SIPRI

World's Top 100 Arms Producers See Combined Revenues Surge As States Rush To Modernize And Expand Arsenals

December 1, 2025

By SIPRI

Revenues from sales of arms and military services by the 100 largest arms-producing companies rose by 5.9 per cent in 2024, reaching a record $679 billion, according to new data released today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Global arms revenues rose sharply in 2024, as demand was boosted by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, global and regional geopolitical tensions, and ever-higher military expenditure. For the first time since 2018, all of the five largest arms companies increased their arms revenues.

Although the bulk of the global rise was due to companies based in Europe and the United States, there were year-on-year increases in all of the world regions featured in the Top 100. The only exception was Asia and Oceania, where issues within the Chinese arms industry drove down the regional total.

The surge in revenues and new orders prompted many arms companies to expand production lines, enlarge facilities, establish new subsidiaries or conduct acquisitions.

‘Last year global arms revenues reached the highest level ever recorded by SIPRI as producers capitalized on high demand,’ said Lorenzo Scarazzato, Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘Although companies have been building their production capacity, they still face a range of challenges that could affect costs and delivery schedules.’
US arms revenues grow but delays and cost overruns persist

In 2024 the combined arms revenues of US arms companies in the Top 100 grew by 3.8 per cent to reach $334 billion, with 30 out of the 39 US companies in the ranking increasing their arms revenues. These included major arms producers such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics.

However, widespread delays and budget overruns continue to plague development and production in key US-led programmes such as the F-35 combat aircraft, the Columbia-class submarine and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Several of the USA’s largest arms producers are affected by overruns, raising uncertainty about when major new weapon systems and upgrades to existing ones can be delivered and deployed.

‘The delays and rising costs will inevitably impact US military planning and military spending,’ said Xiao Liang, Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘This could have knock-on effects on the US government’s efforts to cut excessive military spending and improve budget efficiency.’
Rearmament under way in Europe, but threat of supply chain problems grows

Of the 26 arms companies in the Top 100 based in Europe (excluding Russia), 23 recorded increasing arms revenues. Their aggregate arms revenues grew by 13 per cent to $151 billion. This increase was tied to demand stemming from the war in Ukraine and the perceived threat from Russia. The Czech company Czechoslovak Group recorded the sharpest percentage increase in arms revenues of any Top 100 company in 2024: by 193 per cent, to reach $3.6 billion. The company attributes the majority of its revenue to Ukraine. Czechoslovak Group benefited from the Czech Ammunition Initiative, a government-led project to source artillery shells for Ukraine. Ukraine’s own JSC Ukrainian Defense Industry increased its arms revenues by 41 per cent to $3.0 billion.

‘European arms companies are investing in new production capacity to meet the rising demand,’ said Jade Guiberteau Ricard, Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘But sourcing materials could pose a growing challenge. In particular, dependence on critical minerals is likely to complicate European rearmament plans.’

As an example of the risks of such dependence, the trans-European company Airbus and France’s Safran met half of their pre-2022 titanium needs with Russian imports and have had to find new suppliers. Furthermore, in light of Chinese export restrictions on critical minerals, companies including France’s Thales and Germany’s Rheinmetall warned in 2024 of the potential high costs of restructuring their supply chains.
Russian arms revenues grow despite sanctions and skilled labour shortage

The two Russian arms companies in the Top 100, Rostec and United Shipbuilding Corporation, increased their combined arms revenues by 23 per cent to $31.2 billion, despite international sanctions that led to a shortage of components. Domestic demand was enough to more than offset the revenues lost due to falling arms exports.

‘Besides sanctions, Russian arms companies are facing a shortage of skilled labour. This could slow production and limit innovation,’ said Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘However, we need to be cautious making such predictions, as Russia’s arms industry has proved resilient during the war in Ukraine, contrary to expectations.’
Asia and Oceania: problems in Chinese arms industry drive down regional total

Asia and Oceania was the only world region to see an overall decline in arms revenues among Top 100 companies in 2024, falling to $130 billion, 1.2 per cent less than in 2023. However, the picture was highly varied within Asia and Oceania. The regional drop was due to a combined 10 per cent decline in arms revenues among the eight Chinese arms companies in the Top 100. Most prominent was the 31 per cent fall in the arms revenues of NORINCO, China’s primary producer of land systems.

‘A host of corruption allegations in Chinese arms procurement led to major arms contracts being postponed or cancelled in 2024,’ said Nan Tian, Director of the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘This deepens uncertainty around the status of China’s military modernization efforts and when new capabilities will materialize.’

In contrast, arms revenues continued to grow among Japanese and South Korean companies in the Top 100 on the back of strong European and domestic demand. The five Japanese companies increased their combined arms revenues by 40 per cent to $13.3 billion, while the four South Korean producers increased their arms revenues by 31 per cent to $14.1 billion. South Korea’s largest arms company, Hanwha Group, recorded a 42 per cent increase in its arms revenues in 2024, with more than half coming from arms exports.
Record number of Middle East companies in the Top 100

For the first time, nine of the Top 100 arms companies were based in the Middle East, with combined arms revenues of $31.0 billion. Arms revenues in the region grew by 14 per cent (see ‘For editors’ below). The three Israeli arms companies in the ranking increased their combined arms revenues by 16 per cent to $16.2 billion.

