Showing posts sorted by date for query SECULARISM. Sort by relevance Show all posts
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Tuesday, November 17, 2026

BANGLADESH

Language Movements Through Personal Narratives: A Study Of Memoirs And Autobiographies – Analysis


Photo Credit: Tanha Tamanna Syed, Pexels


November 10, 2026

By Dr. Saleh Shahriar

Key Takeaways:

The 1952 Language Movement, in which police killed student demonstrators demanding recognition of Bengali, is presented as the foundational event of Bengali nationalism that later shaped the 1971 Liberation War.

Drawing on memoirs by Abul Mansur Ahmad, Mirza Nurul Huda, Badruddin Umar, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Mohammad Toaha, the piece treats the movement as contested memory rather than a single nationalist narrative.

It argues that autobiographical sources reveal grassroots, leftist and counter-memories that challenge top-down accounts and call for further research into the movement’s socio-economic and cultural complexities.


Introduction

The 1952 Language Movement remains a defining moment in the socio-political history of Bangladesh. 

Bengali, as a language, has long withstood pressures from dominant languages such as Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, English, and, later, Urdu.

 This linguistic struggle can be traced as far back as the 13th century, well before the political partitions of the 20th century (Alam, 1991). 

The 1971 Liberation War, which culminated in the independence of Bangladesh, was deeply rooted in this earlier movement for linguistic and cultural recognition. The movement drew contributions from a diverse group of actors, students, political leaders, journalists, writers, and civil society organizations, each playing key roles at different phases. 

Bengali nationalism was visibly articulated through the language struggles of 1947–48 and 1952.

The linguistic debate intensified in 1947, when Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed, Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University, declared Urdu as the future state language of Pakistan. In a swift rebuttal, Dr. Muhammad Shahidullah, a renowned Bengali linguist and professor at the University of Dhaka, argued in the Daily Azad (19 July 1947) that Bengali should be the medium of instruction and administration in East Pakistan (Haq, 2006). This demand gained political traction with the formation of the Gana Azadi League that same month.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah later reinforced the state’s linguistic agenda by asserting that Urdu alone should be the national language of Pakistan. This pronouncement met with strong opposition in East Pakistan, where demands for Bengali’s recognition grew louder (Ahmed, 1979). It is true that Jinnah’s speech in Dhaka was the most volatile and divisive issue in Pakistani politics. After Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination, Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin echoed Jinnah’s stance during a 1952 visit to Dhaka, inciting outrage. In response, the All-Parties Action Committee was formed on 31 January 1952. This coalition included the Awami League, Islamic Brotherhood, Tamaddun Majlis, Youth League, and student bodies from Dacca University and other institutions. The Tamaddun Majlis, founded on 1 September 1947, emerged as a leading platform advocating for Bengali as the state language, influenced by the East Pakistan Renaissance Society (Basu, 2023).


The tragic events of 21 February 1952—when police opened fire on unarmed student demonstrators—resulted in the deaths of Rafiq, Barkat, Jabbar, and Salam. These killings marked a turning point, eventually leading to the formal recognition of Bengali as one of Pakistan’s state languages. The massacre also catalyzed the collapse of the Muslim League in East Pakistan and bolstered support for regional political forces, culminating in the sweeping victory of the United Front in the 1954 elections.

Drawing on selected memoirs, this piece argues that mainstream historiography has been dominated by top-down nationalist discourse, often overlooking grassroots experiences and traumas. One of the major contributions of this work is its identification of Bangladesh Studies as a contested site of competing narratives and counternarratives. Please note that the current piece draws heavily on my previous journal contribution, titled “The Politico-Cultural Roots of Bangladesh: Remembering the Language Movement through Memoirs and Autobiographical Narratives,” published in Cogent Arts & Humanities, volume 13, issue 1 (2026), by Routledge, Taylor & Francis, London.


Identity Politics, Language Movement and Memory Studies: A Theoretical Framework


History is not merely a chronology of events; it reflects the collective memory and actions of societies. Memory and identity are closely intertwined. Figure 1 proposes a theoretical framework connecting familial traditions, socio-economic status, religion, and political ideology—all factors influencing identity construction. Language, as a cultural cornerstone, becomes a defining element in this identity-making process. Through this lens, the Language Movement can be understood not merely as a cultural or linguistic demand, but as part of a broader identity politics rooted in historical memory and collective grievance.


F
igure 1: The Framework on Cultural Norms, Identity Politics, and Memory Studies
 (Source: Author)


Memoirs and autobiographies offer invaluable insights into the past, especially when the authors have either directly participated in the events they describe or have acquired information from primary witnesses. These first-person narratives often present information absent from formal historical records and serve as essential tools for reconstructing events, particularly for social historians. Within the social, political, and cultural spheres, memory plays a vital role in shaping individual and collective identity. Intergenerational transmission of memory occurs through a network of texts, photographs, films, archives, monuments, and rituals—forming what scholars term the “politics of memory”. The use of such primary sources—memoirs, letters, and diaries—enriches historical inquiry by capturing the lived realities of those who experienced key events
Analysis of the Language Movement

The state of United Pakistan (1947–1971) was geographically absurd, with its eastern and western wings separated by over 1,000 miles. This spatial separation was mirrored by profound cultural, linguistic, and political divisions. The autobiographical reflections of prominent movement-era figures provide crucial insights into this period

Abul Mansur Ahmad (1898–1979)
Abul Mansur Ahmad

Abul Mansur Ahmad’s autobiographical work Amar Dekha Rajnitir Ponchash Bochor stands as a crucial primary source for understanding the origins, leadership, and organizational facets of the Language Movement. Born in Dhanikhola village of Mymensingh in 1898, Ahmad experienced the 1905 Partition of Bengal as a child and was later actively engaged in the political affairs of both colonial Bengal and post-partition Pakistan. His contributions to the movement were manifested through both literary advocacy and political engagement. A firm believer in secularism, Ahmad emphasized the separation of religion from politics, once asserting, “Let religion begin where politics ends; the two must not meet”.

As the editor of the Calcutta-based Ittehad during 1946–1948, Ahmad strongly advocated for the Bengali language. He played a pivotal role in drafting the 21-point manifesto of the United Front, which secured a decisive victory in the 1954 provincial elections. Earlier, in 1942, the East Pakistan Renaissance Society had been formed through the efforts of Abul Kalam Shamsuddin and Mujibur Rahman Khan, emphasizing mutual recognition of rights in the quest for Pakistan. Ahmad’s memoir offers profound reflections on his ministerial roles—both as a regional minister for nine days and later as a federal minister from September 1956 to October 1958.

In his 1944 speech at the East Pakistan Renaissance Society in Calcutta, Ahmad underscored the distinct cultural identity of Bengali Muslims. Critiquing Rabindranath Tagore’s vision, he stated,


“The Muslims of Bengal . . . cannot be great by imitating Rabindranath. They will have to develop their own identity on the basis of their own culture. In the world of Visva-Bharati of the world-poet Rabindranath, so many times has the joyous Mother come and departed, but never for a day in the sky of that world did the moon of Eid and Muharram [Muslim holy days] appear . . . it is the harsh truth”.

In fact, Abul Mansur Ahmad was a spokesman for the ideal of Bengali-Muslim autonomy (Sartori, 2007). In other words, Abul Mansur Ahmed’s memoir blends his individual life with broader historical movements. His narrative contributes to what scholars call collective memory—how a nation or group remembers its past. His perspective helps construct a specifically Bengali Muslim political memory of events like the late colonial period and partition.

