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Wednesday, June 03, 2026

Fired Scott Pelley breaks silence with bombshell claim: CBS ordered him to put lies on air

David McAfee
June 3, 2026 
RAW STORY


60 Minutes' Scott Pelley. (Shutterstock)

Scott Pelley, the veteran CBS News correspondent fired this week after publicly accusing network leadership of "murdering" 60 Minutes, issued a formal statement Tuesday night detailing what he says drove him out — and the allegations are specific.

"New management has instructed me to inject falsehoods and bias into a politically sensitive story," Pelley wrote. "I've been told to include assertions that are unverified. To date, in every case, I have managed to ignore these instructions or refuse them."

Pelley said the demands didn't stop there. Politicians, he wrote, had been invited to select which correspondents would conduct their interviews — a practice he called incompatible with basic journalistic standards. And he revealed that mismanagement had nearly killed an episode outright: the broadcast came within 19 minutes of not getting on the air at all.

The statement named a culprit. The new owner of CBS, Pelley wrote, was dismantling the most successful program in television history "apparently to curry a moment of favor with the Trump administration."

As Raw Story reported Tuesday, Pelley was fired after confronting CBS News leadership in a staff meeting and accusing them of murdering the program. In his termination letter, CBS Executive Producer Nick Bilton said Pelley was dismissed "for cause" — a designation Pelley can challenge in court.

His new statement made clear he views the firing as part of a broader collapse. Senior leadership and two correspondents had already been cut before he was shown the door, he said, and "good people were silenced because they stood up for our audience."

None of it came during a ratings slump. 60 Minutes posted a 9 percent jump in viewers at the end of its 58th season — growth Pelley called "unheard-of."

"The collapse of values at the top has become untenable," he wrote. "The principles I hold dear are gone, and so I must leave as well."

He closed after 37 years at CBS with a prayer "for a day when sanity, competence, and courage return."




Fired Scott Pelley Says ‘60 Minutes’ Under Bari Weiss Wanted ‘Falsehoods and Bias’ Injected

“Incompetence and unprofessionalism in the new management have wreaked havoc,” said the veteran journalist as his 37-career with CBS News came to an end.



US journalist Scott Pelley attends a celebration of the announcement of CBS’s new Fall schedule at Paramount Studios in Hollywood, May 2, 2024.
(Photo by Michael Tran/AFP via Getty Images)


Jon Queally
Jun 03, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

Fired by the network where he had worked for nearly four decades on Tuesday night, veteran “60 Minutes” correspondent Scott Pelley said in a statement that he had been directed by the new management team at CBS News, led by editor-in-chief Bari Weiss, “to inject falsehoods and bias into a politically sensitive story” and also “told to include assertions that are unverified” in his reporting.

What looks like the collapse of “60 Minutes” has played out both behind closed doors at the network in recent months and publicly, with a series of high-profile firings of other longtime journalists and producers at the show. Details of internal meetings have been leaked, revealing serious tension between veteran members of the nation’s most-watched television news magazine and Weiss’ new management team.

‘She Was Brought in to Kill’ 60 Minutes: Scott​​ Pelley Unleashes on Bari Weiss at CBS Meeting

‘Let’s Call This What It Is: Censorship’: Fired ‘60 Minutes’ Journalists Speak Out

“The leadership of 60 Minutes is no longer recognizable,” Pelley said in his statement, released just hours after Nick Bilton, the show’s new executive producer appointed by Weiss last month, announced the firing. “The principles I hold dear are gone, and so I must leave as well.”



Bilton said in his statement that Pelley had been “terminated for cause effective immediately,” following a contentious staff meeting on Monday in which Pelley accused Weiss, who was not at the meeting, of being “brought in to kill” the program, not save it.

Despite “repeated attempts to have direct conversations with him over the weekend” and earlier on Tuesday, Bilton said, his efforts “to find common ground” with Pelley were not successful. “That was not the path Scott chose,” he said.



Pelley’s narrative of events was starkly different.

“Last month, 60 Minutes lost its DNA when our entire senior leadership and two of our best on-air correspondents were cruelly fired without cause,” Pelley said in a statement sent to several news outlets. “Good people were silenced because they stood up for our audience. They stood for fairness against the forces of political bias; they stood for professionalism against chaos.”

“For my part,” he continued, “new management has instructed me to inject falsehoods and bias into a politically sensitive story. I’ve been told to include assertions that are unverified. To date, in every case, I have managed to ignore these instructions or refuse them. Recently, politicians have been invited to choose correspondents for interviews on the broadcast. Giving politicians control over 60 Minutes interviews is not how this is done. Finally, incompetence and unprofessionalism in the new management have wreaked havoc. In a case involving one of my stories, the entire program came within 19 minutes of not getting on the air at all.”

Pelley concluded: “I depart after 37 years at CBS with one emotion—a heart brimming with gratitude for the men and women of CBS News who encouraged and enriched my work, very often at the risk of their own lives. I pray for a day when those people and their ideals are honored again—a day when sanity, competence, and courage return.”

Bari Weiss just set off an 'underwater earthquake' at CBS by firing Scott Pelley: expert

Robert Davis
June 2, 2026 
RAW STORY


CBS News head Bari Weiss at a conference in Idaho in July.
 (Brendan McDermid/Reuters)

A media expert warned CBS chief Bari Weiss on Tuesday night that she just set off an "underwater earthquake" at her network by showing veteran journalist Scott Pelley the door.

Brian Stelter, CNN's chief media analyst, told Kaitlan Collins on "The Source" that Pelley's firing likely won't go over well within the CBS newsroom and could lead to a costly legal battle. In the termination letter, CBS Executive Producer Nick Bilton said Pelley was dismissed "for cause," which he can challenge in court.

"This is like an underwater earthquake at CBS News. It's not going to be visible on TV right away, but this is bound to have many ripple effects and maybe a legal battle," Stelter said.

Pelley had been a journalist with CBS News for more than four decades before he was dismissed on Tuesday. His firing came just one day after Pelley confronted CBS News leadership in a staff meeting and accused them of "murdering" the flagship show, "60 Minutes."

