation, a US-based think tank, at least 1,200 Israelis were killed on October 7, with 250 others taken hostage and moved to the Gaza Strip.

Meanwhile, in retaliatory airstrikes that began the same day, Palestinian health officials reported that more than 230 people were killed and 1,600 were wounded in the Gaza Strip. That number has since ballooned to 42,847 fatalities as of October 24, 2024.

Tel Aviv was enraged as Israelis had been taken hostage, and the country’s self-proclaimed sovereignty was once again challenged. Israeli commanders and intelligence chiefs have since resigned over their failure to prevent the attack.


A man runs on a road as fire burns after rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip, in Ashkelon, Israel October 7, 2023. — Reuters/Dawn

However, it must be noted that in the immediate aftermath, much of what was reported on October 7 had been exaggerated. For example, reports of mass rapes carried out by Hamas remain unsubstantiated or have been proven outright false.

Moreover, the most remote criticism of Israel’s conduct will have one branded as a Hamas sympathiser or, worse, antisemitic.

In his 2024 paper ‘Orientalism and the Discourse on Israel/Palestine’, Marcel Wegner argues that Israel portrays October 7 “as another chapter of endless Jewish suffering” and in doing so, is blurring the line between religion and state policy.

“If one argues this to be the case, it leaves no space for nuance in the discourse,” Wegner writes, adding that Israel’s narrative “creates a hegemonic discourse that is incontestable”.

What is Hamas?


A cursory glance at the group will lead you to believe that it is another in a long line of keffiyeh-wearing Palestinian freedom fighters, challenging the colonial oppressor. However, looking at the group’s origins shows that they were created to serve a different political interest.

The group was founded by Palestinian cleric Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 1987 during the First Intifada (Arabic for uprising), according to Hamas themselves, to fight the Israeli forces that occupied Gaza at the time.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent nonprofit organisation, states, “Hamas is a militant movement that has controlled the Gaza Strip for nearly two decades.”


Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Ismail Haniyeh in a file photo from 2003. — Reuters/File

Politically, Hamas’ main rival is the Fatah party, which dominates the Palestinian Authority in the occupied West Bank. Since 2007, Hamas has been the de facto governing party in the Gaza Strip after they won the 2006 Legislative Elections. According to Al Jazeera, Fatah refused to recognise the vote and Hamas took over the enclave following a brief conflict.

To this day, reconciliations remain unfinalised, though both parties have come together as a result of the Israeli military offensive. It is noteworthy that Fatah has formally renounced the use of violence, unlike its rival.

Iran entered the picture after its Islamic Revolution in 1979 and according to the United States Institute for Peace (Usip) — a think tank founded by the US Congress — “Hamas and Iran both wanted to see Israel replaced by the Islamic state of Palestine.”

Despite hailing from different sects, both actors had shared interests, with Ayatollah Khomeini pledging $30 million annually to the group in financial support, Usip states. Israel and its allies allege Iranian backing for Hamas continues to this day.


Palestinian school girls returning home from classes pass a line of Arab men being frisked by Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip in this photo from 1986. — Reuters/File

According to a 2012 paper by Jean-Pierre Filiu, a professor of Middle East studies at Paris’ prestigious Sciences Po University, there are two “interpretations” of the origins of Hamas.

In the first, Hamas was created in December 1987, but its roots as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza date as far back as 1946.

Filiu argues that the second interpretation “basically depicts Hamas as a ‘golem,’ a creature in Jewish folklore fashioned from mud and made animate who ultimately escapes his master” — effectively saying that they are a creation of Israel.

Even the group’s name is rooted in both Hebrew and Arabic — in Arabic, it means “zeal” and is an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, while in Hebrew, it translates to “violence”.

The offshoot

Yassin, who was killed in 2004 by an Israeli strike while leaving a mosque, had studied in Egypt and accepted the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s oldest and largest Islamic organisation, according to the BBC.

The Council on Foreign Relations states that Yassin established Hamas “as the Brotherhood’s political arm in Gaza” in 1987, adding that its “purpose was to engage in violence against Israelis as a means of restoring Palestinian backing for the Brotherhood.”

The group set out its principles in a charter in 1988, calling for the destruction of Israel. However in recent years, to moderate its image, it set out a new charter, which focused more on establishing a Palestinian state, though it does not recognise Israel.

“Palestine is a land that was seized by a racist, anti-human and colonial Zionist project that was founded on a false promise (the Balfour Declaration), on recognition of a usurping entity and on imposing a fait accompli by force,” Hamas’ 2017 ‘Document of General Principles and Policies’ reads.

Palestinian Hamas fighters take part in an anti-Israel military parade in Gaza City August 26, 2015. — Reuters/File

Looking at its “official” history, Hamas’ origins seem to reflect its contemporaries — a resistance organisation rising against an oppressive actor.

Its initial charter suggests that the group is much more reliant on violence compared to its contemporaries like Fatah.

Israeli officials insist that the group’s violent nature has influenced their response and hesitance (or outright refusal) to negotiate a peace deal. From the Israeli perspective, Hamas poses an existential threat to its security, especially given that it is receiving training, funding and other forms of aid from its arch-nemesis Iran.

Speaking on ‘The Ezra Klein Show’ on September 20, New Yorker editor David Remnick, said a great deal can be learned about Hamas by looking at their leader, Yahya Sinwar, who has since been killed in an Israeli military operation in Gaza.

A Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist, Remnick has performed “deep, long-form reporting from Israel for decades”, host Klein said on the episode, adding that Remnick has profiled high-profile figures including Yasser Arafat, Israeli PM Netanyahu and Sinwar himself.

Remnick described Sinwar as “the most powerful person in Gaza and a decider for Hamas”, adding that he went underground after October 7 2023.

“When he was a student at university … he attached himself to Sheikh Yassin,” Remnick said. “Sinwar found himself appointed … one of the leaders of the Majd” — Hamas’ morality police. … He was jailed in the 80s and remained in Israeli jails for a couple of decades.“

During his incarceration, Sinwar wrote a novel titled ‘The Thorn and the Carnation’. “If you want to know anything about Yahya Sinwar, it is very much worth reading,” Remnick said, saying that the book shows “the roots of his politics and fury”.

