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Monday, June 01, 2026

DRONES

Catching the unknown: The drone designed to hunt other drones

A captured drone, 28/05/2026
Copyright Johanna Urbancik/ Euronews

By Johanna Urbancik
Published on


After repeated drone sightings at airports and critical infrastructure sites, a German company believes it has found a way to identify who is behind them.

A suspected drone sighting brought disruption to Munich airport on Saturday morning, with around 26 flights reportedly diverted and further delays affecting departures. It's the latest in a growing number of drone incidents at German airports.

Figures from Germany's air navigation service, Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS), show that 37 drone sightings were recorded in the first three months of this year alone. Yet one question often goes unanswered: who was flying them?

In most cases, investigators are unable to determine whether a drone was being operated by a hobbyist, an irresponsible pilot or someone with more hostile intentions.

Without recovering the aircraft or identifying its operator, establishing where it came from is often impossible.

The answer? A drone 'hunter'

One German company believes it has found a way to solve the problem. Working alongside US radar manufacturer Echodyne, Argus Interception has developed a system designed to hunt down rogue drones and catch them in mid-air.

Rather than shooting a target down, the company's A1-Falke interceptor fires a net intended to bring the aircraft safely to the ground. The idea is not only to avoid debris falling onto people or property below, but also to recover the drone intact so it can later be examined by investigators.

The drone capture, 28/05/2026 Johanna Urbancik/ Euronews

To improve the chances of a successful interception, the drone carries two net payloads, allowing operators a second attempt if the first misses.

At an exclusive demonstration attended by Euronews and a small group of journalists near Hamburg, the companies put the system to the test. A target drone was launched across a training ground before the A1-Falke was sent in pursuit. Moments later came a loud bang. Seconds after that, the target was caught in the interceptor's net.

Sven Steingräber, co-founder of Argus Interception, says the system was designed for situations where shooting a drone down is not an option, such as near airports, critical infrastructure or in densely populated urban areas.

"We set out to address a capability gap," he said. The aim, he argues, is to respond to drone incursions proportionately while avoiding collateral damage. "Our net system allows us to capture the drone, transport it away and place it exactly where we want it," Steingräber added. "That way, we can avoid harm to bystanders as well as damage to property."

In built-up, urban areas, he argued, that distinction matters.

Steingräber and Frankenberg at the Argus Interception factory Johanna Urbancik/ Euronews


How does the system work?

In simple terms, Echodyne provides the eyes, while Argus provides the interceptor.

The two companies play different roles within the same system. While Echodyne's radars monitor the airspace and detect suspicious aircraft, Argus' A1-Falke is responsible for the interception itself.

"You saw a couple of different radar systems on the ground," Echodyne chief executive Eben Frankenberg told Euronews. The larger system, known as EchoShield, is responsible for "detecting an initial drone flying into the area" before "tracking it with very high fidelity and sending that data to the command and control centre."

A smaller radar, EchoGuard, performs the same role, but at shorter ranges. Once a target has been identified, its position is passed to the interceptor. The A1-Falke then takes over. Mounted on the drone itself is a radar called EchoFlight, which performs what Frankenberg describes as "air-to-air tracking."

Echodyne CEO Eben Frankenberg next to a radar system. Johanna Urbancik/ Euronews


"So once the interceptor drone is in the air, then it's going to go find the intruder drone and then start tracking it," he said. "And so the interceptor drone can then follow it," Frankenberg said.

The A1-Falke is then sent in pursuit. Designed to catch rather than destroy its target, the drone fires a net intended to entangle the aircraft and bring it safely to the ground.

To increase the chances of a successful interception, it carries two net payloads, allowing operators a second attempt if the first misses. The drone itself is piloted from the ground. While artificial intelligence assists with the operation, the final decisions remain in human hands.

A growing security concern

Steingräber argued that many people still underestimate the potential threat posed by drones flying over sensitive sites. "Modern wars often don't begin with the first shot being fired, but with the gathering of information," he told Euronews. Many people, he said, are unaware that intelligence collected by a drone today could have significant consequences at a later stage.

"Such drone flights over critical infrastructure can have major consequences," Steingräber said. "Operational procedures are filmed, supply routes are mapped and critical points are assessed for an adversary, allowing them to strike more effectively because they already have the information."

Reports of drones flying over critical infrastructure, airports and military sites in Germany have become more frequent since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Until recently, responsibility for dealing with such incidents rested largely with the police. The German army was generally limited to responding to drone activity over its own facilities.

Radar and drone, near Hamburg, 28/05/2026 Johanna Urbancik/ Euronews


That changed last year when Germany amended its Aviation Security Act. While primary responsibility still lies with the police, the armed forces can now provide support if requested by state authorities and if the available civilian resources are deemed insufficient.

Some in the industry argue that the current framework leaves operators of critical infrastructure with few tools to respond to suspicious drone activity. They are calling for facilities such as airports, energy sites and other sensitive locations to be given greater scope to use counter-drone systems themselves.

One example is the net-based interceptor demonstrated to Euronews near Hamburg, which is designed to capture a drone rather than destroy it. As it carries no live ammunition and is not classified as a weapon, operators could deploy the drone themselves, bring an intruding aircraft down and have it examined afterwards.


‘Much better defence’ required to avert Russian drones, former Romanian NATO official tells Euronews


Euronews

By Méabh Mc Mahon & Angela Skujins
Published on

Exclusive: Former NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană has warned that the military alliance needed stronger low-altitude military capabilities to shoot down drones, as seen with the incursion late last week in Romania that has left the country in "shock".

Former North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Deputy Secretary General, Mircea Geoană, said that much better defences were required by Europe to ward off drones – and the Romanian city of Galați still lives in a state of "shock" following an incursion by a Russian drone carrying explosives on Friday.

Late last week an unmanned aerial vehicle crashed into a residential building in the Romanian south-eastern port city near the border of Ukraine, sparking a fire and injuring two people.

The Romanian government blamed Moscow for the incident and declared the Russian consul in Constanța a persona non grata while closing the consulate.

In recent weeks, several drones have entered European airspace, causing concern across the Baltics. However, this is the first incident in which Romanians have been injured.

“The shock of the Russian incursion and explosion on a block of apartments in Galați is still here with us,” Geoană said in comments to Euronews’ Europe Today programme on Monday.

“Galați is a big city, an industrial city on the Danube. On the other side of the river, there is Ukraine, and Russia is constantly attacking infrastructure on the Ukrainian side,” he said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected blame for the drone crash, while the country's deputy chair of Russia's Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev inferred more drones would continue to stray into European skies. "The peaceful sleep is over," he said.

“Concern” within Bucharest had cumulated over more than four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine due to the country’s proximity to the battlefield, said Geoană, who served within NATO's upper echelons between 2019 and 2024. He also served as Romanian Foreign Minister from 2000 to 2004.

A Romanian fighter jet of NATO's Baltic Air Policing Mission successfully shot down a stray drone that entered Estonia’s airspace on 19 May. Asked why this did not occur in Romania on Friday, Geoană said the military did not “have enough time or space to shoot”.

Romania’s Ministry of Defence did scramble two F-16 fighter jets to respond to the aircraft, however Romania’s General Gheorghe Maxim said the forces had insufficient time – only four minutes – to shoot it down.

The incident has further underlined the need for NATO to better equip itself against the form of modern warfare that occurs in low-altitude, Geoană said.

“We have to do a much better effort to try to find the right kind of air and missile defence for NATO in general,” he explained.

“For mid-altitude and high altitude, let's say there are some things in place: Patriot missiles, F-16 things, F-35 NATO operations."

“For this basically low altitude things… you can acquire them, the only thing is that you have to put your right priorities in the right place.”


