Russia and Myanmar sign ten documents as Putin dangles LNG, nuclear power and a deep-water port

Min Aung Hlaing's first Moscow trip as president produced a long list of agreements, an anti-sanctions declaration and very little trade. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 19, 2026

Russia and Myanmar signed ten documents in the Kremlin on August 18, including a joint declaration on countering Western sanctions.

The talks between Vladimir Putin and Myanmar's president Min Aung Hlaing produced a package covering nuclear power, liquefied natural gas, a deep-water port and search-and-rescue satellites.

It was the former junta chief's first official visit to Russia since he took the presidency in April, and the fifth country he has visited in the role after India, China, Laos and Thailand. He has made four previous trips to Russia as junta leader, the first in June 2021, five months after seizing power.

The substance was almost entirely prospective. Behind a package covering everything from nuclear power to search-and-rescue satellites sits a bilateral trade relationship worth less than $75mn a year - roughly what Russia earns from crude oil exports in about three hours.

The signing was headed by the Declaration of the Russian Federation and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on Ways and Means to Counter, Mitigate and Redress the Adverse Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures - the standard Russian formulation for Western sanctions, and the clearest statement of what each side is getting from the other. Both are under sweeping Western restrictions; neither can do much about it except say so together.

The rest were interagency memoranda: electric power and oil and gas, the electronics industry, digital technologies, information and communication technologies, culture and the arts, satellite navigation and manned space exploration, the Cospas-Sarsat search and rescue system, and ASPOS, Russia's automated warning system for hazardous situations in near-Earth space. A memorandum was also signed between Russia's Federal Anti-Monopoly Service and Myanmar's Competition Commission.

The one item with a commercial mechanism attached was a set of protocols implementing an April 16, 2026 memorandum between Russia's RC-Investments Fund and Myanmar's Ministry of Electricity and Energy, covering long-term supplies of liquefied natural gas.

Energy was where Putin spent most of his statement. “Joint construction of a power plant and an oil refinery in southern Myanmar is under consideration,” he said, adding that Russian companies were “ready to participate in hydrocarbon exploration and production, including offshore”.

On gas he was more specific about the ambition than the timetable: “There are good prospects for exporting liquefied natural gas to Myanmar, both for domestic consumption and for transit to neighbouring countries.” Myanmar is a gas producer in long-term decline whose Yadana field is fading, and which has spent two years rationing fuel - the idea of it becoming an LNG transit route for Russian cargoes is a considerable stretch of the map.

The nuclear project got the strongest billing. “Last year, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the construction of a Russian-designed nuclear power plant in Myanmar,” Putin said. “This is truly a flagship bilateral project.” That agreement, signed in March 2025 by Rosatom director general Alexei Likhachev and Myanmar science and technology minister Myo Thein Kyaw, covers a 110MW small modular reactor with scope to expand to 330MW. Myanmar has no nuclear power, generated 24.3 TWh of electricity in 2019, and is a country where armed resistance groups control something close to a third of the territory.

Putin also listed “an ironworks and an organic fertiliser production facility” under construction, and plans “to build a deep-water seaport on the country's southern coast capable of handling large-capacity vessels”.

That last one is the Dawei project, and it is where the Russian corporate involvement is actually visible. Inter RAO (MOEX: IRAO) has been working up a coal-fired power plant, an oil refinery and an LNG terminal tied to the Dawei deep-sea port, and signed an agreement in June with the Launglon Economic Development Company. Gazprom (MOEX: GAZP) International has discussed the engineering for the Dawei refinery. RosGeo signed a memorandum in October 2025 to run an artificial-intelligence pilot extracting gas from thin sand layers at five wells in the Aphyauk field - Myanmar's first AI-based production enhancement project.

The most substantive economic disclosure was about plumbing rather than projects. “Reliable financial settlement mechanisms have been established,” Putin said, “with two-thirds of commercial transactions now conducted in Russian rubles.”

That is the real achievement here, and it is a sanctions-evasion achievement rather than a trade one. Mir cards are now accepted at Myanmar hotels and shops. Myanmar's central bank delegation went to Moscow in July to talk to Sberbank (MOEX: SBER) about cybersecurity, fraud prevention and its biometric Smile Pay system, and attended a St Petersburg forum on ruble-based digital payment platforms and cryptocurrency regulation.

Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov set out what Russia actually ships. “This year we began supplying large volumes of mineral fertilisers, previously only petroleum products,” he said, adding Russia was “ready to further increase our supplies of mineral fertilisers, petroleum products, engineering products and, of course, agricultural products” and to “increase imports of light industry and agricultural products from Myanmar”. He said the relationship was “now entering the investment phase”.

The base is very low. Bilateral trade ran at $34.45mn in the 2020-21 fiscal year and $74.73mn in 2023-24 - more than doubling, and still negligible. Myanmar sends Russia garments, socks, mango puree, footwear, bags and human hair. Russia is also raising labour quotas for Myanmar workers, of whom some 3.5mn are already employed across Southeast Asia.

On security Putin was brief but unambiguous. “Our countries have established close military and military-technical cooperation,” he said. “Bilateral naval exercises are regularly held off the coast of Myanmar, and Russian Navy ships also make port calls there.”

