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Monday, January 19, 2026

Russia: Four Administrative Fines For Anti-War Articles, Criminal Investigation Underway – Analysis

A court in the southern Russian region of Krasnodar has fined an independent Orthodox priest the equivalent of more than two months’ average wage in four administrative prosecutions for allegedly “discrediting” the Russian Armed Forces and expressing “overt disrespect” for society, state bodies, and state symbols. Police based at least two of these cases on articles which Hieromonk Iona Sigida posted on his church’s website.

In four hearings in late December 2025, Slavyansk City Court found Fr Iona guilty on one charge of “discreditation” of the Russian Armed Forces (Administrative Code Article 20.3.3, Part 1), and three charges of disseminating information expressing “overt disrespect for society, the state, official state symbols of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, or bodies exercising state power in the Russian Federation” (Administrative Code Article 20.1, Part 3) (see below).

Forum 18 wrote to Slavyansk City Court and the Krasnodar Region court system’s unified press service, asking why the peaceful expression of religious views on politics and the war in Ukraine was considered either “discreditation” of the Armed Forces or “disrespect” for society or the state. The chair of Slavyansk City Court responded on 15 January, directing Forum 18 to the written decisions on the court website (see below).

On 20 November 2025, the Investigative Committee opened two cases against Fr Iona under Criminal Code Article 354.1, Part 4. The cases apparently also relate to materials he published on the church website, criticising the way Victory Day (9 May) and other Soviet holidays are marked. It is unknown when these cases might reach court. At present, Fr Iona is under house arrest at the home he shares in Slavyansk-na-Kubani with his church’s 88-year-old leader, Archbishop Viktor Pivovarov. Fr Iona’s house arrest was extended in mid-January (see below).

Parishioners of the Holy Intercession Tikhonite Church believe that both Fr Iona’s criminal and administrative prosecutions are “politically motivated and related to [Sigida’s] pacifist stance”. “The calls for peace that Hieromonk Iona published on the church website are the very essence of the Orthodox faith”, one church member, Sergey, told Caucasian Knot (see below).

The retrial of Buddhist leader Ilya Vasilyev, also for opposing Russia’s war in Ukraine on religious grounds, is now due to begin on 19 January 2026, according to the Moscow court system’s online portal. In October 2025, appeal judges overturned his conviction on technical grounds, and sent his case back for re-examination (see below).

On 23 December 2025, Moscow City Court rejected Orthodox journalist Kseniya Luchenko’s appeal against a detention order for her issued in absentia on 24 November 2025. The initial 2-month detention order will be up for renewal in late January. Luchenko has lived outside Russia since 2022 (see below).

The Investigative Committee in Moscow opened a case against Luchenko in September 2025 under Criminal Code Article 207.3, Part 2 Paragraph d (“Public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for reasons of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or for reasons of hatred or enmity against any social group”). This carries a maximum punishment of 10 years’ imprisonment (see below).

Investigators initiated the case on the basis of a Telegram post in which Luchenko condemned a Russian missile strike on a Kyiv children’s hospital in July 2024, and contrasted this with the Russian state and Moscow Patriarchate’s promotion of so-called “traditional values” (see below).

Criminal, administrative convictions for opposing Russia’s war on religious grounds

Since February 2022, courts have sentenced four people to imprisonment and fined three on criminal charges for opposing Russia’s war against Ukraine on religious grounds. Investigators have also opened four criminal cases against people who have left Russia, and have placed them on the Federal Wanted List

Most recently, the Investigative Committee charged exiled Orthodox journalist Kseniya Luchenko with “Public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for reasons of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or for reasons of hatred or enmity against any social group” (Criminal Code Article 207.3, Part 2, Paragraph d) (see below). 

Having been postponed from 25 December 2025, the retrial of Buddhist leader Ilya Vasilyev is due to begin on 19 January 2026 at Moscow’s Preobrazhensky District Court, according to the Moscow court system’s online portal.

In October 2025, Moscow City Court overturned Vasilyev’s conviction under Criminal Code Article 207.3 (“Public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”), Part 2, Paragraph d (“for reasons of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or for reasons of hatred or enmity against any social group”) on technical grounds. The court sent his case back for re-examination.

