It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Pro-Russia Serb nationalist politician Milorad Dodik – who is serving a six-year ban from holding public office for defying rulings of Bosnia’s international envoy and Constitutional Court, claimed victory on Sunday, saying his party would hold a “vast majority”.
The former president of Bosnia's Serb statelet, Milorad Dodik, said his party had retained power in the entity and its seat on the shared presidency, as preliminary results showed a drop in turnout for Bosnia's general elections.
Dodik led the declarations for a dizzying number of posts to be decided in the general elections in a complex system that has held the partitioned Balkan country together since the 1995 peace deal.
The key race was for the tripartite presidency, split between Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks, and the Serb and Croat ethnic groups. Dodik's Serb nationalists ran on a platform of greater autonomy and secessionist rhetoric.
"If it had not been for (US President) Donald Trump's magnificent victory, we would probably be political corpses today," he told supporters in Banja Luka, in a speech that also thanked his close ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"But now, thanks to the new environment, we are political winners," he added.
Zeljka Cvijanovic of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) speaks after the publication of general election results, in Banja Luka, Bosnia, Sunday, Oct. 4, 2026 Radivoje Pavicic/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved
The 67-year-old was not on the ballot after being convicted of overstepping his powers and banned from the presidency for six years.
But he remains a central figure in the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska entity.
With 95% of the ballots counted, according to electoral officials, his candidate, Zeljka Cvijanovic, was firmly on track to retain her spot in the presidency.
Meanwhile, Bosniak presidential incumbent Denis Becirovic also claimed victory after results showed him leading a tighter race for his seat.
"A freedom-loving, anti-fascist and civic Bosnia and Herzegovina is alive," Becirovic, from the Social Democrats party, told supporters in Sarajevo.
Denis Becirovic (SDP) poses for a photo with his wife after declaring himself winner of the Bosniak seat of the tripartite Bosnian Presidency in Sarajevo, Sunday, Oct. 4, 2026 Armin Durgut/Copyright 2026 The AP.
Bosnian Croat nationalist candidate Darijana Filipovic also claimed victory in her bid for the Croat presidential seat.
Dodik's party was also projected to retain power in the Serb entity's parliament and local presidency by a large margin.
The US-brokered ‘Dayton agreement’ ended the 1992-95 conflict but entrenched divisions that often paralyse decision-making.
It divided Bosnia into two semi-autonomous entities –s the Serb-run RS and a Muslim-Croat federation – linked by a weak central government.
Turnout dropped nearly 10% from the last election in 2022, to around 42% on Sunday, according to official figures.
A man places his ballot into an electronic ballot box during the general election in Sarajevo, Bosnia, Sunday, Oct. 4, 2026 Armin Durgut/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved
In the Muslim-Croat federation, Becirovic advocates a path toward the European Union and NATO
But if Dodik's party returns to the presidency, it would almost certainly mean the political deadlock that has blocked the necessary reforms for years would remain.
After two decades in power, Dodik and his party have repeatedly clashed with the country's central authorities and vocally oppose EU membership.
Croat nationalist parties are also pushing for electoral reform. They want a greater say in choosing the Croat member of the presidency in the entity they share with the more numerous Bosniaks.
Sunday, October 04, 2026
Bosnian Serb strongman claims election win, thanks Trump and Putin
Sarajevo (AFP) – The former president of Bosnia's Serb statelet, Milorad Dodik, said his party had retained power in the entity and its seat on the shared presidency, as preliminary results showed a drop in turnout for Bosnia's general elections.
Dodik led the declarations for a dizzying number of posts to be decided in the general elections in a complex system that has held the partitioned Balkan country together since the 1995 peace deal.
The key race was for the tripartite presidency, split between Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks, and the Serb and Croat ethnic groups. Dodik's Serb nationalists ran on a platform of greater autonomy and secessionist rhetoric.
"If it had not been for Donald Trump's magnificent victory... we would probably be political corpses today," he told supporters in Banja Luka, in a speech that also thanked his close ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"But now, thanks to the new environment, we are political winners," he added.
The 67-year-old was not on the ballot after being convicted of overstepping his powers and banned from the presidency for six years.
But he remains a central figure in the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska entity.
With 95 percent of the ballots counted, according to electoral officials, his candidate, Zeljka Cvijanovic, was firmly on track to retain her spot in the presidency.
Meanwhile, Bosniak presidential incumbent Denis Becirovic also claimed victory after results showed him leading a tighter race for his seat.
"A freedom-loving, anti-fascist and civic Bosnia and Herzegovina is alive," Becirovic, from the Social Democrats party, told supporters in Sarajevo.
Bosnian Croat nationalist candidate Darijana Filipovic also claimed victory in her bid for the Croat presidential seat.
Dodik's party was also projected to retain power in the Serb entity's parliament and local presidency by a large margin.
The US-brokered Dayton agreement ended the 1992-1995 conflict but entrenched divisions that often paralyse decision-making.
