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Monday, October 21, 2024

The Student Movement Awakes with a Roar in Argentina as Students Occupy Universities to Defy Austerity


Argentina’s far-right president Javier Milei’s brutal austerity measures and attempts to dismantle public universities have triggered a massive student mobilization throughout Argentina. With protests, occupations, public classes, and assemblies to discuss the path ahead, students and staff are confronting the far-right government.



Juliana Yantorno 
October 16, 2024
LEFT VOICE

Students, faculty, and staff participate in an assembly at the National University of Córdoba's Law School in Córdoba, Argentina.

When far-right president Javier Milei intervened to veto a Congressional bill to fund public universities and keep his slashes to the education budget intact, he had no idea that he would wake up the sleeping beast of Argentina’s student movement.

Between October 14 and 15, students and faculty held more than 100 assemblies to decide how to organize the fight against the far-right government’s attacks and many voted to occupy their universities. Students are now occupying 72 different schools and departments across the country and they are holding public classes in the streets in 30 universities across Argentina. According to data collected by La Izquierda Diario, more than 100 departments and schools are taking some sort of action to protest the gutting of the public education budget. In the following days, there will continue to be assemblies and possibly new occupations. Organized from below, the students in each occupation and assembly are beginning to prepare mobilizations to the centers of Argentina’s main cities.

It is not yet possible to foresee where this great university rebellion will lead, but it is already taking on historic proportions. It is spreading quickly in the province of Buenos Aires with 26 schools and departments occupied; 12 departments are occupied in the city of Buenos Aires alone. But the protests reach across the entire country, from the provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe, Tucumán, Catamarca, Chubut, Jujuy, and La Pampa, to Neuquén, Río Negro, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, and Santa Cruz.

There is no corner of the country where this rebellion has not shocked the education community. The University of Buenos Aires (UBA) has been one of the epicenters of the conflict, with the historic occupation of departments such as Law, Medicine, Psychology, Architecture, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities, to which others are being added as the week progresses. More than six departments in the National University of La Plata have been occupied, as well various departments in schools in the Buenos Aires suburbs and in the interior of the province of Buenos Aires, such as Mar del Plata, Tandil, and Bahía Blanca.
A Force to Be Reckoned With

The magnitude of this conflict is the result of structural changes in Argentina over the last 20 years, namely the growth in the number of universities and in the university population. This means that the university system extends to every corner of the country. Public university enrollment has doubled from 28 national universities with 600,000 students in 1990, to 61 universities with 2 million undergraduate and graduate students today. Another 500,000 students are enrolled in private universities. Reality tells a completely different story than Milei, who declared that “the national public university is of no use to anyone but the children of the rich and the upper middle class, in a country where the vast majority of children are poor.”

It doesn’t take much to see through his lies. At least 48% of public university students are poor. First generation university students who come from working families make up around 47.8% of students enrolled in 2022, a deep and growing phenomenon that can be seen particularly clearly in the universities of Greater Buenos Aires and other urban centers throughout the country. This process is uneven depending on the area. According to government data, 39% of students at UBA are first generation; in universities in the Greater Buenos Aires area, such as at the university of José C. Paz, this figure rises to 75%; at the University of Florencio Varela, the figure is closer to 76%; and in Lanús University, 70% of students are first generation. In this way, a new subject has been developing within the student body, namely students who work or come from working families, drawing a more direct link with the working class and its traditional organizations (unions and social movements).

In these places, universities are in close proximity to large concentrations of workers. In other historical moments, this geographical unity generated an important objective basis for tendencies towards worker-student unity, as was the case in Córdoba in the 1960s and 1970s. This context is relevant to the present. New universities are joining the struggle alongside students from more historical and traditional universities such as the University of Buenos Aires, La Plata, Rosario, or Córdoba.

These changes show the potential of the new student movement as it breaks out onto the political scene. We cannot use the same old categories to understand it, as if this was just a middle class movement. The phenomenon is much deeper; the students are a political-social subject that can change the dynamics of class struggle at the national level and have an impact on the workers’ movement.

It is not only the education community that has been moved by recent events. Workers in factories across the country are excited by the protests and the students’ willingness to fight back. As one worker at the oil company YPF Ensenada told us:


I get excited thinking that my daughters can study at the University […] Our union should be doing what the kids who are standing up to Milei are doing, we should be in the same situation.

What Milei does not understand is that his attacks crush the hopes of millions of people who dream of their children going to a public university, and now he has awakened the student movement. The defense of the university is a demand that crosses not only the middle class, but also the working class. It has broad and massive support. With that, it can show the way to confront all the government’s attacks.
The Defense of Education and Rejection of Milei’s Austerity

The debates and discussions in the assemblies and among students express a resounding repudiation of Milei’s veto of the university budget, which attacks public education and is another arm of the austerity that affects the majority of working people in the country.

What resounds from below is clear: “we cannot stand it any longer.” In addition to the difficulties of keeping up with classes, students are burdened by increases in utilities, rents, and not being able to pay for travel to and from school. This comes on top of the government’s severe austerity and slashes to pension and healthcare budgets. This is the harsh reality of the majority of people living in Argentina. The outrage at this reality is being amplified and expressed through the voices of students, faculty, staff, and healthcare workers who are converging at the university assemblies, public classes, and protests that have spread across the country.

Faced with the anger of the student movement with popular support, Milei is trying to reposition himself. In response to the protests, he recently said that he is “not going to give in,” but he justified this statement by admitting that the university will continue to be public and that students will not have to pay fees; however, he went on to attack the protests, saying that the protests are “la defensa de un curro” — in other words, a scam by a few to take advantage and make money from the universities. Milei and his allies are getting nervous, faced with a student movement that they did not expect. This is evident in increased tensions at the universities; for example, at the National University of Quilmes (in the south of Buenos Aires Province), members of Libertad Avanza (the party founded by Milei) attacked those participating in an assembly at the university with pepper spray as they discussed the direction of the struggle. At other universities Milei’s supporters took the microphone at the assemblies to carry out provocations. The government’s policy is in crisis.

The argument that we are tired of hearing from Milei’s supporters is that we have to achieve fiscal balance, and that we have to say where we will get the money for the university budget. Who did they ask when the government made a decree to allocate 100 billion pesos for the Intelligence Services? Did they justify where they would get that money from? What these arguments seek to hide are the government’s priorities: in the 2025 Budget, the items for Education and Culture represent 0.87% of the GDP; Science, Technology, and Innovation take up 0.22%; meanwhile the Public Debt Services represents 1.31% of the GDP.

What is being rejected by the movement is that Argentina’s crisis should be paid for by students, retirees, healthcare workers, and all working people who face utility fee increases. It rejects the idea that culture and the sciences should be gutted to pay the IMF while businessmen and financial speculators continue to turn huge profits. What the government should really audit are not universities, but the illegal and illegitimate debt; it should cancel the taxes that favor big business that Milei’s government passed with La Ley de Bases. These are the real scams that have plundered the country for decades to the benefit of international financial capital and big business.

In every occupation and every assembly, students express their weariness for this austerity plan applied by Milei’s government. We fight to overturn the government’s veto, in defense of education and for an increase in the education budget and the salaries of teachers and staff.

But the fight against Milei’s austerity is broader. In every assembly we hear applause whenever a motion is proposed in support of the struggle of healthcare workers at the Laura Bonaparte Hospital and Garrahan Hospital, or every time someone mentions the bravery of the retired men and women who confronted harsh repression to protest pension cuts. In the assemblies we hear harsh criticism of the complicit leadership of the CGT (the main trade union confederation in Argentina) and the demand for a national strike and a plan of struggle to defeat the plan of Milei and the IMF. As students we know that our struggle can be a spearhead that strengthens all the sectors that confront Milei’s attacks.

This was expressed by the testimonies of the students in the different assemblies:


“Our struggle is in response to the cruelty that the government is displaying not only towards students, but also towards retirees and workers”

“Our need for the occupations is to protect the non-teaching and teaching workers, for the working students who do not even have a plate to eat on at lunch so we wait for dinner to be able to eat. The veto was the straw that broke the camel’s back”

“They are taking away from us the possibility of dreaming. For many, the public university is the only possibility of studying. It is taking away our future and we are not going to give it up that easily.”

Our fight cannot wait until Congress discusses the 2025 budget, which will not be voted on until the end of the year and which leaves Milei the power to veto the articles he does not like. In addition, university administrators will try to divide the various fronts in the fight against the government’s austerity, asking for increases in the university budget without caring if the difference is made up by making cuts to pensions or public health and education. The increase in the budget has to happen now! For months the university has been in a dire state, since the salaries of faculty and staff do not exceed the poverty line. We have to give a forceful response now in order to win back what the budget cuts have taken, including the 25% of faculty salaries that have already been gutted. We do not want faculty and staff to live below the poverty line! We also reject the entire 2025 government budget presented by the administration, which strictly follows the demands of the IMF to pay the fraudulent debt.

The student and university movement must funnel our energy into the streets to converge with all the sectors in struggle. For this reason, together with the coordinated actions that have already been voted on in many universities, in each assembly we raise the demand for a Third National Education March in Buenos Aires to make our rejection of the veto undeniable.
We Cannot Rely on Congress. We Trust Only in the Power of the Students and Workers!

These weeks have demonstrated the strength that we students and workers have when we organize and take actions like the occupations and public classes. This is what the workers of the Bonaparte Hospital did when they took over the hospital and managed to reverse the closure announced by the government.

But to keep up our momentum and drive the movement forward means confronting political forces that want to funnel our energies into electoral maneuvers. In particular, this means debating the path forward for the movement with the Peronist groups and leaderships (who represent Milei’s main center-left political opposition) which, depending on their electoral calculations, try to stop the struggle. These groups have not been at the head of developing a plan of action in any department at the university; they do not call assemblies, and in many cases they have voted against occupying the schools. Damningly, they did not participate in the important mobilizations that took place on the day that the university budget was voted on in Congress.

Máximo Kirchner (son of former Peronist president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner), leader of the organization La Cámpora, supported the different mobilizations and called to build “solidarity” among the sectors in struggle, but at the same time he maintained that,


The veto is a constitutional power of the President and if we could not reject the vetoes, it is because we still do not have the number of deputies that allow us to do so. An objective for 2025 throughout the country is to build an electoral force so that when the president vetoes we have the necessary hands to stop him. There is no other way to do it.

