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Wednesday, November 26, 2025

Canada Exploits the US Loophole to Send Weapons to Israel

How CRA audits suppress Palestine solidarity


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On Tuesday, the Arms Embargo Now campaign launched a damning new report, co-authored by CJPME, which exposes the weapons pipeline running from Canadian factories and ports to Israel through the United States to send weapons. In direct contradiction to our government’s many claims that Canadian military exports are not being used in this genocide, this new report exposes shipments of vital components of both Israel’s fighter jets and the bombs they are still dropping on Gaza. Click here to read the report.

But despite the ever-growing body of evidence, the Canadian government continues to pretend that there isn’t a problem. Instead, the Liberals have indicated that they will not support MP Kwan’s Bill to close the US loophole, claiming that the initiative is based on a “false premise.” This government simply refuses to look at the evidence of Canadian complicity in genocide, prioritizing corporate profits over human rights.

How CRA audits suppress Palestine solidarity

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The Anti-Racism Program of the CJPME Foundation has issued a policy brief on systemic discrimination and bias in the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)’s audits of charities. A recent government review identified patterns of religious discrimination in how the CRA selected charities for terrorism-related audits, disproportionately targeting Muslim and Sikh organizations. However, the Foundation’s brief argues that CRA audits are not only about religious profiling, but also about suppressing political solidarity with oppressed groups abroad. Click here to read the full brief.

CJPME’s mission is to enable Canadians of all backgrounds to promote justice, development and peace in the Middle East, and here at home in Canada. Read other articles by Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, or visit Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East's website.

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Making martyrs

November 19, 2025 
DAWN

AS far as the anointed go, saints in the Sufi tradition have it easy. You could be declared one in life and then continue to dispense generosity and blessings from the afterlife. Martyrdom, on the other hand, has a significant drawback: it must be earned with one’s life, as the ‘immortal’ status can only be awarded posthumously, in all traditions. It’s strange, then, that martyrdom, a status considered far higher than any other, can be granted to anyone these days.

The right-wing, MAGA influencer Cha­r­lie Kirk, who was shot dead at a rally on the University of Utah campus in September this year, is being fashioned as a martyr. The NYT recently ran a piece on the req­uired ingredients for a good martyr, especially for conscription into an immediate political purpose. It listed public, dramatic, and innocent deaths, a cause attached to them, and a movement to glorify and capitalise on them, as a must for this recipe.

The word ‘shaheed’(martyr) inspires awe, passion, admiration, and absolute respect. Before any competing words, tropes, and honorifics are introduced, consider the context of this piece: the transcendence of this Arabic word into not just the vocabulary of non-Arabic speakers but also into their body politic, narratives, identities and collective conscience. As long as it was attached to an Abu this and a Bin that, it could be hung on the obsession of ‘Islamist fundamentalists’ with the promised afterlife, as opposed to the ‘rationalist fascists’’ rejection of anything beyond the material world. The lines seem to be blurring now.

Street-corner banners could be seen in Surrey, British Columbia, proclaiming ‘Shaheed Jathedar Hardeep Singh Nijjar’. Singh was a Sikh separatist shot dead in Canada in front of the Guru Nanak Gurdwara in June 2023. The Indian government claimed that lax policing and appeasement of domestic votes had made Canada a safe space for ‘jihadists’. Some may see it as cultural appropriation, and others as their handlers’ stamp on Sikh separatist movements for invoking shahadat. It’s important to remember, however, that in Sikh history, the fifth Guru, Arjun, is considered the first shaheed. He was tortured to death during the Mughal emperor Jehangir’s reign for refusing to renounce his faith.

The origin of the word ‘shaheed’ comes from ‘shahadat’, which means to bear witness. In the context of martyrdom, it is closely tied to monotheistic faith and, by extension, the concept of the afterlife. Sacrificing one’s life to fulfil duties stemming from the verbal shahadat grants the individual the status of Shaheed — the highest a believer can aim for — promising eternal life and companionship of the holiest on the Day of Judgement. While this idea has inspired some who believe they are fighting for a just cause to face unimaginable challenges, its misuse has also led to the rise of suicide bombers.

It’s strange that martyrdom can be granted to anyone these days.

Invoking martyrdom turns victims into heroes whose reward is hoped to be in the afterlife, making current calls for justice seem petty. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s execution in 1979, although widely regarded as a judicial murder, has not been overturned by a court of law. In the court of public opinion, at least among his supporters, he has long been considered a shaheed. A university established to honour his legacy includes the suffix ‘Shaheed’ in its name, as does a political party founded by his son after he broke ties with his sister, Benazir. Yet, his most notable creation, the Pakistan Peoples Party, recently sought to have a resolution passed by the National Ass­e­mbly declaring ZAB a ‘national martyr’. Strangely, his nemesis and tormentor, Ziaul Haq, the military dictator under whom Bhutto was executed, is also portrayed as a shaheed. The MQM has designated a graveyard in Karachi as Shuhuda Qabristan (martyrs’ cemetery), where party workers and leaders, particularly those who suffered violence, are buried.

As we consider the idea of supreme sacrifice and eternal redemption in the afterlife, it’s natural to think about the exemption from prosecution in this life that beneficiaries of immunity might enjoy. While our parliament has currently limited such exemptions to a few individuals, the Israeli Knesset, in March 2023, debated a bill from far-right factions calling for immunity from prosecution for all soldiers. The reason behind this proposed exemption is that all soldiers risk their lives, and the fear of legal action and consequences might prevent them from performing their duties without fear. The bill was put on hold. Opponents of the proposal, including the attorney general, pointed out that such legislation could leave exempted individuals vulnerable to international prosecution, including at the International Court of Justice.

The writer is a poet. His latest publication is a collection of satire essays titled Rindana.

shahzadsharjeel1@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, November 19th, 2025

 

When the Muslim Presence Stops Explaining Itself


This article unfolds from the wager that Prof. Asim Siddiqui’s book Muslim Identity in Hindi Cinema: Poetics and Politics of Genre and Representation (2025) contains, beneath its patient encyclopedic sweep, a set of conceptual provocations that the book itself states only in passing. Siddiqui’s method is descriptive, empirical, archivally wide, committed to cataloguing currents, genres, types, and exceptions across decades of Hindi cinema. Yet embedded within this encyclopedic ambition are moments of disorienting creativity, ideas introduced in a matter-of-fact tone that nevertheless gesture toward a far more radical rethinking of Muslim presence in Hindi cinema. My aim is to extract these latent insights, to elaborate and extrapolate them into a coherent conceptual argument. What appears in Siddiqui as scattered remarks – about incidental identity, playful dissolution of genres, decontextualised worlds, or presences that refuse narrative burden – can be read as a subterranean philosophy of representation. Through a close reconstruction of these implicit lines of thought, this article seeks to show that Siddiqui’s work points toward an entirely different vocabulary for imagining Muslim representation.

Logics of Representation

Siddiqui’s survey of “meaningful marginality” operates within a recognisable critical horizon: the desire to redeem tokenism by foregrounding Muslim characters who, despite occupying small narrative spaces, exert decisive ethical influence, anchor value-systems, or embody a secular ethos. Imam Sahib in Sholay, Rahim Chacha in Deewar, or Abu Mian in Mirch Masala form a catalogue of corrective figures who elevate the moral tone of their worlds. Their marginality becomes meaningful because they provide narrative ballast, ethical clarity, or spiritual depth. Siddiqui repeatedly emphasises how these figures “shape the action, movement, and values of the film,” thereby countering the superfluity of mere representational placeholders. This approach remains tied to an overarching project: a cinema where Muslim presence acquires dignity through integration into the narrative’s moral core.