"Yesterday’s performative display of hostility — enacted in front of the staff instead of in a civil, private conversation — demonstrated that you have no interest in contributing to the future success of the show, or approaching my new tenure with a mind open to collaboration and progress,” Bolton wrote in the letter.



CBS Firings Called ‘Straight From an Authoritarian Handbook’ and Preview of Paramount-Warner Bros. Merger

The pending Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery merger “represents an existential threat to the free press, independent media, and free speech in this country and beyond,” warned several press freedom groups.



Free press advocates project messages opposing the Paramount-Warner Bros. merger on Jazz at Lincoln Center during the News and Documentary Emmy Awards on May 27, 2026 in New York City.
(Photo by Eugene Gologursky/Getty Images for Emmys Rapid Response Project)


Julia Conley
Jun 02, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

A coalition of nine press freedom groups on Tuesday warned that last week’s firings of top journalists at CBS News’ “60 Minutes” were a “grotesque effort taken straight from an authoritarian handbook”—but emphasized that the dismissal of reporters who had pushed back against the Trump administration signaled danger for journalists across the media, particularly as a pending merger would hand control of CNN to the same billionaire family that how runs CBS.

The Coalition for Women in Journalism, Common Cause, Freedom of the Press Foundation, and Reporters Without Borders were among the groups that released a statement saying the firing of “60 Minutes” correspondents Sharyn Alfonsi and Cecilia Vega—as well as two top executives—were meant to “appease a sitting president and dismantle one of the loudest voices in investigative journalism.”

But the groups emphasized that “this is only the beginning,” considering the fact that Warner Bros. Discovery recently voted in support of a $110 billion proposed merger with Paramount Skydance, owned by David Ellison, the son of President Donald Trump megadonor Larry Ellison. The deal could be finalized as soon as July.

Warner Bros. Discovery owns CNN, and media critics have warned the network could be headed for the same loss of editorial independence that CBS has faced since right-wing former opinion columnist took the helm of the latter network last year following the Paramount Skydance merger.

Since then, newly appointed editor-in-chief Bari Weiss has pulled from the air a “60 Minutes” segment that questioned the Trump administration’s explanation for the deportation of hundreds of immigrants to an El Salvador prison, personally booked guests for news programs, and called for programming that appeals to “centrist” viewers.

“Bari Weiss’ shameless actions fulfill the Ellisons’ commitment to President Trump to remake CBS to his liking,” said the groups on Tuesday. “Larry Ellison has reportedly promised to do the same at CNN if allowed to take control through the pending Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery merger. Not because it makes any business sense, but because they seek to control the public discourse.”

“We have to make the story heard. It’s what ‘60 Minutes’ would have done; it’s what the Fourth Estate is tasked with doing; it’s what Trump and the Ellisons want to prevent. Don’t let them.”

The groups noted that the firings of Alfonsi, Vega, executive producer Tanya Simon, and executive editor Draggan Mihailovich came as more than 200 journalists and documentarians signed an open letter opposing the Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, citing concerns that the deal “would open the door to improper political meddling in journalists’ editorial decisions,” and noting that according to The Wall Street Journal, David Ellison has “promised President Donald Trump ‘sweeping changes’ at Warner-owned CNN—a frequent target of Trump’s ire.”

“Ellison will likely alter CNN’s editorial direction (not to mention meddle with HBO’s documentaries) to be more friendly to the administration, threatening press freedom,” said the signatories, including Wajahat Ali, Mehdi Hasan, and Alfonsi.

A separate letter organized by Democracy Defenders Fund has garnered signatures from over 1,000 actors, producers, directors, screenwriters, and other entertainment professionals.

“This transaction would further consolidate an already concentrated media landscape, reducing competition at a moment when our industries—and the audiences we serve—can least afford it,” reads the letter, which calls for state attorneys general to block the merger. “The result will be fewer opportunities for creators, fewer jobs across the production ecosystem, higher costs, and less choice for audiences in the United States and around the world. Alarmingly, this merger would reduce the number of major US film studios to just four.”

On Tuesday, the press freedom groups warned that the merger “represents an existential threat to the free press, independent media, and free speech in this country and beyond, and should not be allowed to move forward.”

“We cannot let this blow to the bedrock of our democracy be lost in the constant barrage of scandal, corruption, and abuse of power,” said the organizations. “We have to make the story heard. It’s what ‘60 Minutes’ would have done; it’s what the Fourth Estate is tasked with doing; it’s what Trump and the Ellisons want to prevent. Don’t let them.”




 

Exclusive: EU Commission to defend Spain in €106 million US energy lawsuit

The Spanish flag flies in Madrid.
Copyright AP Photo / Manu Fernandez

By Marta Pacheco
Published on

When firm Blasket Renewables sought to enforce compensation in a US court, the European Commission argued that Spain could not legally pay it, highlighting a clash between international arbitration and EU law.

The European Commission is seeking permission from the European Council to defend Spain from a €106 million lawsuit brought in a US court under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) which could put Madrid in breach of EU state aid rules, according to a document seen by Euronews.

The ECT is a post-Cold War international agreement designed to protect investments in unstable, formerly communist states. It has since become a source of controversy because it allows energy companies to sue countries for measures that could harm their expected profits.

While the legal case is binding and can generally be enforced in courts under international investment treaty rules, the European Union argues that Spain could face conflicting legal obligations – at home and abroad – if a US court orders enforcement.

After Spain rolled back the state aid scheme set up in 2007 to promote electricity generation from clean power sources, the Japanese investor Eurus Energy claimed losses under the ECT and won the right to compensation, with Spain ordered to pay €106 million plus interest in November 2022.

The legal proceedings were initiated by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an arbitral tribunal linked to the World Bank, which manages legal disputes between international investors and countries worldwide.

In 2023, Spain challenged the compensation award, but ultimately failed.

Between a rock and a hard place

Eurus then assigned the case to Blasket Renewables, described in the document as a US-based “vulture fund” specialising in difficult-to-enforce arbitration compensation, effectively seeking enforcement through US courts.

"The Kingdom of Spain has informed the Commission that Blasket Renewables has filed a petition seeking recognition and enforcement of the award before the courts of the United States," reads the document.

The Commission argues that if Spain "compensates investors for losses incurred due to the repeal of the 2007 State aid scheme", it amounts to state aid, meaning financial support that a government gives to a company or investor.