These groups at the university parrot the line of the Peronist party in government: the electoral strategy of waiting for the 2025 elections.

We have seen in the last several months that we cannot have any confidence in Congress. It is in this rats’ nest where Milei has been able to pass his vetoes, with the support of the right-wing PRO (Propuesta Republicana, the party of former President Mauricio Macri) and of the Radical, Peronist, and provincial party deputies. We have to draw a strong conclusion: no confidence in Congress!

We also have no trust in the university officials who, after the great mobilization of October 2, had an official policy of “wait and see,” emptying the streets and putting their trust in Congress.

We are tired of this government, but we are also tired of the deputies of all colors who sell themselves for two pesos. We are tired of the organizations and groups that seek to demobilize our protests and do not organize the struggle.

Our focus is the university rebellion, the student movement that is once again taking up the old traditions of assemblies and occupations, and that has shown with great strength that it can confront this government in the streets. What is new is the organization from below, in assemblies and commissions in each department. In the current context of student mobilization, self-organization has become a fundamental tool to give more strength to the movement, and it is an aspect that we are betting on to develop the struggle. The occupation of buildings, accompanied by public classes and activities, not only make our demands visible, but also seek to bring the whole community closer to the ongoing struggle. In several departments, commissions have even been formed to organize different aspects of the struggle; this includes the organization of public potlucks alongside members of the surrounding neighborhoods and community, generating stronger and broader unity.

The events we are going through now represent the most profound and sharpest process of class struggle in Argentina’s universities in the last twenty years. This progress is also reflected in the creation of spaces such as the “Asambleas Interfacultades e Interclaustros,” which integrate students, faculty, and staff in the construction of a plan of struggle from below. These developments have to function in a democratic way, based on the mandates of the assemblies and taking care that new comrades who are just joining the struggle can express themselves.

While Peronism aims at unity with the authorities and politicians, for us the real unity to defeat Javier Milei’s plan is the unity of the students, workers, and retirees. As Myriam Bregman — member of the Partido de Trabajadores Socialistas (PTS, Left Voice’s sister organization) and part of the Frente de Izquierda electoral front, said recently:


In our country there are more than two million university students. If they were to unite with the retirees, with the health workers and other sectors that are under attack, their strength would be overwhelming. Unstoppable.

That is what Milei and his supporters fear so much, and this is the path we must fight for in the student movement.

This article was originally published in Spanish on October 16, 2024 in La Izquierda Diario.

Translation by Madeleine Freeman


From the Belly of the Beast, Solidarity with the Argentine Student Movement



Over 80 universities are occupied in Argentina in a struggle against austerity measures passed by right-wing president Javier Milei in the service of paying the imperialist IMF debt. If you are a student or university worker, sign this petition in solidarity with the struggle in Argentina and against the imperialist gutting of higher education.



Left Voice
October 17, 2024




This is a statement in solidarity with the student movement in Argentina. If you are a university student or worker, we invite you to sign the statement.

Amid a slew of attacks against public services such as healthcare, airlines, public pensions, and education, the far-right president of Argentina, Javier Milei, vetoed the budget for public universities. This is meant to divert public funds away from education and towards paying off the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an arm of U.S. imperialism that forces semi-colonial countries into debt as a mechanism of control.

Through a series of democratic assemblies, students voted to reject this austerity and occupy over 80 universities, putting a hard stop to business as usual.

As a place of study and discussion, the university has always been a hotbed for organizing, and students have always been on the frontlines of combative struggle all over the world. Those signed onto this statement are students, faculty, and groups affiliated with colleges and universities. Many of us were involved in the encampments fighting for divestment and a Free Palestine and many have been involved in labor struggles on our campuses. Today, we are seeing the combative tradition of students continue in the fight against austerity in Argentina. As university students and workers, we stand in solidarity with this movement in Argentina.

This is a part of a greater global fight by students and university workers against our schools being run in the interests of imperialist domination. In Argentina, we see the increasing privatization of education, including this attack that guts educational institutions to pay off an imperialist debt. In the United States, public universities function via student debt and low wages while universities take endowments from the occupying force of Zionist Israel that bombs universities and kills professors. We see these attacks when our universities, which should be run by the students, professors, and communities, instead sic armies of police on us to crack our skulls and charge us with felonies for protesting a genocide.

Students and workers across the world are fighting back so that our universities are not run like businesses as opposed to institutions by and for the working class. The effect of decades of attacks on public education and privatization is that it is harder to pursue an education and students, faculty, and staff suffer the consequences of degraded living conditions. On top of their studies, students feel the burden of rising rents and cost of living. Most students are workers, often studying and working precarious jobs to pay for their classes and daily life; their job prospects if and when they graduate are increasingly dim. For university workers, between stagnant wages and underemployment, making a living is increasingly unstable.

Therefore, we as students and workers within the United States reject austerity everywhere, we denounce the scholasticide, violence, and repression against students everywhere, and as those dwelling here within the heart of imperialism, we reject U.S. imperialism everywhere, from Argentina to occupied Palestine.

Beyond defending ourselves from attacks, we demand that education be by and for the working class, where education is public and free, run by students, workers, and the broader community.

We as students and university workers in the core of the imperialist leviathan, make an international call to join our hands and hearts in solidarity and with students and workers around the world to not only combat attacks on our institutions, but to win them back against the capitalist that gut and destroy them. We support the student movement in Argentina and stand in solidarity with all those who are right now fighting Milei’s right wing austerity and occupying their universities.

Sign the statement.




Monday, September 09, 2024

 

From “Returning to Europe” to “Occupying Brussels”

First published at Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Over the past decade, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has emerged as one of Europe’s most important — and controversial — politicians. This is no small feat for the leader of a country whose economic weight and strategic importance both in Europe and on the world stage remains, well, modest.

Having established himself as a point of reference for the far-right worldwide, Orbán has also become an object of constant criticism, misunderstanding, and sheer fantasy across the political spectrum. True to form, he campaigned on a platform of “no migration, no gender, no war” in the run-up to the 2024 European election and called on his supporters to “occupy Brussels”. It was thus to be expected that Hungary’s assumption of the rotating presidency of the EU Council in July 2024 would not be without turbulence.

Council presidencies are generally expected to serve as “honest brokers” between the EU’s 27 member states — but Orbán’s first steps only seemed to heighten the bloc’s internal contradictions. Commentators aligned with his brand of “illiberal" nationalism celebrated his Trumpian slogan, “MEGA” (short for “Make Europe Great Again”), while pundits and politicians from centre-right to centre-left were incensed by his unannounced diplomatic trip to Moscow and founding of a new far-right group in the European Parliament. Left-wing voices pointed to his focus on creating a “business-friendly environment”, opposition to the European Green Deal, and closeness with other far-right leaders. There was however, a central element missing in most commentary: the current tension between Brussels and Orbán is only part of a longer, intertwined history, in which both parties have enabled each other more often than not.

By 2024, Orbán had ruled Hungary for the majority of its post-1989 history. Yet despite being in power for nearly two decades, mainstream media regularly portrays his regime as an anomaly within the European Union, perhaps best explained by the authoritarian personality of a leader who capitalizes on the EU’s disunity, smelling blood at each sign of dysfunction. This narrative might be reassuring for European liberals, but if we look beyond the ever-increasing, highly publicized clashes between Orbán and the European Commission over questions like the rule of law, the rights of sexual minorities, freedom of speech, or, more recently, Ukraine, a more complex image emerges — one of mutually reinforcing interests, in which mediatized spats serve one purpose, and capital flows another.

Orbán’s rise cannot be separated from Hungary’s integration into the EU, but his story goes beyond the specific case of a small Eastern European country. The emergence of a semi-authoritarian state in the heart of the Union reveals a lot about the changing nature of contemporary capitalism, the role of European institutions, and the process of uneven Europeanization in recent decades.

Hungary was a willing forerunner in the regional implementation of neoliberal ideas during the 1990s. A few years later, Orbán’s rise to power and subsequent state-building provided a new model for right-wing governance. After he returned to the prime minister’s office in 2010, a steady inflow of EU funds helped cement Orbán’s rule. Placed against this backdrop, the Hungarian regime appears less as an anomaly within the EU project — and more like its logical result.

Eastern Europe’s (very) long transition

Commentary on contemporary Hungary often exhibits a degree of puzzlement. Had Hungary not executed a peaceful capitalist transition and effective market reforms? By the time it joined the EU, the country appeared poised for seamless integration. Yet in the two decades since, it has mostly made negative headlines: bailout packages, neo-Nazi militiashate crimes against Roma, an increasingly rogue prime minister, and endless wrangling between Budapest and Brussels. Where did it all go wrong?

The roots of the Orbán regime can be traced all the way back to Hungary’s last years as part of the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc. Contrary to the dominant narrative, Eastern Europe’s economic integration with the West did not begin with accession to the EU or even the fall of the Berlin Wall. By 1989, most ostensibly “socialist” countries had been integrated into world markets to various degrees for decades. This process accelerated with the end of the Bretton Woods system, the defeat of alternative globalization projects, and the rise of neoliberalism. Of all Warsaw Pact members, Hungary opened up the most to global capital flows, as it sought to become a “bridge” between West and East, financing technological upgrading with Western loans.

Along with Poland and Romania, Hungary joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s, contracting its first World Bank loan in 1982. Joint ventures with foreign firms were legalized as early as 1972, and by 1989, much of the regime’s technocratic elite had already been converted to the merits of the free market, with thousands of foreign companies operating in the country. Nevertheless, this gradual marketization neither alleviated domestic tensions nor substantially improved the country’s global economic standing. Hungary stumbled into its post-socialist transition saddled with substantial debt, cut off from the Comecon trading bloc, and without a coherent strategy to move forward.

There were both antecedents and continuities on either side of 1989: Eastern European countries remained dependent economies, already partially dependent on a Western-dominated, increasingly financialized global order. The transition to all-out capitalism nonetheless marked a qualitative break. As the “end of history” dawned, the region emerged as a new frontier for capital, where willing local elites, international intervention, and a shifting global landscape combined to enact a radical transformation.

Each country took on specific trajectories. The Baltic states went the furthest in their neoliberal restructuring, while Slovenia is often cited as the country that best managed to protect its welfare institutions, state capacity, and labour’s bargaining position. Some countries, regions, and even specific cities fared better, but over three decades into the former Eastern Bloc’s transformation, none have managed to break away from the kind of semi-peripheral status that subordinates their development to the decisions of external investors and great powers.