No new defence document was announced. A five-year military cooperation agreement was signed in February 2026 and its terms have not been published. The existing relationship runs through arms sales to a military blacklisted by Western governments, army training, and university scholarships for thousands of Myanmar soldiers. Russian is now taught at the universities of Yangon and Mandalay and at the Defence Services Academy; about 400 Myanmar students are at Russian universities and more than 7,000 have been educated there in total.

Min Aung Hlaing said the two had discussed cooperation in “defence, security, tourism, agriculture, healthcare, and a number of other fields”, and used his statement mainly to advertise. “Myanmar has a strategically advantageous geographical location. There are huge sales markets near our country. We have rich resources, a wonderful climate and a coastline of more than 1,300 miles,” he said. “That's why we want to invite investors from Russia to cooperate with our country. Dear Mr President, I ask you to support the arrival of investors in Myanmar.”

He also delivered the line the visit was designed around: “Myanmar is a reliable partner of Russia in Southeast Asia. Myanmar always stands ready.”

Putin's own framing leaned on history rather than commerce. “Russia and Myanmar are bound by truly strong, time-tested ties of friendship, partnership, and mutual support,” he said, noting Soviet support for Myanmar's nation-building in the 1950s and 1960s and that relations established in 1948 had become “especially trusting in recent years”. He thanked Min Aung Hlaing for “your assistance in promoting Russia's relations with ASEAN” - which is the other thing Moscow wants here, given Myanmar's seat in a bloc where Russia has limited traction.

He opened with condolences for the monsoon floods still running in Myanmar, and Min Aung Hlaing reciprocated by thanking Russia for sending rescue teams after last year's earthquakes: “Russia promptly dispatched rescue teams, and many of our people were rescued. I still remember this.”

The softer items were unusually prominent for a summit read-out, which tells you something about how much hard material there was. A Myanmar consulate general is to open in Vladivostok. Myanmar cultural and religious centres already operate in the Altai Territory and the Kaluga and Moscow regions. Min Aung Hlaing told Putin an agreement had been reached to build a Russian Orthodox church in Yangon. He goes on to the Republic of Tuva, a centre of Russian Buddhism, and to a Russia-Myanmar business forum at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics on August 19, organised by Myanmar's embassy and the Roscongress Foundation.

Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, whom Min Aung Hlaing also met, offered the same forward tense as everyone else: “We see excellent opportunities to boost our bilateral trade, economic, and investment potential,” and a readiness to share Russian work on “the digital economy, autonomous electronic systems, and artificial intelligence applications”.

What Min Aung Hlaing came for is not really the LNG or the reactor, neither of which is close to delivery. It is the photograph. He took the presidency in April after a general election held in only 102 of Myanmar's 330 townships, with a claimed 52% turnout, which UN experts and rights groups called neither free nor fair. Since then he has been collecting state visits. Russia, which needs friends in ASEAN and buyers who will settle in rubles, is the least demanding host available, and the one most willing to sign a joint declaration saying that sanctions are the problem.

How Myanmar’s SMEs Are Coping With An Economy Of Uncertainty – Analysis


Credit: The Sabai

August 20, 2026

Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

By Hsu Latt Phyu

Key Takeaways:

Myanmar’s SMEs are navigating an economy shaped by inflation, power shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and policy uncertainty, forcing many businesses to prioritise survival over growth.

Despite these challenges, SMEs have demonstrated resilience through practical adaptation strategies, including alternative energy use, flexible workforce arrangements, informal financing, and digital innovation.

Strengthening SME resilience through supportive policies, improved infrastructure, access to finance, and capacity-building initiatives will be critical for Myanmar’s long-term economic sustainability and recovery.

1. Introduction

Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has faced a prolonged polycrisis characterised by political instability, inflation, currency depreciation, power shortages, trade disruptions, and labor migration. More recently, fuel supply disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict have further increased production and transportation costs, amplifying existing economic vulnerabilities. While large firms may possess greater financial capacity to absorb shocks, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been disproportionately affected. Yet despite operating in an environment where uncertainty has become the norm, many SMEs continue to adapt and survive. This article examines how Myanmar’s SMEs are coping with an economy of uncertainty.

2. Myanmar’s Current Economic Situation

Although Myanmar’s economy showed signs of a modest recovery in early 2026, the improvement remains fragile amid ongoing political instability and economic uncertainty. Inflation rose to 24.6 percent in April 2026, driven largely by higher fuel and transportation costs, while the depreciation of the kyat increased the price of imported goods and raw materials. At the same time, foreign exchange controls and import restrictions have made it more difficult for businesses to access essential inputs, while conflict-related disruptions continue to raise logistics costs and delay deliveries. Businesses also face persistent electricity shortages, forcing many to rely on generators and alternative energy sources, which increase operating costs. Meanwhile, labor migration, skills shortages, and compulsory military service have made recruitment increasingly difficult. Together, these challenges have pushed many SMEs to prioritize survival and adaptation over growth.

