Revolution over but more protests than ever in Bangladesh

By AFP
November 15, 2024

More protests are being held in Bangladesh after restrictions on public assembly fell away with the ouster of Sheikh Hasina - Copyright AFP Abdul Goni

Sheikh Sabiha ALAM

The solo protest of Bangladeshi hunger striker Mahbubul Haque Shipon is hard to spot among the six other demonstrations under way on the same busy thoroughfare.

Shipon’s country is emerging from a summer of upheaval after student protests sparked a revolution, culminating in autocratic premier Sheikh Hasina’s August ouster.

Hasina’s government imposed draconian restrictions on public assembly until it was no longer able to contain anger over rights abuses and widening inequality after 15 years of rule.

While many are hopeful that Hasina’s overthrow heralds a brighter future, the end of those restrictions has led to more protests in the capital Dhaka since her departure than during the uprising against her.

“I am here for the sake of the nation and for a great cause,” Shipon told AFP, four days after he dragged a mattress onto the kerb to begin his one-man campout.

The 47-year-old is calling for the ouster of Bangladesh’s president — still in office, but suspect as a Hasina appointee — and the scrapping of the constitution he blames for the country’s past woes.

As he vowed not to eat again until his demands were met, his words were drowned out by the clamour of numerous other protests being staged around him.

Government land office employees nearby chanted demands for higher pay and benefits, next to another man waging his own solitary protest urging protections for Sufi religious shrines.

Further down was a group forming a human chain to highlight the case of a university official subjected to anonymous death threats. They left, and another group took their place to condemn a vandal attack on a nearby mosque.

Non-stop demonstrations near the Secretariat building — the administrative nerve centre of Bangladesh’s government — have been gratefully catered to by the area’s street vendors.

“Since the protests began, demand has skyrocketed,” Arup Sarkar, who makes a living selling an assortment of red and green Bangladesh flags, told AFP.

“Protesters need flags of various shapes and sizes.”



– ‘A standstill’ –



But police are less enthused about the sheer number of protests across the sprawling megacity, home to more than 21 million people.

Many rallies are staged on Dhaka’s arterial roads, already notorious for their near-constant gridlock.

On a day in November, garment workers protesting over unpaid wages held sit-ins on highways that halted transport into the city’s industrial fringes.

At the same time, an unrelated student procession blocked the road outside the Secretariat for hours.

Determining the precise number of protests held in Dhaka in a given week is impossible, because rules requiring prior permission from police are routinely disregarded.

“Some follow the rules, while many don’t, so we do not really know the actual number of demonstrations,” police officer Muhammad Talebur Rahman told AFP.

“We encourage people to speak up, but at the same time, we would ask that they avoid inconveniencing Dhaka’s residents.”



– ‘Fascist party’ –



The interim government that replaced Hasina, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, has been largely tolerant of protests since it came to office.

One notable exception is on demonstrations called by the remnants of Hasina’s Awami League party, which it fears is attempting to regroup after many of its top leaders were arrested following her downfall.

The party’s attempts to stage a rally this month were quickly thwarted by police and student demonstrators, who occupied the site of the planned mobilisation to drive off supporters.

“The Awami League, in its current form, is a fascist party,” Yunus’ press secretary Shafiqul Alam told AFP.

“This fascist party will not be allowed to hold protest rallies in Bangladesh.”



– ‘Fundamental rights’ –



Other signs suggest growing concern within the government over the constant disruptions caused by protests.

Last month, it urged Bangladeshis to stop staging rallies that blocked traffic and instead hold them in parks — a directive that has been largely ignored.

Yunus’s administration had already banned rallies outside his official residence weeks after he took power, evidently out of frustration that constant crowds were impeding its work.

On some occasions, the protests have also threatened to provoke disorder and violence.

Islamist groups last month announced plans to besiege the offices of two newspapers after accusing them of disrespecting their faith, prompting the government to deploy soldiers to protect staff inside.

And earlier this month, a crowd attempted to storm Dhaka’s most prestigious theatre to stop the staging of a popular play.

A member of the production had allegedly posted a Facebook comment criticising the protesters that ousted Hasina, and authorities had to halt the play to ensure the safety of performers.

“Freedom of speech and assembly are fundamental rights,” Abu Ahmed Faizul Kabir of legal rights group Ain O Salish Kendra told AFP.

“But they should not infringe upon the rights of others.”

 

Two Gifts from Ivan Aguéli: Sufi, Anarchist, Theosophist, Painter

Nov

10

2024

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From Bitter Winter, A magazine on religious liberty and human rights, by Massimo Introvigne

A museum in Sala and a book on his magazine “Il Convito” help understanding the different aspects of the extraordinary career of the Swedish artist.

This year, I received two gifts from a character I had been interested in for decades, Swedish painter Ivan Aguéli (1869–1917). First, I was finally able to visit the Aguéli Museum in his birthplace, Sala, Sweden. Sala is located some 130 kilometers from Stockholm, and the museum is open only four days per week. It is a small museum but still essential for understanding Aguéli as an artist. 

In fact, there is a different perception of Aguéli in Sweden and elsewhere. In Sweden, he is primarily known as a painter, and one who eludes classification in a specific current, and honored as such. Abroad, his artistic production is less known than his role in the history of the spread of Sufism in the West, esotericism, and anarchism. In fact, a closer look at the Egyptian landscapes may open a window on Aguéli’s spirituality. But you have to look at them twice.

Massimo Introvigne visiting the Aguéli Museum in Sala, August 17, 2024.

The second gift came by the mail. It was the book by Paul-André Claudel “Un journal « italo-islamique » à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale : Il Convito / النادي [al-Nâdî] (Le Caire, 1904-1912)” (Alexandria: Centre d’Études Alexandrines, 2022). The book is a jewel and confirms that there is no substitute for the printed paper. The elegant composition of text and illustrations would never be the same on Kindle. 

The museum in Sala introduces the artist but does not reveal the important role of Aguéli as a cultural strategist who tried to create a friendship between a part of the Western culture and Islam. This is the subject matter of Claudel’s book, organized around the magazine “Il Convito,” published in Italian, Arabic, and sometimes Ottoman Turkish in Cairo between 1904 and 1907, with two further issues in 1910 and 1912 by Aguéli and Italian medical doctor, scholar, and intelligence agent Enrico Insabato (1878–1963). 

Claudel’s tour de force succeeds in showing the idiosyncratic nature of the magazine. There is little doubt that Insabato, under his hat (one of many, though) as an Italian spy, produced the magazine to persuade Muslims that, unlike Britain and France, the secular Italy of the early 20th century was a friend of Islam. Engaged in an ideological and political conflict with the Vatican, Italy did not support Catholic or Protestant missionaries either.

The cover of Claudel’s book.

However, the continuous dialogue and cooperation between Insabato and Aguéli produced a magazine unlike the many others published by Europeans in Egypt. The latter often praised reformist and modernized Islam. On the contrary, Aguéli was a Sufi and “Il Convito” praised a traditional Islam resisting modernization and criticized the reformists. 