Individuals also continue to face prosecution under Administrative Code Article 20.3.3 (“Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”) for opposing the war in Ukraine from a religious perspective.

Ever-increasing internet censorship has seen websites and materials blocked for: “extremist” content; opposition to Russia’s war against Ukraine from a religious perspective; material supporting LGBT+ people in religious communities; Ukraine-based religious websites; social media of prosecuted individuals; and news and NGO sites which include coverage of freedom of religion or belief violations.

The Justice Ministry has also added 13 religious leaders and activists to its register of “foreign agents”, largely for reasons related to their opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Krasnodar Region: Multiple prosecutions of anti-war Orthodox priest

December 2025, Slavyansk City Court heard four administrative cases against Fr Iona (Ilya) Sigida (born 7 February 1991). The court fined him a total of 155,000 Roubles, about 10 weeks’ average local wage. He has declined to appeal against any of the convictions – at least three of which have now entered legal force, according to the court website.

Fr Iona has pawned his car in order to pay the fines, a church member based outside Russia told Forum 18 on 5 January 2026.

Fr Iona is a hieromonk in an independent Orthodox church led by Archbishop Viktor Pivovarov, who has himself faced both administrative and criminal prosecution for his condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is not in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate.

The court registered the four administrative cases against Fr Iona on 8 December 2025. One was under Administrative Code Article 20.3.3, Part 1 (“Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”), the other three under Administrative Code Article 20.1, Part 3. 

Administrative Code Article 20.1 punishes “Petty hooliganism” – Part 3 covers “Dissemination on information and telecommunications networks, including the Internet, of information which expresses in an indecent form, which insults human dignity and public morality, overt disrespect for society, the state, official state symbols of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, or bodies exercising state power in the Russian Federation, with the exception of cases provided for in Article 20.3.1 of this Code, if these actions do not constitute a criminally punishable act”.

Forum 18 wrote to Slavyansk City Court and the Krasnodar Region court system’s unified press service before the start of the working day of 12 January 2026, asking why the peaceful expression of religious views on politics and the war in Ukraine was considered either “discreditation” of the Armed Forces or “disrespect” for society or the state, and which materials formed the basis for the two cases for which the court has not yet published written decisions.

Judge Vladimir Otroshko, chair of Slavyansk City Court and the judge who found Fr Iona guilty in one of his Article 20.1, Part 3 cases, responded on 15 January. He did not answer Forum 18’s questions, but stated that “the position of the court is set out in detail in the judicial decisions following the examination of materials on the administrative offences .. these judicial decisions are published in the prescribed manner on the website of Slavyansk City Court”.

Fr Iona is also facing criminal charges for a possibly related offence of “overt disrespect for society about days of military glory” (Criminal Code Article 354.1, Part 4), apparently for articles he posted on the website of the Holy Intercession Tikhonite Church in Slavyansk-na-Kubani.

Fr Iona and Archbishop Viktor wrote articles for the church website until summer 2024. As well as discussing theology and liturgy, these writings often critically assessed aspects of Russian history and present-day society from a religious perspective. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, they also condemned the war from a religious perspective. 

According to written decisions on the court website, articles by Fr Iona formed the basis for his prosecution under Administrative Code Article 20.3.3, Part 1 and for at least one of the cases under Article 20.3, Part 1. Decisions for the other two cases are not publicly available.

On 18 December 2025, Judge Vladimir Otroshko fined Fr Iona, who was not present in court, 40,000 Roubles (about 3 weeks’ average local wage) under Administrative Code Article 20.1, Part 3.

Police based their case on an article on the church website, eshatologia.org, in which Fr Iona wrote “a man, asking himself the question: who is Mister Putin, saw in a dream a madman-maniac with a bare torso and a large knife, who was cutting off raw human flesh with blood and greedily devouring it”. According to the written decision, “This statement is aimed at showing blatant disrespect for the state”.

The court has redacted the dates on which Fr Iona published the article and on which investigators first discovered it. It is known, however, that nothing was posted on the church website after summer 2024. The statute of limitations on Article 20.1, Part 3 is three months from the date an offence is committed.