Russia fired record 8,150 drones at Ukraine

in May: AFP analysis

Kyiv (Ukraine) (AFP) – Russia fired a record number of long-range drones at Ukraine in May, an AFP analysis of Ukrainian air force data showed Monday, as Kyiv appealled to allies for air defence support.



Issued on: 01/06/2026 - RFI

A Russian drone flies above Kyiv during an attack on May 24 © Genya SAVILOV / AFP


Russia launched 8,150 long-range drones in May, according to a compilation of daily air force reports, up to 24 percent on the number fired in April.

Kyiv has developed a robust network of air defence systems across the country that is capable of downing most drones, but it still relies on Western allies to down Russian missiles.

The new record barrage comes after a three-day truce last month raised hopes for broader peace efforts but Kyiv and Moscow accused each other of violations and stepped up their long-range attacks.

Russia also fired 211 missiles in May, among the highest monthly figures, at a time when Kyiv called on the United States for urgent help with supplies of ammunition for its Patriot anti-missile systems.

Russia lauched one of its worst attacks on the capital in months in May, when a missile slammed into a residential building, as part of a barrage that killed two dozen people.

Moscow last month also deployed its nuclear-capable ballistic missile -- dubbed Oreshnik -- for only the third time of the invasion.

Kyiv intercepted about 91 percent of all incoming drones and missiles in May, according to air force data.
One Russian drone attack in May partially destroyed this Kyiv apartment block © Roman PILIPEY / AFP


That points to how Ukraine has pioneered systems to intercept long-range drones but remains heavily reliant on Western allies to counter missiles.

Ukrainian officials have repeatedly warned that stocks of anti-missile systems and ammunition are running low.

President Volodymyr Zelensky appealed directly to US President Donald Trump last month for help downing Russian missiles.

The deficits have been exacerbated by the war in the Middle East, which saw US allies expend huge quantities of air defence ammunition protecting sites in the Gulf.

Trump re-entered the White House last year vowing to quickly end the Ukraine war, but talks stalled as the Moscow and Kyiv remain at odds over Russia's territorial demands.

Diplomatic efforts further derailed after Washington's attention turned to the US-Israeli war on Iran that erupted on February 28.

© 2026 AFP

Ukraine: How a kamikaze drone partially operated by AI is attacking Russian convoys

Drones piloted by artificial intelligence are now being deployed on the Ukrainian front lines, and while there has been much talk about them, there is still much that remains unknown. The US-made Hornet Drone, which is partially guided by AI, is at the centre of a new Ukrainian strategy to target Russian logistics.



Issued on: 01/06/2026 
By:The FRANCE 24 Observers/Guillaume MAURICE

This video, shared online by the Azov Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine on April 16, 2026, shows a Russian truck being hit by a Ukrainian Hornet drone that’s piloted by AI. A red square marks the drone’s potential target. © X / azov_media

For the past few months, a drone has been prowling Russian logistics routes. The Hornet, which the Russians call the "Martian-2", is a mid-range kamikaze drone partially piloted by artificial intelligence.

The drone – which is built of polystyrene, has a 2-metre wingspan and a range of more than 100 km – costs $6,000 USD. It can hit a target at a speed of 200 km/h and can carry a 4.5kg payload. After the drone is launched using a catapult, it flies using an electric propeller motor, which means that it is nearly silent, according to Russian sources. It is piloted using two cameras.

The US-designed Hornet was developed by the American company Perennial Autonomy, which was founded and financed by former Google CEO, Eric Schmidt. This drone is frequently used in US Army training exercises. However, in July 2025, Perennial Autonomy – then called Swift Beat – made a deal to supply Ukraine with drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on May 5 that Ukraine had quadrupled its number of mid-range strikes, meaning those beyond 20 kilometres, between February and April 2026.

This shows a Hornet drone on its launcher. © US Army


Once the drone is in Russian-occupied territory, it can apparently pilot itself using artificial intelligence, a system that makes it less vulnerable to Russian signal jamming.


The drone is said to be able to automatically identify its targets before striking. It is, however, very difficult to know the precise role played by artificial intelligence in the decision taken to strike. Our team contacted Perennial Autonomy, who did not want to comment on the drone’s piloting system. The Ukrainian Army did not respond to our questions.

Elite Ukrainian units like the Azov and Khartia Brigades have been posting images of Hornet drones striking Russian supply convoys. On his Telegram channel, Russian military blogger Alexander Kharchenko admitted that Russian “logistics is seriously disrupted”. He said that the Hornet is allowing Ukrainians to strike at an unprecedented distance: “Until recently, the guys were easily carrying out patrols 50 kilometres from the frontlines. But now, this area is under fire by the Hornets.”
‘The drone approaches its target silently, we don’t have time to react’

In video after video, the same scene repeats over and over. The drone flies over the area, spots a Russian truck or another piece of equipment and marks its target with a red square. Then, it hurtles toward its target to detonate.


This video shows a Russian truck being targeted by a Hornet flown by the Azov brigade. © X / azov_media


On Telegram, another Russian military blogger described how Hornet drones work: “In most cases, the drone flies at a low altitude (around 200 m) all along our roads. It identifies its target and attacks. The drone approaches its target silently, most of the time, we don’t have time to react.”

This video, posted on April 16, 2026 by the Azov Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine shows eight successive strikes on Russian equipment. X / azov_media
A drone striking behind the lines

On May 8, the Azov Brigade deployed a Hornet drone in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol, which is occupied by the Russians. They flew over the edges of the city, which is more than 100 kilometres from any Ukrainian positions.



This video, published by the Azov Brigade on May 9, 2026, shows a Hornet drone flying over the occupied city of Mariupol, which is more than 100 km from Ukrainian positions. X / azov_media

This shows a Hornet drone deployed by the Azov Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine flying over the gates of the city of Mariupol, which is occupied by Russian troops. Location: 47°13'21.08"N 47°13'21.08"N © X / azov_media


It’s not the first time that a Hornet has flown so far: according to an analysis by the FRANCE 24 Observers, out of 13 videos of drone strikes posted online by different Ukrainian units, nine of them took place more than 80 kilometres from the front line.

George Barros, director of innovation at the Institute for the Study of War, says that the Hornet is partially guided using artificial intelligence:


"Once the Hornet enters Russian territory, its partial AI guidance allows it to independently select its target. Even without a connection to the pilot, the drone can recognise a Russian truck or armoured vehicle. This makes it resistant to jamming, since it no longer depends entirely on the signal used by the pilot to guide it.

The Hornet is also capable of flying autonomously during the final meters of the attack thanks to artificial intelligence. This is particularly useful because some Russian vehicles are equipped with jammers. However, the precise role of AI in the drone’s operation remains unclear.“

According to the researcher, this system enables the drone to strike far behind Russian lines, most notably in the Mariupol region:


“Mariupol is a major logistical hub, with numerous highways connecting southern Ukraine to the Donetsk region. Large numbers of troops and significant quantities of ammunition transit through this area.

Using small FPV-type kamikaze drones, the Ukrainians were already able to strike Russian positions located up to 30 kilometres from the front line. With missiles and long-range drones, they can hit Russian refineries hundreds — even thousands — of kilometres away.

But there is an operational gap between 30 km and 120 km that allows the Russians to deploy their logistics and prepare their assaults. It is within this space, referred to as the ‘intermediate depth,’ that the Ukrainians are trying to operate.”
When a Russian organisation is able to study the drone

Russian Telegram channel Ghost_Malleus_Maleficarum, which specialises in the technical analysis of Ukrainian drones, reported that the Hornet has a “success rate above 80%”. Meaning that volunteers from the Coordination Centre for Assistance to Novorossiya (KCPN), an organisation that trains Russian soldiers in operating drones, were thrilled to get their hands on a downed drone that they could study. Volunteers from this organisation wrote a 100-page report on the components of a Hornet drone.
In their report, KCPN analyses the components that make up Hornet drones in great detail. 
© kcpn.info


The document describes the drone’s ability to use artificial intelligence and mentions that they contain Qualcomm processors, a unit capable of processing data from several cameras present on the engine using artificial intelligence.