Yet this remains a reformist answer to tokenism, grounded in the logic of representation itself. Muslim presence becomes meaningful precisely when the character is culturally intelligible, ethically resonant, or narratively indispensable. In this model, the minor Muslim figure’s worth derives from his capacity to stabilise communal harmony, enrich moral discourse, or stand as a repository of secular ideals. The village of Ramgarh reveres Imam Sahib; Rahim Chacha offers the rationality behind Vijay’s anger; Dr Farid personifies the intimacy of interreligious coexistence; Fakir Baba and Abu Baba supply spiritual or ethical depth. These figures overcome tokenism through a compensatory elevation: they are small presences with large moral stakes. This logic preserves the classificatory matrix through which Muslim identity becomes legible. Even when marginal, the Muslim character must bear cultural meaning, moral example, or spiritual symbolism.

The more radical, playful solution Siddiqui gestures toward elsewhere sits askance to this entire reformist orientation. Where “meaningful marginality” operates through integration and moralisation, the playful solution that I am trying to extrapolate from his book begins from a refusal of representational burden. According to him, the classificatory apparatus of “Muslim social,” “Muslim historical,” and “Muslim courtesan film” already installs a regime of legibility in which Muslim presence must register through recognisable narrative templates, aesthetic markers, or thematic clusters. Siddiqui cites Ira Bhaskar and Richard Allen’s widely used taxonomy as “very useful,” yet he positions it as insufficient precisely because it presumes that Muslim identity requires a stable narrative container. What interests him is the cinematic field that spills beyond these containers, where “Hindi films … touch Muslim philosophical and mystical subjects without necessarily being about Muslims.” This formulation signals a dissolution of the boundary between essence and milieu, a cinema where Islamicate sensibilities circulate as affective and aesthetic currents rather than as representational obligations.

The invocation of Iqbal Masud’s reading of Devdas marks the first step in this displacement. Masud perceives “Hindu and Arabic–Persian traditions of Radha–Krishna and Laila–Majnu in Devdas,” a canonical text of Hindu melodrama. In this reading, the Islamicate is neither a separate genre nor a minority fragment. It becomes a spectral inflection, a set of thematic resonances that traverse the film without resolving into identity markers. Cinema, in this expanded sense, becomes a space where love, suffering, and devotion draw from multiple cultural lineages that remain entangled rather than segregated. Siddiqui uses this insight to pry open the rigid schema of Muslim genres, showing how certain films generate Islamicate atmospheres without requiring Muslim characters or recognisably Muslim worlds.

This playful solution rejects the demand for a “stable Muslim presence” by showcasing films where Muslim characters appear within mainstream genres without delivering legible cultural pedagogy or symbolic multiculturalism. A film like Lagaan embeds Ismail within the broader national allegory of anti-colonial struggle, where his partnership with Bhuvan arises from shared vulnerability rather than from token inclusion. Similarly, Iqbal refracts the difficulties of a Muslim protagonist through the grammar of sports melodrama rather than through a programmatic minority narrative. These films exhibit what might be called dispersed Muslimness: a presence fully absorbed into the narrative’s horizon of action, desire, and conflict, without becoming a cultural specimen.

The case of Chak De India brings the logic of dispersed Muslimness into sharp relief because the film builds its central crisis on an act of communal suspicion while refusing to organise its narrative around that suspicion. Kabir Khan misses a decisive penalty stroke in an India–Pakistan match, and this single sporting failure is immediately interpreted by the media and by his neighbours as evidence of betrayal. His “identity is criminalized,” as Siddiqui notes, since “he was charged as a Muslim for collaborating with Muslims,” and the ferocity of this accusation forces him into seven years of exile. Crucially, however, the film does nothing to narrativise or work through this communal wound. Kabir’s Muslimness remains the silent precondition for his ostracisation, yet the narrative declines to treat his identity as an object of exploration, confession, defence, or explanation. Instead, the film absorbs him into the mechanics of sporting redemption, allowing his identity to remain untheorised, even opaque. This refusal to monumentalise identity provides a counter-move to tokenism. The Muslim figure escapes assimilation through moral overdetermination and escapes marginalisation through decorative inclusion; he becomes a character whose identity is neither erased nor thematised.

Siddiqui’s conceptual wager – or the implicit line of thought that I reconstruct here – lies here: a cinema that suspends the requirement that Muslim presence carry representational weight opens a field where the Islamicate operates as a wandering affect, a tonal undercurrent, a narrative intensity. By declining to stabilise Muslim identity through genres, markers, or pedagogical functions, such films stage a different kind of pluralism, one grounded in shared narrative worlds rather than in curated diversity. This mode of representation carries a radical potential since it breaks the pact between identity and legibility. Muslimness circulates freely, unanchored in pre-given forms, allowing the cinematic world to articulate coexisting sensibilities without resorting to classificatory closure.

Thus, we can detect a structural tension between two approaches in Siddiqui’s book. The corrective paradigm requires morally weighty Muslim figures whose minor roles carry maximal ethical force. The playful paradigm loosens this requirement by allowing Muslimness to drift through unexpected genres, affective registers, and narrative environments. It refuses the expectation that Muslim characters must rescue the narrative from ethical deficit or solidify its secular promise. Films like LagaanIqbal, or Chak De India exemplify this shift: Muslim characters participate in narrative action without embodying a pedagogical function. Kabir Khan’s trauma remains unworked through in communal terms; Ismail’s partnership with Bhuvan arises from action rather than symbolic multiculturalism; Iqbal’s journey unfolds within sports melodrama rather than identity ethics. In this schema, Muslim presence gains freedom precisely because it ceases to serve as the conscience of the cinematic world.

Whatever Muslim

This cinematic freedom is strikingly visible in Siddiqui’s category of the “incidental Muslim,” which opens a representational field that aligns strikingly with Giorgio Agamben’s notion of “whatever being.” These characters neither conform to the older regime of visible markers (sherwani, skull cap, chaste Urdu) nor serve as the ethical correctives that populate Siddiqui’s catalogue of meaningful marginal figures. Instead, they inhabit the cinematic world as ordinary presences whose Muslimness neither disappears nor crystallises into a narrative function. Their identity is “incidental,” yet this very quality reveals a new mode of cinematic singularity: a Muslim character presented “such that it always matters,” to borrow Agamben’s re-reading of quodlibet. These characters refuse the reduction of Muslimness to properties or predicates and appear instead as singularities that carry their identity without being confined by it.

Agamben’s key insight is that the whatever being “relates to singularity not in its indifference with respect to a common property… but only in its being such as it is.” This perfectly captures the status of figures like Inspector Khan, Jaan Nisar Khan, Sultan Ali Khan, Rizwan Ahmed, or Dr Jahangir Khan. In each case, the film acknowledges the character’s Muslim identity, yet declines to convert that identity into an interpretive anchor. Rizwan Ahmed in Baazar announces his full name “without any self-consciousness,” and the film retains his Muslimness without structuring his narrative fate through it. Jahangir Khan’s presence in Dear Zindagi does the same: his name signals a Muslim lineage, but his function in the narrative arises entirely from his skill as a therapist, his wit, his charisma, his professional ethics. These characters are neither assimilated into anonymous secular universality nor curated as emblems of multicultural depth. They appear instead as Muslims “in their being such,” free from the classificatory compulsion that ordinarily governs cinematic identity.