“There are long passages about Sinwar and his schoolmates being taken … to visit Israel … including a visit to Jerusalem,” Remnick said. “He asks at one point, rhetorically … who will be our great Saladin?”

In the book, Sinwar was referring to who would lead the Palestinian struggle, Remnick says, suggesting, “Clearly at some level, as I’m reading it, he’s positioning himself as that great leader.”

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar looks on as Hamas supporters take part in an anti-Israel rally over tension in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa mosque, in this file photo from October 2022. — Reuters

“Sinwar isn’t a figure of extraordinary mystery,” Remnick said. “He grew more aware during his time in prison that hostage-taking was effective,” which explains Hamas’ taking captives on October 7, 2023.

Remnick then talks about the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2011. “Israeli society was obsessed with this case,” Remnick said, adding that he was “released for a thousand Palestinian prisoners. One of whom was Yahya Sinwar.”

Remnick’s observation suggests that Sinwar had an impact on Hamas’ modus operandi, especially considering that over 200 Israelis were taken captive during the attack.
The ‘Golem’

While Hamas was formed as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is evidence that it received substantial enough backing from Israel that it can be considered a “creation” of theirs — Filiu’s “Golem”.

Over time, Israeli officials have admitted the country’s role in propping up Hamas as a counterweight to Fatah and how that plan backfired, leading Hamas to resort to violence.

“Hamas, to my great regret, is Israel’s creation,” says retired Israeli official Avner Cohen in a 2009 interview with The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), terming Hamas an “enormous, stupid mistake”.

Cohen says that Israel “encouraged” Hamas as a counterweight to other nationalist factions, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its dominant faction, Fatah.


Former Israeli Religious Affairs Official Avner Cohen in a photo from 2017. — Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey



The WSJ piece adds that Israel “often stood aside” when Hamas and their secular left-wing Palestinian rival Fatah battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank.

While some Israeli officials have viewed this as a catalyst for Hamas’ rise to power, others have attributed it to the alleged backing of Iran and other actors opposed to Israel.

“Hamas in Gaza was built by Iran as a foundation for power, and is backed through funding, through training and the provision of advanced weapons,” said then-Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert in 2009, according to WSJ.

The WSJ further adds that around Yassin’s arrest in 1984, Cohen sent a report to senior Israeli military and civilian officials in Gaza. He warned that Israel’s policy towards Hamas would allow them to develop into a dangerous force.

“I believe that by continuing to turn away our eyes, our lenient approach to Mujama (Hamas) will in the future harm us. I, therefore, suggest focusing our efforts on finding ways to break up this monster before this reality jumps in our face,” Cohen wrote.

A piece by Mehdi Hasan and Dina Sayedalahmed for The Intercept also cites Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, who served as Gaza’s military governor in the early 1980s. Segev told a reporter for The New York Times, “The Israeli government gave me a budget… and the military government gives to the mosques.” Like Cohen, Segev stated that the aim was to prop Hamas as a counterweight to Fatah.

In a 2018 video for The Intercept, Hasan acknowledges Hamas’ creation as an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood but states that Egypt had repressed the group in Gaza before 1967. After 1967’s Six-Day War, Israel invaded and occupied the Gaza Strip and, according to Hasan, “they didn’t just turn a blind eye to the Islamists, they encouraged them.”






Hasan adds that Hamas has killed more Israeli civilians than any other group and that their leaders are “viciously anti-Israeli and even anti-semitic in their rhetoric”. He says that “the die was cast for blowback”.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said something similar in January 2024. “Yes, Hamas was financed by the government of Israel in an attempt to weaken the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah,” he said in a speech at the University of Valladolid in Spain, Reuters reported. However, he did not elaborate any further.

There is evidence that Israel has been sending funds to Hamas as late as 2018. In December 2023, Dawn published a report stating that Israel appro­ved the transfer of more than $1 billion from Qatar to Gaza, even though there were intelligence warnings that the group was planning large-scale attacks on Israel.

It is now clear that around the 1970s and 1980s, Hamas was patronised by Israel to divide and rule the occupied Palestinian territories and control the Palestinian sphere of influence.

Furthermore, The Times of Israel reported in 2023 that an Israeli ministry drafted a proposal to transfer Gaza’s 2.3 million people to Egypt’s Sinai peninsula, “drawing condemnation from Palestinians and worsening tensions with Cairo”.

Despite being a “concept paper”, putting it in the context of rhetoric from far-right Israeli government figures shows that vacating the Gaza Strip is one of Tel Aviv’s goals.

Israel’s more extreme elements, like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, have displayed their contempt and prejudice against Palestinians on record numerous times. In July for example, Ben-Gvir said Palestinian prisoners “should be shot in the head instead of giving them more food”.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich recently called thwarting the creation of a Palestinian state “his life’s mission”. Israeli Ambassador to the UK Tzipi Hotovely said on the UK’s Channel 4 that she has “no empathy” for Palestinians in Gaza.


A combination photo showing Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Israeli Ambassador to the UK Tzipi Hotovely. — Dawn/Reuters

The Intercept states: “To be clear: First, the Israelis helped build up a militant strain of Palestinian political Islam, in the form of Hamas and its Muslim Brotherhood precursors; then, the Israelis switched tack and tried to bomb, besiege, and blockade it out of existence.”

Hamas reflects the fate of many other proxy groups — a state wanted an actor under its control to maintain its sphere of influence or to fight a hostile actor and disrupt theirs.

As with Afghanistan, this plan backfired and Frankenstein’s monster is trying to kill its creator. Thus, one can deduce that Israel’s impetus for prolonging the ongoing conflict is not just to eliminate a threat to its security, but also to rectify a grave error.
One year on

The nature of the October 7 attacks, and the subsequent fighting thereafter, fall in line with Hamas’ behaviour as an organisation. They are the most powerful Palestinian faction out of their contemporaries and have made the most of their regional alliances with Iran and other armed groups to further their goals.

