Trump absent as New York marks 25 years since 9/11 with first Muslim mayor

New York marks the 25th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks on Friday, with President Donald Trump attending a ceremony at the Pentagon while Vice President JD Vance and four former presidents join commemorations at Ground Zero, where victims’ relatives will read the names of those killed.

Issued on: 11/09/2026 -
By: FRANCE 24

The 9/11 attacks killed almost 3,000 people, most of them at the World Trade Center in New York © JOHN MOORE, AFP

New York commemorates the 25th anniversary of the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks Friday with a ceremony marked by US President Donald Trump's absence and right-wing outrage at the attendance of the city's first Muslim mayor.

Trump will pay his respects at the Pentagon, not New York, where hijacked planes destroyed the World Trade Center and killed most of the 2,977 total victims on that world-altering day.

Vice President JD Vance and Trump's four living predecessors -- Republican George W. Bush, who was in office during the attacks, and Democrats Joe Biden, Barack Obama and Bill Clinton -- are all expected at the "Ground Zero" site in lower Manhattan.

No one will give speeches at the ceremony, while bereaved family members will read out the names of all of those killed and a bell rung to mark major moments during the attack.

"Memorials like this and discussions about those events are an important part of keeping it alive and understanding how we prevent tragedies like this from ever happening again," said Robert Kafka, a Chicagoan in his 60s visiting the 9/11 Memorial.

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Alongside the former presidents will be Democratic Mayor Zohran Mamdani, the Big Apple's first Muslim mayor, despite a campaign urging him to stay away spearheaded by the right-wing New York Post and former mayor Rudy Giuliani.

A petition, which has gathered more than 100,000 signatures, accuses Mamdani of associating with unspecified individuals who are "dismissive of American institutions or insufficiently critical of extremist ideologies."

"It's concerning to me that the mayor is being treated differently simply because he is Muslim," city council member Shahana Hanif told CNN.

Mamdani won plaudits however for recently revealing thousands of documents showing what city officials knew about toxicity levels of the air in Lower Manhattan following the attacks.

After the initial dust cloud that followed the collapse of the World Trade Center, months of pollution and lingering dust ensued, causing cancers from which thousands of New Yorkers still suffer today.

'Toxic air'

"People got sick because the leaders they trusted lied and told them they were safe to breathe in toxic air," Mamdani said Tuesday.

Nineteen Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four planes on that nearly cloudless day in 2001. Two jets slammed into the World Trade Center's Twin Towers, causing the iconic 110-story buildings to collapse.

A third plane struck the Pentagon, while a fourth crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers fought back.

Beyond those killed on September 11, more than 9,400 other people have died from 9/11-related illnesses, according to the federal program established to provide medical care to those affected.

Some 100 million Americans were not even born or are too young to remember the tragic events.

Logan Miller, 32, lost his uncle during the attacks, and his grandfather to 9/11-related illness in the aftermath.

"I think the next generation just can't fathom what actually transpired and how someone could be impacted by that, and so I actually find them asking more questions," he told AFP.

Huge crowds are expected to gather in Lower Manhattan for the memorial service.

The Secret Service has erected a security ring of steel around the site of the 9/11 Memorial and Museum.

Police commissioner Jessica Tisch said an anti-drone team would be deployed as a precaution, but stressed there was no intelligence of a specific threat to the gathering.

Al-Qaeda meanwhile has marked the anniversary by releasing a video showing images of late leader Osama bin Laden and his son Hamza, who Trump said in 2019 had also been killed.

Ahead of the memorial, a drone show with 2,977 lights rose above New York Harbor, one for each person killed in the attacks.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

 

25 years on, 9/11 continues to cast a long shadow over the US

Copyright Alexandre Fuchs/Copyright 2021 The AP. All rights reserved

By Simon Ormiston

Published on 11/09/2026 - EURONEWS

Alongside the thousands of Americans killed on 9/11, dozens of Europeans lost their lives that day — and 25 years on, some of the people accused of being behind the attacks have still not faced justice.