By relentlessly pushing for a specific set of market reforms, the European Community (since 1993, the European Union) only reinforced existing structural inequalities and path dependency. These policies transformed Central and Eastern European countries into “ competition states” engaged in a race to the bottom to provide (overwhelmingly Western) multinational corporations with the most amenable conditions. The price paid for these changes would be steep: recent estimates have put the number of excess deaths during the “lost decade” of the 1990s at upwards of 7 million. The politics championed by Viktor Orbán have not substantially addressed any of these processes’ root causes — but he has proven particularly skilful at capitalizing on the resentment caused by this experience in order to mobilize large swaths of society for his state-building project.

Actually existing social Europe

The transformation of Hungary into a neoliberal testing ground was part and parcel of global changes that also thoroughly transformed societies on the other side of the Iron Curtain. By 1990, Western European economies had largely abandoned the Keynesianism that produced much of Western Europe’s post-war “golden age”. By the time “actually existing socialism” collapsed, the Washington Consensus — policy prescriptions based on a credo of market stabilization, liberalization, and privatization — was already firmly entrenched in the core of the EC.

In the absence of fiscal harmonization, the European single market pitted the continent’s respective welfare states against each other. For all of the talk of building a “Social Europe”, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU effectively constitutionalized the free movement of capital and labour while simultaneously reducing states’ fiscal flexibility by setting hard rules regarding budget deficits and sovereign debt. The treaty’s social provisions might have made references to “social dialogue”, but its vague contours were neither mandatory nor have they been prioritized since.

The 1990s were also a pivotal moment in establishing the EU’s economic architecture. “ Disciplinary neoliberalism” — a commitment to low inflation and fiscal discipline — was hardwired into the treaties at the heart of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), while at the same time, “ American deregulatory and competitive pressure was applied on Europe’s bank-based financial system”. Central banks were in effect “ de-nationalized”, becoming key institutional nodes in the spread of an increasingly financialized system. The former were key actors in the establishment of commercial banks’ subsidiaries in Europe’s Southern and newly opened Eastern peripheries. In Hungary, as in other neighbouring countries, these subsidiaries were hardly incentivized to boost domestic production, allowing them to engage in increasingly high-risk activities, with yields channelled back to the Western core.

The economic integration of Eastern European economies such as Hungary offered a fix to the crisis of wage-led growth facing Western European economies at the time. By insulating economic decision-making from democratic oversight and by radically opening up Eastern Europe to transnational capital, it offered new models of accumulation for Western economic elites, whose interests increasingly determined institutional policy. Under the cover of integration, the EU engaged in wide-ranging institution-building in candidate countries. This “Europeanization” was not restricted to the transfer of legislation concerning minority rights or administrative capacity — in preparation for their entry to the EU, candidates (including Hungary) had to conform to the austerity measures prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty.

These processes were all conditioned by the gravitational pull of Germany’s powerful manufacturing sector and its export-driven growth model. Buoyed by the absorption of East Germany and the incorporation of Eastern European economies as de facto satellites, the Federal Republic of Germany asserted its dominant position within the bloc, decisively shaping the form the latter would take during the 1990s. This was particularly true in Hungary, and remains the case today: Germany is Hungary’s biggest trading partner, accounting for nearly a quarter of its total foreign trade.

“Returning to Europe”

In the spring of 1994, Hungary became the first former Warsaw Pact member to officially request EU membership. It would take nearly four years for official accession talks to begin and another four years of negotiations before membership was overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum in 2003. Hungary entered the Union one year later, together with several of its Eastern European neighbours.

EU institutions played a determining role in determining Hungary’s trajectory both before and during accession. Strict membership conditionality was used to reshape domestic policies and the Hungarian state’s structure, while “national investment promotion agencies” pushing the opening of local economies to international investors were directly financed by the EU. Established in 1990 with the stated goal of facilitating European integration, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was also an important actor in this process, intervening in policy areas and predicating its loans on the involvement of private capital. In parallel, the bank established and maintained benchmarks and “transition indicators” to measure countries’ “progress” on the road to privatization.

The resulting process was the very opposite of the East Asian-style developmentalist path, in which state-run development banks played a crucial role in advancing coordinated industrial policies. It was also diametrically opposed to Western Europe’s own post-war recovery, premised as it was on active state intervention and national industrial policies. When Hungary’s (conservative) government sought to alter the manner of privatization in order to favour domestic bidders in 1993–4, the response of the EU, the EBRD, and the IMF was swift — they condemned the government’s effort to insulate itself from “foreign penetration”and suspended scheduled financial aid. This led to an immediate worsening of Hungary’s credit score on international markets, making it more difficult and costly for the state to refinance.

By the end of the decade, key industrial assets as well as much of the banking, telecommunication, and energy sectors had been transferred to foreign ownership. Foreign takeovers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) effectively downgraded capacity in many sectors. To prevent unwanted competition, many former SOEs were either broken up or simply killed off — others were penalized by a system that effectively favoured foreign investors through cheap loans, tax cuts, and subsidies. As Hungary’s economy was restructured around export-led specialization, only about a quarter of existing domestic companies survived.

Campaigning on a promise of “privatization done right” and mending relations with European partners, the Socialist Party (the de facto successor to the former ruling party) won an outright majority in the 1994 elections, putting an end to the short-lived (and chaotic) experiment of the previous government. In the following years, the Socialist-led government would impose massive cuts to education and welfare. The EBRD finally released withheld funds in 1996, after an IMF bailout mandated a deepening of the privatization process, a reduction of the state apparatus, and the restructuring of the tax system. An agreement with the EU doubled down on the government’s commitment to privatize banks, telecommunications, and energy utility companies.

These macroeconomic choices had a drastic effect on social policy. The crunch in savings, pensions, and real wages was not an unforeseen consequence of mismanagement, but the logical corollary of the EC, IMF, and the EBRD blaming “excess demand” for distorting the market. EU leaders concurred with Hungarian economist János Kornai’s assessment that the country had a “premature welfare system”. Rather than viewing the social security institutions of the previous regime as a foundation upon which to build a resilient society, they were too often seen as the bloated heritage of a system whose soft budgets and over-generous welfare had led to its demise. As the state’s welfare capacities declined, facilitating citizens’ access to private credits increasingly became a means to reduce social tensions.

As a result of these policies, real wages fell by a quarter, the national pension fund lost one third of its value, and both agricultural and industrial production fell by over 30 percent. By the middle of the decade, over 1 million jobs had been lost and organized labour practically ceased to exist. Hungary’s public housing stock was almost entirely privatized.

However widespread, the effects of this transformation were not distributed equally. The historically wealthier western parts of the country did not experience the precipitous decline in living standards that unfolded in some north-eastern regions. The Roma minority and women were particularly hard-hit. At the same time, this period saw the rise of a “comprador class” invested in the local implantation of transnational capital, to whom it provided technical and managerial services. The personal aspirations, connections, and acumen of this group largely determined the politics of this period.

None of these processes were inevitable. Hungary might have had an outstanding amount of public debt even compared to its neighbours, but its abandonment of any pretence to industrial policy and its adoption of no-strings-attached privatization were political choices. Hungarian elites’ short-sightedness, naivety, and self-interest were important factors, but these were not solely internally driven decisions — they necessitated the active intervention of European institutions.

Stumbling into the new millennium

Hungary’s EU accession sparked a degree of optimism. The preceding decade had been difficult, but the country had “ finally returned to Europe” in the words of then-PM Péter Medgyessy. There was much talk of new beginnings, and the notion of Hungarians opening pastry shops in Vienna became a popular trope. For the first time since the transition, Hungary experienced several years of sustained economic growth. The Socialist-Liberal coalition government elected in 2002 even appeared willing to address some of the worst effects of the previous decade’s social policies.

Beneath the surface, however, the deep fissures caused by the transition had only been papered over. About one third of Hungarians remained at risk of poverty. Population numbers had steadily declined since 1989. For all of the sacrifices of the 1990s, sovereign debt had only just inched below 60 percent of total GDP. The adoption of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy had proven disastrous for most cooperatives and many small- and medium-scale farmers.

As Hungary underwent drastic social changes, its economy became increasingly vulnerable to international capital flows and more dependent on (predominantly German-owned) car manufacturing — by 2008, the share of trade in terms of total GDP jumped from around 65 to 160 percent. Yet much of the foreign direct investment (FDI) that poured into the country during these years did not result in significant technological transfers or the upgrading of Hungary’s position within global value chains.

A similar asymmetry defined the highly unregulated financial sector: by 2005, over 80 percent of bank assets in Hungary were held in foreign banks. After government subsidies for housing loans were scaled down, these banks jumped in, flooding the market with foreign currency loans. Coupled with the absence of a coherent social policy, this would prove a disastrous prelude to the social crisis that ripped through Hungary in the mid-2000s — and in which EU institutions would again play a determining role.

Elected in spring 2006 on a promise of “reform without austerity”, Socialist PM Ferenc Gyurcsány quickly began implementing harsh austerity measures with the full support of Brussels. Despite massive demonstrations triggered by a leaked speech in which he admitted to lying about the country’s finances, the government pushed on, drastically reducing spending on public services and administration. Hungary’s economy was brought to a standstill.

Yet, if anything, the implementation of austerity in 2006–7 only made the country more vulnerable to the 2008 financial crisis. In autumn 2008, speculative attacks against the Hungarian forint resulted in a dramatic depreciation of the currency. Household debt rose to 40 percent of total GDP — 80 percent of which consisted of foreign currency loans. Hundreds of thousands of indebted households were suddenly confronted with exponentially rising mortgages and debt. The number of those living in precarity exploded, and homelessness and emigration rose sharply. Evictions became a common sight.

The Troika moves in

In autumn 2008, a troika of the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the European Commission stepped in to stem Hungary’s economic freefall. The intervention was significant — in many ways, Hungary served as a testing ground for the EU’s catastrophic reaction to the eurozone crisis a few years later.

The IMF insisted that the government take out a significantly bigger loan than originally planned, which both increased the country’s dependence on international creditors and worsened its overall indebtedness — the very issue the bailout purportedly sought to correct. The situation was also worsened by the ECB’s refusal to accept Hungarian bonds as collateral for a 5-billion-euro loan, which effectively priced the country out of the sovereign bond markets and forced it to dip further into its already depleted euro-denominated reserves. The Commission, however, emerged as the most hawkish decisionmaker of the trio, demanding immediate rectifications to the budget, setting a hard 3-percent deficit target for 2010–11, and mandating a pension reform more radical than the one requested by the IMF.

