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Monday, January 12, 2026

PAKISTAN’S WINDING ROAD TO THE BOMB
Published January 11, 2026
EOS/DAWN

LONG READ

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto (left) pictured alongside Munir Ahmad Khan (centre) and Dr Abdus Salam (right) during the inauguration ceremony of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (Kanupp) on November 28, 1972 | PAEC



BHUTTO’S SUMMIT WITH SCIENTISTS

I had not yet joined the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and was working as an information officer in the Press Information Department (PID), where each information officer is responsible for servicing the media needs of one or more ministries.

On a cold January day in 1972, a colleague in the PID responsible for media projection of scientific organisations talked about a planned meeting of the country’s scientists. President [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto had called the meeting to frankly discuss what role they could play in national defence and security, he said. Where and when it was to be held, he was not sure. It would be at some undisclosed secret venue, he said.

He also said that prominent scientists and engineers had started arriving in Islamabad, waiting to be taken to the conference venue, which was known only to a few. There was confusion about the venue. When the word spread that it would be held in Quetta, some scientists actually travelled there, making their own private arrangements. In the morning, a military aircraft airlifted a precious human cargo of scientists and engineers from Islamabad. But instead of Quetta, it landed at Multan. Those who had already arrived in Quetta were herded to Multan in a special Pakistan Air Force aircraft.

No one was sure of the conference’s purpose. Some excited scientists, before leaving their homes, only told their families that they would be out of station for a few days without disclosing where they were going. Having been personally invited by the head of state, everyone felt elated.

Even though the purpose had not been officially declared, there was a sense among the scientists that Bhutto wanted to salvage the country in the wake of the loss of East Pakistan. He wanted to seek the support of the scientific community and raise the morale of the people, they conjectured.

In January 1972, at a secret meeting, Pakistan’s top scientists were tasked by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with one objective: build an atomic bomb, no matter the cost. At the heart of this endeavour was Bhutto’s handpicked nuclear expert, Munir Ahmad Khan. For two decades, Munir Ahmed Khan worked behind a thick veil of secrecy, building key nuclear structures in a race against time, sanctions and even smear campaigns. In Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey, Farhatullah Babar details the story of the unsung architect of Pakistan's atomic programme. Eos presents, with permission, excerpts from the book recently published by Lightstone Publishers…

In private conversations, they recalled that Bhutto outlined his views on foreign and security policies in his 1969 book The Myth of Independence. As a minister in [Gen] Ayub [Khan]’s cabinet, he had failed in his mission to make Pakistan nuclear. But now he was the president himself, and a great opportunity was knocking at his door.

Pakistan had not only suffered defeat at the hands of the Indian army, but it had also lost half of the country and more than half of the population. China also had not applied pressure on India’s border, and Pakistan had suffered a permanent strategic loss by the cessation of East Pakistan.




The Multan Conference was aimed at inspiring the scientists and engineers to commit themselves to delivering. The Chief Scientific Adviser to the president, Dr Abdus Salam (later Nobel Laureate), was also on board the special flight from Islamabad. A younger colleague later recalled Dr Salam saying, “I think they are going to make us bite the dust.”

Excitement grew as they neared Multan. An army bus was waiting to collect the cream of scientists as they disembarked in Multan. Shamiaanas covered the spacious lawns of Nawab Sadiq Qureshi’s — a PPP [Pakistan Peoples Party] leader and Governor of Punjab — residence in Multan, to host the first-ever face-to-face meeting between scientists and the country’s president.

The conference brought together science luminaries from all over the country, including the chairman of the PAEC, the versatile and outspoken Dr I.H. Usmani. Professor Abdus Salam had also flown in from abroad. The attendees also included Munir Ahmad Khan, a nuclear engineer with international credentials. He had flown in from Vienna, where he was in charge of the nuclear power and reactor division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It was a historic moment in Pakistan’s journey toward nuclear development. Scientists and engineers took turns addressing pressing issues in science and technology, with particular focus on how quickly Pakistan could achieve atomic capability. Criticism voiced at the conference ranged from lamenting the misallocation of funds for building physical infrastructure to issues with trained manpower and a lack of planning and motivation. Some voiced concerns about bureaucratic red tape, while others passionately demanded respect and recognition.

After several scientists had spoken, Bhutto rose to speak. The chatter in the pandal stopped. There was a pin-drop silence as eager eyes turned towards him.

Bhutto began his address by recalling with anguish the surrender and national humiliation in December 1971 and vowed to restore the lost national honour. He then told the audience that he had invited them to seek their help. He addressed them directly, face-to-face, and excited them. Only a month earlier, Pakistan had witnessed its darkest hour: the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, following a humiliating defeat in the Indo-Pakistani war. The nation’s wounds were fresh, its pride shattered. Amidst the ruin, Bhutto’s speech kindled in the gathering the spark of resolve that would forever alter the trajectory of Pakistan’s history.

Bhutto’s words resonated with the scientists. In Multan, he was not merely outlining a policy; he was igniting a movement. Masterfully blending pragmatism with patriotism, he quoted from history. He spoke about the transformative power of nuclear technology, instilling enthusiasm in the audience. He cited India’s steady march toward atomic capability as both a challenge and a provocation. Pakistan’s survival in the regional power matrix required a matching response.


Dr Mujaddid Ahmed Ijaz (extreme left), Munir Ahmad Khan (centre) and Dr Abdus Salam (extreme right) at the International Nathiagali Summer College on Physics and Contemporary Needs (INSC) in 1976 | Ijaz Family Archives



When the crowd of scientists was sufficiently charged, Bhutto directly asked how they could help meet the threat to the nation’s security. India possessed not only superiority in conventional weapons, it was also building nuclear weapons.

“Can you meet India’s nuclear challenge?” He asked them, promising “all the resources you may need.” He had challenged the scientific community at a time of the lowest national morale, and the scientists were ecstatic.

Curiosity was replaced by enthusiasm. The enthusiastic ones believed they could do it even if some of their colleagues disagreed. The atmosphere was electric, tinged with the weight of what lay ahead.

As the discussions unfolded, the pandal crackled with ideas, projections, and debates about feasibility, resources and time frames. The scientists understood that achieving nuclear capability was no small feat — it was a herculean task and a willingness to defy all odds — but they were ready. There were a few who were sceptics, also mindful of the technical roadblocks, but a shared sense of purpose united all.

MORE THAN A CONFERENCE

Scientists fell over one another to convince the president they could deliver on the promise. The president was amused as he watched them engage in a shouting match. “Yes, yes, sure, we can deliver,” the scientists shouted back in unison, almost like children on a playground, a scientist later recalled.

When a scientist claimed that Pakistan had already reached a “take-off stage” in the nuclear field, Bhutto said, “There is no such thing as the take-off stage. Either we take off or we are left behind.”

President Bhutto deplored that we had been left behind in almost every aspect of national life, especially in science, technology and education.

How long will you take to deliver, he asked them. The scientists did not expect such a pointed question from the head of state. Already charged with enthusiasm, the meeting turned into near pandemonium. Scientists made claims and counterclaims about how soon it would be done.

Some said it would take five years; others thought it would take longer. The overenthusiastic claimed to do it in less than a year, while the realistic ones said at least five years were needed. Everyone was eager to catch Bhutto’s attention.

When a young engineer jumped and almost shouted, “Five years, Your Excellency, five years!” Bhutto asked him to sit down.

On the dais, the chairman of PAEC, Dr I.H. Usmani and Dr Salam looked at each other. As a young scientist claimed that they could make the bomb in three years, Usmani nudged Professor Salam, sitting next to him, with his elbow.

Usmani, the pioneer of nuclear energy in the country, believed that Pakistan was a long way away from acquiring nuclear capability. “We will never be able to make it, we do not have the infrastructure,” he whispered in his ear, Salam later recalled to me.

When Salam asked him whether he disapproved of the quest to go nuclear, Usmani told him, “How can I refuse the president anything? I am only trying to be realistic.”

Usmani then said, “Listen, morally I can disagree with a nuclear weapon, but I will not. I know what Bhutto wants and I want to help him.”