Russian military blogger UAVDEV reported that the signal enabling a pilot to remotely control the drone is hidden amongst civilian wifi traffic, which enables it to circumnavigate Russian electronic war systems that don’t jam non-military wifi.

These photos, taken by Russians, show the antennas in the drone’s wings. 
© kcpn.info


Russian military bloggers admit that the drone detectors currently used by the Russian army have blind spots that include the radio frequencies used by the Hornet. KCPN reported that the Ukrainians obtained and analysed Russian detectors, enabling them to adapt this new wave of Ukrainian drones. The report castigates the designers of the Russian jammers, who aren’t admitting their failures to stop Ukrainian drones.

But Barros says that electronic warfare alone is not sufficient to counter the threat of drones.

“Jammers cannot be 100% effective against drones. They can only operate on limited frequencies — it is impossible to jam every frequency at once. A jammer can only disrupt signals within a limited geographical area determined by its range, so choices have to be made. These systems also cannot operate continuously around the clock because they need to be recharged.

There is no miracle solution. The Russians will have to adapt the entirety of their logistics and supply train if they want to protect the rear."

This article has been translated from the original in French by Brenna Daldorph.



Thursday, May 28, 2026

 

U.S. Strikes Iranian Drone Launcher After Attack on Merchant Shipping

A six-pack Shahed-136 drone launcher (IRGC)
A six-pack Shahed-136 drone launcher (IRGC)

Published May 27, 2026 9:37 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

On Wednesday, U.S. forces conducted a limited strike on Iranian territory in response to Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz, the second such strike since the beginning of the week. The incident illustrates the continued high risk to shipping in the waterway, even as negotiations move forwards. 

Iranian forces launched four one-way attack drones at merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday, U.S. officials told the Wall Street Journal. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy fighter jets responded and shot down all four before they could reach their targets. Navy F/A-18 Hornet fighters proceeded to destroy the Iranian ground control unit for the drone launches - located near Bandar Abbas - before it could threaten shipping any further, the officials said. 

Officials emphasized that the drones were a threat to commercial traffic, and that the actions were "measured, purely defensive, and intended to maintain the ceasefire."

Talks mediated by Qatar and Oman continue to progress towards a longer ceasefire agreement, and are said to be nearing completion. On Wednesday, President Donald Trump ruled out one rumored component - a proposal to moderate Iran's current dominance of the Strait of Hormuz by transitioning to a joint Iranian-Omani control scheme. The strait's TSS passes wholly through Omani waters, and Oman has historically administered the traffic scheme (at no charge) on a day-to-day basis. 

Asked about this arrangement at an open cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Trump threatened to attack Oman, a peaceful state which has helped mediate between Iranian, GCC and Western interests for decades. "Oman will behave like everybody else or we’ll have to blow them up. They understand that," Trump said. 

Separately, the U.S. Treasury announced Wednesday that it would formally sanction the new Persian Gulf Strait Authority, the Iranian administrative body set up to handle transit arrangements and fee payments for the "Tehran Tollbooth" route through the Strait of Hormuz. The route is administered by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, itself blacklisted as a foreign terrorist organization.

Thursday, May 21, 2026

 

Ukraine tests balloon-launched drone system to extend strike range

Ukraine tests balloon-launched drone system to extend strike range
Ukraine is testing a new drone delivery system where it floats a drone high into the atmosphere and then drops it on a target, effectively doubling the rage of its attack drones. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook
By bne IntelliNews May 21, 2026



Ukraine has tested a balloon-assisted launch system designed to greatly extend the operational range of its intermediate range attack drones and improve its strike capabilities against Russian targets.

The potentially low-cost adaptation is the latest innovation in the rapidly developing arms race between Russia and Ukraine as the war goes into its fifth year and both sides are under increasing economic pressure.

Ukrainian troops reportedly launched the Ukrainian-American Hornet one-way attack drone from an aerostat balloon during a recent trial. According to military blogger reports circulating online, the balloon carried the drone approximately 42km before releasing it from an altitude of 8km.

The approach allowed the drone to preserve almost all of its onboard battery power before beginning its independent flight on the final leg to the target. Reports said the Hornet used only about 5% of its battery during the ascent phase attached to the aerostat. The balloon-drop effectively doubled the range of the drone which is usually limited to around 150km.

The concept is intended to combine the endurance advantages of lighter-than-air platforms with the manoeuvrability of small attack drones. By outsourcing the energy-intensive climb and part of the transit distance to a balloon, operators can reserve battery capacity for the strike phase of the mission.

Ukraine has increasingly relied on domestically developed unmanned systems during the war with Russia, particularly as drone warfare has become central to both reconnaissance and long-range attacks on military and energy infrastructure. Since last year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has been increasingly targeting Russian refineries and between 10-15% of Russia’s oil production capacity is reportedly offline, which will increase the pressure on the Russian budget.

Kyiv has accelerated efforts to produce cheaper and longer-range platforms capable of operating beyond front-line positions while reducing dependence on costly missile systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy recently said that Ukraine plans to produce 7mn drones this year and in April it fired more drones at Russia than Russia fired at Ukraine for the first time.

Aerostat-assisted launches are relatively uncommon in modern battlefield operations but offer potential advantages including lower fuel consumption, reduced launch infrastructure and greater operational flexibility. Military analysts caution, however, that large balloons may themselves become vulnerable to air defence systems and adverse weather conditions.

The Hornet programme reflects growing co-operation between Ukrainian and US-linked defence technology developers as Ukraine seeks unconventional methods to offset Russia’s larger industrial and missile production capacity.

Wednesday, May 06, 2026

Lufthansa Warns Strait of Hormuz Closure Will Add $2 Billion in Fuel Costs


Lufthansa Group expects the surge in jet fuel prices to cost it an additional $2 billion this year as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz “is leading to a shortage in kerosene supply and thus to a significant increase in kerosene prices,” Europe’s biggest airline said on Wednesday.

Lufthansa expects strong summer travel numbers, but it warned that “At the same time, the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz is leading to a shortage in kerosene supply and thus to a significant increase in kerosene prices.”

The war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have severely constrained Europe’s jet fuel supply, while jet fuel prices have spiked to over $200 per barrel.

The war in Iran has cut most of Europe’s imports of jet fuel, while local output has been falling for nearly two decades due to dozens of refineries closing permanently or being converted to biofuel production.

Despite the fact that the airline group has hedged about 80% of fuel costs for 2026, the spike in jet fuel prices “places a substantial burden on the cost base of Lufthansa Group airlines,” it said.

As of current estimates, the kerosene price surge would lead to additional costs of 1.7 billion euros, or $2 billion, in 2026, Lufthansa said.

“While no restrictions in kerosene supply are currently expected at any of the Lufthansa Group hubs, potentially reduced fuel availability later in the year represents an additional risk factor,” the airline said.

Till Streichert, chief financial officer of Deutsche Lufthansa AG, warned “Our annual profit will likely be lower than originally anticipated.”

Lufthansa last month said it would remove a total of 20,000 short-haul flights from its European summer schedule. A week earlier, Lufthansa had said it was accelerating plans to reduce its flight program and retire some aircraft earlier “In view of significantly increased kerosene prices, which have more than doubled compared to the period before the Iran war, as well as rising additional burdens from labor disputes.”

By Michael Kern for Oilprice.com


Tankers Stranded Once Again As Trump Calls Off 'Project Freedom'

Cargo vessels and tanker owners, who hoped for a U.S. escort out of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this week, are back scrambling to find feasible solutions to passing the critical trade chokepoint after U.S. President Donald Trump called off the 'Project Freedom' effort to help guide vessels out of the Strait, just three days after announcing it.

