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Friday, August 07, 2026

Jordan warns status quo in Jerusalem 'under threat' as ministers meet in Amman

Amman hosted an emergency ministerial meeting on Wednesday to rally support behind Jordan’s custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy sites, as Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi warned that Israeli measures risk igniting a wider religious conflict.


Issued on: 05/08/2026 - RFI

Israelis celebrate near Damascus Gate during the annual Jerusalem Day march commemorating Israel's capture of East Jerusalem in 1967, 14 May. 
AP Photo/Leo Correa 

Speaking at the meeting, Safadi said Israel was entrenching its illegal occupation of East Jerusalem by expanding settlements, annexing land, confiscating property and imposing restrictions designed to isolate the city from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory.

He accused Israeli authorities of "violating the sanctity of Islamic and Christian holy places and curbing freedom of worship for both communities".

Quoted by the Jordan Times, he said: “Christian clergy are suffering from the savagery of extremism, and churches are confronting attempts to seize their assets and lands through illegal legislation enacted by Israel."

He added that such moves flouted international law, which denies an occupying power sovereignty over occupied land.

He said Israel’s “provocative policies” were targeting the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound through systematic attacks aimed at undermining its Islamic identity and altering the long‑standing status quo.

Muslim worshippers pray outside the Dome of the Rock at the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound during Friday noon prayers, following 40 days of closure by the Israeli authorities, in Jerusalem's Old City on 10 April. AFP - AHMAD GHARABLI


'Not religious'

Safadi said that the Arab‑Israeli conflict was "not religious" in origin but rooted in Israel’s occupation and denial of Palestinian statehood.

Yet he cautioned that repeated violations at Al‑Aqsa could fuel a religious narrative and "trigger calls for a global jihad" to defend one of Islam’s three holiest sites, with consequences “uncontrollable if it erupts".

“We sound the alarm and urge the international community to take decisive action to stop Israeli violations in Jerusalem, end policies that entrench the occupation, restore hope for peace, and end the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza,” he said, calling on the world to “act before it is too late”.

'Jerusalem is a tinderbox'

The Amman meeting brought together foreign ministers of the Arab Ministerial Committee, an initiative of Saudi Arabia, tasked with countering Israeli actions in occupied Jerusalem, the Arab League secretary‑general, and counterparts from Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey and Malaysia.

Jordan framed the gathering as urgent amid what it described as an “imminent” threat of an Israeli takeover of the Al‑Aqsa compound, with the potential to “trigger a religious conflict” extending far beyond Palestine.

Safadi told the Guardian newspaper that “Jerusalem is a tinderbox” and that tampering with the status quo could reverberate across the Muslim world.

Amman’s alarm follows a string of government‑backed incursions by Jewish religious extremists on to the Al‑Aqsa/Dome of the Rock compound, known to Jews as the Temple Mount.

On 23 July, more than 2,000 Israelis from the religious right, led by national security minister Itamar Ben Gvir, stormed the site, praying and performing rituals around the compound in what Jordanian officials called "the worst violation in modern history".

(with newswires)
Push for indictment as Lebanon marks six years since Beirut port blast

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is urging the judiciary to issue a long-awaited indictment over the 2020 Beirut port blast, as the country marks six years since the catastrophe which killed more than 200 people.


Issued on: 04/08/2026 - 

Aftermath of a massive explosion is seen in in Beirut, Lebanon, Tuesday, 4 August 2020. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

"The issuing of the indictment by the investigating judge has become a necessity that can no longer be delayed," Aoun said in a statement on Monday.

The massive Beirut port explosion on 4 August, 2020, killed more than 220 people, injured more that 6,500 and damaged swathes of the capital.

Lebanese authorities have said the explosion was triggered by a fire in a warehouse where tonnes of ammonium nitrate fertiliser had been stored haphazardly for years, despite repeated warnings to senior officials.

A map showing the scale of Beirut's port explosion that was felt across the region. © RFI/Graphics department

Nobody has been held accountable for the disaster, with victims and their families still demanding justice, in a country long plagued by official impunity.

Justice "means upholding rights, revealing the whole truth without any omission, and holding accountable" all those who were negligent or caused the catastrophe "whatever their position", Aoun said.

"The Lebanese judiciary is called today more than ever before to prove its independence and ability to deliver justice to the victims. The indictment is not just a legal procedure, but a right owed by the living to the martyrs and their families," he added.

In March, a judicial official told French news agency AFP that judge Tarek Bitar had completed his probe involving some 70 defendants including politicians, security and military officials and civil servants.

He referred the case to the public prosecutor who was to study it, present his opinion and then refer it back to Bitar to issue the indictment.

A man stands next to graffiti at the damaged port area in the aftermath of a massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon 11 August, 2020. REUTERS/Hannah McKay TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY REUTERS - HANNAH MCKAY

The case, which is still with the public prosecutor, had been bogged down by political and legal wrangling since 2023, after Iran-backed Hezbollah led a campaign demanding Bitar's removal and dozens of lawsuits also sought to remove him from the case.

However, Bitar resumed his investigations last year as Lebanon's balance of power shifted and Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam took office following a 2023-2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which weakened the group.

Since then, several legal impediments to Bitar's work have also been removed, including the lifting of a travel ban against him.

Salam said on social media platform X that "there can be no settlement at the expense of justice, even if it is sometimes delayed".

He vowed "no cover for any official, no matter their position, whether in the Beirut port explosion case or any other issue. Accountability will not spare anyone".
Ugandan military honours Netanyahu’s brother with Entebbe memorial statue

Uganda’s military has unveiled a monument to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s older brother, who was killed during a hostage rescue operation in the East African country in 1976.



Issued on: 04/08/2026 - RFI

This monument honors the late Yoni Netanyahu, brother of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, at the old terminal of Entebbe International Airport in Entebbe, Uganda, here as unveiled on 1 August, 2026. Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces P - Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces P

The statue of Yonatan Netanyahu holding an assault rifle was unveiled on Saturday by Ugandan military chief Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who said he commissioned the monument to pay tribute to the soldier’s courage.

