Canada and India strike agreements on rare earth, uranium

By AFP
March 2, 2026


India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) met with Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney in New Delhi - Copyright AFP Joe Klamar

India and Canada on Monday reached a string of agreements, including on critical mineral cooperation and a “landmark” uranium supply deal for nuclear power, the countries’ leaders said in New Delhi.

The pacts, which also covered technology and promoting the use of renewable energy, were announced after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Canadian counterpart Mark Carney hailed a fresh start in the relationship between their nations.

“Our ties have seen a new energy, mutual trust, and positivity,” Modi said.

Ties effectively collapsed in 2023 after Ottawa accused New Delhi of orchestrating a deadly campaign against Sikh activists in Canada, accusations India rejected.

Carney’s visit — his first to India since taking office last year — is not only aimed to reset strained ties, but also to push efforts to diversify trade beyond the United States.

“There has been more engagement between the Canadian and Indian governments in the last year than there has been in more than two decades combined,” Carney said in New Delhi, in a speech alongside Modi.

“This is not merely the renewal of a relationship. It is the expansion of a valued partnership with new ambition, focus, and foresight, a partnership between two confident countries charting our own course for the future.”



– ‘New opportunities’ –



Energy-hungry India — the world’s most populous country with 1.4 billion people — has ambitious plans to expand nuclear power capacity from its current eight to 100 gigawatts by 2047.

“In civil nuclear energy, we have struck a landmark deal for long-term uranium supply,” Modi said, adding the countries would also work together on small modular reactors and advanced reactors.

Carney said they had agreed the launch of a “strategic energy partnership with significant potential” including CAN$2.6 billion ($1.9 billion) uranium supply agreement “supporting India’s nuclear ambitions”.

Carney added that Canada was “well positioned to contribute, as a reliable supplier” of liquefied natural gas (LNG), from its west coast.

“As India seeks access to critical minerals for its manufacturing, its clean-tech, and its nuclear plants, Canada’s resource base and world-leading companies position it as a strategic partner,” he said.

The two countries agreed last year to resume negotiations on a proposed free-trade deal, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

“Our target is to reach $50 billion in bilateral trade,” Modi said. “This is why we have decided to finalise a comprehensive economic partnership soon,” he added, saying it “will open new opportunities to invest and create jobs in both countries”.



– Defence deal –



Carney said he wanted to reach a deal on the “ambitious agreement” by the end of the year to “reduce barriers and increase certainty”, also said the nations were renewing security cooperation through a “new defence partnership”.

Canadian pension and wealth funds have already invested $73 billion in India.

Before Carney took office last year, Ottawa accused Modi’s government of direct involvement in the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a naturalised Canadian citizen who was part of a fringe group that advocated for an independent Sikh state called Khalistan.

Khalistan militants have been blamed for the assassination of an Indian prime minister and the bombing of a passenger jet.

India has repeatedly dismissed the Canadian allegations, which sent relations into freefall, with both nations expelling a string of top diplomats in 2024.

Ties improved after Carney took office in March 2025, and envoys have since been restored.

After India, Carney will travel to Australia and Japan — part of a wider push to broaden Canada’s economic partnerships.

Carney has made reducing Canada’s heavy reliance on the US economy a centrepiece of his foreign economic policy.

In 2024, before US President Donald Trump returned to office and upended global trade with a flurry of tariffs, more than 75 percent of Canadian exports went to the United States. Two-way trade that year exceeded $900 billion.

So far Trump has broadly adhered to the North American free-trade agreement he signed during his first term, and about 85 percent of US-Canada trade remains tariff-free.

But at the same time, Trump has also imposed painful industry-specific tariffs, and there are fears that if he scraps the broader trade deal, the Canadian economy will be hit hard.

burs-pjm/mtp

Canada’s Carney to mend rift, boost trade as he meets India’s Modi


By AFP
March 1, 2026


Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney greets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a G7 meeting last year in western Canada - Copyright AFP Idrees MOHAMMED
Abhaya SRIVASTAVA

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney will seek to reset strained ties and push efforts to diversify trade beyond the United States when he meets his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi on Monday.

The talks in New Delhi are expected to cover trade and investment, clean energy, defence, critical minerals and artificial intelligence, officials from both sides have said.

A major focus will be reviving negotiations for a long-discussed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

Speaking to business leaders in Mumbai on Saturday, Carney said the planned deal, which he was looking to seal by the end of the year, could double bilateral trade by 2030.

“This visit marks the end of a challenging period, and more importantly, the beginning of a new, more ambitious partnership between two confident and complementary nations,” he said.

Carney’s visit is a key step forward in ties that effectively collapsed in 2023 after Ottawa accused New Delhi of orchestrating a deadly campaign against Sikh activists in Canada.

India’s foreign ministry said Carney’s visit marked a “significant step” in strengthening relations.

India is seeking to attract more overseas investments and says Canadian pension and wealth funds have already invested $73 billion.

Energy-hungry India — the world’s most populous country, with 1.4 billion people — hopes Canada can support its ambitious plan to expand nuclear power capacity.

– ‘Strategic partner’ –

“We can be India’s strategic partner in critical minerals for India’s manufacturing, clean tech, and nuclear industries,” Carney said.

“And India can help us double our grid with clean power by 2040.”

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is in India to boost trade between the two countries – Copyright AFP Indranil Mukherjee

Before Carney took office last year, Ottawa accused Modi’s government of direct involvement in the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a naturalised Canadian citizen who was part of a fringe group that advocated for an independent Sikh state called Khalistan.

Khalistan militants have been blamed for the assassination of an Indian prime minister and the bombing of a passenger jet.

Former prime minister Justin Trudeau’s government further alleged India had directed a broader campaign of intimidation against Sikh activists across Canada.

India has repeatedly dismissed the allegations, which sent relations into freefall, with both nations expelling a string of top diplomats in 2024.

Strategic analyst and author Brahma Chellaney said Carney’s trip was “intended to close one of the most acrimonious diplomatic chapters between two major democracies in recent memory”.

“For two pluralistic democracies navigating an uncertain century, this may prove to be the most sustainable foundation of all,” he said on X.

Ties between New Delhi and Ottawa improved after Carney took office in March 2025, and envoys have since been restored.

– ‘Enormous opportunities’ –

“Building true strategic autonomy requires diversification, not isolation,” Carney said.

“It creates enormous opportunities for India and Canada to work together, to limit risks, to increase prosperity, and to build sovereignty.”

Carney has made reducing Canada’s heavy reliance on the US economy a centrepiece of his foreign economic policy.

In 2024, before US President Donald Trump returned to office and upended global trade with a flurry of tariffs, more than 75 percent of Canadian exports went to the United States. Two-way trade that year exceeded $900 billion.