Over the weekend, President Trump announced 'Project Freedom' to help guide vessels out of the Strait of Hormuz, and some ships did pass the chokepoint under U.S. protection early this week.

One of two such vessels was a ship operated by a subsidiary of Denmark-based shipping giant AP Moller-Maersk, the company confirmed this week. The ship, Alliance Fairfax, had been stranded west of the Strait of Hormuz since the war began on February 28, Maersk said.

But the short-lived relief that stranded ships could soon find their way out of the Strait was cut short only three days into the project Freedom endeavor. President Trump late on Tuesday called off the effort, saying in a social media post that "while the Blockade will remain in full force and effect, Project Freedom (The Movement of Ships through the Strait of Hormuz) will be paused for a short period of time to see whether or not the Agreement can be finalized and signed."

The Strait of Hormuz was mostly clear of traffic after the pause of the Project Freedom plan, according to vessel-tracking data monitored by Bloomberg.

Since Project Freedom was announced and later abandoned, Iran has signaled it is expanding the area around the Strait of Hormuz it now controls.

Early on Wednesday, reports emerged that the U.S. believed it was nearing a framework agreement to end the war with Iran—a deal that would eventually reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices plunged by 12% early in the morning EDT before paring their losses.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com 


Iran Launches "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" to Administer Hormuz Tolls

The PGSA will provide an administrative interface with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, which oversees transits (Fars)
The PGSA will provide an administrative interface with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, which oversees transits (Fars)

Published May 5, 2026 6:48 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

After Iran announced its plan to charge for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz in March, a plethora of scam operators popped up to offer fraudulent paperwork in exchange for payment in cryptocurrency. That problem may now have a solution, though not the one that the shipping community would prefer: Iran has launched an official "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" with its own formal email address, providing owners with a verifiable single window for arranging transit with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. 

According to Islamic of Iran Public Broadcasting, vessels wanting to transit the Strait of Hormuz will receive an email from the official address "info@PGSA.ir," which will include information about Iran's transit regulations. Once the shipowner "aligns their procedures with this framework," they can obtain authorization for passage. 

The creation of a new government authority to interface with the IRGC does not resolve the questionable legality of Iran's tolls on an internationally-designated strait. But there is a more pressing compliance concern: the U.S. has threatened to sanction any entity that pays Iran for transit. Shipowners may think twice about openly communicating arrangements with the new authority's email account, given the surveillance capabilities of U.S. signals intelligence services.

Meanwhile, on the south side of the strait, the U.S. continues to promote a new safety "umbrella" for ships transiting outbound through Omani waters. The newly-formed "Project Freedom" is a competing vision for marine traffic: guided by the U.S., conducted without charge. Iran opposes the mission and has used force in an attempt to block it, including attacks on merchant ships and on U.S. Navy destroyers. 

Those actions continued Tuesday: an unspecified cargo vessel was struck by a projectile in the strait, according to UKMTO. Martin Kelly of EOS Risk Group has identified the target as a CMA vessel, and CBS reports that it was the Maltese-flagged boxship CMA CGM San Antonio.

Several of the ship's crewmembers were injured in a cruise missile strike, two officials clarified to CBS.  

Like other ships operating in the strait in the last few days, CMA CGM San Antonio has gone dark for security purposes, and her AIS transmission has not been received since Tuesday. Her last known position was off Dubai.  

The IRGC's Positions on Larak Overlook the "Tehran Tollbooth" Route

Larak, center, sits just east of Qeshm at the apex of the strait (NASA Worldview)
Larak, center, sits just east of Qeshm at the northernmost point of the strait (NASA Worldview)

Published May 5, 2026 3:14 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Larak Island, to the south of and covering the approaches to Iran’s largest port at Bandar Abbas, has achieved some notoriety in recent weeks as the island which Iran’s IRGC says merchant traffic must circumnavigate to transit the Strait of Hormuz on Iranian terms.

Larak is largely barren, a plug of sandstone 134 meters at its highest. The only settlement is the village of Larak on the northern side of the island, which is graced by the remains of a Portuguese castle. Locals get by with subsistence fishing, goat herding and smuggling, and hence the IRGC presence on the island is probably a substantial source of income. A feature of the landscape are recharge dams, designed to trap flood water and replenish local water supply when it rains occasionally.

There is little on the island by way of conventional military footprint, but IRGC facilities will merge with and be largely indistinguishable from the civilian infrastructure. The coast guard maintains a separate establishment to the IRGC Navy, but both communicate with passing sea traffic on the common Channel 16.

IRGC locations on the island of Larak (Google Earth/Copernicus/CJRC)

Lighthouses: Whether manned by coast guard or IRGC Navy staff, or both, Larak North Lighthouse and Larak Lighthouse on the high point of the island both provide visual observation of sea movements to north and south to fill out the maritime intelligence picture. Larak Lighthouse on the peak appears to have a coastal radar, two communications towers and in normal times flashes a white light every 12 seconds.

IRGC HQ & Communications Site: This is an active site, with until recently two tall communications towers, and a commercial ship’s radar on a 25-meter mast. The site has the only helipad identified on the island, suggestive of the headquarters function. The site also has garaging, which would be suitable for parking up anti-ship missiles and drones on mobile launchers.

Prepared Firing Points (FP1-3): Three prepared locations, each comprising three or more earthwork firing platforms, dominate the strait to the south. All three locations are connected to the island’s road network, so that mobile launchers can quickly reach these positions from hidden or protected storage locations elsewhere on the island. These storage locations cannot easily be identified, and may include caves and underground tunnels, but the IRGC also has protocols for keeping mobile drone and missile launchers in civilian buildings and warehouses. There is a substantial warehouse just south of the village of Larak, for which there is no obvious or declared purpose, which could be such a storage facility.

IRGC Navy Facilities: The IRGC Navy uses the only harbor on the island with a breakwater at Larak village. Before the current war, two 17-meter Peykaap II-class missile boats were frequently seen berthed on the main jetty in the harbor. The Peykaap II are each equipped with a pair of single Kowsar or Nasr anti-ship missile launchers, with the missiles using internal guidance and active terminal homing out to a range of 20 nm. At a second jetty close by, also seen on recent overhead visits, was an average of six fast speed boats, of the Taregh Class or smaller. These two jetties appear, from the low resolution imagery still available since February 28, to be the only two sites which may have been attacked.

Given the covert character of the IRGC presence on Larak Island, some capability is likely to have survived since February 28. Mobile drone and missile launchers can be hidden with relative ease, and replacements may have been brought onto the island during the ceasefire to replace any stock which has been destroyed, such that some offensive drone and missile capability may still be in place. In any case, the most important role for the island in the IRGC scheme of battle is to act as an observation post, from which to maintain surveillance of the Strait and from which to cue strike assets held elsewhere.

Larak Island sits at the northern tip of the IRGC’s recently-declared prohibition zone. Red boundaries show the approximate border of the prohibition zone, and the Iranian shipping channel is show in purple. The border of Omani territorial waters is marked in yellow. The Disputed Islands in the western approaches to the Strait are occupied by Iran (Google Earth/Copernicus/CJRC)

Fujairah in Focus as Oil Flows Reroute Around Hormuz Crisis

  • Fujairah has become a critical export and bunkering hub as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, offering one of the few routes for UAE crude and fuels to reach global markets.

  • Its importance has surged due to infrastructure like the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, which allows significant volumes to bypass Hormuz—though it cannot fully replace lost regional exports.

  • Rising strategic value has made Fujairah a target, with recent attacks and escalating tensions highlighting its central role in global oil supply and shipping routes.

As the Strait of Hormuz has now been closed for nearly nine weeks, the oil hub at Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become an even more prominent oil export and bunkering hub than it has ever been.