‘The growing backlash over Israel’s actions in Gaza seems to have had little impact on interest in Israeli weapons,’ said Zubaida Karim, Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘Many countries continued to place new orders with Israeli companies in 2024.’

The 2024 ranking includes five Turkish arms companies (with combined arms revenues of $10.1 billion, an 11 per cent year-on-year increase), after MKE entered the Top 100 for the first time. The United Arab Emirates’ state-owned conglomerate EDGE Group reported arms revenues of $4.7 billion in 2024.
Other notable developments The combined arms revenues of the three Indian companies in the Top 100 increased by 8.2 per cent to $7.5 billion on the back of domestic orders.
The four German companies in the Top 100 saw their combined arms revenues go up by 36 per cent to $14.9 billion, boosted by increased demand for ground-based air defence systems, ammunition and armoured vehicles due to the perceived threat from Russia.
US company SpaceX appeared in the SIPRI Top 100 for the first time, after its arms revenues more than doubled compared with 2023, to reach $1.8 billion.
For the first time, an Indonesian company entered the Top 100. DEFEND ID reported a 39 per cent increase in its arms revenues to $1.1 billion, boosted by industry consolidation and increased domestic procurement.

Download the SIPRI Fact Sheet here.


SIPRI

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI also has a presence in Beijing, and is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide.

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European rearmament and the drive to war

Carol Turner reviews this Saturday’s CND Conference.

Labour Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood has announced what she says are “the most sweeping asylum reforms in modern times.” Modelled on Danish legislation that is widely regarded as the most oppressive in Europe, her long list of measures includes lengthening the time before which leave to remain can be granted from 5 to 20 years, and making deporting undocumented migrants easier.

Driven by the Blue Labour faction Mahmood belongs to, these draconian measures have been received with delight by Reform and the Tories who immediately and predictably demanded more. With typical showmanship, Nigel Farage responded by inviting the Labour Secretary of State to join Reform!

Mahmood’s response to the clamour created by Reform and the Tories will further divide an already divided party. This is a poisoned chalice for Labour, and not just among its MPs, as the Labour Hub report well documents. It has already drawn protests across the party, from NGOs, and even our predominantly compliant media.

But why should a discussion about rearmament and war begin with asylum laws?

War as a driver of immigration

It is widely acknowledged that the main factors behind population flows are the desire to escape conflict, the adverse effects of climate change and the need to avoid persecution and human rights violations. The UN reports the global total of migrants in 2024 was 304 million.

Behind all these issues is the growing gap between rich and poor, relentlessly driving up migration.  Today, more people than ever before live in a country other than the one in which they were born. Growing efforts by governments of the global north to close their borders to migrants create further hardship for them, without resolving these long-term population flows.

The military bootprint is stamped as deeply on climate change as it is on war. Many reports from Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) attest to the details. SGR Director Stuart Parkinson will address this at CND’s Conference this Saturday. Sabby Dhalu, Co-convenor of Stand up to Racism, joins Jeremy Corbyn and others in the opening session of Stop Nuclear Expansion: How to Reverse the War Drive which takes place in person in London.

Europe’s drift to war

Few would dispute that 2005 has been dominated by preparations for war. Under pressure from President Donald Trump, Europe is preparing to take on a greater share of the military burden and financial cost of the continent’s security. The Council of Europe is encouraging military integration, promoting Europe-wide procurement, and offering loans for increased military spending.

In Britain, the government increasingly talks about ‘war readiness’. Not only has that meant increasing military spending – from the current 2.2%, to 2.7% in 2027, including more spending on security services, with hints of an increase to 5% by 2035. War readiness has also included expanding the UK’s nuclear capability.

Starmer has not only accepted the return of US nuclear bombs to Britain, but also purchased US nuclear-capable fighter jets which will form part of NATO’s European nuclear-sharing arrangements. All this has taken place without debate or vote in Parliament. With Trump in the White House, the drift to war is starting to look like a stampede.

These developments are beginning to be met by anti-war coalitions coming together, such as Stop ReArm Europe. In Britain, a new generation of peace campaigners is taking to the streets and protesting at military bases seeking to change the public dialogue.

A  new nuclear arms race

European preparations for war are replicated across the globe. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2025 handbook warns a new arms race is opening up, the risks from which are likely to be “more diverse and more serious.”

SIPRI  reports global security continues to deteriorate, in particular:

• global military spending was up for the tenth successive year, exceeding $2.7 trillion (that’s $2,700,000,000,0000) in 2024
• “new uncertainties arose” as a result of President Trump’s election, and
• major armed conflicts in Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Sudan, as well the Russia-Ukraine war and Israel’s continued slaughter in Gaza.

CND Conference workshops will drill down into some of these details — including a briefing on Britain’s nuclear expansion and an activist-led discussion about shutting down nuclear bases. Themes include European rearmament, the Ukraine war, the defence jobs myth, militarism in education, the rise of the far right, and a climate breakdown workshop with CND’s newly elected Vice Chair Murad Qureshi,

Changing the conversation

CND wants to change the national conversation. We urgently need to push back against  rearmament and military spending, to spread beyond the peace and anti-war movements, and the more progressive and far sighted sections of the labour movement into wider sections of British society.

Our conference is looking at solutions too — building opposition to war and nuclear expansion on the streets, in the unions, and across the universities. Join us and help change the dialogue: register now at https://tinyurl.com/CNDStopWarDrive.