Mirza Nurul Huda (1919–1991)
Mirza Nurul Huda

An esteemed economist and long-time professor at Dhaka University, Mirza Nurul Huda documented in his memoirs the socio-political transformation of East Bengal. Born in a village near Tangail in 1919, Huda witnessed the unfolding of the Language Movement from an academic perspective. He reflected on the grief and resistance that followed the deaths of language martyrs such as Abdus Salam and Abul Barkat. Recalling the reaction, he stated, “We held funeral prayers in absentia at S.M. Hall, as the bodies were not released” (Huda, 2021, p. 84). Huda saw the movement as the first critical rupture in the foundation of the Pakistani state.

In his memoir, Huda provided an intriguing discussion about his 1948 controversial statement of Jinnah at the Curzon Hall of the University of Dhaka. Quoting a personal physician attending Jinnah, Huda came to learn Jinnah’s self-realization on his role in the language movement. Jinnah said from his sick bed that he made two mistakes. The first was not recognizing Bengali as a state language. The second was not paying enough attention to the interests of East Pakistan.

We can note a few important analytical points from Mirza Nurul Huda’s narratives on the language movement. First, he is not just documenting events but reinterpreting them through hindsight, especially writing after the emergence of Bangladesh. The mention of martyrs like Abdus Salam and Abul Barkat is not just personal recollection—it contributes to Bangladesh’s collective memory of sacrifice. Second, he recalls some sites of memory such as Curzon Hall, S. M. Hall and the University of Dhaka. Sites of memory (lieux de mémoire) is a concept popularized by Pierre Nora, who refers to symbolic and material spots like monuments, museums, traditions, or places—that crystallize a community’s shared heritage and identity (Nora, 1996). Third, the grief described is analytically important. The inability to access the bodies and hold symbolic funerals reflects trauma and state repression, key themes in memory studies. Memory here is shaped by loss, absence, and injustice, not just events. Fourth, Huda did not hear Muhammad Ali Jinnah directly; he relies on a physician. This is an example of a layered memory, showing how narratives are constructed through intermediaries.

Badruddin Umar (1931–2025)
Badruddin Umar

Although not an active participant, Badruddin Umar was a direct observer of the key developments surrounding the Language Movement. In Amar Jibon, he recalled the intense debates and activism of the period (Umar, 2021, p. 307). His multi-volume workentitled, Purbobanglar Bhasha Andolon o Tothkalin Rajniti remains a seminal contribution to understanding the movement’s history (Umar, 1972).

Umar documented how public observances shifted from March 11 (1949–1951) to 21 February post-1952. He elaborated on the role of Dhaka University’s State Language Movement Committee and various pamphlets circulated to raise awareness. As editor of Sainik and contributor to Duity, Umar chronicled the rise of new political forces like the Purbo Pakistan Jubo League. Leaders such as Toaha, Abul Hashim, Oli Ahad, and others played significant roles. Umar himself authored Amader Bhasher Lorai (Our Struggle for Language), which was publicly broadcast during protests. Umar further explained the socioeconomic and political ramifications of the February resistance. As he said,

“For definite socioeconomic and political reasons, the revolt could neither be transformed into a social revolution nor it last longer than it actually did. But one thing is clear. Through the language movement, united resistance of the people of East Bengal against the exploitation of feudal, big bourgeois and imperialist agencies in general, and against the Pakistan government in particular, took a definite phase” (Umar, 1987, p. 10).

The memoirs of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Badruddin Umar foreground an important historiographical debate by demonstrating that history functions as contested memory rather than an objective recounting of the past. In The Unfinished Memoirs, Mujib retrospectively frames his political trajectory as continuous and central, positioning his early involvement in the Language Movement as a precursor to Bangladesh’s independence. This narrative reflects the selective and meaning-making nature of autobiographical memory.

In contrast, Badruddin Umar’s interpretation serves as a form of counter-memory, challenging the dominance of Mujib’s account by questioning the extent of his role during critical events such as February 1952. The coexistence of these perspectives illustrates that memory is not fixed but is instead constructed, contested, and shaped by political and ideological positions. From a Bangladesh Studies perspective, this debate reveals how national history is produced through struggles over representation and authority, where certain figures are elevated while alternative voices seek to reframe the narrative. In a nutshell, we note that Mujib’s memory builds authority and national leadership whereas Umar’s memory critiques and redistributes that authority.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975)
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, born in 1920, completed his undergraduate studies at Calcutta University and earned a law degree from Dhaka University. As a founding member of the Awami League in 1949, he played a central role in the party’s sweeping victory in the 1970 elections. His involvement in the early phase of the Language Movement is documented in The Unfinished Memoirs, where he recalled how, in February 1948, the Pakistan Constituent Assembly debated Urdu as the sole national language, sidelining Bengali despite its majority speakers. Together with Tamaddun Majlish and the East Pakistan Muslim Students’ League, Mujib opposed this decision and advocated for equal recognition of Bengali (Mujib, 2013, p. 97).

Mujib viewed the Language Movement as a precursor to the broader struggle for self-rule. However, some scholars like Umar (2019) contend that Mujib’s actual role during the critical events of 21 February 1952—when he was imprisoned—was limited.

A few points are likely to emerge from The Unfinished Memoirs by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. First, it is not just recollection, it’s a self-positioning narrative. He frames himself as an early and consistent defender of Bengali language rights. Second, Mujib’s interpretation of the Language Movement as a “precursor to self-rule” reflects retrospective understanding after 1971. The Language Movement is framed as the ideological starting point of Bengali nationalism. Mujib’s account reinforces the dominant narrative that language controversy led to the autonomy movement. The movement for regional autonomy eventually gave birth to Bangladesh. Third, the mention of Tamaddun Majlish and East Pakistan Muslim Students’ League is important as these groups show how civil society and student activism were central to the Language Movement.


Mohammad Toaha (1922–1987)

A committed leftist and language activist, Mohammad Toaha played a significant role in the early stages of the Language Movement. He was a prominent student leader at the University of Dhaka. He was associated with progressive and leftist student organizations, including the East Pakistan Students Union and other underground communist-affiliated groups.
Mohammad Toaha

Toaha was instrumental in founding and supporting key organizations such as the East Pakistan Muslim Students’ League, Tamaddun Majlish, and Gana Azadi League. His memoir presents a critical analysis of misconceptions about the goals and leadership of the movement. He was involved in the formation of the All-Party State Language Action Committee. This committee played a pivotal role in organizing demonstrations, meetings, and protests demanding recognition for the Bengali language.

Toaha highlighted the tensions between the Urdu-speaking population of Old Dhaka and the Bengali-speaking student activists. A rift was observed between the Urdu-Speaking people in Old Dhaka region and the Students of the Dhaka university. As Toaha noted,

“To create a sense of confusion between the Urdu-speaking inhabitants of the Old Dhaka city and the Bengali-speaking students, Sir Nazimuddin intentionally worked for the creation of an atmosphere of animosity. The people living in the old Dhaka city became very ferocious upon those students and activists who were demanding Bangla as one of the state languages. Eventually, the angry mob demolished the office of the Tamaddin Majlish situated in the then Dewan Bazar Rail Crossing area.” (Toaha, 2022, p. 107)

It is interesting to note that the people coming from the old Dhaka area warned that they will not hesitate to “kill” the students for opposing the Urdu.

We can connect how Toaha’s narration appeal to memory studies by showing that it not just as a historical account, but as a constructed narrative of the past—one that reflects perspective, power, and selective remembrance. First, think about who is remembering. Mohammad Toaha is not a neutral observer; he was a committed political actor in the Bengali Language Movement. In memory studies, this matters because personal memoirs are forms of subjective memory. They shape how events are later understood, often emphasizing certain actors (like leftist groups) while challenging dominant narratives that may sideline them.

Second, this text illustrates counter-memory. Official histories of the Language Movement often foreground mainstream political leaders or parties, but Toaha highlights the role of student activists and leftist organizations such as East Pakistan Students Union and Tamaddun Majlish. In memory studies, this is an attempt to recover marginalized voices and contest what is remembered collectively.