Looking at their origins, it is clear that Israel’s patronage of Hamas contributed to the group’s actions since 1987, as well as why the present conflict is unparalleled in its violence. Their activity was enabled by Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, empowering them as a policy option against the more popular, secular Fatah.


A boy looks on at the site of an Israeli strike on tents sheltering displaced people at Al-Aqsa hospital, where Palestinian Shaban al-Dalou was burnt to death, in Deir Al-Balah on October 15. — Reuters

However, this plan backfired, thanks to a lack of forward-thinking, the group’s innate antisemitism having been born during the first Intifada and the presence of a convenient proxy for Israel’s enemies.

Given the unprecedented nature of this conflict, Hamas may grow even more entrenched in its ideology and possibly return to the initial charter from the 1980s, which in turn would invite an even harsher response from Israel — a vicious cycle that will result in more innocents on both sides getting caught in the crossfire.
Mission accomplished?

Having observed the events of the past year, it can be argued that the aftermath of October 7 is something Hamas neither foresaw nor wanted. Their leadership is dead, the Gaza Strip is in ruins and over 42,000 people have been killed — more if one counts the bodies buried under rubble, or not in one piece. They knew Israel would react — it is doubtful they expected a retaliation to this extent.

The impact of the conflict — the spread of disease, famine and a lack of medical facilities — could act against the group, turning what’s left of their support base in Gaza against them.

On the other hand, if they aimed to destabilise or divide Israel, then they have arguably achieved that goal. Israeli politics are deeply divided, with opposition leaders incessantly calling for Netanyahu’s resignation. Israelis are out on the streets protesting the offensive, demanding the return of the hostages and an immediate ceasefire. A ceasefire, it seems, Netanyahu is unwilling to enact, lest he lose his seat at the head of government.


‘Grip on power’

Netanyahu was embroiled in a corruption scandal before the events of October 7. He was accused of receiving luxury goods and disrupting “investigative and judicial proceedings” and was formally indicted in 2019, according to The New York Times. The trial began in 2020.

According to The Times of Israel, Netanyahu’s corruption trial has been delayed until 2025, having been suspended in October 2023 after the attacks. “The prime minister faces charges of fraud and breach of trust in Case 1000 and Case 2000, and charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust in Case 4000,” The Times of Israel adds.

The Israeli Army’s former head of operations, Major General Israel Ziv said that the offensive has become a source of “political stability” for the Israeli PM. For Netanyahu and his government“.

A refusal to cease hostilities amid immense pressure both at home and from abroad, even from some of its staunch allies, is causing Tel Aviv to become a political pressure cooker. Something that works to Hamas’ benefit.

Thursday, October 17, 2024

Israeli weapons of mass destruction are a real-life Frankenstein

Israel's dystopian weapons industry poses a threat to humanity, with the Hezbollah pager attacks setting a dangerous precedent, says Richard Silverstein.

Perspectives
NEW ARAB
Richard Silverstein
14 Oct, 2024



Like a spoiled child, whatever Israel wants, Israel gets,
 writes Richard Silverstein [photo credit: Getty Images]

Israel specialises in weapons of mass destruction.

In the 1990s, Israel pioneered the use of armed drones in warfare and was the first to use exploding cell phones in assassinations. Thirty years later, Israel was among the first to use satellite-operated, AI-guided, autonomous weapons, to assassinate an Iranian nuclear scientist.

Israel has also spearheaded various forms of mass surveillance, including facial recognition and social media data mining. It does so via search algorithms targeting keywords which psychologists and intelligence agents have identified as indicators of radical inclination or concrete plans.

More recently, Israeli agents established an elaborate plan to sabotage a shipment of electronic pagers purchased by Hezbollah.

Thousands of the devices were distributed to their members. When they received a text message generated by the Mossad, they all exploded within an hour of each other. The next day they did the same thing with cell phones. They killed 40 Lebanese including three children. Nearly 4,000 were severely injured, many blinded as a result of eye injuries, as they looked at the messages on the screen.

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Unfiltered
Ravale Mohydin

Israel's brazen attack represents the first mass sabotage of everyday communication devices, used by much of the world. It sets an unimaginably dangerous precedent.

Imagine if, in the future, Israel or other states devise ways not just to hack, but to explode all communications devices of major companies such as Google or Apple in a specific country. The result could not only damage overall communications infrastructure but also cost the lives of massive numbers of users.

Israel also has mass cyberwarfare capabilities. It used some of them to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program and hack the communication devices of targeted Palestinians.

It has developed facial recognition technology, compiling databases to collect and analyse images of every Palestinian living in the West Bank.

In doing so, it can track their location, identifying who they meet, where, and when. The foremost military SIGINT entity among global armies, Unit 8200 intercepts every form of communication among Palestinians including email, telephone, texts and phone calls. They are used to recruit Shin Bet informants who spy on their families, neighbours and communities. Israeli intelligence uses such information to assassinate Palestinian resistance leaders.

While Israel gains a momentary advantage or degrades the capability of an enemy — these are tactics, not strategy. They attain a short-term gain instead of a long-term interest.

And to obtain even that small advantage, the costs keep rising. The weapons have to get more powerful, the risks increase, and the death count rises. Meanwhile, Israel grows uglier and more hated.

Israel also relies on old-fashioned military operations. In the past few days, it began what Biden national security officials have falsely labelled a “ground operation” or “limited incursion” into southern Lebanon.

Global media have followed suit. Some are calling it a “targeted operation”. The alleged military goal is the return of 70,000 northern Israeli residents to their homes.

In reality, the invasion will fail to achieve this objective. Despite absorbing blows, Hezbollah still retains 150,000 missiles, some among the most advanced in Iran’s arsenal. They are resisting the military assault on their country and will continue to do so, likely intensifying their resistance.

Israel's 'battle-tested' weapons industry


Israel field tests its weapons against enemies in Palestine, Lebanon and Iran. They provide proof of concept persuading armies, weapons engineers and intelligence agencies throughout the world to purchase them.