Kainerugaba is also the eldest child of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and widely seen as a possible successor since Museveni's reelection in January.

Among those attending the ceremony were members of an Israeli delegation, including Barak Orland, a businessman based in Uganda.

The statue has been installed outside the airport terminal in the town of Entebbe where Lt. Col. Yonatan Netanyahu was shot dead as he led Israeli commandos in a mission to rescue 106 passengers who had been taken hostage on an Air France flight. He was the only Israeli commando killed in the mission.

“Today, this memorial stands not only in remembrance of a distinguished soldier, but also as a tribute to the enduring values he embodied: courage in the face of danger, unwavering commitment to protecting innocent lives, and steadfast devotion to duty,” Kainerugaba said at the ceremony.

Kainerugaba also described the mission as "one of the most significant episodes in modern history" and spoke of the now close ties between the two countries as a "remarkable journey".

Uganda's military chief, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba unveiled this monument honoring the late Yoni Netanyahu, brother of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, at the old terminal of Entebbe International Airport in Entebbe, Uganda, on 1 August, 2026 © Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces P - Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces P

Entebbe hijacking

The hijackers – two Palestinians belonging to a faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and two Germans from the Revolutionary Cells – separated dozens of Jewish and Israeli passengers from the others on board.

They threatened to kill the hostages unless Israel released dozens of Palestinian and other prisoners.

The Paris-bound Airbus A300 had taken off from Tel Aviv on 27 June 1976 and stopped in Athens, where the four hijackers boarded. They seized the aircraft and forced it to fly first to Libya to refuel and then to Uganda, where Idi Amin welcomed them.

After a week of negotiations, Israeli commandos stormed the airport overnight on 3 to 4 July. They rescued 102 hostages, while three were killed during the raid. A fourth hostage, Dora Bloch, who had been taken to hospital before the operation, was later murdered on Amin’s orders.

Dozens of Ugandan soldiers were also killed during the operation, which lasted less than an hour.

Subtle diplomatic switch

At the time, Uganda's President, dictator Idi Amin Dada, had severed ties with Israel and was an open supporter of the Palestinian independence cause.

Israel’s success humiliated and enraged Amin, while the Organisation of African Unity – now the African Union – condemned the raid as a violation of Uganda’s sovereignty.

President of Uganda Idi Amin Dada while addressing the media on 28 July, 1975, in Kampala during the Organisation of African Unity (OUA) summit. AFP

The rescue remains a seminal event in Israeli history and is widely regarded in Israel as one of the country’s greatest military successes. Benjamin Netanyahu has said his brother’s death in the operation “changed the course” of his life.

Netanyahu welcomed the unveiling of the monument. In a message released after the ceremony, he described his brother Yoni as an enduring symbol of courage, devotion and love for Israel.

“Fifty years have passed, but his spirit continues to inspire in Israel and around the world,” he said.

Amin was overthrown in 1979. Uganda gradually rebuilt its foreign relations after his fall, although contacts with Israel remained limited for several years.

Museveni, who came to power in 1986, adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy, and Uganda and Israel formally restored diplomatic relations in 1994 after more than two decades without official ties.

Benjamin Netanyahu visited Uganda in July 2016 to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Operation Entebbe.

Relations have since grown closer, with Israel seeking to strengthen its diplomatic and security partnerships across East Africa.

(with AP)
New Caledonia races to avoid shutdown as new government takes office

New Caledonia’s 19th government formally took office on Wednesday after its 11 members unanimously agreed on the allocation of portfolios, with the immediate task of securing €109 million by the end of August to avoid a complete shutdown of the local administration.


Issued on: 06/08/2026 -  RFI

Christopher Gyges, elected member of the Government of New Caledonia (Les Loyalistes group), attends a formal session to elect members of the Government of New Caledonia at the Congress in Noumea on 31 July, 2026. AFP - DELPHINE MAYEUR

Elected by New Caledonia’s Congress last Friday following the 28 June provincial elections, the new government had until now been restricted to managing day-to-day affairs.

It must work to stabilise the finances of the South Pacific territory, which is struggling with the aftermath of the May 2024 riots which left 14 people dead and caused more than €2 billion in damage.

“We are in a state of cessation of payments,” government president Milakulo Tukumuli told reporters on Wednesday. “We need around 13 billion [Pacific] francs – that’s €109 million – which we do not have.”

Without additional financing by the end of August, Tukumuli warned that the local administration could face a “complete shutdown”.

He leads Oceanian Awakening – L’Eveil Océanien – which brings together his small centrist party and other anti-independence groups.


Oceanian Awakening (L'Eveil Oceanien) party leader Milakulo Tukumuli looks on during the elections for the forming of the 17th government of New Caledonia, in Noumea, on February 17, 2021 AFP - THEO ROUBY

Paris holds key to funding

A meeting was held on Tuesday between the New Caledonian government and the French state – represented by the Interministerial Mission for New Caledonia (MINC) – in an effort to mobilise funds earmarked under the “refoundation pact” launched in March.

According to MINC director Amaury Decludt, around €432 million has been budgeted for 2026, of which some €141 million has already been disbursed.

“That leaves a significant margin,” he told French news agency AFP, noting that the remainder could be made available through state-guaranteed loans or grants.

However, the release of the funds remains conditional on the implementation of “credible reforms” aimed at reducing the deficit and enabling the territory to regain financial autonomy by 2030.

“Today, the [French] state is the only financier of New Caledonia,” Decludt said, adding that commercial banks and financial markets were no longer lending to the territory because of a loss of confidence.

He stressed that Paris did not intend to dictate the content of the reforms to New Caledonia’s institutions.

“We have no signal today that would lead us to lack confidence in the government,” he said, noting that Congress had given the new executive a clear mandate to carry out reforms.