Usmani then rose on his seat.

“With all respect, Mr President,” he said, “but I think that we should look into the eye of truth.”

At present, Pakistan does not possess a thing that justifies the optimism in this pandal, he said. “We do not have any metallurgists or a steel industry.” Usmani had the courage to speak his mind in front of the president and a charged crowd of enthusiastic scientists.

Perhaps Dr Usmani was not wrong. As head of the organisation for a decade, he knew better. There was no infrastructure in place needed to go nuclear. It took more than a decade after the Multan Conference for Pakistan to conduct its first cold nuclear tests, in March 1983, and complete its nuclear fuel cycle projects.


(Left to right) Professor Ishfaq Ahmad, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Gen K.M. Arif and Munir Ahmad Khan at the cold test site | Beyond the Bomb


A young engineer was keen to speak but was ignored each time he raised his hand to ask for the floor. Just as the next speaker was about to take the floor, Bhutto, pointing towards the young engineer, said, “No, no, that man over there.”

“Mr President, all I want to say is that we have a research institute in PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology] at Nilore. Local people call the nearby bus stop ‘Nilore Bum Factory.’ They believe that the atom bomb is the saviour. They also hope that the bomb will be produced in this building. But what are we doing here? We can make it if tasked,” he said.

Bhutto listened intently.

The young man was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, later the first project director of the uranium enrichment project at Kahuta and much more.

As the scientists differed over how soon the bomb could be made, Bhutto raised his hand and stretched out three fingers. Everyone was silent. He wanted the bomb made in three years. All eyes had turned to him.

“Can I have this from you in three years?” he then asked. “Yes, yes,” the scientists responded in chorus, vowing not to disappoint him.

The Multan conclave of scientists marked the starting point of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear programme. The dye was cast that day.

The Multan Conference marked the genesis of a long and arduous journey. Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear capability was as much a battle against external pressures as it was a test of internal resolve. In the years that followed, the country faced a barrage of international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and economic challenges. Yet, the vision set in motion that January day in Multan endured.

The Multan Conference remains a pivotal chapter in Pakistan’s history, its significance extending beyond the realm of nuclear technology. It set Pakistan on a path that continues to shape its identity and policies.

More than a chatter of enthusiastic scientists, it was a solemn promise to deliver. More than a conference, it was a defining moment.

BHUTTO SELECTS MUNIR AHMAD KHAN

Amidst fervent exchanges at the Multan Conference, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once again raised his hand to signal that he had an announcement to make. The chatter in the pandal fell silent, all eyes fixed on him.

Turning towards Munir Ahmad Khan, seated on the podium, Bhutto declared, “From today, Munir Ahmad Khan will be the new chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.” Munir Ahmad Khan was thus entrusted with the responsibility of advancing the nuclear programme, aligning it with Bhutto’s bold vision.

Bhutto’s faith in Munir Ahmad Khan seems to have been rooted in their past association, which began when Munir Ahmad Khan worked at the IAEA in Vienna. He had established himself as a distinguished nuclear engineer and shared a common vision with Bhutto about the role of nuclear technology for the country’s development and survival.

In December 1965, Bhutto, then Pakistan’s foreign minister, accompanied President Ayub Khan during an official visit to London. Bhutto orchestrated a meeting of Munir Ahmad Khan with President Ayub, aiming to persuade the latter to invest in nuclear reprocessing technology. Despite Munir Ahmad Khan’s compelling arguments, Ayub remained unconvinced, placing reliance on China’s “nuclear umbrella” in case Pakistan needed it. After the meeting, a disappointed Munir Ahmad Khan was reassured by Bhutto: “Do not worry—our turn will come.”

That turn came in 1972. Bhutto, now the president of Pakistan, positioned Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of PAEC, signalling a new chapter in the pursuit of his ambition of making Pakistan a nuclear power.

Following Munir Ahmad Khan’s appointment, Dr I.H. Usmani, who had served PAEC with great distinction for over a decade, resigned from his position. While Dr Usmani laid the groundwork for scientific development, Munir Ahmad Khan was tasked with a transformative mission: to translate Bhutto’s vision of a nuclear Pakistan into reality.

In his address, Bhutto noted what he called a “process of erosion” which he said had set in the country as a result of the events of December 1971. He wanted it addressed urgently. In the realm of science and technology, he wanted to launch a “crash programme” to nurture indigenous talent. He wanted to create a pool of at least a hundred scientists, bringing home expatriate Pakistani talent, and instituting prestigious awards for the talented. He wanted to ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were powered by its own people.

THE UNSUNG HERO

Munir Ahmad Khan’s emphasis on secrecy and a low profile was one of the reasons for his remaining unsung. But this was not the only reason. He remained unsung also because his criticism of the tendency to seek personal projection at the expense of the nuclear programme displeased a powerful lobby that cherished personal publicity.

He was uncomfortable when some contemporaries liked to advertise their achievements and flaunted nuclear capabilities, terming it irresponsible. He said that scientists, bureaucrats and generals in other countries do not publicly make tall claims about their capabilities. No scientist in India, Israel or any other country had publicly made such claims.

A former army chief publicly made some claims in the mid-nineties that appeared to him unwise. With carefully chosen words, he strongly criticised him in a newspaper article. He said that what the ex-army chief had said amounted to Pakistan making a fool of the US president for continuing to certify, on the advice of the US Embassy in Islamabad for three years from 1987 to 1990, that Pakistan did not have nuclear capability or a device. He predicted that such irresponsible rhetoric would cost Pakistan dearly.

Naturally, those in high places seeking personal publicity did not like it and turned against him.

When, in May 1988, Pakistan demonstrated nuclear capability, individual scientists in another organisation scrambled to claim credit for bomb-making, cherishing the spotlight. In doing so, some scientists excelled over others. The PAEC scientists were trained in his [Munir Ahmed Khan’s] nursery with a rigid code of restraint for two decades. They remained tight-lipped even at that time of national celebrations.

While there was no one to speak for him, his detractors had a field day. When he retired, he launched a vigorous campaign advocating to curb nuclear rhetoric. He and his associates in the PAEC paid a heavy price for this restraint. He endured all this with grace.

Despite his remarkable achievements in bringing Pakistan to the world nuclear map, he was not lauded. His achievements were not recognised during his lifetime. For 20 years, the cold nuclear tests that were carried out under his watch had remained a guarded secret.

He denied himself and the team limelight through self-projection, adhering to the strict secrecy codes. He did not advertise his achievements to safeguard the safety and security of the nuclear programme. He believed that advertising personal achievements would damage the programme by attracting adverse international response.

In his memoirs, Professor Riazuddin, the quiet theoretician behind the bomb, has said: “All the strategic nuclear infrastructure was completed during the tenure of Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of the PAEC. Thus, all the key elements, except uranium enrichment, were already in place, including conducting cold tests and building tunnels in the Chagai mountain for carrying out underground nuclear tests when needed. In spite of all this, he didn’t get the credit he deserved and remains an ‘unsung hero.’”

He had raised the bar of secrecy so high that it deprived his team of due recognition. When in office, he never mentioned in public the word “cold nuclear tests”, let alone reveal that it had indeed been successfully carried out way back in the early 1980s.

His detractors ensured that Munir was not honoured in his lifetime. While others were decorated with the highest civil award twice, Munir Ahmad Khan was denied it. [Asif] Zardari had long been aware of Munir Ahmad Khan’s work, since his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was prime minister. During his first term as president, he posthumously awarded the unsung hero in 2012 with the highest civil award, the Nishan-i-Pakistan. His family received the award.

In a world often seduced by the allure of spectacle, the power of restraint is the most profound virtue, but it does not come without a cost. Munir Ahmad Khan’s life and the price he paid demonstrated this truth. He exemplified it throughout his career in his disdain for self-promotion and his advocacy for nuclear discretion. His steadfast belief that nuclear capabilities must never be flaunted distinguished him as a leader of extraordinary foresight. He was willing to pay a price for it.