This process was further deepened through what came to be known as the Vienna Initiative, which brought together Eastern European governments, the Commission, the IMF, the EBRD, and Western banks with subsidiaries in the region. Instead of disciplining the actors whose predatory lending had led to the “subprime moment” in the first place, the agreement effectively bailed them out. In return for the banks’ promise not to withdraw from Eastern Europe, national governments pledged to implement further austerity. As such, the agreement pioneered a form of joint fiscal governance over several Eastern European countries by Western banks, EU institutions, and the IMF.

The strings attached to these various bailouts and interventions included massive cuts to Hungarian pensions and wages. Taking over from the disgraced Gyurcsány, a “technocratic” administration led by Gordon Bajnai continued to prioritize reigning in public deficits and debt. Its efforts were a failure even on their own terms, as the economy continued to shrink throughout 2009. Amidst a global recession, exports fell by nearly 20 percent and public debt continued to rise. These measures left Hungarian society poorer, more divided, and more unequal than at any point since 1989, but decision-makers in Brussels and Frankfurt labelled it a success all the same.

Orbán’s return

Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party was not idle during these crisis-ridden years. The party had slowly rebuilt its base while in opposition, amplifying the grievances of foreign currency debtors and an anxious middle-class while forging alliances with segments of domestic capital that felt left out of the country’s FDI-driven growth model. Orbán’s first term had not been characterized by any significant departure from the Europeanization path, but the political landscape in which he achieved a two-thirds majority in 2010 was wildly different. It would become the perfect staging ground for the building of his “illiberal state”.

Within a few years of retaking power, Orbán had in many respects gone further in defying neoliberal orthodoxy than most left-wing governments in recent memory. In 2011, he very publicly refused further cooperation with the IMF and called for an “economic freedom struggle”. From 2013 onwards, his government worked hand-in-hand with a repoliticized Hungarian National Bank, allowing it a degree of economic leeway forsaken by most administrations. Breaking with decades of tradition, the newly empowered governor of the country’s central bank established zero-percent lending rates to boost domestic investment. Sovereign debt was drastically reduced and (re)domesticated. Much of the energy, telecommunications, and banking sector was nationalized. Special taxes on banks were levied, while the latter were also forced to accept a fixed-rate agreement with many foreign currency debtors. A few years later, at the height of the Covid crisis, the government broke another taboo, introducing price controls for certain key products — all while maintaining steady growth, high employment, and facilitating the rise of politically supportive middle and upper classes.

In breaking with key elements of neoliberal doctrine, the regime has doubtlessly shown the European Left that making bold political moves and challenging EU diktats is very much possible. It has also provided an early example for what has been heralded as the “return of the state” in the wake of the Covid pandemic. That said, the Orbán regime’s use of state intervention and renationalization is not in the service of an egalitarian or redistributive vision — if anything, it serves as a warning that such seemingly progressive means can be used for very reactionary ends.

Hungary’s GDP might have steadily increased, but growth has been increasingly decoupled from social welfare and social mobility remains staggeringly low. Life expectancy remains the lowest of the Visegrád countries. Public spending on education and healthcare have been in steady decline, while enrolment in higher education has fallen by nearly 20 points during his tenure. Facilitated by a flat tax rate of 15 percent and the highest VAT in Europe (27 percent), a form of “perverse redistribution” has persistently siphoned wealth upwards. Even the government’s highly publicized “pro-family” policies have in effect favoured middle- and high-earners over working-class families.

The country’s “democratic backsliding” is thoroughly documented — hegemonic government control over the media, a systematic takeover of educational institutions at every level, a compliant judicial system, and the near-complete entanglement of party and state have led to a form of managed democracy in which more and more sectors of government are removed from public oversight and control. Much has also been written about Orbán’s perpetual fanning of culture wars, the incessant hate speech spewed by pro-government actors, and the very real effects these have on the public sphere, social minorities, and political opponents.

Since 2015, an increasingly belligerent anti-EU rhetoric plays a central role in Orbán’s strategy. Yet even if European institutions regularly express concerns and doubts, the overall response has been dithering and toothless. More importantly, the very architecture of the EU has played a key role in enabling the regime.

Europe’s reliable partner

Orbán’s much-publicized break with the IMF — as well as some of his governments’ more “unorthodox” measures — might have caused alarm in Brussels, but the Hungarian leader proved to be a reliable partner when it came to the EU’s fiscal and economic policy through much of the 2010s. He included a mandatory debt brake in his 2011 constitution, and supported the EU’s 2012 Fiscal Compact that further constitutionalized austerity. Domestically, the government’s Economic Stability Act hardwired fiscal discipline down to municipal governance, both tightening government control and reinforcing the neoliberal paradigm.

During years marked by ongoing turbulence in Southern Europe and the 2015 standoff with the Syriza government in Greece, Hungary appeared as a safe destination for investment. A reform and modernization of tax collection services bolstered Orbán’s credibility in the eyes of bond investors and Brussels. Indeed, since 2013, Hungarian bonds have successfully been sold at regular intervals on international markets.

Orbán’s first years in power benefitted from a more favourable global conjuncture, quantitative easing, and an uptick in industrial investment. But his economic project is also highly dependent on the direct inflow of EU funds, which only started pouring into the country in a major way after 2010.

Constituting around 4 percent of total GDP, they have fuelled government-engineered housing and construction booms. Distributed with little oversight, they have also allowed the ruling party to centralize and verticalize power: in addition to widespread cronyism and corruption, vertical relations of dependence are institutionalized at every level. This is particularly apparent in small towns and village, where local Fidesz potentates use the massive inflow of Rural Development Programme (RDP) payments to consolidate their power. The centrality of EU funds to the regime’s survival was underlined when large amounts of cohesion funds were frozen as part of ongoing rule of law disputes between Budapest and Brussels: the forint’s exchange rate rapidly deteriorated, construction projects were halted around the country, and the government was forced to borrow at highly unfavourable rates on the international market, steadily raising the very sovereign debt it had taken such pride in reducing.

The German connection

During the past decade, Orbán has styled himself as the relentless defender of national interests and the frontiers of “white” Europe against shadowy globalist cabals of refugees, homosexuals, and warmongers. But his success has not been the product of canny domestic manoeuvring and EU funds alone.

For all the national sovereignty talk, his governments have overseen a deepening of the country’s dependent integration into global supply chains, in effect establishing a two-tier system: on the one hand, state intervention in sectors with little export value such as banking, telecommunications, and energy facilitated the emergence of a national capitalist class deeply wedded to the government. On the other, the regime facilitated and profited from the expansion of (predominantly German) manufacturing to the region during the 2010s.

As such, the EU’s lenience regarding Hungary cannot be separated from the government’s deep ties with German industry, whose interests are pushed by the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), and by extension, the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest and most powerful grouping in the European Parliament. Faced with growing competition predominantly from East Asia, Germany’s automotive industry has pursued an aggressive relocation strategy in Eastern Europe over the past decade. Pliant local governments, subsidies, low labour costs, and the convenient presence of EU funds earmarked for local infrastructural development have allowed a significant ramping-up of nearshore production.

The example of Audi is telling: speaking in June 2020 at a plant in the western Hungarian town of Győr, Orbán called the factory “the pride of Hungarian industry” and assured it would remain open throughout the pandemic, even as strict lockdowns were enforced countrywide. By the time he made that announcement, successive governments had already awarded sizeable direct subsidies to Audi on six occasions. The factory was established in 1998, but has significantly ramped up production since Orbán’s return to power, producing its two-millionth car to much fanfare in 2023. The direct subsidies did not arrive in a vacuum: at 9 percent, the Hungarian corporate tax rate is the lowest in the EU. With subsidies and various forms of government support, the effective rate paid by companies such as Audi is closer to 3.6 percent.

During the 2010s, the “pride of Hungarian industry” generated 5.7 billion euro in profits for its German-based headquarters; 5.4 billion was siphoned out of the country and directly paid out to its — overwhelmingly German — shareholders. Despite employing more than 10,000 workers, only a fraction of the factory’s hundreds of suppliers are actually Hungarian.

When Audi’s parent company, Volkswagen, faced a diesel emission scandal in 2015, it emerged that many of the faulty engines had been produced in Hungary. In the following months, the Hungarian government went to great lengths to shield the company at the European level. German car manufacturer grandees reportedly bragged about their direct access to the Hungarian PM. Hungary, in turn, has emerged as one of the biggest clients of the German defence industry in recent years — many of the weapons sported by Hungarian army patrols while enforcing strict Covid lockdowns through 2020 and 2021 were of German origin.

Hungary’s deepening integration into these industrial production chains has profoundly reshaped labour law and relations in the country. Over the past 15 years, the number of workers employed by temporary agencies has increased five-fold. It has become nearly impossible for public sector workers to go on strike. The 2018 “slave law” permits up to 400 hours of overtime and three years of salary payment delays. These changes are not sui generis — they are the outcome of an overall framework pioneered and enabled by the EU catering to Germany’s export-led economy, in which countries such as Hungary mostly serve as cheap, disposable manufacturing sites, and providers of a mobile, flexible labour force.

A new frontier for “green” industries

Despite his boisterous claims and carving out of an outsized reputation on the global stage, Orbán has recently faced an increasingly challenging domestic situation. Widespread dissatisfaction is reflected in the rise of Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider whose upstart Respect and Freedom Party (TISZA) garnered nearly 30 percent of the vote in the European elections.

Orbán’s difficulties, much like his previous successes, have largely economic roots. Since the start of the pandemic, Brussels’s halting, piecemeal freezing of EU funds has jeopardized the Hungarian growth model. Continuous emigration imperils demographic stability, while the lack of investment in healthcare, basic infrastructure, and education is feeding growing domestic discontent. Beginning in 2022, Hungary’s central bank drastically raised interest rates, the government reduced much of its “pro-natalist” policies, and substantially scaled down its most popular measure, the household utility subsidy scheme. Inflation spiralled out of control, driving up the prices of hard foodstuffs and basic necessities.

But shifts in both EU and global investment patterns, the implementation of the European Green Deal, and the rise of industrial frameworks for the “green transition” have allowed Hungary to move towards a new cycle of accumulation. By 2024, the country emerged as Europe’s second-largest producer of electric batteries.

