The Question Of The Alevi Minority In Turkey And Their Religious Identity – Analysis

Alevi women partaking in Semah ritual in Turkey. 

Photo Credit: SERDAR AYDIN 1, Wikipedia Commons


March 9, 2026 
By Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Introduction

Despite occasional suggestions from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—including floated referendums on EU talks in the mid-2010s—the path to Turkish EU membership remains blocked, fueling debates over whether accession would strengthen European security against radicalism or exacerbate cultural and historical divides.

A current EU political concern is reflected in many controversial issues, and one of those the most important is about whether or not to accept Turkey as a full member state (being a candidate state since 1999). Turkey is, on one hand, governed as a secular democracy by moderate Islamic political leaders, seeking to play the role of a bridge between the Middle East and Europe. However, Turkey is, on the other hand, an almost 100% Muslim country with a rising tide of Islamic radicalism (especially since the 2023 Israeli aggression on Gaza and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Gazans), surrounded by neighbors with a similar problem.

There are two fundamental arguments by all of those who are opposing Turkish admission to the EU: 1) Muslim Turkish citizens (70 million) will never be properly integrated into the European environment that is predominantly Christian; and 2) In the case of Turkish accession, historical clashes between the (Ottoman) Turks and European Christians are going to be revived. Here we will refer only to one statement against Turkish accession: it “would mean the end of Europe” (former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) – a statement which clearly reflects the opinion by 80% of Europeans polled in 2009 that Turkey’s admission to the EU would not be a good thing. At the same time, there are only 32% of Turkish citizens who had a favorable opinion of the EU, and, therefore, the admission process, for which formal and strict negotiations began already in 2005, is very likely to be finally abortive.

Islamic fundamentalism and Turkey’s admission to the EU

The question of Turkish admission to the EU is, by the majority of Europeans, seen through the glass of Islamic fundamentalism as one of the most serious challenges to European stability and, above all, identity that is primarily based on Christian values and tradition. Islamic fundamentalism is understood as an attempt to undermine existing state practices for the very reason that militant Muslims (like ISIS/ISIL/DAESH) are fighting to re-establish the medieval Islamic Caliphate and the establishment of theocratic authority over the global Islamic community – the Umma. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism first came to the attention of the Western part of the international community in 1979 when a pro-American absolute monarchy was replaced with a Shia (Shiia) Muslim anti-American semi-theocracy in Iran. In other words, Iranian Shia Muslim clerics, who were all the time the spiritual leaders of the Iranians, became their political leaders too. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 prompted possibilities of similar uprisings in other Muslim societies, followed by pre-emptive actions against them by other governments.

What can be the most dangerous scenario for Turkey from the European perspective if the accession negotiations fail is, probably, Turkish turn towards the Muslim world, followed by rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism, which can be properly controlled by the EU if Turkey were to become a member state of the club? That is, probably, the most important “security” factor to note regarding the EU-Turkish relations and accession negotiations. Namely, following the 9/11 terror attacks (on Washington and New York), it was becoming more and more clear that it was better to have (Islamic) Turkey inside the EU rather than as a part of an anti-Western bloc of Muslim states.

In general, for Western governments and especially for the US and Israeli administrations, Shia Muslims became seen after the 1979 Iranian Islamic (Shia) revolution as the most potential Islamic fundamentalists and the religious terrorists. Therefore, the oppression of Shia minorities by the Sunni majorities in several Muslim countries is deliberately not recorded and criticized by Western governments. The case of the Alevi people in Turkey is one of the best examples of such a policy. However, at the same time, the EU administration is paying full attention to the Kurdish question in Turkey, even requiring the recognition of the Kurds by the Turkish government as an ethnocultural minority (as different from the ethnic Turks). Why are the Alevi people discriminated against in this respect by the EU’s minority policy in Turkey? The answer is because the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but Alevis are considered a Turkish faction of the (militant) Shia Muslim community within the Islamic world.

In the next paragraphs, I would like to shed more light on the question of who the Alevi people are and what Alevism is as a religious identity, taking into account the fact that religion, undoubtedly, has become increasingly important in both the studies and practice of international relations and global politics. We also have to keep in mind that religious identity was predominant in comparison to national or ethnic identities for several centuries, being the crucial cause of political conflicts in many cases.

What is Alevism?

The Alevi people are those Muslims who believe in Alevism, that is, in fact, a sect or form of Islam. Especially in Turkey, Alevism is a second common sect of Islam. The number of Alevi people is between 10 and 15 million. The name of the sect comes from the term Alevi, which means “the follower of Ali”. Some experts in Islamic studies claim that Alevism is a branch of Shi’ism (Shia Islam), but, as a matter of fact, the Alevi Umma is not homogeneous, and Alevism cannot be understood without another Islamic sect – Bektashism. Nevertheless, Alevi culture produced many poets and folk songs, alongside the fact that Alevi people are experiencing many everyday life problems in living according to their beliefs in Islam.

The Alevis (Turkish: Aleviler or Alevilik; Kurdish: Elewî) are a religious, sub-ethnic, and cultural community in Turkey representing at the same time the biggest sect of Islam in Turkey. Alevism is a way of Islamic mysticism or Sufism that believes in one God by accepting Muhammad as a Prophet, and the Holy Qur’ān. Alevi people love Ehlibeyt – the family of Prophet Muhammad-, unifying prayer and supplication, prayer in their language, to prefer a free person instead of Umma (Muslim community), to prefer to love God instead of God’s fear, to overcome Sharia reaching to the real world, believing in the Holy Qur’ān’s genuine instead of shave. Alevism has found its cure in human love; they believe that people are immortal because a person is manifested by God. Women and men are praying together, in their language, with their music that is played via bağlama, with semah. Alevism is an entirety of beliefs that depends on Islam’s rules, which are based on the Holy Qur’ān, according to Muhammad’s commands; by interpreting Islam with a universal dimension, it opens new doors to the earth. The Alevi system of belief is Islamic with a triplet composed of Allah, Muhammad, and Ali.

There are many strong arguments about the relationship between Alevism and Shi’ism. Some researchers say that Alevism is a form of Shi’ism, but some of them say that Alevism is sectarian. We have to keep in mind that Shi’ism is the second most common type of Islam in the world after Sunnism. This is a branch of Islam which is called the Party of Ali for the reason that it recognizes Ali’s claim to succeed his cousin and father-in-law, the Prophet Muhammad, as the spiritual leader of Islam during the first civil war in the Islamic world (656−661). In most of the Islamic countries, the Sunnis are in the majority, but the Shi’ites comprise some 80 million believers, or, in other words, around 13% out of all the world’s Muslims. The Shi’ites are predominant in three countries: Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. However, Alevism cannot be understood as identical to Sufism, which is the mystical aspect of Islam that arose as a reaction to strict religious orthodoxy. Sufis seek personal union with God, and their Christian Orthodox counterparts in the Middle Ages were the Bogumils.

Undoubtedly, Alevism has some similar issues with Shi’ism; at the same time, there are a lot of differences concerning the general practice of Islam. However, in some Western literature, Alevism is presented as a branch of Shi’ism, or more specifically, as a Turk or Ottoman way of Shi’ism.

Split within Muslims

We have to keep in mind that in this place, the Islamic expansion in the 7th and 8th centuries was accompanied by political conflicts which followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and the question of who is entitled to succeed him is still splitting up the Muslim world today. In other words, when the Prophet died, a caliph (successor) was chosen to rule all Muslims. However, as the caliph lacked prophetic authority, he enjoyed secular power but not authority in religious doctrine. The first caliph was Abu Bakr, who is considered, together with his three successors, as the “rightly guided” (or orthodox) caliphs. They ruled according to the Quran and the practices of the Prophet, but, thereafter, Islam became split into two antagonistic branches: Sunni and Shia.

The Sunni-Shia division basically started when Ali ibn Abi Talib (599−661), Muhammad’s son-in-law and heir, assumed the Caliphate after the murder of his predecessor, Uthman (574−656). The civil war ended with the defeat of Ali and the victory of Uthman’s cousin and governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya Umayyad (602−680), after the Battle of Suffin. However, those Muslims (like the Alevi people, for instance) who claimed that Ali was the rightful caliph took the name of Shiat Ali – the “Partisans of Ali”. They believe that Ali was the last legitimate caliph and, therefore, the Caliphate should pass down only to those who are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and Ali, her husband. Ali’s son, Hussein (626−680), claimed the Caliphate, but the Umayyads killed him together with his followers at the Battle of Karbala in 680. This city, today in contemporary Iraq, is the holiest of all sites for Shia Muslims (Shi’ism). Even though the Prophet Muhammad’s family line ended in 873, the Shia Muslims believe that the last descendant did not die, as he is rather “hidden” and will return. Those basic Shia interpretations of the history of Islam are followed by the Alevi people, and, therefore, many researchers are simply considering Alevism as a faction of Shi’ism.