His ethical philosophy was that nuclear capability is not a status symbol but a grave responsibility. It needed strategic silence and avoiding rhetoric that could provoke adversaries or attract unnecessary global attention. He clearly understood that self-promotion in this sensitive domain was counterproductive and dangerous. The success of Pakistan’s nuclear programme lay in the collective effort of a well-knit team in complete secrecy, not in individual accolades.

He never sought cheap popularity, denied himself newspaper headlines, and declined to advertise the Commission’s achievements. He kept a low profile and disliked anyone making provocative, inflammatory statements to grab headlines.

The brandishing of nuclear capability was anathema to him. He believed that bravado, brandishing nuclear capability or advertising achievements did not serve the national interest. A natural consequence of this worldview was that he and his team were not acknowledged for their work.

His commitment to restraint placed him at odds with those in positions of power. But he was not deterred and continued to be vocal in condemning nuclear rhetoric. Later, when talking about the former army chief’s public statement, he said, “Farhatullah, it was more than a lapse in judgment; it was a breach of trust.”

He viewed such declarations as reckless and an invitation to international sanctions. He foresaw adverse diplomatic fallout and the damage it could inflict. His frustration stemmed not only from the immediate consequences but also from the long-term implications of eroding the trust of global powers.

Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see the day when his warnings against the dangers of irresponsible nuclear behaviour proved true.

The world was shocked when, in 2006, Gen Pervez Musharraf disclosed in his memoirs, In the Line of Fire, how a clandestine proliferation network had been in existence in Pakistan for a long time, and blamed one lone individual for it. The network had actually been busted by the CIA in 2003, and Musharraf was forced to acknowledge it in his 2006 memoirs. Ignoring Munir’s warnings cost the nation dearly.

The legacy of restraint was both his formidable strength and a great burden. While it was meant to shield Pakistan’s nuclear programme from external threats, it also allowed his detractors to dominate the narrative. His posthumous recognition, with the highest civil award, was a bittersweet moment for his family and colleagues. It was a long-overdue acknowledgement of his role in placing Pakistan on the global nuclear map while also underscoring the quiet pain of a life spent in service without recognition.

His life is a powerful reminder of humility and restraint in leadership. When egos clash and ambitions run high, quiet dedication to the collective good is his enduring legacy. Prioritising responsibility over recognition and wisdom over bravado while remaining personally self-effacing shall resonate as his legacy.

Excerpted with permission from Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey by Farhatullah Babar, published by Lightstone Publishers

The writer is a former senator and served as the director of information at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) under Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan

Published in Dawn, EOS, January 11th, 2026
‘Good night and good luck’

Political and media landscapes are witnessing their own version of McCarthyism.
Published January 11, 2026 
DAWN

The writer is a security analyst.


MCCARTHYISM is a ghost that survives within political and institutional systems. It thrives on witch-hunts, rejects scrutiny, and shields itself with distorted logic, manufactured fears, and convenient lies. It brands itself as the custodian of ‘true patriotism’, while relegating all dissenters to the category of the less loyal. Today, this spectre is once again dominating parts of the world, including the US and Pakistan.

George Clooney’s Good Night, and Good Luck captures this phenomenon by revisiting the confrontation between journalist Edward R. Murrow and Senator Joseph McCarthy during the 1950s. The term ‘McCarthyism’ itself emerged from the senator’s methods, which included wild accusations hurled without proof, careers destroyed on suspicion, and a climate of fear promoted to silence critical voices.

Yet the film does not unfold McCarthy’s character as much as it peels back the layers of the newsroom. It shows how editorial boundaries, commercial pressures, and fear of losing business gradually suffocate journalistic courage. It reminds us that compromises do not arrive abruptly but creep in quietly. But it also shows that there is always a way out, a path that begins with vigilance, integrity and the refusal to accept intimidation.

Though set in the 1950s, Good Night, and Good Luck resonates with today’s local scenario in which political and media landscapes are witnessing their own version of McCarthyism where narratives are policed, loyalties questioned and fear weaponised. The film invites us to reflect not only on history, but on our own moment.

Political and media landscapes are witnessing their own version of McCarthyism.


An op-ed piece cannot do a full film review, and there is no plan to act as spoiler for those who have the film on their watch list. However, Cole Porter’s famous 1940s’ song, I’ve Got My Eyes On You, which also has the line ‘I’m checking all you do from A to Z’ has been masterfully used in the film and one can easily understand the context.

These are difficult times for journalism, especially the kind that once stood firmly against McCarthyism. The challenge intensifies when the media landscape drifts towards sensationalism and embraces the notion, as referenced in the film, that ‘yellow is better than red’. Those who attempt to expose strong-arm tactics today face familiar reprisals: loss of advertisements, government pressure, accusations of being unpatriotic, and even direct threats.

Yet vigilance makes all the difference. Logic, objectivity and professional reporting covering all essential angles of a story remain possible, though not without hardship. Whether in Gaza during Israel’s genocidal campaign against Palestinians, the recent events in Venezuela or the tragic incident in Minneapolis that law enforcement and President Donald Trump attempted to cover up, segments of the media have continued to perform their professional responsibilities despite immense pressure.

The world over, those subscribing to the tenets of McCarthyism, in every age, remain obsessed with the idea that hidden forces or subversive actors are out to destroy a nation. They believe only a coercive approach can confront such imagined threats. Witch-hunts become their tool; ‘witchcraft’ their political art. For those unfamiliar with the origins of this mentality, Europe’s experience between the 15th and 17th centuries is instructive. That era saw widespread accusations of witchcraft amid political instability, famine, disease, economic crises, and religious conflict. The clergy scapegoated ‘witches’ — mostly poor women — and Heinrich Kramer, a priest, authored the Hammer of Witches, a manual that claimed that the devil targeted women, especially those who defied husbands and social norms. Kramer weaponised fear with pseudo-logic, legitimising the witch trials that haunted Europe for nearly two centuries.

The ‘McCarthyism’ of any age depends on the same logic of ‘witchcraft’ and witch trials. If journalists or media groups anywhere come under pressure, the reason is often simple: they are challenging the McCarthyism of their time.

Pakistan has a long history of confronting a similar state-led approach — from sanctions and censorship under the Press and Publications Ordinance of 1960, which empowered the state to shut down newspapers and arrest journalists, to the pre-publication censorship imposed during the Bhutto and Zia regimes, and later the clampdowns, bans, and channel closures witnessed under Nawaz Sharif and Gen Pervez Musharraf. Since then, restrictions have only become more layered, whether under the PTI government or the PDM-led administrations.

Although a large proportion of media groups and even well-known journalists have compromised at various stages, a small but resilient community of journalists, along with a few strong-nerved media owners, has continued to challenge these pressures. Zameer Niazi documented much of this struggle, but in recent years, two important accounts have emerged from senior journalist Hussain Naqi. The first is his memoir, Mujh Se Jo Ho Saka, and the second is a compilation of an extended interview conducted by Dr Syed Jaffar Ahmed, published under the title Jurat-i-Inkaar. Both works capture not only Naqi’s personal journey but also the collective struggle that defines Pakistan’s political, social and journalistic history over the last seven decades.

This is, in many ways, a Pakistani version of Good Night and Good Luck, a narrative that deserves equal praise and could well be adapted into a screenplay. Hussain Naqi’s story makes one truth abundantly clear: subscribers to the McCarthy approach in successive Pakistani regimes have believed that the media is responsible for creating political instability and chaos. They succeeded in silencing the press for years, sometimes for entire decades, yet the country never escaped chronic instability.

Instead of reassessing their approach, they continue to rely on the same tactic of suppressing dissent, a strategy that has never produced the desired outcomes, nor is likely to in the future. The title of the film is borrowed from the famous line in Romeo and Juliet, ‘Good night, good night! Parting is such sweet sorrow”. But the film also subtly invokes another Shakespearean truth: “The fault … is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”


Published in Dawn, January 11th, 2026



Muhammad Amir Rana is a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.