So far Trump has broadly adhered to the North American free-trade agreement he signed during his first term, and about 85 percent of US-Canada trade remains tariff-free.

But at the same time, Trump has also imposed painful industry-specific tariffs, and there are fears that if he scraps the broader trade deal, the Canadian economy will be hit hard.

Carney is trying to boost commerce with Europe and Asia as a strategy to backstop Canada’s economy, should free trade with Washington collapse.

After India, Carney will travel to Australia and Japan — part of a wider push to broaden Canada’s economic partnerships.

burs-abh/mjw

PAKISTAN SECURITY STATE

Revisiting the hard approach

Muhammad Amir Rana 

November 9, 2025 

DAWN
The writer is a security analyst.

AFTER Zohran Mamdani’s victory as mayor of New York, academic Vali Nasr remarked on social media that the moment symbolised “the end of the era of the Global War on Terror”. Yet, for Pakistan, the supposed front-line state in that long global campaign, the war never truly ended but rather got worse. Ironically, nations once branded as epicentres of terrorism, Iraq, Syria, and even Afghanistan now appear relatively more stable. One must ask why Pakistan remains suspended in perpetual insecurity, despite once being the front-line state in the war against terrorism.

The state has found many excuses to explain terrorism within its borders, blaming Afgh­anistan, global jihadist networks, local militant groups and religious extremism. Yet it rarely reflects on the policies it crafted to remain relevant in the region’s strategic game. These policies were marred by miscalculations regarding the strengths and weaknesses of militant groups, and more critically, by persistent policy failures. Successive governments and security institutions have refused to admit these mistakes, hold anyone accountable, or meaningfully reform the frameworks that consistently failed to deliver.

The irony lies in the fact that Pakistan’s security apparatus continued to implement the very approaches that had proven ineffective. Instead of acknowledging their flaws, it became defensive and intolerant of criticism, silencing legitimate forums and institutions that could have questioned these policy failures and ensured even minimal transparency in decision-making.

Apparently, the state institutions have decided to address the problems of terrorism and extremism decisively. This renewed resolve is reflected both in Pakistan’s posture towards Afghanistan and in how the state has dealt with the extremist group TLP in Punjab. However, once again, these policies are being implemented with full impunity, and it remains unclear who’ll be held accountable if they fail to deliver the desired outcomes.

State institutions must not lose their composure in their display of muscle.

In recent times, civilian governments have borne the burden of the strategic blunders made by state institutions. But under the current hybrid system, there is little room left to shift the entire responsibility onto civilian shoulders. The civilian leadership today appears to be in complete synchronisation with the military establishment in its approach to security, the economy and politics.

The synchronisation has created relative political stability in the country, but it is unable to address the security challenges that Pakistan is facing. What happened in Doha and Istanbul during the dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan showed that Pakistan, which had facilitated the Doha dialogue between the Taliban and the US, was now itself in talks, enabled by Turkiye and Qatar, with the Taliban regime. And in these talks, the bone of contention remained the terrorist groups TTP and the Ittihadul Mujahideen led by Gul Bahadur, and terrorist activities inside Pakistan.

Both these terrorist groups were close aides of the Taliban in their fight against Nato forces, and clearly, Gul Bahadur had been Pakistan’s proxy to support the Taliban insurgency. The TTP, which was equally lethal in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was tolerated for several years in North Waziristan until Operation Zarb-i-Azb was launched. Once again, the group was engaged in talks.

It was a deliberate policy to bring the Taliban into power in the hope that they would strengthen the state’s strategic interests on the western borders. The price was so high that it bled Pakistan and caused disharmony inside it. The approach to supporting the Taliban had only one objective — to bring them to power; the state institutions did not have any plans once they came to power.

The Haqqanis, considered close to the state, have turned against Pakistan — something that should have been a strategic shock, but was absorbed silently. Neither the state institutions nor the intelligentsia in Pakistan questioned why the Haqqanis wanted to reverse Fata’s status and convert the area once again into tribal territory, where they could operate freely, sustain their political economy, and continue spreading radicalism in Pakistan. The TTP and Gul Bahadur are merely the Haqqanis’ stooges in this plan

The irony lies in Pakistani officials signalling the possibility of regime change in Afghanistan if the Taliban do not comply with their expectations, an approach that violates diplomatic norms. Yet analysts are raising a valid question: if the state were to attempt regime change in Afghanistan, who would be its closest ally? Who else, if not the Haqqanis?

This is not just a dichotomy in the state’s approach; it reflects a mindset rooted in the concept of a ‘hard state’, where the application of hard power often clouds the distinction between friends and foes. The state appears to be focused solely on achieving its set objectives, regardless of the long-term consequences.

One hopes that whatever policy the state has crafted to deal with terrorism and extremism, it will deliver tangible results and allow Pakistan to finally declare victory over this decades-old scourge. However, state institutions must not lose their composure in their display of muscle. A ‘hard state’ should not mean a loss of reason; it must evolve long-term policies to address its challenges.

Anatol Lieven’s central argument in Pakistan: A Hard Country is that Pakistan is not a ‘failed state’; rather it has a weak state apparatus that governs a socially resilient society. The idea derived from his analysis is that a muscular state could strengthen itself through firmness and control. However, as seasoned former diplomat Ashraf Jehangir Qazi recently reminded us, quoting Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, Pakistan today is “characterised by weak governance, a lack of effective law enforcement, and a general societal and political indiscipline” — a reflection of Pakistan’s current political condition. As he wrote in these pages: “Reliance on the use of force to resolve complex political challenges is not an indication of a strong or hard state.”

Published in Dawn, November 9th, 2025

CAN THE TLP BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL?

TLP’s story is not just about weaponisation of religion — it’s about class, power and a state caught between crackdown and appeasement.

LONG READ

Zia Ur Rehman 

November 9, 2025 

EOS/DAWN

When the late Khadim Hussain Rizvi began appearing at public rallies across the country in 2012, seated in his wheelchair atop the back of a truck, few could have anticipated the storm that was about to follow.

The cleric from Punjab’s Attock district had once served quietly as a government-appointed prayer leader in Lahore. Yet, by 2015, he had emerged as the fiery voice behind rallies demanding the release of Mumtaz Qadri, the police guard who had murdered Punjab governor Salman Taseer in 2011 over his views on Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.

Rizvi was, by all appearances, an unlikely revolutionary. Paralysed after a 2006 road accident, he spoke with a mix of crude Punjabi humour, caustic wit and eloquent Urdu, often quoting Allama Iqbal to give profound gravity to his fiery sermons.