It divided Bosnia into two semi-autonomous entities -- the Serb-run RS and a Muslim-Croat federation -- linked by a weak central government. Low turnout
The major parties' repeated focus on war-era rhetoric of ethnic division frustrated some voters, who hoped for candidates to address economic concerns in one of Europe's poorest countries.
Economist Merima Cerim Karisik, voting in a northern Sarajevo suburb, told AFP she hoped for change and a turn away from the tired politics of the past.
"That what we have seen over the past 30 years will finally come to an end," she said.
Amela Hadzic, after casting her ballot at the same polling station, said it felt like the country had gone backwards recently.
"I hope people have seen that things cannot go on like this. I doubt there will be any major changes, but hopefully things will at least get better, however little," Hadzic said.
With the debut of biometric identification and the scanning of paper ballots at thousands of polling stations, authorities said technical issues had caused voting to be extended at some stations, but there were no reports of major incidents.
Turnout dropped nearly 10 percentage points from the last election in 2022, to around 42 percent, according to official figures.
- No progress on EU goals -
In the Muslim-Croat federation, Becirovic advocates a path toward the European Union and NATO.
But if Dodik's party returns to the presidency, it would almost certainly mean the political deadlock that has blocked the necessary reforms for years would remain.
After two decades in power, Dodik and his party have repeatedly clashed with the country's central authorities and vocally oppose EU membership.
Croat nationalist parties are also pushing for electoral reform. They want a greater say in choosing the Croat member of the presidency in the entity they share with the more numerous Bosniaks.
Bosnia's main ethnic parties appeared to be strengthening their grip on power in the October 4 elections, preliminary results showed, potentially complicating the country's bid to join the European Union and prolonging a political deadlock that has frustrated voters and Western powers alike.
With 92.3% of polling stations processed, the Bosniak nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was the largest party in the race for the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking 19.89% of the vote, or 240,762 ballots, according to preliminary data from the Central Election Commission.
The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the dominant party among Bosnia's Serbs and led by Milorad Dodik, was second nationally with 16.44%, followed by the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP) with 9.39%.
The coalition around the main Bosnian Croat party, HDZ BiH, was fourth with 8%, while a list led by Republika Srpska opposition politician Draško Stanivuković took 5.99%. The results are preliminary and votes are still being processed.
In the race for the three-member presidency, Denis Bećirović, representing the United for the State coalition, led with 38.03% for the Bosniak seat, ahead of SDA leader Bakir Izetbegović on 34.25%. Bećirović is a staunch advocate of Bosnia's EU and Nato integration.
SNSD candidate Željka Cvijanović had a strong lead for the Serb seat, with 55.6% of the vote after 80% of polling stations were processed. HDZ BiH candidate Darijana Filipović was leading for the Croat seat with 48.19%, convincingly ahead of rival candidates.
SNSD victories
Dodik declared victory for his SNSD across all levels of government after the first preliminary results were released, also indicating a victory for the party's candidate for the presidency of Bosnia's Serb entity Republika Srpska.
"I declare victory at all levels. Thank you to everyone. This is a result similar to that of 20 years ago," Dodik said, reported Klix.ba.
He also linked the result to the political climate in the United States, saying that without Donald Trump's return to the White House, his party might have been in a weaker position.
In Republika Srpska, the Serb entity that makes up one of Bosnia's two autonomous regions, the SNSD was on 38.93% with nearly 87% of votes counted for the entity's parliament, and Dodik's son Igor Dodik topping the list. Stanivuković's Movement for a Safe Srpska was second on 14.19%, followed by SDS on 12.27%. The party's candidate Savo Minić is on track to secure the entity's presidency.
Complex political system
Bosnia's complex political system was established under the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, which ended the 1992-95 war and divided the country between the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Bosniak- and Croat-majority Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A weak central government and a three-member presidency link the two entities.
The arrangement has frequently produced political stalemate, with leaders from the two entities and the country's three main ethnic groups often unable to agree on decisions at the state level.
That paralysis has become a major obstacle to Bosnia's EU ambitions. The country received EU candidate status in December 2022 and the bloc agreed in 2024 to open accession negotiations. But formal talks have yet to begin because Bosnia has not completed key reforms, including measures to strengthen judicial oversight and anti-corruption legislation.
A stronger showing by the established ethnic parties could make it harder to overcome those divisions, particularly if the new parliament reproduces the confrontations that have repeatedly blocked state-level decisions.
The election also took place against a backdrop of competing foreign influence. The EU wants to bring Bosnia and other Western Balkan countries into the bloc, while Russia has maintained close ties with the leadership of Republika Srpska and supported its political autonomy. The United States remains a major player in Bosnia, both through its role in the Dayton peace settlement and its broader efforts to limit Russian influence.
Washington is also backing a proposed $1.5bn gas pipeline intended to connect Bosnia to Croatia and provide an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The project has become part of a wider contest over Bosnia's future energy orientation, with the EU raising concerns about the transparency of the selection of the US-linked investor.