It also maintained that traditional Islam needed a caliphate, which led the magazine to a pro-Ottoman position that finally led to its undoing. When Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1911 to add Libya to its colonies the contradiction between the pro-Italian and pro-Turkish attitudes of “Il Convito” exploded. The Young Turks revolution of 1908 had already changed a landscape where Türkiye could be perceived as the representative of a traditional Islam opposing modernity.

Aguéli (standing, left) and Insabato (standing, center) with others in Cairo, circa 1904.

Of course, Aguéli the Muslim convert and Sufi is well-known as the man who introduced René Guénon (1886–1951) to Sufism, although on how extensively the latter was influenced by the Swedish painter (perhaps more than he cared to admit) opinions differ.

Claudel’s book also offers some curious clues about Aguéli’s relationships with esoteric milieus. Given what “Il Convito” was and its connections with the Italian intelligence, it may look strange to find there Theosophical references and an obituary of Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), co-founder of the Theosophical Society. But the references are less strange if we consider that Aguéli was a member of the Theosophical Society himself. 

Obituary of Colonel Olcott in the June 1907 issue of “Il Convito” (from Claudel’s book).

As many in Swedish esoteric milieus and beyond, he was also influenced by Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772). Claudel adds some interesting details, including the close relationship in Cairo between Aguéli and Eugène Dupré (1882–1944), in fact so close that they shared for a while the same apartment. Dupré co-founded the Egyptian branch of the Martinist Order and another esoteric society, the Ordre du Lys et de l’Aigle. Claudel also mentions Dupré’s claim that Aguéli was “a very close friend” of Charles Grolleau (1867–1940), another Martinist and disciple of Papus (Gérard Encausse, 1865–1916). Grolleau later converted to Catholicism and, via an introduction by Guénon, participated in the initiatives in Paray-le-Monial of iconographer Louis Charbonneau-Lassay (1871–1946) promoting the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

Here, Claudel’s book needs to be read together with another essential text on Aguéli I already reviewed in “Bitter Winter”: “Anarchist, Artist, Sufi: The Politics, Painting, and Esotericism of Ivan Aguéli” (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), a collection of fourteen essays and of some key texts by Aguéli, edited by Mark Sedgwick. The collection includes decisive chapters by Per Faxneld on Aguéli and esotericism and by Sedgwick himself on the Swedish painter and Guénon (and a contribution by Claudel too).

Ivan Aguéli, “Egyptian Landscape,” circa 1895. Aguéli Museum, Sala.

The most puzzling question is how Aguéli could have been at the same time a Muslim Sufi, a member or associate of different Western esoteric organizations, and an anarchist. Insabato had been an anarchist too, but at least from a certain date on he was more a spy on anarchists circles on behalf of the Italian intelligence service. Claiming that Aguéli moved from anarchism to Sufism and esotericism would not solve the problem. He remained an anarchist, although in his later years a less active and outspoken one, until his mysterious death near Barcelona in 1917, hit by a train. 

Left, French police photograph of Aguéli taken by the inventor himself of the mugshots, Alphonse Bertillon (1853–1914); right, Leda Rafanelli (credits).

In fact, Aguéli was not the only anarchist who claimed that anarchism was atheistic as it rejected the religions that sided with the rich and the powerful, such as 19th-century Christianity, but Islam was a religion of the oppressed and an entirely different matter. 

Here, a comparison may be proposed with Tuscan anarchist Leda Rafanelli (1880–1971). While many know her only as the lover of pre-Fascist Benito Mussolini (1883–1945), Rafanelli was at the same time an anarchist, a self-styled Muslim (if an idiosyncratic one), and a professional Tarot reader who cultivated a number of esoteric interests. Comparing her to Aguéli would do for another interesting book and would confirm that anarchy and esoteric spirituality were not necessarily incompatible.

Post-Uprising Bangladesh Toddles Towards Democracy

Bangladesh’s post-uprising government is negotiating a sea of challenges as it speaks of radical changes to restore democracy

Snigdhendu Bhattacharya
Updated on: 19 October 2024

Students stage a demonstration on the High Court premises during a protest to demand the resignation of pro-Awami League judges in Dhaka Photo: Getty Images

There was a hint of tragedy right at the beginning of Bangladesh’s new journey on August 5 that spoilt the celebration party, even if partially.

On August 1, when the stage was set for the student-led protesters’ one-point demand for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation, one video clip from a 2019 event went viral on social media. Its audio was used in the background of almost every visual of public gatherings in Bangladesh’s cities and towns in the first week of August.

The video had hundreds of students joining folk music band Joler Gaan’s members to sing Dhono Dhanyo Pushpe Bhora (abundant with wealth, food and flowers), one of undivided Bengal’s most popular patriotic songs, while waving their cellphone flashlights in darkness – a magical moment.

People sharing the clip on social media in August 2024 said the 2019 rendition – with hundreds in thundering chorus and Joler Gaan’s Rahul Ananda’s prompts in between – brought tears to their eyes, gave them goosebumps and filled them with patriotic fervour as they fought to liberate themselves from Hasina’s Awami League’s authoritarian rule. Joler Gaan members, too, participated in the protests.

But on August 5, as the news of Hasina’s resignation and exit from Bangladesh spread, and mobs started vandalising Hasina’s residence and statues, sculptures and properties of national importance across cities and towns, Joler Gaan founder Rahul Ananda’s residence-cum-the group’s studio in Dhaka was not spared either. Rare musical instruments were burnt, broken and looted. Ananda bore the brunt of collateral damage.

In Jessore, when a group of young protesters was reportedly vandalising an upper floor of ruling party leader Shaheen Chakladar’s 5-star hotel, another mob set fire to the lower floors, killing about two dozen youths stranded on the upper floor.

Since then, while being relieved at the fall of an authoritarian rule, the people of Bangladesh have also remained worried about the possibility of falling into anarchy or in the hands of another group of undemocratic forces, the Islamic radicals.

Mob rule has kept Bangladesh on the edge, in particular, leading to a series of tragedies. People have been lynched, humiliated, and forced to resign from government jobs. Hindu temples, Sufi shrines and Buddha statues came under attack. While the interim government, headed by peace Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, has taken multiple measures that earned praises from civil society, some trends keep even some of Hasina’s staunchest critics worried.

According to Dhaka-based economist and public intellectual Anu Muhammad, the interim government has taken the right steps to look deeply into the financial crisis, national indebtedness, problems with financing mega projects, agreements and contracts and mega corruption.

He lauded the efforts to reform the election commission, the civil administration and the police force and rewriting the Constitution. Some “good, well-deserved” people have found appointments in top posts in various institutions like Universities and art and culture academies, Muhammad says.

However, he is concerned with the government’s “inability or reluctance” to stop the mob violence, and attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, temples and shrines. He is also worried about the indiscriminate filing of cases against people connected with the previous regime. This he finds a violation of the new government’s promise to ensure free and fair trials of specific responsible persons of the past regime for killing and looting.

“Harassing women for dress, occupation and appearances has become a matter of big concern. The spread of discriminatory oppressive ideas and forces is also a matter of concern,” says Muhammad, a member of the newly formed Ganatantrik Adhikar Committee (Committee for Democratic Rights).