In turn, they impose precisely the same regime both inside and outside the country. This in turn fuels a lucrative weapons export market. Israel is ranked 10th in the world regarding the value of such products.

Its innovation in the development of such weapons systems is followed closely by the world’s weapons buyers. The former become products exported to failed states and repressive regimes like Myanmar, South Sudan, UAE, Philippines, etc. which use them to suppress dissent and settle scores with their enemies, just as Israeli does.

Whatever weapons Israel wants, but does not have it obtains from the US.

In the case of the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, US-made F35 warplanes, carried US-made bunker-buster bombs, while there are unconfirmed reports of AWAC planes monitoring the assassination in real-time. All were instrumental in the murder plot.

All the while, the Biden administration uses plausible deniability to excuse it all by claiming Israel didn’t warn the US before it acted.

Either the Pentagon is lying to avoid outrage at its role, or it is telling the truth. The latter would indicate that the US is providing its most lethal munitions without any control or restraints.

This violates US law which calls for using exported weapons under international law. The Leahy Law requires the government to end weapons shipments to regimes found to have violated human rights.

The State Department, tasked with such oversight, has deliberately ignored the findings of multiple agencies that Israel was violating both standards, issuing its statement that Israel is not in violation.

Imagine during WWII, if instead of sending thousands of ships filled with food and weapons to Britain to resist the Nazis, the US decided it was in its interest to send an armada to support Hitler’s invasion of the island and the Holocaust. This is akin to what Biden has done, sending a carrier battle group to the region along with 50,000 troops.

Israel's mad march to war


Biden seems to think this threat will cow Iran from attacking Israel. Apparently, it hasn’t worked. After Israel sent its troops into Lebanon, Iran launched 200 missiles targeting Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Though Iron Dome intercepted most of them, there are not yet reports concerning any that struck their targets.

Israel has vowed retaliation. We are now in a state of calibrated escalation. Iran could have fired salvos of thousands of missiles. Then Israel would have been justified in a massive response, provoking all-out war. Instead, it fired a smaller number knowing Israel would retaliate in kind.

Though neither side wants to be blamed for starting such a war, Netanyahu has numerous reasons to want one. He is doing everything in his power — from the assassinations of Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif to the assassination of Nasrallah — to incite such a catastrophic conflict.

He needs these wars to distract from his unpopularity at home and to delay his corruption trial. He also seeks the distinction of being the only prime minister to launch direct attacks on Israel’s foremost regional enemy, Iran and its nuclear program. Netanyahu’s march toward mayhem continues unobstructed.

How can President Biden believe the US can play any role in such a process? We have no relations with Iran. We have refused to engage in talks with even Iran’s moderate leaders. We have proven instrumental in murdering the leader of its primary regional ally.
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Perspectives
Benjamin Ashraf

The Biden administration seems either oblivious or uncaring regarding the impact this will have on the country’s status in the Arab and Muslim world.

It is implicated in the genocide in Gaza, which some public health experts estimate to be over 300,000 dead from combat and related causes.

It is an accessory to the assassination of one of the most admired leaders in the Muslim world. There is nothing we would not do for Israel. Why would the Arab world not hate America? Even more than it hated this country before these events.

Returning to Israeli cyberwarfare, regulation of these weapons lags far behind their development and use on the battlefield. Neither the UN nor any country regulates their use, permitting Israel to wreak havoc without any restraint from global regulatory authorities. It can develop and manufacture ever more lethal weapons with neither ethical nor legal limits.

Further, international bodies established to prosecute war crimes such as the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice seem powerless to hold Israel accountable for the use of these weapons of mass mayhem. In the former case, its judges failed to issue arrest warrants for Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Despite findings by the ICJ that Israel was committing genocide, it has no enforcement mechanism and Israel has ignored the findings.

The story of Frankenstein by Mary Shelley mirrors the medieval Jewish golem myth. The latter recounted a pogrom in Prague in which the Jews were attacked by their Christian neighbours. The city’s rabbi created a huge creature out of clay to protect the Jews. He succeeded and the violence stopped. But in doing so the rabbi lost control of the protector of the Jews. He ran amok causing even more danger for them.

To end it, the rabbi destroyed him by turning him back into clay. Israel is a golem wreaking havoc in the Middle East and beyond. Unfortunately, there seems to be no one who can control it or turn it back into clay.

Richard Silverstein writes the Tikun Olam blog and is a freelance journalist specialising in exposing secrets of the Israeli national security state. He campaigns against opacity and the negative impact of Israeli military censorship.
Follow him on Twitter: @richards1052


Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Thursday, July 18, 2024

Israel’s Unseen Second Front

While the war in Gaza rages on, militant Jewish settlers are pushing further into the Palestinian heartland



AUTHOR
Edo Konrad
NEWS | 07/11/2024
Scenes of devastation in the village of Duma in the West Bank following a raid by unknown assailants, 12 May 2024.Photo: Flash90 / Nasser Ishtayeh

LONG READ

On 28 February 2024, some four months into Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip, dozens of young Israeli settlers saw an opportunity to set a precedent. Nearly 20 years after Ariel Sharon’s government evacuated the Jewish settlements from Gaza, a small number of them — some reportedly carrying construction materials, while at least two were armed with the kind of rifles used by the military — stormed the Erez Crossing in a first attempt to rebuild Jewish settlements.


Edo Konrad is a journalist and the former editor-in-chief of +972 Magazine.


“We came here [because] we wanted to go home. I live in a community of deportees from Gush Katif, and we wanted to go back”, one 18-year-old settler told Local Call. “I would like the government to understand [what] the majority of the people already understood: We are here. It is ours … We need to go to Gaza, destroy all the terror there, and build there ourselves”, said another.

The settlers were successful — at least momentarily. They managed to erect a makeshift outpost, not unlike the kind seen in the occupied West Bank, which they named Nisanit Hachadasha (“New Nisanit”) after one of the settlements of Gush Katif, the Jewish settlement bloc that was evacuated as part of the 2005 disengagement plan. But unlike the disengagement, in which police and soldiers forcibly removed 9,000 settlers from a colony built in the heart of the Palestinian civilian population, this time Israeli security forces stood nearby and provided protection as the settlers swarmed. It would take several hours before the police arrived to remove them.