Tech issues
Election day was marked by some problems with the introduction of new voting technology. The election watchdog coalition Pod Lupom said it had recorded 46 serious violations by 9:30 a.m., including problems involving election materials, polling procedures and access for observers. Only 52.1% of polling stations opened at exactly 7 a.m., while another 37% opened within 15 minutes. The new technology was nevertheless operational before voting began at 99% of the polling stations observed, Pod Lupom said.
Turnout was 28.8% by 3 p.m., 8.12 percentage points below the level recorded at the same time in the 2022 elections, according to the election commission. The relatively low participation reflected the frustration of many voters with a political system that has changed little despite years of promises of reform.
Bosnia awaits for final general election results as preliminary count remains unclear
Around 3.4 million eligible voters in Bosnia headed to the polls to choose the three members of the country’s multi-ethnic presidency, lawmakers for the national Parliament, and heads of institutions for the country’s two entities.
Polls have now closed in Bosnia’s general election on Sunday, where preliminary results remain unclear, and the country is waiting for further updates in the coming hours to get a clearer picture of the outcome.
Some 3.4 million voters were eligible to choose the three members of the multi-ethnic presidency, national lawmakers, and leaders of the country's two entities: the Muslim-majority Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska.
The complex system of institutions was created by the US-brokered 1995 peace agreement to manage divisions among Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats.
Early reports show voting was delayed at several polling places due to problems with new digital voting technology, which was introduced to address earlier concerns about vote tampering. Bosnia's Election Commission made this decision to prolonge the 7 p.m. voting cutoff at polling stations that experienced problems.
The election comes as many citizens in the multiethnic Balkan state face everyday problems, while some leading politicians stoke the war-era tensions that have kept the country divided since the 1992-95 conflict.
By 3 p.m. around 27% of voters had cast their ballots, according to the commission, a decrease from 35% at the same time during the last national election.
New election security measures
For the first time, authorities were using electronic voter identification and ballot scanning to curb the irregularities and organised manipulation that undermined confidence in earlier elections.
Most of the 75 parties running are organised along ethnic lines. The Bosniak nationalist Party of Democratic Action has campaigned on keeping Bosnia united against Serb separatism, while many Bosnian Croats back ethnic parties such as the local branch of Croatia's ruling Croatian Democratic Union.
Izetbegovic, who was beaten by Becirovic in 2022, is seeking a third term as president of the centre-right SDA, the largest Bosniak party in the nation.
A woman places her ballot into an electronic ballot box during the general election in Sarajevo, Bosnia, Sunday, Oct. 4, 2026. (AP Photo/Armin Durgut) AP Photo
Many disillusioned citizens say politicians use nationalism to avoid tackling real problems like low living standards and the exodus of young people. Mostar voter Ivan Silic said nothing has improved since he first voted and that politicians live well while everyone else's situation stays the same.
Dodik looms large despite not being on the ballot
Despite not being on the ballot, the campaign has been dominated by Milorad Dodik, the pro-Russian, separatist former president of Republika Srpska. Dodik is banned from public office after being convicted of defying the international envoy who oversees the peace agreement.
Fresh from meeting Russia's president Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Dodik leads a party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, that is likely to win in Republika Srpska.
Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, right, and Prime Minister of Republika Srpska Savo Minic enter a hall for the talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. AP Photo
At a final rally Friday in Banja Luka, attended by Russia's ambassador, Igor Khalabukov, Dodik declared Bosnia is "dead" and "an impossible country". "It doesn't make any sense," he stressed.
Off the ballot for the first time in almost 30 years, he is still in command and is present across the country's media, says Dragan Bursac, an analyst. In Bursac's view, the ban is not working, and Dodik is exploiting it.
Ethnic tensions continue to rise
Bosnia has been peaceful in recent years, but its politicians have kept ethnic divisions alive. Bosnian Serb leaders such as Dodik have pushed for their entity to break away, raising Western fears of renewed instability.
The Balkan nation remains one of Europe's poorest countries, still recovering from a war that began after it declared independence from Serb-led Yugoslavia and ethnic Serbs took up arms to carve out their own state. That conflict killed more than 100,000 people and displaced millions.
The country is formally seeking European Union membership, but progress has stalled despite EU efforts to push its leaders toward reform.
Major powers continue to influence socio-economic and political life in the small Balkan nation. Russia is holding down the EU's efforts to expand its membership throughout the Balkans, including Bosnia, while continuing to back the Republika Srpska.
While a $1.5 billion pipeline project to import US liquefied natural gas is being pushed by a corporation with ties to the Trump administration as part of the US's efforts to gain influence.
Relate
And recently, wartime wounds were reopened by public tributes in Serbia and among Bosnian Serbs to Ratko Mladic, the wartime army commander who died in late August while serving a life sentence for genocide and other war crimes.