3. The Role of SMEs in Myanmar’s Economy

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are widely recognized as the backbone of Southeast Asian economies, accounting for over 90 percent of businesses and employing a large share of the workforce. In Myanmar, SMEs make up 94 percent of enterprises and between 52 and 97 percent of total employment. Beyond their economic contribution, SMEs play an important social role by creating livelihoods, supporting local communities, and generating income opportunities in both urban and rural areas.

However, despite their importance, SMEs continue to face significant structural challenges. Previous studies have highlighted constraints such as limited access to finance, outdated technology, low productivity, and poor market access. Moreover, formal policy support for SMEs remains limited, reducing their ability to reach their full economic potential.

4. Challenges Facing SMEs

Since 2021, Myanmar’s SMEs have faced overlapping economic, operational, workforce, and financial challenges. Unlike large corporations, SMEs are often more vulnerable to external shocks and have fewer resources to absorb rising costs.

Inflation, currency depreciation, and fuel price increases have significantly raised production and transportation costs, while weaker consumer purchasing powerhas reduced demand and squeezed profit margins. At the same time, frequent power outages, import restrictions, and supply chain disruptions continue to increase operational uncertainty and business expenses.

International sanctions have added further pressure on some SMEs. Although sanctions primarily target military-linked entities, Myanmar’s military-dominatedeconomy means that restrictions on financial transactions, trade, and supply chains can also create unintended spillover effects for civilian-led SMEs. These indirect impacts make it more difficult for businesses to access foreign currency, credit, imported inputs, and international markets, placing additional pressure on firms with limited financial resources.

Labor shortages have become another major challenge, driven by skills gaps, outward migration, and compulsory military service, resulting in higher recruitment and training costs. Access to finance also remains limited, as many SMEs face difficulties obtaining affordable credit and must cope with ongoing liquidity constraints.


Together, these challenges have created a business environment where many SMEs prioritise survival and continuity rather than growth and expansion.

5. Resilience of SMEs in Myanmar

Despite operating in an increasingly uncertain environment, many Myanmar SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience by adapting their business models and day-to-day operations. Rather than pursuing expansion, many firms have focused on maintaining continuity, preserving cash flow, and responding flexibly to changing circumstances.

5.1 Energy Adaptation

Frequent power outages have forced businesses to invest in alternative energy sources such as diesel generators and off-grid solar systems. In October 2025, approximately 42 percent of firms’ electricity consumption came from diesel generators and off-grid power sources. While these investments increase operating costs, they enable businesses to continue production and maintain essential services during prolonged outages.

5.2 Workforce Adaptation

To cope with labor shortages caused by outward migration, skills mismatches, and compulsory military service, many SMEs have adjusted how they manage their workforce. As the labor market shifts toward more informal, part-time, and casual employment, particularly in urban areas, firms have adapted by relying on more flexible labor arrangements to maintain business operations. Many businesses have also raised wages and provided short-term training to attract and retain workers, despite the additional costs involved. These workforce adjustments have enabled SMEs to sustain operations in an increasingly constrained labor market.

5.3 Financial Adaptation

Limited access to formal credit has encouraged SMEs to explore both formal and informal financing mechanisms. Following the 2025 earthquake, state-backed recovery loans and subsidised lending programs contributed to a significant increase in SME lending. At the same time, informal financing remains an important coping mechanism. Some firms rely on loans from friends and family, while many businesses facing cash-flow shortages use personal networks to sustain operations. These informal support systems often serve as an important source of resilience when formal financial channels are difficult to access.

5.4 Digital Adaptation


Myanmar’s digital economy has long been shaped by social commerce, with Facebook serving as a major platform for communication, marketing, and online sales. However, internet restrictions and the nationwide VPN block introduced in 2024 disrupted access to many digital platforms and reduced online business activity. In response, SMEs have diversified their digital presence by adopting alternative channels such as Telegram, Viber, and TikTok to reach customers and maintain sales. This ability to adapt to a rapidly changing digital environment highlights the flexibility and innovation that characterise many Myanmar SMEs.

Although these adaptive strategies have helped businesses survive, resilience should not be mistaken for recovery. Many firms continue to face significant constraints and remain focused on sustaining operations rather than pursuing long-term growth.

6. Recommendations

Strengthening the resilience of Myanmar’s SMEs requires coordinated efforts from businesses, policymakers, and development partners.

For SMEs

SMEs should continue investing in energy diversification through solar power and other alternative energy solutions to reduce vulnerability to electricity disruptions.
Businesses should also adopt digital tools such as e-commerce websites, chatbots, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled customer service, and digital payment systems to improve efficiency and expand market access.

Where possible, firms can strengthen local supply chains by sourcing raw materials domestically to reduce dependence on imports and foreign exchange volatility.
Developing workforce retention strategies, including employee training, flexible working arrangements, and career development opportunities, may also help address labor shortages.

For Policymakers

Policymakers should prioritise improving electricity infrastructure, facilitating access to affordable financing, and simplifying import and licensing procedures.
Expanding vocational training programs and workforce development initiatives can help address skills shortages.

In addition, targeted tax relief and regulatory support for SMEs could reduce operational burdens and encourage business investment.