Tukumuli said a cross-party delegation of elected representatives would travel to Paris before the end of August to press for the rapid release of the funds.

In New Caledonia’s 19th government, Tukumuli retains responsibility for external relations and civil security, while also taking charge of transport, health and social protection.

Loyalist vice-president Christopher Gygès will oversee the economy, taxation, telecommunications and customs.

Alcide Ponga, president of the previous government and also from the non-independence camp, has been assigned responsibility for mining and energy – two key sectors of the New Caledonian economy.


The Arctic In A Changing World: Climate, Security And Ethics Of Global Governance – Analysis



By K.M. Seethi

Key Takeaways:

Climate change is transforming the Arctic into a new arena of geopolitical competition by opening shipping routes, exposing resources and increasing military activity among the US, Russia, NATO, the EU and China.

The region is shifting from post-Cold War cooperation (Arctic Council) to strategic rivalry, creating a security dilemma that raises risks of miscalculation, including in the nuclear domain.

Sustainable Arctic governance requires balancing security interests with environmental protection, scientific cooperation and the rights of the nearly four million people—especially Indigenous communities—who live there.


The Arctic is rapidly becoming one of the principal arenas of twenty-first century geopolitical competition. The retreat of sea ice, driven by accelerating climate change, is opening new maritime routes, exposing vast reserves of hydrocarbons and critical minerals, and expanding access to strategic waters that were once locked beneath permanent ice. What was long regarded as a region of scientific inquiry and environmental conservation has become an area where military strategy, economic interests and great-power rivalry increasingly have assumed considerable importance.

The United States, Russia, NATO and the European Union are expanding their strategic presence across the High North through military deployments, naval exercises, surveillance systems, icebreaker fleets and critical infrastructure projects. China, although not an Arctic state, is steadily broadening its scientific, commercial and technological engagement, viewing the region as an important component of its long-term global strategy. The Arctic has consequently become an arena where geopolitical ambitions increasingly interconnect one of the world’s fastest-changing environments.

This growing competition could be seen against a backdrop of profound ecological transformation. Rising temperatures, thawing permafrost, disappearing sea ice and changing marine ecosystems are changing the physical geography of the Arctic at an unprecedented pace. These environmental changes are creating new economic opportunities while simultaneously increasing ecological vulnerability. As strategic competition intensifies, concerns over environmental protection, Indigenous rights and international cooperation have been overshadowed by military calculations and resource politics.

Climate Change is Transforming the Arctic

Few regions demonstrate the consequences of climate change more clearly than the Arctic. Scientific observations show that the region is warming nearly four times faster than the global average. Rising temperatures have accelerated the melting of sea ice, thawing of permafrost and erosion of Arctic coastlines. These changes are transforming landscapes that have remained relatively stable for thousands of years.

The consequences go beyond the Arctic itself. Melting sea ice is opening new shipping routes that were once inaccessible for much of the year. Areas previously locked beneath permanent ice are attracting growing interest because of their reserves of oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals and other critical resources. Fisheries are also shifting as marine ecosystems respond to warming waters. What was once largely inaccessible has become increasingly reachable, drawing governments, industries and military planners into a region that was previously regarded as geographically remote.

Climate change is also exposing hidden environmental risks. Arctic permafrost contains approximately 1,300 gigatonnes of organic carbon, while marine sediments and river deltas store another 400 gigatonnes. As frozen ground thaws, increasing quantities of this ancient carbon enter Arctic rivers and coastal waters. Recent research from the Alfred Wegener Institute and the University of Bremen offers a more nuanced understanding of this process. Scientists found that although large amounts of carbon are released into the Arctic Ocean, much of it becomes buried in seabed sediments rather than immediately returning to the atmosphere. Microorganisms consume only about 10 per cent of the carbon deposited in marine sediments, while the remainder is stored beneath the seafloor. These findings may improve climate models, although researchers caution that thawing permafrost continues to alter Arctic ecosystems in complex ways that remain poorly understood.


The movement of sediments and organic material is already affecting marine biodiversity. Increased sediment loads reduce the amount of sunlight reaching underwater ecosystems, influencing algae that support fish, crustaceans and marine mammals. The Arctic’s ecological changes therefore extend from microscopic organisms to entire food webs upon which Indigenous communities have depended for generations. Climate change is transforming economic opportunities, transportation networks, ecological systems and political calculations simultaneously.

Climate Change and the Return of Geopolitics

Environmental transformation has coincided with a profound turn in global politics. As the Arctic becomes more accessible, major powers increasingly regard the region as strategically indispensable. The United States has substantially elevated the Arctic within its national security agenda. A striking illustration is President Donald Trump’s decision to launch a programme to construct 11 heavy polar icebreakers through a partnership with Finland, valued at approximately US$7 billion. Trump has long argued that the United States has lagged behind Russia in Arctic capabilities. He frequently contrasts America’s small operational icebreaker fleet with Russia’s 56 polar icebreakers and China’s growing Arctic presence.


The administration argues that expanded icebreaking capacity is essential for protecting American interests as shipping routes expand and strategic competition intensifies. Critics, however, question both the scale of the programme and the procurement process. The United States Coast Guard’s own assessment had concluded that four or five heavy icebreakers would adequately meet operational requirements. Independent analysts have also questioned whether sufficient long-term funding exists to maintain such a large fleet after construction.

The renewed American interest goes beyond ships. President Trump has repeatedly expressed interest in Greenland, arguing that its location gives it exceptional strategic value for North American security. These remarks have generated unease in Greenland, Denmark and among several European allies, who fear that the Arctic is increasingly being viewed primarily through the prism of strategic competition rather than partnership.