Bosnian Serbs regard him as a hero, despite his UN court conviction over the killing of more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995.
Senior Bosnian Serb officials attended his funeral in Belgrade, drawing sharp EU criticism and angering Bosniak politicians.
Saturday, October 03, 2026
WAR IN UKRAINE
What links matryoshka dolls, Belarusian nuns, French churches and Russian troops? In recent years, visitors to French churches and cathedrals may have come across Belarusian nuns selling matryoshka dolls, religious icons and honey. They come from the Saint Elisabeth Convent in Minsk and present these sales as a means of funding their charitable work. However, the convent openly supports Russia’s war in Ukraine and has helped collect supplies for Russian soldiers.
Issued on: 01/10/2026 - RFI
Matryoshka dolls – commonly known as "Russian dolls" – are being sold by Belarusian nuns at French churches, with the funds supporting Russian troops.
“The nuns at the convent look after orphaned children, who are usually abandoned because they have a physical or mental disability. The orphanage is home to 200 children. The sisters are involved in other social work – in particular, they look after the homeless, alcoholics and drug addicts at a shelter 30km from the convent," notes the announcement of a sale organised by the sisters of Saint Elisabeth Convent at the Sacred Heart parish in Val d’Or, central France, in July 2022.
In May 2023, the Diocese of Paris announced a similar "exhibition and sale" at the parish of Saint-Léon, featuring icons, handicrafts, honey and herbal teas. In May this year, the Belarusian nuns were selling their wares at the Celtic Orthodox Church in Saint-Dolay in Brittany.
During the summer, they ran a stall for several weeks in Les Sables-d’Olonne near Nantes on France's Atlantic coast – which was the subject of an investigation by the newspaper Ouest-France. Because since 2022, members of the convent have taken part in fundraising campaigns for the Russian army, financing vehicles and equipment.
Continent-wide network
Natallia Vassilevitch, a Belarusian theologian in exile, is the founder of the organisation Christian Vision – which has been documenting the monastery’s activities for several years.
She tells RFI the community carefully tailors its message to its audience. "On the Russian-language website, there are photos of children with automatic rifles. They know exactly who they’re addressing. They understand what can be said and what cannot be said."
She continued: "These contacts were first established [by the convent] in the late 1990s and early 2000s. [They] would simply load up a car a bit haphazardly, the nuns would set off, arrive at the parishes and say: 'Hello, we've come from Belarus, we do good work, we help children, can we sell our goods here?' At any Orthodox event, any religious festival, any Christmas market, wherever you go in Europe, the monastery sells its products."
According to Vassilevitch, over the years these nuns have built up a network across the continent. Between them, members of the convent speak several foreign languages and organisations linked to the community have been registered in Germany and Poland.
A 2024 investigation by the Belarusian media outlet Buro described Saint Elisabeth Convent as a veritable "Orthodox business conglomerate" around which several legal entities, dozens of retail outlets and numerous workshops are centred. Around 1,600 people are said to work in the various organisations linked to the monastery.
Vehicles and drones
Christian Vision's StopSEM project tracks fundraising campaigns for Russian military personnel and has gathered publications from the convent and its partner groups documenting examples.
Some of these fundraising operations are channelled through a group called Aid to the Brothers, coordinated by the convent's Sister Alexandra, whose secular name is Liudmila Liakhova.
In 2023, Christian Vision identified at least seven vehicles whose purchase had been financed in whole or in part with the help of the convent's network, and which were intended for the transport of military personnel and the evacuation of the wounded.
Drones were also supplied.
When questioned about these purchases at the time by Vot Tak, an independent Russian-language media outlet operated by Poland's public broadcaster, Sister Alexandra confirmed that her group was assisting the military by purchasing requested equipment.
According to Vassilevitch, however, the convent's involvement goes beyond sending supplies. She reports that it is encouraging vulnerable men, notably former prisoners, to join the Russian army.
"They tell them these stories with great enthusiasm: 'look, our brother went off to fight, he died over there and became a hero', whereas he could have been a homeless alcoholic who died in a gutter."
A priest decorated by Putin
The convent's spiritual father, Archpriest Andrei Lemeshonok, has since 2022 made numerous statements justifying the Russian invasion. In May 2025, he declared that the convent itself was now "a combat unit".
On 4 November 2025, Lemeshonok was received at the Kremlin and presented by President Vladimir Putin with the Pushkin Medal – a Russian state honour awarded, according to a presidential decree, for his contribution to the preservation and promotion of the Russian language and culture abroad.
During the ceremony, Lemeshonok thanked the Russian president for "the hope" he had restored to the people, comparing his commitment to a journey towards Golgotha, the hill outside Jerusalem where the Christian gospels say Jesus Christ was crucified.
This ideological affinity was nothing new. During mass protests against Belarus's President Alexander Lukashenko in 2020, Lemeshonok took a stand in favour of the Belarusian authorities. In January 2023, Lukashenko himself visited Saint Elisabeth, where he too publicly defended his support for Russians fighting in the war.