Nevertheless, Judge Otroshko noted that the Supreme Court ruled in 2005 that “a continuing administrative offence is an action or inaction that consists of a prolonged, uninterrupted failure to perform or improper performance of obligations stipulated by law .. the day of discovery of a continuing administrative offence is considered to be the day when the official authorised to draw up an administrative protocol identified the fact of its commission”.

According to the Administrative Code (Article 4.5 Part 2), the statute of limitations on prosecuting a continuing administrative offence is counted from the date of discovery of the administrative offence.

The judge concluded that Fr Iona’s publication of the article “has the characteristics of a continuing offence, and is ongoing .. therefore, the statute of limitations for bringing I.P. Sigida to administrative liability has not expired”.

On 23 December 2025, Judge Natalya Kovalchuk found Fr Iona guilty under Administrative Code Article 20.3.3, Part 1 and fined him another 40,000 Roubles (about 3 weeks’ average local wage).

The basis for this administrative prosecution was an article he had posted on the church website on 24 February 2022, the day Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Investigators found this article on 24 November 2025.

In this article, Fr Iona wrote: “Today, on the night of 23-24 February, the newly revealed antichrist, the embodiment of the devil, V. Putin, sent his army to destroy the last unconquered holy Rus’ in the person of Ukraine”, according to the written decision, “thereby committing public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Russian Armed Forces to protect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to maintain international peace and security”.

On this occasion, Fr Iona was in court. He pleaded not guilty, arguing that Article 20.3.3 was not in effect at the time he posted the article. Judge Kovalchuk, however, dismissed this as “a line of defence which is refuted by the evidence examined and the data obtained during the case proceedings, in which I.P Sigida stated that he had not yet removed the article from the Internet”.

The judge concluded that Fr Iona’s actions, “allowing the publication of a text containing a negative assessment of the use of the Russian Armed Forces in the special military operation to be openly accessible on the Internet, were aimed at discrediting, that is, slandering and deliberately undermining the authority of the Russian Armed Forces used in the special military operation, and distorting the goals and objectives set before them”.

Fr Iona received another 40,000 Rouble fine under Article 20.3, Part 1 on 23 December 2025, and a 35,000 Rouble fine, also under Article 20.3, Part 1, on 29 December 2025. It is unknown which materials these prosecutions were based on.

Fr Iona has not lodged any appeals. “He cited his religious beliefs as the reason for his refusal, declining to respond to the authorities’ aggression against believers”, independent media outlet Caucasian Knot reported on 4 January 2026

Krasnodar Region: “Putting him on trial for his faith is already political”

Parishioners of the Holy Intercession Church believe that both Fr Iona’s criminal and administrative prosecutions are “politically motivated and related to [Sigida’s] pacifist stance”. “The calls for peace that Hieromonk Iona published on the church website are the very essence of the Orthodox faith,” one church member, Sergey, told Caucasian Knot. “Putting him on trial for his faith is already political.”

The practice of initiating multiple administrative prosecutions while a criminal case is already underway “is not a mistake and not chaos, but a deliberate tactic”, Timur Filippov (an independent lawyer originally from Krasnodar Region but now based outside Russia) who was not involved in Fr Iona’s cases, commented to Caucasian Knot on 4 January. “Administrative cases are used as a tool of pressure, not as a means of punishment for specific offences.”

Such administrative cases – which can “resurface as often as necessary” – create an impression of the defendant as a “systematic violator”, can worsen their procedural position, and exert “psychological and financial pressure”, Filippov added. “This isn’t justice, but control and exhaustion.”

Filippov also noted that prosecuting individuals for materials published before the adoption of the relevant laws “formally contradicts the Constitution”, but that this is “ignored in such cases”. Fr Iona was fined for an article published on 24 February 2022, when Administrative Code Article 20.3.3 did not come into force until 4 March 2022.

Krasnodar Region: Orthodox priest also facing criminal investigation

Fr Iona (Ilya Sigida) is currently under investigation on two charges of “Dissemination of information expressing overt disrespect for society about days of military glory and commemorative dates of Russia associated with the defence of the Fatherland, as well as desecration of symbols of military glory of Russia, insult to the memory of defenders of the Fatherland or humiliation of the honour and dignity of a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, committed publicly” (Criminal Code Article 354.1, Part 4). 