But investors seeking compensation disagree, arguing that the payments are not government subsidies but compensation that Spain is legally required to pay after losing an international arbitration case.

Under EU rules, governments are not allowed to give special benefits to particular businesses if doing so would give them an unfair advantage over competitors, unless the support has been approved by the Commission.

The legal case highlights a clash between two legal systems, each asserting that its rules should prevail. International arbitration holds that Spain must pay, while the Commission says that making the payment could breach EU rules.

"Where aid is granted in violation of that provision, the beneficiary cannot have any legitimate expectations in being allowed to keep that aid, and the member state is obliged to recover it ex officio," reads the document, implying that the Spanish government would need to act accordingly.

The Commission considers that foreign courts' recognition and enforcement of such financial compensations is "incompatible with EU law" and would undermine "the primacy of EU law," which the EU executive sees as "unenforceable".

'Vulture funds' versus Spain

The Spanish Energy Ministry said that arbitral proceedings between international investors and Spain over renewables are the result of decisions made by the previous Spanish government, particularly in 2013 under former conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.

Madrid added that the majority of final arbitrations linked to renewable energy investments are in the hands of litigation funds, which have acquired the rights to the original plaintiffs, the main one being Blasket Renewable Investments.

"They are not the companies affected; they have purchased debts against Spain and try to enforce them abroad, filing the same cases in different countries," reads an Energy Ministry statement.

Paul de Clerck, economic justice coordinator at the NGO Friends of the Earth Europe, said this legal case was the "perfect illustration of the absurdity" of international state dispute settlements (ISDS).

He argued that if an investor doesn’t agree with a Spanish decision, it should go to the normal Spanish courts and not to a "business-friendly tribunal".

"Vulture funds are further misusing the system by buying up claims to make profits at the expense of tax payers," de Clerck told Euronews.

"It is high time that this comes to an end and that the EU and member states take ISDS out of all of their investment treaties."


Spain: Background And U.S. Relations In Complicated Times – Analysis

June 3, 2026 
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
By Derek E. Mix


Summary

Relations between the United States and Spain have experienced tensions during the second Trump Administration. Over the past several decades, the two countries have had extensive cultural ties, shared a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and cooperated closely on numerous diplomatic and security issues. Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982 and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986. Some Members of Congress may have an interest in Spain’s internal political situation and relations with the United States.
 
Political Situation

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) has led the government of Spain since 2018. PSOE formed a minority coalition government with Sumar, an alliance of left-wing parties, following Spain’s 2023 election. The government relies on parliamentary support from smaller regional parties to pass legislation. The center-right Popular Party (PP) and the far-right party Vox are the main opposition parties. The next election is due by August 2027. King Felipe VI is Spain’s head of state.

U.S.-Spain Tensions

Prime Minister Sánchez has been a leading European critic of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy. The Sánchez government has expressed opposition to the U.S. military operation against Iran that began in February 2026 and denied the use of military bases in Spain to U.S. forces involved in strikes against Iran. The Trump Administration has strongly criticized Spain’s position, and President Trump has threatened to “cut off all trade” with Spain in response.


At NATO’s 2025 summit, Spain was the only member of the alliance not to commit to spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense by 2035 (3.5% on core defense requirements, such as equipment and personnel, and 1.5% on defense- and security-related spending, such as critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, and a strong defense industrial base). President Trump strongly criticized Spain’s position.
Security and Defense Relations

Spain has played an important role in U.S. defense strategy for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Five U.S. destroyers equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are based in Spain, and the United States also has access to an air base in Spain. Historically, the United States and Spain have cooperated closely on counterterrorism. Spanish forces participated in the NATO-led missions in Afghanistan for nearly two decades.
 
Economic Relations

Two-way direct investment between the United States and Spain totaled more than $121 billion in 2024, with Spanish investment in the United States accounting for nearly three-quarters of that total. U.S.-Spain trade in goods and services was valued at nearly $75 billion in 2025, and the United States had a trade surplus of almost $3 billion.

Selected Foreign Policy and Security Issues

Spanish armed forces participate in more than a dozen international peacekeeping and security operations, including NATO and EU missions and the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.


Following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Spain has provided Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian assistance and supported EU sanctions against Russia. Spain hosts more than a quarter of a million Ukrainian refugees.

Relations between Spain and Israel have been strained over the past several years. Spanish officials criticized Israel’s military operations in Gaza and against Iran. In 2024, Spain formally recognized a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

The Sánchez government has deepened Spain’s ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Sánchez has traveled to China four times in four years, and the two countries have signed numerous trade and cooperation agreements. Some analysts assert that Sánchez’s approach to China is a strategy to diversify Spain’s economic ties in the context of tensions with the United States over tariffs and foreign policy issues.





Introduction and Issues for Congress

For decades, U.S. policymakers have considered Spain to be an important U.S. ally. Political developments in Spain, U.S.-Spain political relations and security cooperation, and U.S.-Spain economic ties are possible topics of continuing interest to the 119th Congress. Some Members of Congress may have an interest in foreign and defense policy debates that have affected U.S.-Spain relations during the second Trump Administration. Members of Congress may consider current issues in U.S.-Spain relations in the course of oversight or legislative activities or in the context of direct interactions with Spanish legislators and officials.

The Congressional Friends of Spain Caucus is a group of Members of Congress who seek to enhance U.S.-Spain relations and promote political, economic, and social ties between the two countries.1 The U.S.-Spain Council, founded in 1996, brings together U.S. and Spanish leaders to promote economic, educational, and cultural ties. The current honorary chair is Senator Ben Ray Luján. Six of the seven previous chairs were Members of the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives.2

Political Situation

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) has led the government of Spain since 2018.3 Sánchez secured a new term in office following an early election in July 2023.4 The government formed by Prime Minister Sánchez after the 2023 election (see Figure 2) is a minority coalition government between PSOE and Sumar, an alliance of left-wing parties, and relies on parliamentary support from smaller regional parties. It is the second coalition government to lead Spain since the restoration of democracy in 1978.5