The dominant branch of Islam is Sunni. The Sunni Muslims, unlike their Shia opponents, are not demanding that the caliph has to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. They are also accepting the Arabic tribal customs in the government. According to their point of view, political leadership is in the hands of the Muslim community as such. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the religious and political power in Islam was never again united into a political community after the death of the fourth caliph.

Alevism in Islam

Alevi people believe in one God, Allah, and, therefore, Alevism, as a form of Islam, is a monotheistic religion. Like all other Muslims, the Alevis understand that God is in everything around them in nature. It is important to notice that there are those Alevis who believe in good and bad spirits (and kind of angels), and, therefore, they often practice superstition to benefit from good ones and to avoid harm from bad ones. For that reason, for many Muslims, Alevism is not a real Islam as it is more a form of paganism imbued with Christianity. However, a majority of Alevis do not believe in these supernatural beings, saying that it is an expression of Satanism.

The essence of Alevism is in the fact that Alevis believe that according to the original text of the Quran, Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was to be the Prophet’s successor as God’s vice-regent on earth or caliph. However, they claim that the parts of the original Quran related to Ali were taken out by his rivals. According to Alevis, the Quran, as a fundamental holy book for all Muslims, should be interpreted esoterically. For them, there are much deeper spiritual truths in the Quran than the strict rules and regulations that appear on the surface. However, most Alevi writers will quote individual Quranic verses as an appeal for authority to support their view on a given topic or to justify a certain Alevi religious tradition. The Alevis generally promote the reading of the Quran in the Turkish language rather than in Arabic, stressing that it is of fundamental importance for a person to understand exactly what he or she is reading, which is not possible if the Quran is read in Arabic. However, many Alevis do not read the Quran or other holy books, nor base their daily beliefs and practices on them, as they consider these ancient books to be irrelevant today.

The Alevis are reading three different books. If, according to their opinion, there is no proper information in the Quran, as the Sunnis corrupted the authentic words of Muhammad, it is necessary to reveal the original Prophet’s messages by alternative readings. Therefore, Alevi believers are looking to (1) the Nahjul Balagha, the traditions and sayings of Ali; (2) the Buyruks, the collections of doctrine and practices of several of the 12 imams, especially Cafer; and (3) the Vilayetnameler or the Menakıbnameler, books that describe events in the lives of great Alevis such as Haji Bektash. Except for these basic books, there are some special sources to participate in the creation of Alevi theology, like poet-musicians Yunus Emre (13−14th century), Kaygusuz Abdal (15th century), and Pir Sultan Abdal (16th century).

The foundation of Alevism is in the love of the Prophet and Ehlibeyt. Twelve Imams are godlike, glorified by the Alevis. Waiting for the last Imam’s (Muslim religious leader) reappearance, the Shia Muslims established a special council composed of 12 religious scholars (Ulema) that elect a supreme Imam. For instance, Ayatollah (“Holy Man”) Ruhollah Khomeini (1900−1989) enjoyed that status in Iran. Most Alevis believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, grew up in secret to be saved from those who wanted to exterminate the family of Ali. Many Alevis believe Mehdi is still alive and/or that he will come back to earth one day. According to Alevis, Ali was Muhammad’s intended successor, and therefore the first caliph, but competitors stole this right from him. Muhammed intended for the leadership of all Muslims to perpetually stem from his family line (Ehli Beyt) by beginning with Ali, Fatima, and their two sons, Hasan and Hüseyin. Ali, Hasan, and Hüseyin are considered the first three Imams, and the other nine of the 12 Imams came from Hüseyin’s line. Just to remind ourselves, the names and approximate dates of the birth and death of the 12 Imams are:

İmam Ali (599-661)
İmam Hasan (624-670)
İmam Hüseyin (625-680)
İmam Zeynel Abidin (659-713)
İmam Muhammed Bakır (676-734)
İmam Cafer-i Sadık (699-766)
İmam Musa Kâzım (745-799)
İmam Ali Rıza (765-818)
İmam Muhammed Taki (810-835)
İmam Ali Naki (827-868)
İmam Hasan Askeri (846-874)
İmam Muhammed Mehdi (869-941).


For the Alevis, to be a really good person is an inalienable part of their life philosophy. It is important to notice that the Alevis are not turned to the Black Stone (Kaaba), which is in Mecca in the Sunni Saudi Arabia, and, as it is known, the Muslim community’s member is supposed to visit it for Hajj at least once in their lives. Alevis’ first fasting is not in Ramadan, it is in Muharram, and it takes 12 days, not 30 days. The second fast for them is after the Feast of Sacrifice for 20 days, and another one is the Hizir fast. In Islam, there is a rule that if a person has enough money, he/she should give a specific amount to a poor person, but the Alevis prefer to donate money to Alevi organizations, not to individuals. As they don’t go to Mecca for Hajj, they visit some mausoleums, like that of Haji Bektaş (in Kırşehir), Abdal Musa (in Tekke Village, Elmalı, Antalya), Şahkulu Sultan (in Merdivenköy, İstanbul), Karacaahmet Sultan (in Üsküdar, İstanbul), or Seyit Gazi (in Eskişehir).

Bektashism

Haji Bektash (Bektaş) Wali was a Turkmen who was born in Iran. After graduating, he moved to Anatolia. He educated a lot of students, and he and his students served a lot of religious, economic, social, and martial services in Ahi Teşkilatı. Haji Bektash started to be popular among the Ottoman elite military detachment, the Janissaries. Nevertheless, he was not of the Alevi origin, but he adopted the rules of the Alevi believers into his personal life. That sect, or a form of Islam, was founded in the name of Haji Bektash Wali, whose members depend on the love of Ali and the twelve imams. Bektashism was popular in Anatolia and the Balkans (especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania), and it is still alive today.

Over the course of time, Bektashism was improved by taking some features of the old beliefs of Anatolia and Turkish culture. However, Bektashism is the most important part of Alevism, as many rules of Bektashism are incorporated into Alevism. For the Alevi believers, the mausoleum of Haji Bektash Wali in Nevşehir in Anatolia is an important point of the pilgrimage. Finally, in Turkey, Bektashism and Alevism, in fact, cannot be treated as different concepts of Islamic theology.

Problems and difficulties of Alevis in Ottoman history and Turkey

When the Ottoman state was established at the end of the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th century, it did not have sectarian frictions within Islam. At that time, Alevis occupied a lot of chairs in state institutions. The Janissaries (originally the Sultan’s bodyguard) were members of Bektashism, which means that even the Sultan tolerated in full such a way of the interpretation of the Quran and the early history of Islam. However, as the Ottoman state was involved in the process of imperialistic transformation by annexing surrounding provinces and states, Sunnism was getting more and more important because the Sunni Muslims were becoming a clear majority of the Ottoman Sultanate and, therefore, Sunnism was much more useful for the state administration and the system of governing. The Ottoman state became involved in the chain of conflicts with the Safavid Empire (Persia, today Iran, 1502−1722) – a country with a clear majority of those Muslims who expressed Shi’ism that is a form of Islam very similar to Alevism. The Alevi group, who complained about being more Sunni in the Ottoman Sultanate, became sympathizing Safavid Shah İsmail I (1501−1524) and his state, as it was based on Alevism. The animosity between the Ottoman Alevis and Ottoman authorities became more obvious in 1514 when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1512−1520) executed some 40.000 Alevis together with the Kurdish people while going to have a decisive Battle of Chaldiran (August 23rd) in Iran against Shah Ismail I. Till the end of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1923, Alevis have been oppressed by the authorities as the sectarian believers who were not fitting to the official Sunni theology of Islam.

After the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Alevis were glad in the first years of the new Republic of Turkey, which declaratively proclaimed a segregation of the religion from the state, which practically meant that there was no official state religion in the country. The Alevi population of Turkey supported most of the reforms with great hope that their social status would be improved. However, after the first years of the new state, they started to experience some difficulties as, de facto, a religious minority. The 1960s were very important for Turkish society for at least three reasons: (1) The immigration had started from the rural area to the urban area following a new process of industrialization; (2) The immigration abroad, mostly to West Germany, according to the German-Turkish so-called Gastarbeiter Agreement; and (3) A further democratization of political life. As a consequence, in 1966, Alevis established their own political party – Birlik Partisi (Unity Party). In 1969, Alevism, as a minority group, sent eight members to the Parliament according to the results of the parliamentary elections. However, in 1973, the party had sent just one member to the Parliament, and finally, in 1977, the party had lost its efficiency. In 1978, in Maraş, and in 1980, in Çorum, hundreds of Alevi Muslims were killed as a consequence of the conflict with the majority Sunni population, but the most notorious Alevi massacre happened in 1993 on July 2nd in Sivas, when 35 Alevi intellectuals were killed in Madimak Hotel by a group of religious fundamentalists.