The European Union has also reassessed its Arctic outlook. A recent policy brief argues that the Union’s 2021 Arctic Strategy recommends treating the Arctic, North Atlantic and Baltic Sea as a single strategic theatre. It calls for greater investment in surveillance systems, satellites, underwater autonomous technologies, critical infrastructure and Arctic communications, while also reducing European dependence on imported critical minerals. The report further argues that climate change should be understood as a security multiplier because it increases military activity, exposes critical infrastructure and opens new navigation routes. At the same time, it emphasises that Europe must continue supporting Indigenous communities and sustainable regional development alongside its expanding security agenda.

A Changing Security Landscape

The transformation of the Arctic is equally evident in military planning. NATO has significantly expanded its presence following the accession of Finland and Sweden, bringing seven of the eight Arctic states within the Alliance. New initiatives such as Arctic Sentry, Forward Land Forces Finland, expanded Iceland Air Policing and the establishment of a Combined Air Operations Centre in northern Norway illustrate an effort to improve surveillance, interoperability and operational readiness across the High North.

Military cooperation has also become increasingly sophisticated. The United States and Norway have intensified joint coast guard operations, naval exercises and the testing of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles capable of operating in Arctic conditions. Maritime exercises now routinely involve multiple Arctic partners, reflecting a growing emphasis on coordinated responses across the North Atlantic and Arctic waters.

For NATO, these measures respond primarily to Russia’s expanding military infrastructure, renewed activity on the Kola Peninsula and increasing cooperation between Russia and China. From Moscow’s perspective, however, NATO’s enlargement and expanding military presence represent a direct challenge to Russian security. The result is a classic security dilemma in which each side justifies its own military expansion as defensive while interpreting the other’s actions as threatening.

The Arctic is consequently becoming an arena where climate change and strategic rivalry reinforce one another. Melting sea ice opens new opportunities for navigation and resource extraction. Those opportunities encourage greater military presence. Increased military activity, in turn, raises the risk of miscalculation in a region where communication channels and confidence-building mechanisms have weakened considerably.

The Arctic’s Emerging Nuclear Dimension

The Arctic has long occupied a central place in the strategic calculations of nuclear powers. Much of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent is concentrated in the High North, including strategic submarines, missile early-warning systems and major military installations. During the Cold War, the region formed one of the principal frontiers of nuclear competition. Today, climate change is altering the physical environment in which these strategic systems operate.

The retreat of sea ice is making Arctic waters more accessible to naval forces while simultaneously changing submarine operating conditions. Military vessels from several countries are likely to encounter one another more frequently in increasingly navigable waters. Such encounters increase the possibility of misunderstanding, accidents or escalation between nuclear-armed states. The Arctic is therefore becoming an area where environmental change and strategic instability intersect.

Another concern lies beneath the thawing ground itself. Large quantities of radioactive waste remain buried in former Soviet military sites, including areas around Novaya Zemlya and locations where decommissioned nuclear submarines were disposed of during the Cold War. Rising temperatures and thawing permafrost may expose or destabilise these contaminated sites, creating environmental hazards whose long-term consequences remain uncertain.

The enlargement of NATO has further altered the Arctic security system. With Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance, almost the entire Arctic now falls within NATO’s collective defence framework, while Russia continues to strengthen its military infrastructure across its northern territories. Some European policymakers have also reopened discussions on strengthening independent nuclear deterrence in response to growing uncertainty about long-term American security commitments. These developments suggest that climate change, conventional military competition and nuclear security increasingly reinforce one another, demanding new approaches to governance and risk reduction.

From Cooperation to Strategic Competition

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, the Arctic was widely regarded as an example of constructive international cooperation. The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 created a forum where the eight Arctic states worked together on scientific research, environmental protection and sustainable development despite wider political differences. Indigenous organisations also gained an unprecedented institutional voice through their participation as Permanent Participants.

That cooperative spirit has weakened considerably. Relations deteriorated after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and reached a new low following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ministerial cooperation within the Arctic Council has largely stalled, while scientific collaboration has become increasingly difficult. Institutions that once encouraged dialogue now struggle to function amid growing geopolitical tensions.

At the same time, security concerns have moved to the forefront of Arctic policy. NATO has expanded its operational presence, while Arctic governments have strengthened surveillance systems, military exercises and maritime coordination. The European Union has proposed integrating Arctic security more closely with defence planning, critical infrastructure protection and industrial policy. Hybrid threats—including repeated damage to submarine communication cables and other critical infrastructure—have reinforced the perception that the Arctic is inevitably a part of the geopolitical confrontations.

The danger is that military preparedness, while understandable in an uncertain security environment, may gradually replace dialogue as the dominant language of Arctic governance. Without sustained diplomatic engagement, confidence-building measures and scientific cooperation, the region has become another arena where rivalry overshadows shared responsibility.

Listening to the People of the Arctic


Amid discussions of military strategy, shipping routes and critical minerals, one reality is often overlooked: the Arctic is home to nearly four million people. For Indigenous communities, including the Sámi, Inuit and many others, the Arctic is neither a strategic frontier nor an economic opportunity. It is home, history and identity.

Finnish Arctic scholar Markku Heikkilä argues that the future of the North cannot be decided solely by governments, military planners or corporations. Decisions about infrastructure, mining and resource development must also reflect the knowledge and aspirations of the people who have lived in the Arctic for generations. The debate surrounding the proposed Sakatti copper-nickel mine in Finnish Lapland illustrates these tensions. While the project could contribute to Europe’s demand for critical minerals, it also threatens ecologically sensitive wetlands protected under the Natura 2000 network and raises concerns among reindeer-herding communities. Similar dilemmas are emerging across the Arctic as governments seek greater access to minerals considered essential for the global energy transition.

These debates remind us that sustainable development must be evaluated by its effects on ecosystems, cultural continuity and community well-being. Indigenous knowledge, accumulated over centuries of living in demanding Arctic environments, remains indispensable for understanding ecological change and promoting sustainable governance. The Arctic therefore requires a model of development that places local communities alongside governments and scientists in shaping public policy.