The center-right Popular Party (or People’s Party, PP), which led the government of Spain from 2011 to 2018, came in first place in the 2023 election, with 33.1% of the vote. The PP won 137 out of the 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies (lower house of parliament) but fell short of a parliamentary majority. PSOE came in second place, with 31.7% of the vote and 121 seats. The far-right party Vox came in third place, with 12.4% and 33 seats, and the Sumar alliance won 12.3% and 31 seats. Seven smaller regional parties won the remaining 28 seats.6

Following the election, Spain’s head of state, King Felipe VI, asked PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo to form a government, but Feijóo was unable to secure the votes needed to become prime minister. King Felipe VI subsequently asked Sánchez (who had remained as acting prime minister) to form a government. To do so, Sánchez needed support from regional parties that advocate independence for Spain’s Catalonia region (see “Spain’s Regions” section, below). To secure their support, Sánchez proposed a controversial law that would grant amnesty to hundreds of people charged with crimes related to separatist activities in Catalonia, including organizing an illegal independence referendum and independence declaration in 2017. The proposed amnesty law triggered large public protests and opposition from Spain’s right-wing parties, police, and judiciary.7 The Congress of Deputies approved the law by a vote of 177 to 172 in May 2024.8




Figure 2. Results of 2023 Spanish Election, Congress of Deputies. Source: El País, “Elecciones Generales 2023.”
Note: Vote percentages rounded to the nearest tenth of a percentage point.



Priorities of the Sánchez government have included addressing income inequality and promoting socially progressive and green policies. In addition to the policymaking challenges of managing support from the regional parties, the Sánchez government has come under pressure due to corruption allegations against several government officials as well as the prime minister’s wife and brother.

The Sánchez government has taken a relatively welcoming approach to migration, viewing it as a means to boost Spain’s workforce and offset the country’s aging population. In January 2026, the government announced plans to legalize the status of approximately 500,000 undocumented migrants, provided they had lived in Spain for at least five months prior to the end of 2025 and did not have a criminal record. Successful applicants are expected to receive a one-year, renewable residence permit and would be eligible for citizenship after 10 years. More than half of the migrants in Spain originate from Central or South America; more than a quarter originate from countries in Africa.9

The next election is scheduled to occur by August 2027. In one aggregate of polls dated April 18, 2026, 32% of respondents expressed support for the PP, compared with 28% for PSOE, 17% for Vox, and 6% for Sumar.10

Spain is a parliamentary monarchy. According to the 1978 constitution, the king of Spain is the head of state. King Felipe VI succeeded to the throne in 2014 following the abdication of his father, King Juan Carlos I, who reigned for 39 years. The king is commander in chief of the armed forces and has formal roles in the legislative process and in appointing government officials. The king exercises limited political power, generally acting on the advice of the prime minister and refraining from interference in political matters.

Spain’s Regions

The Spanish state consists of 19 provincial territories referred to as self-governing communities or autonomous communities.11 Two Spanish territories in particular, the Basque region and Catalonia (see Figure 3), maintain distinctive cultural identities. Politics in these regions features the strong presence of nationalist independence movements.
 
Figure 3. Basque Region and Catalonia. Source: Created by CRS using data from the Department of State, Esri, DeLorme, ArcWorld, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency


The Basque region is in north-central Spain, on the Bay of Biscay near the border with France. The separatist terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) waged a violent campaign against the central government starting in the 1960s, killing approximately 800 people between 1968 and 2010. In 2008-2009, ETA was weakened by arrests of key leaders and declared a ceasefire in 2011. All Basque nationalist parties subsequently renounced violence in favor of pursuing independence through politics. ETA formally moved to disarm in 2017 and announced its full dissolution in 2018.


Catalonia is in northeast Spain, on the Mediterranean Sea and the border with France, and includes Barcelona, Spain’s second-largest city. It is one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).12 In 2017, the regional government of Catalonia attempted to hold a unilateral referendum on independence, and the Catalan parliament held a vote for independence. The government of Spain condemned both actions as illegal and unconstitutional. The government subsequently triggered an article of the Spanish Constitution allowing it to dissolve the regional government and assembly of Catalonia and take direct control of the regional police force. Spain lifted the article in 2018 following a new regional election and the formation of a new regional government. In 2019, Spain’s Supreme Court found nine separatist leaders guilty of sedition and abuse of public funds and sentenced them to prison. In 2021, the Spanish government pardoned the nine separatist leaders and released them from prison. More than 300 other individuals stand to benefit from the 2024 amnesty law described above.

Polling indicates that support for independence in Catalonia has decreased since the 2017 separatist crisis. For example, one 2025 poll funded by the Catalan government found 37.6% in favor of independence and 54.1% opposed, compared with 49.4% in favor and 41% opposed in 2017.13 Some observers attribute lower support for independence to factors such as disillusionment with the aftermath of the 2017 crisis, political fatigue in relation to the separatist issue, and more pragmatic or conciliatory approaches by politicians on both sides having reduced tensions surrounding the issue.14
Economy

Spain is the world’s 15th-largest economy and the 4th-largest economy in the 27-member European Union (EU).15 Spain’s economy grew by 2.8% in 2025 and is forecasted to grow by 2.1% in 2026. Unemployment is forecast to be 9.8% in 2026.16 Spain’s economy has fluctuated over the past two decades. The COVID-19 pandemic interrupted what had been a sustained period of economic recovery following a prolonged downturn from 2008 to 2014. Prior to 2008, Spain had experienced more than a decade of strong economic growth. In 1999, Spain was among the first group of EU countries to adopt the euro as its currency.

The tourism sector accounts for more than 15% of Spain’s GDP; Spain is the world’s second-largest tourist destination behind France. Other important sectors of Spain’s economy include construction and real estate (combining for 15% of GDP) and automobile manufacturing (10% of GDP).17 More than 62% of Spain’s exports go to other EU countries, and nearly 57% of imports come from EU countries.18 Spain’s top trading partners are Germany, France, China, Italy, Portugal, the United States, and the United Kingdom.19

Relations with the United States

The United States and Spain have close links in many areas, including extensive cultural and economic ties. The two countries also have a history of partnership on diplomatic and security issues, including strong counterterrorism cooperation.20 Under the terms of a bilateral Agreement on Defense Cooperation originally signed in 1988 and subsequently amended several times, the United States has access to a naval base at Rota and an air base at Morón. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2026, approximately 3,700 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Spain as of early 2026.21 Since 2014, four U.S. Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable ships (Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis BMD system) have been based at Rota as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for BMD in Europe. In 2023, the United States and Spain signed an agreement to increase the number of U.S. destroyers forward deployed in Rota from four to six. In 2024, a fifth destroyer arrived.22 The ships operate in the Mediterranean Sea to defend Europe against ballistic missiles that could be launched from countries such as Iran. The ships also have undertaken other missions, including patrolling the Black Sea, participating in interoperability drills in the Baltic Sea, and conducting anti-submarine exercises in the North Atlantic Ocean.