Undoubtedly, the Alevi believers still face many problems in Turkey today in connection with freedom of religious expression and the recognition as a separate cultural group. For example, the religious curriculum does not have any information about Alevism, but rather only about Sunnism, which means that Alevism is not studied on a regular basis in Turkey. Alevism is deeply ignored by Turkey’s administration, for instance, by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (est. 1924), which is an institution dealing with the religious questions and problems, but in practice, it is working according to the rules of Sunni Islam. However, on the other hand, there are some improvements in Alevi cultural life, as, for instance, many foundations and other civic public institutions are opened to support it. Nevertheless, Alevis, like Kurds, are not recognized as a separate ethnocultural or religious group in Turkey due to the Turkish understanding of a nation (millet) that is inherited from the Ottoman Sultanate, according to which all Muslims in Turkey are treated as ethnolinguistic Turks. The situation can be changed as Turkey is seeking the EU’s membership and, therefore, certain EU requirements have to be accepted, among others, and granting minority rights for Alevis and Kurds.

Conclusions

Alevism is a sect of Islam, and it shows many common points with Shi’ism. However, we can not say that it is a part of Shi’ism as a whole. Alevi culture has a rich heritage in poems and music because of its worship style. In Anatolia, Bektashism is usually connected with Alevism.

The Alevi people were living in the Ottoman Sultanate and its successor, the Republic of Turkey, usually with troubles, as they, with their religion, did not fit the official (Sunni) expression of Islam.

Today, Alevis in Turkey are fighting to be respected as a separate religious-cultural group that can freely demonstrate their peculiar way of life. As a matter of fact, the Alevi people could not express themselves freely for centuries, including in present-day Turkey, which should learn to practice both minority rights and democracy.

Finally, if Turkey wants to join the EU, surely, it has to provide a maximum of the required standards of protection of all kinds of minorities, including religious and religious-cultural ones. That can be a chance for the Alevi people in Turkey to improve their status within society.

Personal disclaimer: The author writes for this publication in a private capacity, which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution. The author of the text does not have any moral, political, scientific, material, or legal responsibility for the views expressed in the article.

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Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.

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Regime change for oil? The real motivations behind the US military intervention in Venezuela

By Malfred Gerig

Published date 8 March, 2026

First published in Spanish at CEDES and Viento Sur. Translation by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

In the early hours of January 3, the United States carried out a military intervention in Venezuela, “Operation Absolute Resolution”, which culminated in the head of state, Nicolás Maduro, being taken to a New York prison. Hours later, US President Donald Trump declared: “We are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition.”1 Why did the US decide to “insert” itself so deeply into the Venezuelan state as to claim it was now “running the country”? In the first instance, we could say, in line with Antonio Gramsci’s realistic and factual observation, that “the great Powers have been great precisely because they were at all times prepared to intervene effectively in favourable international conjunctures”2 The answer, therefore, to what motivated the US military intervention would simply be that a favourable situation opened up for it to insert itself effectively and take advantage off.

However, in “real history,” as Gramsci called it, the dialectic between international and national forces is more complex and thorny. How favourable a situation is for a Great Power to intervene is determined by the extent to which the dialectic within civil society (horizontal power relations) gives way to the penetration of a foreign sentinel (vertical power relations). The crux of the matter is that integral state crises create fertile grounds for forceful solutions. Such crises can be resolved internally through “organised economic and political expressions” rooted in national life but also create favourable circumstances for the “activities of unknown forces” (Gramsci dixit), generally represented by the actions — first technical-military and then political-military — of a foreign sentinel. According to Gramsci, the “charismatic ‘men of destiny’” who tend to emerge when integral state crises can not be organically resolved — that is, when a static equilibrium means no side can definitively prevail — do not necessarily come from within the competing national forces, but may express an international force penetrating into national life.3 A Great Power international Caesarism?

Returning to the focus of this essay: what was the ultima ratio for US military intervention in Venezuela? Was it just an inexcusable regime change for oil? Did the fate of two states — Venezuela and the US — intertwine simply because it is “all about oil” (David Harvey dixit)? When answering these questions, the words of Thomas Friedman come to mind: 

There is nothing illegitimate or immoral about the U.S. being concerned that an evil, megalomaniacal dictator might acquire excessive influence over the natural resource that powers the world’s industrial base.4

Yet can this imperial moralising be sustained when Trump 2.0 is clearly seeking to reformat the naïve “rules-based international order”? Is the claim that the Trump 2.0 administration’s intervention in Venezuela was simply “about oil” as simplistic, naïve and insufficient as the argument that it seeks to “restore democracy” and stabilise the country?

The problem with the it’s “all about oil” thesis is that this is an excellent explanandum but helps little in terms of explanans. In other words, this thesis tells us what is crucial, the ultima ratio of imperial intervention: they are there for the oil. But it fails to explain why this is crucial: that is, how they intend to benefit from the oil. Furthermore, it simplifies the situation by obscuring some of Washington’s other economic and geopolitical objectives. My argument is that the explanans for US military intervention is both the US civil society dynamics and the catastrophic outcome for Venezuelan society of the country’s integral state crisis and Long Depression. It also finds its reason in the current state of the modern inter-state system and the US hegemonic cycle.

The catastrophic outcome of a state crisis

Nation-states coexist in a hierarchical, unequal and polarised inter-state system, within which relative strength determines who imposes their will and who suffers as a consequence. Strong states — namely, those that have been successful in building state capacity, organising warfare and accumulating capital — impose their will and entrench themselves at the top of the hierarchy, while weak states suffer and are relegated to the bottom. It is no coincidence that, as Immanuel Wallerstein argued, national economic development is a priority collective task for political communities grouped into nation-states. In a world economy governed by the relentless accumulation and centralisation of capital and power among classes, countries and regions, the weakening of a state will always provide a great opportunity for a foreign sentinel to act. States can therefore not afford, under any circumstances, to live through prolonged periods of organic crisis of authority and hegemony, much less a “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces” that undermines the sources of social power on which the nation-state is built. In sum, nation-states in the modern inter-state system cannot afford processes such as the Long Venezuelan Depression.

Building on my argument in La Larga Depresión Venezolana (The Long Venezuelan Depression) and drawing on Gramsci’s conceptual arsenal, I argued in “The Venezuelan transition to patrimonialism” that the integral state crisis in which Venezuelan society had been mired since 2016 had escalated eight years on to a point where the ruling elite was denied “breathing-space”, foreshadowing the “peace of the graveyards” that follows the “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces” at a domestic level, and worse still, the intervention of a “foreign sentinel.”5 The crux of my argument was that the Trump 1.0 administration (2017–21), with its strategy of collapse, had not failed to bring about regime change in Venezuela, if one considers the transformations in the country’s political economy and mutations in the ruling elite. In La Larga Depresión Venezolana, I pointed out that 

comprehensive sanctions on the public sector set the stage and prepared the legitimacy for the passive counter-revolution that embraced orthodox monetarist macroeconomic stabilisation, neoliberalism with patrimonialist characteristics, and crony capitalism.6

If we take a realistic view of interstate system dynamics, then why would this regime change from below not then lead to an outward regime change or geopolitical realignment via subjugation, if the sources of national power were completely undermined? In other words, if national political life was determined by the catastrophic stalemate between A and B, then what factors could prevent the intervention of force C from outside?

This was the point at which the fate of the “patrimonialist party” shaped by Nicolás Maduro’s leadership (2013/2016–2025) was sealed: its strategy of power for power’s sake, patrimonialism, and crony capitalism undermined both popular and national sovereignty, and the sources of social power (ideological, economic, military and political) on which Venezuela’s Westphalian sovereignty rested on — namely, other states’ respect for a national authority. This reduced the political, social and military costs of foreign military intervention, which, of course, is contrary to international law and the Westphalian framework.

In summary, thanks to the ruling elite’s decision to appropriate the state for itself, disregard the will of the people and undermine all sources of social power that sustain the nation-state, along with the counter-elite’s inability to resolve the catastrophic stalemate without the help of international Caesarism, the price that Venezuelan society paid was the intervention of a foreign sentinel, the attempt to install a protectorate, the plundering of our natural resources via tribute and, ultimately, the jeopardising of the sovereign existence of the Venezuelan nation-state. The resolution of the catastrophic stalemate that characterised the integral state crisis came in the form of a Jacksonian-Hamiltonian, mercantilist, territorialist, ethnocentric foreign sentinel that had internalised Ulpian’s maxim: quod principi placuit vigorem legem habet (what pleases the prince has the force of law).