In Bangladesh, Will The August Of Liberation Last?
BY Snigdhendu Bhattacharya

Debates and Diktats

One of the positive aspects a Dhaka-based journalist highlights is the increase in the number of debates and discussions on a range of issues involving a wide variety of forces.

There are demands for rewriting the national socio-political history, re-evaluating major events leading to where the country stands today, identifying the roots of political authoritarianism and the search for the identity of Bangladeshi people and the role of language and religion in shaping politics and identity. People are debating about what the key features of the new Constitution should be.

Leaders of the interim government have argued that during Hasina’s rule, the AL appropriated the whole history of the country’s 1971 liberation war, suppressed the AL’s authoritarian turn during 1972-75 and erased everyone other than Hasina’s family from the history of nation building to create a cult out of her father, Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Liberation War and Bangladesh’s first President.

This is why an objective history of the country, highlighting the roles of all heroes sidelined in history for so long, has to be rewritten, they have argued. AL supporters have seen in these efforts to erase Mujibur Rahman and the legacy of the 1971 liberation war. Some Islamic radicals have even called for disowning the 1971 ‘independence’ altogether, ob the ground that it came with India’s help.

There are debates about the nature of Islam – how the religion practiced in Bangladesh is different from those of northwest India, Pakistan, and the Arab world. Many such discussions are triggering radical backlashes, who are calling for turning Bangladesh into an Islamic country.

Bangladeshi political expert Mubashar Hasan, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Oslo, Norway, agrees that people are speaking more freely on matters related to politics and governance. “People are enjoying this freedom of expression. No one is spared from criticism,” he tells Outlook.

Hasan, a survivor of the Hasina regime’s enforced disappearance tactics used to silence critics, lauds the Yunus government’s decision to join the Convention against Enforced Disappearance and the move to try those accused of the July-August violence perpetrated by the previous government and ruling party in the International Crimes Tribunal. He appreciates the government’s measures in the economic field, such as initiating talks with Western financial institutions.


Law and Order

Many in Bangladesh believe the Yunus government’s lack of control over law and order stems from its lack of political authority.

They argue that at the core of the interim government are Yunus and three student leaders – Mahfuz Abdullah (Alam), Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmood – from a student organisation, Ganatantrik Chhatra Shakti, launched only last year. It lacks organisational influence outside Dhaka and other varsity towns, even if the leaders enjoy high popularity among the masses.

“Due to their lack of political organisation and authority, they depend heavily on cooperation from the Army and myriad political forces opposed to Hasina, especially Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and other Muslim groups,” says a Dhaka University professor who does not want to be named.

The professor adds that the government is trying to gain the civil society’s confidence but in the conflict between civil society and undemocratic religious forces, it stands indecisive or infirm. “At present, even the police fear getting mobbed and lynched. Only a government with a clear public mandate can restore law and order. ”

Among the most worrying trends, the professor highlights how the banned international terrorist organisation Hizb-Ut-Tahrir has been publicly holding rallies, displaying the black flag used by West Asian terror groups, and calling for establishing a Caliphate in Bangladesh. Besides, the syllabus reforms committee was dissolved after an Islamic cleric objected to some members for their secular stands.

“No one really knows who is in control. There is a cold tension between all forces. I feel that multiple forces are trying to assert and wrest control but none have it yet,” says a Dhaka-based journalist.

Hasan, however, attributes the Yunus government’s struggles in restoring control over the law and order situation to the police force’s lack of confidence. Many officers remain in hiding due to their brutal crackdown on protesters and are attempting to avoid public backlash and legal procedures, he says.

Those who have returned to duty often remain inactive, even in situations that require a proactive role from law enforcement. This contributed to insecurity among some minorities, as seen in attacks on minority religious groups and followers of Sufi traditions. The government finally granted magistracy power to the Army to improve the situation.

According to Hasan, the most pressing issue is when Bangladesh will hold elections, as at the root of the country’s current crisis lies the absence of a credible election in over a decade. People joined the student movement demanding Hasina’s resignation because they had already been calling for her departure for many months to pave the way for a free and fair election.

“Even during the student agitation, there was no talk of Rashtra Sanskar (state reforms). Their sole demand, which garnered widespread support, was for Hasina’s resignation. This was neither a coup nor a revolution. There was no pre-declared reform agenda—it was a mass uprising. While people want reforms, they also desire a government with a popular mandate to implement them. The government must prioritise conducting a free and fair election,” he tells Outlook.


Behind Bangladesh Protests, The Weight of Deep-Seated Frustrations
BY Rabiul Alam

Changing Political Landscape

Another debate that has gripped Bangladesh is whether the interim government should wait for all its intended reforms before conducting the elections or engage only in the reforms necessary for conducting a free and fair election and then leave the rest on the government form through electoral mandate.

While the main forces behind the uprising are favouring thorough reforms first, major parties like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which was Hasina’s AL’s chief opponent and is now perceived to be the largest party, prefer the interim government to focus on electoral and administrative reforms necessary for conducting the elections.

Indicating a change in the political landscape, the BNP is increasingly trying to project itself as a liberal democratic force and engaging in conflict with Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamic political party. The JeI was the BNP’s long-term ally against Hasina.

Political observers see in these developments the emergence of new political alignments, in which the BNP stands on one side, the Ganatantrik Chhatra Shakti-backed new political formation on the other, and a JeI-led alliance of Islamic parties as the third force.

While some Ganatantrik Chhatra Shakti leaders and others have argued for banning Hasina’s Awami League from politics, the BNP opposed it, saying it wants the AL to be on the electoral field. Hasina and her collaborators should face free and fair trials but all parties should get a level playing field for the proper restoration of democracy, BNP leaders argued.

BNP leaders believe the AL has earned such notoriety due to its authoritarian rule and the massacre of protesters between July 15 and August 4 that it has no chance of coming anywhere close to power even if allowed to contest.

Parties that had allied with Hasina, though, allege an atmosphere of terror that would not allow them any scope for free and fair participation in the elections. The Yunus government has already issued an arrest warrant against Hasina, who is reportedly living in India since her hurried exit from Bangladesh on August 5. Most other senior AL leaders are either in jail or in hiding. Leaders of some of Hasina’s ally parties have shared the same fate.

Recently, Army Chief Waker-uz-Zaman, while strongly backing the Yunus government, said that he feels the reforms should be completed and a transition to democracy initiated within 12 to 18 months. While Yunus has been evasive on any electoral timeline, the government’s chief law advisor, Dhaka University professor Asif Nazrul told the media that his “primary assumption” says conducting the elections should be possible by the next year.

Whether or when elections or reforms become a new conflict point remains to be seen.

BLASPHEMY

Pakistan ‘vigilantes’ behind rise in online blasphemy cases


By AFP
October 14, 2024

The families of young Pakistanis say their relatives were duped into sharing blasphemous content by strangers online

 - Copyright AFP Aamir QURESHI

Zain Zaman JANJUA

Aroosa Khan’s son was chatting on WhatsApp but suddenly found himself the target of “vigilante” investigators who accused him of having committed blasphemy online, a crime that carries the death penalty in Pakistan.

