Saudi Arabia, France Call For Iran Diplomacy, Reaffirm Support For Palestinian State In Joint Statement

France's President Emmanuel Macron walks towards Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France. (SPA)

 August 25, 2026

By Arab News

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By Noor Nugali

Key Takeaways:

• Saudi Arabia and France, in a joint statement after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Macron met in Paris, called for a negotiated solution on Iran that ensures the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and full IAEA cooperation, while demanding restoration of unrestricted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz to pre-February 28, 2026 conditions.

• On the Palestinian track, both sides welcomed a reported Hamas disarmament agreement, urged a sustainable ceasefire and unimpeded humanitarian access to Gaza, rejected moves undermining a two-state solution within 1967 borders, and called for an end to Israeli settlement expansion and settler violence.

• Beyond regional diplomacy, the leaders marked a century of ties by expanding the strategic partnership—deepening defense cooperation, boosting trade and investment (including a major Qiddiya project in France), and advancing collaboration in AI, quantum technologies, culture, and Expo 2030—while addressing stability in Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Syria.

Saudi Arabia and France called for a negotiated solution on Iran, the restoration of unrestricted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and renewed efforts toward Palestinian statehood as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and French President Emmanuel Macron laid out a broad joint vision for Middle East security and an expanded strategic partnership.

In a joint statement issued following their meeting in Paris on Monday, the two leaders emphasized that stability in the Middle East must be based on the sovereignty of states, respect for international law and the pursuit of political and diplomatic solutions to conflicts and security threats.

Iran featured prominently in the statement, with Riyadh and Paris stressing the need for a negotiated solution to prevent further escalation and ensure regional security.

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to a diplomatic solution that guarantees the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and called on Tehran to resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

They also condemned attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz and threats to the security of waterways, emphasizing the need to restore navigation through the strategic passage to the conditions that prevailed before Feb. 28, 2026.

The two countries called specifically for freedom of navigation, regular shipping traffic and the absence of direct or indirect tolls or restrictions on passage, in accordance with international law.

On the Palestinian issue, Saudi Arabia and France welcomed the announcement of an agreement on the disarmament of Hamas and called for its implementation.

They stressed the need to create conditions for a sustainable ceasefire and ensure the urgent, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza. They also rejected attempts to undermine the Palestinian people’s right to establish an independent state within the 1967 borders and emphasized the importance of preserving the unity of the Palestinian territories.

Riyadh and Paris also called for an end to Israeli settlement policy and settler violence, which they said threaten the two-state solution, and reiterated their commitment to the full implementation of the New York Declaration.

The two sides reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian Authority’s reform agenda and welcomed the announcement of legislative and presidential elections in Palestine.

The statement addressed several other regional flashpoints, including Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan and Syria.

On Lebanon, the two leaders agreed to intensify efforts toward a final resolution of the conflict through strengthening the Lebanese state and its institutions while safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

They commended President Joseph Aoun and the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for steps taken to rebuild state institutions and extend state authority. Riyadh and Paris also reiterated support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces, called for the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and stressed the need to complete the disarmament of all non-state armed groups. They also called for Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory.

On Yemen, the two countries reaffirmed support for the Presidential Council and UN efforts to reach an inclusive and comprehensive solution to the crisis.

They condemned Houthi attacks targeting civilian infrastructure and vital facilities in Saudi Arabia, as well as attacks on ships. France expressed its “solidarity and full support” for the Kingdom and rejected attacks on Saudi territory

On Sudan, both sides called for intensified efforts to end the crisis and halt foreign interference while preserving the country’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and institutions.

Saudi Arabia and France also reaffirmed support for Syria’s unity, stability and economic recovery. They highlighted the potential to reposition Syria as a bridge connecting Europe, the Gulf and Asia through alternative routes and welcomed the establishment of a Saudi-Syrian-French business council.

Beyond regional diplomacy, the statement signaled a significant expansion of bilateral cooperation as the two leaders marked a century of political relations between Saudi Arabia and France and presided over the first meeting of the French-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council.

The two countries adopted a declaration strengthening their historic defense cooperation, including in armaments and training, while committing to greater coordination on global security and stability.

Economic ties were another major focus. Bilateral trade reached about $11.8 billion in 2025, while both countries agreed to strengthen cross-investment and cooperation between financial institutions.