For Development Partners and the International Community

Development partners can support SME resilience through renewable energy programs, digital literacy initiatives, business continuity training, and concessional financing schemes.

Technical assistance and capacity-building programs can also help SMEs strengthen their ability to adapt to future economic shocks while contributing to inclusive and sustainable economic development.

Governments imposing sanctions, such as the EU and the United States, should strengthen targeted sanctions while minimizing unintended impacts on civilian-led SMEs by maintaining access to essential financial services, trade, and humanitarian support.

7. Conclusion

Myanmar’s SMEs support SDG 8 and SDG 9 by creating employment, sustaining livelihoods, and demonstrating innovation in the face of economic challenges. SMEs are operating under extraordinary economic pressures arising from inflation, energy shortages, trade disruptions, labor migration, and political uncertainty. Despite these challenges, many businesses continue to survive through adaptation, flexibility, and innovation. From investing in alternative energy sources to adopting new digital platforms and informal financing mechanisms, SMEs have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of prolonged uncertainty.

However, resilience should not be viewed as a substitute for structural economic reform. The future of Myanmar’s economic sustainability will depend not only on macroeconomic stabilisation and improved infrastructure but also on strengthening the resilience of SMEs.

About the author: 

Hsu Latt Phyu is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master’s degree in Social Innovation and Sustainability from Thammasat University, Thailand.

Source: This article was published at The Sabai


About Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

The Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is a hybrid think tank (non-partisan) and consultancy firm that advances sustainable governance, policy innovation, and sustainability literacy in Myanmar. Through its Sustainability Lab, SRIc conducts in-depth public policy research and analysis to promote sustainable development and guide Myanmar toward a more resilient, equitable, and environmentally conscious future. SRIc provides strategic policy advocacy, CSR consultation, and the development of sustainability roadmaps grounded in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. These services support public institutions and private sector actors in aligning their operations with the Sustainable Development Goals. By integrating rigorous research with actionable consultancy, SRIc supports responsible business practices, fosters innovative CSR strategies, and designs impactful sustainability pathways. SRIc contributes to local transformation & global sustainability efforts through this dual approach.
View all posts by Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre →

The ecosocialist alternative: An interview with Sabrina Fernandes

By Sabrina Fernandes & Federico Fuentes

Published 16 August, 2026

[Editor’s note: Sabrina Fernandes will be speaking at Ecosocialism 2026, September 11-13, Magan-djin/Brisbane, Australia. For more information on the conference visit ecosocialism.org.au.]

Sabrina Fernandes is a Brazilian political economist who has published books and articles on ecosocialism, internationalism, leftist organising, Global South politics and ecosocial transitions. Fernandes is also a member of the Global Ecosocialist Network.

Speaking with Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, Fernandes puts the case for ecosocialism, notes some of its important contributions to modern Marxist theory, and explains why we need an eco-territorial internationalism.

Ecosocialism has been gaining traction within the radical left. How do you define it?

Some people still view ecosocialism as just socialism with environmentalism added on, or that it means you are a socialist who is also interested in the environment, climate change, etc. But I understand ecosocialism as a strain within Marxism and socialism that does not treat nature as just another issue we occasionally talk about and sometimes forget. Nature is central for ecosocialists — it is something we read into class, gender, race and capitalist exploitation.

The prefix “eco” is not there by chance. “Eco” modifies how we think about a socialist society. It reflects our understanding that we cannot build socialism on a scorched Earth and that we must consider the planet we will inherit. Ecosocialists do not separate the struggle against capitalism from the struggle against capitalism’s destruction of nature.

We also understand that a post-capitalist society must do more than just overcome capitalism. It will have to overcome productivism, extractivism and other practices that disrespect nature and cause irreparable damage to Earth. We need to change the mode of production not just to end labour exploitation but also the exploitation of nature.

Anti-imperialist ideas are very important on the left, particularly with more wars and imperialist interventions in the Global South. How can ecosocialist ideas better equip us to fight imperialism?

Ecosocialists in Brazil and Latin America are well aware we need to be anti-imperialist. I live in Brazil where United States President Donald Trump is intervening in our elections, scheduled for October. Imperialism is definitely a major challenge. But being anti-imperialist is not enough — we need to be ecologically anti-imperialist.

Imperialism cannot simply be reduced to imperialist powers intervening in the economies and politics of the Global South, or superexploiting labour there. It also turns nature in the Global South into resources. If our anti-imperialism does not take nature into account, we can end up replicating practices that destroy nature in the name of fighting imperialism.

An example is the Amazon forest, which spans across nine South American nation-states. The Amazon is also home to hundreds of indigenous groups that have lived there and taken care of this territory for thousands of years. The Amazon is the result of their labour and care for nature.

If we treat anti-imperialism as simply a question of Brazil versus the US, or Colombia versus the US, we can end up arguing against imperialists destroying our forest, but saying that if South American governments do it, that is fine, or at least within our rights. This is a vulgar notion of sovereignty, but standard among the developmentalist left, and even some in the socialist left.

We need to talk about sovereignty, but if we treat it as simply a question of property, control or dominion, we can end up replicating imperialist frameworks. The sovereignty we fight for must be ecological sovereignty, which intertwines internationalism and concerns over sovereignty with the notion of ecosystemic responsibility.