A quarter of a century after hijacked planes struck New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, the attacks of 11 September 2001 remain lodged in the American psyche more firmly than almost any other event of the past 25 years.

A new Ipsos poll finds that roughly half of US adults, unprompted, name 9/11 among the most significant events of their lifetime — ahead of the Covid-19 pandemic, the elections of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, and Hurricane Katrina of 2005.

Nine in ten say the attacks changed the country "a great deal" or "quite a bit," and most Americans can still recall exactly where they were when they heard the news.

Yet despite that lasting wound, only around one in ten plan to actively mark Friday's anniversary - for those that do a moment of silence and the flying of the flag are the most common gestures.

Two planes flew into the World Trade Center in New York on 9/11 killing 2,977 people. 11 September, 2001. Chao Soi Cheong/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved

Confidence in the government's ability to prevent another attack has also declined steadily since the record highs recorded in the days after 2001.

What's planned for the 25th anniversary?

Commemorations will unfold across the three sites. In New York, victims' relatives will gather on the Memorial plaza to read aloud the names of those killed, punctuated by seven moments of silence — one more than in previous years, added to honour those who have since died of 9/11-related illnesses.

Ceremonies will also take place at the Pentagon in Arlington and at the Flight 93 National Memorial in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

People were forced to flee as the streets around lower Manhattan were covered in a thick ash after the twin towers collapsed. 11 September, 2001. SUZANNE PLUNKETT/2001 AP

Trump will not attend the New York ceremony this year, opting to speak at the Pentagon instead.

Vice President JD Vance will go to Ground Zero - the area where the first search for survivors in began - while former presidents Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush are also expected to attend the New York event.

Why is it called 9/11?

For some, the shorthand can seem puzzling. The date was the eleventh day of the ninth month but the American convention of writing dates with the month-first leads to "9/11" which also mirrors how the emergency number 911 is dialled in the US.

How many Europeans died in 9/11?

While nearly 3,000 Americans died in the event, hundreds of foreign nationals were also among the dead. Estimates place the number of non-American victims at roughly 372, drawn from around 60 countries.

Britain suffered the heaviest toll of any country besides the US, with 67 nationals killed. Germany, Italy, Ireland and other European states also lost citizens, many of them financial workers employed at or visiting the World Trade Center.

Over 2,600 pieces of the World Trade Center were distributed across the US and 11 other countries including this display in London. FILE AP Photo

American financial services firm Cantor Fitzgerald occupied floors 101 through 105 of the World Trade Center's North Tower, directly above the impact zone of American Airlines Flight 11.

The company employed a number of Europeans and in total 658 employees were killed that day - the largest loss of life of any individual firm.

Number of Europeans killed in 9/11 attacks:

• United Kingdom — 67
• Germany — 11
• Italy — 10
• Ireland — 6
• Poland — 6
• Portugal — 5
• France — 4
• Romania — 4
• FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) — 2
• Sweden — 2
• Switzerland — 2
• Belarus, Belgium, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Ukraine - 1 per country

What happened to the perpetrators?

All 19 hijackers died carrying out the attacks - 15 were Saudi nationals, two from the United Arab Emirates, and one from Egypt and one from Lebanon.

Behind them stood the wider terrorist al-Qaeda network who claimed direct responsibility for the attacks. Osama bin Laden, the group's leader, evaded capture for almost a decade before being killed by US special forces in Pakistan in 2011.

His eventual successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed in a drone strike in Kabul in 2022.

The self-described "mastermind" of the plot, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was captured in Pakistan in 2003 and has been held at Guantánamo Bay since 2006 charged with the first-degree murder of 2,977 people.

A US military judge has now set his long-delayed trial to begin in June 2028, alongside several alleged co-conspirators, following a collapsed 2024 plea deal that would have seen the men admit guilt in exchange for the death penalty being removed from sentencing options.

Proceedings have dragged for over two decades amid disputes over evidence obtained through the use of torture, including waterboarding, at secret CIA sites.

 

Why there is no lawyers’ movement in Pakistan today

In 2007, live television turned a sacked chief justice into a national uprising that ended Gen Musharraf’s rule. A lawyer who marched then, and resigned from the Supreme Court in protest last year, explains why that isn’t happening now.