The statement also welcomed Qiddiya Investment Company’s ambition to develop a major mixed-use destination in Cergy-Pontoise in the Île-de-France region, encompassing entertainment, leisure, hospitality, culture and sport. Current ambitions include investment of around €6 billion over the project’s development lifecycle.

Cooperation will also deepen in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and emerging technologies, while the countries agreed to extend their partnership on AlUla until 2035, building on cooperation in archaeology, heritage and culture.

France also confirmed its participation in Riyadh Expo 2030, with both leaders agreeing to make the event a highlight of Saudi-French relations.

The visit saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in defense, healthcare, AI, emerging technologies and entertainment, while the French-Saudi Investment Roundtable produced announcements of more than 22 agreements and MoUs across key sectors.

Together, the initiatives underscored a partnership that Riyadh and Paris are seeking to deepen not only around trade and investment, but also around some of the Middle East’s most consequential diplomatic and security challenges.

The Mecca Pact Redraws Asia’s Security Map – Analysis

Credit: OpenAI / Ramesh Jaura


August 27, 2026

By Ramesh Jaura

Key Takeaways:

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan pledged in Mecca that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all; they are now adding ministerial mechanisms, exercises, and defense-industry ties—but the pact still lacks NATO-style command, definitions, or automatic obligations.

The deal grew from Gulf insecurity after Iran-related strikes and doubts about U.S. guarantees; Washington has welcomed it as burden-sharing, while China, Iran, Egypt, and India each read it through their own interests.

Ambiguity is both deterrent and risk: members do not share the same rivals, nuclear implications are unofficial and unproven, and a crisis involving India, Iran, Yemen, or the Mediterranean could test whether the promise holds.

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have pledged to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Egypt is weighing membership, Washington has welcomed the move, Iran wants reassurance, China sees opportunity, and India is watching closely. A new security order may be forming, but its direction is unclear.

The place was chosen with care: Mecca, Islam’s holiest city, where Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met on 7 August and declared: “Any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all.”

It was a short sentence with a long shadow.

For Saudi Arabia, it offered protection when American guarantees no longer felt sufficient. For Türkiye, it gave Erdoğan another route to make his country an independent centre of power. For Pakistan, poor but militarily important, it reminded others that Islamabad cannot be ignored.

Together, they bring a rare mix. Saudi Arabia has wealth, energy power and influence across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Türkiye has NATO’s second-largest army and a fast-growing defence industry. Pakistan has a large, battle-tested military—and the only nuclear arsenal held by a Muslim-majority country.

It did not take long for commentators to call the new grouping an “Islamic NATO,” or sometimes a “Sunni NATO.” The description is tempting. It is also misleading.

NATO was built over decades. It has integrated command, military plans, shared procedures and a bureaucracy that works even when leaders disagree. The Mecca pact has none of that yet. It does not define an attack, say who decides one has occurred, or spell out what each member must do.

Would military support be automatic? Could one member decline to fight? Would Türkiye’s obligations under the new pact conflict with its duties as a NATO member? The agreement leaves these questions open.

But dismissing the pact as a ceremonial gesture would now be equally misleading.

Six days after the signing, Türkiye’s Defence Ministry began giving the pact substance. The partners plan political and military mechanisms linking foreign ministers, defence ministers and commanders. They intend to hold exercises on land, sea, air and cyberspace, and to cooperate on drones, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, military production and technology transfer.

Reuters reported that the three defence industries would also be brought closer together.

The Mecca Agreement is not yet an Islamic NATO. But neither is it merely a piece of paper. It is an alliance being built while the surrounding region burns.Subscribe
A pact born in a frightened region

The agreement emerged, at least in part, from fear.

The United States and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February 2026, triggering a confrontation that crossed borders and sea routes. Iranian missiles and Tehran-aligned armed groups threatened Gulf states, oil facilities and commercial shipping. The Houthis intensified attacks from Yemen. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb again became places where one strike could raise prices and shake governments.

Soon after the pact was signed, three Pakistanis were killed in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Their deaths underlined a hard truth: conflicts in the Gulf, Red Sea and South Asia can no longer be kept apart.