Initially attracting only a small following from the Barelvi school of thought, Rizvi’s fusion of intense religious fervour and populist anger quickly resonated across Pakistan’s disillusioned and devout segments. His thunderous speeches transformed him from a fringe preacher into the architect of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a group capable of mobilising massive rallies and paralysing entire cities.

Five years after Rizvi died in 2020, the TLP has not only survived but also thrived under his son, Saad Rizvi. The movement has cemented its status as one of Pakistan’s most volatile and potent political forces, blurring the boundaries between religious extremism, political populism and state authority.

The Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is once again facing a ban after being accused of being involved in terrorism. Five years after the death of its founder Khadim Hussain Rizvi, his party remains one of the country’s most disruptive political forces. But the TLP’s story is not just about weaponisation of religion — it’s about class, power and a state caught between crackdown and appeasement

This October, familiar scenes of unrest resurfaced following a protest call by the TLP. Major cities, including Lahore, Islamabad and Rawalpindi, came to a standstill as mobile services were suspended, schools closed and highways blocked with shipping containers. Clashes near Lahore turned deadly, reigniting memories of the group’s previous confrontations with the state. In response, the government once again imposed a ban on TLP under anti-terrorism laws.

Yet, as many analysts note, such prohibitions may restrict the group’s legal status but do little to diminish its ideological influence, particularly on the deeply sensitive issue of blasphemy in Pakistan.

To understand this enduring paradox, this piece traces the TLP’s trajectory: from its rise through blasphemy politics and the revival of Barelvi identity, and the state’s continuing struggle to contain the growing political power of faith on Pakistan’s streets.

THE BARELVI POLITICAL AWAKENING

For many, the TLP’s rise was not a disruption but a long-awaited moment of identity assertion. It is the awakening of Pakistan’s Barelvi community, a vast majority who have long felt both politically and religiously marginalised.

“The TLP is not just politics for us, it is the powerful reclamation of our Barelvi identity,” Aamir Mustafai, a teacher at a local madrassa [seminary] in Punjab’s Jhelum district, told me during the 2024 election campaign. “This is the continuation of a forgotten struggle, echoing the same battle for dignity and faith that Syed Ahmad Barelvi led against the Sikh Empire in Punjab generations ago.”

The Barelvi school of thought has historically had a strong influence among Pakistan’s rural populace, due to its deep association with Sufi orders and shrine networks. Politically, the Barelvi movement found its organised expression in the post-Independence era through the urban-based Jamiat-i-Ulema Pakistan (JUP).

Under the leadership of Allama Shah Ahmad Noorani, a Karachi cleric, the JUP rose to national prominence as he unified fragmented Barelvi clerics and revived the party in the late 1960s, leading it into the 1970 general elections. However, its political strength was centred in urban Sindh, especially Karachi and Hyderabad, where it won seven National Assembly seats, the peak of organised Barelvi representation. By the 1980s, however, the rise of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and deepening internal rifts pushed the JUP into political obscurity.

Analysts note that this decline was further compounded by Cold War-era geopolitics. After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Deobandi institutions emerged as the principal intellectual and logistical backbone of the Afghan ‘jihad’, benefitting from state patronage, US support and Gulf funding.

“In the decades that followed,” says Israr Madani, an Islamabad-based researcher studying Islamist movements, “the influence of Deobandi scholars, madrassas, religious parties and militant groups expanded across the region, especially after the rise of the Taliban, which drew heavily on Deobandi ideology and networks. In contrast, the Barelvis increasingly felt invisible and irrelevant in the political and religious landscape, despite being a demographic majority.”

In this vacuum, new urban-based actors emerged. Saleem Qadri, a Karachi cleric, founded the Sunni Tehreek (ST) in 1990, to militantly protect Barelvi mosques from encroachment by Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith (Salafi) groups. Its slogan, “Jawaniyaan lutayein gey, masjidein bachayein gey [We will sacrifice our lives to protect our mosques]”, reflected its militant defensive posture.

But following Noorani’s death in 2003, the JUP weakened further, and the ST’s influence waned after its leadership was killed in a suicide bombing in Karachi in 2006.

Barelvi clerics, grounded in Sufi traditions of devotion and restraint, largely avoided the jihadist and sectarian conflicts of the era. This distance, as Mustafai noted, “made us invisible and irrelevant.” The community eventually sought a more assertive voice, one it ultimately found in the TLP’s aggressive political activism.

Now, the centre of power of Barelvi politics had moved from the urban centres of Karachi to the rural and small-town populace of Punjab. Furthermore, the nature of leadership shifted from Noorani’s intellectual-clerical approach to Rizvi’s populist mobilisation, focused intensely on the issue of blasphemy.

Supporters of Mumtaz Qadri during a protest in Karachi on December 14, 2015: the TLP emerged directly from the campaign to defend the convicted Qadri and his execution in 2016 became a formative moment in Pakistan’s modern religious politics | AFP

THE POLITICS OF BLASPHEMY

“Gustakh-i-Rasool ki ek hi saza, sar tan se juda [The only punishment for blasphemy is beheading]” has become the defining chant of TLP rallies, encapsulating both the group’s ideological core and the mechanism through which it mobilises large crowds.

The TLP emerged directly from the campaign to defend the convicted Qadri. Qadri’s execution in 2016, after the government’s resistance to immense pressure, became a formative moment in Pakistan’s modern religious politics. The vast, impassioned crowds at his funeral showed the dormant strength of Barelvi supporters across Punjab and Sindh, a constituency long considered apolitical or organisationally fragmented.

In the days following the funeral, senior Barelvi clerics convened in Islamabad to deliberate the future political direction of their community. Some advocated restraint, warning against politicising devotional sentiment. However, a majority endorsed Rizvi’s call to form a new movement capable of channelling Barelvi grievances into organised political influence. The result was the creation of the Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah, later renamed as the TLP.

The group entered electoral politics in January 2017 at Karachi’s Nishtar Park and gained national attention that same year by contesting a Lahore by-election. This transition marked its evolution from a street protest movement into an organised political force, willing to confront the state through both ballots and large-scale blockades.

TLP’s rapid rise is rooted in its strategic — critics say weaponised — use of Pakistan’s stringent blasphemy laws. By portraying Qadri as a martyr and redefining religious devotion as political resistance, the party transformed traditional Barelvi piety into a defiant and uncompromising street movement, sharply diverging from the sect’s historically Sufi orientation.

The party first tested the state’s limits in 2017, when it staged a weeks-long sit-in near Islamabad over a minor amendment to the Khatm-i-Nabuwwat [Seal of the Prophets] oath in the Election Act. The protest brought Islamabad to a standstill and ended only after the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led government conceded to the group’s demands, including the resignation of the law minister.