Carol Turner is a CND vice-chair and convener of its International Advisory Group. She is a long-time peace and anti-war campaigner, and author of Corbyn and Trident: Labour’s Continuing Controversy and Walter Wolfgang: A Political Life.

Image: CND badge https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CND_badge,_1960s.jpg Author: Gerald Holtom, photographed by BirchallDanny, made available under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication.

Unfinished War In Ukraine – OpEd

November 23, 2025 
By Lim Teck Ghee


Ukraine became the world’s largest importer of major arms in the period 2020–24, with its imports increasing nearly 100 times over compared with 2015–19. — SIPRI


Media headlines of the Ukrainian President Voledmyr Zelensky, after he signed a military procurement letter of intent with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, quoted him describing the deal as providing Ukraine with “one of the greatest air defense systems in the world” to defend against Russian air attacks and ensure long-term security.

According to the agreement, Ukraine will receive up to 100 of France’s Rafale F4 fighter jets as well as advanced air defence systems. The estimated sales value of a new Dassault Rafale fighter jet typically ranges from Euro $225 million to Euro $285 million per aircraft, depending on the specific contract which includes weapons packages, training, and support. This would make the deal worth an eye watering Euro $22 to $28 billion alone. Other military hardware to be procured but not yet to be cost include air defense systems, advanced air-to-air missiles and guided bombs, radar systems and drones, with production of interceptor drones planned to begin in late 2025.

The French success in this procurement exercise brings to closer attention a very important, but often under reported and less detailed, aspect of the war. While much reporting on Ukraine focuses on the war itself and the aid packages to support the country, the commercial competition and industrial winners within its supporters in the European Union (EU) and other armament exporters such as the United Kingdom for military aid and procurement contracts are significant. This competition for the economic and financial benefits of war and reconstruction will intensify even as the war, in its current form, is ending.

​According to available data, the European Union collectively has provided over US$60 billion in military aid and contracts to Ukraine. Germany has frequently been cited as the largest individual EU country contributor. ​However, when looking specifically at arms sales and procurement contracts which indicate which country’s defense industry is “winning” in terms of new business, the picture is more complex and dynamic. An added feature is the perception that Ukrainian military procurement is riddled with kickbacks and corruption is widespread, both internally among Ukrainians and externally among international partners and observers. As recently as March 2025, surveys indicated that over 91% of the Ukrainian population believed corruption is “somewhat” or “very widespread.” This has not discouraged sellers of armaments to Ukraine. Instead it appears to have encouraged them.

European Key Armament Players

​Germany has consistently been one of the largest single European donors of military aid to Ukraine, often ranking second globally after the United States in terms of total allocated aid. This includes high-value equipment like the Leopard 2 tanks and IRIS-T air defense systems. German companies, such as the arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, have secured major contracts for producing and supplying ammunition, vehicles, and other equipment, making the country a significant industrial winner.

France has become the world’s second-largest arms exporter overall (in a recent period from 2020–2024), and its exports to other European states have surged. While the letter of intent does not represent immediate sales, it proposes potential contracts for the French defense industry (Dassault Aviation, etc.) and will be a major shift in Ukraine’s future military air procurement.

Sweden has signed a similar letter of intent for a long-term deal to supply up to 150 Gripen E fighter jets to Ukraine, with the first deliveries expected within the next few years. Sweden has also provided significant military aid in other forms, including armored vehicles, artillery, air defense systems, and financial contributions to various funds.

​Poland is also consistently cited as a major supplier of military aid, often ranking third among all suppliers to Ukraine (after the US and Germany) in terms of the transfer of major conventional arms.

Biggest Winner in Ukraine’s Reconstruction And Rearmament

Unreported behind the scenes as Europe’s leaders go public in continuing to urge Zelensky to reject a settlement of the war except on terms that are deemed as a clear defeat for Russia has been the fierce competition among their military and industrial interests to win the lucrative contracts enriching the lobby groups and buttressing national economies. This competition is intensifying as Zelensky makes a last ditch effort to rally European military support to avoid a more comprehensive defeat as Russia’s war machine grinds forward and closes in on Ukrainian positions in the Donbas region.

The biggest winner is unlikely to emerge from among individual EU countries heavily invested in the armament and industrial complexes or even from the EU as a collective. It will be the United States which, having provided the largest amount of military assistance to Ukraine – an estimated $66.5 billion in military aid since February 2022 – is determined not only to call the shots in the peace settlement but also to recover its war ‘investment’ in the reconstruction and rearmament years ahead.

This can be seen clearly from the 28 point draft peace settlement plan presented to Ukraine which is essentially an American imposition on Ukraine and its supporters in the EU. The entire structure of the plan – particularly control over Russian frozen assets, the financial profits for the US in reconstruction, the US-led security dialogue,and the key position and authority of the Peace Council to be chaired by Trump to monitor implementation – appear designed to establish US primacy in shaping the post-war European order and accessing strategic and economic opportunities, potentially at the expense of the EU’s own efforts, leverage, and desired role in continental security.

European military and industry critics of the plan will be hoping that the final peace settlement will see more than a few contracts thrown their way as American military and economic hegemony over Europe continues uncontested.

Lim Teck Ghee

Lim Teck Ghee PhD is a Malaysian economic historian, policy analyst and public intellectual whose career has straddled academia, civil society organisations and international development agencies. He has a regular column, Another Take, in The Sun, a Malaysian daily; and is author of Challenging the Status Quo in Malaysia.