U.S.-Spain relations have experienced considerable tensions during the second Trump Administration. Prime Minister Sánchez has been one of the leading European critics of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy.23 The Sánchez government has opposed the U.S. military operation against Iran, arguing that Spain’s “position does not stem from any antipathy towards the American administration, and even less from sympathy for Iran’s brutal regime…. Our position stems from the fact that this war is illegal, a major threat to the rules-based international order, and contrary to the interests of humanity.”24 Spain denied the use of Rota and Morón to U.S. forces involved in strikes on Iran and closed Spanish airspace to flights involved in the operation.25 Spain’s government argued that using the bases for the Iran operation would violate the bilateral basing agreement; Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares reportedly stated that “Spanish military bases will not be used for anything that falls outside the agreement with the United States and the United Nations Charter.”26 President Trump has been critical of Spain’s policy responses, reportedly stating that the Sánchez government is “not cooperating at all, they have been very bad,” and that the United States could “cut off all trade with them.”27 Sánchez also opposed the U.S. operation to capture Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, reportedly stating that “Spain did not recognize the Maduro regime. But neither will it recognize an intervention that violates international law and pushes the region toward a horizon of uncertainty and belligerence.”28

Defense spending has been another source of tension between the United States and Spain. At NATO’s June 2025 summit, all NATO members except Spain committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 (3.5% on core defense requirements, such as equipment and personnel, and 1.5% on defense- and security-related spending, such as critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, and strengthening the defense industrial base). The Spanish government reportedly informed NATO prior to the summit that it could not commit to the 5% target and received an exemption allowing it to set a defense spending target of 2.1% of GDP (see “Defense Spending” section, below).29 President Trump criticized Spain’s position, reportedly stating “We had one laggard—Spain…. They have no excuse to do this…. Maybe you should throw them out of NATO, frankly.”30 In August 2025, the Spanish government announced it would not move ahead with purchasing U.S.-made F-35s (built by Lockheed Martin) to replace its aging fleet of F-18 aircraft, asserting that it would instead seek to acquire a European-made alternative.31

Economic Ties

U.S. exports of goods and services to Spain were valued at $38.6 billion in 2025, and U.S. imports of goods and services from Spain were valued at $35.8 billion.32 Top categories of U.S. goods exports to Spain are energy products, chemicals, transport equipment, and engines. Top categories of U.S. goods imports from Spain are industrial machinery and equipment, semi-manufactured goods and construction material, energy products, and food products.33 In 2024, U.S. direct investment in Spain totaled $33.8 billion and Spain’s direct investment in the United States totaled $87.4 billion.34 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, leading sectors in Spain for U.S. exporters and investments are the aerospace and defense sector, business investment services, energy, green technologies, information and communication technology, medical equipment and devices, safety and security equipment and services, and the agricultural sector.35 In 2023 (most recent data available), U.S. affiliates employed nearly 195,000 people in Spain and Spanish affiliates accounted for 86,500 jobs in the United States.36 As Spain is a member of the EU, U.S. tariffs on products from the EU apply to products from Spain.37

Selected Foreign Policy and Security Issues

For decades, the main tenets of Spanish foreign policy have been multilateral cooperation through Spain’s membership in institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the United Nations; friendly and cooperative relations with the United States; and strong ties with Central and South America. Spain also views security and stability in the Maghreb, Mediterranean, and Middle East to be foreign policy priorities.38

Defense Spending

Spain increased its defense spending from approximately $12.6 billion in 2019 to approximately $37.9 billion in 2025.39 At an estimated 2% of the country’s GDP, the 2025 figure met the goal that NATO members agreed to in 2014 as a minimum defense spending target. The Sánchez government increased defense spending by approximately $12 billion in 2025 to reach 2% of GDP.40 Over the past decade, Spain has had one of the lowest defense spending percentages in the alliance. Much of the new spending is intended to strengthen Spain’s national defense industry; Spain launched more than 30 military equipment modernization programs in 2025.41 As discussed above, Spain is the only NATO member that has not committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035. The Sánchez government argued that allies’ inputs to NATO should be measured not solely by spending but also by military capabilities and contributions to NATO operations and initiatives; the government asserted that Spain is a strong contributor to NATO missions and that it already has increased defense spending considerably.42 Some analysts express doubt that Spain can meet its NATO capability requirements without further increases in defense spending.43Some observers suggest that Spain’s reluctance to spend more on defense is largely due to domestic political pressure to maintain or increase spending on social welfare programs.44

Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Spain has supported Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion and backed the EU sanctions adopted against Russia to date. According to the Kiel Institute, a nongovernmental organization that tracks international assistance to Ukraine, Spain committed $1.64 billion in military assistance and $900 million in financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine from January 2022 through February 2026.45 Spain’s military assistance to Ukraine has included Leopard tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and systems, anti-tank weapons, small arms, and ammunition. As of December 31, 2025, Spain reported hosting more than 259,000 refugees from Ukraine.46

International Security Missions

Spain is an active participant in international security and peacekeeping operations, with approximately 4,000 soldiers and guardias civiles (one of Spain’s two national police forces) deployed in 15 international security and peacekeeping missions as of January 2026.47 Spain contributes military personnel to the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. Spanish aircraft and personnel also regularly participate in NATO air policing missions in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. In addition to its contributions to reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank, Spain contributes to NATO’s training mission in Iraq, NATO’s maritime security operation in the Mediterranean Sea, and NATO’s operation to protect Turkey’s border with Syria. In addition, Spain has deployments to the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, the EU anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, and several other EU missions. Spain participated in NATO-led missions in Afghanistan from 2002 until the withdrawal of allied forces in 2021.