The dialectic of US civil society and the Venezuelan opposition

David Harvey suggestively argued in his classic book, The New Imperialism, that we must take very seriously the hypothesis that US interventions abroad are motivated by a desire to distract attention from internal difficulties. In Harvey’s words, 

There is indeed a long history of governments in trouble domestically seeking to solve their problems either by foreign adventures or by manufacturing foreign threats to consolidate solidarities at home.7

To support this thesis, Harvey referenced a passage from Hannah Arendt, where she exposes the inherent instability of a civil society based solely on the accumulation of wealth and power. For Arendt, such a society can only remain stable 

by constantly extending its authority and only through process of power accumulation ... [The] ever-present possibility of [civil] war guarantees the Commonwealth a prospect of permanence because it makes it possible for the state to increase its power at the expense of other states.8

Let us ignore here Trump’s reasons for using Venezuela as a domestic scapegoat and focus instead on the actions of the decadent Venezuelan opposition political elite, which converted Venezuela into an ideal scapegoat amid the internal turmoil of US civil society under Trump.

During 2024, a window of opportunity opened up as Venezuela’s organic crisis entered a plebiscitary moment. After the resounding failure of Juan Guaidó’s dual power strategy, María Corina Machado opportunistically changed her perspective, momentarily abandoning insurrectionary strategies, believing she could lead the traditional opposition to take advantage of this plebiscitary moment, given the evident support of the vast majority of Venezuelans for an electoral and peaceful solution to the crisis. However, this plebiscitary moment “from below” ran counter to the political will of the “patrimonialist party” and the “foreign party” of the opposition “from above.” This was a first warning sign that Venezuelan society was very likely heading toward the “reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces,” the “peace of the graveyards,” and the intervention of a “foreign sentinel.” Consequently, between July 28, 2024, and January 10, 2025, this window of opportunity opened by this plebiscitary moment was closed off, the catastrophic stalemate became irresolvable, and corruption, violence and fraud were consolidated as the source of social power. From January 2025 onwards, the Machado-led opposition was left with no room for manoeuvre at the national level, instead hoping that a foreign sentinel would resolve the catastrophic stalemate in its favour.

Machado’s wager on a foreign sentinel must therefore be considered an integral part of the Venezuelan political class’s shift towards corruption, violence and fraud as a source of domination without authority. Is there anything more violent, corrupt and fraudulent than contributing to and promoting a military intervention against your own nation? Since January 2025, Machado’s only political asset, apart from sentimental exploitation of the Venezuelan diaspora, has been her adherence to, support for and promotion of the Trump administration’s theories about Venezuela and Venezuelans, motivated by his desire to push forward with his domestic immigration policy and his “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. 

While Maduro persecuted and imprisoned militants from her political party, Vente, Machado’s political activity focused not on protecting her militants from repression, national resistance or forming a broad political front, but rather on helping — often in ways that bordered on the pathetic — to build Washington’s case against Venezuela, against Venezuelans and against Maduro.9 For his part, Trump, ignoring reports from his own intelligence services, found in Machado’s narrative and actions the ideal scapegoat to: 1) justify an immigration policy that has led to heightened conflict within US civil society; and 2) intervene militarily against a weakened and discredited enemy and initiate the US Grand Strategy pivot towards Latin America amid the current Great Power rivalry by realigning Caracas with Washington. All this while appropriating manu militari an oil tribute for “favours rendered” as the sentinel and Caesar of the catastrophic stalemate. Rather than bringing her to political power, Machado’s Faustian pact with Trumpism served to declare Venezuelans hostis humani generis and contributed to the MAGA offensive against the popular and national sovereignty of several Latin American states.

The crisis/contest phase of the US hegemonic cycle and the “Donroe doctrine”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published in November 2025, states:

After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere. This “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests.10

Much ink has been spilled in Latin America over the past two centuries regarding the Monroe Doctrine. In most cases, it has been to support, in a victimising and essentialist tone, the denunciation that US imperialism has a providential motivation in Latin America. Here, on the contrary, I want to put forward a situational interpretation of the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The US hegemonic cycle has entered its third phase, the crisis/contest phase, following the geopolitical failure of the Project for a New American Century in the Middle East and, above all, the Great Recession that began in 2007. As Immanuel Wallerstein has argued, the balance-of-power or crisis/contest phases of hegemonic cycles are “a period of slow but steady disintegration of world order, the previous order.”11 The modern inter-state system is today not heading towards any kind of “world order”, but rather towards systemic chaos, in one of the two senses given to the concept by Giovanni Arrighi: a conflict that arises “because a new set of rules and norms of behaviour is imposed on, or grows from within, an older set of rules and norms without displacing it.”12 Alluding to the classic phrase of the master Thucydides, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney recently pointed out in Davos that at such moments within the modern interstate system, it is not just the weak but also middle powers who suffer. How do they suffer? They suffer both as a result of the logic of territorialist power and from the segmentation of the world market among Great Powers. Arrighi’s conceptual distinction between the logic of capitalist power and the mode of territorialist domination is essential to interpreting the situation:

Territorialist rulers tend to increase their power by expanding the size of the container. Capitalist rulers, in contrast, tend to increase their power by piling up wealth within a smaller container only if it is justified by the requirements of the accumulation of capital.13

Trump 2.0’s territorialism — and, of course, the intervention in Venezuela with the intention of turning it into a “reliable partner,” economically and politically — must be interpreted in light of the demands of capital accumulation in the context of the balance-of-power phase. In other words, the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, with its respective territorialism, is the flip side of containment in East Asia; the commitment to the logic of capitalist power in Asia corresponds to the commitment to the logic of territorialist domination in the Western Hemisphere. Hence, the contrast between territorialist and harsh words dedicated to the Americas in the National Security Strategy quoted above and the tone of capitalist power logic dedicated towards Asia: “In the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict.”14 The demands of global capital accumulation and the US–China hegemonic conflict has led to territorialism and the expansion of power and resources in the Americas.

Trump’s regime change for oil in Venezuela, or geopolitical and geoeconomic realignment of Caracas, has geostrategic incentives if Venezuela’s integral state crisis is situated amid the crisis/contest phase of the US hegemonic cycle. The weakening of sources of social power in Caracas created a low-cost window of opportunity for the Trump administration to rebalance its withdrawal from Asia with a realignment in the Western Hemisphere, starting with an oil-producing state in crisis capable of offering an example to the entire continent of what the weak will suffer if they do not adapt to US interests in this phase of Great Power rivalry.

The transformation of inter-entreprise competition into inter-state competition on a global scale is a recurring pattern of the modern world-system in the crisis/contest phase.15 Prior to the Trump 2.0 administration, trends and countertrends could be used to debate whether a turning point had been reached, regarding when competition between capital accumulation agencies became competition between states, with their respective territorial, militaristic and industrialist escalation. However, the Trump 2.0 administration marks a point of no return from inter-company competition to Great Powers competition for territory, natural resources and supply chains. The segmentation of the world market, which for Arrighi was a key element in the transition from the previous phase of crisis/contest to collapse/transition, and from there to war pandemonium seems to now be an irreversible trend in the current crisis/contest phase.

Territorialism over a country with Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, regardless of their quality, is alluring for US oil corporations in a scenario of global market segmentation, as it guarantees the management and disposal of resources essential for the valorisation of downstream oil, where global inter-corporate competition in the oil industry and inter-state struggle for capital in search of investment and profits converge. Amid Great Power rivalry and global market segmentation, the benefits of controlling Venezuela’s oil fields for the US state include expelling geopolitical competitors from accessing it as, paradoxically, secondary sanctions reduced the cost of Venezuelan oil for China due to discounts. For US oil corporations, Caracas’s geopolitical realignment may offer them the everlasting possibility of competing for profits through accumulation by dispossession: profits from vibration rather than production. In other words, the possibility of generating substantial profits leveraged on the artificial reduction of costs and the manu militari conversion of the Venezuelan nation’s property rights into the private property rights of corporations. Political capitalism hand-in-hand with international Caesarism? Exploitative domination?

In an article dedicated to analysing the doctrinal bases of Trump 2.0’s foreign policy, I argued that to understand his actions, it is necessary to abandon the restricted and euphemistic use of the term “regime change” and adopt a broader one with three meanings: 1) a violent overthrow of a foreign government; 2) a structural transformation in the mode of regulation and regime of accumulation in a peripheral and semi-peripheral country to the benefit of a Great Power; or 3) the establishment of an international or regional order by a Great Power.16 The “regime change” taking place in Venezuela — accelerated by the January 3 military intervention — falls into the second category: Caracas’s realignment with Washington’s geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Regime change for oil? Yes, but also for the sake of establishing a protectorate.