The 27-year-old is one in hundreds of young men standing trial in Pakistan courts accused of making blasphemous statements online or in WhatsApp groups, an offence for which arrests have exploded in recent years.

Many of the cases are being brought to trial by private “vigilante groups” led by lawyers and supported by volunteers who scour the internet for offenders, rights groups and police say.

The families of young Pakistanis, including doctors, engineers, lawyers, and accountants, say that their relatives were duped into sharing blasphemous content by strangers online before being arrested.

“Our lives have been turned upside down,” Khan told AFP, saying that her son, who has not been named for security reasons, had been tricked into sharing blasphemous content in the messaging app.

One local police report suggests that the vigilantes may be motivated by financial gains.

One such group was responsible for the conviction of 27 people who have been sentenced to life imprisonment or the death penalty over the past three years.

Blasphemy is an incendiary charge in Muslim-majority Pakistan, where even unsubstantiated accusations can incite public outrage and lead to lynchings.

While they date back to colonial times, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws were ramped up in the 1980s when dictator Zia ul-Haq campaigned to “Islamicise” society.

AFP has attended multiple court hearings in the capital Islamabad, where young men are being prosecuted by private vigilante groups and the FIA for blasphemous online content.

Among them is Aroosa’s son — who had joined a WhatsApp group for job-seekers and was contacted by a woman.

She sent him an image of women with Quranic verses printed on their bodies, his mother said, adding that the contact then “denied having sent it and asked Ahmed to send it back to her to understand what he was talking about”.

He was later arrested and prosecuted by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).



– ‘Noble cause’ –



The most active private investigation group is the Legal Commission on Blasphemy Pakistan (LCBP), which told AFP they are prosecuting more than 300 cases.

Sheraz Ahmad Farooqi, one of the private investigation group’s leaders, told AFP that more than a dozen volunteers track online blasphemy, believing that “God has chosen them for this noble cause”.

“We are not beheading anyone; we are following a legal course,” Farooqi told AFP outside a courtroom that heard 15 blasphemy cases, all filed by his group.

He said that most of the accused were addicted to pornography and were disrespecting revered Islamic figures by using their names and dubbing voices attributed to them over pornographic content.

He acknowledged that women were involved in tracking and arresting the men, but they were not members of his group.

Cases can drag through the courts for years, though death penalties are often commuted to life in prison on appeal at the Supreme Court and Pakistan has never executed anyone for blasphemy.

A special court, attended by AFP, was formed in September to expedite the dozens of pending cases.



– ‘Vested agenda’ –



The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that multiple vigilante groups were working in a “dedicated manner” to “witch-hunt” people for online expression or to fabricate blasphemy evidence using social media with “vested agendas”.

“All such groups are formalised by self-declared defenders of majoritarian Islam,” the group said in a report published in 2023.

A 2024 report by police in Punjab province, the country’s most populous province, that was leaked to the media said that “a suspicious gang was trapping youth in blasphemy cases”.

“The Blasphemy Business” report was sent to the FIA with recommendations to launch a thorough inquiry to determine the source of the vigilante groups’ funding.

Two FIA officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that they had received the report but denied that their office was acting on the tips of vigilante groups.

The FIA did not respond to requests for official comment.

An official involved in prosecuting the cases told AFP outside the court: “Not a single person arrested was trapped by any manner. They committed the crime.”

“The law is very clear about it, and we have to enforce it as long as the law is there.”

Arafat Mazhar, the director of Alliance Against Blasphemy Politics, a group advocating against the misuse of blasphemy laws, told AFP that the alarming rise in cases was not because people “are suddenly more blasphemous”.

He said the rise in the use of messaging apps and social media and the ease of sharing and forwarding content was a significant factor.



– Shunned –



The accused struggle to find defence lawyers willing to represent them and the slightest accusation can turn an entire family into pariahs.

Nafeesa Ahmed, whose brother is accused of sharing blasphemous images on WhatsApp and whose names have also been changed, said her family was shunned by close relatives.

“There is a massive cost that families of accused are bearing. First of all, our security or lives are at risk,” she told AFP.

She said some of the families have sold thousands of dollars worth of houses and gold, given to brides on their wedding, to fight the cases.

Dozens of families which have formed a support group have protested in the capital calling for an independent commission to investigate the vigilante groups and their role in prosecuting Pakistanis for blasphemy.

“In this society, if someone commits a murder, he can survive because there are thousands of ways to come out of that but if someone is accused of blasphemy he cannot,” said Nafeesa.

“When it comes to blasphemy, the public has its own court and even family members will abandon you.”

SOCIETY: DEFYING THE MOB

Masood Lohar

Published October 13, 2024 
EOS/DAWN

PAKISTAN

Thousands turn up to demand justice for Dr Shahnawaz Kumbhar in his hometown of Umerkot, Sindh on September 25, 2024 | Social Media


The swiftness with which the blasphemy allegation against Dr Shahnawaz Kumbhar, a 36-year-old doctor at a government hospital in Sindh’s Umerkot district, spiralled into violent bloodlust, reflects the deadly intersection of religious extremism, personal vendettas and mob violence.

It did not matter that the alleged blasphemous remarks appeared on the doctor’s social media account, which he insisted had been hacked. The people wanted blood, and the police, it seems, were too willing to comply. A hardline cleric announced a bounty of five million rupees, while local law enforcement went into hyperdrive to apprehend the doctor.

OF MURDERERS AND SAVIOURS


The doctor was arrested by the Umerkot police from Karachi a day later, on September 18. He was killed a little after midnight on the same day, according to a high-level police report, “in a staged encounter” that took place in the jurisdiction of Sindhri police.

The local police in-charge, Sindhri Station House Officer (SHO) Niaz Khoso, claimed that the doctor was killed “unintentionally”, but the doctor’s family and rights group disputed the claim.

The day after the murder, the SHO, along with high-ranking police officials from Mirpurkhas and Umerkot, were seen in video clips uploaded on social media being feted as heroes by the same hardline cleric who had offered the reward for killing the doctor. The videos also show a local lawmaker, part of the Pakistan Peoples Party, congratulating the policemen.

The groundswell of support for Dr Shahnawaz Kumbhar, who was murdered over blasphemy allegations, eloquently articulates Sindh’s culture of tolerance, rooted in its Sufi traditions…

In one of the videos, the now-suspended SHO can be heard saying that he wasn’t worthy of such a task, but was grateful to God for giving him the opportunity, while referring to Dr Kumbhar’s extrajudicial killing.

Meanwhile, the doctor’s family wasn’t allowed to perform funeral rites, and an enraged mob snatched the body and set it on fire. A brave Hindu youth, Premo Kohli, tried to protest and protect the body, but the mob attacked him as well. Despite that, he still retrieved the badly burnt body once the enraged mob had left.

The incident spread terror throughout Umerkot, the only district in Pakistan with a Hindu majority. There was palpable fear of a blasphemy accusation, like a sword dangling on their heads, and many felt that they could be ‘next.’