Parishioners believe the cases to be based on articles Fr Iona wrote on the church’s website about Soviet holidays – in particular, Victory Day (9 May).

National Guard troops raided Holy Intercession Church at about 6 am on 27 November 2025 and arrested Fr Iona. During his interrogation, they or Investigative Committee officials forcibly shaved his hair and beard, beat him, and shocked him with a stun gun, Fr Iona stated after his release. The next day, Slavyansk City Court placed him under house arrest until 20 January 2026. Fr Iona’s house arrest was extended in mid-January.

It is unknown when the criminal cases against Fr Iona might reach court. In the meantime, he is prohibited from leading worship, and the community believes that a “surveillance vehicle is on duty near the church”, the church member outside Russia told Forum 18. In November 2025, investigators had Fr Iona placed under house arrest until 20 January 2026.

Upon his release, Fr Iona “definitely had a concussion”, the church member outside Russia told Forum 18 on 5 January 2026. “He was vomiting for three days after the beating.” Although his physical health has since improved, “I know he’s depressed”, another parishioner, Sergey, commented to Caucasian Knot on 4 January 2026. “First, he was beaten. Second, the invasion of the church, the searches, the confiscation of personal belongings and documents – this is a severe trauma for a young man who lived by faith. Now he doesn’t want anything, he just prays. No appeals. There are appeals, but he will not sign them. It’s impossible to convince him otherwise.”

Forum 18 wrote to Krasnodar Region Investigative Committee on 1 December 2025 to ask:
– which materials from the church website investigators are using as the basis of their prosecution cases;
– and why they have banned Fr Iona from leading worship services.

Forum 18 also wrote to Krasnodar Region Investigative Committee and Krasnodar Region National Guard on 1 December to ask why they had considered it necessary to use physical violence against Fr Iona and whether the alleged perpetrators had been suspended from duty and placed under investigation. 

Forum 18 had received no response to any of these enquiries by the middle of the working day in Krasnodar Region of 16 January 2026.

Krasnodar Region: 2023 fine

Fr Iona was first fined under Administrative Code Article 20.3.3 in November 2023 for an article entitled “The cult of war”. Archbishop Viktor Pivovarov was fined under Article 20.3.3 in March 2023, then under Criminal Code Article 280.3 for repeat “discreditation” in April 2024. 

Viktor Ivanovich Pivovarov (born 8 February 1937) was ordained a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), which opened parishes inside Russia in the early 1990s. In 2006, he became an Archbishop in the Russian [Rossiyskaya] Orthodox Church (RosPTs), which was founded after a series of splits within ROCOR. He now leads a rival branch of RosPTs which he established in 2009 after a further split. It is not in communion with either other parts of ROCOR or the Moscow Patriarchate.

Moscow: Appeal court upholds Orthodox journalist’s detention in absentia

On 29 September 2025, the Investigative Committee in Moscow opened a caseagainst Orthodox journalist Kseniya Valeryevna Luchenko (born 13 June 1979) under Criminal Code Article 207.3, Part 2 Paragraph d (“Public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for reasons of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or for reasons of hatred or enmity against any social group”). This carries a maximum punishment of 10 years’ imprisonment.

Investigators initiated the case on the basis of a Telegram post in which Luchenko condemned a Russian missile strike on a Kyiv children’s hospital in July 2024, and contrasted this with the Russian state and Moscow Patriarchate’s promotion of so-called “traditional values”.

Although Luchenko left Russia in 2022, Moscow’s Cheryomushki District Court issued a detention order for her in absentia on 24 November 2025. Moscow City Court upheld this decision on 23 December 2025. The initial 2-month detention order will be up for renewal in late January.

According to Moscow City Court’s written appeal decision, seen by Forum 18, investigators initially decided on 2 October 2025 to place Luchenko under travel restrictions. After discovering that she was in fact outside the country, they had her added to the Interior Ministry’s Federal Wanted List on 22 October 2025. Investigators then sought the court order to have her detained. This would see her immediately arrested should she return to Russia (or travel to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine).