Saturday, January 03, 2026

Revolution today

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar
Published January 2, 2026 
DAWN

IT is New Year’s Day, 2050. Pakistan’s 400 million people make it the world’s third most populous country. A four-decade-long youth bulge is as intense as ever, with half of the labour force between the ages of 15 and 29. Daily life is a rat race, punctuated by climate breakdown events and insurgencies. The state plays Leviathan under the guise of order.

As thought experiments go, projecting 24 years into the future on the basis of where we find ourselves today is no grand act of imagination. Only government propagandists and some mainstream commentators still argue that ‘Pakistan is turning a corner’. Most serious analyses acknowledge that the pace of economic, political, and social decay is hastening. Why engage in such gloomy scenarios? They compel us, I think, to imagine trajectories which are not only hopeful, but even revolutionary.

The idea of revolution has taken a beating since the end of the Cold War. US imperialism has backed a host of ‘coloured revolutions’ to roll back the legacies of the historic socialist revolutions and national liberation struggles of what Eric Hobsbawm called the short 20th century.

Here in Pakistan, where the left has been criminalised from the get-go, the meaning of revolution has been hollowed out further since the turn of the century by dictators like Musharraf and parachuted charlatans like Tahirul Qadri. Yet, a large number of digitally savvy youth consciously desire political transformation. The term ‘Gen Z revolt’ has gained great currency recently, following events in Bangladesh, Nepal, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka, where young people have exercised collective agency to overthrow incumbent regimes.

There is something heady about the fact that an otherwise amorphous, digitally connected cross-section of young people can crystallise into such a powerful force. But experience confirms that popular mobilisations can easily be co-opted, corrupted, or thwarted by the absence of a shared vision for substantive transformation.


The idea of revolution has taken a beating.

The recently scripted ‘Gen Z revolt’ in Mexico that reads like a Washington-backed ‘coloured revolution’ is only the most prominent example. Closer to home, Bangladesh’s ‘revolution’ has increasingly turned sour, perhaps unsurprisingly given the dubious politics of figureheads like Muhammad Younus.

How, then, do we make sense of this contradictory political landscape? Young political subjects are certainly willing and able to name structures of power, and even challenge them. But without romanticising the socialist revolutions and decolonisation movements of the past, what we miss today are organised mass parties with a clear ideological agenda. It is one thing to coalesce around the wrongs of the system on digital networks, but quite another to organise at the grassroots to put in place an alternative socioeconomic and political system.

We may not see another era of mass parties, featuring trade unions and popular peasant organisations. Successful political entities that claim mass membership today largely rely on effective digital mobilisation strategies without necessarily sustaining parallel grassroots organisation. The PTI is the most obvious example. Indeed, it embodies many of the fundamental contradictions of the prototypical online Gen Z subject. Despite all that has happened since April 2022, is the ‘youth’ that catapulted the PTI to prominence 15 years ago now decisively opposed to Pakistan’s militarised and imperialised structure of power? Or is it still liable to co-option in intra-elite factional struggles?

Whatever the PTI’s future, there are still enough reasons to believe that Pakistan’s young working masses can come together to avert the dystopic scenario outlined at the outset. The crucial ideological pillars of a collective political project would read like this: 1) a developmental trajectory beyond capitalism featuring mass redistribution, job-creating industrialisation, and ecological regeneration; 2) an end to the brutalisation of ethnic peripheries and the crafting of a new, multinational identity; 3) ending the hegemony of the national security apparatus, decolonisation of Pakistani statecraft, and enshrining people’s needs as the object of state policy; 4) a commitment to redressing patriarchal violence — structural and physical — at all levels of state and society; 5) articulation of anti-imperialism and principles of non-alignment in foreign ties by discontinuing the state’s historical policies of auctioning the country’s geostrategic location, its natural resources, and labour for imperialist rents.

We are far from realising such an ideological agenda at present. But no matter how intellectually pessimistic we must be in the face of dark realities, we can retain a modicum of hope that such revolutionary horizons can still exist.

Published in Dawn, January 2nd, 2026


The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Saturday, December 20, 2025

Islamabad the ugly
Published December 19, 2025
DAWN


IT is a truism that Pakistan is an extremely class-divided society. From the proverbial village to the metropolitan city, the brutal reality of an anti-poor system stares us in the face, assuming we choose to open our eyes and look.

In late November, the Capital Develop­ment Authority (CDA) initiated a mass eviction in a sprawling katchi abadi sandwiched between the Bari Imam shrine and the President’s House. The abadi, known as Muslim Colony, has existed for at least five decades, and by conservative estimates was home to 20,000 working people, making it arguably the largest informal settlement in Islamabad.

Muslim Colony’s first-generation residents literally built Islamabad with their own hands, including the grand buildings on Constitution Avenue that overlooked their shanties. Over the years, a significant number of Muslim Colony residents became the drivers, gardeners, cooks and cleaners that sustain the ruling classes’ offices and homes.

As construction workers and service providers, katchi abadi dwellers are never ‘security risks’ — in fact it is their labour which explains the palatial lifestyles of Islamabad and Rawalpindi elites. But when push came to shove, the CDA and what seemed like most of Islamabad’s police force forcibly dispossessed Muslim Colony residents of their homes. Anyone who dared peacefully resist faced violent arrest and harassment.

And the courts? The evictees were principally protected by at least two stay orders, one issued by the Supreme Court in 2015 after another mass eviction of a katchi abadi in sector I-11 of the capital, and another more recent one issued by the Islamabad High Court after Muslim Colony residents approached it.

The eviction crews, led by highly educated CDA officers, treated the court orders as mere pieces of paper worth less than the cost of their printing. Perhaps we should not be surprised at the contempt of the bureaucratic apparatuses of the state for even the little relief provided by the superior courts to the working poor in this country — after all, ex-military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf once boasted that the Constitution is merely a piece of paper that can be ripped up and tossed into the proverbial dustbin.


Katchi abadi dwellers are never ‘security risks’.

Katchi abadis and their violent dispossession expose one of the most long-standing myths in Pakistan. They say ‘Islamabad the beautiful’ is the most liveable city in Pakistan, a planned metropolis of world-class standard. To begin with, the CDA and successive militarised hybrid regimes that back it have turned Islamabad into a concrete jungle, allowing all sorts of commercial activities in the Margalla hills while fronting relentless construction of big thoroughfares and plazas to serve the suburban rich. All this has made the city even less liveable for the mass of its working people alongside students who in-migrate to acquire an education.

Renting a home, let alone buying one, is virtually impossible for a working-class household in Islamabad. The city’s real estate was already more expensive than Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar or Quetta even before post-2000 heralded a great new land grab by property speculators and real estate developers. Apparently, all of this was and continues to be facilitated by the CDA, which has wilfully made a mockery of the 1960 Master Plan, occasionally making changes in zoning by-laws to provide post-facto cover to all sorts of profit-making abominations.

Meanwhile, katchi abadis have continued to proliferate because the working masses do, after all, need shelter. There are now approximately 50 settlements in Islamabad with a total population of more than 500,000. Another one of the my­­ths that has been peddled by the CDA and others of its ilk — who want the labour of working people but refuse to acknowledge their basic needs — is that katchi abadi dwellers are free riders and land grabbers who are essentially har­ming the public good. This, quite simply, is a lie.

Katchi abadis come into being through fully-functioning informal housing markets in which cash exchanges hands between the users of land (katchi abadi residents), the administrators of land (government functionaries) and informal middlemen. The government functionaries are at the apex of this arrangement because they pocket a ‘monthly rent’ while always retaining the power to arbitrarily pull the plug and bulldoze the settlement.

This is what happened in Muslim Colony as it has happened in many other katchi abadis. And given the complete impunity of those who perpetrate so-called ‘anti-encroachment operations’, they will not stop. But working people will not be swallowed up by the ground either. It is they who make Islamabad what it is. Without them, it is but an ugly reflection of the larger class war waged by this country’s rapacious and shameless elite.

Published in Dawn, December 19th, 2025


The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.



Wednesday, November 19, 2025

 PAKISTAN

A State Betrayed


The 27th Amendment rewrites Pakistan’s rules and hands its courts and army to the powerful few.