But what was truly worrisome was the emerging complicity of the police, who had played the role of the executioner. A week earlier, another blasphemy accused had been shot dead while in police custody in Quetta, with the cop hailed as a hero.

Dr Shahnawaz Kumbhar



AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESPONSE

But unlike the reaction in Quetta, and in the majority of blasphemy cases elsewhere in the country, the public response in Sindh was altogether different.

It likely has as much to do with the brave act of the Hindu youth, who stopped the lynch mob from completely burning the body, as it does with Sindh’s long history of Sufi saints.

A week after the murder, on September 25, thousands of people from across Sindh flocked to Dr Kumbhar’s village to take part in his funeral, in an unequivocal response to right-wing bigotry. Manji Faqeer, a prominent folk artist, sang Sufi tunes at the grave as it was garlanded with petals.

This defiance is the product of the deeply ingrained culture of religious tolerance and interfaith harmony that Sindh has maintained over thousands of years. It dates back to poets and saints of the Sufi genre, such as Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, Sachal Sarmast and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, who are revered for their message of love, peace and harmony.

This is also reflected in numbers. According to a study by the Centre for Research and Security Studies, published in 2022, 89 people were killed in Pakistan for allegedly committing blasphemy between 1947 and 2021. There were roughly 1,500 accusations and cases during this period. Of those, 1,098 cases — more than 70 percent — were in Punjab. In the same period, Sindh reported 173 cases.

With their latest and most unequivocal response to blasphemy accusations, the people of Sindh have compelled the provincial government to take action. Since then, several high-ranking police officials have been booked in the case, along with the cleric who offered the reward for Dr Shahnawaz’s murder.

A HISTORY OF INJUSTICE

A similar pushback was witnessed in the case of Mashal Khan, who was murdered on the campus of a university in Mardan by a mob in 2017, but it tapered off with the accused acquitted.

Many other cases have followed a similar trajectory, with the blasphemy accused either murdered, going into exile or forced to rot in prison — with the recurring theme being that they are denied the right to fair trial.

It includes academic Junaid Hafeez, who was given the death penalty over social media posts. In 2014, a year after his arrest, his lawyer was gunned down in his office. Hafeez was given the death penalty in 2019 and remains on death row.

The case of 14-year-old Rimsha Tahir of Islamabad is equally chilling, after a court found that she was wrongly accused of blasphemy. The cleric accused of planting the evidence was, however, acquitted after witnesses retracted their statements.

Even in the case of the recent murder of the blasphemy accused at a police station in Quetta, the victim’s family has pardoned the policeman, meaning that he would get away scot-free.

EMBOLDENING FANATICISM

The frequency with which those who instigate blasphemy accusations and take part in mob violence escape justice has emboldened many others. This can be tracked by the increase in not just the number of reported blasphemy cases, but also the recent spate of attacks on places of worship belonging to Pakistan’s persecuted Ahmaddiya community.

The cases in which the perpetrators have to face justice is rare, such as that of the murder of Sri Lankan national Priyantha Kumara. Many in civil society believe that the death sentences handed out to the perpetrators were given due to the victim being a foreign national and the resultant outcry over it globally.

The systemic abuse of blasphemy laws has tarnished Pakistan’s image globally, and gives credence to the perception that there are strong strands of religious intolerance and extremism in the country.

The horrific spectacle of vigilante ‘justice’ inflicted by lynch mobs, captured in real-time on cell phones by individuals taking part in it — and often shared with pride on social media — speaks volumes about how deeply entrenched the exploitation of religious sentiments is in Pakistan.

The strange and chilling fact is that the blasphemy laws themselves are almost never enforced in these cases. The mobs circumvent the legal system to seize power and administer their own form of ‘justice.’

A CLARION CALL OF RESISTANCE

But as opposed to previous episodes of mob violence, where response to the violence and brutality has often been limited — if not completely muted — the response from the people of Sindh has been clear: they want to stand against such injustice.

The groundswell of support for the victim and his family, who continue to face harassment from religious hardliners, has provided a template for people in other parts of the country to take a stand against those preaching violence.

The swiftness of this organic response, which saw a province-wide mobilisation, and support from the rest of the country, is a reminder that the culture of resistance and tolerance remains strong in Sindh. It eloquently articulates the need to protect those accused of blasphemy so that they get a fair trial.

The state must now respond in a similar manner, by instituting legal reforms to ensure that such tragedies are not repeated.

The writer is a climate change expert and the founder of Clifton Urban Forest. He can be contacted at mlohar@gmail.com.
X: @masoodlohar

Published in Dawn, EOS, October 13th, 2024

SMOKERS’ CORNER: SAFEGUARDING SINDH

Nadeem F. Paracha 

Published October 6, 2024

Illustration by Abro

Last week, protests erupted in Umerkot, a city located at the edge of the Thar Desert in Sindh. The protests were held to condemn the extrajudicial killing of a doctor who had been accused of committing blasphemy. The Sindh government confirmed that the accused was killed by the cops who had arrested him. His dead body was then snatched by some ‘fanatics’ and set on fire.


This horrific incident shocked a large number of ethnic Sindhis, who are in majority in Sindh outside the province’s multi-ethnic capital, Karachi. For over two decades now, Sindhi media and Sindhi scholars have been airing concerns about the ‘radicalisation’ of Sindhis.

However, the Sindhi-majority regions of Sindh have not witnessed as many incidents of ‘religiously motivated violence’, as have the country’s other provinces — especially Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). For example, according to a 2022 report, out of a total of 1,415 cases of blasphemy registered by the police between 1947 and 2021, 1,098 were in Punjab and just 173 in Sindh.

Even though there were even fewer such cases registered in KP and Balochistan, these two provinces (and Punjab) have witnessed far more incidents of sectarian violence and Islamist militancy than Sindh. However, Sindh’s ethnically diverse capital Karachi is somewhat of an exception. Its streets witnessed sectarian warfare in the early 1980s and then, from the mid-2000s, the city became a hub for various Islamist groups to raise money for their militant activities, through extortion, kidnappings, robberies, etc.



Incidents of violence and killings in the name of religion in Sindh are the remnants of a state-sponsored project that is no longer in play — but also indicate that secular forces need to secure social spaces they have abdicated to extremists

In 1979, the state had started to roll out an ‘Islamisation’ project. Sindh, apart from its capital Karachi, somewhat succeeded in avoiding the impact of the project. Over the decades, though, the project began to mutate and started to be navigated from below. It eventually fell in the lap of multiple segments of the polity. These segments began to use the contents of the project for lucrative evangelical purposes, and to accumulate social power. In many cases, the contents were also used to bolster anti-state Islamist militancy.

Karachi, despite being impacted by the outcomes of the project, has remained largely secular due to its diverse ethnic make-up, massive size and cosmopolitan nature. The rest of the province, on the other hand, which has a Sindhi majority, has often frustrated many attempts to radicalise this majority. This is largely due to the inherently pluralistic and ‘moderate’ disposition of Sindhis.