Towards an Ethics of Stewardship

The Arctic raises questions that are more significant unlike geopolitical concerns. It challenges humanity to reconsider its relationship with nature at a time when environmental change is unfolding faster than political institutions can respond. Climate change has demonstrated that ecological systems do not recognise political boundaries. Carbon released from thawing permafrost, rising sea levels and changing ocean currents affect societies far beyond the Arctic Circle.

An ethical approach begins by recognising that security goes beyond military capability. Genuine security also depends on ecological stability, scientific cooperation, respect for Indigenous rights and responsible stewardship of natural resources. Policies that treat the Arctic merely as a theatre for strategic competition would accelerate the very instability they seek to prevent.

Even during periods of political disagreement, scientific cooperation has often remained one of the few channels through which trust can be sustained. Collaborative research on climate change, biodiversity, marine ecosystems and environmental monitoring should therefore be strengthened rather than weakened by geopolitical tensions.

There is also a compelling case for renewing multilateral dialogue. Several scholars have proposed complementary mechanisms involving governments, military officials, coast guards, scientists and Indigenous representatives to address practical concerns such as maritime safety, environmental emergencies, nuclear risk reduction and search-and-rescue cooperation. Such initiatives will not eliminate strategic competition, but they can reduce the risk of misunderstanding and encourage confidence-building where formal diplomacy has become difficult.

The upshot is that the we cannot allow Arctic to become another arena where environmental change is viewed primarily as an opportunity for strategic gain. We should, instead, remind the international community that ecological responsibility and peaceful cooperation remain indispensable foundations of global security.


About K.M. Seethi

K.M. Seethi is Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU), Kerala. He also served as ICSSR Senior Fellow, Senior Professor of International Relations and Dean of Social Sciences at MGU. One of his latest works is "ENDURING DILEMMA Flashpoints in Kashmir and India-Pakistan Relations."
View all posts by K.M. Seethi →



Fish over Trump: Economy will determine Iceland's vote on the EU

The town of Grindavik, in southwestern Iceland, home to many fishermen
Copyright AP Photo

By Vincenzo Genovese
Published on

While Arctic security and US claims over Greenland dominate international headlines, Icelanders are set to decide their European future on far more familiar grounds such as fish and farming. The 29 August referendum is less about geopolitics than sovereignty and identity.

Blue whiting, mackerel and golden redfish could prove more decisive at the ballot box than US President Donald Trump's expansionist ambitions, Russia's looming threats or European politicians' sweet nothings.

In Iceland, where the sea shapes the economy, livelihoods and national identity, the most significant crossroads of the last decade ultimately comes down to one thing: fish.

On 29 August, Icelanders will vote on whether to resume negotiations to join the European Union, restarting a process that was frozen in 2013. If voters approve, negotiations with Brussels will kick off again – with the prospect of joining the EU sooner than other countries on the waiting list.

At first glance, the geopolitical timing seems obvious. The United States' renewed interest in Greenland, combined with the long war in Ukraine, has pushed the Arctic higher on Europe's strategic agenda, while Icelanders appear increasingly caught between two great powers.

Yet beneath the headlines, the campaign tells a different story. This referendum is being fought over economics, sovereignty and, above all, control of Iceland's fishing grounds, according to Eirikur Bergmann, politics professor at Bifröst University and one of the country's best-known political writers.

“Icelanders are split in half,” he said, arguing that public debate still centres, as it always has, on the benefits of adopting the euro and the risks facing the fishing industry.

Fishermen's concerns are Iceland's concerns

While fishing's share of Iceland's GDP is declining, it still accounted for about 8% in 2024. It remains one of the country's largest export industries and the backbone of many coastal communities.

This isn't the first time Icelanders have fought over the sea: during the three “Cod Wars” between 1958 and 1976, Reykjavík successfully defended its maritime claims against the United Kingdom.

Today, the threat comes from the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which manages fishing resources among member states. The “shared fish stocks” that fall under the jurisdiction of more than one state, with a division of catch quotas, are the biggest concern for the Icelandic fishing industry, prompting exemptions or special arrangements if the country joins the EU.

Iceland's fishing industry is indeed built around one of the world's most sophisticated quota systems. It sets scientifically based catch limits and allocates fishing rights to each vessel, with quotas that can also be traded.

For fishermen in coastal towns such as Ísafjörður or Vestmannaeyjar, local media report that the question is not only how much fish Iceland can catch, but also who should have the right to decide who catches it.

As Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir said in a recent interview, fisheries and agriculture are likely to become the toughest chapters in any renewed accession talks.

Like fishermen, Iceland's farmers also operate under one of Europe's most protected agricultural systems, supported by public subsidies designed to compensate for the country's harsh climate and small domestic market.

For them, the feared acronym is CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), the EU agriculture overhaul which distributes subsidies according to common rules and could disrupt the entire domestic system.

Supporters of EU integration are also betting on economic advantages for their campaign.

The biggest is the eventual adoption of the euro. This would eliminate exchange-rate volatility caused by the Icelandic krona, bringing down inflation, interest rates and the cost of international trade, as highlighted in a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

A referendum born by chance

This renewed interest in Europe is not a response to Trump's repeated statements about Greenland and expansion ambitions in the Arctic region.

While the United States has long been Iceland's principal security guarantor through NATO and cooperation with the EU becomes more attractive if Washington becomes less predictable, the security issue has neither shaped domestic politics nor is it dominating the discussion on the referendum.

“I wouldn't say that has properly filtered into the debate yet,” Bergmann said, arguing that the country decided to hold the referendum after the 2024 election.

“This is prior to the second term of Donald Trump and prior to these geopolitical changes. The security defence issue was not a part of that decision,” he said.

The referendum is the consequence of a change in government rather than a dramatic shift in public opinion.

A Eurosceptic coalition came to power in 2013, suspending negotiations and later withdrawing Iceland's application altogether, without consulting the electorate. The pendulum swung back in 2024, and a coalition of pro-European parties pledged to let Icelanders decide whether negotiations should resume.