A year later, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) government faced similar pressure over the appointment of Princeton economist Atif R. Mian, an Ahmadi, forcing his removal. And when the Supreme Court in 2018 acquitted Asia Bibi, a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, TLP-led protests erupted across the nation, demanding the judges’ execution.

The party’s influence has since extended to foreign policy. In 2021, the TLP organised nationwide protests demanding the expulsion of the French ambassador over blasphemous caricatures published in France, underscoring its capacity to steer both domestic and diplomatic discourse.

CLASS, POPULISM AND STREET POWER

In Lahore, the TLP’s street-level appeal cannot be missed. Hundreds of rickshaws bearing portraits of Rizvi and the insignia of the Labbaik Rickshaw Union weave through the city, turning public transport into rolling political billboards. “We support the TLP because it’s a party led by people like us, not Sharifs, Bhuttos or Khans,” Jamil Butt, a rickshaw driver, told me a week before the 2024 elections.

Analysts argue that the TLP’s strength lies in its social composition, particularly in Punjab, where rapid urbanisation has transformed villages into sprawling peri-urban settlements. This shift has produced a frustrated, alienated lower-middle class that feels excluded from both elite politics and economic opportunity.

“Rickshaw drivers, shopkeepers, small traders and farmers saw in him [Khadim Hussain Rizvi] an authentic voice of their frustrations,” says Umair Rasheed, a US-based PhD scholar researching the TLP. “His aggressiveness, his language, the way he challenged the ruling elite, all of it allowed him to appear as ‘one of them’ — a man of the people rather than a distant politician.”

This dynamic, analysts note, is why even the PTI, despite its broad populist appeal, struggled to capture this segment of Punjab’s electorate. Some observers describe the TLP as “the PTI of the poor.”

Rasheed added that Rizvi also cleverly exploited class tensions within the Barelvi community. By empowering local mosque-level maulvis [clerics], he positioned himself against the established Barelvi clerical elite, including pirs [spiritual leaders] or sajjada nasheens [custodians of shrines], whom he frequently condemned in his sermons. This intra-sect critique further endeared him to lower-rank clerics and their followers, who long felt marginalised by hereditary religious hierarchies.

Adam Weinstein, an analyst at the Quincy Institute in Washington, DC, who witnessed the TLP’s violent 2017 protest observes, “Enforcing blasphemy is the rallying cry, but beneath it lies rage at a society that offers no way up, and enraged young men always turn on minorities and the state itself.” He argues that what appears to be a religious movement is, in many ways, “class-based fury wrapped in religious language.”

The TLP in Karachi, however, draws strength from an additional and influential source: the conservative Memon business community, giving it both financial muscle and urban legitimacy. Several prominent Memon traders have even contested elections on TLP tickets, fusing economic power with religious populism.

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND POLITICAL DISRUPTION

The TLP built its electoral identity around slogans such as “Deen ko takht par lana hai [Bring religion to power]” and “Vote ki izzat Nizam-i-Mustafa mein hai [The sanctity of the vote lies in the Prophet’s system].” These messages positioned the party as a force seeking to fuse religious absolutism with state authority.

Unlike many traditional religious parties, the TLP showed an unusual ability to transform street agitation into electoral momentum, drawing in voters disillusioned with mainstream parties and eager for a political vehicle that promised dignity, certainty and confrontation.

Its urban expansion became most visible in Karachi. The 2022 by-election in Korangi, typically a battleground for MQM-Pakistan, demonstrated the TLP’s ability to unsettle entrenched political actors. Groups of TLP supporters appeared at MQM-P rallies, loudly chanting “Labbaik, Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah [O Prophet of God, We Are Ready]”, creating an atmosphere of fear among MQM workers wary of mob aggression. A widely circulated video from the campaign captured MQM-P leader Mustafa Kamal accusing the TLP of “using religion as a political weapon.” Clashes erupted between rival workers on the polling day.

During the campaign, several TLP supporters described their political migration from MQM after a paramilitary crackdown weakened it. Abid Qureshi, a TLP activist, says, “When MQM’s muhalla [neighbourhood] committees disappeared, the local mosque and milad committees became new centres of influence. That’s where TLP stepped in and filled the vacuum.”

Political analysts argue that the TLP’s rise reflects not only religious fervour but also patterns of political displacement in Pakistan’s two largest provinces. Yet the party’s sociology differs sharply between Punjab and urban Sindh. In Punjab, its growth largely came at the expense of the PML-N. A 2018 Gallup Pakistan survey found that 46 percent of TLP voters had backed the PML-N in 2013, indicating a significant transfer of conservative, lower-middle class support toward Rizvi’s movement.

The party’s electoral breakthrough came in the 2018 general elections, when it secured more than 2.2 million votes nationwide, around 4.2 percent of the total, becoming Pakistan’s fifth-largest party by vote count. Although the first-past-the-post system prevented it from winning National Assembly seats, the TLP gained a foothold in the Sindh Assembly, winning two general seats in Karachi, along with one reserved seat for women.

Its disruptive impact extended beyond Punjab. In Karachi’s Lyari, historically a PPP stronghold, the TLP outperformed PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, relegating him to third place and indirectly facilitating a PTI victory. This outcome symbolised how the TLP had begun altering urban political equations.

Despite widespread doubts over the credibility of the 2024 elections, analysts note that the TLP’s vote bank expanded further, reaching roughly 2.89 million, an increase of nearly 700,000 votes since 2018.

Members of TLP protest after authorities block a road with shipping containers in Lahore on October 10, 2025: the latest ban on TLP, recommended by the Punjab government amid fresh unrest, appears to signal a potentially tougher stance than seen previously | AFP


DEVASTATING SOCIAL TOLL

In August 2023, the Christian neighbourhood of Jaranwala in Punjab’s Faisalabad district descended into chaos after allegations of Quran desecration against two Christian brothers. Within hours, mobs armed with sticks and stones swept through the streets, burning churches, desecrating Bibles and ransacking Christian homes. Over 20 churches and nearly 100 houses were torched, forcing hundreds of families to flee.

Subsequent police investigations confirmed that the violence did not erupt spontaneously. Local clerics affiliated with the TLP had used mosque loudspeakers to summon crowds, urging them to “defend the sanctity of the Quran.” Punjab authorities later arrested over 100 people, several of them identified as TLP activists.

The Jaranwala tragedy was not an isolated episode — it revealed the deepening fractures in Pakistan’s social and moral order. Over the past decade, the TLP’s aggressive brand of religious populism has fundamentally reshaped the country’s political and social discourse, causing an explosion of blasphemy accusations, a surge in mob lynching and renewed fear among religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis and Christians, according to police officials and rights activists.