In a 2021 study, the Karachi-based researcher Imtiaz Ali noted that “Sindhis have unwaveringly discarded those who have denied their traditions of tolerance.” According to Ali, “the progressive literature widely circulated in Sindh has played a huge role in developing resilient minds.” Ali adds that Sindh’s arts are influenced by Sindhi poetry that is largely feminine in nature and tightly tied to Sufism. This has shielded Sindhis from being overwhelmed by the outcomes of the ‘Islamisation’ project that has wreaked havoc in Punjab and KP.

Those concerned about the rising incidents of religious extremism among Sindhis are of the view that the incidents are the outcome of the resources and effort that the state once invested in its bid to ‘Islamise’ the Sindhis. These efforts were part of a larger scheme formulated by the state that wanted to ‘Islamise’ polities in Sindh, Balochistan and KP. The state believed that ‘political Islam’ and a vigorous propagation of Islamic rituals were effective tools to neutralise Baloch, Sindhi and Pakhtun sub-nationalisms.

The scheme was a success in KP, mainly due to Pakistan’s role in the anti-Soviet ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan, which was lavishly bankrolled by the US and Saudi Arabia. Some political commentators have suggested that, since Pakhtuns by nature are religious, the state was able to lure them towards more extreme expressions of the faith. These expressions were being propagated by the state and by its Islamist assets to romanticise the Afghan insurgency against Soviet troops. As a result, secular Pakhtun sub-nationalism lost a lot of traction in KP.





The scheme to radicalise the ethnic Baloch in this regard was not as successful, though. Baloch society can be conservative, but it is inherently secular. Most Baloch insurgencies before the recent one were driven by leftist ideas. However, Balochistan’s ‘Pakhtun belt’ was more receptive to the ways of the scheme.

Indeed, while the overriding purpose of the scheme was to neutralise Sindhi, Baloch and Pakhtun sub-nationalisms, one of the spillovers of the scheme and of the ‘Islamisation’ project was the eventual radicalisation of Punjab — the country’s largest and most powerful province. In fact, the scheme was often viewed by non-Punjabi sub-nationalists as the work of Punjabi elites. This is thus a case of the chickens coming home to roost. Another ironic outcome has been the recent alliance between secular Baloch separatists and militant Islamists in Balochistan.

However, the claim that such schemes are still being rolled out may not hold much truth anymore. With China firmly in the picture and anti-state Islamist militancy stalling Pakistan’s new economic and regional aspirations, the state is now trying to assert itself against the outcomes of its own schemes. It is clearly planning to completely overcome these, even if this requires an entirely reformed state structure in the areas of economics, judiciary and even within the military establishment. This is unfolding in plain sight.

This is why the increasing frequency of sporadic, religiously motivated violence in Sindh is probably a belated outcome of a scheme that is no longer in play. This violence in Sindh is more the handiwork of groups who, years ago, had entered through a window that was opened in Sindh by the scheme. Gradually, through madrassas [religious schools], these groups began to flex the contents of the now-defunct ‘Islamisation’ project. The groups are trying to accumulate social power and influence because they have found no mentionable electoral traction in the province.

The ‘left-liberal’ Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) remains Sindh’s largest political party. It has won four consecutive elections in Sindh, from 2008 onwards. Its vote bank has continued to swell. The sweeping PPP wins in Sindh have made sure that no Islamist groups or their allies are able to enter the Sindh assembly. Sindhi sub-nationalists, who were once at the forefront of maintaining the indigenous secular disposition of Sindhis, have disintegrated. In fact, recently they were seen riding on the coattails of conservative/anti-PPP Sindhi elites.

With Sindh electorally secured, the PPP will have to invest a lot more in the social areas that have been vacated by the Sindhi sub-nationalists and are being occupied by the radical Islamists. It’s time that the party secures these areas as well.

Published in Dawn, EOS, October 6th, 2024

NON-FICTION: A GLORIFIED HISTORY OF SINDH

Soonha Abro 

Published October 13, 2024

Sindhis in a Global Context: Past, Present, Future, and Origins (2600 BCE to…)
By Dr Maqbool A. Halepota
Halo Publishing International, Texas, USA
ISBN 978-1-63765-584-9
444pp.

Dr Maqbool A. Halepota’s Sindhis in a Global Context: Past, Present, Future, and Origins (2600 BCE to…) is an ambitious project that attempts to chronicle the rich history of Sindh from 2600 BCE up to present times. This includes the prehistoric period in Sindh, the Indus Civilisation and discovery of Mohenjo Daro, the Vedic age, the conquest of Sindh by the Arabs, the indigenous Sindhi rulers, and the British colonial period in the province.

He, then, provides an account of the post-1947 period, including Pakistan’s martial law periods, as well as some important political movements, such as the anti-One Unit movement and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The author also touches upon the movements and spread of the global Sindhi diaspora and, briefly, the future outlook for Sindhis.


The book is a rather informative and somewhat enjoyable read. The portions on prehistoric Sindh, especially its origins, as well as the reigns of the Persians, the Greeks and the Arabs, were particularly interesting because these are not very familiar topics for Pakistani readers. In fact, it would be an excellent idea to include more of such material in school history textbooks, so our young children can begin learning about these portions of our local history at a young age, irrespective of whether they are Sindhis or not.

The process of rediscovering the history of the Indus Civilisation and the excavation of Mohenjo-Daro, in much greater detail than the tiny portions on the topic one read in history textbooks during school, proved to be an immensely enjoyable experience and informative. Readers interested in learning more about the various aspects of Sindh’s history can also benefit a lot from the excellent bibliography included at the end of the book.


An ambitious and informative book about the history, culture and politics of Sindh through the ages is not critically rigorous enough but could still serve as a starting point for future research

For a book of such a huge magnitude and potential, it regrettably contains some glaring editorial errors. It includes some unfortunate factual errors, which could have been easily verified through a simple Google search. For instance, the year of Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s death is incorrectly cited as 1947 on page 167, instead of 1948. Furthermore, the citations given throughout the text are rather disorganised. Another particularly bothersome aspect of the book is that it lacks an index, without which it is quite difficult to search for any specific information within the book. This will make it rather difficult to use for any scholars researching on Sindh.

Moreover, the book also lacks consistency in the transliterations of non-English words, mostly from Arabic and Sanskrit, and occasionally from Sindhi. This inconsistency adversely impacts one’s reading experience, because one is unaware of how to pronounce an unfamiliar word. The author has also neglected to provide a clarifying ‘Note on Transliterations’ that describes the correct pronunciations of all the non-English words used throughout the book. Such notes are considered an important convention in academic writing.

However, for a book directed at a more general readership, a suitable solution would be to do away entirely with transliterations and corresponding diacritic marks. It is acceptable to do so when writing an academic text directed at a more general audience, instead of a purely academic one. Collectively, these weaknesses spoil one’s general enjoyment of reading this most informative book. This issue could have been dealt with by the text undergoing a much more meticulous editorial process and guidance to the author.

Finally, this book claims to present the ‘glorious’ history of Sindh to the readers, especially directed at those hailing from Sindh. Indeed, the history of Sindh is immensely rich and intriguing for any history enthusiast. It is also true that Sindh has been plagued by numerous serious problems throughout its history, and continues to be affected by them even today. The painstaking research that went into writing this book is undeniable. However, these historical facts are presented with hyperboles, unsubstantiated claims and a complete lack of critique.