The immediate danger explains why they signed the agreement. But behind it lies an older anxiety: can the United States still be trusted to protect its partners?

For decades, Gulf monarchies lived under an American security umbrella. US troops, intelligence, weapons and political commitments sustained the regional order. That relationship still matters. Saudi Arabia buys vast quantities of American arms, and no regional combination can easily replace America’s military reach.

But trust has thinned.

The 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field exposed how vulnerable the kingdom had become to inexpensive missiles and drones. Washington did not retaliate directly against Iran. Riyadh remembered.

Then came America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Regional governments watched how US forces left. The circumstances were different, but the question travelled beyond Kabul: if American priorities changed, who might be left next?


Washington was turning towards China while its Middle Eastern partners dealt with Iran, proxy forces, missiles, drones and the aftershocks of the Gaza war.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House did not remove uncertainty. His administration has shown it is willing to use enormous force. But that does not mean partners always know when America will act, how far it will go or what they will endure when it does.

Saudi Arabia is not breaking with Washington. It is doing something more careful: ensuring Washington is no longer its only option.

The kingdom has strengthened relations with China, restored diplomatic ties with Iran, kept channels open to Russia and invested heavily in its defence industry. The Mecca pact adds two more layers of protection: Türkiye and Pakistan.

It does not announce the end of American power in the Gulf. It shows that American power is no longer accepted as the only pillar on which security rests.
America applauds—but may not control what follows

Washington’s response has complicated the idea that the pact is an act of rebellion against the United States.

On 16 August, Trump said he was “very happy” that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan had “recently, and finally” signed the agreement. He called it a “big, bold, and important first step” and praised the three governments for becoming better able to defend themselves. Anadolu Agency reported his remarks.


Trump has long argued that America’s allies should spend more and carry more of their own defence burden. From that angle, the Mecca pact is useful. It could allow regional states to handle more of their security without repeatedly calling on Washington.

The arrangement does not immediately threaten America’s position. Türkiye remains in NATO. Saudi Arabia still depends heavily on American weapons, intelligence and logistical support. Pakistan continues to work with Washington on terrorism and regional diplomacy.

For the moment, the United States can welcome the pact as burden-sharing.

But there is a catch.

If the three countries produce weapons together, exchange intelligence and build crisis procedures, they will need less American permission and protection. Greater capability will give them more freedom to make choices Washington may dislike. The pact may not be designed to push America out, but it could help create a region where America is no longer central to every calculation.
What the three partners want

Each of the three countries sees something different in the agreement.

For Saudi Arabia, the attraction is protection—and access.

Pakistan has trained Saudi officers and soldiers for decades. Pakistani troops have served in the kingdom before. The military relationship is not new; the pact gives it a more formal and politically stronger shape.

Türkiye offers something else: a defence industry that can supply weapons more cheaply and often with fewer conditions than Western governments impose. Its drones, missiles, warships, armoured vehicles and electronic-warfare systems have attracted buyers across Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia wants to produce more of its own weapons under Vision 2030. Joint ventures with Turkish and Pakistani companies could help reduce its dependence on expensive Western imports.

For Türkiye, the pact is an opportunity to expand its reach.

Erdoğan does not want Türkiye seen merely as NATO’s difficult southeastern member. He wants it recognised as a power in its own right, with influence from the Black Sea and Mediterranean to the Middle East, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

Weapons are now an important part of that ambition. Turkish drones have affected the course of several wars. Defence exports bring money, influence and long-term political relationships. The Mecca pact opens a much larger field for all three.


Pakistan’s gains are different but just as important.

Islamabad’s economy remains fragile. Saudi loans and deposits have helped it through crises. Türkiye has supported Pakistan politically, especially over Kashmir, and the two countries have developed close defence ties.

By standing beside the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in Mecca, Pakistan sent a message: whatever its economic troubles, it remains a country whose military strength and nuclear weapons give it strategic value.

The agreement also confirms the weight of Pakistan’s military establishment. Field Marshal Asim Munir has been publicly credited with helping to bring it about. In Pakistan, the most important ties with China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the United States are rarely shaped by civilian diplomacy alone.

Yet the three partners do not share the same enemies.