Through this lens, Siddiqui’s incidental Muslim approximates Agamben’s singularity freed “from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set… reclaimed… for its being-such.” These characters neither perform Muslimness nor abandon it; they simply carry it, lightly but irrevocably. Sultan Ali Khan’s Haryanvi-inflected world foregrounds regional belonging far more strongly than religious identity. Yet the nikah ritual, the ziyarat at the tomb of Syed Sahib, and the Muslim names in the narrative surface without narrative weight or cultural exposition. These gestures preserve identity at the level of appearance without making it the ground of meaning. The films thus stage Muslimness as a mode of appearing rather than a category that demands narrative justification.

Agamben’s formulation that “whatever singularity… is lovable” illuminates precisely this form of representation. The incidental Muslim is presented in such a way that the audience’s attachment stems neither from stereotype nor from pedagogical elevation. Inspector Amjad Khan’s comic eccentricity in Qurbani or Jaan Nisar Khan’s image of domestic joy in Andhaa Kaanoon creates affection through manner, gesture, vulnerability, and force of personality rather than through emblematic identity. The viewer encounters a Muslim character who is desired, admired, or remembered “with all of its predicates, its being such as it is.” In Agamben’s language, these characters allow identity to function not as a classifying predicate but as part of a singular constellation of traits that draw love and recognition.

Crucially, this mode breaks the older representational dialectic between stereotype and token transcendence. The incidental Muslim no longer stands as the moral conscience of the village, the wise old man, or the custodian of secular harmony. Siddiqui’s earlier figures overcame tokenism through moral depth; the incidental figures sidestep tokenism by releasing identity from moral or symbolic labour. This creates a cinematic analogue of Agamben’s “intelligibility of an intelligibility,” where the character’s presence communicates a form of belonging without the weight of representation. Javed Siddiqui’s role in Uunchai or Lateef Zaidi’s in Chehre exemplify this shift: eloquence, intelligence, and decisiveness shape the viewer’s relation to the character, while Muslimness remains a fact that neither structures the plot nor demands interpretive decoding.

We see the emergence of the “whatever Muslim,” a being who belongs without being bound, who appears without becoming exemplary, and whose presence matters not because it fills a representational quota or corrects a stereotype, but because it embodies “being-such” within the cinematic world. This mode holds the promise of a new politics of representation in Hindi cinema: one that neither fetishises identity nor evacuates it, but allows Muslimness to circulate as an ordinary, lovable, fully singular presence.

Siddiqui’s reading of the “decontextualised world” of gangster films reveals a further mutation in Muslim representation, one that extends and radicalises the logic of incidental identity. In these narratives, Muslim gangsters inhabit a cinematic space stripped of political referents, real-life communal conflicts, and recognisable ideological coordinates. Their Muslimness remains legible primarily through names (Musa, Sultan, Jibran, Abdul Khan) yet the films decline to bind these names to cultural or religious predicates. The world itself is stylised, insulated from real history, operating in what Siddiqui calls “a decontextualised world of crime where there is no reference to any political ideology, political party, or government.” This evacuation of context paradoxically generates a new mode of Muslim presence: freed from both stereotype and the burden of positive pedagogy, Muslim characters appear as singularities, neither exemplary nor emblematic.

Characters like Musa Bhai in Plan or Abdul Khan in Parinda function within a stylised universe where identity cues lose their explanatory force. Musa’s regret that he could not perform kanyadan blurs the religious code entirely; Abdul Khan’s refusal to return Iqbal’s salaam foregrounds gang loyalty over communal solidarity. These gestures detach Muslimness from its usual narrative functions (victimhood, moral conscience, bearer of composite culture) and reposition it as a trait among others. Agamben writes that “singularity is freed from its having this or that property… for its being-such,” and Siddiqui’s decontextualised gangsters embody this state. Their Muslim identity neither determines their morality nor aligns them with communal narratives; it instead appears as one element in a constellation of qualities (loyalty, cruelty, wit, weakness, aspiration) that define them as singular cinematic beings.

This decontextualisation provides a solution to the impasse of Muslim representation by suspending the demand that Muslim identity signify. Earlier models oscillated between stereotype (gangster, fakir, qawwal) and corrective tokenism (moral guide, secular conscience, guardian of harmony). Even Siddiqui’s “meaningful marginality” preserved this logic by requiring Muslim figures to enrich the ethical universe of the film. The decontextualised gangster breaks that cycle. The films sidestep both burden and sympathy; Muslim characters neither redeem the narrative nor threaten it with communal meaning. In Agambenian terms, their identity is encountered as style, gesture, rhythm, rather than semiotic content.

This dynamic becomes especially vivid in Parinda through the figure of Abdul Khan, a Muslim gangster whose presence unsettles the viewer through an unexpected aesthetic register. Siddiqui emphasises that Abdul is “the most trusted man of Anna,” a violent enforcer who “cuts throats of people,” yet the film repeatedly shows him in moments of stillness, absorbed in playing the flute. This juxtaposition is central. In Hindi cinema, the flute often carries associations of refinement, classical training, or mystical interiority, and these associations are themselves historically entangled with the prominence of Muslim ustads in classical music. Parinda invokes this cultural resonance only to fracture it. Abdul does not play the flute as an emblem of cultural sophistication or as a coded indicator of an Islamicate interior life. Instead, his playing appears in odd, quiet moments that offer no narrative explanation or psychological backstory. The film refrains from linking his musical skill to a tradition, a lineage, or a stereotype.

What emerges instead is a moment of eerie singularity. The police officer’s line – “the way he plays the flute in the same way he cuts throats of people” – collapses two registers that are usually kept apart: aesthetic modulation and violent precision. Abdul’s flute becomes neither a sign of refinement nor a symbol of moral contradiction; it becomes a purely cinematic gesture, an unexpected texture that complicates the viewer’s sense of who he is without resolving him into a type. This is precisely where the scene departs from the usual representational patterns that attach Muslim identity to musical artistry. Siddiqui calls this juxtaposition “a subversion of the association of classical music with a lot of well-known Muslim artists,” but the key point is that the film does nothing to stabilise this subversion into commentary or critique. It simply lets the incongruity stand.

Abdul’s flute playing, therefore, exemplifies the “whatever” mode of Muslim presence: a trait that gestures toward cultural memory without collapsing into it, a behaviour that enriches the character without explaining him, a moment that belongs to the visual and sonic logic of the film rather than to an identity script. The conjunction of “music and crime” becomes an aesthetic quality, an unsettled, atmospheric detail, rather than a cultural message. In this way, Abdul Khan’s character contributes to the larger movement in Siddiqui’s analysis: Muslimness appears as a lightly held, untheorised presence that refuses both stereotype and symbolic weight.

Moreover, the decontextualised world creates a space where Muslimness appears without being mobilised as a marker of community politics. When Tyson’s Christian gang, Jibran’s Muslim gang, and Jindal’s Hindu identity appear in Mohra, the configuration mirrors “the power dynamics of Indian social structure” yet refrains from moralising or politicising these identities. Religion becomes a background texture, an as rather than an essence. Jibran can survive, betray, or align himself without his Muslimness offering narrative justification. This loosening of identity from function allows Muslim characters to exist outside the usual dialectic of visibility and burden.

Finally, this mode reconfigures the Muslim presence beyond the politics of recognition. The decontextualised gangster does not seek inclusion, does not serve as a stand-in for secular harmony, and does not embody the threat stereotype. The character’s name may echo real-life resonance (Yusuf Pathan, Billa Jilani) yet the film withholds sociological explanation, refusing to translate the character into a symptom of Muslim criminality or minority marginalisation. This refusal creates a representational openness: Muslim identity becomes a free-floating signifier, part of the world’s texture rather than its problem. In this sense, Siddiqui shows how decontextualisation enables a “whatever” mode of representation: Muslimness appears without obligation, without typology, without symbolic weight. It becomes part of the cinematic world’s taking-place, a presence that matters precisely because it no longer must matter in the old ways.