INTERVIEW: Ukraine’s "cheap, fast and brutally effective” innovation positioning it as European defence hub

/ Nadine via Pixabay

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By Clare Nuttall in Glasgow November 23, 2025

Ukraine is rapidly emerging as a centre for defence and dual-use technological innovation, accelerated by the ongoing war, according to Maria Repko, deputy executive director at the Centre for European Strategy (CES).

From autonomous systems to first person view (FPV) drones and cyber defence tools, the conflict is forcing Ukrainian engineers and tech firms to innovate at unprecedented speed, Repko told bne IntelliNews. 

“The war has made Ukraine a real-time testing ground for battlefield technologies,” Repko said. “R&D cycles are measured in days, not years. It’s cheap, fast and brutally effective.”

Repko noted that Ukraine’s innovation is not limited to military applications. “Ukraine combines several strategic advantages: a large, educated workforce (over 30mn people today, and nearly 40mn pre-war), abundant and cheap green energy — particularly from nuclear and renewables — and geographic proximity to key European markets,” she said. These factors, she added, make Ukraine a potential hub for high-value manufacturing and nearshoring once the war ends.

Real-time laboratory

According to Repko, the country’s rapid adaptation to wartime needs has fundamentally shifted how defence and dual-use technologies are developed. “Critically, Ukraine is now also a leader in dual-use and defence innovation,” she said.

A CES report, titled “Europe’s next frontier: why Ukraine matters now”, describes Ukraine as an “indispensable contributor to the continent’s defence”. Ukrainian innovations in drones, autonomous vehicles, and cybersecurity are increasingly attracting international attention, offering a model for how smaller economies can leapfrog traditional R&D timelines under urgent conditions.

“Even beyond defence, the skills and technologies developed in Ukraine have broad commercial applications,” Repko said. “Cybersecurity, AI, and advanced engineering developed under wartime pressures can feed into European tech and industrial sectors in peacetime.”

EU integration 

Ukraine’s integration with European supply chains is already deepening. The CES report argues that full economic and industrial integration into the EU could boost Europe’s competitiveness, industrial resilience, and energy security.

Before 2014, Ukraine’s economy remained largely tied to post-Soviet supply chains. But since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, trade patterns have shifted dramatically. The DCFTA agreement with the EU laid the groundwork for deeper integration, a process accelerated by wartime migration, which has created new personal and professional links across Europe. “Many European firms already source from Ukraine, and Ukrainian companies increasingly operate to EU standards,” Repko said.

She noted that EU accession is “crucial” for long-term investor confidence. “EU accession acts as a magnet for investment because it signals long-term market integration and legal stability,” she said. “The prospect of joining the EU Single Market is what transformed investor confidence in countries like Poland. Ukraine is following a similar path—just compressed into a much shorter timeline. Progress on EU chapters is already solid.”

The country has a highly educated population, a strong industrial base, and sectoral strengths that align with European needs. Advanced manufacturing, metallurgy, engineering, and IT form a robust foundation for future reconstruction and industrial expansion.

In the IT sector alone, Ukraine has more than 360,000 professionals, ranking eighth in Europe by workforce size. The country has developed reputations for cybersecurity, software development, and AI applications. “Ukraine has built strong reputations in cybersecurity, AI, and software development,” Repko said.

Wartime conditions 

Ukraine is operating under wartime conditions, meaning its potential in many areas cannot yet be fulfilled. Repko stresses the need for robust air defence and war-risk insurance to protect investors, assets, and goods. Workforce mismatches, both territorial and skills-related, require investment in mobility and training. Legal and institutional improvements are also necessary to reduce bureaucratic risks and strengthen the business climate.

The CES report highlights the synergy between Ukraine’s industrial capabilities and Europe’s strategic needs, from clean energy and green metallurgy to advanced R&D. It argues that post-war reconstruction could be a catalyst for relocating higher-value operations to Ukraine, boosting both local development and European competitiveness.

Repko considers “realistically” this will be mostly after the war. “High-value operations — from clean energy infrastructure and green metallurgy to advanced R&D — can and should be relocated to Ukraine once reconstruction begins and the security environment stabilises. The talent is there. The industrial base is there. And the alignment with EU needs—from green transition to defence innovation—couldn’t be clearer,” she told bne IntelliNews.

The CES report also points to Ukraine’s energy resources as a key advantage. Nuclear power, renewables, and natural gas could help reduce European dependence on external suppliers while supporting decarbonisation goals. Repko said that, with strategic investment, Ukraine could evolve from being an energy importer to a supplier of affordable, sustainable energy for Europe, further enhancing its role in regional competitiveness.

Overall, Repko and the CES report argue that Ukraine’s wartime innovations and industrial capabilities are helping to position it as a strategic partner for Europe. “If Russia is treated as a long-term threat—and many now do—then Ukraine's defence-tech ecosystem will remain highly relevant for decades,” she said.

By combining defence innovation, a skilled workforce, strong industrial sectors, and EU integration, CES analysts  consider Ukraine could not only rebuild after the war but also emerge as a key contributor to European competitiveness and security.