Pakistan’s principal conventional rival is India. Türkiye is preoccupied with Syria, Kurdish armed groups and its disputes involving Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Saudi Arabia is focused on Iran, the Houthis, missile and drone attacks, Red Sea shipping and the security of its oil installations.

Sooner or later, those differences will matter.

Would Türkiye and Saudi Arabia regard an Indian strike on Pakistan as an attack on all three? Would Pakistan be expected to help Türkiye in a clash with Greece, another NATO member? If the Houthis struck Saudi Arabia, would Islamabad and Ankara be required to join a war in Yemen? What if a Saudi–Iranian confrontation escalated?

The pact does not answer.

Ambiguity can deter. An adversary may hesitate if it cannot predict how three countries will respond. But it can also tempt an ally to take risks, expecting support that may not arrive.

Even NATO’s celebrated Article 5 does not automatically send every member to war. It allows each ally to take “such action as it deems necessary.” Political leaders still decide what solidarity means.

The Mecca pact will face the same test. Promises made in a palace are one thing. Keeping them when soldiers may die is another.
The nuclear question no one can avoid

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons hover over every discussion of the agreement.

Has Islamabad quietly placed Saudi Arabia or Türkiye under a nuclear umbrella? Would Pakistan threaten nuclear retaliation if the Saudi state faced an overwhelming attack?


Nothing in the public text says so. Pakistan has announced no nuclear guarantee. No evidence shows it has transferred weapons or control to either partner. Saudi officials insist the agreement is not tied to nuclear ambition or an arms race.

That caution matters. Speculation should not be mistaken for fact.

Saudi Arabia is a non-nuclear member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Türkiye is also an NPT member and already participates in NATO’s nuclear arrangements. Any transfer of nuclear weapons would create an international crisis.

But nuclear deterrence depends as much on uncertainty as on published doctrine.

A country considering a devastating attack on Saudi Arabia must ask whether Pakistan would remain uninvolved if the kingdom’s survival were at stake. The absence of an answer may be part of the deterrent.

It may also make the region less safe.

Israel has an undeclared nuclear arsenal. Iran has advanced nuclear capabilities. Pakistan has tested weapons. Türkiye belongs to a nuclear alliance. American forces are spread across the region. Now a new defence pact enters this crowded landscape with unclear nuclear limits.

There is another source of concern. The Trump administration has pursued a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia that reportedly drops safeguards Washington previously demanded, including a categorical Saudi renunciation of uranium enrichment and reprocessing and acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol.

Reuters reported that arms-control advocates and members of Congress feared that the proposed terms could weaken non-proliferation standards.

A civil nuclear programme is not a nuclear-weapons programme. But in this region, intentions are viewed through a lens of fear. Iran’s capabilities, Pakistan’s arsenal and weaker safeguards around Saudi nuclear development would inevitably be considered together.

A shield built to make Saudi Arabia feel safer could deepen the nuclear anxieties of everyone around it.
Is Iran the enemy—or a neighbour to be reassured?

Because the three signatories are Sunni-majority countries, the pact has often been described as an alliance against Shia-majority Iran.

The timing strengthens that interpretation. Iran and armed groups aligned with it have attacked Saudi interests. Türkiye cooperates with Tehran in some areas while competing with it in Syria, Iraq, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Pakistan shares a difficult border with Iran and has exchanged cross-border strikes with it.


But the relationship cannot be reduced to an old sectarian divide.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan says the pact identifies no enemy. Pakistan calls it “purely defensive.” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei initially responded with caution rather than outrage. Iran, he said, need not fear regional self-reliance if it remained inclusive and addressed the real causes of insecurity.

Hard-line voices in Tehran were less forgiving. They asked how Pakistan could join a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia while claiming to be an honest mediator between Iran and the United States. Others warned Riyadh that a written pact would not guarantee its safety.

Erdoğan then demonstrated how the new allies hope to use their position.

On 17 August, Erdoğan urged Trump to return to talks with Iran and offered Türkiye’s help. Ankara said it would keep working with the United States, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar and other mediators. At the same time, Erdoğan praised the Mecca pact as a contribution to regional security—Reuters reported Türkiye’s attempt to combine deterrence with diplomacy.

Pakistan is trying to do the same.