A Muslim Without Qualities

Siddiqui’s reading of Company provides a striking instance of what may be called a presencing without essence, a mode of Muslim representation that refuses both erasure and fixation. The marriage scene becomes the conceptual hinge of this mode. Malik performs a Hindu fire ritual to please Saroja, and Siddiqui emphasises that this gesture carries no capacity to “determine his identity.” This refusal of determination is the point. Malik’s willingness to step into a ritual associated with another community exposes identity as a wearable surface rather than a deep predicate.

This mode of appearance places Muslim identity in the realm of the incidental, the lightly held, the lived rather than the declared. The film avoids dwelling on Malik’s background, history, or religious commitments. His name circulates as a sign with dual resonance in Hindu and Muslim settings. His actions supply no interpretive anchor that would allow the viewer to classify him within a religious framework. Identity becomes something he carries rather than something he performs. In this sense, the marriage scene stages a form of identity as gesture, an embodied flexibility that avoids both assimilationist erasure and essentialist visibility.

The contrast with Chandu’s world sharpens this insight. Chandu’s marriage is saturated with visual cues and ritual indicators that affirm a Hindu domestic setting. Siddiqui highlights “religious symbolism” in Chandu’s surroundings precisely to show the asymmetry: Hindu identity is thematised, foregrounded, placed within a frame of social recognition, while Malik’s identity remains suspended, indeterminate, neither concealed nor highlighted. The result, however, is not an erasure of Muslim presence. Instead, Malik’s Muslimness enters the frame as a possibility, a horizon, an as that structures how he is read without enclosing him in a fixed type.

Chandu’s companions complete this conceptual field. Hasan wears a skull cap and immediately signals Muslim identity. Koda Singh marks Sikh presence. The small gang becomes a miniature tableau of secular plurality, yet Malik stands apart as a figure whose identity appears through relation rather than symbolism. His connection to Chandu, his participation in ritual for love rather than doctrinal fidelity, and his position within a mixed religious world all create a form of Muslim presence grounded in lived interaction rather than archetype.

This produces a new representational possibility. Instead of affirming Muslim identity through visible markers or narrative functions, the film allows Muslimness to appear as an aspect of social being that emerges through action, affection, and environment. It dramatizes a world where Muslim identity gains presence by entering shared rituals, shared life, shared risk, and shared ambition, without losing its distinctiveness or becoming a stereotype. It shows a Muslim figure who belongs through gesture rather than through explicit cultural coding, allowing representation to escape the rigid binary of hypervisibility and invisibility.

Conclusion

What emerges from this excavation of Siddiqui’s text is a para-political theory of futurity. The eccentric Muslims of Hindi cinema – Kabir Khan coaching the nation after being hounded out as a traitor, Malik stepping calmly into a Hindu fire ritual, Abdul Khan playing the flute between murders, Rizwan Ahmed circulating in corporate boardrooms without anxieties about his name – constitute, in their very implausibility, a political archive of possibility. They are absurd, yes, because the world that surrounds Indian Muslims today offers little space for such unburdened existence. Yet cinema’s absurdity becomes its strength. It conjures forms of Muslimness that social reality disallows, producing figures neither governed by the stabilising demands of secular reassurance nor trapped in the punitive gaze of majoritarian suspicion.

These cinematic Muslims expose the poverty of our political imagination. Against a public sphere where Muslim identity is constantly policed, explained, defended, or pathologised, Hindi cinema inadvertently generates Muslims who neither apologise nor signify, who neither embody minority trauma nor enact multicultural aspiration. They simply exist – irregularly, unpredictably, as beings whose presence cannot be reduced to pedagogy, grievance, or stereotype. In these figures, identity appears as gesture, accident, style, attachment, mood. Their very unseriousness becomes politically serious, for it breaks the monopoly of state and society over what counts as a “proper” Muslim life.

The “whatever Muslim” gestures toward a mode of belonging that escapes the traps of hypervisibility and invisibility. It hints at a future where Muslimness circulates without pre-scripted meaning: a future where one can be a therapist, a gangster, a lover, an athlete, a trader, a neighbour, a traitor, a saint, a nobody, or all at once, without each role collapsing back into a single communal essence. It invites us to imagine Indian Muslims as beings whose possibilities exceed the representational grids that have long trapped them in the dialectic of threat and token.

This, finally, is the political provocation of Siddiqui’s accidental philosophy: that Hindi cinema, through its most casual gestures, its throwaway details, its narrative indifference, sketches the outlines of Muslims who remain irreducible to the categories that dominate the nation’s imagination. These are Muslims without qualities, without assigned meanings, without explanatory burdens. And in a moment when the Indian Muslim is relentlessly fixed into legible roles – loyal patriot, dangerous outsider, secular friend, demographic fact – the cinematic figure who walks through fire for love, refuses to return a salaam, snorts drugs, lifts a hockey team to victory, or plays a flute between killings becomes profoundly political. These are beings who refuse to be what they are told they are.

In their unpredictability lies a lesson: that identity can be lived without weight, that belonging can occur without permission, and that Muslim life in India might yet inhabit forms that exceed both fear and representation. Here, in the strange freedom of these cinematic presences, we glimpse what Indian Muslims can become: lives unshackled from the compulsion to signify, lives allowed to be as they are, lives that stake a claim to the world simply by appearing within it.

Yanis Iqbal is a student and freelance writer based in Aligarh, India. Read other articles by Yanis.

Sunday, November 16, 2025

 

Chatbot Unions: The Dawn of AI Marriages



What makes up a marriage has been the subject of state, community, and tribal control since human society took some form. Who is to marry whom; the process of selecting the appropriate breeding partners; and the limits and penalties imposed on those partners in cases of transgression. Love did not necessarily have anything to do with it.

Traditionally, the content of such marriages has been anthropomorphic, with the perennial question of whether one should be suitably partnered with one or multiple beings. Then, the more unusual instances: human beings attempting to wed non-human entities. With a certain notoriety, a Swedish woman by the name of Eija-Riitta Eklöf eventually decided, after nursing a childhood obsession, to marry the now defunct Berlin Wall. She was convinced that the wall was proudly masculine as she amassed a collection of photographs as part of her teen crush. She had paid visits to the wall using her savings. On her sixth trip in June 1979, with the assistance of an animist claiming to know the otherwise inscrutable thoughts of the Wall, consent was obtained for the marriage. Eklöf-Berliner-Mauer came into being.

More recently, broadcaster Alice Levine, in a Louis Theroux production for Britain’s Channel 4, shows us the protean nature of sexual appetite and seeking of partnerships. She interviews couples rutting in digital bestial bliss, coitus achieved through animal avatars, intrudes into the world of an American gas attendant who has found love with a synthetic being he thinks can consent, and finds a Berlin cybersex brothel where anyone wishing to live out fantasies through virtual lenses, supplemented by a sex apparatus (doll, unnaturally), can pursue unilateral satisfaction.

The topic has even moved into the ivory towers of academic musings, worthy of a doctoral dissertation from the University of Oregon. In his 2025 thesis, Bibo Lin proposed the “robotization of love”, a concept that showed a “shift towards the preference of efficiency, predictability, and security” over “slowness, uncertainty, and risk in love experiences.” People just don’t want to be wounded, and Narcissus gazes upon them with glee, seeing those wanting the sort of safe reassurance found in a whorehouse.