The success of international Caesarism and of the establishment of a protectorate as a way of resolving the catastrophic stalemate in Venezuela will be determined by the dialectic revolution/restoration and which element predominates. In Gramsci’s words, “it is revolution or restoration which predominates.”17 The US protectorate, as a form of resolving the catastrophic stalemate between passive and active restoration, does not escape the fact that “restorations in toto do not exist.” On the contrary, it might unleash the progressive power that until now had been overshadowed by the catastrophic dialectic of the struggle between two restorations.

• 1

  TRANSCRIPT: President Trump Discusses the Capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, 3 January 2026. https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/trump-transcripts/transcript-president-trump-discusses-the-capture-of-nicolas-maduro-in-venezuela-10326. 

• 2

  A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, p 411, https://uberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/gramsci-prison-notebooks.pdf  

• 3

  Selections from Prison Notebooks., pp. 450-451.

• 4

  T. L. Friedman, 'A War for Oil?', The New York Times, 5 January 2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/opinion/a-war-for-oil.html

• 5

  See M. Gerig, La Larga Depresión venezolana: economía política del auge y caída del siglo petrolero, Caracas, Cedes/Trinchera, 2022, p. 42 ff: M. Gerig, “La transición venezolana hacia el patrimonialismo: para una sociología política de la apropiación del Estado”, Sin Permiso, 23-09-2025. https://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/la-transicion-venezolana-hacia-el-patrimonialismo-para-una-sociologia-politica-de-la-apropiacion-del. It is crucial to bear in mind Gramsci’s words: “either the old society resists and ensures itself a breathing-space, by physically exterminating the élite of the rival class and terrorising its mass reserves; or a reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces occurs, and a peace of the graveyard is established, perhaps even under the surveillance of a foreign sentinel.” A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, p. 410.

• 6

  M. Gerig, La Larga Depresión venezolana: economía política del auge y caída del siglo petrolero, cit., p. 57.

• 7

  D. Harvey, The New Imperialism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 12.

• 8

  H. Arendt quoted in Harvey ibid., p. 16.

• 9

  Deisy Buitrago, "Venezuela's Nobel prize winner bets big on Trump as pressure builds on Maduro", Reuters, 28 October 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-nobel-prize-winner-bets-big-trump-pressure-builds-maduro-2025-10-28/. 

• 10

  National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf 

• 11

  I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750, 2nd edition, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011, p. XXV.

• 12

  G. Arrighi, The long twentieth century: money, power and the origins of our times, London, Verso, 2010, p. 31.

• 13

  Ibid., p. 7.

• 14

  National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025, cit., p. 23. 

• 15

  See G. Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Origins and Foundations of the 21st Century, London, Verso, 2007, pp. 163.

• 16

  M. Gerig, “Empire through submission (Part II): Neomercantilism, regime changes and the dangers posed for Latin America”, LINKS, January 6 2026, https://links.org.au/empire-through-submission-part-ii-neomercantilism-regime-changes-and-dangers-posed-latin-america 

• 17

  A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, p 411

 

In the time of predators: The stakes of Trump’s imperialist intervention in Venezuela

By Franck Gaudichaud & Antoine Larrache

Published date 8 March, 2026

Republished from Tempest.

The attack against Venezuela in early January and the abduction of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores are part of the new U.S. strategy within the broader reorganization of the world and of inter-imperialist power relations. This aggressive strategy notably involves increased economic pressure and direct military interventionism toward Latin America. Franck Gaudichaud looks back at these events in an interview conducted by Antoine Larrache for Inprecor magazine, with remarks updated for Contretemps Web. This interview was translated into English by Hector Rivera for International Viewpoint and Tempest Magazine.

What happened during the abduction of Maduro and his partner?

Quite a few elements and details remain unknown, even more than a month later, but we are clearly facing a large-scale imperialist aggression and, quite literally, a coup d’état, which took place on the night of January 2–3. Venezuela was bombed with an unprecedented military deployment (with more than 150 aircraft and helicopters operating simultaneously). It is the first time that a South American country has been bombed in this way (let us recall the most recent interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, against General Noriega in Panama in 1989, or the invasion of Grenada in 1983, which was preceded by the arrest and execution of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop).

The U.S. had a massive military presence in the Caribbean for several months, including the deployment of the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, along with an entire armada, all under the pretext of fighting drug trafficking — an operation that resulted in several extrajudicial killings and the bombing of boats. The possibility of an intervention was ultimately confirmed. Special forces landed on the ground during the operation and destroyed several strategic and defensive points in Venezuela. The near-total absence of organized and centralized defense, particularly anti-aircraft defense, by the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) made it possible to capture and detain, in record time, the sitting president Nicolás Maduro and his partner, deputy Cilia Flores, who were then “extracted” and deported to the United States. They were presented before a judge in New York on fabricated charges, including accusations of leading a “narco-state.”

This military operation, which violates Venezuela’s sovereignty and — of course — all international law (which is the least of Trump’s concerns), marks the beginning of a brutal attempt to recolonize the country and perhaps even to establish a protectorate in the medium term, if we are to believe the first statements coming from the White House. Within the context of the prolonged crisis of capitalism, the decline of U.S. global hegemony, and the violent reorganization of the inter-imperialist system, Trump’s objective is to bring the entire hemisphere to heel, using or threatening to use the largest military-industrial arsenal humanity has ever built. It is also, more directly, about regaining control over Bolivarian Venezuela and preparing the colonial plundering of the country’s vast heavy oil reserves.

According to your information, what has been the attitude of the state apparatus and the ruling layers in Venezuela following this operation?

It is still in the process of reorganization. What we can clearly observe — and what our contacts on the ground confirm — is that following the detention of the president and his partner, there has been continuity within the Madurista state apparatus, now embodied by the figure of interim president Delcy Rodríguez. Both military and civilian leaderships, the upper levels of the bureaucracy, leaders of the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), and the various factions of the Bolivarian business bourgeoisie appear to be closing ranks… for now. Of course, what is decisive here — and will continue to be — is the attitude of the army, the pillar of Maduro’s political control, particularly since the crises of 2014 and 2017–2019.

For now, we see the main leaders of what had been Madurismo in power since the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, on Delcy Rodríguez’s side. First and foremost is Diosdado Cabello, the regime’s strongman, who controls the police, maintains very strong ties with the army, and also with China. The Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, the seemingly untouchable Vladimir Padrino López, has expressed his support (he was not dismissed despite the January debacle), as has the president’s brother, Jorge Rodríguez, one of the key figures of Chavismo and then Madurismo, now president of the National Assembly. There are nevertheless debates about the extent to which a sector of the regime may have dropped Maduro beforehand and struck a deal over the ongoing transition, in the face of maximum pressure from the United States and the repeated failures of negotiations with Trump.

A whole segment of the existing bureaucracy, particularly high-ranking military officials, has economic interests in oil and mining extraction to protect, as well as their own impunity to negotiate in the event of regime change… But how much room for maneuver do they have now (especially in the absence of a broad, autonomous national popular resistance movement)?

The fact remains that there was no immediate politico-military capacity to respond to what was, at the very least, an anticipated or possible aggression by the Pentagon — despite armed forces supposedly on permanent alert. Several billion dollars had been invested in Russian and Chinese equipment, particularly to protect Caracas and its airspace, with anti-aircraft defenses and sophisticated radar systems over recent years. Everything appears to have been neutralized beforehand. There are therefore many unknowns from this perspective, but there was no coordinated national defense movement. Does this indicate limited internal active or passive complicity, a breakdown in the chain of command, or a strategic passivity by the General Staff while awaiting a reorganization of power? Debates are raging at Miraflores Palace, and rumors and fake news are also being feverishly fueled by Washington’s services to maintain control. Those who paid the highest price for this debacle were more than 100 people (civilians and military personnel), including members of Maduro’s personal guard and particularly 32 Cuban agents killed in the confrontation.

As for Delcy Rodríguez’s position, she confirmed the establishment of a state of exception. We are therefore far from any perspective of opening or democratization, quite the opposite, even if several political prisoners have also been released, including the opposition figure Enrique Marquez. If approved by parliament, it would allow — under certain conditions — the release of several hundred political prisoners. The bill officially acknowledges the existence of prisoners of conscience in Venezuela (detained for political offenses or for “criticism of public officials”). Though it should be noted that the law does not cover murders or aggravated violence, particularly those committed by the far right, nor does it cover corruption (which is rather positive). This amnesty proposal is also the product of intense mobilization by several collectives of families of detainees.