Like most shifts in Hungary’s history since 1989, this latest twist has also been driven by external forces: the EU’s Green Deal and the rise of East Asian electric battery manufacturers. What is touted as the EU’s flagship environmental policy remains in effect a derisking frameworkoffering price signals in lieu of a coordinated industrial strategy. The outsourcing of investment decisions to private actors has in effect meant that EU funds earmarked for the green transition have allowed transnational corporations to further harness European integration to their benefit.

The Hungarian government has also sought to turn this situation to its advantage, betting simultaneously on its relations with East Asian partners and the EU’s strategic weakness — and subsidies. Within just a few years, electric battery plants constructed almost exclusively by East Asian firms popped up around the country. This development largely occurred outside the official remit of the EU’s Green Deal funds, but Western manufacturing companies have largely profited from it — just as their Hungarian factories have profited from subsidized Russian gas or recently established Chinese-built photovoltaic plants. In turn, European companies are seeking to catch up, with numerous investments buoyed by EU funds planned throughout Hungary.

The reality of these battery plants reveals the true face of Europe’s market-driven “transition”. Established without consulting local communities and shrouded in secrecy by government contracts denoting them as sites of “national interest”, they have been shown to cause significant harm to local land and water. Working conditions have been described as harrowing, with workplace accidents — and even deaths — a regular occurrence. The workforce is increasingly composed of workers from the Global South employed on fixed-term contracts, making labour organizing — or even oversight — particularly difficult. Just as with traditional car manufacturing, profits are not redistributed locally, nor has this development contributed to an upgrade in Hungary’s position within value chains.

The outcome of the EU’s green policies have thus had a triple effect in the country: worsening labour conditions, polluted aquifers and soils, and strengthening Orbán’s hold on power.

A small country with a big footprint

Two decades after Hungary’s accession to the EU, domestic support for membership remains high. Opposition parties compete to prove their “pro-European” credentials and pledge to introduce the euro as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the country neglected to mark the twentieth anniversary of its membership in any significant way, reflecting a deeper malaise regarding the way integration has unfolded. Even the most pro-EU commentators noted with a certain bitterness the jarring contrast between expectations in 2004 and the current reality — as it turns out, only a few Hungarians ended up opening pastry shops in Vienna.

But if European integration failed to live up to Hungarians’ expectations, Viktor Orbán’s subsequent rise to power should not be seen as its inverse. The way European integration unfolded was key to the creation of the unequal, crisis-prone society that emerged in Hungary during the 1990s. Later, EU institutions played a decisive role in the catastrophic response to the economic crisis of the late 2000s, paving the way for Orbán’s unchecked accession to power. These same institutions have facilitated his regime’s enduring rule — today, they promote industrial policies enacted in the name of the green transition that reinforce structural inequalities, short-termism, and the centralization of power and profit among a small elite.

Hungary’s trajectory cannot, of course, be blamed on Brussels alone — the failure of Janez Janša in Slovenia or the Law and Justice party (PIS) in Poland to establish similar regimes underlines the specificities of the Hungarian case. But that does not mean Orbán should be treated as exceptional. His government has provided a blueprint for “illiberal” governance around the world — in effect, the periphery has begun restructuring the centre.

Since 2015, his regime has played a decisive role in shifting the EU’s position on refugees and migration, normalizing the elevation of hate speech to the level of policy. When it comes to economics, he has proven that state intervention can be wielded strategically, while leaving the core of neoliberal governance untouched. Meanwhile, Brussels’s condemnation of Orbán’s dalliance with autocrats has little credibility given the EU’s own partnerships with Azerbaijan’s Aliyev or Egyptian dictator el-Sisi, while calls for free speech in Hungary increasingly expose its own double standards given the crackdowns on pro-Palestinian voices across Europe. Even his labelling as a far-right exception loses credence given the newfound acceptance of Giorgia Meloni.

What lessons to draw from Orbán’s example? His rise might have been facilitated by the EU, but it also contains valuable insights for the Left. After all, his success is also a symptom of the Left’s failure to offer an alternative to globalized neoliberalism, to articulate a coherent vision out of the 2007–8 financial crisis, and ultimately to offer a viable political project capable of wielding power at the nation-state level without losing sight of an internationalist horizon.

It is crucial to understand the detrimental role played by European institutions in our current predicament — but that does not mean breaking out of them offers a ready or desirable fix. Ironically, defeating Orbán and charting a different path for Hungary and Europe will require learning from him — for better than most centre-left governments in recent decades, he has understood how to use the state to implement policy on his own terms and defy central elements of EU orthodoxy. Any future left-wing project will have no choice but to do the same.

Áron Rossman-Kiss is a Budapest-based researcher, artist, and activist in Szikra, a left-ecological political movement in Hungary.

Sunday, July 14, 2024

UPDATED

FRANCE

Popular Front Pushes Back Far Right

July 13, 2024
Source: LINKS


Journalists in France were quickly deleting the drafts they had been preparing when the exit poll came up on their screens. All the polls had been suggesting that Le Pen’s far-right National Rally would be at least the largest party and possibly even get close to an absolute majority. In the event, the mass mobilisation of the Left with the New Popular Front helped it become the largest bloc without getting a governing majority. Thanks to the call from the left to tactically vote for the best candidate to defeat the RN, the Macron bloc also did better than expected, although losing 80 seats in the process. Le Pen had been predicted to win up to 200 seats but did far worse. However, we should not forget her group topped the vote share, and the increase in her party’s seat tally is still historic.

Formation of the New Popular Front (NFP)


Given the collapse of NUPES in 2020, the previous left coalition that had blocked Macron from getting a working majority in 2022, it was not at all inevitable that the left would come together in a broad united front in these elections. The New Popular Front (NFP) ranged from the very moderate ex-President Francois Hollande to Philippe Poutou, the former presidential candidate from the New Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA). The action programme it put before the electorate was a clear break both with the anti-working class neoliberalism of Macron and the social liberalism of the Socialist Party. People reacted positively to the idea of dumping Macron’s raising of the pension age or an increase in the minimum wage. There was a wave of enthusiastic support in the neighbourhoods, and the unions helped build big demonstrations against the post-fascist Le Pen.

Some small ultra-left organisations in France like Lutte Ouvrière and a split from the NPA criticised the NFP, stayed out, and stood candidates in the first round. They also refused to clearly call for a vote for the best-placed candidate in the second round in order to stop Le Pen. This is not so different, for example, than refusing to vote for Biden against Trump in swing states. The British Socialist Workers Party, in an article on their site, supported this position. If the left had not voted for Macron candidates in the second round, it would have meant an overall majority for Le Pen. Just listen to the relief expressed by ethnic minority people on TV in the Republic Square last night. They were terrified at a Le Pen government moving aggressively against so-called bi-nationals. Stopping a Le Pen government makes a real difference. Counter-posing mass struggles or street mobilisations as an immediate solution to defend black or Arab people is just demagogy. In fact, there is a strong argument that the formation of the NFP actually encouraged some of the biggest anti-racist, anti-fascist mobilisations we have seen in France for some time. As the NPA has argued, the NFP was not a barrier to mobilisations. Nor did it prevent the NPA from putting a class struggle line against the moderation of the PS or the Macronists.

The road ahead for the NFP

Today in France, people feel more confident and hopeful about keeping Le Pen out of government. The idea that the results just reinforce the moderate wing of the movement is just a one-sided analysis. Indeed, despite the huge media offensive against Jean Luc Melenchon that labelled him and his party as extreme or antisemitic for standing up for Palestine, his party is still the leading one inside the NFP. Of course, the PS has recovered some of their support – they always retained a local base – but they are still facing a strong challenge to their left, which did not exist a decade or so ago. The PS was not able to resist the fairly radical action programme adopted by the NFP. Today it is important because La France Insoumise (LFI, France Unbowed, led by Melenchon) is arguing that this programme should be the basis of any new government that the NFP leads.

This week the big issue is what next. There is no working majority for any of the three political blocs in parliament. Normally, the president approaches the biggest party or coalition to nominate a new prime minister. The current Macronist prime minister has already tendered his resignation pending a new order. Clearly, the non-LFI components of the NFP are not in favour of Melenchon as prime minister, despite him being the leader of the biggest party inside the NFP. Leaders of the Ecolos, like Tondelier or Rousseau, CP leader Roussel, as well as the moderate Glucksmann who is aligned with the PS, are calling for a discussion and vote involving all the NFP MPs. Hollande will also be using his influence to stop Melenchon. Olivier Faure, PS leader, has said a name will go forward to Macron by the end of the week.


Challenges for Melenchon and the NFP

Melenchon himself is a problematic leader. He purged a number of his dissident MPs at the start of the campaign, like Alex Corbière and Danielle Simonnet, who are certainly not ‘rightists’. They defied him and stood, eventually winning their seats. Melenchon has never really allowed democratic structures inside the LFI. So a certain reluctance to put him forward as Prime Minister is understandable. Corbière used his appearance on TV after the vote to raise the issue of democratic accountability inside the LFI. François Ruffin, another LFI dissident with a big national profile, has said he will no longer sit with the LFI group in parliament. He has presidential ambitions.

Macron’s strategy will be to try and set up some sort of emergency national coalition detaching moderate components of the PS and the Ecolos. This is not straightforward as these people have opposed his reactionary social policies on pensions and the like. If they got into bed with Macron, it would be a political gift to the LFI. At the moment, the LFI are emphasising the action programme that all the NPF signed up to. It is a good basis for further mobilisation, as the statement by the NPA points out (see below).

Glucksmann and others, on the other hand, are talking idealised scenarios of giving the parliament back to the people, apparently over and above the political parties. He waffles about a new politics, inventing a new political culture. Whatever happens, it is clear there will be new fissures and debates between and within the components of the NFP.
The Rassemblement National and future prospects

Although the RN has been pushed back, their position has still been strengthened compared to the previous parliament. An unstable period with no majority and various stitch-ups means they can frame it as the caste ganging up on the true defenders of French identity. So it could still provide them with plenty of space to build their forces.

One important task for radicals and progressives in this period will be to try and keep up the mobilisation of young people that we have seen in the NFP campaign. Le Pen and its youthful leader, Bardella, have been successful in winning a lot of young people. Mobilising progressive young people can eat into that support. Maintaining the neighbourhood NFP structures developed in the campaign would be one way of doing this.