Field Marshal Munir was due in Tehran on 24 August for talks with senior Iranian officials. The agenda was expected to include Pakistan’s efforts to mediate between Washington and Tehran, the Mecca Agreement, the Houthis and the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz. Reuters reported that the planned visit to Washington would pave the way for another round of punishing sanctions against Iran.

Munir’s visit carries special weight. He is not only Pakistan’s most powerful soldier but also a central figure behind the Mecca pact. Iranian officials will want to hear from him directly: is this alliance a shield, a sword or both?

Pakistan has placed itself in a difficult position. It must persuade Saudi Arabia that it is a dependable defence partner while convincing Iran that it has not joined a hostile front. It must keep Washington engaged without becoming an instrument of American pressure.

The pact’s first serious test may therefore come not on a battlefield but in a room in Tehran. Can Pakistan and Türkiye help deter Iran without making dialogue with Iran impossible?
Egypt stands at the door

Türkiye has made clear it does not want the alliance to remain a three-member club. Egypt is the most obvious prospective member.

Cairo is no longer merely observing. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty says his government is studying membership “very seriously,” though any decision must fit Egypt’s constitution and legal commitments. Chatham House sees the hesitation as political as well as legal. Egypt has long avoided binding military blocs and wants to preserve its role as mediator. Joining could look like taking sides against Iran, Israel, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus or India without giving Cairo clear security gains. For now, Egypt has reason to wait, watch how the pact works in a crisis and keep its options open.


The Gulf states face the same problem. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not always agree on regional priorities. Qatar and its neighbours recently emerged from a bitter blockade. Oman prizes its independence and role as mediator.

The Mecca pact is therefore unlikely to become a military organisation embracing all 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

A smaller core is more plausible, surrounded by looser arrangements for tasks: protecting Red Sea shipping, sharing intelligence, coordinating missile defence, countering drones, fighting terrorism and producing weapons.

That may sound less dramatic than an Islamic NATO. It could prove more useful.
China: The Power Outside the Pact

China did not sign the Mecca Agreement, and no evidence shows Beijing designed it. Yet its influence is impossible to ignore.

Pakistan’s “all-weather” partnership with China is one of Asia’s deepest military relationships. Beijing supplies aircraft, missiles, air-defence systems and warships, and the two countries jointly produce the JF-17 fighter. In April, Pakistan commissioned the first of eight planned Chinese-designed Hangor-class submarines, four to be built in Pakistan under a technology-transfer deal. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute⁠, China supplied 80 per cent of Pakistan’s major arms imports between 2021 and 2025.

The pact could bring Chinese, Turkish and Western systems into the same network. Türkiye offers drones, missiles, electronic warfare and a growing defence industry. Saudi Arabia brings money but still relies mainly on American and other Western equipment. Making these systems work together will require compatible communications, command procedures, maintenance chains and training.

That helps explain why Türkiye’s Defence Ministry has put joint exercises, production, technology cooperation and “sustainable maintenance and logistics support” at the centre of the deal. Reuters reported⁠ that cooperation will span land, sea, air and cyber operations, with attention to drones, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence. Over time, this could create a military-industrial network that Beijing does not control, but that depends less on the West.

China’s economic presence matters too. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor links western China to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. China is also a major buyer of Saudi oil and an investor in the kingdom’s infrastructure, telecommunications and renewable energy. Its mediation of the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement in 2023 showed it can exercise influence in a region long dominated by Washington.

Saudi Arabia does not expect China to replace the United States as its military protector, and Beijing has shown little interest in assuming that burden. But China offers trade, investment, technology and another option. Türkiye’s ties with Beijing are more guarded because of NATO, Europe and differences over Uyghurs. Even so, Erdoğan values relationships that widen Ankara’s room for manoeuvre.


Beijing can stay outside the pact and still benefit. It may gain from a less American-centred region, finance infrastructure and supply weapons without defending the alliance. For India, already facing China’s military partnership with Pakistan, that is hardly reassuring.
India has reason to watch—but not to panic

India’s ties with China have steadied slightly. Talks on the disputed frontier have resumed, but the damage from Galwan remains: troops are still deployed, claims unresolved and mistrust deep.