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Russia-Pakistan Defence Cooperation: Between Optics And Reality – Analysis


Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif with Russia's President Vladimir Putin on sidelines of Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru

October 22, 2025 

Observer Research Foundation
By Aleksei Zakharov

News of Russia’s supplies to Pakistan of RD-93MA engines, which power Pakistani JF-17 Block III fighter jets, has become part of a domestic political debate in India, prompting an emotional backlash in the media. While Moscow is indeed proceeding with these deliveries, including the upgraded variants, this is hardly a new development. Even if, as some critics have levelled, Russia ignored Indian requests to halt these exports, this has been the case since at least 2007. Therefore, the renewed attention to this issue at this juncture merits scrutiny. That said, it is still worth revisiting Russia’s defence engagement with Pakistan to weigh in on its future trajectory.

All Talk and Little Action

There should be no illusions about Russia’s intention to sell defence systems to Pakistan. Russian military experts have long argued that Moscow should reconsider its approach to South Asia and reap the benefits of supplying both India and Pakistan with weaponry. The oft-cited argument is that, unlike Russia, other arms suppliers to India, such as the US and France, have been able to sell weapons to both New Delhi and Islamabad while still being preferred over Russian bids during tenders. Meanwhile, the argument goes, Russia has been compelled to restrict itself in the name of “privileges” in its partnership with India.

It is important to consider these arguments in context. This debate dates back to the 1990s when Moscow was on the verge of providing Pakistan with Su-27s. Despite strong lobbying from the foreign ministry and a general warming of Russia-Pakistan political ties, the deal was eventually abandoned. This was followed by further discussions, fuelled by Pakistan’s desire to purchase various defence platforms from Russia, including air-to-air missiles, tanks, stealth frigates, and artillery guns. Most of these Pakistani proposals led nowhere and were blocked by Russia due to Indian objections. What did materialise, however, was the Russian provision of Mi-17/171 dual-use transport helicopters, which were delivered to Pakistan in several batches between 1996 and 2016, as well as four Mi-35M combat helicopters (Refer to Table 1).

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

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As India has sought to reduce its dependence on Russian-origin military hardware, the “commercialisation” of defence supplies to Pakistan has gained prominence in Moscow. Russian experts estimated in 2019 that Pakistan’s demand for Russian arms could potentially reach US$8-9 billion. What these projections often fail to consider, however, is the fragile state of Pakistan’s economy, which is cash-strapped and reliant on external support. This means that any significant deal would only be viable if Russia were to extend a loan to the Pakistani government. Not only would this alienate a reliable and financially stable partner, but such an arrangement would hardly be beneficial for Russia’s own economic interests, particularly at a time when Moscow itself needs hard currency. Beyond Islamabad’s limited purchasing capacity, there are deep-seated concerns over the alignment of Russian and Pakistani regional objectives and the broader “unpredictability” of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the long run.

The Story of Russia’s Engines in Pakistan

In 2007 and 2010, Rosoboronexport reached deals to export 250 RD-93 engines to China, with an option for an additional 400 units and the right to transfer them to third countries, including Pakistan. Following the Russia-Pakistan military cooperation agreement of November 2014, Pakistani officials claimed that they would be able to purchase these engines directly from Russia, expressing interest in training engine specialists there and seeking Moscow’s assistance with the modernisation of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex’s engine-repair facilities. However, there has been no confirmation that Russia has entered into any such arrangement beyond the delivery of engines and spare parts — and even these are exported to Pakistan via China.

The RD-93 is an export variant of the RD-33 engine used in Russian MiG-29 fighter jets, primarily designed to power the Chinese Chengdu FC-1/Pakistani JF-17 Thunder. The RD-93MA is an upgraded version of the RD-93, offering an increased thrust of 9,300 kg compared to 8,300 kg. While the first two JF-17 variants relied on the RD-93, the enhanced power output of the RD-93MA is geared towards the JF-17 Block III, enabling the aircraft to carry heavier payloads, integrate advanced avionics, and achieve higher speeds. According to SIPRI data, Russia has delivered more than 200 RD-93 engines to Pakistan since 2007 (Figure 1).

Beyond enhanced performance, the supply of Russian engines for China-Pakistan fighter jets is also a matter of reliability. Despite China’s efforts to replace the RD-93 with the domestically developed WS-13 engine, both China and Pakistan remain dependent on Russian-made engines, which are regarded as more reliable and durable. Prominent Russian experts argue that India should view the continued supply of Russian engines for the JF-17 in a positive light, given that New Delhi is well aware of the jets’ capabilities when powered by the RD-93/RD-93MA and can therefore predict their operational performance.

Figure 1. The Schedule of RD-93 Supplies from Russia to Pakistan

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (some figures are estimates)

Beyond Arms Supplies

Another aspect of Russia-Pakistan engagement involves joint military drills, which have become a regular feature. The latest edition of Druzhba counter-terrorism exercise took place in Russia’s Southern Military District from 15 to 27 September 2025. The exercise focused on “drone warfare, fighting in built-up areas and counter-improvised explosive devices.” These exercises have been held regularly since September 2016, with exceptions in 2022 and 2023.

A naval component has also been embedded within the framework of bilateral interactions. In March 2025, the Russian and Pakistani navies conducted the Arabian Monsoon joint exercise in the North Arabian Sea, aimed at “enhancing interoperability and demonstrating a joint commitment to countering common maritime security threats.”

Officials from both sides have also been engaged in regular meetings of the Joint Military Consultative Committee (JMCC), which has convened consecutively for the past seven years, except in 2022. The most recent consultations took place in Moscow in August 2025 and were co-chaired by Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defence, Colonel General Alexander Fomin, and Pakistan’s Defence Secretary, Retired Lieutenant General Muhammad Ali.