“The only reason Iceland is moving ahead now is that we have a change in government. But the EU question had nothing to do with these parties coming to power,” Bergmann said.

He believes this explains why opinion polls remain finely balanced, with Icelanders revisiting a question that has divided the country since the early 2000s.

Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin may have reminded Iceland that the international order is changing, but voters entering polling stations are likely to think less about Greenland or Russia's ambitions in the Arctic than about domestic economic concerns.

A clear path to the EU

While Icelanders remain divided over whether negotiations should even resume, Iceland would probably face a smoother accession process than many candidate countries in the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe.

Iceland is already deeply integrated into Europe: it's a member of the single market through the European Economic Area (EEA), and enjoys free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the Schengen area.

Negotiations would not start from scratch, but would be built on the results of the previous agreements.

By the time Iceland withdrew its application in 2013, 27 negotiating chapters had been opened, 11 of which had been provisionally closed.

If negotiations resume, the European Commission will first need to assess the legislative changes that have taken place in Iceland over the past decade before discussions can formally restart.

“Beyond the technicalities, it is clear that Iceland would be going into the negotiations one step ahead, compared to another candidate country,” an EU official told Euronews.

The Nordic country is also largely aligned with the EU on democratic standards, according to Valérie Hayer, leader of the liberal Renew Europe group in the European Parliament and one of the staunchest supporters of Iceland’s accession.

“It is already a highly capable democratic partner (which) shares common values and (which) already plays a pivotal role in North Atlantic security,” she said, claiming that adding Reykjavík would reinforce the EU’s geopolitical reach.

European politicians and EU officials stressed that Iceland has nothing to lose in EU membership talks and that joining the Union poses no threat to the Icelandic language: it would enjoy the same official status as other EU languages, despite being spoken by fewer than 400,000 people.

Even so, for many Icelanders, the referendum on Europe raises deeper questions of identity. Some fear joining a supranational institution would result in a gradual erosion of Iceland's political autonomy, a particularly sensitive issue for a country that achieved full independence from Denmark in the 20th century.

The future of Iceland's relationship with Europe may ultimately depend on emotional considerations, another EU official familiar with the matter told Euronews.

“Voting will take place on the mainland, but people will vote looking at the sea.”


 Can The US And Europe Cooperate In Africa? – Analysis



August 6, 2026
By Charles A. Ray


Key Takeaways:

Africa’s demographic surge will reshape global influence: By 2050, Africa’s population is projected to reach nearly 2.8 billion (28% of the world total), driven by a youthful median age of about 25 and rapid urbanization rising to 65%, positioning the continent as a major engine of future economic growth if it can harness a demographic dividend.

US and European influence is eroding amid Chinese gains: Deep cuts in US aid, Europe’s declining trade rank, and lingering perceptions of paternalism have created openings for China (via the Belt and Road Initiative) and other emerging powers, underscoring the need for a shift from aid to genuine partnership.

Future relations must move to balanced cooperation: Success depends on supporting African agency through trade, climate and renewable energy projects, digital innovation, and joint strategies that treat African nations as co-architects rather than passive recipients.


(FPRI) — Africa’s global role is constantly evolving. Demographically, Africa is poised to occupy a dominant position in the world over the coming decades. By 2050, Africa’s share of the global population will have grown from its current 19 percent to 28 percent, reaching nearly 2.8 billion people. This growth will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa due to its high fertility rates and youthful population, with its median age reaching about 25. These demographic trends will enable Africa to become a major engine for future economic growth.

Another factor that could impact Africa’s future position is its rapid urbanization. Africa’s urban population percentage, which stood at 54 percent in 2020, is expected to rise to 65 percent by 2050.


All of these trends together signal a brighter potential future for Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, moving it from the sidelines onto the main field of play in global economic and geopolitical affairs.

Like any coin, however, there are two sides. Rapid population growth, a youthful population, and rapid urbanization present both opportunities and challenges. If African nations can stimulate economic growth by fully leveraging their expanding working-age population, they can harness a demographic dividend. On the other hand, failure to invest adequately in education, healthcare, and employment opportunities could leave the population vulnerable to increased poverty, resource strain, social challenges, and security threats. Young, mobile populations are not likely to sit idle in an age of high-tech communication, when their access to global information shows better conditions elsewhere. In addition, poor governance and a lack of opportunity can feed narratives advanced by extremist movements, fueling violence that is not confined to any one location or continent.

The bottom line is that, by 2050, Africa’s population growth and urbanization will reshape the continent’s demographics, economy, and global influence. But to maximize benefits and mitigate risks, African nations must engage in long-term strategic planning.

Europe Should Look to the Future

While US relations with Africa are currently in flux, opening the door for a revitalization—or even a reset—of Europe’s engagement on the continent, the importance of the trilateral US-Europe-Africa relationship to the continent’s development should not be ignored or forgotten.

The relationship between the United States, Europe, and Africa is a complex web of historical legacies, economic interdependence, and evolving geopolitical strategies. It spans centuries, beginning with the earliest transatlantic encounters and continuing into a present shaped by both cooperation and competition. Understanding this relationship requires tracing its historical roots, examining its current dynamics, and anticipating its future trajectory.

The initial phase of US-Europe-Africa relations was dominated by the transatlantic slave trade, during which European colonial powers forcibly transported millions of Africans to the Americas, including territories that would later become the United States. This brutal system devastated African societies and inhibited the continent’s economic and political development. However, it also laid the economic foundations for both European industrialization and American agricultural expansion, creating historical legacies that plague trilateral relations to this day.