According to Santiago Canton, the ICJ Secretary General, the 27th amendment introduces changes that raise serious concern. He warns that these shifts could weaken the courts’ role in checking executive power and compromise the basic rights of people in Pakistan.

Parliament has created a new Federal Constitutional Court and moved many core powers from the Supreme Court to that new body, including original jurisdiction over constitutional disputes and the transfer of all pending constitutional appeals and suo motu cases to the FCC.

Pakistan is already facing deep political strain, and any move that reduces judicial independence will only intensify public mistrust. Legal experts warn that once constitutional checks grow weak, governments tend to stretch their authority further, often at the cost of civil liberties. This amendment also arrives at a time when civic space is shrinking and voices questioning state decisions face growing pressure. If these trends continue, ordinary citizens will lose their last reliable shield against abuse of power, leaving the justice system unable to protect those who need it most.

That change is not a technical tweak. The FCC will be staffed by judges chosen under an altered appointments regime that gives the executive far greater control. High court judges can be shifted between provinces on presidential orders after a JCP recommendation, and a judge who refuses transfer may be deemed retired. These rules strip judges of institutional independence and make transfers a political tool rather than an administrative measure.

Parliament also removed the Supreme Court’s suo motu powers by deleting Articles 184, 186 and 191A. That change closes a potent front of public accountability that ordinary citizens and bar bodies used to reach the top bench quickly. The new arrangement reorders courts so that constitutional review sits behind a court whose judges are more directly tied to the executive.

Article 243 of the Constitution has been rewritten to create a post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) to be held by the army chief. The amendment abolishes the Chairman Joint Chiefs (CJCSC) slot and concentrates command over the army, navy and air force under one figure. The move also creates a National Strategic Command for nuclear oversight, but crucially it locks the head of that command to appointments made in consultation with the army chief.

The bill grants five-star officers constitutional protections that are almost absolute. These officers keep rank and privileges for life and enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution that cannot be removed except by a two thirds parliamentary vote. That raises a stark inequality. Elected leaders remain removable by simple majority. The amendment gives permanent legal shelter to the uniformed elite and places civilian politicians at a structural disadvantage.

The personal fallout has been dramatic. Senior jurists reacted within hours. Two Supreme Court judges Justice Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Athar Minallah tendered resignations in protest, calling the amendment a grave assault on the Constitution and saying they could not sit on a court reduced to a shadow of its former role. A senior member of the Law and Justice Commission and former Attorney General Advocate Makhdoom Ali Khan also resigned. These departures are not routine. They mark a collapse of faith inside institutions meant to protect rights and law.

The manner of passage deepens the injury. The amendment moved through the cabinet and both houses in fast and contested sittings. The Senate vote came amid an opposition boycott and the National Assembly approved the bill by the numbers the ruling coalition mustered. Critics point to a lack of sincere debate, to rushed drafting and to last minute textual changes that favour continuity of political control rather than consensus rebuilding.

A particularly alarming detail in the file is the clause that secures the army chief’s position for an extended period. The record notes that Field Marshal Asim Munir will remain army chief and Chief of Defence Forces until 2030, a change that would make him the longest serving army chief without formal martial law. That is not symbolism. It is constitutional entrenchment of a single person’s dominance.

The political and social reaction has been mixed, but a strong current of alarm runs through lawyers civil society and parts of the public. International commentators and regional observers described the move as a major erosion of civilian control. Grassroots hashtags and street protests capture a sense of betrayal and fear that the formal rules of the republic have been rewritten to favour the khaki order.

Defenders argue the amendment unclogs court backlogs and modernises military coordination. They say a specialised FCC will speed constitutional adjudication and that a single defence chief can improve strategic command. Those arguments matter on paper, but they do not explain or justify the permanent legal shields and the transfer of appointment power from neutral bodies to political ones. The speed and balance of the reforms matter as much as their technical claims.

So where does Pakistan go from here? The amendment alters the field but it does not erase civic memory or legal debate. Courts that survive the political pressure can still interpret the text. Bar associations and civil rights groups can press cases that test the limits of immunity and transfer powers. Political parties and citizens can use every lawful tool to restore balance. The road will be long and fraught, but institutions are not dead unless everyone gives up.

In conclusion the 27th Amendment is a turning point. It rewrites the balance between people courts and the uniform. It makes impunity structural and places lasting authority in hands that answer first to the uniform not the ballot. That is the substance of the grievance judges lawyers and citizens now voice. If Pakistan is to survive as a republic governed by law the response must be calm smart and constitutional, not only loud. The work of repair must begin now.

Syed Salman Mehdi is a freelance writer and researcher with a keen interest in social, political, and human rights issues. He has written extensively on topics related to sectarian violence, governance, and minority rights, with a particular focus on South Asia. His work has been published in various media outlets, and he is passionate about raising awareness on critical human rights concerns. Read other articles by Syed.
State and its pillars

Arifa Noor 
Published November 18, 2025
DAWN


NOW that the 27th Amendment has been passed, some in the legal profession and others are mourning the new subservience of the judiciary, going as far as to say that the third pillar of government has come crashing down.

Of course, what is less mourned, perhaps, is that the second pillar, parliament, is no longer standing upright either. Having been weakened over the years, it no longer functions as an independent branch either. It sits, stands and runs around in circles on cue — from the leadership of the political parties and the known unknowns. There were hints of it during the passage of the 18th Amendment but the slide began in earnest later — from the lightening-fast approval given to Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa’s extension to the present when constitutional amendments are passed within days. The ‘public representatives’ are led by the Pied Piper to the ‘ayes’ gallery when the vote is needed and there is little choice in the matter. And it doesn’t matter if they are sitting on the treasury benches or are in the opposition.

The executive may have had its hand strengthened by the recent legislation, but simply on paper. But its ability to make decisions is now a thing of the past. The only reason it is perhaps not discussed much is that its helplessness is hidden behind closed doors. In private rooms, it is hard to say who is chairing meetings or making the decisions. The capitulation is just not as public as in the case of the legislature even though the results are visible to all.

Indeed, there is little hope that any of the three pillars of the state are intact.


There is little hope that any of the three pillars of the state are intact.

But in the land of the pure, political theories remain just that — theories. Here, the pillars of the state weaken and crumble, straining just to stay upright but in our everyday lingo, the word ‘state’ is used to denote our respect and our acknowledgement of the power and influence of one institution. At times, we use the word also to concede our own vulnerability. But that is another story.

The state hasn’t been left untouched either. The 27th Amendment has brought sweeping reforms to the structure of the armed forces as well. Among other things, the new legislation has discontinued the joint chief position and introduced a new CDF, a position which will be held by the chief of army staff, who now appears to be far more than the ‘first among equals’. At the same time, the tenure of all services chiefs has been increased from three to five years. The head — COAS/CDF — has also been given lifetime immunity, like the president.

It is being said this will help prepare the armed forces for modern warfare and allow for the kind of coordination that was perhaps not possible earlier. Time and again, those who claim to understand how warfare works argue this, but their language explains little to those of us not in the know. These new changes will bring or improve combat readiness, synergy, multi-domain integration — though what this means in practical terms remains unclear to those of us who have never worn a uniform.

It is easier, however, to understand the far simpler concerns or worries that are being put forward.

There are fears that these changes may allow for centralisation of power in a single post/individual that is also above the law. Of course, some can argue that strong men who claimed to speak for or on behalf of the state were always above the law — the trial of Musharraf is a case in point — but now this has been put down on paper. But in a country such as Pakistan where checks on the ruling elite have always remained weak, the precedent being set by offering immunity to any government official is worrying. Others will want to follow suit in the future, as it will encourage decision-making without any fear of accountability.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, questions have been raised about what this will mean for the other two forces and their ability to make decisions or have their views heard if the perception of equality between all three forces is not acknowledged on paper. This, it is feared, will impact not just the morale but also decision-making.