To the untrained eye, Nisanit Hachadasha might appear as a form of marginal political theatre, not to be taken too seriously. But the event in many ways marked the culmination of a vision that has been percolating among the settler movement for decades — one that could only be realized through a paradigm-shifting explosion of violence such as all-out war or ethnic cleansing, permanently thwarting the establishment of a Palestinian state and turning the settlers into the masters of the land.

Israel’s unprecedented onslaught and devastation in the Gaza Strip, which came as a response to the gruesome Hamas attacks on Southern Israel and the capturing of hundreds of hostages on 7 October, has provided the settlers with precisely such an explosion. While the mood among mainstream Israeli society is one of painful sacrifice for a “necessary” and “just” war of defence, the settlers and their representatives in the Knesset have had a hard time disguising their celebratory mood. They believe their moment to make history has come. Indeed, the question is not only whether they will succeed, but what kind of threat potential failure could pose to their entire project.
National Religious Revanchism

On the morning of 7 October, as the horrors of the Hamas attacks were becoming clearer (1,200 Israelis killed, 252 hostages taken, and half-a-dozen kibbutzim destroyed), Israel’s Settlements and National Projects Minister Orit Strock spoke before the cabinet. “First of all, happy holiday”, the far-right settler reportedly said at the top of her remarks, referring to the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah. “A happy holiday this will not be”, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shot back, reflecting the gap between him and the fundamentalist partners key to holding his government together.

As the war dragged on, Strock would come to symbolize what can only be described as a defiant glee that has characterized the National Religious movement since the November 2022 elections brought them to the height of their power, and certainly since the beginning of the war. In May 2024, Strock openly opposed the “terrible” ceasefire agreement, the approval of which would be tantamount to a betrayal of IDF soldiers and Israel’s war aims. In response to American efforts to negotiate a ceasefire, Strock said that the US “does not deserve to be called a friend of the State of Israel”. In early July, she told a group of settlers that Israel had entered a “miraculous” era — the miracle in question being settlement expansion.

She is by no means alone, and the settler movement is certainly not the only segment of Israeli society agitating for more carnage. The entire right wing, from Netanyahu’s allies in the media to right-wing Haredi journalists, is veritably euphoric, joyfully calling for the expulsion of Palestinians and the annihilation of Gaza as we know it.

That euphoria extends deep into mainstream Israeli society, which was shocked by the sheer brutality of Hamas’s attack, enraged by the government and army’s inability to prevent it, and now feels abandoned and betrayed by the world during the Jewish state’s most difficult hours. In this atmosphere, genocidal rap songs have topped the pop charts, large-scale civilian initiatives have been deployed to justify Israel’s ruthlessness, artists who were once associated with multiculturalism have embraced far-right talking points, calls to end the war are often seen as tantamount to treason, and anti-government protests have not reached anywhere near the numbers seen during the movement against the right-wing judicial coup last year.

Were it not for the fracturing of the Israeli public over Netanyahu’s political motivations for quashing any ceasefire deal and the army’s outwardly stated failure to neither defeat Hamas nor rescue the vast majority of hostages through military operations, it is not hard to imagine that the centre and much of the centre-left would still support Netanyahu’s deliberately vague goal of “total victory”. Yet since 7 October, Religious Zionists (the ideology of the vast majority of West Bank settlers) have been the most assiduous supporters of the war and its potential for remaking the country, both demographically and geographically.



Israeli security forces guard as Jews tour the West Bank city of Hebron, 29 June 2024.Photo: Flash90/Wisam Hashlamoun


Religious Rabbis have publicly and unashamedly celebrated the war and the possibilities it opens up for remaking the political order. Settler media outlets such as the radical TV channel Arutz 7 and the more dignified weekly Makor Rishon, widely regarded as the mouthpiece of the settler elite, have been almost unanimous in their celebratory demands for the permanent re-occupation and re-settlement of Gaza. Religious soldiers fighting in the strip — particularly “Hardalim”, far-right nationalists whose political beliefs are imbued with religious zealotry — have used the current war to remake the army in their image and influence soldiers with extremist rhetoric.

Moshe Feiglin, a far-right settler and former member of Knesset for the ruling Likud party, invoked Adolf Hitler while describing what should be done to Palestinians in Gaza. Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s finance minister and one of the most powerful figures in the current government, has publicly demanded permanent military control of Gaza, rejected any accountability for the events of 7 October, and told hostage families that any deal with Hamas to bring back their loved ones would be akin to “collective suicide”.

In Gaza, meanwhile, dozens of soldiers in the Gaza Strip, including officers, have been documented waving orange flags associated with the movement to resettle Gush Katif, displaying posters announcing the renewal of settlements, or calling for the re-establishment of Jewish communities there.


Never have they had this kind of influence over Israeli politics, and Netanyahu is afraid of them bringing down the government, which gives them enormous influence and power to keep the war going.

It is no surprise, then, that the attempt to build a settlement outpost in northern Gaza came only one month after 15 members of the governing coalition, including Smotrich, participated in the “Conference for Israel’s Victory” in Jerusalem, where they demanded the Israeli government promote the re-establishment of settlements in the Gaza Strip. At a time when Israeli soldier casualties were piling up in Gaza, settler leaders were filmed ecstatically dancing. On the wall of the conference hall, a giant map of Gaza could be seen dotted with the locations of potential new settlements to be built on the ruins of cities, villages, and refugee camps. What would happen to the 2 million Palestinians living in the strip was not discussed. A similar conference promoting the settlement of southern Lebanon took place in mid-June.

Within months, the so-called Lobby for the Settlement of the Gaza Strip held its first meeting in the Knesset, where Likud MK Tzvika Fogel called on Israel to “turn Shifa Hospital into a 7 October museum” and Religious Zionist Party member Zvi Sukkot, chairman of the Knesset Subcommittee for Judea and Samaria [West Bank], pledged that one day “our children will play in the streets of Gaza”.