China’s support for Pakistan adds another layer to India’s concerns.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor runs through territory India claims. New Delhi sees it as both an economic project and a breach of sovereignty. Indian planners must still weigh pressure from Pakistan and China at once, even if neither side wants a two-front war.

The Mecca pact could connect this tense South Asian picture to West Asian politics.

Pakistani forces, already heavily supplied by China, may gain access to Turkish technology, Saudi money, shared intelligence and joint planning. Such shifts rarely appear overnight; they gather force slowly.

India’s government has said it is examining the pact’s implications for national security and regional stability and will take the necessary steps to protect Indian interests.

New Delhi is right to seek clarity.

Türkiye has backed Pakistan on Kashmir. The two countries cooperate on warships, exercises, training and aircraft modernisation. Saudi Arabia’s 2025 defence agreement with Pakistan laid the ground for the trilateral pact.

In a future crisis, Pakistan could invoke the Mecca Agreement even if Riyadh and Ankara had no wish to fight India.

Would the pact apply only after an unprovoked attack? Could Islamabad invoke it after a terrorist incident or an exchange across the Line of Control? Who would decide who started the conflict?

India is asking those questions quietly without turning concern into panic.

Saudi Arabia’s ties with India have deepened. The kingdom supplies energy, invests in India and hosts a large Indian community. The two governments cooperate on trade, terrorism, technology, maritime security and defence.

Riyadh has no reason to sacrifice this relationship for Pakistan. Saudi foreign policy has become practical and flexible. It can maintain a defence pact with Islamabad while expanding relations with New Delhi.


India appears to be taking the same approach: deepen Gulf ties, seek assurances, monitor Pakistan’s defence links with Türkiye and China, and strengthen its naval presence in the Arabian Sea.

The Ministry of External Affairs has dismissed reports that India sought an urgent mutual-defence pact with Israel as fabricated. India already has close defence ties with Israel. Turning them into an openly anti-Muslim alignment would damage decades of careful diplomacy across the Arab world.

India’s strength has long been its ability to deal with rivals at the same time: Saudi Arabia and Iran, Israel and the Arab states, the United States and Russia.

The Mecca pact makes that balancing act harder—and more necessary.
A promise waiting to be tested

The agreement does not prove that a new regional order has arrived. Its members may find unity easier to declare than to practise.

But it does show that the old order is fading.

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are not abandoning old relationships; they are adding new ones. They want choices and no longer want security to depend on a single power whose priorities can shift after an election, war or crisis.

Trump sees burden-sharing. China sees opportunity. Iran wants to know whether the pact targets it. Egypt is weighing membership. India is asking whether Pakistan’s reach has grown.

The pact remains several things at once: a shield, a warning, an arms partnership, a diplomatic tool, and a claim to greater independence.

It could make the three countries safer. It could also spread conflicts across regions.

An India–Pakistan crisis could gain a Middle Eastern dimension. A Saudi–Iranian confrontation could draw in Pakistan and Türkiye. A Turkish dispute in the Mediterranean could test commitments Riyadh and Islamabad never expected to keep.

The stronger the alliance becomes, the more restraint it will need.

Its members must define aggression, set clear consultation procedures, keep politics in control of military decisions and clarify where conventional cooperation ends and the nuclear shadow begins.

Mecca produced a dramatic promise: an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all. Weapons, exercises and political machinery now support it. Its meaning, however, will remain uncertain until someone asks the three countries to keep it.

When that day comes, the question will not be what leaders signed in Mecca, but what they are prepared to sacrifice—and whether their shield makes a frightened region safer or gives it new reasons to fear.

About Ramesh Jaura
Ramesh Jaura is a journalist with 60 years of experience as a freelancer, head of Inter Press Service, and founder-editor of IDN-InDepthNews. His work draws on field reporting and coverage of international conferences and events.
View all posts by Ramesh Jaura →

 

Why Iran Ruffles the Feathers of the United States

by M. Reza Behnam | Aug 26, 2026 |

Strip away the diplomatic briefings, Congressional hearings and the endless cable news loops about centrifuges, regional proxies and cyber attacks, and you hit a raw unvarnished nerve.

What truly disturbs the United States about the Islamic Republic is not its policies, its rhetoric or even its nuclear ambitions.  It is Iran’s audacity to exist completely outside the American orbit; and make it work.