Athar Minallah 

Published July 13, 2026  

The Lawyers’ Movement of 2007-2009 is considered one of the most significant episodes of civic mobilisation in the country’s history. What began as a dispute over the suspension of the chief justice of Pakistan evolved into a nationwide campaign to challenge Gen Musharraf’s rule.

The reinstatement of a handful of deposed judges was symbolic. Its true importance lay in restoring the Constitution, ending a decade of dictatorship, facilitating the return to democratic governance, and reaffirming the principle that political authority must derive from the will of the people, rather than from unelected centres of power.

The conventional explanation given for the movement’s success focuses on lawyers, judges, and political parties. All three groups played a role, but this reasoning overlooks a fundamental factor: the movement’s ability to transform a constitutional dispute into a compelling national narrative.

Understanding why that happened explains why no comparable lawyers’ movement exists today, despite continuing debates about constitutionalism, judicial independence, and the rule of law.

When it began, of course, the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement was hardly a mass uprising. In those days, most Pakistanis had little direct engagement with judicial politics. The turning point came when private television channels began providing continuous live coverage of protests, court proceedings, and political developments. For days, weeks, and months, prominent lawyers such as Aitzaz Ahsan, Muneer Malik, Hamid Khan, Tariq Mehmud, and Ali Ahmad Kurd addressed audiences live on television, openly challenging the authority of Gen Pervez Musharraf, who simultaneously held the offices of president and chief of army staff. He had underestimated the impact of live visuals.

This was unprecedented. Millions of Pakistanis watched lawyers criticise the country’s most powerful institutions in realtime. Rallies, arrests, police actions, and courtroom developments were broadcast live, transforming what might otherwise have remained a professional dispute on a national political cause.

The significance of this media environment cannot be overstated. Political movements succeed not simply because grievances exist, but because they become visible, shared, and emotionally resonant. Live television allowed citizens to witness events as they unfolded, turning isolated protests into a national conversation. Images of the chief justice being manhandled by police, unarmed lawyers in their black coats resisting arrest, the violence in Karachi on May 12, 2007, and, later that same evening, Gen Musharraf displaying his arrogance by raising his fists and declaring victory, transformed a constitutional dispute into a moral drama that was beamed into millions of living rooms.

An often-overlooked aspect of the movement is that, in its initial months, the judiciary itself did not immediately emerge as a united institution of resistance. Following the chief justice’s suspension in March 2007, judges continued functioning within the existing judicial framework. Between March and November, however, the movement gathered extraordinary momentum through relentless media coverage and sustained public mobilisation. Twenty-four-hour television transformed lawyers into national figures and judicial independence into the defining constitutional issue of the day. As public support intensified, judges increasingly found themselves at the centre of a national constitutional struggle. When emergency rule was imposed in November 2007 and judges were required to take the oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order, many refused. By then, they understood that they would be seen as villains if they joined the other side.

The movement also arrived at a particular time within the broader political context. By 2007, Pakistan had experienced almost a decade of Gen Musharraf’s rule, for which public fatigue had become increasingly evident. Many Pakistanis, irrespective of political affiliation, were thus receptive to demands for constitutional restoration and democratic change. Gen Musharraf had also largely lost the support of key foreign allies, many of whom appeared to believe that their principal strategic interests had already been secured.

A further important factor was the alignment of political parties. All major political parties eventually converged on a shared minimum demand: restoration of the judiciary and genuine democracy. Their common objective of restoring democracy transformed what began as a professional protest into a broad constitutional movement and greatly facilitated mass mobilisation. The violence of May 12, 2007 and its visuals telecast live further alienated the few political parties that continued to support Gen Musharraf, deepening his political isolation.