Question over visas
Despite this, representatives from the convent continue to make fundraising trips to France.
In Les Sables-d’Olonne, Father Antoine Nouwavi, head of the local parish, explained to Ouest-France that he had refused to welcome the nuns in 2023 and 2024 after discovering the allegations against their convent.
He finally agreed to their return after receiving a letter from the Mother Superior of Saint Elisabeth stating that reports of her support for the war were false and that the money raised in France was intended exclusively for charitable causes.
The priest acknowledged, however, that he did not have the means to verify the final destination of the funds raised.
Christian Vision says it has alerted church leaders in France to the group's activities. According to Vassilevitch, the number of communities willing to welcome the nuns has since fallen.
Other European countries have taken a stricter approach. In Sweden, the Church last year officially recommended that its parishes no longer host the nuns of Saint Elisabeth. Their stalls have also been banned or closed down in Poland, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. In Germany, a member of the Bundestag has called for an investigation into their activities.
Vassilevitch questions why countries continue to grant the nuns visas, given that it is currently difficult for Belarusians to obtain a permit to enter the Schengen zone.
"The question is, why? Why does no one check, when they cross the border, what they are carrying, or whether the use being made of these visas actually corresponds to the reason they were issued, given the various threats Europe is currently facing?"
When asked by RFI about the presence and activities in France of representatives from Saint Elisabeth Convent, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it had "no information to provide on this matter".
The author says Russia’s latest Duma vote did what the Kremlin wanted: opposition was barred and United Russia kept a rubber-stamp majority Putin can call a mandate for the Ukraine war.
Two quieter votes may matter more. In South Ossetia, Moscow-backed Marat Kambolov—an official from North Ossetia—won the presidency after a deeper cooperation pact and a sacked local governor, which the piece reads as a step toward annexation if Russia loses leverage in Armenia, even though Tbilisi and the world still formally oppose border changes.
In Udmurtia, émigrés and locals used an anonymous online ballot to pick a 10-member opposition assembly under journalist Andrey Grigoryev, reviving a 1990 sovereignty line for all peoples of the republic. Moscow faces a cross-ethnic protest vote; other émigré groups face a test of who can claim to speak for a region.
The outcome of Russia’s latest Duma “election” has been as expected. The Kremlin banned opposition figures from taking part, whose presence might have cost the ruling United Russia Party its constitutional majority. As a result, the Kremlin has gotten almost precisely what it sought. The elections resulted in an even more tightly controlled Russian parliament that will rubber-stamp whatever Russian President Vladimir Putin asks for. He will use these results to claim the legitimacy of his regime and overwhelming Russian popular support for his war against Ukraine (e.g., CNN, September 21).
Because the Duma vote involved all of Russia and because the Kremlin trumpeted its supposed importance, the just-completed Russian vote unsurprisingly attracted enormous attention both in Russia and abroad. Two other “Russian” elections held at the same time, though they drew far less attention, appear set to prove more fateful. First, a Kremlin-backed Russian citizen was elected as president of South Ossetia, the Georgian breakaway territory Moscow helped wrest from Tbilisi in 2008 (OC Media, September 9; Vot Tak, September 19; Kavkazskiy Uzel, September 20; RITM Eurasia, September 21). Second, an opposition assembly in the Udmurt Republic in Russia’s Middle Volga region was selected via a secure internet channel (Region.Expert, September 18; Udmurtia, accessed September 22). The first sets the stage for Russia’s annexation of South Ossetia, and the second challenges the Kremlin by laying the groundwork for a legitimate alternative to Moscow’s rule there, as well as for opponents of Putin’s rule in emigration who do not move to organize similar bodies in similar ways.
After Putin invaded Georgia in 2008, South Ossetia along with Abkhazia became partially recognized states, controlled, especially in the case of South Ossetia, by Moscow, and have diplomatic relations with only a handful of countries. Many expected Moscow would annex South Ossetia and join it to Russia’s North Ossetian republic just north of the border. That has not happened for at least three reasons. First, international opposition to border changes, including in the South Caucasus, continues (EXO FM, August 7). Second, Moscow wants to deepen its rapprochement with Georgia, a goal that could be compromised if it absorbed one or both breakaway republics (Svobodnaya Pressa, August 8). Third, the Russian government is getting almost everything it wants without the downsides of annexation and the other financial costs of doing so, including having a military base there (Window on Eurasia, June 12, 2024).
In recent months, significant changes appear to have set the stage for eventual annexation (see EDM, June 26). First, the international community, while still officially opposed to annexations, has shown through its response to Moscow’s moves against Ukraine and Donbas that it is not prepared to take action when and if they happen. Second, Georgia, while still opposed to annexation, has fewer choices than it did and might not end its cooperation with Moscow even if Russia annexed South Ossetia. Third, the Russian military base in South Ossetia has become vastly more important for Moscow given that Russia may soon lose its base in Armenia or be forced to reduce its size and capabilities to remain (see EDM, September 8; Window on Eurasia, September 19).