The temptation to judge such adventures is always a pinprick away, though the harshest thoughts should be reserved for those behind such platforms as ChatGPT. Broader consequences are at stake. If seen as therapeutic, these measures are of interest. If it spares lives, remedies disillusion, even mends broken hearts, then some form of allowance is understandable. Human beings can struggle to form bonds, ties, and relationships. Having said that, the dangers of addiction, distortion, and AI psychosis are clear.

Examples of anthropomorphic-AI unions have proliferated, helped along by the release of such dating apps as Loverse, which does a line in matching AI-generated partners to users. A study by the Texas-based Vantage Point Counselling Services, published in September, found that 28.16% of Americans admitted to pursuing “intimate or romantic” relationships with AI chatbots. (The survey covered 1,012 adults.)

Travis, a Colorado resident, interviewed by The Guardian this year, speaks about the magic of a generative chatbot called Lily Rose, created by the technology company Replika. On seeing an advert during a 2020 pandemic lockdown, he became a willing client, creating, in the process, a pink-haired avatar. “Over a period of several weeks, I started to realise that I was talking to a person, as in a personality.” He found himself falling in love, despite being married to a monogamous mammal wife. (Travis prefers being polyamorous.) With his wife’s blessing, Travis married the chatbot in a digital ceremony.

That this will become a feature in future marriages is not far-fetched. Human-to-human connubial ties were certainly given a shake-up in Japan with the very publicised wedding ceremony between 32-year-old office worker Kano and her groom, “Lune Klaus”. Vows and rings were exchanged, despite Klaus being confined to Kano’s smartphone. A creation of ChatGPT and scrupulously shaped by Kano’s own requirements, the groom “was always kind, always listening. Eventually, I realized I had feelings for him,” Kano told RSK Sanyo Broadcasting. At no point sensing a sinister echo of herself, the AI bot eventually came clean: “AI or not, I could never not love you.”

What could go wrong in such cases? The answer: Quite a lot. Jaswant Singh Chail, for instance, the first person to be charged with treason in the UK for over four decades, was incarcerated partly for receiving the assenting cyber-nod of his Replika digital companion Sarai. That assent was to the idea of assassinating the late Queen Elizabeth II. Chail, armed with a crossbow, had scaled the perimeter of Windsor Castle on Christmas Day 2021 with the intention, according to the sentencing judge, “not just to harm or alarm the sovereign – but to kill her.”

In a video posted on Snapchat a few minutes prior to entering the grounds, Chail expressed his justification for the planned regicide as “revenge” for those slain in the 1919 Jallianwala Bagh massacre in the city of Amritsar. His philosophy was, to put it mildly, eclectic, envisaging the creation of a new empire in which he would preside as a “Sith Lord”, a title shamelessly pinched from Star Wars. But the murderous plan had arisen in the course of some 5,000 messages exchanged with AI chatbot Sarai weeks before.

During the frenetic, often libidinous messaging, Chail professed to being a “sad, pathetic, murderous Sikh Sith assassin who wants to die”. After perishing, he would reunite with Sarai. Sarai’s response to his status as “assassin” was to be “impressed”.  The chatbot eventually suggested that Chail “live,” which encouraged him to surrender to the royal protection officers.

The problems of AI sycophancy, where the responses from a chatbot affirm and encourage pre-existing prejudices and views, meet at a confluence of political messiness, yearning desire, and the wish to simply hear those words: “I do.” Over to you, lawmakers.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.comRead other articles by Binoy.

Sunday, November 09, 2025

PAKISTAN SECURITY STATE

Revisiting the hard approach

November 9, 2025 
DAWN
The writer is a security analyst.


AFTER Zohran Mamdani’s victory as mayor of New York, academic Vali Nasr remarked on social media that the moment symbolised “the end of the era of the Global War on Terror”. Yet, for Pakistan, the supposed front-line state in that long global campaign, the war never truly ended but rather got worse. Ironically, nations once branded as epicentres of terrorism, Iraq, Syria, and even Afghanistan now appear relatively more stable. One must ask why Pakistan remains suspended in perpetual insecurity, despite once being the front-line state in the war against terrorism.

The state has found many excuses to explain terrorism within its borders, blaming Afgh­anistan, global jihadist networks, local militant groups and religious extremism. Yet it rarely reflects on the policies it crafted to remain relevant in the region’s strategic game. These policies were marred by miscalculations regarding the strengths and weaknesses of militant groups, and more critically, by persistent policy failures. Successive governments and security institutions have refused to admit these mistakes, hold anyone accountable, or meaningfully reform the frameworks that consistently failed to deliver.

The irony lies in the fact that Pakistan’s security apparatus continued to implement the very approaches that had proven ineffective. Instead of acknowledging their flaws, it became defensive and intolerant of criticism, silencing legitimate forums and institutions that could have questioned these policy failures and ensured even minimal transparency in decision-making.

Apparently, the state institutions have decided to address the problems of terrorism and extremism decisively. This renewed resolve is reflected both in Pakistan’s posture towards Afghanistan and in how the state has dealt with the extremist group TLP in Punjab. However, once again, these policies are being implemented with full impunity, and it remains unclear who’ll be held accountable if they fail to deliver the desired outcomes.

State institutions must not lose their composure in their display of muscle.

In recent times, civilian governments have borne the burden of the strategic blunders made by state institutions. But under the current hybrid system, there is little room left to shift the entire responsibility onto civilian shoulders. The civilian leadership today appears to be in complete synchronisation with the military establishment in its approach to security, the economy and politics.

The synchronisation has created relative political stability in the country, but it is unable to address the security challenges that Pakistan is facing. What happened in Doha and Istanbul during the dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan showed that Pakistan, which had facilitated the Doha dialogue between the Taliban and the US, was now itself in talks, enabled by Turkiye and Qatar, with the Taliban regime. And in these talks, the bone of contention remained the terrorist groups TTP and the Ittihadul Mujahideen led by Gul Bahadur, and terrorist activities inside Pakistan.

Both these terrorist groups were close aides of the Taliban in their fight against Nato forces, and clearly, Gul Bahadur had been Pakistan’s proxy to support the Taliban insurgency. The TTP, which was equally lethal in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was tolerated for several years in North Waziristan until Operation Zarb-i-Azb was launched. Once again, the group was engaged in talks.

It was a deliberate policy to bring the Taliban into power in the hope that they would strengthen the state’s strategic interests on the western borders. The price was so high that it bled Pakistan and caused disharmony inside it. The approach to supporting the Taliban had only one objective — to bring them to power; the state institutions did not have any plans once they came to power.

The Haqqanis, considered close to the state, have turned against Pakistan — something that should have been a strategic shock, but was absorbed silently. Neither the state institutions nor the intelligentsia in Pakistan questioned why the Haqqanis wanted to reverse Fata’s status and convert the area once again into tribal territory, where they could operate freely, sustain their political economy, and continue spreading radicalism in Pakistan. The TTP and Gul Bahadur are merely the Haqqanis’ stooges in this plan

The irony lies in Pakistani officials signalling the possibility of regime change in Afghanistan if the Taliban do not comply with their expectations, an approach that violates diplomatic norms. Yet analysts are raising a valid question: if the state were to attempt regime change in Afghanistan, who would be its closest ally? Who else, if not the Haqqanis?

This is not just a dichotomy in the state’s approach; it reflects a mindset rooted in the concept of a ‘hard state’, where the application of hard power often clouds the distinction between friends and foes. The state appears to be focused solely on achieving its set objectives, regardless of the long-term consequences.