The detention order is “effective from the moment of [Luchenko’s] transfer to the law enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation, in the case of her extradition or deportation to the territory of the Russian Federation, from the moment of her detention on the territory of the Russian Federation, or from the moment of her detention on the territory of the Russian Federation in case of voluntary entry into the territory of the Russian Federation”.

At the appeal hearing, Luchenko’s lawyer Katerina Tertukhina argued that Luchenko did not abscond, and that the district court had “failed to consider that she had left the Russian Federation long before the publication of the materials she is accused of and before the initiation of criminal proceedings against her”. The court had provided no grounds for its conclusion that Luchenko would obstruct the criminal investigation and had failed to take into account that she is “accused of a non-violent crime and does not pose any public danger”.

The appeal judges concluded, however, that the lower court had “reasonably agreed with the investigative authorities’ assertion of [Luchenko’s] involvement in the crime of which she is accused .. took into account the circumstances and nature of the crime she is charged with, the fact that she is accused of committing a serious crime against public safety, that she has absconded and is on the international wanted list, and therefore correctly concluded that it was necessary to place the accused in custody”.

Luchenko is under investigation for a post she made on her Telegram channel on 8 July 2024, and a repost of the same text on the website of independent media outlet Ekho Moskvy on the same day. 

The post reads: “The Russian Orthodox state [Rossiyskoye pravoslavnoye gosudarstvo] celebrated ‘The Day of Family, Love, and Fidelity’, by striking a children’s hospital in Kyiv with a missile.

“And in Russia, a ‘Family Parade’ is underway. It began over the weekend, but is taking place today in most cities. With daisies and the flags of the World Congress of the Russian People. And with the active participation of dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church. They celebrate the festive liturgy, then march in this ersatz procession of the cross [krestniy khod], singing troparia [hymns], and then presenting medals to large families, while bombs are falling on Ukrainian children. These are the ‘values of Holy Rus’.”

On the morning of 8 July 2024, a Russian missile had hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv, injuring ten children and destroying or severely damaging several departments. 

In 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree designating 8 July “The Day of Family, Love, and Fidelity”, “in order to preserve traditional family values and the spiritual-moral education of children and youth”. 

F18News

Forum 18 believes that religious freedom is a fundamental human right, which is essential 

for the dignity of humanity and for true freedom.



Sunday, January 18, 2026

INTERVIEW

Former Archbishop of Canterbury: Putin is a heretic – he has no holy mission in Ukraine


For years, the Russian Orthodox Church has given its blessing to Moscow’s brutal invasion and attempted to frame it in religious terms. The former archbishop tells Maira Butt that Vladimir Putin’s violence directly contradicts the message preached by Christ


Putin calls Ukraine invasion his ‘holy mission’ in bizarre Christmas address


Sunday 18 January 2026 

The Independent



The former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has accused Vladimir Putin of “heresy” after the Russian President claimed his invasion of Ukraine was a “holy mission”.

During a speech to mark Orthodox Christmas earlier this month, Putin called his soldiers “warriors” who were acting “as if at the Lord’s behest” and “defending the fatherland”.

Mr Williams, who served as the Archbishop of Canterbury from 2002 to 2012, condemned the use of religion to justify the invasion as “disturbing” and said that Putin’s revanchism directly contradicts the message preached by Jesus Christ.

“I’d certainly say we’re talking about heresy,” he told The Independent. “We’re talking about something which undermines a really fundamental aspect of religious belief, of Christian belief, which assumes that we have to defend God by violence.”

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than 1,600 theologians and clerics from the Eastern Orthodox Church issued the Volos Declaration, which condemned the “Russian World” ideology as a heretical belief and practice. The belief system grants Russia a special place in the cosmic order and claims the country has a divine right to build the “Holy Rus”: a land chosen by God for the Russian people.


Vladimir Putin lights a candle as he attends a Christmas service at a church in Moscow (AFP via Getty)

“The idea that death in battle for your country equates to Christian martyrdom seems to be the most bizarre and unjustifiable interpretation you could take,” Mr Williams said.

“There is something really, really disturbing about the systematic, comprehensive rebranding of Christianity as Russian national ideology.”

He referred to statements made by Christ that his kingdom is “not of this world” and “if it were of this world, my servants would fight”.