Macron’s position has been weakened. The vote against the RN is not an expression of support for his policies, which have in fact made the bed for Le Pen. It cannot be excluded that down the line he will be forced to call early Presidential elections. Although it is a few years away, the question of candidatures, including Melenchon, will not be far from the political debate. Macron cannot stand, and it is questionable whether Macronism without Macron will remain a viable option.
New Anticapitalist Party (France): The far right has been pushed back by popular mobilisation — Now we must implement the program of the New Popular Front

The main lesson of the first results of this second round is the setback suffered by the Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN) and its allies. The defeat of the hundreds of fascist, racist, Islamophobic, antisemitic and ultra-racist candidates put forward by the RN is a huge relief for racial minorities, women, LGBTI+ people and workers. This victory for the united left has halted the momentum of the far right, which nonetheless won around fifty more seats. This defeat of the far right of Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen is the result of the popular mobilisation that took place thanks to the unitary impetus provided by the creation of the Nouveau Front populaire (New Popular Front, NFP).

This is already a victory for the NFP, which was made possible by the rallying of the entire left — political parties, trade unions and campaigning groups — and above all by the grassroots mobilisation of large sectors of the working classes, in particular racial minorities and young people, who committed themselves everywhere to blocking the RN. This made it possible for a very large number of NFP MPs (including a relative majority for La France Insoumise [France Unbowed, LFI]) to be elected to the National Assembly on the basis of a program that breaks not only with Macronism in the service of the ultra-rich, but also with the liberal left of the François Hollande mandate, which had followed the policies of the right.

The defeat of the RN should not hide the fact that it has increased its number of MPs very significantly and remains a threat to racial minorities, social rights and democratic freedoms. Nor should it obscure the defeat of the Macronists, who lost a third of their seats. If they still have so many MPs, they owe it only to left-wing voters, who largely switched to them in the second round to block the RN. This blocking vote in no way changes the electoral results: in both the European and legislative elections, Emmanuel Macron and Gabriel Attal were clearly disowned and therefore no longer have any legitimacy to claim to lead the country. Macron now has no option but to submit to the will of the people and allow a left-wing government to implement the NFP program, which now has the legitimacy of the ballot box. Otherwise, he must leave.

This rejection is also a rejection of the Fifth Republic and its authoritarian and undemocratic institutions. The popular mobilisation, marked by a turnout unprecedented in decades, also raises the need to move towards a Constituent Assembly, for a genuine democracy of the majority. From now on, the commitments made must be honoured, and all the emergency measures set out in the NFP programme must be applied, starting with the repeal of the pension and unemployment insurance reforms.

This can only happen if popular momentum is maintained and extended. That means building NFP collectives at grassroots level, open to everyone, which can help to amplify the movement and build mobilisations and strikes over the coming months. No government of national unity can respond to the aspirations expressed in the ballot boxes today. We must remain united to act, to debate and to map out an emancipatory perspective that will push back the far right in the long term, around a left that fights and breaks from the system, a left that can radically transform this society!

The French Did It, We Can Too

 

 JULY 12, 2024

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Photograph Source: Acediscovery – CC BY 4.0

Threatened with the possibility that a far-right political party, the National Rally, might come to power on its anti-immigrant platform, the French left united and created a coalition called the New Popular Front. After the first round of the election, pundits predicted that the quasi-fascist National Rally would win the election. But the fear of the right and its racism, authoritarianism, and odor of Nazism, and the rapid assembly of a coalition of leftists, pro-labor, pro-immigrant, and environmentalist parties inspired the French people who voted to defend their Republic and its historic values inherited from the French Revolution summed up in the slogan of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.” And in the Place de la République they celebrated by singing the socialist anthem the Internationale, the song that recalls the French attempt at a socialist revolution in 1848, the Paris Commune of 1871, the powerful Socialist and Communist parties of the country’s past, and the Maqui, the French resistance to the Nazi occupiers during World War II.

Why did the New Popular Front win? First, they put forward a new political option, a leftist coalition created to meet the moment. Second, they engaged in a spirited campaign based on a progressive program aimed at taking wealth form the wealthy and providing resources to the working class and the poor. Third, they entered into an honest alliance with President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble coalition, showing a willingness in contested constituencies to step aside for the centrist candidate, just as the centrist candidates stood aside for the left candidate. Witnessing this new idealistic political alternative, the French people seized the opportunity to be their best selves, a population rejecting fascism and endorsing democracy.

Let Us Do What They Did 

First, like the French, we need a new inspiring alternative. That means that Biden must step aside and allow the Democrats to choose a new candidate in some democratic process, through public debates and an open party convention. Whether this is Vice-President Kamala Harris or someone else, what is important is replacing Biden in whom the country no longer has confidence. Having done that, the Democrats need to put that candidate on the road in a national tour offering a progressive program and excoriating Trump’s far right, anti-democratic, misogynistic, racist, xenophobic, and anti-union platform. A new candidate running on a progressive program and lashing out against Trump could inspire the American people and let us too become our best most democratic, most egalitarian, most socially responsible selves.

The Supreme Court’s decision on presidential immunity has made it absolutely necessary to defeat Trump who if elected will, as Justice Sotomayor has said, have the power of a king. Beating Trump is not impossible, but it requires Democratic Party politicians to show courage and creativity and it demands that if they prove capable of that, that we vote for the Democratic Party presidential candidate, whoever that may be.

Let us too be able to celebrate in our squares and plazas across the country, singing our anthems of social justice, “Solidarity Forever,” “We Shall Not Be Moved,” “De Colores,” “Bread and Roses,” “I Will Survive,” and “Won’t Give Up.” We will sing remembering the great workers’ movements of our past, the fight for the civil rights of Black Americans and of Latinos, the women’s liberation movement, Stonewall and the LFBTQ movements, and the environmental movement. We will vote for the Democrats not because we expect that party to deliver us, but because it will keep Trump from power and give us more time to organize the great movement we need and a new political alternative.

The French did it. We can and we must do it too.


Thanks to a Massive Mobilization of the Left in France, the Far Right Cannot Control the Government


 
 JULY 11, 2024
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What are the results of the parliamentary elections in France on 7 July 2024?

In the second round of France’s parliamentary elections on 7 July 2024, the National Rally (Rassemblement National -RN-) suffered a political defeat, even though it increased its number of MPs. The wager of the far-right party was to win a majority in the National Assembly (along with its allies who have been expelled from the right-wing party Les Républicains), which would have enabled Jordan Bardella, the party leader alongside Marine Le Pen, to become prime minister. This outcome seemed possible after the European elections on 9 June 2024 and the first round of parliamentary elections on 30 June when the far-right RN had excellent scores and the political bloc behind President Macron was in complete disarray.

Their objective was not achieved because on 7 July voters of the Left mobilized in favor of candidates of the Nouveau Front Populaire that came together in four days after 9 June when Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly following his rout in the European elections. Indeed his bloc had obtained only half of the votes garnered by the Rassemblement National and half of the votes that had gone to the various parties of the Left, who had competed in scattered fashion.

How can the setback of the Rassemblement national and its allies be explained?

The main reason for the far Right’s setback can be found in the decision made by Left-wing forces after the 9 June European elections to build a united bloc under the name Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front – NFP). This new front of the Left brought together La France Insoumise (LFI), the Socialist Party (PS), the Ecologists (LE), the Communist Party (PCF) and NPA-L’Anticapitaliste, with LFI as the driving force. The Socialist Party and others soon understood that they had to join even if a number of senior executives were reluctant and some even refused to join. Unity of the Left was of the essence since the French parliamentary election is a majority election with two rounds. Unlike a proportional election in which alliances could be negotiated later, it was important to propose only one candidate of the Left in each constituency to secure the best possible chance of going through to the second round, and winning.

The Right and the major media, including public service media that are more and more closely monitored by the government and are favorable to big capital, harshly criticized the Nouveau Front Populaire, claiming that it included parties – namely the LFI and the NPA – that support “terrorism.” Many commentators even pointed to the alleged anti-Semitism of LFI and NPA. The slurs were extremely violent and outright mendacious. Despite this hateful campaign, the NFP managed to agree on a program and put forward candidates everywhere. The violence was not only verbal, but included physical attacks by the far Right.

Many of the Left’s voters were convinced that on this occasion it was necessary to pull together and go into the neighborhoods, public squares, weekly markets and all places of debate. The awareness of the danger represented by a possible victory for the far Right made it possible for the Left to mobilize in large numbers.

What can be said about the NFP’s program?

The programme on which the Nouveau Font Populaire stood for election is not anti-capitalist, but it is resolutely anti-neoliberal and pro-working class. It is unambiguously opposed to Macron’s policies. It clearly counters the expectations of corporations and the richest 10% of the population. A few of its key measures are: a minimum wage at €1,600 NET, reinstatement of the wealth tax (ISF) cancelled by Macron in 2018, taxes on superprofits, repeal of Emmanuel Macron’s pension reform with the aim of reducing the retirement age to 60, repeal of unemployment insurance reforms, automatic indexation of wages to inflation, cancellation of the recent rise in the price of gas on 1 July, a freeze on certain prices, a 32-hour working week “in arduous or night jobs”, a more progressive income tax scale (in concrete terms, this would mean a return to a scale with 14 brackets as opposed to the current 5), a moratorium on unnecessary major projects, a move towards completely free schooling and recognition of the State of Palestine.

The NFP’s programme is a step back from the program of the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left) in France in the early 1980s, but 40 years of the neoliberal offensive have had a profoundly regressive effect.

What were the results of the European elections on 9 June 2024?

The Rassemblement National came in far ahead of any other party, with 31.4% of the vote (over 7.7 million votes), more than double the votes for Emmanuel Macron’s list, which obtained just 14.6% (3.6 million votes). In addition, there was another far-Right list featuring Marine Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal Le Pen and Éric Zemmour. Their list got 5.5% of the vote. There was also a list from the traditional Right, “La droite pour faire entendre la voix de la France en Europe” (the Right to make France’s voice heard in Europe), which obtained 7.25% of the vote.

The Left was dispersed during the EU parliamentary elections. The list supported by the Socialist Party (PS) obtained 13.8% of the vote, that of La France Insoumise (LFI) 9.9% and that of the Ecologists (LE) 5.5%. In all, the Left won less than 30%. Voter turnout was low: 51.5%.