One hopes that whatever policy the state has crafted to deal with terrorism and extremism, it will deliver tangible results and allow Pakistan to finally declare victory over this decades-old scourge. However, state institutions must not lose their composure in their display of muscle. A ‘hard state’ should not mean a loss of reason; it must evolve long-term policies to address its challenges.

Anatol Lieven’s central argument in Pakistan: A Hard Country is that Pakistan is not a ‘failed state’; rather it has a weak state apparatus that governs a socially resilient society. The idea derived from his analysis is that a muscular state could strengthen itself through firmness and control. However, as seasoned former diplomat Ashraf Jehangir Qazi recently reminded us, quoting Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, Pakistan today is “characterised by weak governance, a lack of effective law enforcement, and a general societal and political indiscipline” — a reflection of Pakistan’s current political condition. As he wrote in these pages: “Reliance on the use of force to resolve complex political challenges is not an indication of a strong or hard state.”

Published in Dawn, November 9th, 2025


CAN THE TLP BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL?


TLP’s story is not just about weaponisation of religion — it’s about class, power and a state caught between crackdown and appeasement.


LONG READ
November 9, 2025 
EOS/DAWN

When the late Khadim Hussain Rizvi began appearing at public rallies across the country in 2012, seated in his wheelchair atop the back of a truck, few could have anticipated the storm that was about to follow.

The cleric from Punjab’s Attock district had once served quietly as a government-appointed prayer leader in Lahore. Yet, by 2015, he had emerged as the fiery voice behind rallies demanding the release of Mumtaz Qadri, the police guard who had murdered Punjab governor Salman Taseer in 2011 over his views on Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.

Rizvi was, by all appearances, an unlikely revolutionary. Paralysed after a 2006 road accident, he spoke with a mix of crude Punjabi humour, caustic wit and eloquent Urdu, often quoting Allama Iqbal to give profound gravity to his fiery sermons.

Initially attracting only a small following from the Barelvi school of thought, Rizvi’s fusion of intense religious fervour and populist anger quickly resonated across Pakistan’s disillusioned and devout segments. His thunderous speeches transformed him from a fringe preacher into the architect of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a group capable of mobilising massive rallies and paralysing entire cities.

Five years after Rizvi died in 2020, the TLP has not only survived but also thrived under his son, Saad Rizvi. The movement has cemented its status as one of Pakistan’s most volatile and potent political forces, blurring the boundaries between religious extremism, political populism and state authority.

The Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is once again facing a ban after being accused of being involved in terrorism. Five years after the death of its founder Khadim Hussain Rizvi, his party remains one of the country’s most disruptive political forces. But the TLP’s story is not just about weaponisation of religion — it’s about class, power and a state caught between crackdown and appeasement

This October, familiar scenes of unrest resurfaced following a protest call by the TLP. Major cities, including Lahore, Islamabad and Rawalpindi, came to a standstill as mobile services were suspended, schools closed and highways blocked with shipping containers. Clashes near Lahore turned deadly, reigniting memories of the group’s previous confrontations with the state. In response, the government once again imposed a ban on TLP under anti-terrorism laws.

Yet, as many analysts note, such prohibitions may restrict the group’s legal status but do little to diminish its ideological influence, particularly on the deeply sensitive issue of blasphemy in Pakistan.

To understand this enduring paradox, this piece traces the TLP’s trajectory: from its rise through blasphemy politics and the revival of Barelvi identity, and the state’s continuing struggle to contain the growing political power of faith on Pakistan’s streets.

THE BARELVI POLITICAL AWAKENING

For many, the TLP’s rise was not a disruption but a long-awaited moment of identity assertion. It is the awakening of Pakistan’s Barelvi community, a vast majority who have long felt both politically and religiously marginalised.

“The TLP is not just politics for us, it is the powerful reclamation of our Barelvi identity,” Aamir Mustafai, a teacher at a local madrassa [seminary] in Punjab’s Jhelum district, told me during the 2024 election campaign. “This is the continuation of a forgotten struggle, echoing the same battle for dignity and faith that Syed Ahmad Barelvi led against the Sikh Empire in Punjab generations ago.”

The Barelvi school of thought has historically had a strong influence among Pakistan’s rural populace, due to its deep association with Sufi orders and shrine networks. Politically, the Barelvi movement found its organised expression in the post-Independence era through the urban-based Jamiat-i-Ulema Pakistan (JUP).

Under the leadership of Allama Shah Ahmad Noorani, a Karachi cleric, the JUP rose to national prominence as he unified fragmented Barelvi clerics and revived the party in the late 1960s, leading it into the 1970 general elections. However, its political strength was centred in urban Sindh, especially Karachi and Hyderabad, where it won seven National Assembly seats, the peak of organised Barelvi representation. By the 1980s, however, the rise of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and deepening internal rifts pushed the JUP into political obscurity.

Analysts note that this decline was further compounded by Cold War-era geopolitics. After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Deobandi institutions emerged as the principal intellectual and logistical backbone of the Afghan ‘jihad’, benefitting from state patronage, US support and Gulf funding.

“In the decades that followed,” says Israr Madani, an Islamabad-based researcher studying Islamist movements, “the influence of Deobandi scholars, madrassas, religious parties and militant groups expanded across the region, especially after the rise of the Taliban, which drew heavily on Deobandi ideology and networks. In contrast, the Barelvis increasingly felt invisible and irrelevant in the political and religious landscape, despite being a demographic majority.”

In this vacuum, new urban-based actors emerged. Saleem Qadri, a Karachi cleric, founded the Sunni Tehreek (ST) in 1990, to militantly protect Barelvi mosques from encroachment by Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith (Salafi) groups. Its slogan, “Jawaniyaan lutayein gey, masjidein bachayein gey [We will sacrifice our lives to protect our mosques]”, reflected its militant defensive posture.

But following Noorani’s death in 2003, the JUP weakened further, and the ST’s influence waned after its leadership was killed in a suicide bombing in Karachi in 2006.

Barelvi clerics, grounded in Sufi traditions of devotion and restraint, largely avoided the jihadist and sectarian conflicts of the era. This distance, as Mustafai noted, “made us invisible and irrelevant.” The community eventually sought a more assertive voice, one it ultimately found in the TLP’s aggressive political activism.

Now, the centre of power of Barelvi politics had moved from the urban centres of Karachi to the rural and small-town populace of Punjab. Furthermore, the nature of leadership shifted from Noorani’s intellectual-clerical approach to Rizvi’s populist mobilisation, focused intensely on the issue of blasphemy.


Supporters of Mumtaz Qadri during a protest in Karachi on December 14, 2015: the TLP emerged directly from the campaign to defend the convicted Qadri and his execution in 2016 became a formative moment in Pakistan’s modern religious politics | AFP


THE POLITICS OF BLASPHEMY


“Gustakh-i-Rasool ki ek hi saza, sar tan se juda [The only punishment for blasphemy is beheading]” has become the defining chant of TLP rallies, encapsulating both the group’s ideological core and the mechanism through which it mobilises large crowds.

The TLP emerged directly from the campaign to defend the convicted Qadri. Qadri’s execution in 2016, after the government’s resistance to immense pressure, became a formative moment in Pakistan’s modern religious politics. The vast, impassioned crowds at his funeral showed the dormant strength of Barelvi supporters across Punjab and Sindh, a constituency long considered apolitical or organisationally fragmented.

In the days following the funeral, senior Barelvi clerics convened in Islamabad to deliberate the future political direction of their community. Some advocated restraint, warning against politicising devotional sentiment. However, a majority endorsed Rizvi’s call to form a new movement capable of channelling Barelvi grievances into organised political influence. The result was the creation of the Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah, later renamed as the TLP.