Thanks to its strategic position on the east coast of the UAE and outside the Strait of Hormuz, Fujairah is now the key export port for crude and fuels from the UAE and an even more important bunkering port for ship refueling.

The strategic position of Fujairah outside the blocked Strait of Hormuz made it a target of Iranian attacks as early as the second week of the now nine-week-long war. In March, attacks at Fujairah suspended oil loading and bunkering operations several times, before the early-April ceasefire temporarily halted attacks from Iran.  

However, the oil port was hit earlier this week after the United States announced Project Freedom to escort ships out of the Strait of Hormuz – currently paused after just three days by President Trump.  

The new attack at the Fujairah Petroleum Industries Zone caused a fire and sent oil prices surging on Monday, as the oil hub outside the Strait of Hormuz is strategic to the UAE’s oil exports and to global shipping.

Fujairah is the UAE’s only access to the Indian Ocean and is one of the few key oil export points that do not depend on tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz

Fujairah is not only a key export route bypassing the critical oil chokepoint, but it is also a major hub for crude and fuels in storage and a key bunkering port for refueling ships. The port is the most important bunkering hub in the Middle East and one of the world’s most critical and largest ship-refueling sites alongside Singapore and Rotterdam, as well as China’s Zhoushan.

The port of Fujairah is the end point of a pipeline carrying crude from the giant oilfields in Abu Dhabi.

The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) runs from onshore oil facilities at Habshan to Fujairah. The original nameplate capacity of the line is 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd) with a reported current capacity close to 1.8 million bpd, according to the International Energy Agency. The UAE has typically exported around 1.1 million bpd of domestic crude via this route, leaving room for up to 700,000 bpd of additional volumes in the case of a Strait closure. 

Fujairah is in no way in a position to replace, even partially, the Middle East’s export volumes lost to the closed Strait of Hormuz. But it is critical for supplies to Asia, especially India, in this period of heightened tensions.

Moreover, Fujairah is home to the FRL refinery partly owned by the world’s biggest independent oil trader, Vitol. The refinery offers about 100,000 bpd of refining capacity, adjacent to the storage terminal of VTTI, jointly owned by Vitol, FM Global Infrastructure Fund, and the Abu Dhabi national energy company.

So, Fujairah is one of the few key oil and fuel export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz and is a very important bunkering hub in the Middle East for ships traveling to Asia and Africa.

As the Middle East crisis doesn’t appear anywhere close to resolution, the Fujairah hub is taking the spotlight not only because it offers an oil export valve for supply that doesn’t need to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

As of Monday, according to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the new map of expanded Iranian control over the Middle East’s most critical oil shipping lane includes Fujairah.

Source: Al Jazeera

IRGC unveiled on Monday a new map showing expanded areas around the critical chokepoint that Iran now claims to have under control. The area extends from a line between Kuh-e Mobarak in Iran and south of Fujairah in the UAE, and from another line between the end of Iran’s Qeshm Island and just west of Umm Al Quwain in the UAE, according to the IRGC Navy.

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com

After Attack on CMA CGM Boxship, Trump Suspends Hormuz Transit Corridor

Destroyer USS Pinckney monitors traffic in the Gulf of Oman, May 2026 (USN)
Destroyer USS Pinckney monitors traffic in the Gulf of Oman, May 2026 (USN)

Published May 5, 2026 8:04 PM by The Maritime Executive



On Tuesday, a cargo vessel was struck by a projectile in the Strait of Hormuz, according to UKMTO - the latest in a series of ship strikes that Iran has launched following the initiation of a U.S.-led maritime security corridor. Shortly after, President Donald Trump announced a temporary "pause" for the corridor program, which was intended to provide a security "umbrella" for merchant ships trapped in the Arabian Gulf to escape via the Omani sector of the strait. The initiative had been in effect for two days, and several participants - and apparent nonparticipants - had come under Iranian attack. 

CBS reports that the vessel struck in Tuesday's attack was the Maltese-flagged boxship CMA CGM San Antonio, and officials told the network that the ship may have been hit by a cruise missile. Several crewmembers were injured in the strike, two officials told CBS. 

Like other ships operating in the strait in the last few days, CMA CGM San Antonio has gone dark for security purposes, and her AIS transmission has not been received since Tuesday. Her last known position was off Dubai.  

Hours after news broke of the strike on the boxship, President Donald Trump declared Project Freedom a "tremendous military success" and announced that it would be paused for diplomatic negotiations. 

"Based on the request of Pakistan and other countries . . . we have mutually agreed that, while the blockade [on Iranian traffic] will remain in full force and effect, Project Freedom . . . will be paused for a short period of time to see whether or not the agreement [with Iran] can be finalized," Trump said in a statement. 

Just hours earlier, in a Pentagon press briefing, top officials said that the now-suspended Project Freedom corridor was beyond a success - it was a "gift." They gave no predictions that it would be put on hold later in the day. 

"As a direct gift from the United States to the world, we have established a powerful red, white and blue dome over the strait. American destroyers are on station, supported by hundreds of fighter jets, helicopters, drones and surveillance aircraft providing 24/7 overwatch for peaceful commercial vessels, except Iran’s of course," Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters. 

"We have a much better defensive arrangement [than traditional escort operations], where we have multiple layers that include ships, helicopters, aircraft, airborne early warning, electronic warfare – we have a much broader defensive package than you would have ever had if you were just escorting. I feel good about that, and it was proven just in the last couple of hours," said Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of Central Command, speaking to TWZ earlier in the morning. 


U.S. Releases Additional Iranian Crewmembers to Pakistan for Repatriation

Iranian containership
U.S. has released crewmembers from the Iranian containership and will also return the ship after repairs (CENTCOM)

Published May 4, 2026 12:43 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry reported that it has organized the repatriation of the Iranian crewmembers from the containership Touska. Pakistani officials called it a “confidence-building measure” by the United States as it continues to seek to mediate the war between the U.S. and Iran.

The statement from the Foreign Ministry said the crewmembers had been flown to Pakistan late on Sunday, May 3, to be handed over to the Iranian authorities. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed in a statement to ABC News that the transfer had taken place, and late on Monday, Iran's Fars News Agency, which is closely aligned with the IRGC, released photos saying the crew was home in Iran.

According to the Iranian report, six of the crewmembers had been released last week, and 15 others had arrived in Iran today. The Pakistanis are saying 22 crewmembers had been handed over. Iran, however, is saying that seven crewmembers remain in Pakistan for a total of 28 from the vessel.

In a bellicose statement last week, Iran said it planned to recapture the containership, which the United States seized on April 19. Donald Trump asserted the ship had ignored warnings in the Arabian Sea after the start of the blockade. USS Spruance fired on the ship, disabling the engine room, and then U.S. forces boarded and searched the ship. Iran said it had deferred military action to rescue the crew and ship to avoid injury to the crew.

Pakistan is reporting that the United States has also agreed to hand the ship back to its owners after repairs. It will be put in Pakistani waters, they report.

“Pakistan welcomes such confidence-building measures,” it said. Pakistan says it will continue to pursue ongoing mediation efforts for regional peace and security.

The move comes as the U.S. continues the blockade and asserts it would be enabling the exit of foreign ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran called any actions a violation of the ceasefire, and there were new reports that Iran fired on commercial shipping and claimed an attack on a U.S. destroyer.

CENTCOM on Sunday reported that 49 commercial vessels have now been redirected to comply with the blockade. It said that U.S. forces remain fully committed to total enforcement of the blockade against Iranian shipping and its ports.



Iran Attacked Two US Navy Destroyers During First Day of "Project Freedom"

One of the two destroyers in the operation was USS Truxton, above (USN file image)
USS Truxton (USN file image)

Published May 4, 2026 10:00 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Defense officials have identified the destroyers that transited the Strait of Hormuz Monday as USS Truxtun and USS Mason, according to CBS. 