Third, his memoir shows how memory engages with conflict and identity formation. The tensions between Urdu-speaking residents and Bengali-speaking students—especially the portrayal of hostility in Old Dhaka—demonstrate how collective memories can construct “us vs. them” narratives. The role attributed to Khawaja Nazimuddin in fostering division reflects how memory can assign blame and interpret motives, which may differ from other historical accounts.

Fourth, Toaha is connected to sites of memory (lieux de mémoire). Places like Dhaka University and areas in Old Dhaka have become symbolic in memory—they are not just locations but carriers of historical meaning, associated with protest, violence, and political awakening.

Finally, Toaha’s memoir performs memory as interpretation, not just recollection. His “critical analysis of misconceptions” shows that memory is active—it argues, revises, and reshapes the past rather than simply recording it.


Conclusion

This article proposes an innovative theoretical framework for examining the Language Movement through memoirs and autobiographical writings, thereby expanding the academic literature on this historic movement. The historiography of Bangladesh remains a site of contested narratives and political tensions, and the history of the Language Movement is no exception. This article challenges the assumption that history moves in a straight line of continuous progress or cause-effect events. Instead, it highlights how the movement’s history reflects complexities, contradictions, fears, overlaps, and recurrences—more like a web, cycle, or spiral, rather than a straight path.

This article argues that memoirs and autobiographies serve as valuable tools in uncovering overlooked grassroots perspectives. While early support for the Language Movement may have been limited, the events of February 1952 catalyzed broader participation and transformed it into a major socio-political movement. Rather than relying solely on official state histories, this work emphasizes the importance of alternative narratives, particularly those found in personal memoirs and autobiographies. 

 Organizations like Tamaddun Majlish and the active involvement of students were instrumental in the movement’s evolution. 

Given its complexity, the history of the Language Movement demands continued academic attention. Future research should explore the intertwined socio-economic, cultural, and political dynamics reflected in personal narratives to enrich our understanding of this formative chapter in Bangladesh’s past.


About Dr. Saleh Shahriar
Dr. Saleh Shahriar is an Assistant Professor at the Department of History and Philosophy, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. His fields of research interest include China studies, international trade, strategic studies, border security, political history, and memory studies. He has published a number of research papers in internationally recognized peer-reviewed journals and contributed several book chapters as well as global encyclopedia entries. He has presented his academic work at different international conferences and seminars. Moreover, Dr. Saleh Shahriar works as a reviewer for some journals and occasionally contributes opinion pieces for the newspapers of Bangladesh including the the Daily Star, New Age and Dhaka Tribune.
View all posts by Dr. Saleh Shahriar →

Sunday, November 08, 2026

 

Federal judge orders Iowa to allow Satanic Temple to hold one-day holiday event in the state Capitol

DES MOINES, Iowa (AP) — Iowa’s Republican leaders have barred the Satanic Temple Iowa's holiday observances in recent years, citing the state Capitol building’s policies that prohibit gratuitous violence and obscene displays.
Federal judge orders Iowa to allow Satanic Temple to hold one-day holiday event in the state Capitol

DES MOINES, Iowa (AP) — A federal judge on Monday ordered Iowa state officials to allow a local Satanic Temple organization to hold a holiday event in the rotunda of the state Capitol after years of rejecting their application.

The court order is the latest in a back-and-forth between the religious organization and Republican state officials, who intend to appeal the judge’s decision, according to Attorney General Brenna Bird’s office.

Iowa’s Republican leaders have barred the Satanic Temple Iowa’s holiday observances in recent years, citing the state Capitol building’s policies that prohibit gratuitous violence and obscene displays.

The Satanic Temple and the leader of its Iowa organization in August sued the state in federal court, arguing that current and former Iowa officials discriminated against their religion by repeatedly refusing to permit their holiday event and violated their constitutional rights and state law.

Chief District Judge Stephanie M. Rose said in her order that the Satanic Temple was likely to succeed on its free speech claim and ordered the current director of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services to approve the group’s application for a holiday event within seven days.

Founded in 2013, the Salem, Massachusetts-based Satanic Temple says it doesn’t believe in Satan but describes itself as a “non-theistic religious organization” that advocates for secularism. It is separate from the Church of Satan, which was founded in the 1960s.

The Satanic Temple hasn’t always been barred from participating in the holiday season at the Iowa Statehouse, where a Christmas tree and other religious holiday installations are included in the rotunda. A Satanic Temple Iowa display, which depicted the goat-headed figure Baphomet, was vandalized three years ago, leading to increased scrutiny of the group and its observances.

In 2024, its application for a display and event was rejected.

The group said its holiday event would include costumes of the European folklore character Krampus, as well as caroling, coloring for kids and ornament making. In denying its application, state leaders have cited policies to protect children who may be present in the public space and pointed to the costumes’ use of sticks, which could be used as weapons. The Satanic Temple members reject that argument.

The chief district judge wrote that Iowa officials’ arguments likely don’t justify the denials. Rose wrote that concern that the Krampus character may frighten children is “not a permissible basis for excluding speech,” adding that concern surrounding sticks being carried as part of costumes “cannot justify denying the entire event.” She said the state department could impose the same conditions it applies to other events on the Satanic Temple’s event, saying props remain subject to the building’s regular security screening.

Members of The Satanic Temple celebrated the ruling, as did the American Civil Liberties Union of Iowa, which is representing the religious organization.

“Too often, fear or misunderstanding of the ‘other’ is amplified by petty governmental bureaucrats looking to score cheap political points by portraying unfamiliar beliefs as ‘dangerous,’” said Matt Kezhaya, attorney for The Satanic Temple, in a statement.

“This was always going to be a family-friendly event,” he added. “None of this became ‘harmful’ just because state officials disapproved of our chosen expression.”

Spokespeople for the Iowa Department of Administrative Services and Gov. Kim Reynolds did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

__

Kelety reported from Phoenix.

























U.S.  Secular voters are increasing. Can ‘the nones’ become a political force?

(RNS) — In the 2026 midterms, the Rev. Adam Hamilton and James Talarico emphasized their Christian faith but won stronger support among nonreligious voters than among Christians.



A man bikes past the sculpture "VOTE!" by Matthew Mazzotta, erected outside the Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections office in West Palm Beach, Fla., on Election Day, Tuesday, Nov. 3, 2026. (AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell)

Kathryn Post
November 6, 2026
RNS

(RNS) — When Kansas megachurch pastor the Rev. Adam Hamilton made history Tuesday night (Nov. 3) by becoming the state’s first Democratic senator in nearly a century, it wasn’t Protestants or Catholics who clinched him the victory — it was religious nones.

Though the Methodist pastor’s Christian principles were front and center during his campaign, he lost both Protestants (37%) and Catholics (48%) in the Kansas Senate race, according to exit polls from CNN. But he but earned support from 81% of the state’s nonreligious voters.

A similar pattern emerged in Texas. James Talarico lost Protestants (40%) and won Catholics (60%), but it was religious nones (78%) who showed up en masse for the Presbyterian seminarian. Democrat Abdul El-Sayed, who is Muslim, lost both Protestants (38%) and Catholics (41%) to Republican Mike Rogers, but he won among nones (76%) and those of non-Christian faiths (68%).



“What I saw from atheists is almost total support from them,” said atheist writer and activist Hemant Mehta, describing anecdotal support for the three candidates. “There was no drop in support, despite the fact that those guys were out and proud about their religion.”

Though exit polls are preliminary and statewide polls use a smaller sample, national exit polls, too, showed that secular voters powered Democratic gains. Seventy-eight percent of nones voted Democrat in the midterms, per CNN and NBC exit polls, compared to 40% of Protestants and 50% of Catholics.