Mr Williams pointed to the fact that Putin often resists calls to scale back fighting and violence over Christian religious periods, including Christmas and Easter.


The former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams (PA)

He also pointed to the arrest and detention of two young Orthodox seminary members, Denis Popovich and Nikita Ivankovich. They are facing up to 20 years in prison on what critics say are trumped-up charges, according to Public Orthodoxy, a publication that is part of the Orthodox Christian Studies Centre.


Mr Popovich was arrested as he was walking to Sretensky Monastery in Moscow for “petty hooliganism” and “allegedly shouting and using obscene language”. Public Orthodoxy wrote in a newsletter on the anniversary of his arrest: “Anyone who knew this devout young man understood immediately that such behaviour was inconceivable for him”. Six weeks later, the allegations had transformed into terrorism charges.

Asked what he would say to Putin, the theologian said: “The word Christianity contains the name Christ. Which Christ do you think you’re serving? The one of the Gospels or some nationalist goblin?”

In 2024, the Ukrainian parliament outlawed the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church because of its strong support for Russia's invasion.

The Russian Orthodox Church has been a powerful ally of Putin, giving its blessing to the war and supporting his campaign to uphold what he calls traditional values in Russian society, in contrast to perceived Western decadence.


Russia’s leader has referred to his invasion of Ukraine as a ‘holy mission’ (Ukrainian Armed Forces)

Mr Williams said that Russia’s use of faith as a justification for war should be an alarm bell for the West. Governments are in denial about the extent to which religion is being “weaponised” to drive human conflict across the world, and religious leaders should step up their condemnation of violence, he suggested.

“In the West, we might think that religion is draining away but it certainly isn’t in other parts of the world,” he said. “To imagine that faith can only be defended by violence is a bit of an insult to faith really. If you're saying faith can only be strong if I beat the living daylights out of unbelievers, you're not saying much about the strength of faith, are you?”



Orthodox priests told The Independent last week that Putin is more akin to the “Antichrist” than a messiah, and that he holds “demonic” beliefs antithetical to the faith.

“Seen from a Christian perspective, you don’t use unholy means to pursue a holy mission,” the former Bishop of Leeds, Nick Baines, told The Independent. “When that unholy means involves slaughtering people, invading their country, and telling lies.”






Thursday, January 15, 2026

Opinion


Can Mayor Mamdani be as good as Candidate Mamdani on Palestine?

Zohran Mamdani started his term as NYC mayor on a radical note by defending BDS, but we must keep up the pressure to prevent future compromise, warns Nada Elia.



Nada Elia
12 Jan, 2026
The New Arab


New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani speaks after he was ceremonially sworn in as New York City’s 112th mayor at City Hall by Sen. Bernie Sanders (VT-I) on January 01, 2026 in New York City. [GETTY]

In addition to the midnight “ball drop,” which symbolises the heralding of welcome change, this new year New York City offered Americans another reason to celebrate, namely the inauguration of Zohran Kwame Mamdani as the mayor of this country’s largest and most diverse metropolis.

A young, African-born, Muslim, South Asian immigrant, Mamdani represents many firsts. He was sworn in on two copies of the Qur’an, his grandfather’s, as well as one borrowed from the New York Public Library's Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, thus reflecting the diversity of the religion in the city where one in ten resident is Muslim.

For other swearing in events, he used two copies of the Qur’an, his grandfather’s and his grandmother’s, a simple gesture that reveals his embrace of his roots, and of gender equality.

But beyond the symbolism of his complex identity – important as that is in an exceedingly xenophobic country – his politics are what stand out. Mamdani ran on a progressive Democratic Socialist agenda, promising freezes on rent-stabilised apartments, and free public transportation, issues of particular import to New Yorkers.

Campaigning during Israel’s intensified genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza, Mamdani repeatedly asserted his pro-Palestine stance, calling for an end to U.S. military support for Israel, and emphasising that what is taking place in Gaza is a violation of human rights and international law.

Nor is his support for Palestine a recent development: as an undergraduate student at Bowdoin College, which he attended from 2010-14, he co-founded that school’s chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine, a group that is still active today. While at Bowdoin, Mamdani also wrote a weekly column in the student newspaper, frequently critiquing the school’s administration, and taking aim at the former college president’s criticism of the 2013 boycott by the American Studies Association of Israeli academic institutions, among other issues.