In light of the resounding defeat of the presidential camp’s list, Macron dissolved the National Assembly and called early elections. The constitution allows the president to continue in office until his term expires in 2027, even if he has to cohabit with a government that opposes him.

What were the results of the first round of the snap legislative elections on 30 June 2024?

The Rassemblement National, which after the EU elections had succeeded in splitting the traditional right-wing party Les Républicains (LR) by forming an alliance with its president, Éric Ciotti, scored 33.22%, better than its score on 9 June. It won 10.6 million votes. The presidential camp obtained only 23% of the vote. The Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front – NFP), which formed immediately in the wake of the European elections, united the majority of the Left and obtained 28% of the vote, not counting the votes won by various left-wing candidates sidelined by the LFI’s leadership, as well as PS dissidents and others. The LR, which had expelled its president Éric Ciotti, obtained 6.6%. Voter turnout was very high: 66.7%.

The huge success of the Rassemblement National list and its allies came as a shock. There was a real risk of the far Right running the government (in cohabitation with President Macron). Young people and activists of the Left who began mobilizing on the evening of the European elections on 9 June stepped up their level of activity to avoid the worst happening. Not only is the program promoted by the Rassemblement National inherently racist, but if the party came to power there would have been an increase in racist acts and attacks by far-right activists and the police, a majority of whom vote for the far Right.

In the minutes following the results of the first round on 30 June, the leadership of La France Insoumise, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as their spokesperson, followed very quickly by the whole of the Nouveau Front Populaire, announced that in order to beat the far Right in the second round, it would withdraw its NFP candidate in every constituency where the NFP came third and the Rassemblement National came first.

The same was not true of the presidential camp, as a series of Macron allies, and even ministers like Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, said that they would never withdraw in favor of an LFI candidate to beat the far-right RN. The Prime Minister, Gabriel Attal, finally took the initiative of calling for a “republican front” to beat the far Right, but it did not lead to unanimity in the presidential camp or in the rest of the traditional Right.

Only seven days remained in which to avoid a takeover by the far Right. Many intellectuals of the Left, and the overwhelming majority of its social movements and citizens, issued numerous statements and held rallies calling for a “roadblock” against the extreme Right. The CGT labor federation union was very active, as was Sud Solidaires. The leadership of the moderate CFDT federation also got involved.

But at the same time, the majority of commentators with access to the major private and public media continued their attacks on La France Insoumise and the NFP, which included the NPA (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste), led by Philippe Poutou, which they accused of being “pro-terrorist” and “anti-police”. Moreover, the RN continued to be invited on all the media platforms, and many prominent journalists displayed empathy with them, whether actual or prompted by circumstances. The polls predicted victory for the RN. And admittedly, a significant proportion of the popular classes and the traditional working class had voted for the RN and were going to do so again. Nor was there any guarantee that, in order to block the far Right, left-wing voters would be prepared to vote for a candidate from the presidential camp or from the rest of the Right, whose actions had in fact encouraged the rise of the RN and who had passed anti-immigrant laws with the RN’s support. Similarly, there was no guarantee that voters on the Right would vote for an LFI or far-left candidate to prevent the election of a candidate from the RN. In the working class camp, the desire to inflict another defeat on Macron’s camp might well continue to take the form of a vote for the RN and not only for the NFP.

What were the results of the second round of legislative elections on 7 July?

+ The big winner of the second round was the Nouveau Front Populaire, which won 182 legislative seats, plus 14 other MPs from various parties of the Left, for a total of 196 seats. In the interest of simplicity we can round the figure up to 200.

+ The minority presidential camp was second with 168 MPs, a loss of 95 seats.

+ In the end, the far-right camp won 143 seats (126 for the Rassemblement National and 17 for its allies, including Éric Ciotti and the other LR members who followed him and who were also expelled from the party). The RN gained 37 seats compared to 2022.

+ Les Républicains (LR), the traditional right-wing party which is in fact closer to the rhetoric of the far Right, won 45 seats (a loss of around twenty seats compared to 2022).

Within the New Popular Front bloc, how is the weight of the different political forces distributed?

La France Insoumise was first with 74 seats (compared with 75 in 2022), followed by the Socialist Party with 59 seats (up sharply compared to its poor result in 2022, when it won just 31 seats), the Ecologists with 28 seats (compared with 23 in 2022) and the Communists (PCF) with 9 parliamentary seats (whereas with its allies in 2022 it had 22). [1] A further 12 NFP MPs are not members of any of the parties mentioned above. The NPA, whose candidate was Philippe Poutou in the Aude department, won no seats.

Within the NFP, the LFI members are clearly the farthest on the left. There are also a few MPs of the Left who had been excluded from the official NFP lists by the LFI leadership and who were still elected on 7 July.

But within the NFP, even though the LFI is the leading force, the PS has made significant gains. What effect will that have?

It is important to consider what is ahead in the light of the gains made by the PS, because that party bears heavy responsibility for the social disaster and the disillusionment of the past ten years (and also the period that preceded it). One of the new PS MPs is former president François Hollande, who personifies those heavy negative responsibilities. Recall that he was elected president in 2012 against the incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy on the promise to put an end to neoliberal policies. He had said that “his enemy was Finance.” But in fact his action was only a continuation of those of the presidents of the Right who preceded him and of their neoliberal policies. He made gift after gift to the major banks, to “Finance” and to the wealthiest segment of the population. It was Hollande who recruited Emmanuel Macron into his government from the Rothschild bank. In 2015, when the Greek people voted Syriza (a coalition of the radical Left) to power, François Hollande and his government joined with Angela Merkel’s rightist government and with the Troika [2] to make sure that austerity policies were kept in place, against the will of Greece’s people.

In the end, in the 2017 elections that brought Macron to the presidency, the PS suffered a crushing political defeat. The party lost 286 legislative seats and was left with only 45 MPs. In terms of votes, in the second round of the 2017 legislative elections the PS took only 7.5% of the vote, whereas the Macron bloc won 49.1% of the vote and 349 seats. In the 2022 legislative election the PS lost even more seats and was left with only 31. At that time it was part of the NUPES coalition, formed at the initiative of LFI, which won a total of 151 seats, 75 of which were for Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s LFI itself.

By comparison the 2024 results are a comeback for the PS, since it now has 59 seats.

Regarding the appointment of the prime minister, there is talk of an “unwritten rule” in the constitution of the Fifth Republic. What is it?

Normally, according to unwritten rule and customary practice under the Fifth Republic, the president appoints a prime minister from among the members of the bloc who came in first in the legislative elections. In this case the Nouveau Front Populaire came in first, and within the NFP coalition La France Insoumise was by far the leading political group. Therefore a member of LFI should become prime minister.

But that is precisely where all kinds of manœuvres can take place.

Big capital wants to avoid having a member of LFI lead the government and determine the agenda. From their point of view, the lesser evil would be for a member of the Socialists to be appointed PM, which would provide more guarantees that the privileges of the wealthiest 1% and the major private corporations would be preserved. So it is more than obvious that the leaders of the Macron bloc want to split off the NFP and seek a compromise with the political forces that are closer to them and more “responsible” – meaning the PS and perhaps certain Ecologists.

Other possible developments from other quarters will also need to be taken into account.

Under these conditions, since the NFP did not win an absolute majority in the Assemblée, it would be well advised not to take on governmental responsibilities, since the situation will not allow it to apply its programme. Their entering the government could cause new divisions and disappointments which could contribute further to abstention or to more votes for the RN. It is better to make a priority of building a social and political front on a foundation of unity in the popular neighbourhoods, in workplaces, etc. A social and political front capable of empowering mobilizations to build a favourable balance of power and use it to win victories, and in any case to push back against the offensive of the Right and Far Right.

Has the fact that France has already seen major social mobilizations in recent years, in particular against the (counter-) reform of retirement in 2022–2023, but also against police violence against racialized persons, played a role in the failure of the Rassemblement National?

There’s no doubt that the fact that in recent years hundreds of thousands and even millions of people have mobilized against Macron’s anti-social, anti-immigrant and repressive policies has helped to create a climate conducive to fighting back against the danger of the far Right.
During the major social mobilizations that have lasted over time without achieving victory, there has not only been frustration and disillusionment; an ability to debate, to organize protests collectively and to develop a collective spirit has also developed. This did not affect the whole population, which explains the real success of the RN, which won votes in some sections of the working classes, particularly in rural areas and in urban areas most affected by deindustrialization, as is the case in Northern France. In most urban areas, there is greater resistance to the penetration of the ideas of the RN, the far Right and the Right in general. This is also clearly the case in urban areas with a high proportion of racialized persons. The fact that LFI and other social forces were not afraid to express their deep solidarity with the Palestinian people and their rejection of racist and anti-immigrant policies convinced sectors of the population to vote for the NFP and against the RN as well as against Macron and the traditional Right.

Is the issue of public debt returning to the center of the debate?

In all the statements from the Right and the Macronist camp, in a multitude of comments in the media, the argument of the unsustainable level reached by the public debt and the need for new budgetary austerity is constantly recurring. They stress the need to comply with the European Commission’s injunctions to reduce the public deficit. The supposed threat posed by the arrival of the Left in government and the supposed dangers in the NFP’s program is constantly being brandished, along with the idea that any implementation of that program would cause markets to panic, the cost of debt to soar and capital to flee. In other words, the same refrain we hear every time the Left is on the doorstep of government; and the aim is not only to frighten public opinion but also to convince the Left’s representatives to abandon any desire not to continue bowing to the dictatorship of the markets and therefore of big business.

In the battle of ideas, it will be important to explain that governments, the Commission and the ECB were willing to increase public debt in order to finance expenditures in the face of the Coronavirus pandemic and the economic and social crisis that it exacerbated. The Macron government and European leaders have been unwilling to tax the super-profits of the big pharmaceutical companies – in particular vaccines producers – which have made scandalous profits at the expense of society. The same goes for retail companies – particularly those specializing in online sales and IT services – which have also made huge profits. Then, when gas prices rocketed in the wake of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine, Macron’s government and those of other countries were unwilling to control energy prices and freeze them, allowing fossil fuel and energy companies to also make huge profits at the expense of society. Lastly, when food prices soared as a result of the war in Ukraine and speculation on cereals, cereal companies made super-profits. Just like the major retail chains, which have increased retail food prices disproportionately and abusively, causing a sharp rise in inflation and a loss of purchasing power for the working classes. The Macron government has refused to impose extraordinary taxes on their profits. Arms production companies are also reaping yet more profits from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, with the full support of leaders of the NATO member countries.