For example, the first half of the book, which tells the story of Sindh’s origins, its prehistoric, Vedic and Arab past, is written in an overly glorifying tone. Then, the tone switches to that of lamentation in the second half, mourning the various discriminations and oppressions meted out to Sindhis throughout history. This could have been avoided completely by conducting a critical but deeply sensitive evaluation of the historical facts and examining them for their impact on the currently existing issues affecting Sindh. This would have made this book a truly definitive history of Sindh. By doing so, it would have genuinely benefited numerous generations of readers, Sindhi or not, and academic researchers across the world.

Despite its weaknesses, Sindhis in a Global Context is undeniably an important text about Sindh’s history. It is not the definitive historical work on Sindh that it had hoped to become but, nonetheless, it does provide several points that could help formulate further research questions in the future.

Although the author intends it to be read primarily by Sindhi youth, it would be of greater interest to readers who are actually enthusiastic about history, as well as academic readers and scholars seeking further knowledge about the rich history, culture and politics of Sindh. It would be useful if the book were made more accessible to readers, especially to its targeted readership, by making it available at bookshops and libraries within Pakistan.

The reviewer is pursuing an MPhil in English literature.

Her research focuses on various South Asian literary traditions, including Anglophone literatures of South Asia, feminist literary criticism, resistance movements and resistance poetry, as well as Urdu and Sindhi literatures

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, October 13th, 2024

Albania to create world’s smallest sovereign state for Bektashi order

Prime Minister Edi Rama confirmed plans for Vatican-style state within Albania’s capital Tirana. / bne IntelliNews

Feedly

By bne IntelliNews September 23, 2024

Albania is planning to create a sovereign microstate for the Bektashi Order, a Sufi Muslim sect, within its capital Tirana, Prime Minister Edi Rama confirmed in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 22. 

The new state will be modelled on the Vatican City in Rome. The plan for the Bektashi microstate reflects Albania’s broader aim of promoting peaceful religious coexistence both at home and abroad.

The new state, which would occupy a 10-hectare parcel of land — about one-quarter of the size of Vatican City — would have its own administration, passports and borders, according to media reports. It will follow the religious practices of the Bektashi Order, a Shiite Sufi group founded in 13th-century Turkey. 

While specifics on the granting of sovereignty remain unclear, Bektashi leaders have expressed enthusiasm for the project. 

In his speech to the UNGA, Rama spoke of Albania’s historical role in fostering religious tolerance, citing examples from World War II and the recent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, according to a transcript published by the government.

“While Albania may be a small country, it has given the world good examples, which has been taken to protect our common humanity,” Rama said, referencing Albania’s protection of Jewish refugees during the Holocaust. “The Jewish community grew 20-fold during the Holocaust thanks to Muslim and Christian families who protected them from the Nazis.”

Rama also pointed to Albania’s recent sheltering of Afghans following the Taliban's return to power, calling it an example of the country’s commitment to protecting the vulnerable: “After the devastation of the fall of Kabul to the Taliban three years ago, we sheltered several thousand Afghans who would otherwise have ended up in the ninth circle of Hell!”

The Bektashi Order has a long history within Albania, having gained prominence in the 15th century through its influence on the Janissary Corps, the elite soldiers of the Ottoman sultan. The order was later banned in Turkey during the secular reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and many of its members relocated to Albania, where it has since thrived.

Nearly half of Albania’s population identifies as Muslim, but the country has significant Catholic and Orthodox Christian minorities.

The Bektashi Order accounts for about 10% of Albania’s Muslim population. It is known for its progressive values, including allowing alcohol consumption, permitting women to dress freely, and eschewing strict lifestyle rules.

The creation of the new microstate is seen as a continuation of Albania’s tradition of religious tolerance, which is central to its national identity.

“Albania … gave the world the youngest saint, Mother Teresa, whose life embodied love for humanity,” Rama said. “It reminded us that not all of us can do big things, but we can do small things with great love. This is the principle on which Albania stands… this is the source of our inspiration, to support the transformation of the center of the Bektashi World Order into a sovereign state within our capital, Tirana.”

The Bektashi leadership, led by Baba Mondi, the order's head, would oversee both religious and administrative functions of the state, with citizenship limited to senior religious figures. The order envisions the microstate as a spiritual and administrative hub, operating independently of the Albanian government.

Islamic environmentalism

Muhammad Hayat Lak | Muhammad Mohad Zulfiqar

Published August 30, 2024

DAWN


IT is no secret that Pakistan faces an existential climate change crisis. Currently ranked fifth in the Global Climate Risk Index, we are at severe risk of exposure to extreme temperatures and climate-related disasters. The destructive floods of 2022 — which affected 33 million people and caused economic losses amounting to more than $15 billion — serve as a warning of what the future might hold.

In such a state of affairs, how can one persuade the people of Pakistan to mitigate environmental degradation? Interestingly, one plausible answer lies in religion, particularly Islam. This, in simple terms, would mean proliferating a scheme of ideas based on the Quran and Sunnah aimed at the conservation of the environment.

Often dubbed as Islamic environmentalism, this idea can be traced back to a series of lectures delivered by the Iranian philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr in 1968 at the University of Chicago. Nasr employed the Sufi concept of unity of the universe to argue that all created beings are interconnected, therefore humans owe a duty to the environment, as much as they do to their fellow men. If humans do not live up to this duty, then society will face moral degradation and crises as a direct corollary of our actions. As the Quran states, “Corruption has appeared throughout the land and sea by [reason of] what the hands of people have earned so He may let them taste part of [the consequence of] what they have done that perhaps they will return [to righteousness]” (30:41).

Recently, through its judgment in Amer Ishaq and others v. Province of KPK, pertaining to air pollution caused by stone crushers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Supreme Court has placed special emphasis on Islamic environmentalism. The court — while referring to Hossein Nasr’s work — has explored the idea on the basis of six fundamental principles: 1) Tawhid, that Allah is the Creator of all and hence all the created are interconnected. 2) Stewardship, that man, as the khalifa, must adopt a responsible attitude towards managing natural resources. 3) Balance, that the natural balance or meezan of Earth shall not be interfered with. 4) Avoiding waste, that Islam advocates the idea of moderation, especially in relation to consumption; the Quran commands,”O Children of Adam! … Eat and drink, but do not waste. Surely, He does not like the wasteful” (7:31). 5) Justice, that climate change hurts the poor the most even though they may have contributed the least. 6) Hima, that natural resources and biodiversity shall be conserved.


Ideas based on Quran & Sunnah aimed at conservation can be promoted.

In countries across the globe, Islamic environmentalism is being used for community engagement to deal with climate-related issues. In Zanzibar, for years fishermen used to dynamite coral reefs to catch fish. Despite successive attempts, the World Wildlife Fund was unable to persuade them otherwise. Eventually, Fazlun Khaled, founder of the Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Sciences (IFEES), was brought in. Khaled dealt with dynamite fishing by engaging local fishermen, imams, and political leaders in community workshops. Khaled emphasised — much like Nasr — that all of creation is connected, therefore harm incurred to one part of it necessarily effects the others. This proved to be a hugely successful exercise, and the use of dynamite fishing plummeted.