Since his actions began last spring, Putin has been seen as willing to move toward annexation. He signed a far more comprehensive cooperation agreement with Tskhinvali, giving Russia even more control over that republic. He sacked the governor and endorsed Marat Kambolov as his successor, an Ossetian from the north whose entire career has been in the Russian Federation. This is a step the Kremlin had never taken before, and it has now been formalized by the snap election in that republic on September 18 (OC Media, September 9; Vot Tak, September 19). While some observers expect that these moves reflect a desire by Putin only to clean up the increasingly troubled situation in the South Ossetian government, most view them as another step toward annexation. They argue, however, that the move may not be imminent, since Kambolov will have to gain control of the government there (OC Media, September 9).
Moscow and Kambolov may move more quickly toward annexation, especially if Moscow loses its base in Armenia. If so, that by itself would make the vote in South Ossetia more significant than the orchestrated elections in the Russian Federation.
If what is taking place in South Ossetia reflects Kremlin calculations and interests, another electoral development far removed from the North Caucasus does not. That is Udmurtia, a Middle Volga republic with a long history of resisting Moscow from the Russian Civil War to this day (Window on Eurasia, September 14, 2019, August 13, 2023, February 22, 2022). Its tradition in that regard is typically ignored because the republic is small, with only 1.5 million residents, two-thirds of whom are ethnically Russian and only one-fifth are ethnically Udmurt. These Finno-Ugric people are traditionally animist but are now counted by many as Russian Orthodox.
In recent years, Moscow has responded by repressing the Udmurt minority, arresting protesters and driving even more into emigration, where the Udmurts are increasingly active (Window on Eurasia, March 1). Instead of retreating into a narrow nationalism, however, that emigration has retained its internationalist positions. Last year, it reissued its 1990 declaration of sovereignty for all the peoples of the republic (Window on Eurasia, September 21, 2025). Last month, it planned to create an independent national assembly through an election on September 20 (Udmurtia, accessed September 22). That election, organized under the leadership of journalist Andrey Grigoryev, naturally had to be held online using a new internet technology that allows voters to remain anonymous (Region.Expert, September 18; OpaVote, accessed September 22).
Details about the election beyond a report that 10 members were elected to the assembly have not been announced (Facebook/Sergey Antonov, September 21). Still, the very fact that such an election was held to fill such a body represents a serious challenge to Moscow, as well as to émigré groups of ethnic Russians, individual national groups, or a combination of both. For Moscow, the challenge comes from individuals willing to stand as candidates and from the readiness of people both in the republic and in the emigration to vote in an election the Russian government opposes, all the more because it encourages Russians and non-Russians to work together against Moscow. For émigré groups, in turn, the challenge of what the Udmurts have done is almost equally great. Their action calls into question both the claims of groups without such a demonstration of backing to speak for their regions and republics and the unwillingness of many to reach across ethnic lines to seek greater freedom, autonomy, and even independence for their regions. As a result, this “Russian” election may also have a greater impact than the much-ballyhooed one for the new Duma.
About Paul Goble Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com View all posts by Paul Goble →
As the far-right in Germany aims to take power, churches are fighting back
BURG near Magdeburg, Germany (RNS) — The AfD may gain power on Sept. 6 in Saxony-Anhalt, posing a direct threat to refugees and the German churches that serve them. Inspired by past resistance in East Germany, faith leaders are doing everything they can to stand in the way of the far-right group.
The Rev. Ulrike Bischoff, left, pastor of St. Petri Kirche in Burg near Magdeburg, and Zholia Parsi, a women's rights activist from Afghanistan who has been living at St. Petri as part of the church's asylum program, video chat with Parsi's family on August 26, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
BURG near Magdeburg, Germany (RNS) — Zholia Parsi bounced on a blue-and-white Noxon mountain bike as she rode laps around the fieldstone sanctuary of St. Petri Kirche, speaking to family on the phone and laughing.
Parsi, who led a women’s rights movement in Afghanistan and fled after imprisonment and death threats from the Taliban, is known internationally for her work on human rights. But in her past three months living at St. Petri as part of its church asylum program, she’s careful not to venture beyond the cement wall that encloses the congregation’s chapel and parish house.
But the bike, which she’d never ridden before coming to St. Petri, is enough freedom for now.
“Believe me, learning was not easy. I fell many times,” Parsi said in an interview, using a translation app on her phone.
She rolled up her corduroy pant leg to reveal a scar on her shin as proof of her practice. “Now, whenever I get on my bicycle … I forget all my sadness and worries. Cycling is not just a hobby for me.”
Under the leadership of the Rev. Ulrike Bischoff, pastor of St. Petri since 2023, the church dedicated the parish house to church asylum. As many as 20 people stay there every year, Bischoff said.