How will it impact decisions about resource allocation, or decisions taken during times of conflict? Will the other services chiefs still be able to make their voice heard, ask some? Here, some insiders have mentioned the 2019 skirmish with India where they claim the then chief of army staff was outvoted when deciding the response to India. This account has been questioned, but as an anecdote it does urge more clarity on how decisions will be made. Will collegial decision-making, which some say has been at work till now, continue once the new structures are in place?

These questions are being asked partly because there is no transparent debate on the changes. If the discussions were open, such questions would not fester.

But beyond the powers, in Pakistan, there is always the worry about how the politics of any changes will play out. A case in point is the frenzied politicking over key non-political appointments as we have seen in the recent past. And one wonders that if powers are further centralised in new positions, whether it will encourage newcomers and aspirants to lobby in new and more aggressive ways for key positions as well as exceptional promotions. The long-term impact of this will not just weaken civilian actors and institutions; this is not one-way traffic.

In a fast-fragmenting state and society where legislation is being used to hollow out institutions such as the judiciary, any new factors that can further add to centralisation of power and increased politicking should worry us all — till some solid answers are provided.

The writer is a journalist.

Published in Dawn, November 18th, 2025

Saturday, October 25, 2025

PAKISTAN

TLP ban



Editorial 
Published October 25, 2025 
DAWN

AFTER the federal cabinet approved the ban on the TLP a day earlier, the interior ministry published a notification on Friday saying that the state believed there were “reasonable grounds” to proscribe the hard-line outfit due to its connection with “terrorism”.

Going by the government’s signals, a formal ban had seemed imminent after TLP cadres clashed with the state in a deadly showdown last week. The immediate trigger was the administration’s refusal to let the outfit march on Islamabad in supposed solidarity with Gaza. This would be the second time the religiously inspired party has been banned. The last proscription in 2021 lasted only a few months, but this time the state appears intent on sustaining the ban. However, one should keep in mind that extremist parties and groups have been banned earlier too, but have re-emerged under new monikers.

PML-N leader and adviser to the PM Rana Sanaullah has said that the state had no issue with the TLP’s religious views and the ban was not designed to ‘eliminate’ the party. Rather, it was supposed to purge “anti-state and terrorist elements”. Going by this logic, if the aim is to target individuals who break the law, why does the state ban parties and groups?

Moreover, in the past, how many heads of militant groups, sectarian outfits and extremist parties have been tried for their crimes? The state’s history of banning groups — from the Musharraf era to date — does not inspire confidence, as outfits are proscribed on paper, but cases against their leaders and active cadres are not diligently pursued. There is also the genuine fear that the powers that be may apply the labels of ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ to ban political parties that have fallen afoul of the state.

In reality, the policy of banning groups is tragicomic. Nacta’s current list of proscribed organisations contains over 80 entries, with some going as far back as 2001. Most of the groups that populate this list ascribe to jihadi, sectarian or extremist ideologies, with a smattering of separatist and ethno-nationalist outfits. But the modus operandi of ‘banned’ groups is to restart work under new names after the ban. For example, Jamaatud Dawa, an incarnation of Lashkar-i-Taiba, has at least 10 aliases, most of which are banned. Moreover, sectarian outfit Sipah-i-Sahaba, which now operates under the ASWJ moniker, has worked under three different names, some banned, others not.

The point is that unless the leaders and members of extremist groups are prosecuted for their crimes — promoting terrorism, inciting violence, hate speech, etc — the state’s attempts to impose bans will not work. The state has banned TLP today, but until those associated with it who have broken the law are prosecuted, it may re-emerge tomorrow in an even more extreme form.

Published in Dawn, October 25th, 2025


The ‘operation’
Published October 25, 2025 
DAWN

WE have been here before. Religious militants previously patronised by the state and valorised by the official intelligentsia are cut down to size in a ferocious high-profile operation. A vocal section of the educated classes, predominantly of liberal persuasion, applaud the state’s new-found resolve to ‘crush terrorism’.

The ‘popular’ backing for the crackdown gives the state carte blanche, but it soon becomes apparent that neither the ideological foundations nor the material bases of religious militancy have been weakened. Meanwhile, the proverbial counterterrorism card is increasingly deployed to clamp down on political opponents in particular, and progressive voices in general.

With the federal government having just notified a ban on the TLP for a second time, will things turn out any differently this time? To be sure, the existential challenge posed by religious militancy extends beyond the TLP, as the recent blowback vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban — and their TTP protégés — lays bare.

The Pakhtun tribal districts have of course experienced the most military operations against ‘terrorists’. Time and again, lofty claims of success have been belied by the killing and maiming of innocents, and destruction of local people’s livelihoods. The end result has been alienation of the very people that should otherwise be the primary beneficiary of any initiative to establish genuine and lasting peace. Recent operations and drone strikes in Bajaur and Tirah are a rinse and repeat of what has been happening for 20 years.

What authorities call ‘collateral damage’ shows the short-sightedness of state policy. One can oppose the ideology of the TLP and its normalisation of mob lynching, whilst at the same time acknowledging that Barelvi militancy has deep social backing that will not be severed magically by the Muridke operation and subsequent criminalisation of the TLP leadership.


Will things be different after the TLP ban?

The government repeating ad nauseam that only three civilians were killed is out of sync with the widespread allegation — not limited only to TLP supporters — that many more died. Whichever version of the event one may believe, the point is that the lives lost in the operation will likely serve as a rallying call that further entrenches the insular Barelvi militant worldview, whether that takes the form of the TLP or something else in the future.

After all, militant ideologies are founded upon concrete material bases. Beyond the Noor Wali Mehsuds and Saad Rizvis of the world, many rank-and-file members of Islamist organisations are drawn towards militancy at least in part because they hail from socially depressed classes and castes. The violent assertion that they experience when they join the organisations is, seen thus, a reaction to the conditions of their existence.

Too often, the liberal commentariat sees the phenomenon of religiously inspired militancy like a light switch that was once turned on by the state, and can therefore be turned off in much the same way. The state has long weaponised religion and much would change if it stopped patronising militant groups for cynical reasons. But launching the odd operation against a ‘good’ Taliban or TLP that has gone ‘bad’ does not mean that the societal roots of militant ideologies have been emptied out. Bear in mind that retrogressive educational curricula and popular media discourses remain unreformed.

Liberal euphoria at the temporary ‘victories’ of the state should not distract from the fact that there is no substitute for the popularisation of a meaningful progressive political alternative that can channel the needs and desires of the mass of you­ng people — prim­arily men but also women — who gra­vitate towards the militant right.


Does this mean that there should be no punitive action against religiously motivated militants who thrive on killing? Not at all. There can and must be consequences for those who weaponise religion to further their violent agenda — without resort to extra-legal mechanisms. By the same token, the strategic masterminds who cultivated the militant right should not be allowed to get away scot-free while shifting the burden of their entire enterprise onto the brutalised young men — and sometimes women — who become the foot soldiers of hate.

Ultimately, a comprehensive ‘operation’ to displace retrogressive ideologies from society will be completed regardless of the state’s expediency. Whenever this comes to pass it will be performed by pro-people left-progressives that take back the language of class and anti-imperialism from the right. The establishment cultivated the religious right at least in part to suppress the ideology and politics of the left. The latter must rebuild its own bases amongst working people for the tide of history to turn once again.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.


Published in Dawn, October 25th, 2025

Monday, October 06, 2025

 

Pakistan As A Consequence Of The Partition Of British India In 1947 – Analysis

India Pakistan Map South Asia Bangladesh

By 


Pakistan as a country

Pakistan is a country located in the northwest of the Indian sub-continent. It borders Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the north-west, China on the north-east, and India on the east, with the direct exit to the Arabian Sea. 


Physically, from the rest of Asia, Pakistan is separated in the north by the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and the Himalaya high ring of mountain chains. Other mountain ranges are going down on the Pakistani western side to the Arabian Sea. Below them is the long and broad valley of the Indus River. The Province of the North-West Frontier contains the strategically very important Khyber Pass, which is very high. Toward the south is the Punjab plateau. It is watered by the tributaries of the Indus River, where wheat is grown. However, to the east is the Thar Desert. It is important to stress that between the Sind Desert, which covers part of the Indus delta, and Baluchistan in the western hills, there are large reserves of natural gas and, to a certain extent, oil, which is also found in Punjab.  