Russia’s strategic partnership with India, particularly the close military and technical cooperation, has always constrained Moscow’s defence engagement with Pakistan. Even in times of turbulence and uncertainty, decision-makers in Moscow have recognised that developing substantial defence ties with Islamabad could cost access to the more lucrative Indian market, which generates billions of dollars for Russia.

Curiously, the controversy over the RD-93 engines has resurfaced at a time when the India-Russia defence partnership is back on track, with major items such as the delivery of additional S-400s, potential joint production of S-500 air defence systems, and the Su-57 fighter jet deal high on the bilateral agenda. Russia is unlikely to jeopardise these strategically and commercially significant opportunities with India for the sake of modest gains with Pakistan. That said, Moscow will continue to engage in limited defence cooperation with Islamabad —including through military exercises and selective arms supplies—within the boundaries accepted by successive Indian governments.

About the author: Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow – Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

 

How Top Arms Exporters Have Responded To War In Gaza – Analysis

File photo of Israeli Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-15I Ra'am. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin Gruenwald, USAF.

 October 7, 2025

By SIPRI

By Zain Hussain

Following the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023, during which around 1200 Israelis were killed, Israel launched an intensive military campaign in Gaza, with the stated aims of destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and bringing home 251 hostages taken during the incursion. This military campaign has continued, with little interruption, for the past two years. 

As of 28 September 2025, the Palestinian Ministry of Health reports a cumulative total of over 66 000 direct conflict-related Palestinian fatalities in Gaza since 7 October 2023, as well as 369 verified deaths from malnutrition. The Israeli campaign has included airstrikes and ground assaults that have damaged or destroyed hospitals, schools and emergency shelters, as well as strikes or attacks on personnel and facilities of United Nations and other humanitarian actors.

A negotiated bilateral ceasefire came into effect between Hamas and Israel on 19 January 2025, part of a planned process supposed to result in the return of all remaining Israeli hostages and an end to the war. The ceasefire collapsed on 18 March, when Israel launched extensive airstrikes into Gaza. 

On 16 May 2025 Israel launched Operation Gideon’s Chariots, a major escalation of its military offensive in Gaza with the stated aims of defeating Hamas, destroying its military and governmental capabilities, and increasing pressure for the release of the remaining hostages. On 8 August 2025 it was announced that the Israeli Security Cabinet had approved Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s proposal for the Israel Defense Forces to take control of Gaza City in a ground assault, which eventually began on 16 September.

The high death toll and the level of destruction in Gaza have aroused growing international concern and calls from states and international organizations for Israel to adopt a less aggressive strategy, lift restrictions on humanitarian access to Gaza, and end the conflict. 

Following Israel’s announcement of the planned takeover of Gaza City, the foreign ministers of Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, along with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, published a joint statement ‘strongly rejecting’ the decision and arguing that the plan risked ‘violating international humanitarian law’. 

Nineteen states have formally recognized the state of Palestine since October 2023, including Spain and, in September 2025, France and the UK. This brings the total number of UN member states that have recognized Palestine to at least 151. 

In September 2025 the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, East Jerusalem and Israel concluded that the Israeli authorities and Israeli security forces ‘have committed and are continuing to commit . . . genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip’. The commission also concluded that Israeli President Isaac Herzog, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant ‘have incited the commission of genocide and that Israeli authorities have failed to take action against them to punish this incitement’. It further said that ‘statements made by Israeli authorities are direct evidence of genocidal intent’ and that ‘the pattern of conduct is circumstantial evidence of genocidal intent and that the genocidal intent was the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the totality of the evidence’. Among its recommendations to UN member states were to:

Cease the transfer of arms and other equipment or items, including jet fuel, to the State of Israel or third States where there is reason to suspect their use in military operations that have involved or could involve the commission of genocide.

Even before this, several states have announced plans to limit supplies of military equipment to Israel in the past year, citing Israel’s conduct of the war. In July 2025 Slovenia announced that it would prohibit all import, export and transit of weapons to and from Israel and would ‘prepare other national measures against the current Israel Government, whose actions represent serious violations of international humanitarian law’.

This backgrounder looks at developments over the past year in the policy and practice of six of the world’s top 10 exporters of ‘major conventional arms’ in 2020–24, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, in relation to the war in Gaza. It also includes the latest available SIPRI data on transfers of major conventional arms to Israel. As such, it updates a similar backgrounder by the author published in October 2024. It does not intend to provide an exhaustive overview of all relevant developments, within these states or globally. 

Arms transfers to Israel

In the past decade Israel has greatly increased its imports of arms. SIPRI estimates that in the five-year period 2020–24, Israel was the world’s 15th largest importer of major arms, accounting for 1.9 per cent of global arms imports in the period. A decade earlier, in 2010–14, Israel ranked 34th. 

Although only three countries supplied major arms to Israel in 2020–24, the United States, Germany and Italy, many others are known to have supplied military components, ammunition or services. This backgrounder looks first at the USA, Germany and Italy, and then at three more states among the top 10 global exporters of major conventional arms: the UK, France and Spain. The four other global arms exporters among the top 10 are excluded from the analysis: Russia and China (the third and fourth largest exporters) because they are not known to supply any arms to Israel; South Korea (the 10th largest exporter) because its exports to Israel are minimal; and Israel itself (the eighth largest exporter). 