The vessels reached the relative safety of the Arabian Gulf, but only after coming under fire, as previously confirmed by CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper. CBS obtained additional detail: Iran responded to the transit by launching missiles and drones at the warships, and it dispatched small craft to interfere with the transit. 

Other air defense assets were on hand to engage and defeat the inbound threats, and half a dozen small boats were destroyed, according to Adm. Cooper. Neither U.S. warship was struck - but the intensity of the reported barrage is not likely to provide reassurance to shipping, especially as two U.S.-flagged merchant vessels came under fire in the course of the first day of operation. 

Foreign-flagged traffic near the waterway also came under fire, even though it is unclear if the foreign vessels selected for attack had any connection to the U.S.-operated "Project Freedom" transit scheme.

The multipurpose cargo ship HMM Namu sustained an explosion and fire in way of the engine room on Monday evening; the fire was out by Tuesday morning, and operator HMM is waiting for safe access to inspect the compartment in order to confirm whether it was an attack or a technical fault. At present, HMM said in a statement, the engine room is still filled with CO2 from the  firefighting effort. Once ready, the vessel will be towed into port at Dubai for inspection and investigation. 

A second vessel, the ADNOC-operated tanker Barakah, was reportedly hit by two drones off the coast of Oman while conducting a Hormuz transit. The crew are uninjured, ADNOC said in a statement. 


 

Indonesia Says Iranian Tankers Have Legal Right of Passage in Lombok Strait

Iranian crude oil tanker
Two Iranian tankers are reported to have diverted to sail through Indonesia's Lombok Strait in an attempt to avoid the U.S. blockade (file photo from Iranian state media)

Published May 5, 2026 6:20 PM by The Maritime Executive


Indonesian officials said they are aware of the reports that Iranian crude oil tankers are transiting the Lombok Strait and cited the right of free passage. The statements came after reports by TankerTrackers.com that two Iranian-flagged crude oil tankers have slipped past the U.S. blockade and are routing through the passage east of Bali as an alternative to the more closely tracked Malacca Strait.

“We believe that these vessels are exercising their right of passage in accordance with international law,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ynonne Mewengkang is reported to have said, according to the Indonesian news service Bernama. The Foreign Ministry cited the 1982 UNCLOS treaty (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), which has been in force for the past 32 years. It reiterated the right of “Innocent Passage” as well as many of the other basic rules regarding the oceans.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) asserted that as of May 5, U.S. forces had directed 51 vessels to turn around or return to port as part of the blockade on Iranian ships and ports. The number of ships is increased by a few each day according to the CENTCOM statements.

TankerTrackers.com first reported on May 2 that it had confirmed an Iranian-flagged tanker named Huge (IMO 9357183), which it had last seen off Sri Lanka, had in fact transited the Lombok Strait of Indonesia. It said the vessel, which is 317,367 dwt and laden with 1.9 million barrels valued at nearly $220 million, was bound for the Riau Archipelago. It is a notorious area for shadow fleet tankers to make illegal ship-to-ship transfers. TankerTrackers.com noted the vessel had been dark for about six weeks, and they believed it had departed Iran just hours before the U.S. started its blockade.

Huge, built in 2008, has been sailing under the Iranian flag since 2015. It is operated by the National Iranian Tanker Corporation (NITC) and is on the U.S. sanctions list.

While only a handful of vessels appeared to have escaped the U.S. efforts, TankerTrakers.com reported on May 3 that it had spotted a second Iranian-flagged tanker taking the same route. The crude oil tanker Derya (IMO 9569700) appears to have been searching for a destination for its cargo of 1.88 million barrels. TankerTrackers.com reported the tanker missed the window of the U.S. waiver to deliver oil to India and had been at sea since mid-April.

Built in 2013, the vessel is also under U.S. sanctions. It entered the Lombok Strait, also heading to the Riau Archipelago.

TankerTrakers.com calculates that, in total, 25 tankers associated with Iran had departed with crude oil cargoes in April, but 15 of them were before the blockade. Since the start of the blockade, TankerTrackers.com reports seven tankers were redirected, and only one, Huge, had reached the Far East. The U.S. also seized two tankers associated with Iran that were accused of being stateless in April.  The U.S. is reportedly seeking forfeiture orders from the U.S. courts for those vessels.

Indonesia said it would continue to monitor the situation and “communicate through appropriate diplomatic channels.” However, at least for now, it is not taking any action against the tankers sailing through its waterway.


The Donald Can’t Reopen the Strait


This is part 3 of a series. part 1, and part 2

by  | May 6, 2026 |

We noted in Part 1 that when confronted with the failure of 44 days of bombing Iran “back-to-the-stone-age”and, also, thankfully, being reluctant to send American boots into a Gallipoli-scale slaughter on the ground, the Donald turned to his goofy Secy of Treasury for a 4-D chess move.

To wit, a blockade of the Gulf of Oman, which commenced on April 13th. The latter was supposed to dry-up Iran’s cash flow from global oil sales and to then fill its oil storage tanks full to the rim, thereby causing the pipelines connecting to its 3.5 million b/d oil production apparatus to back up and then explode in a post-constipationary release.

Alas, the Donald’s genius boy band – also including Pete Hegseth and Little Marco Rubio – forget the elephant in the room. To wit, it was always a question of which of the dueling blockades – Iran’s at the Strait of Hormuz or the US Navy’s outside of the SOH on the Gulf of Oman – would run out of time first.

However, you only had to know a little bit about the world’s 103 million barrel per day petroleum supply, demand and storage system, and a tad more about oilfield engineering, production management and storage systems, to realize that there was never a doubt as to the outcome.

Namely, that the true-believers who run Iran, and in the face of an existential threat to their regime, were destined to outlast the world economy’s ability to function without the Persian Gulf’s massive flows of hydrocarbons and its derivatives. These crucial ingredients of global economic life ordinarily transit the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) to the tune of 30 million BOEs (barrels of oil equivalent) each and every day.

Of course, the truth is that the Donald is lazy, impatient and impulsive—and therefore is always ready to run with a factoid or cockamamie notion that suits his purposes at the moment. And regardless of whether it happens to be true, valid, plausible and or even rational.

So when the know-it-all but actually clueless Wall Streeter at the Treasury Department tried to horn-in on the Big Boys action in the White House Situation Room by stumping up his “Operation Economic Fury”, the Donald was all ears. He then assuredly announced that Bessent’s brilliant idea would soon be giving the term “silver bullet” a wholly new definition – even as he patted himself on the back for making it possible:

“The blockade is genius. The blockade has been 100% foolproof. It shows how good our Navy is, I can tell you that. Nobody is going to play games. We have the greatest military in the world, and I built much of it during my first term.

Except. Except. The prowess of the US Navy wasn’t hardly the half of it. In truth, the blockade was really about oil patch engineering. That and the proven resourcefulness of the Iranian regime when it comes to thwarting attacks on its economy after decades of sanctions, embargoes and malicious economic pressures of every kind.

The Donald was apprised of none of this, of course, so naturally he went ball-to-the-walls, exuberantly promoting the efficacy of the blockade.

“When you have lines of vast amounts of oil pouring through your system, if for any reason that line is closed because you can’t continue to put it into containers or ships… what happens is that line explodes from within, both mechanically and in the earth… They say they only have about three days left before that happens. And when it explodes, you can never rebuild it the way it is.”

Well, three days have passed since the Donald issued the above statement, and nothing has exploded in the Iranian oilfields. And that’s par for the course when it comes to the Donald’s penchant for making up shit and then announcing it to the world.

In the first place, there was not a remote chance that Iran’s 41 million barrels of above ground storage tanks would fill to the rim, and then blow up its oil fields in less than three days. As we demonstrated in Part 1, they would have had upwards of 60 days of combined above ground and floating storage – even if production were to remain at the current 2.75 million barrels per day.