When diplomatic pretenses are scrapped, we see that a major power does not spend billions of dollars, conduct regional wars and upend global markets out of pure legalistic devotion to global rules or nonproliferation treaties.

The conflict with the United States, is not about what Iran has in its centrifuges.  Rather, it is about what Tehran represents to a hegemon that refuses to accept  “no” and cannot tolerate a world not under its control.

If the mere possession of enriched uranium or atomic warheads was the ultimate redline, the outline of America’s animosities would look entirely different.

The “crossing the nuclear threshold” explanation collapses under the weight of obvious global contradictions.  Washington, for example, has found ways to coexist, cooperate or outright partner with other nuclear-armed nations; from historical accommodations with Pakistan and India, to winking at Israel’s undeclared arsenal, and managing a pragmatic, albeit tense, approach to China and North Korea.

In the vocabulary of global superpowers, compliance is currency.  Washington tolerates fierce enemies if they eventually capitulate; and it accommodates brutal allies if they submit to American domination.  What empire dreads most is an uncooperative self-reliant country that refuses to bend the knee, yet stubbornly survives after decades of total economic siege.

The real reason Iran gets under the skin of the American foreign policy establishment, and why it has become its main target, has little to do with atoms, and everything to do with sovereignty, geography and the architecture of U.S. hegemony.

For decades, the unwritten rule of the post-Cold War order was simple: align with the U.S.-led global order, or be excluded and isolated.  Most nations that initially balked had little choice but to integrate, bound by the weight of a dollar-dominated global economy.   Difficult states were either absorbed or efforts were made to bring them into client-state relationships, or they are heavily monitored.

In 1979, Iran did the unforgivable.  It rebelled and institutionalized a successful, unapologetic ideological revolution that expressly rejected U.S.-Israeli hegemony, and built an enduring political structure explicitly rooted in anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. It proudly declared that a Middle Eastern state could chart its own destiny outside the Western framework.

Since then, generations of U.S. policymakers have convinced themselves that crushing economic sanctions, diplomatic excommunication, assassinations and covert sabotage would inevitably lead to a popular implosion or “regime” collapse.

Washington’s frustration has only deepened because its strategy has not worked.

Instead, Iran adapted. It cultivated a culture of domestic self-sufficiency and pivoted Eastward; proving that a nation could survive outside the Western financial template.  Washington has viewed Iran’s resilience, not simply as a policy challenge, but as a dangerous ideological precedent.

One has only to look at a map to understand Washington’s obsession with Iran.

Geography is destiny; and Iran’s geographical location is the U.S. empire’s worst headache.

Perched directly above the Strait of Hormuz, Iran sits at one of the most vital maritime crossroads on earth – the liquid throat through which massive amounts of the world’s energy passes daily.

For the better part of a century, “Pax Americana” in the region has rested on a chauvinist premise: the U.S. military will police the global commons, control energy chokepoints and dictate the terms of regional and global trade.

The Islamic Republic has defied this assumption and refuses to allow the U.S. to be the landlord of its backyard.  To ensure its sovereignty and regional preeminence, Tehran has developed a robust asymmetrical military capability.

To a superpower accustomed to uncontested dominance across every ocean and air space, an “unmanaged” armed power sitting astride the global energy supply is an itch that cannot be scratched.

Washington has anchored its regional hegemony through security alliances with Israel and Arab janissaries.  In response, Iran engineered its own security architecture and counterweight to U.S.-Israel dominance through a network of non-state actors and regional alliances – the “Axis of Resistance” (Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria, before President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown in 2024).

However one defines the “Axis of Resistance,” it has been a masterclass in strategic statecraft that has fundamentally checked Washington and Tel Aviv’s ambitions at almost every turn.

Iran and the U.S. approach regional politics through fundamentally irreconcilable worldviews.

Washington acts like an indispensable global manager and boss.  It makes the rules for the world and expects every other country to obey them without question. Iran, on the other hand, operates from a fiercely nationalistic, civilizational mindset that views foreign oversight as an existential insult.

Iran refuses to play the role of the chastised regional outcast, waiting for Western permission to participate.  For the United States, witnessing Iran successfully institutionalize its defiance and cement its regional power would signal the end of its control over the Middle East.