She tells the refugees that beyond the church’s campus, they risk run-ins with law enforcement and might be detained. Refugees in church asylum have suffered a particular hardship and are waiting for immigration officials to review their cases more carefully. The outcome of that review determines whether the person is eligible to work and rent an apartment elsewhere, allowing them to leave church asylum.
The day before RNS visited, a family of five who are also refugees from Afghanistan had moved in.
A campaign sign for Ulrich Siegmund, lead candidate for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in Saxony-Anhalt, near Magdeburg, August 11, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
The Rev. Ulrike Bischoff in her office at St. Petri Kirche in Burg near Magdeburg, Germany, on August 26, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
But on Sunday, this could all change if the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party has its way. The AfD could gain power in state elections for Saxony-Anhalt on Sept. 6, which would be the first time a right-wing party in Germany has done that since World War II.
If that happens, the AfD has vowed to send police into churches to detain refugees and initiate deportation proceedings.
The proposed attack on church asylum is one part of the AfD’s larger plan to oust refugees from Saxony-Anhalt. But it’s also a blow to churches, which criticize the AfD as antithetical to their Christian values.
Amid this conflict, the AfD wants to strip funding from “state churches” — Catholics and a Protestant, or Lutheran, body known as the Evangelische Kirche — that they claim are too liberal and have veered from their core mission.
Clergy participate in a panel about the upcoming elections in Saxony-Anhalt during the “Festival of Hope” in Dessau Market Square, August 30, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
But the churches are fighting back, and fiercer than ever. Local clergy have arranged counterdemonstrations, hosted town halls on defending democracy and, in at least one instance, run for office with the main purpose of unseating a powerful AfD politician in the state parliament.
The Catholic Diocese of Magdeburg, which is the capital of Saxony-Anhalt, and the regional Evangelische Kirche in Mitteldeutschland, or the regional Protestant authority, each coordinated public awareness campaigns, with banners, podcasts and video interviews, and participation in anti-AfD rallies and festivals.
One of those festivals was a week before an election in Dessau on Aug. 30.
Norbert Weiß, left, a volunteer with the Catholic Diocese of Magdeburg, talks to patrons about upcoming elections in Saxony-Anhalt as part of the Magdeburg diocese's “Vote Consciously” campaign during the “Festival of Hope” in Dessau Market Square, August 30, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
Udo Israel, rear left, and Frieder Weigmann help kids stack a “democracy Jenga tower” at the “Festival of Hope” in Dessau Market Square, August 30, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
As thousands of parishioners and clergy enjoyed bratwursts, musical acts and panels with top church leaders addressed the election. As this mostly older crowd listened or danced, kids climbed a rock wall, took selfies with a famous influencer who briefly showed up and stacked a “democracy Jenga tower.”
Klemens Schubert said the tower, imprinted with phrases like “solidarity and human rights,” is a fitting metaphor, whether it stands or falls.
Bishop Friedrich Kramer, the top administrative leader for the Protestant church in most of Saxony-Anhalt, said all this activity is unprecedented for churches, but it wasn’t their choice.
“The churches are not the motor of escalation. In this case, it’s the AfD,” he said in an interview, which a colleague translated from German. “We have to say something against them, and we have to defend the people or the groups that are affected by the AfD.”
The person within the AfD who’s most responsible for the proposals and messaging that’s stirring this outcry among churches is Hans-Thomas Tillschneider.
Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, third from right, a top politician within the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, participates in a “Christians ask politicians” candidate forum on August 17, 2026, in Magdeburg, Germany. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
Tillschneider, deputy state chairman for the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, walked with determination through the state parliament building in Magdeburg, his footsteps reverberating through the halls.
He’s balding but sports a scruffy beard and thick-rimmed glasses, which Tillschneider removed to pause and think of an answer to a question about whether the AfD serves only white, Christian Germans.
“We make politics in the interest of our citizens, and our citizens are mostly German. Whiteness, I am not interested in this race question. And if there’s a Black German voting for AfD, no problem” Tillschneider said. “Muslims of course can practice their religion. But this doesn’t alter the fact that Germany is a Christian country. Hundreds and hundreds of years of German history is influenced deeply by Christianity.”
The Office for the Protection of the Constitution classifies this AfD state branch as a confirmed “right-wing extremist” organization.
Known within and beyond Saxony-Anhalt for his inflammatory comments about LGBTQ+ people and immigrants, Tillschneider was the key figure behind an election manifesto that drew international attention for controversial policy proposals.
Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, deputy state chairman for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in Saxony-Anhalt, at his office on August 17, 2026. Tillschneider has been a top strategist behind the party’s most controversial police proposals in advance of upcoming elections in the state of Saxony-Anhalt. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
One proposal that drew attention was a tax incentive for families to have more children. Another is ending inclusive classroom programs for for children with disabilities and restricting some immigrant children to continue attending class.