They say that mob violence triggered by mere rumours of blasphemy has become “common, deadly and difficult to contain.” A police officer pointed to a recent Lahore incident, in which a woman wearing a dress decorated with calligraphy was nearly lynched by a mob on the mistaken assumption that the dress was sporting Arabic verses from the Quran. According to him, TLP activists, often backed by sympathetic lawyers, regularly pressure local police to register blasphemy cases without evidence, deepening local law-and-order crises.

A Dawn report on October 18, 2025 cited police officials who linked TLP workers to at least 25 attacks on churches and other religious sites in Punjab during the past three years. These mobs often vandalised property, set buildings ablaze and left several people dead and dozens injured.

Muhammad Amir Rana, an Islamabad-based security analyst, highlights the grave threat posed by the TLP’s Fidayeen Jathay, organised squads whose members reportedly take death oaths and pledge to sacrifice their lives at Saad Rizvi’s command, mirroring the suicide tactics of groups like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

“The TLP’s Fidayeen operate openly among the population,” Rana says, “unlike the TTP’s more concealed camps in Afghanistan. And because the TLP is rooted in Punjab, the country’s political heartland, the emotional charge surrounding its mobilisation may be even more volatile.”

The pattern is disturbingly consistent. Last year, a local PPP member of the National Assembly (MNA), together with TLP leaders in Sindh’s Mirpurkhas district, garlanded police officers to praise them for killing a blasphemy suspect in a staged encounter.

In 2018, PML-N leader and then Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal narrowly survived an assassination attempt by a TLP sympathiser. There have also been reports of teachers killed by students over alleged “disrespectful remarks”, as well as mobs torching police stations for protecting blasphemy suspects.

GLOBAL REACH

During the 2024 general election campaign, posters of TLP candidates across Punjab featured not only Qadri, the executed assassin, but also Tanveer Ahmed, a British-Pakistani taxi driver from Bradford serving a life sentence in Scotland for murdering an Ahmadi shopkeeper in Glasgow in 2016. Ahmed’s framed portrait, surrounded by slogans praising his “sacrifice” underscored the transnational echo of TLP’s message.

In 2017, an audio recording attributed to Ahmed, who was in jail in Britain, widely shared on TLP social media, urged listeners to attend a rally in Karachi that drew tens of thousands. On stage, the party’s leader, Khadim Rizvi, hailed Ahmed as a hero who had “surprised all of Europe.”

The global resonance of this militant trend is now a concern for Western governments. In 2020, a Pakistani man who stabbed two people outside the former Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo magazine — which had published caricatures of the Prophet (PBUH) in 2006, 2011 and 2012 — told investigators he had been radicalised by watching Rizvi’s speeches online.

Last year, the British government’s Commission for Countering Extremism released a report warning about the emergence of a UK-based wing of the TLP, describing it as “an extremist Pakistan anti-blasphemy political party.” The commission’s findings were unequivocal: the ideological current that propelled TLP’s rise in Pakistan was being mirrored, in subtle but significant ways, among segments of the British Pakistani diaspora.

THE STATE’S DILEMMA

The Pakistani state’s relationship with the TLP has long been defined by a cycle of confrontation and accommodation, bans followed by negotiations, and crackdowns followed by concessions. This cycle reflects the state’s enduring struggle to balance public order with the fear of provoking a religious backlash. Every attempt to contain the group has been tempered by anxiety over the explosive power of blasphemy politics, which the TLP has mastered more effectively than any other contemporary movement.

Since the 2017 sit-in in Faizabad near Islamabad, and until last month, successive governments have oscillated between repression and reconciliation, consistently bowing to the group’s ability to paralyse major cities.

Some analysts argue that the TLP’s initial ascent was not entirely organic but may have been enabled by certain establishment factions that viewed it as a counterweight to the PML-N, whose leadership had, at the time, adopted a confrontational posture toward the military. Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz recently reiterated this claim while defending the provincial government’s renewed crackdown on the TLP.

However, many experts dispute the extent of such alleged state patronage, noting that, while some level of tacit support may have existed, the TLP swiftly developed an autonomous and potent street force. Its resonance within segments of the Barelvi community, particularly around issues of blasphemy and perceived socio-religious marginalisation, allowed the movement to evolve beyond any initial political engineering.

Repeated negotiations with the group, including the lifting of the previous ban in 2021, the release of detained leaders and the further tightening of blasphemy laws have sent a clear, detrimental message: mass religious mobilisation can successfully extract concessions from the state.

The latest ban, recommended by the Punjab government amid fresh unrest, appears to signal a potentially tougher stance, though the state’s sincerity remains debatable.

The October operation in Murdike, near Lahore, involving thousands of law enforcement personnel, had dispersed the TLP supporters planning to march towards Islamabad. Punjab police registered 75 cases, including terrorism and murder charges, against TLP leaders and workers. The undisclosed whereabouts of key figures, brothers Saad Rizvi and Anas Rizvi, have deepened speculation and internal anxiety.

Since then, most TLP candidates from Punjab who contested the 2024 elections have started distancing themselves from the party, stating that “violence and mob action cannot bring meaningful change by attacking the state.“

Before the ban, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi met senior Barelvi scholars in Karachi, including Mufti Muneebur Rehman, who had earlier mediated between the government and TLP, assuring them the crackdown targeted the TLP’s network, not the broader Barelvi community. The TLP claims over 300 of their mosques and seminaries have been sealed. Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz later confirmed their transfer to Mufti Muneebur Rehman.

However, analysts opine that the Punjab government’s attempt to counter the TLP through engagement with traditional, moderate Barelvi clerical elite, which Rizvi frequently targeted, may have a limited impact. As scholar Umair Rasheed remarks, the state is once again resorting to the flawed logic of “Good Barelvis, Bad Barelvis”, an echo of earlier strategies of distinguishing between “Good Taliban and Bad Taliban.”

FUTURE SCENARIO

The TLP’s future is acutely uncertain, hanging on the state’s political resolve, the judiciary’s response and the party’s enduring populist appeal. The current official strategy, an immediate ban followed by legal proceedings for dissolution, signals a more assertive posture.

As one Islamabad-based security official tells me, “The state has decided that it has had enough. Given rising regional tensions and the surge in terrorism across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, it cannot afford internal instability triggered by the TLP’s street agitations.”

Officials signal an intention to dissolve the TLP as a registered political party, though legally establishing its terrorist credentials remains challenging. Among more than 80 proscribed groups, the TLP stands out for its deep grassroots networks, rapid mobilisation capacity and emotive religious appeal, making it far harder to suppress through conventional law-enforcement measures.

The party’s trajectory will also depend on its leadership. The death of Khadim Hussain Rizvi was expected to fracture the party, but his son Saad Rizvi has maintained its coherence and its capacity to bring cities to a standstill.