Relations with Israel

The Spanish government condemned the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. Tensions subsequently emerged between Israel and Spain after some Spanish government ministers criticized Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. In May 2024, Spain (along with Ireland and Norway) formally recognized a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders, which includes the West Bank and Gaza, and East Jerusalem as its capital.48 Prime Minister Sánchez reportedly described the move as “the only way of advancing toward what everyone recognizes as the only possible solution to achieve a peaceful future, one of a Palestinian state that lives side by side with the Israeli state in peace and security.”49 In response to Spain recognizing a Palestinian state, the Israeli government recalled its ambassador to Spain and accused the Spanish government of rewarding Hamas’s terrorism. In September 2025, Spain recalled its ambassador to Israel amid diplomatic tensions over Spain blocking the use of its ports and airspace for the transport of weapons to Israel; in March 2026, Spain announced that it had permanently withdrawn its ambassador to Israel in the context of further tensions over Spain’s opposition to Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran.50

Relations with China

Over the past several years, the Sánchez government has made Spain’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) a foreign policy priority.51 Some observers assert that especially during the second Trump Administration, Spain has sought to deepen economic relations and technology cooperation with China and attract more PRC investment and tourism. Such observers argue that Spain’s more favorable position toward China is a strategy to diversify economic ties in the context of tensions with the Trump Administration over trade, tariffs, and other foreign policy issues.52 In April 2025, shortly after the Trump Administration announced tariffs on the EU and other countries, Sánchez visited China to conclude a series of trade and cooperation agreements.53 The two governments signed additional economic and cooperation agreements during a visit by King Felipe VI to China in November 2025. In April 2026, Prime Minister Sánchez made his fourth visit to China in four years.54


About the author: Derek E. Mix, Specialist in European Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

 

The Rule of One Price and the Donald’s ‘F’ In Energy Economics 101


by | Jun 3, 2026Antiwar.com

The Donald seems to think he has all the time in the world to end the conflagration he and Bibi started in the Persian Gulf. Today he even told the mullahs to take a hike when they suspended any further negotiations owing to Bibi’s brutal strikes on civilian targets in southern Lebanon and continued violations of the so-called April 13th truce in the Persian Gulf.

Thus, regarding the meandering negotiations of the last 45 days, the Donald averred,

“I don’t care if they’re over, honestly… I really don’t care. I couldn’t care less,”

Brave words, these. And completely, totally and hideously out to lunch, too.

What’s actually just around the corner is an explosion of oil and related energy prices that will make the 1970s look like a Sunday school picnic, but here we have the Donald talking just plain barking idiocy about what comes next:

He also said he wasn’t worried about oil prices, which spiked following the report in Iranian state media that Tehran is vowing to “completely block” the Strait of Hormuz in addition to halting negotiations.

“I think the oil will be dropping like a rock in the very near, you know, the very near distance,” Trump said.

The president of the United States – the alleged sagacious businessman we have purportedly been waiting for – couldn’t be more sadly mistaken about something as basic and straight forward as the price of crude oil, its refined products and related energy commodities: To wit, the Donald is absolutely clueless about the cardinal fact that there is one world oil market and ONE PRICE the planet over.

And that’s regardless of the fact that the US is now a large scale net exporter of crude oil, refined products and nat gas liquids. In recent weeks, in fact, the Persian Gulf outages have caused exports to soar 12.9 mb/d, which is up nearly 20% from the 10.8 mb/d average during 2025. In all, current net exports of petroleum liquids at 5.7 mb/d leave not doubt that the USA is solidly “energy independent”.

But when it comes to the massive Persian Gulf supply outage of upwards of 13 million barrels per day – even after leakage thru both the Iranian and US Navy blockades – so what!

No matter the origin, the destination, the mode of transportation, the precise grade of the crude oil or the mix of refinery output from asphalt to diesel fuel, jet fuel, naphtha and gasoline, it all comes out in the same global supply/demand wash. To wit, traders, producers, consumers, middle men and speculators the world over everywhere and always are on the look out to buy something lower and sell it higher – even after dickering over price adjustments for grade, quality, transportation costs and other incidentals of commerce.

To be sure, there are some leads and lags in the process, but in today’s information rich and instantaneous world, it does not take long for a few missing barrels of supply from the massive petroleum basins upstream of the SOH to work their way through worldwide tradings systems and supply chains and show up at the diesel fuel pumps at corn planting time in Podunk, Iowa.

In fact, not withstanding so-called USA energy “dominance” the booming level of total liquids exports shown above, diesel fuel prices on the US domestic market are up by an average of +46% since December 2024, from $3.52 per gallon to $5.71 per gallon. And, as shown in the chart, the latter stands barely a plug nickel below the $5.76 per gallon peak price registered under Sleepy Joe in June 2022.

Needless to say, that upcharge of $2.19 per gallon does not fall silently upon the US supply chain silently like the proverbial tree falling in the empty forest. To the contrary, the US consumes about 170 million gallons of diesel fuel per day in various work fleets which criss-cross the warp and woof of the nation’s $30 trillion GDP. This includes:

  • 15 million diesel-fueled work trucks, ranging from rancher pick-ups, to medium and heavy-duty class 4-8 freight haulers vehicles, to semi-trailer-trucks.
  • About 2.0 million construction vehicles including excavators, bulldozers, loaders, backhoes, cranes etc.
  • Around 4 million diesel-fueled farm tractors, self-propelled combines, balers, forage harvesters and similar equipment.
  • Around 39,000 diesel-powered railroad locomotives and and 7,000 work boats operating on rivers, lakes and coastal waterways.

At length, of course, the $170 million per day diesel fuel cost increase incurred by these work fleets get passed on in part or while to customers and their customers down the line to the food aisles and furniture departments of Walmart superstores. In turn, some production doesn’t happen, some weaker links in the supply chains have their profit margins squeeze and some of this $1.2 billion per week up-charge for diesel fuel alone is hitting the bank accounts of retail consumers.

Accordingly, it can be well and truly said that the Donald is just plain out-to-lunch when he thinks that because the US is “energy independent” he therefore has all the time in the world to bring his insane war to a close. In fact, rarely has any POTUS been as dead wrong as is the Donald on the matter of Persian Gulf petroleum supplies:

“We don’t need oil, don’t need the Strait, don’t need anything.” (While touting inflated claims of U.S. production surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia combined).