The United States

According to SIPRI data, in 2020–24, the USA provided 66 per cent of Israel’s imports of major arms. These included aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles, ships and air defence systems. These transfers were funded by both direct purchases by Israel and US military assistance.

In April 2025 the US government claimed to have provided Israel with over US$130 billion in bilateral assistance since 1948, ‘focused on addressing new and complex security threats, bridging Israel’s capability gaps through security assistance and cooperation, increasing interoperability through joint exercises, and helping Israel maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME)’. Israel is the leading global recipient of Title 22 US security assistance under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme, formalized by a 10-year memorandum of understanding (2019–28). Under the memorandum, the USA provides $3.3 billion in FMF and $500 million for cooperative programmes for missile defence annually.

Throughout 2024 and 2025, the USA has continued to support Israel militarily through arms supplies and deployments of its own forces. Arms deliveries in 2024 included missiles, bombs and armoured personnel carriers. 

The administration of President Donald J. Trump has signalled its firm commitment to supporting Israel and publicly distanced itself from some of the criticism that Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, made of Israel’s actions. In January 2025 President Trump liftedthe hold that Biden had put on the transfer to Israel of a shipment of Mk-84 2000-pound bombs. The hold had been imposed in May 2024 because of concerns about Israel’s planned military offensive in Rafah Governorate.

In 2025 the US State Department has continued to notify the US Congress about a number of potential arms sales to Israel.

In February 2025 the State Department, declaring that an emergency exists to bypass Congressional review, notified Congress about three potential arms sales to Israel: $2.04 billion for 35 529 2000-pound bombs (Mk-84 or BLU-117 general purpose bodies, or a combination of both) and 4000 I-2000 Penetrator warheads; $675.7 million for nearly 5000 1000-pound bombs and guidance kits; and $295 million for Caterpillar D9 bulldozers. In March US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that he had signed a declaration to use emergency authorities to expedite the delivery of approximately $4 billion in military assistance to Israel. In the same announcement Rubio said that since Trump had taken office on 20 January 2025, the administration had approved nearly $12 billion in major Foreign Military Sales to Israel. 

Germany

In 2020–24 Germany accounted for 33 per cent of Israel’s imports of major conventional arms. These were mainly for Israel’s naval forces: 81 per cent of the transfers were frigates and another 10 per cent were torpedoes. The remaining 8.5 per cent were armoured vehicle engines, including those for armoured vehicles used in the war in Gaza. Sa’ar 6-class frigates (MEKO A-100 Light Frigates) supplied by Germany have also been used in the conflict.

On 8 August 2025 Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that the German government would not authorize any further exports of military equipment that could be used in Gaza until further notice. Merz reiterated the German government’s positions that Israel has a right to defend itself; that release of all remaining hostages and ‘purposeful’ negotiation towards a ceasefire were the top priority; and that Hamas should be disarmed and ‘must not play a role in the future of Gaza’. However, he said that the German government believed that the ‘even harsher military action’ approved by the Israeli Security Cabinet (referring to the plan to take over Gaza City) would make those goals harder to achieve. 

Italy

In 2020–24 Italy accounted for 1 per cent of Israel’s imports of major arms. Most of these comprised light helicopters (59 per cent); the remainder were naval guns (41 per cent) to equip frigates supplied by Germany. Apart from these, Italy is also a partner in the F-35 programme, for which it produces components. The F-35 programme is a US-led programme to produce the F-35 combat aircraft. It involves the production of parts and components by eight partner states, including Italy and the UK (see below). The F-35 has been used by Israel in its military operations, including in Gaza. Concerns about the potential use of the F-35 by Israel to carry out violations of international humanitarian law have led to much criticism of transfers of the aircraft or its parts to Israel. 

In an interview in August 2025 published by the Italian foreign ministry, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Antonio Tajani condemned Israel’s plan to invade Gaza, saying ‘this carnage cannot continue’. He also stated that ‘since 7 October two years ago, Italy has not sold arms to Israel’. However, following a similar statement by Tajani in January 2024, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto clarified that arms exports to Israel continued, but only deliveries under contracts signed before 7 October 2023, and that these exports were only allowed after checks to ensure that any weapons would not be used against civilians in Gaza.

In its 2024 ‘Report on operations authorized and carried out concerning the control of export, import and transit of weapons materiel as well as the export and transit of high-technology products’, the Italian government mentions—regarding data for authorizations of individual export licences—that: ‘Israel is not included in the 2024 data, as the characteristics of the Israeli intervention in Gaza have led the UAMA national authority not to grant new export authorizations pursuant to Law No. 185/1990.’ The Unit for the Authorization of Armament Materials (UAMA) is Italy’s national authority for export control of arms and dual-use items.

The United Kingdom

According to SIPRI data, the UK has not exported any major arms to Israel since the 1970s. However, the UK does supply Israel with components for various systems such as aircraft, radars and targeting equipment, including components for the F-35 combat aircraft. Export data reveals that, in the last quarter of 2024, the UK approved Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) for exports of military goods to Israel worth £127.6 million ($170.8 million)—more than the combined exports between 2020 and 2023. 

In September 2024 the UK suspended around 30 previously issued licences for exports of military equipment to Israel that could be used in Gaza. The decision excluded ‘UK components for the multi-national F-35 joint strike fighter programme . . . except where going directly to Israel’.