In the nineteenth century, Europe’s “Scramble for Africa” formalized colonial domination, carving the continent into competing spheres of influence with arbitrarily drawn borders that combined traditional enemies in some cases and divided clans and family groups in others. While it was not a colonial power in Africa per se, the United States maintained indirect involvement through trade, missionary activity, and, later, some limited territorial control. One example was US support for the founding of Liberia, which the American Colonization Society initially managed from its founding in 1822 until its independence in 1847. The American Colonization Society, founded in 1816 by Robert Finley, a Presbyterian minister, was dedicated to transporting free Blacks and emancipated slaves to Africa. While it received some funding from the federal government, its overwhelmingly white membership was from clergy and abolitionists, as well as a large number of enslavers, most of whom agreed that free Blacks could not be integrated into white America, which was the prevailing view of white Americans at the time.


The mid-twentieth century brought profound change to Africa and the tri-lateral relationship. After World War II, independence movements gained momentum, reshaping the country’s geopolitical landscape. The Cold War intensified US and European engagement, as both sought to prevent newly independent African nations from aligning with the Soviet Union. The US implemented security and aid programs, while Europe maintained deep economic and cultural ties with its former colonies. As preventing the spread of Communism was the primary concern, no consideration was given to the good governance of US and European client states in Africa. As a result, both the US and Europe supported brutal dictators who further impeded political and economic advancement, caused widespread suffering, and left a legacy of mistrust of the US and Europe among a large percentage of the population.

US-Europe-African relations today are characterized by overlapping but distinct strategic priorities. Europe has lost ground as a trading partner to African countries. Although the EU was historically Africa’s largest trading partner, it ranked 6th in trade volume in 2023- 2024, behind the US. In 2023, the United States and Germany were the top two providers of development aid to Africa, followed by Japan, the UK, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and Italy. Since the second Trump administration took office in January 2025, US development aid has been drastically reduced, with projected reductions of 56.9 percent. Europe has not picked up the slack, further diminishing the collective US-Europe influence across the continent.

The EU’s partnership with Africa should be a strategic priority. As Europe’s close neighbor, Africa shares not only historical ties with EU countries but also, in many cases, common interests and values. At a 2022 EU-African Union (AU) Summit in Brussels, the two sides adopted a Joint Vision for 2030, which aims to be a driving force in promoting common priorities, shared values, and international law, with a focus on trade liberalization, infrastructure investment, and migration management.
The US Has Lost Much of Its Influence—but It Is Not Too Late to Correct Course

Although the US is no longer Africa’s dominant trading partner, it can still play a critical role in security cooperation, counterterrorism, and public health—if it chooses to do so. US programs like PEPFAR have been transformative in public health, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has lifted some African economies out of poverty. With these and other assistance programs currently suspended or canceled, the future of US involvement is impossible to predict. The US has begun efforts to resume some counterterrorism (CT) operations and some health assistance, but controversy has surrounded both.

The resumption of CT operations raises concerns about effectiveness, sustainability, and potential unintended consequences. Rather than targeted CT operations, the current operations resemble counterinsurgency, with the risk of mission creep and overreach. Despite years of military pressure by local government forces supported by foreign assistance and advisors, extremist groups remain active, changing their tactics, by shifting from isolated attacks to sustained pressure campaigns, constantly relocating, expanding territorial/economic control, and replacing killed leaders. This experience shows that kinetic operations will not solve the problem without addressing the political and social problems that inspire these groups. In addition, US engagement, particularly in the Sahel, often involves cooperation with military-led governments that place restrictions on activity, such as restricted movement and access for US military personnel and contractors, and maintain alliances with US adversaries, limiting operational effectiveness. Additionally, cuts in US aid and reductions in international support have exacerbated humanitarian crises in Africa, undermining stability and increasing the potential for extremist recruitment.


Recent bilateral health agreements between the United States and several African countries have raised concerns, as they require access to the country’s health surveillance data and exclusive US rights to pathogen samples for pharmaceutical development. These agreements are seen as undermining sovereignty, equity, and human rights, and potentially compromising patient privacy. Additionally, allegations that the US has, in some countries, linked health assistance to access to critical minerals have also raised concerns.
China and Others Are Taking Advantage of US Missteps

The elephant in the room regarding current US and European relations with Africa is China, whose Belt and Road Initiative has reshaped Africa’s infrastructure landscape. Other emerging powers, such as India, Turkey, and the Gulf States, have also entered the competition. China, in particular, has taken advantage of reduced US engagement to expand its own influence in Africa. This increasingly competitive environment calls for renewed Western efforts to demonstrate that they are reliable, long-term partners.

But rebuilding this credibility, however, will be an uphill climb. African leaders often express concerns about aid conditionalities, slow delivery of promised investments, and lingering perceptions of paternalism and marginalization. Migration pressures, instability in regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and the urgent need to build climate resilience further complicate the current picture.
A Recipe for Change

The future of US-Europe-Africa relations depends on whether these partnerships can evolve into more balanced, mutually beneficial arrangements.

Several trends are likely to shape this evolution:

1. From Aid to Partnership

African nations are increasingly asserting agency and prioritizing trade, industrialization, and technology transfer over aid. The African Continental Free Trade Area offers a platform for deeper intra-African integration, which the US and Europe should support through carefully calibrated investment and market access.

2. Climate and Energy Cooperation

Africa’s vast renewable energy potential, from solar in the Sahara to wind along its coasts, aligns with global decarbonization goals. Joint projects in green hydrogen, sustainable agriculture, and climate adaptation, in addition to advancing Africa’s development goals and building climate resilience, could become central pillars of international cooperation.

3. Geopolitical Realignment


As the global order becomes more multipolar, Africa’s strategic importance will increase. The US and Europe should collaborate more closely and work as true partners with African governments to counter Chinese and Russian influence while simultaneously competing for African markets.

4. Digital and Innovation Partnerships

Africa’s young, tech-savvy population has bypassed the analog age and offers significant potential for collaboration in digital infrastructure, financial technology, and AI-driven solutions to development challenges.