Of course, we know that global imbalances, developmental inequalities, colonial legacies, and imperialism still exist. But we can not genuinely fight imperialism if we replicate imperialist notions of development, especially around nature.

Our pathway must be different, building ecological anti-imperialism and showing in practice that another way of life is possible — one that adjusts our mode of living and mode of production in accordance with nature.

Regarding imperialism and nature, ecosocialists have developed important ideas such as sacrifice zones. Could you explain this concept?

Sacrifice zones is a concept from the environmental justice movement. It reflects the level of inequality and violence seen when certain regions are treated as completely disposable. These zones are seen as worth sacrificing for the good of the economy or nation-state.

Sacrifice zones are ultimately places to displace economic externalities. When I started studying economics, we were taught to treat costs that do not fit within the model as externalities. Ultimately, someone has to deal with that externality.

As Karl Marx explained in Capital Volume 2, crisis is inherent to capitalism. A convenient way to manage a crisis is organising zones where its impacts are felt hardest. These are mostly territories already subjected to colonialism, imperialism, racial oppression, dispossession, etc, making them vulnerable to further exploitation.

Chile has got to a point where you have officially recognised sacrifice zones to deal with the effects of copper mining. Local communities are forced to deal with health impacts, with water being taken away and soil being contaminated. As such, people there have started organising around this question of sacrifice zones.

Nowadays, due to what is called the “green transition” — which is really about decarbonising electricity rather than a real transition — what we find are green sacrifice zones. These zones come with a twist though: they are justified with the argument that you cannot complain about lithium or cobalt mining because we need these minerals to fight climate change.

This is just a rehash of the argument to justify iron ore mining because we needed this for “development” and “progress”. The difference now is that if you resist green sacrifice zones, you are supposedly not just against progress but against fighting climate change — a quite perverse argument.

So, it is important to take the sacrifice zone concept seriously and develop ideas on production that manage impacts without sacrificing specific people or territories. That involves questions of industrial policy, trade, sufficiency, growth, etc. That is why socialists have been discussing with degrowthers and post-growthers to achieve a synthesis that acknowledges the realities of inequalities between the Global North and South.

Is this where the ecosocialist concept of “ unequal ecological exchange” can be useful?

Yes. Unequal economic exchange can be seen in the flow of goods. Global South countries primarily export cheap raw materials and import expensive manufactured goods. This trade imbalance creates an economic hole in Global South economies and makes them dependent on the Global North, resulting in dependent capitalism.

Unequal economic exchange also acknowledges workers in the Global South are super exploited compared to the labour of workers in the North. They may not earn as much as the elites in their countries, but there is a difference between workers’ pay in the Global North and South.

Ecosocialists also want unequal ecological exchange in the conversation, because until now the transformation of nature into resources has been mostly ignored. An example is meat. Argentina and Brazil export a lot of meat to the US, Europe and China. But they are not just exporting animals — through a lot of cruelty — but the water, soil, nutrients and everything else needed to grow that animal too.

Unequal ecological exchange happens there, and we need to raise this as it connects to ecological anti-imperialism and the question of degrowth. We need to ensure a just degrowth that does not create more inequalities, but instead accounts for them.

Are there other ecosocialist concepts that can help us better understand the world today?

Something ecosocialists talk about is eco-territorial internationalism. I helped develop this concept with Breno Bringel and others. It grapples with the view many socialists hold of the state as being above everything else. Even though as ecosocialists we engage with the state, we find this view problematic.

Dealing with issues of sovereignty or democracy participation only through the state can end up simply replicating colonial relationships, especially with regards to indigenous peoples with traditional connections to territory. It can also distract us from areas that could hold solutions.

Right now, the far right in South America is seeking to take over the state, and in many places has done so. One important way to fight back is by taking the state back from the far right. But we can also do other things along the way, and this affects how we think about international solidarity.

A great example of eco-territorial internationalism is energy sector trade unions connecting across borders to promote work stoppages and strikes to stop oil exports to Israel. Brazil finally stopped exporting oil to Israel last year after this kind of pressure. This did not come from the state or government, but an alliance of trade unions working with people in solidarity with Palestine across different countries. Together, they tracked the oil and the ports where it was switching ships to get to Israel.

But imagine if Brazil was still under a far-right government. Arguing that we must first elect a progressive government before applying this pressure would not make sense. Eco-territorial internationalism allows us to find other avenues for internationalism that are not just about the state.

Another important concept that I recently learnt about is terricide. This concept was developed by Moira Millán, a Mapuche writer, warrior and defender of indigenous territories in Argentina.

The concept of terricide reminds us that ecocide is not just about the death of nature, but the death of our world-making with nature. We are not just destroying the territory but also our sense of belonging, cultures and ways of existing.

We need to fight terricide on all fronts. Some believe fighting for better environmental management or against environmental crimes is enough, but terricide reminds us that we are becoming more alienated from nature and this must be reversed.

The far right is not in government in Brazil, but it is still present in the form of Bolsonarism, the political movement behind former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro. How do you view the resurgence of the far right?