More broadly, however, the Rodríguez siblings seem to be confirming what Trump and Marco Rubio proudly announced at their press conference immediately after the aggression: They would be willing to usher in a new era of “cooperation” with the United States, particularly to facilitate the “reconstruction” of the oil industry under imperial oversight. Their room for maneuver is admittedly limited. Internally, however, the president has repeated that the goal is to safeguard the country’s sovereignty; she is officially demanding the immediate release of Maduro and Flores and adopts anti-imperialist rhetoric in her televised speeches. Yet CIA director John Ratcliffe was received in Caracas and even awarded a medal! And Trump announced that he was canceling any further attack because “the United States and Venezuela are now working well together.”

To what extent can a “Madurismo without Maduro” be organized, under pressure from imperialism and in collaboration with Trump? Why have there been no significant mobilizations of Chavistas and popular bases?

It was believed that Trump’s main option was that of regime change, placing the ultra-conservative, neoliberal, pro-U.S. opposition embodied by Maria Corina Machado and the 2024 presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez, who was disqualified following electoral fraud, on the “throne.” But Machado has been publicly humiliated and sidelined by Trump, at least for now: and the gift of her Nobel Peace Prize medal to the autocrat of the United States will not change much! Trump’s gamble is therefore clearly to rely on the state apparatus and Madurismo, calculating that they control the country, noting that they retain the essential support of the army and also real (albeit diminished) social bases: popular Chavism, whose potential resistance must be channeled. This would be accompanied by considerable political, military, and economic threats and pressure. Washington’s calculation is that Corina Machado and Edmundo González would not be able to radically reorganize the country in the short term without direct support from imperialism, including ground troops. An Iraq-style scenario is unthinkable for Trump and would be too costly, including domestically, given that his MAGA base is highly critical of military invasions, that the situation in the United States is tense, with major struggles underway (against ICE in particular), and since the midterm elections are coming up in November.

It is quite surprising that the state apparatus and the “bolibourgeoisie” are capable of navigating such an upheaval.

Everyone is waiting to see what happens. The interim Venezuelan government, as I said, is blowing hot and cold, including in relation to its own population. But the collapse is shocking, especially for those who thought that massive national anti-imperialist resistance, fueled by years of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” was possible. Fear and uncertainty dominate at this stage, and while there have been demonstrations in support of Maduro’s release, they have remained relatively timid. This is not so surprising. On the one hand, there is the immense military asymmetry and maximum political pressure exerted by U.S. imperialism, in a regional context that is, moreover, hostile. On the other, for more than a decade, we have witnessed the authoritarian disintegration, political collapse, and economic destruction of Chávez’s country and of what the Bolivarian process and its progressive, national-popular, and anti-imperialist impulse had embodied in the 2000s.

Madurismo exacerbated the most problematic aspects of Chavismo and consolidated a Bolibourgeoisie caste in power, a new oligarchy that has accumulated foreign currency from oil and mining extraction and certain state assets through dispossession and corruption. After repressing (often violent) demonstrations and conservative pro-imperialist opposition sectors, temporarily closing the elected parliament, and concentrating power in the executive branch, Maduro did the same to the left-wing opposition, against former allies (notably the PCV, Venezuelan Communist Party), imprisoning trade unionists and former Chavista leaders and ministers. The internal situation, exacerbated and worsened by years of U.S. blockade and unjust sanctions, has led to the exile of 8 million Venezuelans (out of a population of 28 million!).

Despite this there has been a slow and steady macroeconomic recovery in recent years, embodied by the very pragmatic management of Delcy Rodríguez, who is responsible for oil extraction, among other things. However, as several Venezuelan trade unions have denounced, Maduro’s economic policy and labor rights resemble more a neoliberal dystopia, with the destruction of all fundamental rights and a headlong rush into extractivism with catastrophic ecological consequences, than “21st-Century Socialism.” A broad trade union front had even planned to hold strikes and demonstrations in mid-January, but this plan was thwarted by Trump and his warmongering.

Under these circumstances, the absence of conditions for a broad, multi-party anti-imperialist resistance, with a popular base mobilized behind a legitimate national government, is glaringly obvious. And the Trump administration is well aware of this. We are not at all in April 2002, when Hugo Chávez suffered a coup d’état, supported by the CIA and local business leaders, and was “saved” by a very strong popular mobilization, while the military showed its willingness to reject this pro-imperial coup.

Are there still sections of the civil-military apparatus that remain rooted in this nationalist-populist perspective and ready to resist the new colonial rule? Popular Chavismo, critical left-wing movements, trade unions, and social movements have been considerably weakened, with some demoralized and others co-opted. However, memories of early Chavismo remain, and here and there, collective community experiences are still alive. Nevertheless, it seems that a significant part of the population, with a great deal of resignation, believes that this new crisis could perhaps loosen the stranglehold on the country and that the arrival of U.S. capital could lead to an economic rebound, or even the return of millions of exiles.

Will we see the establishment of a kind of forced co-management and “pro-imperial” collaboration on the part of a section of the Bolibourgeois cast to to save its interests (which is in fact unlikely in the long term), while continuing to run the country in this quasi-protectorate context? There is no question of transition, or even elections, in the short term. But it is already being considered by everyone in the medium term. Is a nationalist response by the government conceivable? In any case, the new hydrocarbons law defended by Rodriguez as a step forward which has just been approved, greatly deepens the liberalization that Maduro had begun in recent months. It radically challenges the state’s sovereignty over the resource, as well as the orientations of the 1999 Bolivarian constitution, to the benefit of U.S. multinationals. This is a historic setback! The United States will decide on extraction. They have announced that they will start by confiscating 50 million barrels for their own benefit and that part of the future dividends from oil exploitation will be placed in Qatar and returned in dribs and drabs to run Venezuelan public services, at their discretion.

Under these circumstances, what will be the capacity of the working classes to reorganize autonomously in order to reject Trump’s control and demand real democratization of the country, in this new context of colonial oppression, after years of immense material precariousness and authoritarian abuses? This is a key question.

Trump explained that he wanted to recover what had supposedly been stolen from the United States in terms of oil resources.

Trump announced without mincing words the destruction he wanted to wreak and his intention to regain control of the country. Historically, since the discovery of oil and the first wells in 1914, and especially during the golden age of extraction in the 1960s under the control of Yankee multinationals, these companies have been able to reap the full benefits of oil extraction, with huge, excessive profit margins, much more than, for example, in Saudi Arabia or the Middle East.

This is in line with the thinking of the ruling oligarchy in the United States, and there is a desire to return to this type of “savage” accumulation through dispossession. When Trump says they were “sidelined,” one might think he is referring to the 1976 nationalization by Venezuelan social democracy (under Carlos Andrés Pérez), but in fact he is referring more directly to 2007 when Chávez reorganized joint ventures for the benefit of PDVSA, and nationalized much of the extraction in the Orinoco oil belt, where the main reserve is currently located, perhaps 300 billion barrels! This is the largest proven reserve in the world, but it is extra-heavy bitumen, which is very expensive to refine.

What billionaire Trump would like to see is for this reserve to fall back into the hands of Exxon, Chevron, and other major U.S. corporations, and also to be able to dictate the price of crude oil worldwide (Venezuela is a key player in OPEC). This is not so easy in reality, given that 80 percent of exports currently go to China and the infrastructure is in a state of advanced disrepair (with 800,000 barrels per day currently being produced). In any case, there are major investments to be made, with some talking about $60 billion or even $100 billion over several years to be injected by North American capital. Nothing is certain, however, as these capitalists would need long-term guarantees that the country’s social and political control will remain stable and that China will be effectively sidelined or at least marginalized. This is truly a prospect of recolonization that could take shape.

At the same time, while the energy and oil angle is obvious — in his speech, Trump says, “Money is coming out of the ground in Venezuela” — we need to analyze the geostrategic aspect, which, in my opinion, is essential and which, incidentally, is brutally expressed by Marco Rubio: to discipline the entire region and threaten South America. The target is Brazil, which still has a degree of geostrategic autonomy. At the same time, the aim is to realign the Caribbean region and, above all, to bring down Cuba (the obsession of Marco Rubio’s Miami clan) like “ripe fruit” rather than through intervention. Cuba is losing its essential ally in Caracas and its oil supply, while the island’s economy is in a situation even worse than during the “special period in peacetime” of the early 1990s. The island is clearly under threat today, which would be another major defeat for Latin American sovereignty. And in doing so, it would threaten Colombia and Mexico, both of which are still governed by progressive governments and enjoy a certain degree of relative autonomy in the regional arena (elections are coming up in Colombia and the pressure will be strong).

The White House’s new “National Security Strategy” (NSS), published last December, confirms a desire to disrupt international relations and even a growing “fascistization” of the world order. Éric Toussaint has just devoted a detailed study to this subject. We are once again entering an era of predatory states and imperialist gangsterism (which, admittedly, never disappeared), where only brute force counts: Latin America as the U.S. backyard, while Putin can more or less do what he wants on a European scale (the European bourgeoisie is despised for its weakness, timidity, and division), including in Ukraine, while China embodies the true “systemic” enemy: a Middle Kingdom to be weakened in Latin America and contained in Southeast Asia.