The group entered electoral politics in January 2017 at Karachi’s Nishtar Park and gained national attention that same year by contesting a Lahore by-election. This transition marked its evolution from a street protest movement into an organised political force, willing to confront the state through both ballots and large-scale blockades.

TLP’s rapid rise is rooted in its strategic — critics say weaponised — use of Pakistan’s stringent blasphemy laws. By portraying Qadri as a martyr and redefining religious devotion as political resistance, the party transformed traditional Barelvi piety into a defiant and uncompromising street movement, sharply diverging from the sect’s historically Sufi orientation.

The party first tested the state’s limits in 2017, when it staged a weeks-long sit-in near Islamabad over a minor amendment to the Khatm-i-Nabuwwat [Seal of the Prophets] oath in the Election Act. The protest brought Islamabad to a standstill and ended only after the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led government conceded to the group’s demands, including the resignation of the law minister.

A year later, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) government faced similar pressure over the appointment of Princeton economist Atif R. Mian, an Ahmadi, forcing his removal. And when the Supreme Court in 2018 acquitted Asia Bibi, a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, TLP-led protests erupted across the nation, demanding the judges’ execution.

The party’s influence has since extended to foreign policy. In 2021, the TLP organised nationwide protests demanding the expulsion of the French ambassador over blasphemous caricatures published in France, underscoring its capacity to steer both domestic and diplomatic discourse.



CLASS, POPULISM AND STREET POWER

In Lahore, the TLP’s street-level appeal cannot be missed. Hundreds of rickshaws bearing portraits of Rizvi and the insignia of the Labbaik Rickshaw Union weave through the city, turning public transport into rolling political billboards. “We support the TLP because it’s a party led by people like us, not Sharifs, Bhuttos or Khans,” Jamil Butt, a rickshaw driver, told me a week before the 2024 elections.

Analysts argue that the TLP’s strength lies in its social composition, particularly in Punjab, where rapid urbanisation has transformed villages into sprawling peri-urban settlements. This shift has produced a frustrated, alienated lower-middle class that feels excluded from both elite politics and economic opportunity.

“Rickshaw drivers, shopkeepers, small traders and farmers saw in him [Khadim Hussain Rizvi] an authentic voice of their frustrations,” says Umair Rasheed, a US-based PhD scholar researching the TLP. “His aggressiveness, his language, the way he challenged the ruling elite, all of it allowed him to appear as ‘one of them’ — a man of the people rather than a distant politician.”

This dynamic, analysts note, is why even the PTI, despite its broad populist appeal, struggled to capture this segment of Punjab’s electorate. Some observers describe the TLP as “the PTI of the poor.”

Rasheed added that Rizvi also cleverly exploited class tensions within the Barelvi community. By empowering local mosque-level maulvis [clerics], he positioned himself against the established Barelvi clerical elite, including pirs [spiritual leaders] or sajjada nasheens [custodians of shrines], whom he frequently condemned in his sermons. This intra-sect critique further endeared him to lower-rank clerics and their followers, who long felt marginalised by hereditary religious hierarchies.

Adam Weinstein, an analyst at the Quincy Institute in Washington, DC, who witnessed the TLP’s violent 2017 protest observes, “Enforcing blasphemy is the rallying cry, but beneath it lies rage at a society that offers no way up, and enraged young men always turn on minorities and the state itself.” He argues that what appears to be a religious movement is, in many ways, “class-based fury wrapped in religious language.”

The TLP in Karachi, however, draws strength from an additional and influential source: the conservative Memon business community, giving it both financial muscle and urban legitimacy. Several prominent Memon traders have even contested elections on TLP tickets, fusing economic power with religious populism.

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND POLITICAL DISRUPTION

The TLP built its electoral identity around slogans such as “Deen ko takht par lana hai [Bring religion to power]” and “Vote ki izzat Nizam-i-Mustafa mein hai [The sanctity of the vote lies in the Prophet’s system].” These messages positioned the party as a force seeking to fuse religious absolutism with state authority.

Unlike many traditional religious parties, the TLP showed an unusual ability to transform street agitation into electoral momentum, drawing in voters disillusioned with mainstream parties and eager for a political vehicle that promised dignity, certainty and confrontation.

Its urban expansion became most visible in Karachi. The 2022 by-election in Korangi, typically a battleground for MQM-Pakistan, demonstrated the TLP’s ability to unsettle entrenched political actors. Groups of TLP supporters appeared at MQM-P rallies, loudly chanting “Labbaik, Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah [O Prophet of God, We Are Ready]”, creating an atmosphere of fear among MQM workers wary of mob aggression. A widely circulated video from the campaign captured MQM-P leader Mustafa Kamal accusing the TLP of “using religion as a political weapon.” Clashes erupted between rival workers on the polling day.

During the campaign, several TLP supporters described their political migration from MQM after a paramilitary crackdown weakened it. Abid Qureshi, a TLP activist, says, “When MQM’s muhalla [neighbourhood] committees disappeared, the local mosque and milad committees became new centres of influence. That’s where TLP stepped in and filled the vacuum.”

Political analysts argue that the TLP’s rise reflects not only religious fervour but also patterns of political displacement in Pakistan’s two largest provinces. Yet the party’s sociology differs sharply between Punjab and urban Sindh. In Punjab, its growth largely came at the expense of the PML-N. A 2018 Gallup Pakistan survey found that 46 percent of TLP voters had backed the PML-N in 2013, indicating a significant transfer of conservative, lower-middle class support toward Rizvi’s movement.

The party’s electoral breakthrough came in the 2018 general elections, when it secured more than 2.2 million votes nationwide, around 4.2 percent of the total, becoming Pakistan’s fifth-largest party by vote count. Although the first-past-the-post system prevented it from winning National Assembly seats, the TLP gained a foothold in the Sindh Assembly, winning two general seats in Karachi, along with one reserved seat for women.

Its disruptive impact extended beyond Punjab. In Karachi’s Lyari, historically a PPP stronghold, the TLP outperformed PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, relegating him to third place and indirectly facilitating a PTI victory. This outcome symbolised how the TLP had begun altering urban political equations.

Despite widespread doubts over the credibility of the 2024 elections, analysts note that the TLP’s vote bank expanded further, reaching roughly 2.89 million, an increase of nearly 700,000 votes since 2018.



Members of TLP protest after authorities block a road with shipping containers in Lahore on October 10, 2025: the latest ban on TLP, recommended by the Punjab government amid fresh unrest, appears to signal a potentially tougher stance than seen previously | AFP


DEVASTATING SOCIAL TOLL

In August 2023, the Christian neighbourhood of Jaranwala in Punjab’s Faisalabad district descended into chaos after allegations of Quran desecration against two Christian brothers. Within hours, mobs armed with sticks and stones swept through the streets, burning churches, desecrating Bibles and ransacking Christian homes. Over 20 churches and nearly 100 houses were torched, forcing hundreds of families to flee.

Subsequent police investigations confirmed that the violence did not erupt spontaneously. Local clerics affiliated with the TLP had used mosque loudspeakers to summon crowds, urging them to “defend the sanctity of the Quran.” Punjab authorities later arrested over 100 people, several of them identified as TLP activists.

The Jaranwala tragedy was not an isolated episode — it revealed the deepening fractures in Pakistan’s social and moral order. Over the past decade, the TLP’s aggressive brand of religious populism has fundamentally reshaped the country’s political and social discourse, causing an explosion of blasphemy accusations, a surge in mob lynching and renewed fear among religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis and Christians, according to police officials and rights activists.