The religion breakdowns of the 2026 NBC News exit polls. (NBC News graphic)

As the number of secular voters grows, some nonreligious organizers view the group as a powerful and overlooked voting bloc. But many nones are nonpartisan and anti-institutional by nature, making them difficult to organize — or even find. As politicians look ahead to 2028, pollsters and researchers say, they’ll face the challenge of creating a blueprint for appealing to secular voters.

“There has been so few efforts of mobilizing them in the same way that candidates go to churches or recruit pastors,” said Juhem Navarro-Rivera, research director at Socioanalítica Research and cofounder of The Secular Vote.

Navarro-Rivera, who studies secularism and politics, said secular voters “punch above their weight” in the Democratic coalition. And NBC exit polls from past presidential elections show they’re a growing part of the electorate overall. In 2016, NBC found that 15% of voters were nones; in 2020, that percentage rose to 22%. In 2024, it grew to 24%, and in 2026, it was 27%.

In addition to increasing in number, they also shifted to the left by 7 or 8 percentage points in the midterms: 78% in 2026 compared to 70% in the 2024 CNN poll and 71% in the 2024 NBC poll.

Data examining the motivation behind the shift isn’t yet available. But researchers and nonreligious advocates told RNS they view the results as a rebuke of the Trump administration’s blending of religion and politics.

“I think what you saw was an incredible backlash against Christian nationalism and authoritarianism,” said Fish Stark, executive director of the American Humanist Association.

Juhem Navarro-Rivera. (Photo courtesy of The Secular Vote)
Fish Stark. (Photo courtesy of AHA)

Navarro-Rivera agreed, saying secular voters were unhappy with how President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth had invoked Christianity to justify political decisions about the war in Iran and immigration enforcement. On a state level, Stark and others pointed to Texas Gov. Greg Abbott’s efforts to expand religion’s role in public schools through mandatory Ten Commandments displays, a law allowing school chaplains and his championing of school-voucher programs that allow public funds to be used in religious schools. In September, the Washington, D.C.-based Public Religion Research Institute found that 87% of religiously unaffiliated Americans rejected or expressed skepticism toward Christian nationalism.

“One thing we learned from this election more than others is no, Democrats are not anti-religious,” said Mehta. “We don’t like Christian nationalism. We don’t like when Republicans try to push their face on everyone else. But beyond that, who cares?”


RELATED: Catholics and ‘nones’ played key role in Democrats’ historic victory, exit polls show

Political scientist Ryan Burge hypothesized that economic factors were a driving force in the none vote. Ahead of the midterms, Pew Research Center found that 83% of religiously unaffiliated voters said the economy was very important in shaping their voting decision. “I don’t think this was an election that’s particularly about secular values or social values. I think it was an election really about affordability,” he said.

Burge, who wrote the 2023 book “The Nones,” also predicted that the most recent shift leftward among nones wasn’t due to atheists or agnostics, a strong majority of whom always vote Democrat, but a third category of people who describe their religion as “nothing in particular.” A 2024 report from Pew found that while 20% of nones said they are agnostic and 17% identify as atheist, the majority of nones (63%) fall into the more ambiguous “nothing in particular” category. And while atheists and agnostics are more predictable — they are reliably left-leaning, civically engaged, have high levels of education and income and are majority white — the “nothing in particulars” are more difficult to pin down.



“Nothing in particulars are absolutely not a definable voting bloc,” said Burge. “They’re everywhere on the map. Some are liberals, some are conservatives, some are old, some are young. Men, and women. Racially, they look like what America looks like.”

They also have fewer financial resources, Burge said, and are more likely than atheists and agnostics to be hurt by inflation.

If it’s true that the nones’ Democratic swing was due to the nothing in particulars, it may be difficult for Democrats to capitalize on, Burge added. They’re a group that’s challenging to mobilize, he said, because they aren’t a cohesive group, they don’t have a clearly identified ideology and they don’t gather.

Ryan Burge. (Photo © Washington University in St. Louis)
Hemant Mehta. (Courtesy photo)

But Stark was more optimistic.

He said at the American Humanist Association, he’d seen some nothing in particulars growing more open to humanist, atheist or agnostic identity. The group has been mobilizing humanists since the 2024 election, he said, funding atheist content creators and establishing dozens of humanist communities across the country, most notably in Mississippi, Texas and North Carolina. Those groups, he said, gather for movie nights and philosophical discussions and have also been active in anti-ICE efforts.

“It’s easier to organize people when they have a strong sense of community and identity,” said Stark.

Looking ahead to 2028, Steven Emmert, executive director for the Secular Coalition for America, told RNS earlier this week that now that the nones are closing in on 30% of the electorate, people running for office can’t overlook them


Burge worried that Democrats could learn the wrong lesson from the midterms and back religious candidates that could alienate nonreligious voters in places like Massachusetts, California and Oregon. But Stark and Mehta argued that the midterms were evidence that nones aren’t opposed to candidates of faith; they’re just opposed to people who want to impose their faith on others. In fact, they argued, backing the separation of church and state is one of the most effective ways to appeal to nones.

“I don’t think many nonreligious people see the fight in terms of people who believe in God and people who don’t,” said Stark, “but people who want to protect our freedom to believe what we want to believe, and people who want to force belief on us.”

Monday, November 02, 2026

A dangerous liaison looms in Québec

Paul St-Pierre Plamondon, left, led the Parti Québécois to victory in Québec’s October 5 election, securing a minority government with just 28 percent of the popular vote. Photo by André Querry.

First published at Canadian Dimension.

The Parti Québécois (PQ), led by Paul St-Pierre Plamondon, a 49-year-old lawyer with an MBA from Oxford University, won the October 5 election in Québec with 28 percent of the popular vote, securing a minority government with the lowest vote share of any election in Québec history and of any provincial election in Canada for some 75 years. Taking into account the relatively low voter turnout — 66.9 percent — the PQ obtained an explicit mandate from just shy of 19 percent of eligible voters.

The PQ ran a campaign focused on scapegoating immigrants for a variety of social evils from overcrowded, under-resourced public schools to threats to the French language. As Martin Patriquin wrote in an article for The Walrus, Plamondon blames immigration “for high home prices, low birth rates, increased crime, and what he has called ‘the deconstruction of society.’” Tellingly, the PQ’s proposed “sustainable immigration model” includes relying on automation and robotization in economic sectors of the economy facing labour shortages, among a host of other measures designed to thwart the influx of newcomers to Québec.

Another prominent pledge was to downsize bureaucracy — familiar code for cuts to public services — through the creation of the disturbingly DOGE-redolent secretariat for government efficiency and regulatory relief (Secrétariat à l’efficacité gouvernementale et à l’allègement réglementaire).

The PQ also promises a balanced budget with a $6.6 billion reduction in government spending over five years and lower taxes on business (decreased by 9.5 percent over five years, which would amount to lost state revenues of $8.9 billion), all of which augurs a new round of austerity policies in the midst of an escalating affordability crisis.

Plamondon has more in common with Lucien Bouchard and his zero deficit and with Pauline Marois and her ethnonationalist charter of values than with the social democratic party founded by René Lévesque.

Referendum redux?

It was, however, the question of Québec independence and a first-term referendum, to which the PQ purports to be firmly committed, that took centre stage during much of the campaign. And in the wake of the PQ victory, corporate media and social media in English Canada were full of alarmed commentary about the two separatist parties now sitting in the Québec provincial parliament — the second being Québec Solidaire (QS), the only left-wing party in the running, which now holds nine seats.