In this context, we have focused the case on middle distillates like #2 diesel fuel because it powerfully illustrates the principle of one market and one price in the global petroleum world. In this case, the twist is the broad range of refineries in the world produce vastly different slates of refined products, depending upon their configuration of process equipment; and also upon their input crude oil, which includes a huge range of global supplies ranging from high to low sulfur and heavy to light gravity or molecular structure.

Accordingly, the percentage of asphalt, middle distillates, jet fuel, gasoline, naptha and petrochemical feed stocks which come out of the refinery depend upon the crude oil grades and qualities going in and the configuration of high capital cost and energy intensive process equipment thru which the crude oil passes on its way to the refined product mix.

Needless to say, the Persian Gulf is huge supplier of a wide range of crudes and is also home to upwards of 9 mb/d of refinery capacity – again, with a wide range of process equipment and normal product slates.

Accordingly, the 14-20 mb/d supply outage has had a complex ripple impact on global crude oil and refined product markets. And one of these impacts has been to generate an especially dire shortages of middle distillates in both the Asian industrial economies, as well as Europe. These huge shortages – far higher proportionately for middle distillates than for crude oil overall – have then ricocheted through global markets, causing a huge increase in demand for US based distillate exports, which, in turn, has caused the US domestic diesel fuel price level shown above to rise in lockstep with the worldwide distillate price surge – “drill baby drill” to the contrary notwithstanding.

The graphics below provide a simplified version of the product off-take form the front-end or basic refinery distillation tower. This is just the first of a multiplicity of downstream processing units that then shape the mix final refined product, but the point here is that the crude oil input to the distillation tower will generate a wide range of product mixes depending upon its gravity level and other characteristics.

Under today’s refinery technology and economics, however, the product mix yielded from the distillation tower is just the first cut of the crude barrel. Increasing levels of costly downstream processing equipment and stages can alter the initial product yield substantially – again based on both capital investment, cost economics and crude oil characteristics. For instance, yields of gasoline arise from numerous process routes (#2 in green) as does distillate (#5 in blue).

These equipment and process streams, in turn, are optimized to what might be called “steady state” crude oil and product markets and relative pricing among these flows. But when normal crude oil and product flows are drastically and unevenly interrupted around the world, you get a mismatch between the steady state economics of a typical refinery and the altered relative price matrix after the disruption.

In turn, that triggers wide-ranging adjustment in product slates, equipment utilization and the mix of crude oil acquired by refiners and input into the refining run. In the macro sense, Mr. Market goes to work on a worldwide basis.

That is what has happened in the global crude oil and refinery markets in spades. The ordinary bafflingly complex flows of crude oil and products through the global refinery market have now been destabilized seven ways to Sunday. As a result, relative product supply imbalances have reached extreme levels, causing prices and shipment flows to shift in sweeping and unpredictable ways.

Still, what cannot be gainsaid is that all the while the rule of one price is generating constant arbitrage among market geographies and product segments in search of a new equilibrium. The problem, of course, is that a madman and passel of doofuses are calling the shots when it comes to the US War Machine and Washington’s diplomatic posture, meaning that the markets can’t settle down – even as the billiard table of war policy and faux diplomacy in Washington continues to vibrate it radically.

Illustration of the Complexity Of The Global Refinery and Product Markets

In short, the Donald/Bibi attack on Iran on February 28 triggered the most severe disruption to global refined product markets in modern history, particularly for middle distillates – diesel (gasoil) and jet fuel (kerosene). So while the crude oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) have dominated headlines, there have been disproportionate impacts on middle distillates stemming from the unique configuration of Persian Gulf refineries and the above described physics of refinery crude yields.

So we next examine the structural differences between the Persian Gulf slates, which are now way short, and U.S. refinery slates – as well as the resulting divergence in distillate versus gasoline crack spreads and volumetric evidence of the disruption’s ripple effects.

Persian Gulf Refineries: Tilted Toward Middle Distillates

The Persian Gulf refineries process predominantly medium-sour crudes (e.g., Arab Light, Arab Medium, Basra grades) with API gravities typically in the 28–34 range and moderate sulfur content. These crudes naturally yield a high proportion of middle distillates include #2 diesel oil upon distillation.

Typical yields for Persian Gulf crudes include roughly 50–60% middle distillates (diesel, jet/kerosene, and gasoil) and only about 20% light ends (gasoline and naphtha), with the balance in heavier residues. Moreover, Gulf refinery equipment configurations amplify this bias. Thus, many facilities, built or upgraded for export-oriented markets in Asia and Europe, emphasize hydrocracking and catalytic cracking optimized for distillate maximization.

In contrast, average U.S. refinery slates lean toward gasoline. U.S. domestic production is dominated by light sweet crudes like WTI (API ~39–42, very low sulfur), which yield approximately 40% light ends (favoring gasoline) and only about 30–40% middle distillates. U.S. refineries, particularly on the Gulf Coast, blend light shale based crude oils with imported medium/heavy sours for optimization, but the overall product slate prioritizes gasoline (often 45–47% of output) over distillates (around 30%).

This mismatch is structural. Persian Gulf refiners are “distillate heavy” by crude chemistry and design, serving export markets hungry for trucking and aviation fuels. U.S. refiners are more “gasoline heavy,” reflecting strong domestic driving demand. When Gulf supply vanished, the world lost barrels disproportionately rich in the products already in tightest supply.

The Post-February 28 SOH Supply Disruption

Following the renewed breakout of kinetic warfare on February 28, 2026, Iranian actions and related hostilities effectively closed or severely restricted the Strait of Hormuz to most commercial traffic. Pre-crisis, the strait carried over 20 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude and products – about one-fifth of global oil consumption. Post-disruption, loadings plummeted: crude and products through the strait fell from ~20+ mb/d to under 4 mb/d in March and lesser levels in April-May, with alternative routes (Red Sea, pipelines) unable to compensate fully.