But for crying out loud. It doesn’t have to remain there. Iran’s extensive oilfields do not function as some inflexible deus ex machina. Over any reasonable period of time, production levels can be managed significantly higher or lower.

As it happens, however, people who know how to produce 3-5 million barrels per day, as they have over the last decade from Iran’s aging oilfields, would sure as hell know how to carefully reduce production to the level of domestic use (1.75 million barrels/day) plus available storage.

To be sure, throttling back the daily oil lifting rates might well hurt economically via short-run revenue losses and potential future output declines requiring costly restarts. But modulating production levels is a manageable engineering task – not the Donald’s doomsday “lines exploding from within” scenario.

Indeed, oil companies the world over do this during periodic field maintenance, price crashes, or force majeure all the time. The current US blockade, therefore, might create some pain through sustained pressure on exports and storage but not an unmanageable, instantaneous blow-up.

So the blockade was never destined to generate a sudden catastrophic “gotcha” event, as portrayed by Bessent, who knows little about the oil fields and the Donald, who comprehends even less.

Oil production (especially in Iran’s mature fields) can and routinely is managed with gradual rate reductions, flow choking, and planned shut-ins to minimize reservoir and infrastructure damage. The “explosion in three days” scenario is therefore not merely hyperbolic; it’s just plain barking nonsense.

In fact, gradual cutbacks to close the gap between daily output and daily off-take – even with no exports and extremely limited storage – would be readily feasible and well within the range of standard oilfield practice.

So start with the current gap between production at 2.75 mb/d and domestic refinery runs and internal use at about 1.75 mb/d. Even if the enhanced refinery runs and small leakage shown in the table below did not happen, the maximum required cutback from current production levels would be about 35% or 1.0 mb/d. Tops.

Needless to say, Iran’s petroleum engineers and oilfield managers – especially given several weeks to implement adjustments – have designed their wells, pipelines, and reservoirs with controls for this exact situation. Thus, its wells have adjustable chokes (valves) at the wellhead. Operators can slowly reduce flow rates over hours or days instead of slamming everything shut. This prevents sudden pressure spikes while allowing the reservoir to equilibrate.

Iran could also prioritize this production curtailment process on a field-by-field basis, starting with less critical wells. So if exports stop completely, upstream production doesn’t have to keep pumping at full volume into full tanks/pipelines.

They can throttle back lifting rates to match available storage or domestic use. Many Iranian fields already use gas lift or water/gas injection for pressure support; these systems can be scaled down gradually to avoid disrupting reservoir dynamics.

In fact, they’ve handled temporary large shut-ins before without “explosions.” Standard protocols involve monitoring bottom-hole pressure, injecting inhibitors (to prevent corrosion/scaling), and avoiding abrupt stops that could cause paraffin/wax buildup or sand settling.

Long-term issues (e.g., clay swelling in carbonates, water intrusion, or minor mechanical deformation) are real in mature fields like Iran’s. But they’re mitigable with planning – not irreversible “explosions.”

Similarly, high water-cut wells might need nitrogen lifts or pumps to restart, but that’s routine work-over work, not evidence of a field-destroying crisis. So what the “explosion” claim actually refers to is the risk of pressure buildup in pipelines and reservoirs when off-take flow is blocked downstream while upstream production continues unchecked. In theory, this could lead to over-pressure, clogs, or leaks—but real world systems have safety relief valves, pressure sensors, and automatic shutdowns.

Indeed, oilfield experts note that literal pipeline/well explosions from this kind of hypothetical situation are “nearly impossible”. The real risk is longer-term in the form of forced shut-ins in mature carbonate reservoirs (common in Iran). This could disrupt pressure support from gas re-injection, leading to some permanent productivity loss (e.g., 100k-500k bpd in worst-case selective fields).

But even this kind of potential impairment builds over weeks and months with poor – not standard – management. Moreover, Iran’s fields are not uniquely fragile like ultra-heavy oil (Venezuela) or shale. They’ve restarted after past shut-ins with limited lasting damage.

For example, after the global collapse of oil demand in the spring of 2020 owning to worldwide pandemic lockdowns, Iranian production was reduced by nearly 50% in a matter of months, from 3.75 mb/d to 1.9 mb/d.

Yet after the global economy re-opened and returned to normal petroleum demand levels, production was subsequently restored to pre-war levels at just under 3.5 mb/d during 2024 and 2025.

In short, there is going to be no explosion in the Iranian oil fields. The Donald is chasing yet another delusion ponied up by his utterly incompetent staff.

Between creative expansion of its storage including floating vessels and salt caverns, enhanced refinery runs to bolster the domestic economy, even minor export leakages via its coast-hugging dark fleet and standard oilfield production management, the Iranians are likely to keep their petroleum economy stable and functioning.

So the blockade won’t be a SILVER BULLET to rescue the Donald from his Iranian War folly, either.

Meanwhile, the Donald is yet again waiting for Godot. But he doesn’t have much time left because the other side of the dueling blockade equation is deteriorating fast. That is, not only is oil heading once again to $125 per barrel and $5 per gallon for gas, but the rest of the vast array of industrial commodities which normally flow through the SOH are beginning to take a larger and larger bite out of global economic stability with each passing week.

So the Donald, as usual, is utterly delusional when he plays school yard negotiator, barking at the swing-sets and slides with the refrain “I’ve got all the time in the world.”

He doesn’t. Not even remotely.

In fact, the near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz since early March 2026 has also created one of the most acute non-oil supply shocks in modern agricultural history, to take the most obvious example.

Roughly one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade – about 16 million tonnes in 2024 and 2025 – normally transits the SOH from Persian Gulf producers. Accordingly, the Gulf states plus Iran account for 34-49% of globally traded urea, 23-30% of ammonia, 41-50% of sulfur, and 20-26% of phosphate fertilizers (DAP/MAP).

These volumes cannot be easily rerouted: pipelines serve only crude oil, not bulk fertilizers or sulfur, and alternative ports lack capacity or infrastructure. Production has also been directly curtailed by attacks on gas processing infrastructure and feed-stock shortages.

On the nitrogen fertilizer side (urea and ammonium nitrate chains), Qatar’s QAFCO is the world’s largest single-site urea exporter with capacity of 5.4 million tonnes/year or about 10-14% of global exports. But it halted output almost entirely after the LNG/gas plant strikes. Saudi Arabia’s SABIC and other Gulf producers have also seen exports drop sharply.

On a pre-crisis basis the region shipped about 10.5 million tonnes of urea annually (21% of global trade) and supplied India 40% of its urea imports – along with major quantities to Brazil, the USA, Australia, and West Africa. Monthly Arab Gulf urea loadings exceeded 1.5 million tonnes; Iran added another 350,000-400,000 tonnes.

With shipments stalled, urea prices jumped 50%+ within weeks after February 28th (e.g., from $480/tonne to $720/tonne), and ammonia followed. Ammonium nitrate, derived from the same ammonia stream, faces parallel tightness. These nitrogen fertilizers are critical for cereal, oil-seed, and rice crops. The shortages now swelling by the day will force farmers to cut application rates or switch crops, directly lowering yields.

The negative impacts of the SOH closure on the sulfur-phosphate chain is further compounding the ag crisis. Gulf producers (Saudi Aramco, ADNOC, Qatar) supply 41-50% of globally traded sulfur, a byproduct of oil/gas desulfurization and essential feedstock for sulfuric acid.

Sulfuric acid, in turn, converts phosphate rock into water-soluble DAP and MA – which are the world’s go-to yield enhancing fertilizers. In this context, Saudi’s Ma’aden complex is the region’s largest phosphate exporter, accounting for 26% of global DAP trade. Disruptions here ripple far beyond the Gulf to China, Morocco and Indonesia (the major phosphate producers), which rely on Gulf sulfur. So their output is now constrained, as well.