A report jointly published in May 2025 by the Palestinian Youth Movement, Workers for a Free Palestine, and Progressive International analysed Israeli Tax Authority (ITA) data to argue that, between October 2023 and March 2025, thousands of military goods were sent to Israel from the UK. The report garnered media and political attention in the UK, leading a senior figure in the Labour Party, John McDonnell, to call for a full investigation into Foreign Secretary David Lammy, arguing that Lammy may have misled parliament, in breach of ministerial code. Lammy subsequently denied this. It is worth noting here that ITA data cannot necessarily be taken at face value, as there are issues that complicate the determination of imports of military equipment, including ambiguities in the recording of the data. 

On 30 June 2025 the High Court of Justice in London dismissed a legal challenge against the UK government brought by Palestinian human rights organization Al-Haq (with Oxfam, Amnesty International UK, and Human Rights Watch as interveners). Al-Haq had argued that the decision to exclude transfers of F-35 parts from the suspension of arms export licences to Israel announced in September 2024 (unless they were supplied directly to Israel) was unlawful. The issue of jurisdiction was key to the decision, with the court concluding that the issue of whether the UK must withdraw from the F-35 programme was not a matter for courts to decide, but for the executive.

In August 2025 Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced that there would be no Israeli national pavilion at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) UK arms fair in September, due to the UK government placing ‘unilateral restrictions’ on Israeli officials’ and military representatives’ participation.

The UK government’s statement on recognition of Palestine did not include a clarification on how this might impact the supply of arms or military equipment to Israel. 

France

SIPRI data does not show any French exports of major arms to Israel in 2020–24. The last recorded exports of major arms to Israel from France were in 1998. However, France has supplied components for arms. 

In a radio interview released on 5 October 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron said: ‘I think the priority today, is to go back to a political solution, to stop delivering arms to carry out fighting in Gaza. France does not deliver them.’ At the Francophonie summit meeting the same day, Macron stated: ‘If one is calling for a ceasefire, coherence would be to not supply weapons of war.’ These statements sparked a strong response from Prime Minister Netanyahu, following which Macron’s office issued a statement that France remained a steadfast friend of Israel. 

In June 2025, aiming to silence ‘continual accusations’ that France continued to supply arms to Israel, Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu declassified a document listing arms components exported from France to Israel in 2024, which he claimed were strictly for the defence of the civilian population or destined for re-export and showed that France does not export arms to Israel. The declassified document reportedly details subcategories, including parts supplied for ‘re-export only’ and others for Israel’s Iron Dome air-defence system. 

In September 2025 French media outlet Mediapart obtained a copy of the Ministry of the Armed Forces’ 2025 report to parliament on arms exports, covering 2024. The report says that the value of French deliveries to Israel fell by half in 2024 compared with 2023, although the value of new orders reached €27.1 million ($30.8 million), above the average for the decade. The report also says that two thirds of these orders were for components ‘that will be integrated into systems for re-export to third countries’, and reiterated the official policy position that France exports to Israel only components intended for re-export or for defensive systems.  

Transfers of military equipment to Israel have continued to come under scrutiny and criticism in France. For example, in June 2025, dock workers in a port near Marseille refused to load crates containing ammunition links manufactured by the French company Eurolinks onto a ship destined for Israel. In a televised response, Lecornu said that one reason France did not export arms to Israel was that ‘Israel is one of the main competitors to the French industry’. 

France has also taken measures to limit the representation of Israeli arms producers at French arms fairs. For example, in June 2025 the French government ordered the closure of five stands hosted by Israeli arms manufacturers (Aeronautics, Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael and UVision) at the Paris Air Show for showcasing ‘offensive weapons’. 

Spain

Since October 2023, the Spanish government has advocated restrictions on the supply of arms to Israel in international forums and the media. 

Spain’s latest national report on exports of defence and dual-use material, covering the first half of 2024, states that Spain has implemented an ‘extremely restrictive’ policy on issuing export licences for defence materials to Israel, and has authorized ‘no permanent exports of any lethal weapons or equipment’ since 2001. Furthermore, since October 2023, no new ‘definitive export operations of defence material’ to Israel have been authorized. The report states that in the first half of 2024, the only defence-related exports were some ‘non-lethal’ items sent to Israel for repair and maintenance before being returned to Spain or sent on to the Philippines armed forces.

Spain has not only limited arms exports to Israel but also sought to restrict arms imports from that country.

In September 2025 Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced that his government would adopt nine ‘additional measures’ that aimed to help ‘stop the genocide in Gaza, prosecute its perpetrators, and support the Palestinian population’. The new measures include the approval of a law legally consolidating the arms embargo on Israel imposed in October 2023 and establishment of a permanent legal ban on the purchase from and sale to Israel of weapons, ammunition and military equipment. Furthermore, all state aircraft transporting defence material destined for Israel were to be denied entry to Spanish airspace.

This followed the cancellation of a €6.6 million ($7.1 million) contract for bullets from an Israeli company in April 2025, and of a contract to purchase 165 Spike LR2 anti-tank missile systems and 1650 Spike missiles from Elbit Systems, worth €285 million ($324 million). 

Following the announcement of the new measures, Spain cancelled a contract for Israeli-designed rocket launchers (12 SILAM rocket launcher systems based on the PULS platform made by Elbit Systems), which had been ordered in 2023.

• About the author: Zain Hussain is a Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.
• Source: This article was published by SIPRI

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI also has a presence in Beijing, and is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide.

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