In this context, refined product exports from the Gulf were hit hardest. GCC product exports dropped from ~5.0 mb/d in February to 2.1 mb/d in March, with diesel and jet fuel accounting for the bulk of the loss. GCC jet fuel exports to the EU alone fell about 70%, or 370,000 b/d.

Overall Middle East refining runs declined by ~3.1 mb/d in March, part of a global refining cut exceeding 5–6.5 mb/d. This was not merely a crude shock. The displaced crude was medium-sour or precisely the grade yielding the highest middle distillate volumes. Lighter replacement crudes (e.g., WTI, West African) available to other refiners produced more gasoline/naphtha but fewer distillates, exacerbating the imbalance.

Divergence in Crack Spreads: Distillates Surge Relative to Gasoline

The supply shock immediately widened distillate crack spreads (i.e. difference in cost per barrel of crude coming in and the weighted average value per barrel of the product slate coming out of the refinery) far more than gasoline cracks. In global benchmarks like Rotterdam and Singapore, diesel/gasoil and jet fuel premiums to crude skyrocketed in March. U.S. Gulf Coast (USCG) ultra-low sulfur cracks reached peaks around $65–86/bbl, while jet cracks were similarly elevated.

Gasoline cracks, by contrast, also rose (to ~$30–40/bbl range) but lagged significantly. This divergence reflected scarcity: middle distillates faced structural tightness (high export reliance from disrupted Gulf, limited spare capacity elsewhere, and inelastic demand from freight/aviation). Refineries worldwide “flipped the barrel,” maximizing distillate yields by adjusting cuts and conversion units – sometimes by 7–10% of the barrel – sacrificing gasoline output.

The result was a powerful price signal. Distillate cracks strengthened dramatically relative to gasoline, incentivizing complex refiners (especially USGC) to prioritize diesel and jet production for export. This dynamic persisted into April–May, with cracks easing from March peaks but remaining elevated.

Volume Impacts: Reduction from Gulf, Shortages Elsewhere, U.S. Export Surge

On a pre-crisis footing, Persian Gulf product exports (heavily middle distillates) exceeded 3–5 mb/d in key flows. Post-SOH restrictions and refinery outages, GCC refined product exports fell sharply, with diesel and jet comprising the majority of losses.

Europe and the Pacific Rim felt immediate pain. Europe saw GCC diesel/jet arrivals drop 70%, pushing inventories toward critical lows and prompting warnings of systemic jet fuel shortages by summer 2026. Airlines cut flights and raised fares; governments coordinated responses.

In Asia (Singapore hub, India, China), diesel and jet premiums surged, with some countries imposing export curbs or rationing. Pacific Rim buyers competed aggressively for alternative cargoes, diverting barrels from other routes.

The U.S. filled the void. USGC refiners ran at 94–96% utilization, optimizing for distillates. U.S. clean product exports hit records (~3.11 mb/d+ in March, with distillates surging). Distillate exports (diesel + jet) climbed to records of ~1.4–1.9 mb/d in peak weeks/months, up significantly from pre-war February levels.

Jet fuel exports alone more than doubled.As a share of combined U.S. crude and refined product exports, middle distillates rose markedly. Total U.S. energy exports reached all-time highs (~14 mb/d combined in peaks), with distillates commanding a larger portion amid global arbitrage to Rotterdam and Asia. This shift tightened some domestic balances but boosted refining

The Middle Distillate Disruption of 2026: Refinery Slates, Strait of Hormuz Shock, and Global Rebalancing

The sharp rise in global middle distillate crack spreads transmitted rapidly to U.S. refineries, demonstrating that the United States is not an “energy island,” despite the Donald’s constant claims emphasizing complete domestic self-sufficiency. As we have indicated, international product markets operate under the rule of one price, where arbitrage by traders, shippers, and suppliers quickly equalizes values across regions, with only limited time lags driven by freight rates and logistics.

When Rotterdam (ARA) and Singapore diesel and jet fuel cracks surged in March 2026 due to the loss of Persian Gulf supply, the premium created immediate incentives for U.S. Gulf Coast (USGC) refiners to divert barrels toward export. USGC low sulfer (ULSD) diesel cracks, which had been in the $15–25/bbl range pre-disruption, exploded to $60–86/bbl peaks in March before settling but remained highly elevated into May (diesel cracks still averaging well above $50/bbl in recent weeks).

Needless to say, this is not a case of abstract economics. Traders chartered tankers within days, loading ULSD and jet fuel in Houston and Corpus Christi for delivery to Europe and Asia. U.S. refiners, facing the same global benchmarks for products, adjusted operations accordingly: maximizing distillate yields, minimizing gasoline where flexible, and running at 94–96% utilization. The result was higher realized margins at the refinery gate for middle distillates, which in turn fed directly into domestic wholesale and retail prices. The U.S. cannot shield itself from global product pricing signals when it is the world’s largest exporter of refined fuels.

As we showed above, refinery-level distillate cracks and prices have translated into surging diesel fuel prices at the pump for American consumers and businesses. In the most recent weeks of May 2026, the U.S. national average on-highway diesel price hovered between $5.52 and $5.64 per gallon – roughly $1.50–$2.00 above typical pre-crisis 2025 levels and more than 60% higher year-over-year in some measures.

As we indicated, trucking, agriculture, and manufacturing—sectors heavily reliant on diesel – face immediate cost pressures that are now rippling through supply chains. Accordingly, this episode underscores a key reality that the Donald has missed entirely notwithstanding his endless braggadocio about his business acumen: to wit, in integrated global markets for refined products, a supply shock halfway around the world can elevate costs for U.S. drivers and businesses within weeks through arbitrage-driven flows.

Claims of total energy independence overlook this interconnectedness; while the U.S. is a net exporter, domestic prices for middle distillates remain tethered to international benchmarks. And, needless to say, when it comes to the business economics of energy, the Donald well and truly deserves an “F”.

David Stockman was a two-term Congressman from Michigan. He was also the Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan. After leaving the White House, Stockman had a 20-year career on Wall Street. He’s the author of three books, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed, The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America, TRUMPED! A Nation on the Brink of Ruin… And How to Bring It Back, and the recently released Great Money Bubble: Protect Yourself From The Coming Inflation Storm. He also is founder of David Stockman’s Contra Corner and David Stockman’s Bubble Finance Trader.