On the ground, settlers and other right-wingers have channelled their power into blocking humanitarian aid trucks and at times destroying cargo to prevent their passage into the Gaza Strip, where the UN says there is an ongoing “full-blown famine”. In some of these cases, police officers simply looked on, doing nothing to stop them.

For Meron Rapoport, a veteran Israeli journalist and editor at Local Call, the settler right’s ecstasy should be taken with a grain of salt. Despite the warmongering and ongoing radicalization, the Israeli public is not interested in sending its children to protect messianic settlers in Gaza. “On the one hand, the influence of the settlers is at its height”, says Rapoport. “Never have they had this kind of influence over Israeli politics, and Netanyahu is afraid of them bringing down the government, which gives them enormous influence and power to keep the war going.” On the other hand, he says, the mainstream Israeli public remains “completely unwelcoming” to the settlers’ messianic vision, particularly after nine months of mass protests against the far right’s attempts to ram through a judicial coup that would neuter the power of Israel’s legal institutions and make it exceedingly difficult to dislodge the Right from power.

According to Rapoport, the settlers know that Israel will not expel the Palestinians from Gaza wholesale, but rather are content with levelling the area and rendering it unliveable, which he says will catalyse a Palestinian exodus. “They believe Israel will create such horrible conditions in Gaza in order to keep the chaos going. Knowing how things work in the West Bank, the settlers believe that the moment the army controls all of Gaza, they will be able to establish communities. If there is no ceasefire deal, and we’re going toward a long war of attrition in Gaza, there is a high likelihood of that happening.”

Nevertheless, he believes the settlers are facing a pivotal moment.


The Right understands that after the war, whenever that will be, the main issue will be the Palestinians after years that they were ignored by the entire world. The settlers fear that a potential future government led by Benny Gantz [Netanyahu’s chief political rival] will accept the premise of a two-state solution, flushing 50 years of work down the drain. They were a step away from realizing God’s plan of emptying the land of its non-Jewish inhabitants and returning it to its “original owners”, and all of a sudden the country is heading toward a conversation on two states? This is the greatest threat to their political project and they won’t have it.
A Long Time Coming

To understand the settler movement in 2024, one must go back not only to its roots, but to the traumas that continue to haunt it today. Up until 1967, the National Religious or Religious Zionist movement was small and relatively powerless, adjoining the ruling Labour Zionist Mapai party that dominated Israel’s political, economic, and cultural order in the early years of the state. But Israel’s breakneck victory during the 1967 War and subsequent occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula — tripling the size of the state — injected a sense of euphoria into the national consciousness. This was particularly true of the National Religious community, which viewed the West Bank, which it calls “Judea and Samaria”, as the cradle of Jewish civilization and the historical heartland of the Jewish people.

The newly occupied territories and their residents were placed under military rule. While East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were illegally annexed, Israel maintained what would come to resemble a military dictatorship over the West Bank and Gaza. Debates over the fate of the territories kicked off almost immediately after the occupation began, along with government plans to thin out the population and put down any attempted rebellion by the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who had suddenly come under an Israeli administration that denied them basic human and civil rights.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol hesitated to endorse widespread settlement in the Occupied Territories, fearing international backlash for violating the Fourth Geneva Convention would complicate prospects for peace negotiations. Yet, as the settler population grew and established a significant presence in key areas, subsequent governments adopted more accommodating policies, providing incentives and support for settlement expansion.

While most of the first settlements in the Occupied Territories were built by secular Jews who identified with the Israeli Left, it was not long before the National Religious community began to organize itself for colonization. One of the earliest and most influential settler organizations was Gush Emunim, founded in 1974, which advocated for the establishment of Jewish communities in the heart of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Gush Emunim attracted support from Religious Zionists who saw settlement as a fulfilment of biblical prophecy and a means to strengthen Israel’s hold on the new territories.

The settler movement expanded rapidly across the Occupied Territories throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially after the Likud party was elected in 1977, often with government approval and financial assistance. The new settlements ranged from small outposts to large urban developments, transforming the demographic and geographic landscape of the West Bank and Gaza. By the end of the 1980s, 200,000 Israeli Jews lived in dozens of settlements and outposts across the Occupied Territories.


The 2005 disengagement represented a watershed moment — and betrayal — for the movement, one that it has been hell-bent on rectifying ever since.

The Oslo Accords signed between 1993 and 1995 posed a significant challenge to the settler movement, as Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed, at least on paper, to Palestinian self-rule and Israeli withdrawal from large portions of the Occupied Territories. While some settlers and far-right nationalists opposed the peace process and engaged in acts of violence, including the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, others reluctantly accepted the prospect of evacuation from certain areas in exchange for the promise of enhanced security and normalized relations. Nevertheless, the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada soon fuelled a resurgence of settler activism and expansionism.

The 2005 disengagement, when Israel unilaterally withdrew its military and evacuated 9,000 Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip, represented a watershed moment — and betrayal — for the movement, one that it has been hell-bent on rectifying ever since. “The disengagement was a slap in the face. It was the first major crisis facing the settlement movement, particularly because it came from the Right rather than the Left”, says Aviad Houminer-Rosenblum, deputy director-general of the Berl Katznelson Center and a member of the Faithful Left movement. “After they were evacuated, the settlers began to turn inward and speak directly to the Israeli public — to ingratiate themselves with the mainstream.”

The new, mainstreamed settler movement, Houminer-Rosenblum recounts, sought to undo its image as an elitist, Ashkenazi-dominated, pampered segment of the population, and instead sought to form common cause with the Likud heartland, much of which is comprised of working- and middle-class Mizrahim [Israeli Jews who hail from Arab or Muslim countries, as opposed to Ashkenazim, or Eastern European Jews, who have historically comprised the Israeli upper classes]. “This allowed the settler movement to speak to ordinary secular people without having to use the language of messianism, redemption, or religious nationalism.”