In its platform and public interventions QS concentrated on social issues and especially affordability, proposing measures to combat the housing crisis and rising food prices, promising to protect social programs and bolster public transportation, and advocating a special tax on the super-rich: a one percent wealth tax on citizens with assets of $25 million or more. While it is a sovereigntist party, its vision of an independent Québec and how to get there is thoroughly different from that of the PQ, at least in spirit, and throughout the campaign it stressed its more inclusive and democratic approach, highlighting its trademark commitment to holding a constituent assembly — with delegates elected throughout Québec, and with the full participation of Indigenous peoples — for the purpose of drafting a new constitution to be submitted to a vote. Its manifesto on sovereignty, Nouveau Québec Libre, emphasizes that an independent Québec must be a decolonized state built jointly with Indigenous peoples, whose self-determination must also extend to choosing to maintain the status quo if that is their wish.

The other three parties — the ruling Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), which was shut out of the National Assembly, the Québec Liberal Party, and the regrettably much-revived Québec Conservative Party — are not pro-independence and were united during the campaign in their antipathy to any plan to hold a referendum.

The reality is that there is very little appetite for a referendum among Québecers: recent polls peg it at between 27 and 31 percent. That figure would be higher among francophone leftists, who are largely favourable to independence. But in light of the generally weak support partly due to fears of a more direct form of US domination with the openly neo-colonialist aspirations of the fascist regime to the south, Plamondon himself promised that no referendum would be in the cards so long as Trump remains in the White House. This did not prevent him from choosing September 30, Truth and Reconciliation Day, to throw down the gauntlet to Indigenous people by declaring that Québec does not need their consent for the eventual adoption of a provisional constitution for an independent Québec — an unsavoury foretaste of Plamondon’s politics of sovereignty.

Another harbinger is the item on military spending in the PQ’s projected military budget for an independent Québec, with five percent of GDP set aside for defence and full participation in NATO and NORAD. In the PQ’s theoretical “Year One” budget made public in 2023, that figure came to nearly $3.6 billion, proportional to Québec’s share of federal defence spending.

At a time when the climate emergency demands a reduction in defence spending as part of a radical shift of budgetary priorities toward social well-being and the energy transition, the PQ is immediately involving an independent Québec in the US-led arms race against China and Russia, without casting doubt on the nature of the North American military-industrial complex, as veteran left activist and political analyst Bernard Rioux points out in his scathing critique of the plan.

Death knell for the CAQ — and a heftier Liberal opposition

The CAQ, the party that ruled Québec with historic majorities for the last eight years — most of those under the premiership of François Legault (a former PQ cabinet minister), who resigned as premier in January 2026 — garnered 13.3 percent of the popular vote under the leadership of Christine Fréchette. However, it did not win a single seat — testament to the vagaries of the first-past-the post electoral system (Québec Solidaire, which earned a smaller share of the popular vote, 12.42 percent, took nine seats). Yet this was a bit of poetic justice since the CAQ actually passed a bill in 2019 to introduce a mixed-member proportional system but abandoned the plan soon after.

The CAQ governed as an ethnic nationalist party in the tradition of the Union Nationale of Maurice Duplessis, meaning that it sought to achieve maximum autonomy for Québec within the Canadian federation without advocating separation. In office it enacted typical neoliberal austerity policies, especially in its later years in office. It also initiated an openly hostile stance on immigration, harping on the idea that Québec is exceeding its reception and integration capacity (capacite d’acceuil), paving the way for the PQ’s demagogy. The CAQ then took an increasingly right-wing turn in its second mandate, introducing a spate of reactionary legislation, including bills attacking the rights of unions, health care ‘reforms’ that enraged doctors by tying their pay to performance targets, additional racist secularism laws targeting Muslims in particular, and a language law designed to make life in Québec harder for new immigrants and Indigenous students.

It also tried (and failed) to ram through Bill 1, the Loi sur l’autonomie constitutionnelle du Québec, which it misleadingly peddled as a constitution. Among other things the bill would have permanently shielded the Québec parliament from legal challenges under the federal or Québec human rights charters and was widely seen as an attack on countervailing powers in Québec society. It was resoundingly opposed by more than 300 civil society organizations including the Barreau du Québec (Québec Bar Association), which, unusually, made a strong public statement against the legislation, warning of “authoritarian drift” (dérive autoritaire). Amnesty International also condemned the bill and called for its withdrawal on the grounds that it was a threat to the rule of law in Québec and a violation of international law.

Yet those various policies and legislative initiatives do not explain the CAQ’s dramatic loss of appeal with its base, which consisted mainly of white francophone suburban and rural voters. The reasons for the CAQ’s precipitous decline remain a point in question. Political observers have pointed to a variety of factors to account for the rechannelling of so much of the CAQ’s vote to the PQ and the Conservative Party on election night: a generalized desire for change, certain key policy decisions such as the scuttling of the “third link” (a new corridor for cars between Québec City and Lévis), the Northvolt fiasco (an investment gone awry in a Swedish start-up’s electric vehicle battery plant), and an ambiguous position on the national question. But it looks to have been some last-minute strategic errors that undermined the newly minted party leader Fréchette’s credibility — most notably what proved to be a false accusation of US interference in the election — which proved decisive in the party’s plunge from 23 percent in the mid-September opinion polls to 13.35 percent at the voting booths.

Meanwhile, the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) is once again the official opposition, having assumed that role during both of the CAQ’s terms of office. Although a stalwart of the party, Charles Milliard only took the leadership earlier this year. A little-known businessman and a pharmacist by training, Milliard made his singular enthusiastic allegiance to federalism and his stated determination to overcome divisions the centrepiece of his campaign and there is reason to think that paid off. The PLQ’s share of the popular vote (24.23 percent) yielded 40 seats, of which 33 were in the greater Montréal area, where nearly 35 percent of the population is allophone or anglophone. For the rest, it’s a pro-business party with a long track record of austerity policies when in power. The tune is familiar: make entrepreneurs’ lives easier, boost business competitiveness, shrink the public service, and so on and so forth.

Québec Solidaire: A welcome voice in the wilderness

The election result for Québec’s only progressive party was better than expected earlier on in the campaign, when many pundits and pollsters predicted a rout for QS. In the event, it kept nine of the 12 seats it held at its high point in 2025. As with the Liberal Party, its support is concentrated in the Montréal area where its vote share increased, but it lost ground everywhere else in the province.

Led during the campaign by the party’s female co-spokesperson and the only immigrant among the contenders, Ruba Ghazal (who is of Palestinian descent), QS stood out markedly from the four other parties in its robust defence of public services, call to raise the minimum wage, opposition to privatization, and plea for progressive taxation. And indeed, since the election, it has doubled down on its pledge to serve as a bulwark against austerity. On other issues, however, its commitments were patently unequal to the challenges of the current moment.

The environment is a case in point. The ecological catastrophe was virtually absent from discussion during the campaign. The PQ for its part promised to raise the target for GHG reductions from 37.5 to 42.5 percent, relative to 1990 levels, by 2034; at the same time, it pledged to “temporarily” reduce the gas tax through various measures by a total of 0.7 cents. QS disappointingly backtracked on its previous environmental commitments, lowering its target for GHG reductions, although it did call for blocking oil and gas pipeline projects in Québec. Its most concrete environmentally-friendly measures revolve primarily around major investments in public transportation, which, however laudable and necessary, fall far short of the radical changes needed to wean Québec from dependency on fossil fuels (one of the world’s biggest per capita energy consumers, despite generating about 94 percent of its electricity with hydroelectric power, Québec still relies on fossil fuels for a little over half its energy needs).