The Trump administration is redrawing the world map to cope with the decline of its once-hegemonic empire. This new phase of international relations in the era of the fourth age of capitalism and major climatic and ecological upheavals is more dangerous than ever, with the remilitarization of inter-state relations and continental-scale military conflicts. Gilbert Achcar describes a “new Cold War,” bloc against bloc, and indeed, this one is increasingly punctuated by open, “hot” conflicts and colonial violence, starting with the genocide in Gaza.

How do you see this process of recolonization in Latin America, given that China is currently Latin America’s largest trading partner?

We are seeing the consequences of what we have been calling, for some time now, the “polycrisis” of the capitalist and inter-imperialist system. The major powers have not really recovered from the crisis since 2008, and we are more broadly in a long wave of “secular stagnation,” with an ongoing reorganization of value chains and marked by the hyperconcentration of capital at the global level. In this phase, the current leading power — the United States of America — is in decline and wants to violently reclaim space, resources, markets, and capacity for geostrategic projection.

In this sense, it is very interesting to return to the writings of Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernest Mandel, and Samir Amin on imperialism, without reading them as “revealed truth,” of course. The same applies to the rich debates on center-periphery relations, the theory of uneven and combined development, and the theory of dependency in the 1970s. Authors who believed that the era of imperialism was more or less over, or that we would see the emergence of a “super-imperialism” of multinational, trans-state corporations that would rule the world, were sorely mistaken: what is emerging is a highly hierarchical and competitive inter-imperialist system, based above all on strong nation States and national military powers. Multinational corporations accompany them in this process, as does financial capital.

In this context, the idea of “hemispheric security” and the doctrine of national security, which is at the heart of U.S. strategic thinking for Latin America, is being reaffirmed in an ultra-violent manner. The Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, and gunboat diplomacy are being revisited by the Trump administration with renewed violence in the form of the “Donroe Doctrine.” According to this worldview, the problem now is competition from China on all fronts, particularly in technology, infrastructure (including Big Tech and monetary infrastructure), and geopolitical power (even if not yet on a military level). Benjamin Bürbaumer’s work is illuminating in this regard: China’s capitalist development since the 1990s directly threatens globalization under U.S. hegemony and that of the dollar, as it was built during the second half of the 20th century. China is in the process of displacing the U.S. commercially and economically in Latin America: it is the leading trading partner of Brazil, Peru, Chile, and South America as a whole. This trajectory seems almost impossible to alter. Even Mexico, which is fully integrated into the U.S. market and its supply chains (notably through a free trade agreement), has China as its second largest trading partner, with companies directly established by the Chinese on the border with the United States.

Trump has said it repeatedly: China could no longer be allowed to control the Pacific and Atlantic ports at the entrances to the Panama Canal, and he succeeded in changing the situation through political pressure and millions of dollars: Panama is once again a canal entirely under U.S. control. His tools are the multiple U.S. bases, the deployment of the Fourth Fleet, and very tight military, informational, and economic control, while China has no real military means in the region.

The relationship with Colombia is central in this regard, since until now, that country has been the key to military geostrategy for the South American region, via the “Plan Colombia” and under the pretext of fighting guerrillas and “narcos.” This is despite the fact that Central America and the Caribbean are considered easier to control (although Cuba continues to resist). This explains Trump’s rather harsh diplomatic conflicts with President Petro, even though negotiations are ongoing.

The outcome of this clash of titans is uncertain — even in Javier Milei’s Argentina, China remains central to trade. There are therefore geopolitical and ideological aspects: Trump wants to strengthen “his own,” in the regional far right, the Mileis, the Bolsonaros, the Kasts, and practices electoral interventionism, as he did in the midterm elections in Argentina. He has also recently succeeded in Honduras, and he will continue to rely on Kast, the newly elected Pinochetist in Chile, the conservative billionaire Noboa in Ecuador, and the conservative liberal right in Bolivia, and put pressure on even very moderate governments, such as Lula’s in Brazil, to say: “If you resist us, you will be considered enemies, and if you are enemies, we will impose completely unprecedented tariffs of 40 or 50 percent, or we will simply threaten you militarily, as we did in Venezuela.”

This show of force, which is also underway against Greenland, shows that the United States is less and less a “hegemon” capable of projecting force or soft power, support, and consensus: They now represent raw domination centered on political-military power relations and commercial ultimatums, against a backdrop of threats of economic or colonial destruction against the “non-aligned,” including Europe and NATO allies if necessary.

It must be very complex to change supply chains and the international organization of labor, so it will require extremely repressive governments. Even in Venezuela, this could very quickly contradict what Trump or others might present as a supposed democratic opening.

Exactly. It is interesting to note the recent statements by figures representing U.S. fossil capitalism and the major oil companies, who expressed their doubts and reservations about the considerable investment that would be required to “reconquer” oil in Venezuela for their own profit, and the lack of guarantees since political stabilization is hard to achieve without establishing a repressive and costly protectorate. Trump had to meet with them and reiterated his commitment to them. In return, Chinese leaders expressed their rejection of the aggression against their Venezuelan ally, but they will have to acknowledge that this is a serious blow, as their military equipment on the ground has proven ineffective.

Xi Jinping’s special envoy to Latin America had met at length with Maduro in Caracas just hours before Trump’s raid. Nevertheless, they issued new strategic documents renewing their rejection of U.S. imperialism and their willingness to engage in “friendly” cooperation and technology transfer with Latin American countries, in contrast to the belligerent attitude of the United States. China understands the threat and has an Achilles heel: its energy dependence (the country buys 70 percent of its oil needs from abroad). Chinese leaders will seek to consolidate their influence in Latin America in the name of mutual respect, despite the setback in Venezuela, without entering into direct confrontation with Trump in the hemisphere. They are promoting a “win-win” discourse, yet the relationship between China and Latin America remains completely asymmetrical: They always want more raw materials, minerals, arable land, and agribusiness. They have announced their intention to reach their goal of $700 billion in investment in the region by 2035. The recently inaugurated Chancay megaport is their flagship project in the region for the “New Silk Road.” Nevertheless, the economic slowdown is also affecting China.

Even though the Chinese Communist Party subscribes to the discourse on multilateralism, the construction of the BRICS and the “Global South,” many activists are well aware that the voracious capitalism of the Asian giant cannot embody a real alternative in terms of emancipation, development, and even diplomacy. This has been evident in their silence in the face of the massacres in Gaza, and even their direct or indirect support for Netanyahu. They advocate for a different global order, certainly, but one that will not necessarily bring liberation to the peoples of the South.

The Latin American region finds itself at the intersection of two conflicting tectonic plates: a dominant, violent imperialism in crisis and a global imperial hegemony that could potentially be emerging. At this stage, the United States spends more than 36 percent of the world’s total military expenditure. This is considerable. 250,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed around the world, compared to only a few hundred Chinese and perhaps 30,000 to 35,000 Russians. Trump wants to rely on this enormous military-industrial power to try to reestablish the United States as an untouchable global player.

Do you have any information on resistance to this offensive in Latin America? What about the attitude of so-called “progressive” governments?

Progressive or center-left governments are denouncing the aggression against Venezuela, the kidnapping of President Maduro, the breakdown of international order, and the violation of a neighboring country’s sovereignty. Lula, Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico, Boric in Chile, and Gustavo Petro even more clearly in Colombia have all spoken out, which does not mean, however, that they support the Maduro regime.

Lula has intervened mainly on the diplomatic front and in a rather timid manner: He has called for an urgent UN meeting, as the legitimate forum for the settling international conflicts; he also tried to mobilize the Organization of American States, but at the same time he has shown a certain powerlessness. Whereas in the 2000s, national-populist governments had a strong capacity for cooperation and pooling resources, with UNASUR, CELAC, and even ALBA, in an attempt to exert influence on the international stage, we are now once again facing fragmentation.

There is no longer any talk of the Bank of the South project, or even of an alternative common currency. Today, the ideal of the Patria Grande (José Martí’s great Latin American homeland) is in decline, nationalism and the far right are on the rise, the collapse of the Bolivarian experiment is weighing heavily on the entire region, Cuba is suffocating and in danger, Bolivia’s Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) is tearing itself apart, the Boric experiment is giving way to Kast, etc. The progressive governments in power (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay) seem relatively isolated, even though Petro and, even more so, Claudia Sheinbaum have managed to consolidate a solid multi-class social and electoral base.