Today, the political landscape is markedly different. Except for one major political party, most others are perceived to have accommodated themselves to prevailing centres of power, weakening their capacity to serve as independent drivers of constitutional and democratic mobilisation. The principal opposition party, despite commanding substantial public support, is widely seen as politically and organisationally constrained. Its leadership remains incarcerated, its organisational structure fragmented, and its ability to act as a unifying national force significantly diminished. There is a widespread perception that recent constitutional and legal changes, including the 26th and 27th Amendments, have further strengthened the coercive apparatus. Unlike in 2007–09, there is no unified political front capable of reinforcing or amplifying a nationwide constitutional movement.

Youth and young lawyers also played a critical role. Senior leaders themselves were committed and led by the idealism of the young, whose determination discouraged compromise at crucial moments. Thousands of younger lawyers organised rallies, travelled across cities, and maintained the movement’s momentum for nearly two years. Effective movements require leadership, but they also depend upon committed participants willing to assume personal risk.

Equally important was the culture of the legal profession. Before the Lawyers’ Movement, bar associations functioned differently. Although elections were contested, they were generally fought over professional integrity, institutional independence, and the welfare of the legal profession rather than overt partisan loyalties. The organised bar retained a strong institutional identity rooted in constitutionalism and the defence of judicial independence.

The establishment had also not regarded the organised legal profession as a significant political challenge. Consequently, it had made relatively few inroads into the internal politics of bar associations. When the confrontation over the judiciary emerged, the bars were therefore able to respond with unusual unity and institutional coherence.

Slogans amplified mobilisation. Demands such as Dastoor ki baladasti (supremacy of the Constitution) and Adliya ki bahali (restoration of the judiciary) were accompanied by more emotive expressions such as Riyasat hogi maa ke jaisi (the state will be like a mother). Crowds openly chanted slogans directed at the dictator’s regime, and these scenes were broadcast live by private television channels into millions of homes. The fact that such slogans could be aired live on national television was itself extraordinary. Together, these broadcasts transformed constitutional language, political dissent, and public protest into a vocabulary that ordinary citizens could understand, identify with, and embrace.

The movement combined grievance with hope. While opposing undemocratic rule, it presented an aspirational vision of justice, constitutionalism, and dignity. That combination enabled it to resonate far beyond lawyers and political elites.

The absence of a comparable lawyers’ movement today reflects the disappearance of many of these conditions. Contemporary Pakistan differs fundamentally from the environment that existed between 2007 and 2009.

The most obvious difference is the media landscape. During the movement, private television channels powerfully amplified dissent. The same channels that broadcast lengthy speeches against a sitting general and provided uninterrupted coverage of anti-establishment protests are now widely perceived to operate within much narrower limits.

Whether due to formal restrictions, informal pressures, commercial considerations, or self-censorship, sustained live broadcasts openly challenging powerful institutions have become almost unimaginable on mainstream private television. Equally important is the perception that the media’s institutional role has changed. During the lawyers movement, many journalists regarded themselves as participants in a broader struggle for constitutionalism and media freedom. Today, that visible institutional resistance is far less apparent. The institution that once helped construct a national narrative of resistance is now widely seen as less able to perform that function.

This matters because movements depend upon visibility. Without shared public exposure, grievances remain fragmented and rarely develop into collective causes.

A climate of fear has increased the perceived cost of mobilisation. Reports of pressure, restrictions on dissent, and intimidation have reinforced the perception that political participation carries greater personal risk, making collective action considerably more difficult. The authority meant to serve the people is instead perceived as being used to silence them.

The legal profession has also undergone profound change. The unity that once characterised the bar associations is no longer evident. Many observers argue that bar politics has become increasingly shaped by partisan affiliations and factional interests rather than shared institutional principles. Over the past two decades, the establishment has also had considerably more opportunity to cultivate influence within a range of institutions, including segments of the legal profession.

Perhaps the most significant change lies within the bars themselves. It is no secret that many lawyers privately acknowledge what they regard as a serious erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence. Many believe that the judiciary has become increasingly subject to the influence of unelected power centres, often acting through the constitutional façade of an elected parliament. Yet these concerns have rarely translated into sustained institutional resistance. Instead, there appears to be a degree of resignation — and, in some quarters, tacit acceptance — that this is now the prevailing constitutional order. The reality may be widely understood within the profession, but few institutional voices are prepared to challenge it publicly.