Brazil had four years of Bolsonaro government [between 2019-2022], and the far right is making a very strong comeback across the region right now. We saw this in Chile with José António Kast’s election [in 2025], Abelardo de la Espriella was just elected in Colombia, and, of course, there is Javier Milei in Argentina.

We also have Trump’s attacks on Venezuela, a country in a very tough situation especially after the earthquakes, and recent right-wing wins in Peru and Bolivia. Things are not very easy right now; in fact they are really bad. And not just in South America, we are seeing this basically everywhere.

Moreover, the far right are quite connected and working together to advance their perspectives and objectives. They want to gain or retain power, but also retain a specific mode of production and a certain flow of goods and resources.

An example of this is Trump’s Shield of the Americas. This organisation only involves right-wing presidents in the region and was created with the supposed purpose of fighting criminal organisations and drug cartels. But Trump wants to use it to empower himself to continue with extrajudicial killings and interventions in other countries. The ultimate aim is ensuring a favourable flow of goods and services into the US as he imposes sanctions on everybody else.

We cannot treat this comeback of the far-right as just ideological. Yes, these people are very authoritarian, they hate everyone, and are very sexist and racist. But they also want to further entrench a very violent form of capitalism. That is why we need to fight the far right on the economic and environmental fronts.

What has the far-right’s rise meant in terms of the environment?

It is interesting to see how nature is treated amid this neo-fascist wave.

On one hand, the far-right directly destroys nature through pillaging for resources, deforestation, mining for rare earth minerals, etc. Brazil has large rare earth mineral reserves that China is interested in, which matters a lot to the US. The US is not happy with [Brazilian president] Lula [da Silva] because, even though Lula is not a big nationalist and is pro-extractivism, he has a different policy to the Bolsonaro family, which prefers to give away Brazil’s minerals to the US.

On the other hand, the Lula government wants to use rare earth minerals, be it for wind turbines and other technologies to fight climate change, or even in military tech. Lula promotes a capitalist model of the energy transition within Brazil, more akin to energy addition or diversification. So, things are complex; they are not as binary as some think.

The Lula government sees nature as something to control. They might not sound like your standard climate denialist, but they fit the profile for partial denialisms. That is why we need to talk about the dangers of green capitalism. There is a tendency to accept certain aspects of climate change as long as they can profit from them. But if a fact is an obstacle to profit and growth, then it is ignored or downplayed.

Even with Trump, he is willing to pull out of the Paris Accords, defund science, etc, but he is also quite happy to promote a huge resource grab to build renewables for his friends in Silicon Valley.

We have also seen the emergence of an eco-fascist trend within the far-right…

Yes. In Europe, we have an eco-fascist trend that says climate change and catastrophe are coming, therefore we must protect ourselves from immigrants. That is where authoritarianism comes in. So, we also need to be aware of this danger.

The main proponents of eco-fascism are found in more developed economies. But the Global South is not immune. Many big business sectors want the far-right in power to enable more violence against indigenous communities and relaxed environmental laws. At the same time, these business sectors know climate change is affecting their crops, and that they will also be subject to environmental collapse. They are preparing for it, including through resource grabs.

So, we need a more complex view of society. Otherwise, we may think the only climate denialists are those who say climate change is the fault of volcanoes or does not exist at all. But that is only a very specific and fringe aspect of denialism.

Climate denialism is everywhere — even on the left. The developmentalist left pretends the situation is not as serious as it is while continuing to promote productivism.

Socialists traditionally place great emphasis on working-class struggles. Ecosocialists have sought to raise the importance of struggles by peoples of the Global South and, in particular, indigenous peoples. How do these struggles intersect?

As capitalism gets more complex, it takes on a different face depending on where you are in the world. In Nordic countries it might look more like a welfare state, whereas in El Salvador it can have a very authoritarian character. Meanwhile, in places such as the Congo it can mean slave labour to obtain cobalt.

But while the faces are different, capitalism remains the same, and each face is interconnected. So, how capitalism looks to people depends on where they fit within it.

In this sense, indigenous struggles are not separate from working-class struggles. In reality, indigenous peoples are expelled from their lands and turned into workers in the city. As capital expands, indigenous people are de-territorialised and become completely dependent on selling their labour power for much less than what they produce. This process is at capitalism’s core.

An indigenous group today may live isolated in their territory and not yet be subject to direct proletarianisation. But their territory will be slowly taken away, because the whole world is subject to proletarianisation. So, how could I treat indigenous struggles as separate from working class struggle?

This is where, again, eco-territorial internationalism is a useful lens. It shows us that these connections and potential alliances exist.

These are not just based on thinking that what is happening to someone else is morally awful and deserves our sympathy and support. Eco-territorial internationalism shows us that, in the end, we are all part of the same “we” and that our solidarity is built on something more concrete than just compassion. By moving beyond morality to political economy, we see how we are all fighting on the same basis and the same fronts.

Drawing out these connections is part of our job. We also must make sure we do not box ourselves into orthodox identities — which were not all that orthodox even in the writing of Karl Marx or other original Marxist thinkers such as Rosa Luxemburg.