Considering his outspokenness on Palestine, Mamdani’s election proved yet again that Zionism is losing its grip on the country, including among Jews: New York City is home to t

he largest Jewish population outside of Israel, and 33% of New York Jews voted for him. This is a small percentage for a Democratic candidate, but a significant one considering the present times, when many Jews are ill at ease with the global outrage at Israel—a country they still relate to, and identify with.

Yet while Americans are used to the sobering disconnect between campaign promises and actual policy, Mamdani did not dally. On January 1, his first day in office, he reversed every executive order issued by his predecessor, Eric Adams, before September 2024. One of these executive orders targeted the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, barring city officials from boycotting or divesting from Israel, and subjecting them to “disciplinary action” should they back such a campaign.

Adams had argued that BDS is antisemitic, and that banning it would protect the city’s Jewish population. But Mamdani was absolutely clear on this issue: while campaigning, he had insisted that he supports BDS as a non-violent movement that puts pressure on Israel to abide by international law, and that banning it stifles free speech.

Mamdani also revoked the controversial International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. That definition has long been criticised for its equation of criticism of Israel with antisemitism, especially as seven of the eleven examples of “antisemitism” it cites are actually examples of criticism of Israeli policies.

The IHRA lists, for examples, as a contemporary example of antisemitism, “Applying double standards by requiring of [Israel] a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” Here it must be noted that a condemnation of other human rights violators is not required when one criticizes any other country: we can criticize Iran, or Saudi Arabia, for their policies and actions without listing all countries that suppress dissidents. The IHRA definition, then, is asking for exceptional treatment for Israel. But also, there is a presumption that Israel is a “democratic nation,” a qualifier that country itself no longer seeks to project.

Pro-Palestine activists have long been organising to counter the adoption of IHRA by cities and universities nationally, even as Zionist groups keep pushing it. Mamdani’s decisive action on it was therefore a welcome development.

Mamdani also cancelled an Adams order that directed the New York Police Department to take steps towards a ban on protests outside houses of worship.

The new mayor faced his first test with the pro-Palestine community within days of his inauguration, when he criticised pro-Palestine protesters outside a synagogue in a predominantly Orthodox Jewish neighbourhood of Manhattan that was hosting an event promoting American real estate investment in occupied Palestinian land. The protesters reportedly made pro-Hamas chants, which Mamdani denounced on social media, even as he refrained from criticising the inflammatory remarks made by the pro-Israel protesters.

The pro-Palestine activists have taken him to task on social media, pointing out that Palestinian armed resistance is a right enshrined in international law, whereas the real estate sales promoted at the event were illegal, and asking what other “selling out” he was prepared to do, so as to appease his Zionist constituents.

Those constituents, his foes, have naturally smeared Mamdani as an antisemite. They have foregrounded the fact that he has refused to condemn the slogan “globalize the intifada,” pointing instead to its literal meaning as rebellion or uprising, and noting that even the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum used that term when translating official comments on the exhibits from the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising into Arabic.

But let’s be clear about this: there would be nothing wrong with the desire to globalise the intifada, which is a revolt against oppression, against occupation, against injustice. And the reality is, Mamdani’s election does not globalise the intifada, as much as it is a clear indication that the intifada is already global, from Palestine to New York City.

Mamdani’s election, and his decisive actions so far, give Americans reason to believe once again that our vote matters, and that our politicians can and will make a change for the better. Less than two weeks into his mayorship, it is still early to pass a judgment evaluating it.

Given the nature of American politics, Mamdani is bound to feel the pressure to prove Zionists wrong as they accuse him of being antisemitic, rather than critical of Israel. But we, too, must insist on holding him to his proven record of understanding the plight of the Palestinian people, and it is incumbent on us to keep pushing him, and supporting him, as he navigates a very difficult terrain.

Nada Elia is Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at Western Washington University, and author of Greater than the Sum of Our Parts: Feminism, Inter/Nationalism, and Palestine.

Follow her on X: @nadaelia48


Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.