Phosphate prices and NPK blends have surged, hitting West Africa and Latin America especially hard. Overall, analysts estimate 25-38% of global nitrogen/phosphate trade and 45% of sulfur trade are at risk.

The timing is truly catastrophic for “next fall.” Northern Hemisphere spring/summer 2026 planting (already underway in parts of the US, Europe, and Asia) faces immediate shortages, but the bigger shock will likely hit the 2026-2027 crop year fall planting in the Southern Hemisphere (Brazil, Australia, Argentina) and winter wheat cycles in the Northern Hemisphere.

IFPRI and other forecasters warn of 5-15% potential declines in global grain/oilseed yields if fertilizer use drops 10-20% in import-dependent regions.

India (heavily reliant on Gulf urea) and Brazil (key soy/corn exporter) are most exposed. Reduced applications in these two giant ag producers could shrink global harvests by millions of tonnes, tightening global food supplies into late 2026 and 2027.

Food-price inflation is already materializing: urea-driven cost increases are already feeding into higher bread, rice, meat, and vegetable prices. Developing nations therefore face acute food-security risks, including higher import bills, subsidy strains, and possible rationing or unrest.

Even the US and EU, though less dependent, are faced with elevated farm-input costs and secondary effects via global commodity markets. No quick fixes exist. Alternative suppliers (Russia, Egypt, China) cannot scale fast enough, and many face their own export curbs or logistics issues.

In addition, strategic fertilizer reserves are minimal compared to oil stocks. The result is a classic “food security time bomb”. Higher fertilizer prices squeeze margins, reduce planted acres or yields, and cascade into grocery bills and political instability – all likely hitting by fall 2026.

In the case of helium and semiconductors, Qatar supplies 30-36% of global helium as a byproduct of its massive North Field LNG/gas processing. Production at Ras Laffan – the world’s largest helium hub – halted in early March after infrastructure missile strikes and LNG curtailments, removing roughly one-third of world supply overnight.

Helium ships in specialized cryogenic containers that last only 35-48 days before boil-off. Consequently, thousands of containers are now stranded or evaporating. South Korea and Taiwan (largest importers) will face acute shortages first.

Helium is irreplaceable in semiconductor fabrication for wafer etching, plasma processes, and ultra-low-temperature cooling. Chipmakers already report 14-20% export cuts translating into fab-line risks; prices have soared 50%+.

Needless to say, the Chip Shock threatens AI hardware, memory, and advanced logic production at a time of surging demand.

Healthcare (MRI magnets) and aerospace are also being hit. But semiconductors feel the earliest pinch – with potential major output losses in Asia within weeks if stocks run dry.

The Persian Gulf is also a 35-40% player in global petrochemical exports ($20–25 billion annually through SOH). Saudi, UAE, and Qatar export massive volumes of methanol (14 million tonnes/year regionally), monoethylene glycol (MEG, 6.5 million tonnes), polyethylene (PE, 12.5+ million tonnes), polypropylene (PP), and other olefins derived from ethane, propane, and naphtha.

Iran’s 80-90 million tonne petrochemical capacity has also curtailed exports to prioritize domestic needs. Naphtha and LPG feedstock flows to Asia (Japan imports 70%, South Korea 50%) are already being throttled, forcing steam cracker shutdowns in Northeast Asia.

Downstream impacts, of course, cascade into plastics, textiles (MEG for polyester), packaging, automotive parts, and construction resins. Prices for PE, PP, and MEG have jumped by upwards of 10% to 15% in days. Consequently, Asian buyers are scrambling to access US or European alternatives, tightening global polymer markets.

The shocks, in turn, are already reshaping supply chains and inflating costs for everyday goods from bottles to fibers. And given the complexity and length of global supply chains, these effects are expected to persist for months even if shipping partially resumes.

Aluminum and broader industrial sectors are also being impacted heavily. The Gulf smelters (UAE’s EGA at about 2.7 million tonnes, Saudi Ma’aden at about 0.8 million tonnes, Bahrain’s Alba) produce about 9-10% of global primary aluminum, almost all exported via the SOH.

Strikes damaged EGA’s Al Taweelah complex and Alba facilities. So exports have largely halted, with limited truck rerouting to Oman ports proving costly and slow. Raw-material imports (alumina/bauxite) are also being blocked, risking further Gulf smelter production curtailments.

The region supplies about 20% of non-China aluminum to the US, EU, and Asia. Accordingly, LME inventories have already plummeted, while aluminum prices have hit 4-year highs. Overall, the global industry has seen premiums surge and the market flip from pre-war surplus to a growing supply deficit.

Downstream effects from the growing shortage of primary aluminum are rippling into autos, construction, packaging, renewables (solar frames, wind components), and aerospace. Other industrials (e.g., sulfur for metals processing) face collateral pressure.

Combined, these shocks are materially raising manufacturing costs globally, delaying projects, and feeding inflation in finished goods – compounding the fertilizer and petrochemical hits.

Needless to say, recovery in all of these Persian Gulf-fed sectors hinges on Hormuz reopening. In turn, that means the Donald does not have all the time in the world – if any time at all – before widespread “stagflation” spreads globally and laps up on the economic shores of the USA, as well.

David Stockman was a two-term Congressman from Michigan. He was also the Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan. After leaving the White House, Stockman had a 20-year career on Wall Street. He’s the author of three books, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution FailedThe Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America, TRUMPED! A Nation on the Brink of Ruin… And How to Bring It Back, and the recently released Great Money Bubble: Protect Yourself From The Coming Inflation Storm. He also is founder of David Stockman’s Contra Corner and David Stockman’s Bubble Finance Trader.No. They aren’t. He made it up. Every damn bit of it.


U.S. Navy Fighter Shoots Out the Rudder of an Iranian Tanker

An F/A-18 Super Hornet takes off from carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (USN)
An F/A-18 Super Hornet takes off from carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (USN)

Published May 6, 2026 2:25 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The U.S. military is matching Iran's new kinetic methods of blockade enforcement, switching to more forceful means to prevent an inbound tanker from running the naval cordon in the Gulf of Oman. 

According to the U.S. Central Command, the sanctioned, Iranian-flagged tanker Hasna (IMO 9212917) was under way and attempting to reach a port on Oman's Gulf of Oman coastline. U.S. forces issued several warnings to the Hasna's crew to cease movement or turn around, but the Hasna did not comply.

To enforce the blockade, CENTCOM dispatched an F/A-18 Super Hornet from USS Abraham Lincoln to take kinetic measures. At about 0900 Eastern Time on Wednesday, the fighter used its 20mm cannon to target the vessel's rudder, disabling Hasna and compelling her crew to stop transiting to Iran. (On a large tanker in ballast, the upper half of the rudder is out of the water and vulnerable to targeting.)

"The U.S. blockade against ships attempting to enter or depart Iranian ports remains in full effect," the command said in a statement. "CENTCOM forces continue to act deliberately and professionally to ensure compliance."

The fighter-strike method of blockade enforcement could improve CENTCOM's ability to tighten the interdiction campaign against Iranian shipping, without requiring scarce surface combatants or manpower-intensive boardings. Tanker-tracking experts have observed leakage through the American blockade, particularly westbound tonnage transiting in ballast. These empty tankers are critical to to Iran's ongoing effort to keep oil production high, as the vessels provide extra floating storage - extending the time horizon before Iranian producers have to begin shutting in wells for lack of a place to put more oil. Shut-ins risk damage at wellheads and long-term lost production; the administration has attempted to turn that risk into a ticking countdown clock in a calculated effort to pressure Iran into political concessions. Tanker storage has given Iran the ability to keep pumping for weeks after many analysts' early expectations, thereby lessening long-term economic harm from the blockade and making it easier to resist U.S. demands.