Could you expand on this?

Claudia Horn has just published a beautiful edition of Rosa Luxemburg’s Herbarium, in which Luxemburg catalogued species of plants. The book contains a touching letter Luxemburg wrote from prison, discussing a buffalo outside her prison that she felt a lot of empathy for, showing there was a lot of sensitivity for other beings, not just humans, in many of the writings and struggles of the past.

Understanding this is key. It is also why I think ecosocialism is quite a strong and potent movement, even if we are small compared to the world at large. Ecosocialism reminds us that to succeed we need to become different as a species. We need to change relationships — both among ourselves and with nature.

This means having to go back a little to the basics and, at the same time, adapting a little. It means looking at technology, economic production and how the family organises care labour in a different way. All these things matter and I think the working class is interested in this conversation.

That is why a big demand for ecosocialists is reducing the workweek or workday. Everybody wins with this demand. We have to both learn to live within our means and make sure that gains in productivity and efficiency flow to workers, not billionaires.

This is a conversation that goes to the core of working-class struggles, but it is also a conversation about nature. The synthesis is quite obvious if you really look into it.

Could you talk about some positive projects or ideas in terms of building alternatives that point to how an ecosocialist society could look?

Last year, during COP30 in Brazil, we had a really big struggle against the government. Lula’s government was pushing the dredging of a river in the Amazon. With droughts becoming more extreme, mining companies and agribusiness can no longer export goods along the river year-round, hence their need to dredge it.

The area is heavily affected by mining, with a lot of mercury sediment in the riverbed. Dredging activity would have brought that all up and mixed it into the water, affecting not only indigenous communities in the area, but every person who lives and depends on the river.

So, this was happening while the government was being all climate friendly at COP30. Of course this inconvenienced the climate leader image it was trying to portray.

At the time, I said this was one of the biggest, perhaps strongest, class struggles in the country, but it was not led by a traditional left party or trade union. It was led by indigenous peoples and allies who occupied Cargill and the local airport. They insisted this could not happen without consulting them.

We can take some lessons from this movement, not just in terms of exposing the hypocrisy but of the destruction that the government promotes. One lesson is not to back down, because in the end they won.

Of course, we know that consultancy processes established through things such as [International Labor Organization] Convention 169, even if important, will not save us from destruction, especially as indigenous people have no veto power. But from this struggle, we could move onto further conversations around agroecology and food sovereignty.

Is agroecology another example of how change can be promoted at the local level?

There is a misconception that agroecology cannot be scaled up; that you cannot produce food for the entire planet using agroecological methods. The argument says we need to instead push to adjust industrial agriculture, through things such as supplements that help cows emit less methane.

This kind of thinking is promoted by many environmental NGOs and organisations, with financing from groups such as the Gates Foundation. It is even promoted directly by agribusiness corporations, such as the Brazilian meatpacking and processing giant JBS. It seeks to obstruct alternatives: rather than changing the way we produce, they want to limit discussion to technological changes and innovations.

But agroecology is scalable — it might not look the same everywhere, because we are talking about different biomes, different soil composition, growing different things, but it is scalable.

This discussion also challenges us to think about food differently; to think about reducing animal exploitation and meat intake, and introducing other crops in our diet.

This may not be commercially viable for capitalism, but it is part of traditional cultures and heritage. That is why the internationalist element of agroecology is really important: we need to think about food production around biomes and what is possible within planetary boundaries.

We already have pockets of great agroecological production in Latin America, Africa, Europe, India. This also requires us to think about machinery for agroecological production in different ways, such as projects to build tractors better suited for small-scale producers.

So now the discussion is about connecting to questions of industrial policy too. This is one of my major interests. Things are happening, but are often dismissed because these alternatives are not embedded in the statist model.

You referred to the difficulties of raising real alternatives. There is also a strong sense that things have gotten so bad that it might be too late to truly change things, or that such change is not even possible. What are your thoughts on this?

A big issue we face is that our imagination has been captured, our horizon has been limited. People say “tell me a country where ecosocialism is working.” Well, if for something to work it requires a whole country, then I cannot give you an example — but I can also say that there is no country where capitalism is working fully; in fact, it is collapsing everywhere.

But we should not limit ourselves to the state level. We should look at examples at the level of sectors and alliances that are forging alternative modes of living and production.

When we do, we see that change is already happening. We can see pushback against utilities’ privatisation and struggles to expand free transit in many areas in the Global North and South. These are ecosocialist struggles.

We have a lot to be proud of and build on. This can help us not feel so distraught. It is easy to be pessimistic. Things are not going completely in our favour right now, but everything is not lost.

I have been talking with Michael Löwy, also from the Global Ecosocialist Network, about how a lot of people are very fatalistic right now.

Of course, the data is very bad and the sensationalism around social media is not helping — telling people that everything is lost and that they should run to the mountains produces a lot of likes and online engagement, which means there are many irresponsible people doing that. Yet, everything is not lost and running to the mountains is a luxury reserved for the very few.

We have a responsibility to help each other and to value good news. This is not the same as saying everything is fine and I do not need to do anything. We need to tell the hard truths, but also value good news, get inspired by that, learn how to build from it, and organise together, as internationalists, for a real ecosocialist transition.