Overall, Québec Solidaire waged a respectable campaign for a party that remains social democratic in its orientation. However, its discourse reflected a gradual shift to the centre that has occurred particularly in the last nine years, spearheaded by former party co-spokesperson Gabriel Nadeau Dubois (GND). Once a firebrand student leader, GND reversed course as the head of QS, appealing for pragmatism and positioning QS as a ‘party of government’ (he has since resigned and retired from politics for the time being). This exacerbated the internal tensions between the forces within the party seeking ‘legitimacy’ and a foothold in Québec’s political class and the party’s left-wing members, who insisted that QS should live up to its slogan of being “un parti de la rue et des urnes” (a party of the streets and the ballot box) — that is, a democratic party whose political orientations are rooted in the social movements working for fundamental social change. Some of these party members came together to form what was initially an informal internal dissident sub-group calling itself the Parti de la rue, which has lately evolved into a more formal organization operating within and outside QS.

What, if any, effect the controversy over QS’s centrist drift — which has gone hand in hand with greater centralization and professionalization — had on the party’s underwhelming showing at the polls, notwithstanding its success in cutting its losses (sauver les meubles is the evocatively apt French phrase) is debatable.

In a post-election column, well-known La Presse journalist and commentator Patrick Lagacé sneeringly pinned the decline in QS’s vote share (it lost approximately 100,000 votes compared to 2022) on the “big gang of loud-mouthed activists who think the party isn’t far enough to the left and is still too colonialist.”

More seriously, for a number of analysts on the left the election was a lost opportunity for QS, which has seen its once robust youth vote (18-34-year-olds) halved over the last three years. Whether the party’s slide toward the centre was actually part of the reason for that is hard to say. Left-wing activist and writer Marc Bonhomme argues that, even in face of the surge of the far-right, QS failed to turn things around, which it might have done with “a hard-hitting platform and a major mobilization of progressive youth,” and he invokes the left-wing of the US Democratic Party and Germany’s Die Linke as instructive examples of the road not taken.

The former chief of staff to GND thinks otherwise. In conversation with Le Devoir, Renaud Poirier-St-Pierre said that the environment had taken a back seat to the cost of living as the main preoccupation of young voters, and that the sense of financial insecurity had prompted them to turn their backs on QS despite the party’s longstanding commitment to affordable housing. He continued, “On the issue of the cost of living, the left has not been able to put forward an approach as persuasive as the one proposed by the conservative parties.” Other commentators in the same Le Devoir article mention youth disaffection leading to relatively higher rates of electoral abstention in addition to polarization as factors contributing to the atrophy of QS’s youth constituency.

The direction QS will take now is also unclear. Canadian Dimension readers are painfully aware that social democratic parties, when they are holding or seeking power, have a virtually unbroken track record of succumbing to the siren song of political power and selling out to the established order. And QS is not immune to this tendency. While the party has played, and could continue to play, a very useful role as a critical opposition in the now majority right-wing national assembly, pressing the case for decency and social justice, the danger is ever-present that the leadership and the caucus will covet a role as a junior partner to the minority PQ government while conducting a public relations exercise to persuade its members and electorate that it is not betraying its principles.

Indeed, rather than ruling out collaboration with the PQ on the grounds of the xenophobic and antisocial character of its program and discourse, QS co-spokesperson Ghazal opened the door to cooperation with Plamondon even before the election, at least on the single issue of an eventual referendum on sovereignty (a prospect firmly opposed by the two other parties now represented in the Assemblée nationale), specifying that QS’s support would not be without conditions. In the wake of the election she clarified some of those conditions, such as a moratorium on winter evictions by landlords, and declared that QS would never support austerity measures and would be “uncompromising” on cuts to public services. There is no chance, however, that the PQ will desist from imposing some form(s) of austerity so the question now arises of what concessions the PQ could conceivably make that would render concertation with the unabashedly ethnonationalist right-wing party palatable to QS.

A right-wing alliance?

But the natural ally of today’s Parti Québécois is not QS: it is the newly resurrected Parti Conservateur du Québec (PCQ). On October 5, the PCQ went from zero to 19 MNAs (Members of the National Assembly) with 20.67 percent of the vote, much of it concentrated in the Québec City area, which has become a hard-right stronghold in recent years, as well as in a rural region that is historically conservative called Chaudières Appalaches in the eastern part of the province.

The contemporary iteration of Québec’s Conservative Party, originally founded in 1850, emerged in 2009, and got little traction until Éric Duhaime took the reins in 2021. One year later, it garnered 12.9 percent of the popular vote. Under Duhaime’s leadership the PCQ’s popularity grew, especially during the pandemic when it attracted an assortment of people, including conspiracy theorists, who opposed vaccines and other COVID-19-related precautions, such as curfews and masks. Marie-Josée Hélie, one of the MNAs the party elected on October 5, once described mandatory vaccination as a genocidal plan motivated by financial gain. Unsurprisingly, the PCQ stands out in Québec’s new parliament for its anti-science leanings — a cause for concern that has been aired in the media before and since the election.

Duhaime himself is a 57-year-old right-wing media personality, writer, and politician. A gay man (as is Liberal leader Charles Milliard), he came out publicly in 2017 and simultaneously denounced LBGTQ+ rights organizations for perpetuating a victim mentality when the struggle for equality was already won. His trajectory suggests he never encountered a reactionary idea he didn’t like.

During the campaign Duhaime repeatedly called for dismantling the “Québec model,” by which he means the interventionist state which he castigates as spendthrift, mired in red tape, inefficient, and an obstacle to prosperity. The PCQ menu features the usual fare, including a balanced budget, lower taxes, promotion of private health care, cutting 20,000 civil service jobs, and axing the special fund to promote electrification and fight climate change, among other measures.

On the matter of Québec sovereignty, Duhaime is closer to the CAQ’s autonomist position than to the PQ’s aspiration to formal independence, and he staunchly opposes any plans for a referendum—not out of any federalist conviction but for fear a lost referendum would weaken Québec, allowing the federal government to encroach on Québec jurisdiction. Better, he believes, to strengthen Québec’s position within Canada by allying with other provinces like Alberta. He went into the campaign urging voters to give the PCQ the balance of power precisely so it can block a referendum.

Yet despite this divergence, Duhaime is Plamondon’s likeliest political bedfellow. The two both want to restrict immigration, rivalling each other in ethnonationalist demagogy, although Plamondon wants more extensive cuts and the two differ on specifics. They are both in favour of creating incentives to increase Québec’s birth rate, such as financial rewards for larger families — a throwback to the revanche du berceau (“revenge of the cradle,” a phrase coined in reference to the strategy, promoted particularly by the Catholic Church after the British conquest and up until the Quiet Revolution, of encouraging very high birth rates among French Canadian women as a way of preserving the French language and culture and create a rampart against English immigration). They also already agree on the thrust of many economic policies. The nature of the conditions Duhaime will impose for propping up the PQ remains to be seen, but looming on the horizon is the most right-wing government in Québec since Maurice Duplessis’ Union Nationale.

The challenges ahead for QS and the left

In this context it’s unlikely that QS can have much influence on government policy, and the party will have to decide how to conduct itself in opposition in a way that allows it to win back some of the support it lost and make inroads with constituencies who are bound to suffer from the austerity policies in the offing. As the only remotely progressive political formation, it will have little competition in any efforts to defend democratic rights, preserve hard-won social gains for workers, fight for affordable housing and groceries, promote a decent and generous approach to immigration, and advocate for a planet in peril. But to succeed, it will need to look to the party’s roots and adopt a broader perspective.

For the left, parliamentary work has to contribute to creating a platform to bring together activist groups fighting on various fronts; doing the grassroots work needed to unite social movements is essential. And insofar as QS is a sovereigntist party, it must distinguish itself from the PQ by elaborating a conception of independence as a far-reaching left project aimed at taking society in a radically different direction from that envisaged by any of the other parties now represented at the National Assembly.