If political stability is maintained and the TLP is unable to trigger new crises, its influence may gradually decline ahead of the next election cycle. Yet, the ideology it embodies, combining religious populism, vigilantism and emotionally charged rhetoric, has already permeated Pakistan’s socio-political mainstream.

According to Weinstein, “TLP is the classic Pakistani dilemma — an extremist movement born from within society, tolerated and, at times, weaponised, until it became a menace. But its followers are still your neighbours, and the blasphemy issue isn’t going anywhere.”

The writer is a journalist and researcher whose work has appeared in Dawn, The New York Times and other publications, and has worked for various policy institutes. He can be reached at zeea.rehman@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, November 9th, 2025

The writer is a journalist and researcher, who writes for The New York Times and Nikkei Asia, among other publications. He also assesses democratic and conflict development in Pakistan for various policy institutes. He tweets @zalmayzia

India-Canada Reboot Their Bilateral Relationship – Analysis

October 27, 2025 

By Institute of South Asian Studies


Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand’s visit to India in October 2025 is part of a continuing push to revitalise the bilateral relationship, shaken to the core during 2023-24 by the allegations of Indian involvement in the murder of a Canadian citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Mark Carney’s pragmatic leadership since taking charge as Canada’s prime minister in the summer and New Delhi’s eagerness to rebuild the valuable partnership with Ottawa have facilitated a productive effort to quietly resolve the Nijjar issue and shift the focus to mutually beneficial cooperation.


By C Raja Mohan

The visit of Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand to India in October 2025 highlighted the strong commitment in Ottawa and New Delhi to reset the relationship after the turbulence that rocked it during 2023-24. The reset began when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the G-7 summit that he was hosting at Kananaskis in June 2025. The two leaders agreed on calibrated steps toward normalisation. This was followed by the resumption of dialogue at the bureaucratic and political levels and an agreement to handle the sensitive questions in a quiet dialogue between the security establishments and the development of an actionable agenda of cooperation.

During her visit, Anand met Modi and held substantive talks with her counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Speaking to a Canadian TV channel at the end of her visit, Anand said, “We are in a moment where economic diplomacy, pragmatism, is of crucial importance”. She added that “Now we’re moving forward from September-October 2023”, referring to the time when the diplomatic ties between the two countries were derailed. Then, Canada, at the highest political level, publicly accused the Indian government of involvement in the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist based in Canada.

This allegation, denied vehemently by India, strained ties severely, leading to a protracted period of diplomatic chill, the mutual expulsion of diplomatic personnel and the suspension of normal channels of communication. The political transition from Justin Trudeau to Carney in March 2025 and the latter’s successful election campaign to retain his premiership provided a valuable political opportunity in Ottawa to take a fresh look at bilateral ties. On its part, New Delhi seized the opportunity to push for a normalisation of the relationship. Anand’s trip to India in October 2025 was the first ministerial visit from the Canadian side in over two years and culminated in a joint statement reaffirming a commitment to rebuilding bilateral ties across multiple sectors. Both sides agreed on a roadmap that fosters cooperation in economic ties, security collaboration, climate change, energy security, technological innovations and people-to-people contacts.

In a remarkable feature, bilateral trade continued to flourish even amid the diplomatic chill. The bilateral commerce in goods and services crossed CAD$30 billion (S$27.7 billion) in 2024. The two sides are now ready to resume the negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that were suspended during the diplomatic freeze. Anand and Jaishankar agreed on “commencing, at an early date, ministerial-level discussions on bilateral trade and investment informed by today’s economic realities and each country’s strategic priorities”. The reference here is to the new tensions in the global trading order triggered by United States (US) President Donald Trump and the testy relations that Ottawa and New Delhi have with his administration. Diversification of trade relations away from excessive dependence on the US market is now a high political priority for both nations.



The renewed momentum in the bilateral relationship, the joint statement issued after Anand’s visit affirmed, is based on “mutual respect for shared democratic values, the rule of law, and a commitment to upholding the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity”. This is a reference to the accusations of both sides during the diplomatic crisis that the other has violated its sovereignty. India accused Canada of encouraging anti-India militants, and Ottawa accused New Delhi of transnational repression.

The legal proceedings against four Indian nationals accused of Nijjar’s murder are ongoing, with trials unlikely to commence before late 2026. In the context of a diplomatic reboot, a significant feature has been the establishment of a constructive and institutionalised security dialogue between New Delhi and Ottawa. Both sides have agreed to enhance cooperation in law enforcement, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism efforts. The collaboration between Indian agencies such as the National Investigation Agency and Canadian bodies like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police represents an important development aimed at jointly addressing security threats linked to diaspora extremism.

This dialogue acknowledges that preventing incidents like Nijjar’s murder requires more than accusation and recrimination; it necessitates transparent communication, mutual trust and institutional mechanisms for addressing security concerns. The presence of a significant Indian-origin Canadians (estimated at two million in a population of about 39 million in 2025) has long necessitated that.

By focusing on coordinated actions and respecting each other’s sovereignty, India and Canada seek to reduce the risk of extrajudicial operations and foster a secure environment for their citizens and expatriates. This security cooperation is a critical building block for restoring confidence in the broader bilateral relationship.

The unfolding momentum in India-Canada relations is a testament to the possibilities of patient diplomacy overcoming deep-rooted mistrust and geopolitical sensitivities. This reboot is still evolving, requiring consistent political commitment and steady advances in various domains of the bilateral ties. However, it does demonstrate how democracies with substantial global stakes can restore ruptured ties through measured diplomacy, shared values, and a commitment to partnership in a complex world.

About the author: Professor C Raja Mohan is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at crmohan@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Source: This article was published by Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)



Institute of South Asian Studies

The Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) was established in July 2004 as an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). ISAS is dedicated to research on contemporary South Asia. The Institute seeks to promote understanding of this vital region of the world, and to communicate knowledge and insights about it to policy makers, the business community, academia and civil society, in Singapore and beyond.

Are Canada and India doing enough to repair ties?

Murali Krishnan in New Delhi

DW

September 4, 2025

India has moved to revive diplomatic ties with Canada, deepening trade and strategic links beyond US dependence.

Relations saw signs of thawing in June when Canadian PM Mark Carney invited Indian PM Narendra Modi to the G7 summit

Image: dpa

India and Canada have appointed new envoys, marking a substantial step toward normalizing their relations following a major diplomatic standoff.

India's Foreign Ministry said it will assign its current envoy to Spain, Dinesh Patnaik, to Canada — while Christopher Cooter will be Canada's new high commissioner to India.
Why did India-Canada relations become strained?

The rift stemmed from former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's allegations that Indian agents were involved in the assassination of Sikh leader and activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar.