Pakistan has a predominantly agricultural economy. The focal export goods are raw and processed cotton, cotton fabrics, and rice. Other agricultural products include sugar cane, wheat, and maize. Livestock-raising is important too. Textiles are an important part of the Pakistani industry and are substantially contributing to Pakistani exports. Other industries include chemicals, cement production, fertilizer, and food processing. 

Population

The inhabitants of Pakistan are about 88% Pakistani Muslims, while there are about 11% Indians (Hindi). Of all the other ethnic groups, Baluchistanis are the most numerous. Baluchistan, as a province, is the least populated. With the partition of British India in 1947 into Pakistan and India, Pakistan received a predominantly Muslim population as well as a larger number of Indians, and vice versa. In the period from 1947 to 1950, population exchange between Pakistan and India, including ethnic cleansing, reached the scale of several million inhabitants in both directions. In Pakistan, the official language is Urdu (the Muslim variant of the Hindi language), which in 1972 replaced English as the official language. However, several other local/regional languages ​​are in use. In 1970, 80% of Pakistan’s inhabitants were illiterate, which caused a lack of professional and educated staff, and this was especially felt in the administration and economy. 

For the sake of more comprehensive education and the reduction of illiteracy, in September 1972, 176 private colleges were nationalized. There were three universities in Pakistan then. About 15% of the population lived in cities, while there were 10 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. The capital of Pakistan was Rawalpindi from 1959, while today it is Islamabad. Until 1959, the largest city in Pakistan was Karachi. Today, Pakistan has a population of 251 million in an area of ​​881,913 sq. km. The GDP is 373 billion dollars, while the GDP per capita is almost 1500 dollars.

State organization

With the division of the British colony of (British) India into two states, India and Pakistan, on August 15th, 1947, Pakistan received the status of dominion, and according to the constitution of February 29th, 1956, it became a republic – the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, composed of two federal units: West and East Pakistan.


By the military coup of October 1958, the constitution was abolished, and a new one was adopted in March 1962. This new constitution provided for a federal system of government, a presidential system of government (the president must be a Muslim and is elected for 5 years), a National Assembly of 156 deputies (78 deputies from each of the two federal units) and two capital cities: Islamabad in West Pakistan (seat of the central government) and Dhaka in East Pakistan (seat of the National Assembly). However, the constitution from 1962 was repealed on March 25th, 1969, and only partially reinstated on April 4th, 1969. 

A turning point in Pakistan’s history was the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in December 1971, when East Pakistan declared itself an independent state under the name Bangladesh. Thus, the new state of Pakistan included only the territory of the former West Pakistan. In January 1972, Pakistan left the British Commonwealth.

A modern history of Pakistan up to the Partition in 1947

Pakistan is a country that came under British colonial control in the first half of the 19th century, when it became part of (a Greater) British India. Interestingly, its name is derived from the word “pak” (ritually pure) in the Urdu language. In other words, it means “Land of the Pure”. However, it is as well as an acronym for its most important component peoples: Punjabis, Afghans, Kashmirs, Sindhis, and the peoples of Baluchistan.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were only a several moves towards independence. One of the reasons was that those people living in the north in Punjab and Kashmir have been great beneficiaries of the British Raj, and occupied important posts in the administration and army of British India. It was among the more disadvantaged Muslim minority in north-central India that a Muslim cultural and political identity began to form, mainly due to several reformers and organizations like the Muslim League, a party founded on December 30th, 1906, in Dacca. Originally, the party fought for separate Muslim representation at all levels of government. The party claimed to represent the grievances and demands of the entire Muslim community within British India. 

Under its leader, Jinnah, the Muslim League issued several requirements for greater rights of Indian Muslims in a vast country of British India in which Muslims at that time accounted for some ¼ of the total population. Nevertheless, this political demand became all the more urgent with the increasing momentum of the Indian National Congress (the INC) under M. Gandhi, which made self-government or even independence under a Hindu-dominated government all but inevitable during the 1930s. In the first decades of its existence, the Muslim League pursued the dual aim of winning greater rights of self-government from the British colonial power and of winning greater rights for Muslims within such a British system. In order to achieve the first aim, the Muslim League cooperated with the INC, with which it allied itself in the Lucknow Pact of December 1916. However, the League was largely ineffective in the 1920s, when it claimed to have some 1.000 members in the whole of British India. This led to a decade in the 1930s of a major revision of the political goals of the Muslim League and the organization itself for the sake of appealing to the disparate Muslim community. 

The League, in 1930, addressed its annual conference to demand, for the first time, a separate Muslim state in the western portion of British India. This demand became gradually accepted, particularly after the Muslim League’s catastrophic showing in the 1937 elections, when it gained only 104 out of 489 Muslim seats. Therefore, its leader, Jinnah, now sought to broaden its popular base. On March 23rd, 1940, the requirement for a separate Muslim state became accepted as the official party’s policy in the coming years. It was known as the Pakistan Resolution or the Lahore Resolution, which, in fact, warned that if conditions for Muslims, especially in areas with a Muslim minority, did not improve, Muslims would lay claim to separate states as their homelands. The very idea of separate Muslim states referred to the western provinces of British India and East Bengal. The Muslim League in 1944 claimed over 2.000.000 members. The League got in the 1945−1946 elections 75% of the Muslim vote. Therefore, the Muslim League got a popular mandate for the creation of a separate Muslim state in the western regions of British India. This task was finally achieved by the creation of an independent Pakistan on August 15th, 1947. However, initially dominant in Pakistani politics, after the death of its party’s leader, Jinnah, the Muslim League lacked an integrative force and soon dissolved into various groups in the coming decade.  

All the countries of South Asia have been troubled by the special position of minorities and of regional groups. The Indian government’s attempt to foster Hindi was soon faced by demands for a new structure of states on linguistic lines, and from the 1950s onward, state boundaries have been rearranged. However, the linguistic feeling remained strong, especially in South India in Madras State, which was renamed Tamil Nadu. Before 1947, Pakistan formed part of British India, but following the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan was created as a separate state, comprising the territory to the north-east and north-west of ex-British India in which the population was predominantly Muslim. In Pakistan, linguistic and regional demands were initially resisted, and the separate provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated as One Unit. However, regional loyalties forced a return to the old provinces, representing linguistic regions, in 1970. In East Pakistan, the strength of Bengal culture and grievances against the dominant West Pakistan elite fostered a demand for autonomy and later for independence.  

The Partition in 1947

For the reason that no agreement could be reached on a unified form of independence, a decision was required about the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The areas in the northwest with a Muslim majority were allowed to choose separation and the formation of a new state of Pakistan. The provinces of British India, which were affected, voted either through their elected representatives or by plebiscite. The rulers of the princely states within British India chose whether to join the independent state of India or where their boundaries marched with the new partition line, Pakistan. Punjab and Bengal were separately partitioned. Independence came to India and Pakistan in August 1947, to Burma in January 1948, and to Ceylon in February 1948. 

In India, it was fraught with problems from the beginning. The major part of the Indian sub-continent wished to remain united under the leadership of Nehru and the Indian National Congress. However, the explosive situation and the impossibility of securing agreement between Congress and the Muslim League led by Jinnah forced the hand of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and on August 14th, 1947, the sub-continent became partitioned and the new state of Pakistan (physically composed of two parts) came into existence. The princely states (500+) have been left to the individual decisions of their rulers, who could, in effect, join either India or Pakistan if their boundaries marched with the new partition lines.

For both India and Pakistan, the first question was the delimitation of frontiers between the new states. However, this question particularly affected the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, where the populations were so mixed that partition seemed the only feasible solution (like in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s). But the boundary award cut through areas which in Punjab were occupied by rich farmlands populated by Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus as neighbors.   