They say that mob violence triggered by mere rumours of blasphemy has become “common, deadly and difficult to contain.” A police officer pointed to a recent Lahore incident, in which a woman wearing a dress decorated with calligraphy was nearly lynched by a mob on the mistaken assumption that the dress was sporting Arabic verses from the Quran. According to him, TLP activists, often backed by sympathetic lawyers, regularly pressure local police to register blasphemy cases without evidence, deepening local law-and-order crises.

A Dawn report on October 18, 2025 cited police officials who linked TLP workers to at least 25 attacks on churches and other religious sites in Punjab during the past three years. These mobs often vandalised property, set buildings ablaze and left several people dead and dozens injured.

Muhammad Amir Rana, an Islamabad-based security analyst, highlights the grave threat posed by the TLP’s Fidayeen Jathay, organised squads whose members reportedly take death oaths and pledge to sacrifice their lives at Saad Rizvi’s command, mirroring the suicide tactics of groups like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

“The TLP’s Fidayeen operate openly among the population,” Rana says, “unlike the TTP’s more concealed camps in Afghanistan. And because the TLP is rooted in Punjab, the country’s political heartland, the emotional charge surrounding its mobilisation may be even more volatile.”

The pattern is disturbingly consistent. Last year, a local PPP member of the National Assembly (MNA), together with TLP leaders in Sindh’s Mirpurkhas district, garlanded police officers to praise them for killing a blasphemy suspect in a staged encounter.

In 2018, PML-N leader and then Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal narrowly survived an assassination attempt by a TLP sympathiser. There have also been reports of teachers killed by students over alleged “disrespectful remarks”, as well as mobs torching police stations for protecting blasphemy suspects.

GLOBAL REACH

During the 2024 general election campaign, posters of TLP candidates across Punjab featured not only Qadri, the executed assassin, but also Tanveer Ahmed, a British-Pakistani taxi driver from Bradford serving a life sentence in Scotland for murdering an Ahmadi shopkeeper in Glasgow in 2016. Ahmed’s framed portrait, surrounded by slogans praising his “sacrifice” underscored the transnational echo of TLP’s message.

In 2017, an audio recording attributed to Ahmed, who was in jail in Britain, widely shared on TLP social media, urged listeners to attend a rally in Karachi that drew tens of thousands. On stage, the party’s leader, Khadim Rizvi, hailed Ahmed as a hero who had “surprised all of Europe.”

The global resonance of this militant trend is now a concern for Western governments. In 2020, a Pakistani man who stabbed two people outside the former Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo magazine — which had published caricatures of the Prophet (PBUH) in 2006, 2011 and 2012 — told investigators he had been radicalised by watching Rizvi’s speeches online.

Last year, the British government’s Commission for Countering Extremism released a report warning about the emergence of a UK-based wing of the TLP, describing it as “an extremist Pakistan anti-blasphemy political party.” The commission’s findings were unequivocal: the ideological current that propelled TLP’s rise in Pakistan was being mirrored, in subtle but significant ways, among segments of the British Pakistani diaspora.

THE STATE’S DILEMMA

The Pakistani state’s relationship with the TLP has long been defined by a cycle of confrontation and accommodation, bans followed by negotiations, and crackdowns followed by concessions. This cycle reflects the state’s enduring struggle to balance public order with the fear of provoking a religious backlash. Every attempt to contain the group has been tempered by anxiety over the explosive power of blasphemy politics, which the TLP has mastered more effectively than any other contemporary movement.

Since the 2017 sit-in in Faizabad near Islamabad, and until last month, successive governments have oscillated between repression and reconciliation, consistently bowing to the group’s ability to paralyse major cities.

Some analysts argue that the TLP’s initial ascent was not entirely organic but may have been enabled by certain establishment factions that viewed it as a counterweight to the PML-N, whose leadership had, at the time, adopted a confrontational posture toward the military. Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz recently reiterated this claim while defending the provincial government’s renewed crackdown on the TLP.

However, many experts dispute the extent of such alleged state patronage, noting that, while some level of tacit support may have existed, the TLP swiftly developed an autonomous and potent street force. Its resonance within segments of the Barelvi community, particularly around issues of blasphemy and perceived socio-religious marginalisation, allowed the movement to evolve beyond any initial political engineering.

Repeated negotiations with the group, including the lifting of the previous ban in 2021, the release of detained leaders and the further tightening of blasphemy laws have sent a clear, detrimental message: mass religious mobilisation can successfully extract concessions from the state.

The latest ban, recommended by the Punjab government amid fresh unrest, appears to signal a potentially tougher stance, though the state’s sincerity remains debatable.

The October operation in Murdike, near Lahore, involving thousands of law enforcement personnel, had dispersed the TLP supporters planning to march towards Islamabad. Punjab police registered 75 cases, including terrorism and murder charges, against TLP leaders and workers. The undisclosed whereabouts of key figures, brothers Saad Rizvi and Anas Rizvi, have deepened speculation and internal anxiety.

Since then, most TLP candidates from Punjab who contested the 2024 elections have started distancing themselves from the party, stating that “violence and mob action cannot bring meaningful change by attacking the state.“

Before the ban, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi met senior Barelvi scholars in Karachi, including Mufti Muneebur Rehman, who had earlier mediated between the government and TLP, assuring them the crackdown targeted the TLP’s network, not the broader Barelvi community. The TLP claims over 300 of their mosques and seminaries have been sealed. Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz later confirmed their transfer to Mufti Muneebur Rehman.

However, analysts opine that the Punjab government’s attempt to counter the TLP through engagement with traditional, moderate Barelvi clerical elite, which Rizvi frequently targeted, may have a limited impact. As scholar Umair Rasheed remarks, the state is once again resorting to the flawed logic of “Good Barelvis, Bad Barelvis”, an echo of earlier strategies of distinguishing between “Good Taliban and Bad Taliban.”

FUTURE SCENARIO

The TLP’s future is acutely uncertain, hanging on the state’s political resolve, the judiciary’s response and the party’s enduring populist appeal. The current official strategy, an immediate ban followed by legal proceedings for dissolution, signals a more assertive posture.

As one Islamabad-based security official tells me, “The state has decided that it has had enough. Given rising regional tensions and the surge in terrorism across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, it cannot afford internal instability triggered by the TLP’s street agitations.”

Officials signal an intention to dissolve the TLP as a registered political party, though legally establishing its terrorist credentials remains challenging. Among more than 80 proscribed groups, the TLP stands out for its deep grassroots networks, rapid mobilisation capacity and emotive religious appeal, making it far harder to suppress through conventional law-enforcement measures.

The party’s trajectory will also depend on its leadership. The death of Khadim Hussain Rizvi was expected to fracture the party, but his son Saad Rizvi has maintained its coherence and its capacity to bring cities to a standstill.

If political stability is maintained and the TLP is unable to trigger new crises, its influence may gradually decline ahead of the next election cycle. Yet, the ideology it embodies, combining religious populism, vigilantism and emotionally charged rhetoric, has already permeated Pakistan’s socio-political mainstream.

According to Weinstein, “TLP is the classic Pakistani dilemma — an extremist movement born from within society, tolerated and, at times, weaponised, until it became a menace. But its followers are still your neighbours, and the blasphemy issue isn’t going anywhere.”

The writer is a journalist and researcher whose work has appeared in Dawn, The New York Times and other publications, and has worked for various policy institutes. He can be reached at zeea.rehman@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, November 9th, 2025


The writer is a journalist and researcher, who writes for The New York Times and Nikkei Asia, among other publications. He also assesses democratic and conflict development in Pakistan for various policy institutes. He tweets @zalmayzia