Nijjar was shot dead by two masked assailants as he left a Sikh temple in the Canadian province of British Columbia in 2023Image: Darryl Dyck/ZUMA Press/IMAGO

According to media reports, Nijjar was a prominent organizer in the Sikh community in Canada. He was also a proponent of the so-called Khalistan movement, which calls for a Sikh homeland by carving out an ethno-religious state in India's Punjab region.

The movement dates back to India and Pakistan's independence in 1947, when the idea was pushed forward in negotiations preceding the partition of the Punjab region between the two new countries.

India dismissed Trudeau's claims as "absurd" and politically motivated, leading to the reciprocal expulsions of top envoys.

Roadmap to warmer ties

After a fractious period of several months, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with his Canadian counterpart Mark Carney in June during the G7 leaders' summit held in Kananaskis, Canada.

Both agreed to take "calibrated and constructive steps to restore stability in the relationship."

"The appointment of a new high commissioner reflects Canada's step-by-step approach to deepening diplomatic engagement and advancing bilateral cooperation with India," said Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand following the appointment.

India-Canada row over Sikh killing has Punjab on edge 03:36

Foreign policy experts and diplomats believe that the re-opening of high-level diplomatic dialogue signals hope for pragmatic engagement, paving the way for resumed trade talks and meaningful strategic alignment, especially vital in shifting global trade dynamics and regional security interests.

"When this crisis broke in 2023, and further escalated last year, both countries brought a mixture of outrage, hubris, and complacency to the table," David Mckinnon, a former senior Canadian diplomat, told DW.

"And each in its own way assumed its 'special' relationship with the USA would be to their advantage in resolving this issue."
Reducing US dependence, diversifying ties

The troubled period between India and Canada was marked by disrupted visa services, consulate closures, stalled trade and investment, travel caution advisories and damaged trust.

Why Canada thinks India is behind Sikh leader killing  18:34

"Obviously, the return of Donald Trump as US President and his increasingly destructive role in the world have completely changed that calculation in Ottawa and Delhi," said Mckinnon, pointing out that it was time for both countries to align on economic and security-related matters.

"For somewhat different reasons, both countries need to diversify away from reliance on the US. For both, though, this imperative is urgent and immediate," he added.

Ajay Bisaria, a former high commissioner to Canada, said the new envoys will develop a roadmap for stabilization, normalization, and eventually elevation of the strained bilateral relationship.

"Cautious optimism permeates the air regarding the improvement of India-Canada diplomatic ties. Canada now appears to prioritize its national interests over diaspora politics in its foreign policy dealings, which may reduce the irritant factor," Bisaria, who co-chairs a Track II think tank initiative, told DW.

Nearly 800,000 Sikhs live in Canada, the largest community outside of Punjab, and the Sikh diaspora often stages activism and peaceful protests for Sikh causes.

"The political turbulence that was becoming an issue for Canadian investment in India has subsided," Bisaria added, pointing to how Canada continues to grapple with challenges from US volatility.

"In fact, Canadian institutional investment is projected to double from the current $100 billion (€85.9 billion) by 2030, as India emerges as a strategic diversification opportunity amidst the volatility in China and the US," said Bisaria.

Cautious diplomatic engineering

Moreover, Bisaria emphasized that the India-UK trade agreement, along with the potential India-US and India-EU deals, will provide a fresh template for the paused talks on an India-Canada interim trade agreement.

"Both sides may take stock of the upended trade order and the web of new bilateral deals they'll have in place this year. By next year, when the dust settles, they could resume conversations on the bilateral free trade agreement," he added.

International trade: Pivot to Asia?  07:20

Some experts believe the future of the India-Canada relationship will depend on whether they can discuss security concerns without them becoming burdensome to bilateral ties.

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, president of Mantraya, an independent research forum, told DW that a reset in relations could not have happened without Canada agreeing to address some of India's concerns.

New Delhi has repeatedly criticized Ottawa for being soft on supporters of the Khalistan movement, which is banned in India but has support among the Sikh diaspora, particularly in Canada.

"The new Canadian administration aims to improve its ties with India by moving past a difficult history that has negatively affected its reputation. It would have assured New Delhi that Canadian law would take a firm stance against trends that threaten India's security," said D'Souza.

She also believes that the Trump administration's unilateral tariff policy is playing a significant role in prompting India and Canada to seek partnerships and markets globally.

Both countries, she said, are focusing on restarting trade talks under the Early Progress Trade Agreement (EPTA), seen as a precursor toward the broader Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with discussions covering areas like goods, services, clean energy, digital transformation, and supply chain resilience.

"Although this may not be sufficient for India to compensate for its faltering partnership with the US, New Delhi has little choice but to salvage what it can. A new multipolar world order is in the making. While this transition is unsettling, nations have no option but to adjust their policies accordingly," said D'Souza.

Edited by: Keith Walker

Murali Krishnan Journalist based in New Delhi, focusing on Indian politics, society and business@mkrish11

 

Expelling Iran’s Ambassador to Australia

Useful Expedient

by Binoy Kampmark / August 28th, 2025

The rank odour of opportunity seems to have presented itself to Australia’s Albanese government. To balance its apparently principled promise to recognise Palestinian statehood come the 80th United Nations General Assembly next month, it seemed only fair that some firm measure be taken against another Islamic outfit to balance the ledger. The Israelis were watching closely, and a sense of concern had started to bubble along the diplomatic channel that Canberra was proving wobbly. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had made his views felt: “History will remember Albanese for what he is: A weak politician who betrayed Israel and abandoned Australia’s Jews.”

On August 26, it all came to the fore. Iran had become the latest, if only briefest, of bogeymen for political consumption in Australia. The Islamic Republic, charged the Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, had “directed at least two” attacks of an “appalling” and “antisemitic” nature. Expecting revelations of gleeful massacres involving whole families including livestock and uprooted orchards, we are told that these outrageous incidents were ones of arson: an attack on Lewis’ Continental Kitchen in Sydney in October last year, and the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne last December. “These were extraordinary and dangerous acts of aggression orchestrated by a foreign nation on Australian soil. They were attempts to undermine social cohesion and sow discord in our community.”

Mike Burgess, the domestic spy chief, confirmed the claim that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) had identified “at least two and likely more attacks on Jewish interests in Australia.” These were linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and found through “painstaking investigation” (good to see that investigations at the spy agency are painstaking). The IRGC had been fiendish in concealing its role, using “a complex web of proxies to hide its involvement.” With shamanistic self-confidence, Burgess revealed that he had warned of this very thing earlier in the year. For a sense of restrained balance, he stated that Tehran may not necessarily be “responsible for every act of antisemitism in Australia.”

The action undertaken seemed outsized, involving the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi along with three other embassy officials. They have been given seven days to exit the country. The IRGC is also slated for proscription as a terrorist organisation.