Tillschneider was in the middle of a firestorm the week before the election after a media interview aired that showed a mug he owns with the insignia of the Russian army — a reminder of his controversial visit with others in the AfD to the Russian-occupied Donbas region in Ukraine in 2022.
When he spoke to RNS, he showed off a different mug: It was bright red and emblazoned, “Donald Trump 45-47 USA President.”
Tillschneider has also led the charge on proposals that aim to weaken the Catholic and Protestant churches, which would strip them of two public funding sources and even redirect some of that income to so-called free churches.
This is partly motivated by Tillschneider’s ongoing conversion to Orthodoxy, inspired by a visit last year to a monastery that infuses German language and cultural customs with Greek Orthodox liturgy.
“In the church, prayer should do no more than this. Not talking about parties, not talking about political tendencies, not talking about political agenda,” Tillschneider said. “Only praying for our country.”
The state of Saxony-Anhalt, red, in Germany. (RNS graphic/Kit Doyle/Datawrapper)
Saxony-Anhalt is home to the birthplace of the Protestant Reformation. Ironically, it’s now one of the most irreligious parts of an already secularized country. This is because it was one of five states that comprised the former German Democratic Republic, which was part of the Soviet bloc and functionally atheist. Today only about 10% of the total population identifies as Protestant and just 3% as Catholic.
Conflict between churches and the AfD has been growing since 2017, when the Catholic and Protestant churches barred AfD politicians from speaking at the largest Christian gatherings in Germany.
Then, the German Catholic Bishop’s Conference denounced the far-right party in 2024. That same year, the Protestant church demoted a pastor in Saxony-Anhalt who ran for city council as an AfD candidate.
In August, a nursing home operated by the Protestant church’s social welfare agency fired an employee who is running for city council as an AfD candidate.
The Rev. Kate Harris Weishaupt, pastor of EmK-Gemeinde Halle, a United Methodist Church in Halle, a city in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, on August 30, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
“I’m really proud the church is taking a stand and, for example, not allowing people to continue in workplaces if they run for the AfD,” said the Rev. Kate Harris Weishaupt, an American pastor who has lived in Germany since 2015. “I’m hoping we can prevent it before it gets too far.”
This past June, a regional United Methodist Church assembly declared it was “incompatible” to be associated with the AfD and part of the UMC in Germany, based on a paper from Harris Weishaupt, who leads a United Methodist congregation in Halle, a city in Saxony-Anhalt.
Pastors in more rural parts of the state are resisting as well.
The medieval city of Salzwedel, pictured on August 25, 2026, is located in the heart of a region in northern Saxony-Anhalt that is geographically isolated from major economic hubs in Germany. It was once the heart of commerce in Prussia. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
In Salzwedel in northern Saxony-Anhalt, the red-brick Marienkirche towers over a medieval village with hidden courtyards and buildings that slouch and slump under the pressure of sinking foundations.
The region, known as the Altmark, was the center of commerce in Prussia centuries ago, and its share of church buildings per capita reportedly outnumbers other parts of the country. But today, its job market and churchgoing culture struggle.
“It’s in the middle of nowhere, and the people have it in their minds they are forgotten by everyone,” said the Rev. Alexander Tiedemann, pastor of Marienkirche.
The Rev. Alexander Tiedemann, pastor of Marienkirche in Salzwedel, a city in northern Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, on August 25, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
Tiedemann said he’s trying to follow the example of his father and grandfather, who were Protestant pastors in the German Democratic Republic when churches were being repressed. He has sought to embody the tradition of preachers finding clever ways to resist from the pulpit using “parables,” rather than outright denunciations.
The so-called Peaceful Revolution that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall began with protests in 1989 that sprang from churches where demonstrators gathered for Monday morning prayer meetings. That history is on the minds of many faith leaders in their recent advocacy against the AfD.
“Especially when I look at a historic place like this, there are so many difficult times the church went through,” Tiedemann said. “The message nevertheless found a way.”
Marienkirche, a Protestant congregation in Salzwedel, a city in northern Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, on August 25, 2026. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
The medieval city of Salzwedel, pictured on August 25, 2026, is located in the heart of a region in northern Saxony-Anhalt that is geographically isolated from major economic hubs in Germany.(RNS photo/Liam Adams)
Back in Burg near Magdeburg, Bischoff confronted the current heated political climate when vandals spray-painted a pro-Nazi reference and other divisive phrases on the wall surrounding St. Petri. In response, she organized a party to repaint the wall and focus on “election empowerment,” she said.
Now, the façade is more uplifting, but the refugees inside still struggle as the election nears. Parsi had expected an update on her asylum case by early August, but she was still waiting in church asylum just a few days before the election.
“I don’t know what is going to happen with my case, and the upcoming elections in Sachsen-Anhalt make me even more anxious,” she said in a message. “I just want to know what my future will be and whether I can stay safe.”
Zholia Parsi looks out the window of the St. Petri parish house on August 26, 2026, in Burg near Magdeburg, Germany. (RNS photo/Liam Adams)