Andrea Levy and André Frappier are both long-time coordinating editors at Canadian Dimension. Both authors are members of Québec Solidaire and the Parti de la rue. All quotations from French-language media have been translated into English by Canadian Dimension.

Down but not out, Québec solidaire must repurpose its role

QS parliamentary leader Ruba Ghazal, of Palestinian origin, hoists a keffiyeh at the swearing-in of the party’s MNAs at Quebec's National Assembly.

Introduction and translations by Richard Fidler for Life on the Left.

For a comprehensive account of the issues, outcomes and shifting political trends and alignments revealed in Quebec’s October 5 general election, I recommend “A dangerous liaison looms in Québec”. The authors, Andrea Levy and André Frappier, are active members of Québec solidaire, the party formed in 2006 by veterans of previous left-wing formations, feminists, environmentalists, independentists and international solidarity activists. As they note,

QS stood out markedly from the four other parties in its robust defence of public services, call to raise the minimum wage, opposition to privatization, and plea for progressive taxation. And indeed, since the election, it has doubled down on its pledge to serve as a bulwark against austerity. On other issues, however, its commitments were patently unequal to the challenges of the current moment…

Overall, Québec Solidaire waged a respectable campaign for a party that remains social democratic in its orientation. However, its discourse reflected a gradual shift to the centre that has occurred particularly in the last nine years, spearheaded by former party co-spokesperson Gabriel Nadeau Dubois (GND). Once a firebrand student leader, GND reversed course as the head of QS, appealing for pragmatism and positioning QS as a ‘party of government’ (he has since resigned and retired from politics for the time being). This exacerbated the internal tensions between the forces within the party seeking ‘legitimacy’ and a foothold in Québec’s political class and the party’s left-wing members, who insisted that QS should live up to its slogan of being “un parti de la rue et des urnes” (a party of the streets and the ballot box) — that is, a democratic party whose political orientations are rooted in the social movements working for fundamental social change. Some of these party members came together to form what was initially an informal internal dissident sub-group calling itself the Parti de la rue, which has lately evolved into a more formal organization operating within and outside QS.

Translated below are two articles by members of the Parti de la rue critically analyzing the challenges ahead for Quebec working people and Québec solidaire in light of the election result. They were published in the left-wing online journal Presse-toi à gauche, which supports QS while urging it to turn left around an anticapitalist program of radical social change.

The evolution of Quebec election results over the last decade is illustrated in the table I have composed and published at the conclusion of this blog post, below. The figures for party votes and seats won in 2026 have been corrected according to recounts in some electoral districts, as reported by Quebec’s chief electoral officer.


What are the prospects, given the rise of the right? What role can Québec solidaire play in this context?

André Frappier and Bernard Rioux

With the PQ’s accession to government, we are entering a political period that risks accentuating the rise of the conservative right in Quebec if we fail to provide a clear and radical response

Highlights

The election campaign ends with an unprecedented distortion of the vote. The PQ came to power with only 28.02% of the vote and won 59 seats, forming a minority government. The Liberal Party won 40 seats with 24.23%, the Conservative Party 19 with 20.66% and Québec solidaire 9 with 12.42%. The CAQ did not win any seats with 13.35%.

Given the anti-immigration policies of the PQ’s Paul St-Pierre Plamondon (PSPP, as the PQ leader is often named) as well as its conservative policies (increase in the military budget and armaments, etc.), it will find support among Éric Duhaime’s Conservatives, who will thus strengthen their positions.

The role of the trade union and popular movement and of all social movements

The labour and grassroots movements have been special targets of the Legault government’s attacks. Anti-union laws have been adopted in quick succession. Insufficient investment in both the health and education sectors has led to a significant deterioration of hospital and school infrastructure. Privatization policies in the health sector have reduced access to care. This government’s denial of the housing crisis has been the terrain on which homelessness has developed. The promises made by all political parties during the election campaign, with the exception of Québec solidaire, to reduce the size of the state, indicate that austerity policies will continue to prevail. The PQ’s minority government will be pressured by the Conservative Party of Quebec to continue to deepen these policies. To believe, in this context, that the PQ government will be open to proposals from unions, grassroots groups and civil society as a whole appears more and more to be a denial of reality.

And the attacks will not only come from the Quebec government. Already, the Carney government’s major projects in terms of fossil fuels, the militarization of the economy and the implementation of artificial intelligence in as many companies as possible entail reducing the rights of the labour movement, as the federal government’s Bill 39 illustrates, as well as denying the rights of First Nations.

Our agenda must focus on building a broad front of resistance.

Sovereignty and the trap of calling for unity for a referendum

Sovereignty will be a key issue in the next period, for several reasons. First, because it is the framework in which the project of social change in Quebec will be defined. Secondly, because it is also the main component of the strategy for social change in the Canadian state. Thirdly, because it will be the objective of the traps launched by the PQ against QS.

The text published in Le Devoir, “For the construction of a progressive independentist alliance,” already indicates the trap in which we must not fall and the challenge of the political campaign to be built. In this article, the authors, including the former president of the CSN, Jacques Létourneau, call for an alliance between the Parti Québécois and Québec solidaire to achieve independence. They invite Québec solidaire to exit the debate on secularism and to reconsider its position on immigration, a debate they term ideological.

Québec solidaire must not fall into this trap, which would serve to normalize and endorse the PQ’s retrograde policies. QS would suffer the same fate as Jagmeet Singh’s NDP, which condoned the policies of the Liberal Party, and would lose all credibility with the population looking for an inclusive, feminist and anti-globalization alternative.

Accordingly, QS must more than ever assume its role as an anti-capitalist left-wing party

We must give meaning to the struggle for independence, which is linked as well to the emancipation of the Indigenous peoples and is also addressed to the question of our relationship with progressives, trade unionists and feminists in the Rest of Canada. The Canadian state in its present form must be defined as the shared fetter on the working class of English Canada and Quebec, and on the Indigenous peoples.

The rise of the far right under the Trump administration in the United States has many progressives fearing that independence would isolate and weaken Quebec and put it in danger. They believe that, in this context, independence must be postponed.

The position put forward by the QS leadership during the election campaign was not convincing in this regard. We talk about the constituent assembly as the democratic way to achieve independence, but we don’t see it as a class struggle where we have to work with allies, first and foremost our trade unionist and feminist comrades in the Rest of Canada. We must not forget, as well, the PQ’s failures with regard to the repatriation of powers.

Canada today is a state dominated by a powerful imperialist bourgeoisie. Canadian banks and companies invested $1,288,860 billion in assets abroad in 2018. The national struggle in Quebec cannot, in this context, be conceived as the repatriation of powers. The logic of that conception would be the reproduction of the same infrastructural pattern as that of Canadian capitalism, but under Quebec control. In a way, this was the experience of Québec Inc. But in the end, the rules of the globalized economy got the better of Rona, Saint-Hubert, Cirque du Soleil and Bombardier’s C Series, which became foreign assets.

The successive austerity policies of the PQ have contributed to amputating the PQ’s sovereigntist project of its dimension as a social project in favour of the popular majority. Let us remember the cuts in health care, with the elimination of 12,000 nursing positions in 1996.1 Today, the PQ of PSPP is going even further with its infamous promises to “deburocratize” the state and to reduce immigration to Quebec under its leadership.