Within just a few years, fundamentalist religious communities called “Torah nuclei” began sprouting up in Israeli cities and towns with relatively low religious populations, or in places where Jews and Palestinians live side-by-side, such as so-called “mixed cities”. The first victim of the intercommunal violence in May 2021 was a Palestinian resident of the city of Lod, allegedly shot dead by a member of the city’s Torah nucleus.

The killing — along with attempted expulsions of Palestinians from Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood, attacks against worshippers at Al-Aqsa Mosque, and Hamas rocket fire from Gaza — sparked days of deadly riots and lynchings between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. Images of settlers being bused in from the West Bank to Lod, where they attacked Palestinian residents, were proof enough that Religious Zionism’s post-disengagement mission of “settling in the hearts” of the Israeli mainstream went hand-in-hand with a kind of violence Palestinians have been familiar with since the early days of the Zionist project.

Children playing in the Bedouin village of Ras Al-Auja north of Jericho in the West Bank, where residents were attacked by Jewish settlers and a number of sheep were stolen, 23 June 2024.Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Press Wire


“The disengagement was the big wound, and today the war and the desire to resettle Gaza is the attempt to close that circle”, Houminer-Rosenblum says.

I would be surprised if there isn’t 90-percent support among the settler movement for resettling Gaza. While the Israeli centre-left feels that its dream has been destroyed, the settlement movement feels the opposite. It is saying, “We were right all along, and now we have the opportunity to rectify the situation.” If you look at [settler] media outlets, there is wall-to-wall support for it.

By 2023, close to 520,000 settlers reportedly lived in the West Bank alone, with another 200,000 in Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, the city Palestinians claim as their future capital. Regardless of whether they will succeed or not, the settlers’ ambitions go much further than simply re-establishing Gush Katif: they want to import West Bank-style annexation, where settler-army collusion has all but become official state policy, colonization of Palestinian land is at an all-time high, and Palestinians are left almost completely defenceless.
Escalation on All Fronts

On 23 June, the New York Times published a disturbing report that hardly made a dent in the Israeli press. According to the piece, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also serves as a minister in the Defence Ministry with broad powers over the West Bank, was recorded at a recent meeting of settler leaders and supporters stating that the government was engaged in a secret effort to transfer more authority from the military — which has officially run the West Bank since 1967 — to the Civil Administration, the body that effectively runs the day-to-day of the occupation. In effect, this constitutes another step toward annexation and cementing formal control of the territory.

Smotrich, who has called for settling 1 million new Jews in the West Bank, is the most powerful proponent of annexation and mass expulsion of Palestinians in a far-right government that views 7 October as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to bury any possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state. Yet if Smotrich sought to explode that possibility through politics, settlers on the ground in the West Bank have been just as effective.

Since 7 October, the West Bank has seen a surge of settler violence against Palestinians, particularly in Area C, which is under full military control. Palestinian officials say Israeli troops and settlers have killed at least 550 Palestinians in the West Bank since the war in Gaza began. According to Yesh Din, an Israeli human rights group that tracks violence against Palestinians, settlers have expelled at least 15 Palestinian communities totalling 800 Palestinian families from their villages.

Shahd Fahoum, a data coordinator at Yesh Din, says that in the past, soldiers assigned to protect the Palestinians would stand idly by during settler attacks. But over the last years, she says, they either actively take part in joint militias, or, particularly after 7 October, are deployed as reservists in so-called “regional defence battalions”, part of an emergency call-up that allows settlers to guard their own settlements in a time of war. Under the cover of war, members of these battalions are reportedly engaging in violence, threats, and destruction of property.

Fahoum explains how the settlers’ complete militarization and the creation of joint militias has facilitated unbridled violence against Palestinians.


Today, the soldiers enter villages and towns, and start attacking Palestinians with stones and rocks. Sometimes they set fires to cars. A lot of the time, if people in the villages come to help, the soldiers will open fire at Palestinians. Sometimes the soldiers and settlers come together. Sometimes the settlers come alone and then the soldiers attack the Palestinians who come to defend their village. The Israeli media will inevitably label this as “clashes between Palestinians and security forces”, which completely erases the reality on the ground.

Law enforcement against settler violence is almost non-existent.


You see it in the numbers. In 2023, only 6.6 percent of settlers who had cases opened against them were indicted, down from around 8 percent in the past few years. When it comes to conviction, it’s even lower. When you look at the sentences of the convicted settlers, you will rarely find an acceptable sentence in proportion to the attack. Usually its community service, or time served — a slap on the wrist.

For Fahoum, the lack of law enforcement is a deliberate feature of Israeli rule over Palestinians. “We talk a lot about settler violence as if it is the problem, but it is a symptom of the problem — the real issue is the occupation and settler colonialism. The state itself sees its settlers as a good thing for its expansionist ambitions, so it makes sense that there is less law enforcement against them.”

Like Fahoum, Hagar Shezaf, West Bank correspondent for Haaretz, sees the current surge of settler violence as the culmination of a years-long process, set in motion before this government even came into power. “When I started reporting from the West Bank in 2019, the general feeling was that few people cared about what was happening in the Occupied Territories”, Shezaf says. “We were seeing the steady growth of outposts, but there was a sense that the entire enterprise was totally normalized.”

But by mid-2021, when Netanyahu was replaced by the so-called “government of change” led by Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, and Benny Gantz, things had begun to shift. First, she says, came the building of Evyatar, a wildcat settlement outpost erected near the Palestinian village of Beita, which launched a protracted struggle that led to the killing of ten residents at the hands of Israeli soldiers. The settlers of Evyatar ultimately agreed to abandon the outpost, but left their structures intact. Even today, a group of soldiers continues to guard the empty buildings, laying the groundwork for the settlers’ return.


The last 25 years have seen the steep decline of any real political challenge to the settlers’ supremacy in Israeli politics.

Shezaf also notes that Gantz, who served as defence minister at the time, effectively allowed settlers to permanently return to Homesh — one of four West Bank settlements evacuated during the 2005 disengagement, and which settlers have been trying to re-establish ever since — following the killing of a settler by Palestinian gunmen in the area in December 2021. By May 2021, Shezaf notes, settlers had taken over senior command positions in the West Bank, and began outwardly proselytizing in ways that were simply not accepted previously.