The decisive factor in such a context is and will continue to be grassroots resistance, class and popular struggles, feminists, peasants, indigenous peoples, regardless of the position of governments, for self-determination and national sovereignty. One way to gain more influence on the regional stage and in relation to Trump, including for left-wing governments, would be to rely on a mobilized population, invoking the historic anti-imperialist horizon that is still very much present in the collective imagination and values of some Latin Americans. However, in Brazil and under Boric in Chile, progressive politics has tended to deactivate struggles and mobilized actors. Not to mention Venezuela. The Maduro government has co-opted and/or repressed resistance, and what it has not done directly, economic collapse and sanctions have taken care of. There are still some “communes” and courageous experiments in self-organization that are worth supporting, but they remain fragile.

This does not mean that there are not multiple mobilizations and resistance movements taking place right now. The continent of Sandino and the Zapatistas remains dotted with struggles. In Brazil, this is very clear, as we have seen the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) remains powerful, despite internal debates about its relationship with Lula. In Ecuador too, in the face of Noboa, with the large mobilizations of CONAIE, the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador, urban unions, and ecological collectives, which succeeded in inflicting a crushing political defeat on the government in the November 2025 referendum, rejecting the project for a new Yankee military base and the authoritarian reform of the Constitution. So in several countries, things are moving.

We could talk about the power of feminist, indigenous, and decolonial movements: For example, there is hope in Chile to confront Kast and his socially regressive, racist, and patriarchal measures. But there are currently no continent-wide mobilizations, as there have been in the past, for example to confront the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) project, which was defeated in 2005. One place of support that could be truly fundamental is the increasingly massive mobilizations underway in the heart of the United States, with the “No Kings” protests and the struggles against police violence and the fascist immigration police (ICE). Mamdani’s victory in New York, and the recomposition of the left against the Democratic Party establishment also come to mind.

Otherwise, we must recognize that there is a rising neo-conservative, even reactionary, tide in many areas in most countries, which weighs heavily. Violence also pervades everyday life and the media, whether it be from cartels and drug trafficking, the state or paramilitaries, or forced migration. This is the case in Chile, which I know well. It is imperative for us to understand what led this country from the great popular uprising of 2019 (which was heavily repressed) to the massive victory of José Antonio Kast’s neo-Pinochetismo in 2025: this is fundamental, in my opinion, because it is a major defeat for all social and political leftists in a country that is emblematic of global neoliberalism.

We are living in a time when neo-fascism and the conservative far right can appear to be an “alternative” in the eyes of a significant portion of the working classes. A time when the left has been discredited or has lost touch with the working classes to the benefit of conservative evangelical churches. A time when anti-capitalist left-wing movements remain weak, sectarian, or lacking in credibility. Of course, from our point of view, the far right is an ultra-regressive “alternative” that serves capital, the destruction of the environment, patriarchy, the brutal domination of oligarchies, etc. It also serves U.S. imperialism in the Americas. Thus, Kast loudly welcomed the kidnapping of Maduro and Cilia Flores. The same is true of Noboa, who posted tweets claiming that the attack was excellent news for Latin America. The Brazilian far right thinks the same. They are Trump’s “lackeys.” Elections are coming up in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru in a few months. In Colombia, there is a real risk of a return of the right. What will happen in Brazil, with an institutional left still dependent on the figure of an aging Lula, now in his 80s?

What suggestions would you give for a transitional global anti-imperialist program?

That’s very (too) ambitious! Because I can’t answer such a question on my own, which, moreover, would have to be adapted to local, national, and then global conditions based on the collective efforts of the populations concerned. What we can say with certainty is that the solution will certainly not be found in this context of militarization, imperial offensives, wars, genocide in Gaza, invasion of Venezuela, widespread submission of peoples to authoritarian governments, mass repression as in Iran, and fascism… So, as our friend Daniel Bensaïd said, we must start by saying “no!”

In the current Latin American context, what militant and radical leftists are seeking to build is already the broadest and most unified anti-imperialist resistance possible on a continental scale, in support of Venezuela and to defend against new interventions on the continent right now. At this stage, continental mobilization remains far below the urgency of the moment. They are already demanding the immediate withdrawal of the huge armada that the United States has been maintaining for months in the Caribbean and the immediate release of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, based on the clear principle that it is up to the Venezuelan people, and only them, to decide who governs them.

In the countries of the “South,” this requires the creation of broad united fronts to reject attacks on sovereignty and self-determination. But such open fronts of resistance should in no way sacrifice the construction of combative left-wing movements, independent of the national bourgeoisie, and of shaky governmental progressivism that has shown all its contradictions over the past 25 years.

This also means a clear debate with the many Latin American “campist” currents, as well as at the international level: “geopolitics” cannot lead to sweeping under the rug the struggle against authoritarianism (whatever form it takes) and the necessary unconditional defense of peoples fighting against imperialisms other than Trump’s (starting with Russia). In the countries of the “global North,” the urgent task is to build active and concrete internationalist solidarity. This is what we have begun, albeit timidly, to put in place in France around Venezuela. This internationalism will also have the task of denouncing the hypocrisy and responsibility of our own governments in the disorder of the world and their submission to Trump: Gaza has painfully reminded us of this, as has the scandalous position of the Macron government on Venezuela. In the short term, in March 2026, the anti-fascist conference in Porto Alegre could be a valuable opportunity. We hope that it will also be transformed into an international anti-imperialist conference to try to bring together, without sectarianism, political and social forces that do not agree on everything, such as the PT, the PSOL, the Brazilian CUT, and sectors of the radical left from across the continent, around common objectives. La Via Campesina, trade unions and feminist groups, social movements from all over the world.

In terms of concrete alternatives, we should try to promote the slogan “war on imperialist war” against the current insane militarization, while supporting those who are courageously waging armed resistance movements for liberation, particularly in Ukraine, Palestine, and Kurdistan. Beyond this “defensive” aspect, this means thinking collectively and “positively” about building democratic alternatives in a context of climate collapse, the collapse of the biosphere and biodiversity, and therefore thinking about a post-capitalist and post-productivist transition program, i.e., a perspective that is both eco-socialist and based on degrowth. Degrowth, of course, in rich countries, but “fair” degrowth, differentiated according to intersectional criteria (class, gender, race), and also degrowth for the oligarchies of the countries of the South. This would involve rebuilding public services, radically redistributing wealth, and implementing ecological planning on several scales (from local to global) based on deliberation, community organizing, self-organization, and democratic control. It is a perspective that raises the question of the exploitation and oppression that permeate our societies and affect us as individuals (racism, sexism, ableism, etc.).

All this cannot be “proclaimed” in an abstract way, like a mantra. How can we jointly develop very concrete transitional programs and measures that are part of a broader strategy based on wide-ranging deliberations? Which stories from the past can inspire us and teach us lessons? How can the left once again “enchant the world,” speak to the “affects” of millions of people, and forge a historic bloc that raises the question of power and its conquest, without denying itself or falling into dogmatism? Let’s start by avoiding ready-made answers. The 20th century and its horrors are still with us…

We know that there will be no emancipation without emancipation in the workplace. Rebuilding workers’ rights (both salaried and precarious) could be a first step in this direction. Let us also keep our ears open to utopian ideas and practical experiences. For example, Latin America is the birthplace of Zapatismo and several revolutionary processes, and for the past 20 years these movements have been debating ways to build a society based on “Buen Vivir,” which draws on a reinterpretation of certain demands and community practices of indigenous peoples. The same is true of women’s rights and all feminist demands against patriarchy. We have seen how the Chilean feminist movement has been able to take a cross-cutting and radical approach by responding to the “precarization of life,” confronting neoliberalism, promoting the dignified reception of migrants, and defending the rights of indigenous peoples. We must therefore start from there to think about transitions, applying them country by country, but also by rebuilding regional and international solidarity. In the face of globalized capital, it is essential to think at this level as well. This without giving in to the siren songs of “patriotism” from part of the left, including the decolonial left, assuming that we must indeed “dream” again, reinvent our collective powers, and help to co-construct popular sovereignties at several levels (including the national level, of course).

We believe that the situation is overdetermined by the catastrophe (already underway) of climate change and that we must rethink everything on this basis if we want to avoid a real cataclysm. The famous “transitional program” (proposed by Trotsky in 1938) must therefore be completely rethought. It is this perspective that the Fourth International has brought to the debate, in several languages, with the Manifesto for an Eco-Socialist Revolution – Breaking with Capitalist Growth, and is the result of several years of collective international work. The challenges are colossal: it is urgent to “pull the emergency brake,” to quote Walter Benjamin’s beautiful phrase. However, the scale of the challenges must not paralyze us. As Daniel Tanuro writes, “it is too late to be pessimistic.” Trump, Netanyahu, Macron, Putin, and their world are capable of the worst; let us feel capable of imagining the best!