The head scratching question in all of this is: Why bother? The Iranian Revolutionary Guards have larger fish to skin, fry and broil. Tehran, for all its appetites in seeking power and influence in the Middle East, has tended to keep its targets beyond the region to Israeli embassies and property and, most notably of all, dissidents. To target the Australian Jewish community would seem to be a needless expenditure of effort and resources. Australia’s resident talking head on the wickedness of the mullahs, Kylie Moore-Gilbert, herself having spent time incarcerated in Iran on suspicions of espionage, is hardly illuminating in her explanation. “It’s difficult to say what Iran’s direct motivations are, other than to undermine Australia’s social cohesion.” She opts for the primary colour approach, streaked with syllogism: as the Iranian regime is antisemitic, and as Israel is the main enemy, it follows that all Jews, according to the dotty haters in Tehran, are “an extension of Israel.”

The expulsion’s salience would have been more significant if it had been done in response to activities undertaken against members of the Iranian Australian community, a far more widespread and evident problem. Yet on this point, the Albanese government proved tardy, despite ample evidence of harassment and surveillance orchestrated at Tehran’s behest. In February 2023, the then Minister for Home Affairs Clare O’Neil stated in her Australian National University address that ASIO had “disrupted the activities of individuals who had conducted surveillance in the home of an Iranian-Australian, as well as conducted extensive research of this individual and their family.” The previous month, a spokesperson for Foreign Minister Penny Wong expressed deep concern at “reports of foreign interference, including the harassment and intimidation of Australians online and in-person.” These matters had been raised with Iran “in no uncertain terms.”

Iran had also proved to be a more convenient, if selective target. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, for instance, Indian intelligence operatives have been creating much mischief, snooping, harassing and leaving their warning signs, most notably when it comes to the global Sikh diaspora. Concerned about the pangs of longing for the independent state of Khalistan, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has not been above resorting to assassination. Melbourne taxi driver Harjinder Singh is one who can attest to threats from the Indian authorities regarding his pro-Khalistan activities, notably to his family back in India.

To add to this, India was found to have engaged in such friendly activities as cultivating access to sensitive defence technology in Australia and securing airport security protocols. In 2020, Burgess announced that his agency had “confronted” the spies in question “and quietly and professionally removed them.” Despite this fuss, there were no diplomatic expulsions. A façade of excruciating politeness was maintained.

Least surprising of all was the hearty approval of the Australian move by Israel. With Netanyahu venomously spouting at the Australian Prime Minister that he was feeble and incapable of protecting Jews in Australia, the expulsion was automatically assumed to be a product of constructive Israeli interference. Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer, after explaining the reasons for Netanyahu’s hectoring, thought it a “positive outcome” that Australia was “taking the threats against Israel and the Jewish people, Jewish Australians living in Australia […] seriously”.

Australia’s Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke dismissed efforts on the part of the Israeli government to claim the lion’s share of credit as nonsense. “We’ve taken this action because Iran has attacked Australians. No other country is involved in terms of that conclusion.”

Short of WikiLeaks finding out the inner strangeness of this, we await further evidence why Iran would ever bother to expend any time on focusing on a country so far from its interests as to be satirically irrelevant. That said, the nature of much intelligence is that it is often short of being particularly intelligent.

 

Transnational Repression, A Growing Threat To UK Says Parliamentary Committee – Analysis

 August 3, 2025

By P. K. Balachandran

The report accuses nations including Russia, China, Iran, and India of perpetrating Transnational Repression on UK soil but India says report is biased   

Transnational Repression (TNR) represents a troubling challenge to human rights in the United Kingdom, as outlined in a recent UK parliamentary committee report.

Defined as actions by foreign governments to harass, intimidate, or harm individuals beyond their borders, TNR undermines fundamental freedoms of expression, safety, and movement. 

The report accuses nations including Russia, China, Iran, and India of perpetrating TNR on UK soil, highlighting a 48% surge in MI5 state-threat investigations and over 20 Iran-related threat-to-life cases since 2022. 

The report explores the nature, impact, and proposed responses to TNR, emphasizing its profound implications for individuals and communities.

Forms of TNR

TNR manifests in diverse forms, from online disinformation and surveillance to physical violence and assassination attempts. These tactics violate internationally recognized rights, including freedom from inhuman treatment and the right to life. 

The report notes specific examples: China employs surveillance, harassment, and bounties, such as the $HK1 million reward on activist Chloe Cheung, alongside alleged “police stations” in the UK to monitor diaspora. 

Russia uses INTERPOL Red Notices, lawsuits, and high-profile attacks, like the Salisbury nerve agent incident, to silence critics. Iran poses significant kidnap and assassination risks, targeting journalists and diaspora with gendered abuse and surveillance through “cultural centres.” 

India is accused by Canada for killing of Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar and the US says that India was plotting to assassinate Gurpatwant Singh Pannun a supporter of Sikh separatism in New York 

On August 1, India’s Ministry of External Affairs rejected the UK report saying that it was “baseless,” “biased” and based on  “unverified sources.”

Wide Impact of TNR

The impact of TNR extends beyond recorded cases, creating a “chilling effect” that suppresses political discourse across entire communities.

Under-reporting, due to fear and the covert nature of TNR, masks its true scale. Personal accounts reveal profound effects: a targeted Chinese individual described pervasive suspicion of strangers, fearing they may be agents of the Chinese government. Such fear discourages public participation and dissent, achieving perpetrators’ goals without widespread overt action.

The report criticizes the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices by authoritarian states to target critics, urging reforms and UK mechanisms to alert individuals about politically motivated notices. 

UK’s Steps

To counter TNR, the UK introduced the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) under the National Security Act 2023, mandating registration of foreign-directed political activities, with penalties up to five years’ imprisonment. 

However, the exclusion of China from FIRS’s enhanced tier has sparked criticism, suggesting a cautious UK approach to Beijing despite its documented TNR activities.

Call for Global Cooperation

Internationally, the report calls for UK’s leadership in addressing TNR, including prioritizing it at the UN and supporting G7 initiatives like the 2024 Leaders’ Statement and Digital TNR Detection Academy. 

These efforts aim to foster coordinated action among democracies to counter TNR’s global rise.

Thus, TNR poses a serious threat to UK human rights, with Russia, China, and Iran as prominent perpetrators, while allegations against India remain contentious due to limited evidence and India’s rebuttal. 

The UK’s strategic framework and international cooperation signal progress, but gaps in enforcement, such as China’s exclusion, highlight challenges in balancing security and diplomacy. 

Robust action is essential to protect individuals and preserve democratic freedoms against TNR’s insidious reach, the report said.

P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.