In the decades after the occupation began in 1967, Israel and the settler movement were able to establish a veritable empire that has all but erased the Green Line, swallowed up Palestinian lands, and built a matrix of control through expanding settler-only roads that connect West Bank colonies to what is sometimes known as “Israel proper”. Today, despite international campaigns to boycott the settlements, there is hardly a distinction between the Israeli economy and its settler counterpart.

By the time the current government was elected in November 2022, the path was paved for what anti-occupation group Peace Now called “probably the best year” for the settlement enterprise. Coalition negotiations birthed the most nationalistic, pro-settlement agreements in Israeli history, even going so far as to state that the Jewish people had a “natural right” to the Land of Israel and making promises to expand settlement building and retroactively legalize settlement outposts that were deemed illegal even according to Israeli law. Within months, Smotrich was effectively in charge of the settlements, a record number of housing units were promoted in the West Bank, 15 illegal outposts were advanced, and the government allocated 3 billion Israeli shekels (roughly 740 million euro) for roads in settlements — constituting around 20 percent of the total budget for such investments.
Cracks in the Facade

The last 25 years have seen the steep decline of any real political challenge to the settlers’ supremacy in Israeli politics. The Zionist Left, once the dominant force in Israeli society, collapsed with the breakdown of the Oslo peace process and the spike in Palestinian armed struggle during the Second Intifada in the 2000s. Israel’s entire political spectrum would soon shift to the right.

The Israelis who remained staunch believers in a two-state settlement may still have constituted a numerical majority, but they shifted towards a political centre that prioritized issues such as cost of living, secular-Haredi relations, civil liberties, and combating political corruption. Netanyahu would return to power in 2009 with the help of the Zionist Left and the centre under the pretext of “managing” — rather than solving — the conflict. The occupation, which had been the lynchpin of Israeli politics since 1967, would only return to centre stage following last year’s attacks.

Palestinians and left-wing Israelis do not count on the Israeli public to put an end to Israeli impunity over the settlements. But can the international community still play a role? Since early February, the US, followed by the UK, EU, Canada, and France, have slapped sanctions including asset freezes and travel bans on a number of prominent settlers and settler groups suspected of committing human rights violations.

An Israeli soldier watches over a rising smoke in nearby Duma town near Nablus after it was stormed by Israeli settlers in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, 13 April 2024.Photo: IMAGO / Middle East Images


Michael Schaeffer Omer-Man, director of research for Israel-Palestine at DAWN, says the move comes after years of pressure on the US to take action against settlers, which he calls a consensus issue in the Biden administration. “For a long time, the political will just wasn’t there”, he says, “but that all changed with the new government, which saw National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir ordering the police to not investigate settler violence, Smotrich taking over the Civil Administration, and the near-denial by the Israeli government that there was anything unusual happening on the ground in the West Bank.”

Then came 7 October and the brutal settler attacks that followed. “The White House understood that something had to be done to stop that violence in the West Bank, and this was used as an opportunity”, Schaeffer Omer-Man continues. “So what do they do? They look into their toolbox at a moment when they need to desperately show, somehow, that there are still limits to what Israel can be allowed to do, as well as to what America will support.”

Sanctions, he believes, have opened the floodgates, prompting other countries to follow suit. “The sanctions of settlers could create a backstop that has a lasting effect, especially considering the irreversible political shift happening right now vis-à-vis Israel. It doesn’t matter how many Republicans come into Congress pledging their support for Israel — lines have been crossed, and it’s going to be hard to go back to a place where people aren’t willing to cross them.”


Even if the US tried to force Israel into negotiations over the establishment of a Palestinian state, the facts on the ground are too dangerous to be ignored.

Yet for Lara Friedman, president of the Forum for Middle East Peace, the move is little more than a “valve” for an administration that is facing widespread criticism for its unbridled support for Israel’s war on Gaza. “They want to make it seem like the White House cares about Palestinian lives and international law — but within a certain limit”, Friedman says. “This way, the Biden administration can try to take the pressure off and show they are doing something in the West Bank, while continuing to give cover to Israel’s war.”

That said, Friedman believes that any attempt to draw a bright red line between the settlers and the Israeli army is a futile one.


Anyone who understands how the settlement enterprise works in the West Bank knows that it is co-led, if not actively led, by the Israeli government. Settler violence is state violence, and the fact is that at this point the Americans aren’t even bothering to respond to Israel’s erasure of the Green Line. Going after a few bad apples is good, but if you want to say that this is going to keep the Titanic from sinking, you’d better think again.

Schaeffer Omer-Man is less pessimistic about the potential prospects, saying that the way the sanctions have been written allows for them to encompass local officials, government ministers, military officials, settler organizations — even entire settlements. “They are starting with bad apples, but everyone understands that sanctions programmes tend to ensnare adjacent and connected entities”, he says. “Because the settlement project is a state project, the higher you go up, the closer you get to state institutions. After that, it becomes harder to segregate different parts of the settler economy from that of the Israeli economy.”

“This sanctions programme is not going to end the occupation or the settlements”, Schaeffer Omer-Man adds, “but it is shifting the goalposts in a way that makes a path seem more possible than it did last year. The fact that Israel’s credibility is being challenged is an opening, it doesn’t mean that it will necessarily lead to something, but it’s a crack that didn’t exist before.”

For all its precedent-setting bluster, it is unlikely that sanctions against settlers will be enough to bring about a fundamental shift in the near future, particularly when set against the Biden Administration’s inchoate policies in Gaza, let alone if Donald Trump returns to the White House. Even if the US tried to force Israel into negotiations over the establishment of a Palestinian state — whether by sheer force, by miracle, or by dangling ample incentives à la Saudi normalization — the facts on the ground are too dangerous to be ignored.

The settlement movement today is a sprawling, extraterritorial empire, a golem diligently handcrafted over decades by the most powerful actors in Israeli society. Ultimately, it is a project with too much to lose and everything to win, and any real attempt to undo its power could very well unleash violence between the river and the sea the likes of which the world has never seen.