Conclusion

In this situation, and with this refusal to levy taxes on the companies that benefited from the crisis and on the richest segment of the population, the States have increasingly resorted to debt financing instead of financing themselves via tax revenues, except for those from indirect taxes on consumption (Value Added Tax – VAT), which are extremely damaging for the vast majority of the population and in particular for the lowest income sectors.

In the battle of ideas, we need to show that for these reasons, a large part of the public debt is illegitimate and must be audited and cancelled.

The migration policies of European leaders and national governments will also be hardened, and human-rights abuses will increase. Human-rights violations will increase, despite denunciations by the European Court of Human Rights and human rights associations. We will need to mobilize. If a powerful social and political front can be put in place from the base to the summit, resistance is possible and victories can be won.

The climate inaction of President Macron and the European institutions will also worsen. A powerful social movement is indispensable for the adoption of genuine measures to combat the environmental crisis.

Rearmament will accelerate. We must also succeed in launching a movement to oppose it.

We must also mobilize in defence of the rights of women and LGBTQIA+ persons.

The rhetoric of the far Right and policies that support it are likely to continue to spread.

As a result, the antifascist struggle and protest actions against the rise of the Far Right will become increasingly important.

Post script:

In the EU parliament, a new legislative group has just been formed, called “Patriots for Europe,” and will be headed by Jordan Bardella. It includes, on the one hand, MEPs from the party of Hungarian President Viktor Orbán and of the two far-right Czech parties Ano and Oath and Motorists, who number 20, and the former EU Parliament group led by Marine Le Pen, Identity and Democracy, which had 58 MEPs, plus the 6 members from Spain’s Vox, who have left the other far-right parliamentary group ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), led by Italian PM Giorgia Meloni. The new “Patriots for Europe” group will total 84 MEPs. The ECR group led by Meloni has been reduced with the exit of the Vox members and now totals 78 seats. The updated breakdown of legislative groups can be seen on the EU Parliament’s Web site at: https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/tools/comparative-tool/

During the parliamentary term that has just ended, the two far-right groups in the European Parliament totalled 118, whereas in the new EP, the two parliamentary groups have 162 members, to which should be added the 15 members of the German AfD, who are not currently part of any group. Breakdown of the Patriots for Europe EP group in order of importance:

— Rassemblement national: 30;
— Fidesz-KDNP: 11;
— Lega: 8;
— ANO: 7
— FPÖ: 6;
— Vox: 6;
— PVV: 6;
— Vlaams Belang: 3;
— Oath and Motorists: 2;
— Chega: 2;
— Danish People’s Party: 1;
— Latvia First: 1;
— Voice of Reason: 1

The author thanks Maxime Perriot for proofreading.

Translated by Snake Arbusto and Christine Pagnoulle.

Footnotes

[1It remains to be seen how the number of MPs allied with or affiliated with the PCF will evolve.

[2The “Troika” is the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank.


French Elections: What the Global Left

Should Learn About Defeating the 

Far-Right


A united left is a formidable opponent that cannot only halt the surge of neo-fascism, but can also offer a positive and inspiring vision for the future.


July 10, 2024
Source: Common Dreams


Far-right forces have gained ground across Europe, particularly in Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In fact, the Netherlands has a new government, a coalition between far right and right, and the far right came first in the first-round of France’s snap election. But fearful of the prospect of a neo-fascist and xenophobic party in government, French voters came out in record numbers and rallied not behind Ensemble—the centrist coalition led by President Emmanuel Macron—but behind the coalition of left forces calling themselves the New Popular Front (NFP), delivering in the end a blow to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) which had made historic gains in the first round and topped the poll with 33.15 percent of the votes cast. NFP came in first in the run-off election, with 188 seats, but falling short of majority.

France’s snap parliamentary election results help us to make sense of the surge of the far right and offer valuable lessons for the left all over the world, including the U.S. where a centrist democrat and a wannabe dictator face off in November.

First, it is crystal clear that the main reason for the rise of Europe’s far right, authoritarian, and ethnonationalist forces is the status quo of neoliberal capitalism. The neoliberal counterrevolution that begun in the early 1980s and undermined every aspect of the social democracy model that had characterized European political economy since the end of the Second World War has unleashed utterly dangerous political forces that envision a return to a golden era of traditional values built around the idea of the nation by fomenting incessant and socially destructive change.

France’s snap parliamentary election results help us to make sense of the surge of the far right and offer valuable lessons for the left all over the world.

True to its actual aims and intent, neoliberalism has exacerbated capitalism’s tendency to concentrate wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer, reduced the well-being of the population through mass privatization and commercialization of public services, hijacked democracy, decreased the overall functionality of state agencies, and created a condition of permanent insecurity. Moreover, powerful global economic governance institutions—namely, the unholy trinity of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization—took control of the world economy and became instrumental in the spreading of neoliberalism by shaping and influencing the policies of national governments. It is under these conditions that ethnonationalism, racism, and neofascism resurfaced in Europe, and in fact all over the world.

In France, the rise of the far right coincided with President François Mitterand’s turn to austerity in the 1980s as his government fell prey to the monetarist-neoliberal ideology of the Anglo-Saxon world. Once Mitterand made his infamous neoliberal turn, the rest of the social democratic regimes in southern Europe (Greece under Andreas Papandreou, Italy under Bettino Craxi, Spain under Felipe Gonzalez, and Portugal under Mario Soares) tagged along, and the eclipse of progressivism was underway.

Less than two decades later, reactionary political forces had emerged throughout Europe as extreme neoliberal economic policies had paved the way for the emergence of political tendencies with an eye to exploiting the catastrophic social and economic impacts of neoliberalism by tapping into a huge reservoir of public anger and discontent with the establishment. Indeed, as neoliberalism tightened its grip on domestic society, far right forces gained more ground. The surge of Marine Le Pen’s RN occurs against the backdrop of Macron’s obsession with converting France into a full-fledged neoliberal society.

A crucial lesson offered by the results of France’s snap election (as well as by Labour’s victory in UK) is that economics remains the rule of the day. Political forces that seek to promote multiculturalism and social rights while pushing at the same time the neoliberal economic agenda will, in the end, get the short end of the stick.

Initially, Macronism was a strategy of trying to appeal to a wide range of center-left and center-right voters by defending secular social rights and even making gestures to LGBTQ people but always with an eye to transforming the social contract and freeing up the “energy of the workforce.” Macron’s “progressive liberalism” philosophy worked up to a point. It backfired in a big way along the way when workers, farmers, and minority groups realized that their economic future was at stake by Macron’s pro-market policies—and that was clearly far more important to them than concerns over social issues and even the environment itself. The “yellow vest” movement that rocked Macron’s presidency in 2018 and left an “indelible mark” on French politics was the first indication that any set of government reforms that carried a disproportionate impact on the working and middle classes was going to be severely challenged.

In the end, Macronism even lost the support it initially had from women’s and LGBTQ organizations, and not simply because Macron’s stance on social policies hardened along the way as part of an opportunistic and desperate attempt on his part to stir conservative voters away from the arms of the far right. It is worth pointing out here that, unlike most social movements which are male-dominated, the “yellow vest” movement was distinguished by the “high proportion of women” that took part in the protests. It was economics that drove French women out into the streets, demonstrating against Macron government’s unjust tax reform measures.

Again, the lesson here is that voters are unlikely to be deceived by the sort of political rhetoric that emphasizes diversity, multiculturalism, and environmental concerns while policies are being pursued in favor of a brutal neoliberal economic setting. Social rights under neoliberalism is a mirage. This is a critical lesson for all left forces in an age in which multiculturalism and the politics of identity play such a prominent ideological role. We see the counter effects of this ultimately “pro-capitalist-stratagem” in the U.S. where voters without college degrees, which amount to over 60 percent of the population, are overwhelmingly on Trump’s camp. A similar tendency can be seen in the Latino community as a growing segment of Hispanic voters are joining Trump’s GOP party.

Voters are unlikely to be deceived by the sort of political rhetoric that emphasizes diversity, multiculturalism, and environmental concerns while policies are being pursued in favor of a brutal neoliberal economic setting.

For the benefit of political expediency and ideological integrity alike, the left should stick to its universalist traditions while remaining of course sensitive to diversity and particularism. But it has no business playing the game of identity politics that has become the hallmark of corporate capitalism and of the liberal political establishment. Last thing we need is a cultural and post-material left morphed into a movement vying for space in a capitalist dominated universe.

More important, as the unique experience of the formation of a coalition of leftist parties in France for the snap parliamentary election attests, the left’s best hope for making major inroads in today’s western societies, which are unquestionably highly complex and diversified, is by introducing and promoting an attractive yet realistic economic agenda that addresses the immediate concerns of average people but without losing sight of the broader objective of the leftist vision which is none other than social transformation.

The “shocking” success of the New Popular Front in the run-off election in France did not materialize simply because French voters wanted to halt the rise of the far right to power, which is the mainstream interpretation. French voters backed NFP for two key reasons: first, because they finally saw the left leaving behind factionalism and, second, because they were lured by its radical manifesto.

For the first time since the 1930s, not only has an anti-fascist alliance been revived in France but there is now hope for the future of the left because of its economic vision, assuming of course that the left can stay united beyond the election. And this is perhaps the greatest lesson leftist forces should draw from the French snap elections: a united left is a formidable opponent that cannot only halt the surge of neo-fascism but can also offer real hope for a humane and sustainable future.



CJ Polychroniou is a political scientist/political economist, author, and journalist who has taught and worked in numerous universities and research centers in Europe and the United States. Currently, his main research interests are in U.S. politics and the political economy of the United States, European economic integration, globalization, climate change and environmental economics, and the deconstruction of neoliberalism’s politico-economic project. He has published scores of books and over one thousand articles which have appeared in a variety of journals, magazines, newspapers and popular news websites. His latest books are Optimism Over Despair: Noam Chomsky On Capitalism, Empire, and Social Change (2017); Climate Crisis and the Global Green New Deal: The Political Economy of Saving the Planet (with Noam Chomsky and Robert Pollin as primary authors, 2020); The Precipice: Neoliberalism, the Pandemic, and the Urgent Need for Radical Change (an anthology of interviews with Noam Chomsky, 2021); and Economics and the Left: Interviews with Progressive Economists (2021).