The Gaza Peace Trump Announced, and the Rejection Netanyahu Delivered

Jamal Kanj

 August 14, 2026

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Image by Ash Hayes.

Donald Trump took to social media Thursday, July 30, to announce what he called a breakthrough: a phased agreement under the Board of Peace requiring the Palestinian Resistance to disarm and Israel to withdraw. The optics were of a president closing out a genocide he, and his predecessor, enabled for two years.

The Palestinian Resistance agreed to the plan. Israel rejected it.

Imagine if the Resistance had rejected the fifteen points by reasonably conditioning disarmament on an end to Israeli occupation. We don’t have to imagine Trump’s reaction. He’d have condemned them by nightfall and held them responsible for killing the peace plan.

Israel gets a different standard. On Sunday, August 9, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told his cabinet: “I want to clarify this: Israel rejects the 15-point document.”

Rather than call out Israel for sabotaging his own plan, Trump waved away Netanyahu’s rejection as mere election posturing, as if that was acceptable. Trump’s dismissal didn’t go unnoticed. Three days later, Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, doubled down declaring that Israel will not withdraw, not from Gaza, not from Lebanon and not from Syria

Last May, I wrote an article: “Stop blaming Netanyahu, stupid,” where I argued, it was never one man. It’s the Zionist Project itself, and the Israeli public that keeps ratifying it. A poll released last summer found 76% of Israelis believe the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza was a mistake. Half of all Israelis now say they’d support renewing Jewish settlement inside Gaza itself — a figure that climbs to 83% among the ultra-Orthodox and 67% among religious Jews. And in a finding that goes to the heart of how Israelis have rewritten their own history, 56% now believe that if the 2005 disengagement had never happened, October 7 would have been far less likely.

Withdrawal, in other words, has been recast in the Israeli imagination as the original sin, not occupation, and not Israel’s pre-October 7 starvation siege.

In rejecting Trump’s plan, Netanyahu is pandering to his voting base. He is giving the Israeli Jewish majority exactly what they’ve told pollsters they want. He’s competing against political challengers who reject any withdrawal from Gaza. Trump excuses this as political “posturing,” as if it’s temporary, when in fact, it is creating a status quo to be normalized after the election.

As usual, Israel responded to Trump’s plan in two days of intensive strikes across Gaza, murdering 26 Palestinians and wounding 76. The single ugliest strike hit medicine warehouses attached to Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir el-Balah, one of the last facilities in central Gaza still able to treat large numbers of patients. Two of four storage buildings were destroyed and two more badly damaged. The target was a “dangerous storage” of intravenous fluid, dialysis supplies, intensive-care medication, in a place where half the dialysis machines didn’t work and kidney patients were dying because treatment sessions keep getting cut.

These weren’t abstractions. In Gaza City’s al-Sousi Tower, a strike killed Abdullah Abu Taif, 33, his pregnant wife, Abeer Anan, 29, their five-year-old son, Azzam, and where medics recovered the remains of an unborn child from the rubble. Near Khan Younis, a strike murdered Mahmoud al-Hams, 38, his wife, Fatima, 37, and their young daughter. An elderly couple, Kamal and Huda Abu Muailiq, were killed in their home near Deir el-Balah the same night.

This’s how Israel translates Trump’s “breakthrough” on the ground.

It is how Netanyahu sends a message to American presidents, as he did nearly a year ago when he openly defied Trump’s calls to stop bombing Gaza. Palestinian children’s blood becomes the currency of political pressure. With every refusal to heed Washington, Netanyahu demonstrates that he can ignore an American president’s demands without consequence, while the credibility and authority of the U.S. president are diminished in the process. Netanyahu’s arrogant message is unmistakable: Israel can defy Washington, and Washington will absorb the political cost.

In October 2025, Israel secured the release of Israeli captives under a deal conditioned on ending the war. It got what it wanted immediately and did not deliver on its side. Since the ceasefire of October 10, 2025, Israel has violated it more than 4,000 times, murdering 1,300 Palestinians — more than all the Israelis, soldiers and civilians, killed on October 7. This is while food aid deliveries was two third less than what the agreement promised. The territory Israel was supposed to withdraw from has instead expanded from 53% to 70%. Any withdrawal Israel may now negotiate, if any at all, will start from that expanded line of occupation, not the yellow line agreed at the ceasefire.

A president who announces a peace deal to the world has no agency of his own. He is too weak to bring himself to hold Netanyahu to account for rejecting his own plan; a political eunuch, unable to rein in a potentate whose country survives on U.S. political and financial largesse.

Trump’s Gaza legacy does not differ from Biden’s. Both stood impotent before Netanyahu’s rejection. Two subservient leaders who had shown over again that Israel does not answer to Washington, Washington answers to Israel. They leave behind a legacy of enabling an Israeli genocide and two consecutive Israel-first administrations.

Jamal Kanj (jamalkanj.com) is the author of Children of Catastrophe: Journey from a Palestinian Refugee Camp to America, and other books. He writes frequently on Palestine/Arab world issues for various national and international publications.