Ultimately, the trajectory of US-Europe-Africa relations will depend on all parties moving beyond historical hierarchies toward genuinely cooperative policy and strategy development. Africa’s role as a co-architect, rather than as a passive recipient, will be essential in shaping a future that is equitable, sustainable, and resilient.

The future, as they say, is in our hands. It is for us to decide what we will do with it.



About the author: 
Charles A. Ray, a member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, served as US Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe.

Source: This article was published by FPRI


About Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
Founded in 1955, FPRI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.
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Zimbabwe eyes $1bn turnover from lithium sulphate exports amid beneficiation drive

Zimbabwe eyes $1bn turnover from lithium sulphate exports amid beneficiation drive
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By IntelliNews August 7, 2026

Zimbabwe's lithium industry is expected to generate about $1bn in turnover this year as producers begin exporting lithium sulphate, with annual revenue projected to rise further as planned processing plants come on stream, Mining Zimbabwe reported on August 6.

The projections were outlined by Lithium Producers Association of Zimbabwe chairman Innocent Rukweza during the Beneficiation Symposium held alongside the Mine Entra 2026 exhibition in Bulawayo.

Zimbabwe, Africa's leading lithium producer, has progressively tightened restrictions on exports of unprocessed lithium as the government pushes miners towards greater domestic beneficiation and the conversion of concentrates into higher-value products such as lithium sulphate.

“In 2022, when we were just exporting ores, we were looking at a turnover of over $60mn,” Rukweza said.

“The moment the ban came in and we were dealing with concentrates; we've been averaging about $580mn between 2023 and 2025. This year, with the first parcel from Arcadia of lithium sulphate, we're expecting turnover to reach about $1bn.”

Rukweza has previously projected that annual lithium industry turnover could reach $3.2bn by 2030 as additional lithium sulphate plants enter production.

The forecast follows Zimbabwe's first commercial export of lithium sulphate from the Arcadia Lithium Mine, marking the country's entry into a higher-value segment of the battery minerals supply chain. Lithium sulphate is an intermediate product used in the manufacture of battery chemicals including lithium carbonate and lithium hydroxide.

Arcadia is operated by Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, which is owned by China's Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (SSE:603799).

Zimbabwe's other major lithium operations include Sinomine Resource Group's (SZSE:002738) Bikita Minerals, Chengxin Lithium Group's (SZSE:002240) Sabi Star mine, Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group's (SZSE:002497) Kamativi project, the state-owned Sandawana mine and Tsingshan-backed Gwanda Lithium Mine.

Several producers are developing or studying lithium sulphate plants as the government pushes the industry further downstream, while Huayou's Arcadia operation is currently the only one producing and exporting lithium sulphate commercially.

Rukweza said about $3.4bn had been committed to completed and planned lithium projects, including concentrators and lithium sulphate plants.

He also said planned industry processing capacity was expected to reach about 385,000 tonnes a year by 2028 as additional beneficiation facilities are commissioned.

Zimbabwe has sought to capture more value from its lithium resources by restricting exports of raw ore and tightening controls on concentrate exports while encouraging producers to invest in domestic processing.

Rukweza urged the government to review the industry's tax regime and introduce fiscal incentives to ensure Zimbabwe remained competitive as producers committed capital to more advanced processing facilities.

Thursday, August 06, 2026

 

Poor housing conditions boost fall risk for elderly



English Longitudinal Study of Ageing data from 2002 to 2023 reveals that among adults aged 65 and over, housing conditions are associated with fall risk



PLOS

When home is a dangerous place: the cost of falls among older people living in the community 

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Poor housing may significantly increase the risk of falls in older people. A study of 5,500 adults aged 65 and over in England shows that falls associated with housing conditions could cost £1.2 billion each year.

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Credit: Anthony Lewis (www.anthony-lewis.com), PLOS, CC-BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)






Older adults living in homes with electrical or plumbing problems, insufficient space, or poor lighting are more likely to experience a fall, according to a new study published August 5, 2026 in the open access journal PLOS One by Javiera Cartagena-Farías of the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and colleagues.

Falls are common among older people living independently; around one in three adults aged 65 and over experience at least one fall a year in England. They can result in fractures, loss of independence, and increased demand for health and social care services.

In the new study, researchers analyzed data from approximately 5,500 adults aged 65 and over participating in waves 1–10 of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), covering 2002–2023. The data included self-reported housing problems as well as whether a participant had experienced any falls.

Electrical or plumbing problems were associated with a 10.8% increase in the probability of experiencing a fall, and were also linked to falls requiring healthcare use. Lack of space was associated with a 3.3% increase in fall probability. Poor lighting was associated with falls resulting in healthcare use (9.3% increase in fall probability). The annual cost of falls attributable to poor housing was estimated at £1.2 billion, comprising £440 million in healthcare costs and £778 million in formal care costs.

The study relied on self-reported falls and housing conditions, which may be subject to recall bias, and the cost model relied on previous findings and assumptions drawn from existing literature.

Despite these limitations, the authors conclude that poor housing conditions significantly increase the risk of falls among older people, suggesting that strategies targeting housing improvement could yield benefits in terms of fall prevention and healthcare savings. 

The authors add: “Poor housing conditions significantly increase the risk of falls among older people. Associated costs could be avoided. Viewing housing improvements as part of an integrated falls-prevention strategy could yield significant benefits for individuals and for the sustainability of health and care systems.”

 

 

In your coverage, please use this URL to provide access to the freely available article in PLOS One: https://plos.io/4wsadYU

Citation: Cartagena-Farías J, Fernández J-L, Silva-Ribeiro W, Brimblecombe N (2026) When home is a dangerous place: the cost of falls among older people living in the community. PLoS One 21(8): e0353755. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0353755

Author countries: UK.

Funding: This research is funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Policy Research Programme (reference NIHR206116). The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the NIHR or the Department of Health and Social Care. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, or decision to publish the manuscript. Author initials for award receipt: JLF. Funder website: https://eshcru.com/.