Québec solidaire must fight for an independence that promises popular sovereignty throughout

The economic, fossil-fuel and environmental crisis will deepen the offensive of the various governments and the intransigence of the bosses. These tensions will fuel the far right, which is seeking to channel popular anger to its advantage. It will be impossible to counter this situation if there is no left-wing alternative. If QS does not situate the struggle for sovereignty within the anti-imperialist framework, if it does not situate the environmental struggle within an internationalist framework, it will necessarily be limited to fighting for reforms in Quebec, within the framework of Canadian federalism, a path that others have trodden before it. This situation would only leave the door open to a nationalist politics which, as we have seen in the last period, has led to an identitarian nationalism. And this is what the Parti québécois proposes in its Blue Book. What this document shows is not a break with the North American imperial order, but its reconfiguration: the transition from a Canadian federalism to a formal sovereignty that reclothes the same relations of economic dependency, the same Western military alignments, the same structures of class and gender domination and the same depridation of nature.

To think of a uniquely Québécois strategy for social change is to ignore the power of financial institutions and corporations. Let us remember the fate that the European Central Bank reserved for Greece (which is nevertheless a sovereign state).

Québec solidaire must defend an independence that is based on popular sovereignty and is a true national liberation. It presupposes a break with the circuits of financial dependency that bind Quebec to Wall Street and Bay Street; the collective appropriation of financial institutions rather than their simple repatriation for the benefit of a national bourgeoisie; disarmament rather than the race for military spending in the order of 5% of GDP; the full and complete recognition of the sovereignty of Indigenous nations over their territories rather than the unilateral codification of borders; and a reorganization of the economy around care and ecological limits rather than around the stability of markets.

October 20, 2026


What are the post-election prospects for Québec solidaire?

Roger Rashi

The Quebec election of October 5 gave us some very unusual results, thanks to the current fragmentation of the political field and the archaic voting system that elects the “first-past-the-post” candidate with the highest plurality.

With only 28 per cent of the vote, the Parti Québécois won 59 seats and will form a minority government. This is an ambivalent result: last December, opinion polls gave the party 39% of the vote and a probable majority of seats. Its shift to the right and its anti-immigration rhetoric have helped make the PQ “the most badly elected government in history” in Quebec. The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), the party in power from 2018 to 2026, is the big loser in this election: it is completely wiped off the map, losing all 90 seats won in 2022 while retaining 13.35% of the total vote. The Quebec Liberal Party, with a modest 24 per cent, won 40 seats and will form the official opposition. The big winner was undoubtedly the Conservative Party of Quebec (PCQ), a hard-right party, which entered the National Assembly for the first time with 19 MNAs and 20.6% of the vote. As for Québec solidaire, it avoided the rout that so many observers predicted, retaining 9 of its 11 seats and winning 12.43% of the vote.

Becoming the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary bulwark against austerity

The only left-wing party in the National Assembly — the other three embracing, to varying degrees, right-wing programs and austerity policies — QS claims to be the sole representative of popular interests in Parliament and the bulwark against austerity. How will it play its cards in a minority Parliament where it could hold the balance of power, just like the PCQ for that matter.

Already, some are advising QS to make an “independentist and progressive alliance” with the PQ in power. Others believe that it should turn even further towards the centre to increase its support and avoid the decline it faces. However, these are precisely the orientations that QS must avoid by all means; they are the result of a poor analysis of the situation and could definitively ruin it.

The PQ is no longer a partially social democratic party or even a vaguely progressive party. Under its current leader, its trajectory is clearly moving to the right, and it has adopted a program that is openly pro-austerity (reduction in the size of the government, cuts in the public service, return to a balanced budget within two years) and fiercely anti-immigration, which will inevitably lead it to form an alliance on these issues with the PCQ. The PQ must seek additional electoral support, and to do so, it will try to tap into the 13 per cent of the right-wing electorate who supported the CAQ. In addition, the PQ has postponed its promised referendum on independence until Trump’s departure, which brings us to 2029 at the earliest. However, a minority government lasts an average of 18 to 24 months, and the PQ will want to obtain a majority mandate in the next election. It will have neither the time nor the interest, while support for sovereignty is lagging in the polls at 29%, to launch a referendum campaign in a shortened mandate.

For all these reasons, Québec solidaire must reject the misleading recommendations and adopt an incisive opposition role in Parliament as well as a combative and dynamic posture outside the National Assembly. Nine MNAs out of 127 cannot, on their own, block an austerity program. But, in alliance with the community, tenant, trade union, anti-racist, feminist and ecological movements — all the social forces that austerity is already mobilizing — a real bulwark can be erected against reactionary forces.

Québec solidaire must no longer limit itself to a role of representing the social opposition in Parliament. It must also see itself and act as a party of social mobilization.

Becoming a party of the workers and the working classes

While demonstrating great resilience in keeping six of its nine seats in Montreal as well as its representation outside Montreal, QS has nevertheless experienced a slow and gradual decline since the 2018 election, when it obtained its best result with 16.10% of the vote and ten MNAs. In 2022, the decline in the popular vote (0.60%) was minimal and relatively obscured by the number of seats won (11). But in 2026, the decline is now clear and undeniable: a loss of 3%, or more than 100,000 votes compared to the two previous elections.

A lucid and sober assessment is necessary: QS's electoralist and centralizing turn, which began in 2021, has been a failure, both at the ballot box and internally. This turn, described as “pragmatic,” has provoked multiple internal crises, all stemming from conflicts originating in the parliamentary wing. It has seriously weakened the party’s activist core and, ultimately, electoral support for the party.

However, the campaign that just ended has sparked a revival of activism and mobilization around QS, something that we have not seen for a long time. How can this progress be consolidated?

First, it is imperative that the party return to the practice of launching political campaigns outside of election periods, in order to maintain the mobilization of its members and expand its recruitment pool. The coming period will be rich in social mobilizations. This will be the ideal opportunity to bring social movement activists back into the fold of QS and to make our party a real party of the ballot box and the street.

Second, we must strengthen the identity of QS as the party of the workers and the working classes. We said it over and over during the election campaign: we are the only party that fights against austerity, wants to tax wealth and defend social and trade union rights. We must push this logic forward and affirm that we are a party of the working class and the working classes, and then support this call with sustained work in all regions of Quebec, in urban and rural areas, as well as around the major economic, social and ecological issues that affect the people: affordable housing, cost of living, improved public services, climate change, working conditions and equal rights.

To reverse its decline, our party must adopt a policy that gives it a clear identity and strong social roots.

Becoming a Left of rupture

In 2011, Québec solidaire included in its program a call to go beyond capitalism and eventually establish the socialization of the economy. This was followed by a series of political proposals on the nationalization of strategic natural resources, national and democratic planning, workers’ self-management, the establishment of a state bank, etc. Unfortunately, these orientations were not deepened and remained more or less a dead letter until the process of revising the programme launched at the end of 2024, which unfortunately led to a weakening of the anti-capitalist proposals and the adoption of a clearly reformist programme. It is this moderate vision that has underpinned the positions of the QS leadership since 2021. The departure of [former QS co-leader] Gabriel Nadeau-Dubois at the end of 2024 has not changed anything in substance.

However, the left-wing parties that are experiencing some success in this period of the rise of the right are those that have adopted a program of rupture with the current system and that often define themselves as parties that are socialist, democratic, ecological and anti-imperialist. This is the case of Die Linke, in Germany, which has just won the mayoralty of Berlin, or Zohran Mamdani, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), victorious in New York. Not to mention Jean-Luc Mélenchon's La France Insoumise, which openly proclaims itself to be a breakaway left. In this period of acute crises of capitalism and the rise of the right, it is the uninhibited and confident left-wing formations that are making progress, while social-democratic reformism is everywhere in crisis. It is their anti-systemic program that provides a compelling and mobilizing character to the immediate proposals of the radical left parties, while giving hope to the popular classes and the social movements that support them.

To establish itself as a real bulwark against austerity and the rise of the right, Québec solidaire will have to deepen its anti-systemic positions. The orientations of its 2011 programme must be updated in the light of recent upheavals in order to lead to a proposal for profound social transformation.

Montreal, October 12, 2026