Nevertheless, the partition of British India soon led to the high rank of violence between Hindus and Muslims as communal riots followed, and a two-way exodus started, with Muslims moving west and Sikhs and Hindus moving east, with more than 1 million people killed. Around 7.5 million Muslim refugees fled to both parts of Pakistan from India, and around 10 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India. The partition of Bengal produced similar results. Overall, some 500.000 people lost their lives. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League, became Pakistan’s first governor-general (President). The new state was composed of the western provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, and North-West Frontier (or known as West Pakistan). Separated by Indian territory was the eastern half of Bengal, which also belonged to the newly proclaimed independent Pakistan (or known as East Pakistan).

In addition to the resettlement of the refugees, the governments had to integrate the 500+ princely states. Most princes were persuaded to accede, promptly, to either India or Pakistan. Hyderabad resisted and became absorbed only after the action by the security forces (police). The ruler of Kashmir as well as hesitated, and an invasion of tribesmen from the Pakistani North West Frontier Province followed. The Maharaja then acceded to India, subject to a plebiscite of the Kashmir people, but Pakistan supported the tribal invaders. The situation was only stabilized by the mediation of the UN in 1949. 

The new state of Pakistan was, from the very beginning, confronted by plenty of problems. The most immediate of these was extensive migration (around 17.5 million people), as a consequence of the partition of British India into a Hindu and Muslim state. In addition, Pakistan contested its borders, as it competed with India over control of Kashmir. This confrontation has led to hostile relations with India up to today and the conduct of three Indo-Pakistani Wars. Moreover, Pakistan suffered as well from the tension between the majority of the population living in East Pakistan and the important posts in government, administration, and the military being occupied by officials from the wealthier and better-educated West Pakistan. These problems have been compounded by the total lack of any tradition or history as a single, unitary state. On one hand, East Pakistan (or East Bengal) was relatively homogeneous, but on the other hand, West Pakistan was composed of regions with widely different economies and ethnicities and with different degrees of religious observance. Some tribes of the North-West Frontier had devout observance of Islam and a history of autonomy within the former British colonial system. They have been contrasted with the more secular elite of Punjab, which had been well integrated into the British colonial administration.   

A contemporary history of Pakistan since the Partition in 1947 up to 9/11

The problem of finding a compromise that would create a viable, integrated, and constitutional entity bedeviled Pakistan during its existence. Pakistan continued to be formally ruled by the 1935 Government of India Act until 1956. The country’s liberal constitution became opposed by the fundamentalist Muslims, and in 1951, the Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated by an Afghan fundamentalist. In 1954, a state of emergency was declared, and a new constitution was adopted in 1956. However, the new political settlement failed to stabilize the country sufficiently to prevent the 1958 army coup, led by Ayub Khan. It was an attempt to adopt a multiparty system, but it failed, and consequently, Ayub Khan imposed martial law in 1958. He, in fact, abolished the recently established democracy but without much resistance, and devised a second constitution in 1962. 

On the other hand, Ayub Khan’s decade of power produced economic growth, followed, however, by political resentment as the two parts of the Pakistani state have been physically separated by a thousand kilometers of the territory of the independent and hostile Republic of India. Allegations by the Bengalis in East Pakistan against West Pakistan’s disproportionate share of the state’s assets led to demands by the Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, for regional autonomy. Nonetheless, in the following civil war in 1971, the Bengali dissidents defeated the Pakistani army, with help from India. It resulted in the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh in the same year. 

In 1965, Pakistan attempted to infiltrate troops into Kashmir. In the fighting which ensued, India made some gains, but in the agreement afterward reached in Tashkent under Soviet auspices, both countries agreed to return to the status quo. His precipitation of a costly and unsuccessful war with India over Kashmir in 1965, and increasing economic difficulties in Pakistan, finally led to his resignation in 1969. Relations between Pakistan and India continued to be tense, however, and rapidly worsened in 1971 when Pakistani military President, Yahya Khan, cruelly repressed the demands for autonomy in East Pakistan (East Bengal, later Bangladesh), which led to 10 million refugees crossing over into India. 

In 1970, the first-ever general democratic election has been organized, which brought to power in Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party. However, these elections were won by the Awami League in East Pakistan. Therefore, the West Pakistani political establishment, led by Yahya Khan, refused to hand over power and sent military troops to secure control in East Pakistan. This action caused a short but extremely violent civil war, and led, after Indian military intervention in December 1971, which supported the Bangladesh guerrilla with powerful military forces, which defeated the Pakistani army within two weeks, to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. Zulfikar Bhutto, as the new President since 1971, created a populist and socialist regime. His program of nationalization, public works, and independence from US financial help failed to overcome the negative effects of the oil price shock of 1973, leading Pakistan into an economic crisis. He introduced constitutional, social, and economic reforms, but in 1977 was deposed in an army coup led by Zia-ul-Haq and later executed.   

Zia-ul-Haq improved Pakistani relations with the USA after the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in 1979, when Pakistan came to host up to three million Afghan refugees, followed by bases for Afghan guerrillas. US military and civilian assistance led to high economic growth in the 1980s. However, Zia-ul-Haq died in a 1988 plane crash. His successor, Ishaq Khan, supervised the transition back to democracy, with the 1988 elections won by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto. She failed to establish control over the country and was dismissed by Khan in 1990 on charges of corruption. However, she became re-elected in 1993, but once again struggled to maintain control in a country plagued by crime, the international drugs trade, and the growing assertiveness of some of the Pakistani provinces (Baluchistan and Sind) and tribes (North West Frontier Province). 

Benazir Bhutto became dismissed by President Leghari once again on formal charges of corruption and mismanagement in 1996 and was finally succeeded by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Islamic Democratic Alliance) in 1997, who proceeded to strengthen his position by changing the constitution, which limited the power of the Prime Minister (the PM). Nevertheless, he as well as confronted the judiciary, which he sought to conciliate towards his policies. Ultimately, in 1999, he sought to introduce Islamic law in Pakistan, but this attempt led to widespread demonstrations, while at the same time, the deteriorating economic situation had already eroded Sharif’s popular support, and for the reason of his pro-Western position during the First Gulf War/Desert Storm, 1990‒1991. His order to the army to withdraw forces from Kashmir and his dismissal of Musharraf led to a successful army coup, headed by Musharraf himself, who suspended the constitution, moved to put Pakistani political and judicial institutions under military control, and tried to stabilize the economy to placate international creditors. After establishing control, Musharraf’s regime became more liberal. However, it happened only after 9/11 (in 2001) that his regime became welcomed in the Western international arena. His decisive support of the US War on Terrorism brought great foreign policy benefits and enabled him to gain very much-needed Western international loans. Nevertheless, his pro-US stance was criticized by many Islamic fundamentalists and radicals in Pakistan, so that needed to temper by a moderate stance towards radical Islamist groups in Kashmir. In 1998, Pakistan carried out a series of underground nuclear tests in response to a similar program by the focal regional enemy – India. 

The political situation in Pakistan remained turbulent, including intra-ethnic violence in Karachi, followed by national economic problems. Pakistani industrial expansion emphasized the private sector and consumer goods. Nonetheless, unemployment rose more rapidly than new production, and up to 70% of the population is still dependent on agriculture. Both governments of India and Pakistan have been putting greater emphasis on better yields from the soil. Though the rate of growth remains slow, both India and Pakistan have succeeded in attaining self-sufficiency in food. Yet some 40% of the rural population remains undernourished because their income is very low.  

Finally, from 1947 up to 1971, there were three Pakistani-Indian Wars: the First (1947‒1948); the Second (September 1st‒23rd, 1965); and the Third (December 3rd‒16th, 1971). These Pakistani-Indian wars were the result of unresolved issues, but especially border-territorial ones, between Pakistan and India that appeared after the British division of the Indian subcontinent, i.e., of British India, in August 1947 between these two states. As a consequence of the Third War, Pakistan lost its eastern territories, on which the new state of Bangladesh was formed. After the war, the general balance of power on the Indian subcontinent changed in India’s favour. India, also improved its strategic and geopolitical position. Nevertheless, the region of Kashmir has been left to be he apple of discord between Pakistan and India to our da

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.