Cases involving lawyers such as Imaan Mazari and Hadi Ali Chattha are frequently cited in this context. The muted response from representative legal bodies manifests the difference between today and the collective activism displayed during the Lawyers’ Movement.

There is another, perhaps more ironic, reason why the public is reluctant to place the same trust in judges and lawyers today. The success of the Movement raised immense public expectations that the restored judges and lawyers would fulfil their promise of making the Riyasat like a mother for its people. Regrettably, many believe those expectations were not met. The judges and lawyers became the principal beneficiaries of a struggle sustained by the sacrifices of ordinary citizens. The ninety innocent lives lost during the movement were gradually forgotten, while the idealism of countless young lawyers was left frustrated.

Instead of using the opportunity to transform the justice system, particularly at the district level where ordinary citizens seek justice, the restored judiciary was widely perceived to have reverted to many of the same institutional practices that had existed before the movement. Genuine reform, made possible by the extraordinary public support for the judiciary, never materialised. For the common citizen, little changed. That disappointment has inevitably weakened public trust in both judges and lawyers.

The broader lesson extends beyond Pakistan. Political movements are rarely driven by facts alone. They depend upon narrative, visibility, organisational cohesion, favourable political conditions, and emotional resonance. The Lawyers’ Movement succeeded not simply because lawyers protested or judges were restored, but because it transformed judicial independence from an abstract legal issue into a compelling national story that millions of Pakistanis could identify with.

Today, nearly every condition that made that transformation possible has changed. The media no longer possesses the same freedom to amplify dissent, bar associations are more fragmented and increasingly shaped by partisan politics, collective institutional resistance has weakened, and political parties no longer provide a unified constitutional platform. Constitutional concerns remain, but the institutional and political ecosystem that once transformed those concerns into a nationwide movement no longer exists.

Throughout history, lasting constitutional transformation has been brought about by political leadership rather than by judges or generals. The Lawyers’ Movement was never merely about restoring a handful of judges to office. Its larger purpose was the restoration of the Constitution, democracy, and the principle that the will of the people must prevail.

It was the political leadership—not judges or lawyers—that ultimately had to make the Constitution work in letter and spirit. For more than seven decades, Pakistan has witnessed repeated cycles in which political leaders aligned themselves with centres of power, celebrating when their opponents became victims, only to forget their own persecution when they later returned to office with the support of those very centres of power. In the end, it has always been the will of the people that has suffered.

The Lawyers’ Movement succeeded because, at that historic moment, political leadership demonstrated the resolve to honour the Charter of Democracy. That spirit created the possibility of building a state that cared for every citizen, especially the weakest and most vulnerable.

The success of the Lawyers’ Movement is too often measured by the restoration of the deposed judges rather than by its far greater achievement: ending nearly a decade of Gen Musharraf’s rule and paving the way for the restoration of constitutional democracy through a freely elected parliament after the unprecedented mass mobilisation that culminated in the 2008 general elections. The reinstatement of the judges was largely symbolic. Ironically, the restored judges were later widely perceived as contributing to the weakening of the very parliament that represented the movement’s greatest constitutional success. That role, however, deserves separate discussion.

Today, the reality is widely recognised. Regrettably, political leaders who have sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution now openly take pride in governance through a hybrid system rather than under the Constitution itself. The greatest responsibility, therefore, rests with the political leadership because it has voluntarily assumed the duty of leading the nation.

What Pakistan needs today is not another Lawyers’ Movement but the collective spirit that once united political leaders, judges, lawyers, journalists, the media, civil society, and ordinary citizens. It needs a movement to make the Riyasat a mother for every citizen, to break the shackles of elite capture, restore the supremacy of the Constitution, and ensure that the will of the people alone governs the country.

It is time for truth and reconciliation. The choice is clear: continue repeating the failures of the past, or finally learn from our mistakes, honour the constitutional promise made to the people, and build a state governed, in both letter and spirit, by the will of its actual stakeholders — the people.

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Header image: Pakistani riot police confront lawyers during a protest in Lahore in November 2007. — AFP