Similarly, the African Muslim Environment Network is playing an active role in dealing with the perils of climate change. It utilises zakat and other charities’ money to spread envir­o­nmental educ­­ation and fin­a­nce sustainable ventures. Mal­aysia also provides a practical example of Islamic environmentalism, where more than 400 mosques have joined hands to counter poaching and promote the conservation of turtles. In 2015, the IFEES launched the Islamic Declaration on Global Climate Change, aimed at educating Muslims across the world about the harmful impacts of climate change. The declaration stressed the moral and religious duty of all Muslims to adopt sustainable practices to counter climate change.

In order to mitigate damage and promote sustainability, the government must draw from these examples and employ Islam as the basis for wider community engagement on the environment. As a deeply religious country, the people of Pakistan will be more receptive to the idea of environmental conservation as a religious duty.

Stakeholders from across the board — academic experts, religious scholars, and socio-political leaders — must come together to form a consensus against environmental degradation. As one fisherman from Zanzibar put it: we can break the laws of government, but not of God.

The writers study law at LUMS.

Published in Dawn, August 30th, 2024

 

Poet and journalist in Egypt faces intense cyberbullying: “The collective male mindset targeted my body”

It has become so normalized that if you disagree with a man, you criticize his ideas; but if you disagree with a woman, you attack her body and her morality. In the darkness of this form of conservativism, no one refutes it. As an intelligent woman in Egypt with my own ideas, the bullying takes myriad forms.

Fatima Naoot

• 13 mins ago
 
• August 6, 2024

Cyberbullying and online blackmail against women in Egypt is on the rise, according to a study published by the Speak Up initiative in March. | Photo courtesy of Niklas Hamann on Unsplash

This Op-Ed is one in a series aimed at shedding light on critical global issues that demand urgent attention and address a spectrum of challenges affecting us all, emphasizing the need for collective action and support. By fostering awareness and encouraging collaboration, the writer hopes to inspire positive change and contribute to a more compassionate and equitable world as we cover the multitude of issues that impact our global community.

Orato journalist Mahasen Hawary met with Fatima Naoot, an Egyptian poet, engineer, and human rights activist. The two engaged in conversation about women in conservative Arab societies and the challenges they face as thinkers and opinion-makers. The journalist asked her about her response to campaigns that attempt to morally and ethically assassinate her character rather than engage in substantive debate. Ms. Naoot shared these thoughts.

Being born in a conservative society in Egypt, I saw women treated like disabled creatures who need a crutch in the form of a man. My own problems began many years ago, but they are not my problems alone. Women who think and ask questions in society, become like strange beings, as if we should not exist. We appear to move beyond the natural boundaries set for us. Expected to allow others to think and decide for us, we cannot truly lead.

I am a woman with independent ideas in Egypt, in a conservative society often viewing women as mindless. I experience a culture where women represent mere bodies designed to please men, carry children, give birth, and raise them – nothing more. Consequently, the collective male mindset targeted my body, harassing me relentlessly and going as far as fabricating indecent images of me.

Escalation of bullying degrades woman poet, activist in Egypt

In the reactionary mindset of Egypt’s conservative culture, the simplest way to attack a woman is to degrade her. Throughout my intellectual journey, I faced many forms of bullying, but the fabrication of vulgar photos felt deeply disturbing. When someone published these pictures and others began spreading them widely, I felt upset and distressed. Even in a more civilized society, an experience like this would bother a woman.

It has become so normalized that if you disagree with a man, you criticize his ideas; but if you disagree with a woman, you attack her body and her morality. In the darkness of this form of conservativism, no one refutes it. As an intelligent woman in Egypt with my own ideas, the bullying takes myriad forms.

In addition to fake nude photos, bullies mock my appearance. For example, they make fun of the shape of my nose. Sometimes I wonder, “If I like my nose, why does it bother you?” I cannot understand why attacking someone’s facial features feels appropriate.

My reaction to bullying changed over the years. In the beginning, I often cried. When I expressed an opinion or shared a poem, people launched full campaigns against me. Some professors at my college who since passed away made their mark on Egypt’s cultural life and in doing so, stirred up stagnant waters. I leaned on them for support.

At that time, as a young poet recently graduated from the Faculty of Engineering, I maintained an idealized image of the world. I drew from my Sufi father’s perspective and the education I received in a school run by nuns. I never imagined at that time how cruel people could be.

Despite attacks on her and her family, woman continues to call for justice

The world of poetry supposedly represents a realm of delicate feelings, emotions, and imagination. Yet, the gossip and hatred I encountered shocked me. The attacks on me publicly escalated to moral assassination. In response, I once wrote an article entitled “My Ordeal with Intellectuals,” as I grappled with feeling psychologically broken. I isolated myself for a while from the cultural community, having once idealized it.  

As I grew accustomed the cyberbullying, these people took it a step further. They targeted my autistic son. Their evil and harsh words felt like daggers stabbing me. “If you were a good woman, God would not have given you an autistic son,” they said. “This is God’s punishment in life, in addition to the punishing you will get in the afterlife.” The pain of those words felt unsurmountable. It marked a new episode in my saga in their desperate attempts to demonize me.

Today, I have adjusted to the reality in Egypt. The praise no longer dazzles me, and I shrug the bullying off. Most of the hate campaigns stem from my calls for justice and citizenship. The women of Egypt exist in a society that leans towards racism and racial and gender discrimination. They differentiate between men and women, Muslims and Christians, and the rich and poor.

When someone like me advocates publicly for citizenship and justice, people become very agitated, especially if the voice comes from a woman. Most of my journalistic and poetic writings remain preoccupied with justice. Therefore, I constantly fight injustice.

Arrested and convicted, women fights on and sees some improvement in opportunity for women in Egypt

The culture of Egypt remains so male-dominated, women often take on male names. If a woman’s name, for example, is Khadija, she might refer to herself as Om Saeed or Om Mohamed, using her son’s, husband’s, or brother’s name. She cancels her own name to conform to society and gain its approval. In a way, she colludes in erasing her independent identity to align with social norms. I stand against those norms.

Some years ago, I advocated for a civil state in Egypt, free of religious discrimination. My vocal opposition to religious rule through writing and speech culminated in a controversy over the Muslim holiday tradition of sacrifice.

When I criticized animal slaughter taking place in public in front of children, a lawyer filed charges against me. I fought a fierce legal battle, experiencing firsthand the meaning of a “legal war.” In 2016, I received a prison sentence for alleged contempt of religion. It felt like a malicious case from the start,

Initially sentenced to three years, they reduced my conviction to a suspended six-month term. Remarkably, Egyptian legislation later criminalized public slaughter, shielding children from the sight. Despite personal attacks and moral assassination attempts, I do see improvements in women’s status in Egypt.

The political leadership now honors women with important ministerial roles and governorships—a first in our history. While I acknowledge these significant steps, I hope religious institutions will further respect women’s rights by preventing child marriages and addressing polygamy. More must be done.