Fundamentally, America’s frustration with Iran is not about its nuclear potential; it is about its independence.  Iran is an enduring testament that despite all the aircraft carriers, economic blockades and diplomatic muscle of a global superpower, there are still places on earth that will look the empire in the eye and say, NO.

© 2026, M. Reza Behnam, Ph.D.

Dr. Behnam is a political scientist who specializes in comparative politics with a focus on West Asia. His “Cultural Foundations of Iranian Politics,” published by University of Utah Press, and still in print, was recognized by Choice as Outstanding Academic Book for 1987–1988.

SDF dissolves, fully integrates into Syrian state institutions

By bna Cairo bureau August 26, 2026

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced on August 25 that it would end its role as an independent military force and integrate its military and security institutions into the Syrian state under an agreement with the government in Damascus, SANA reported.

SDF commander Mazloum Abdi made the announcement in Arabic and Kurdish during a speech to reporters at the presidential palace in Damascus.

“We announce today the end of the mission of the Syrian Democratic Forces and, with full responsibility, declare its dissolution as an independent military force,” Abdi said.

He said SDF fighters had taken on “a major responsibility during one of the most difficult stages Syria has gone through”, adding that they had “liberated many Syrian cities and towns, first from Baath rule and later from ISIS terrorism.”

“The circumstances have changed today and the country has entered a new phase whose title is peace and participation in building the new Syria,” Abdi said.

He added that the decision came after an agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the completion of the process to integrate SDF forces into Syrian army brigades.

Syrian state television reported that the announcement also covered the dissolution of the Kurdish-led autonomous administration and all military and civilian formations affiliated with it, with their full integration into state institutions.

The announcement followed a meeting between Abdi and al-Sharaa at the presidential palace, attended by senior Kurdish official Ilham Ahmed and prominent Kurdish military commander Siban Hemo, who serves as deputy defence minister for the eastern region.

Abdi said on August 20 that the integration of the SDF’s military, security and administrative institutions into state structures had been completed, opening the way for a political phase focused on securing Kurdish rights in Syria’s constitution.

Saudi Arabia welcomed the SDF’s integration into Syria’s military institutions, saying the move would contribute to security and stability. The Saudi Foreign Ministry said Riyadh supported steps taken by the Syrian government to meet the aspirations of the Syrian people and advance unity and development.

Jordan also welcomed the announcement, describing the integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions as an important step towards strengthening Syria’s unity, security and stability.

Turkish garment giant LC Waikiki launches first production plant in Syria

Syrian workers at LC Waikiki’s Aleppo plant. / Screenshot, @PiyasaTturkiyeFacebookTwitterLinkedIn

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By Akin Nazli in Belgrade August 26, 2026

LC Waikiki, the largest fast-fashion retailer in Turkey, in June quietly launched production at a 150-worker facility in northern Syria, Turkish daily Ekonomi reported on August 25.

The plant was built on the outskirts of Aleppo, inside the newly reactivated Al-Rai Industrial City. The company plans to expand the workforce at the plant to 1,000 within three years. It will cater not only to domestic consumers in Damascus and Homs, but will also dispatch shipments to the EU and the UAE.

In May, LC Waikiki opened its first post-war store in Syria at Damascino Mall in Damascus. Outlets in Aleppo, Homs and Latakia are slated to follow.

Video: A video story about LC Waikiki’s Aleppo plant released by Syria’s industry ministry.

Global player

At end-2025, LC Waikiki had more than 1,300 stores across the globe. It posted a turnover of $6bn last year while its export revenues amounted to $1.2bn. The company has been the market leader in Turkey since 2004.

LC Waikiki was launched in France in 1988. Six percent of the company still belongs to the family of George Amouyal, one of the founders. In 1997, Turkish company Taha Tekstil, owned by Sefik Yilmaz Dizdar and Mustafa Kucuk, acquired 93% of LC Waikiki.The Kucuk family currently controls a 47% stake in the company while the Dizdar family holds 35%.

The company opened its first retail store in Sisli district of Istanbul. In 2009, LC Waikiki opened its first store abroad, in Romania.

The worth of LC Waikiki promoted Kucuk and Dizdar to the Forbes’ billionaires list in 2016.

More investments on the way

Syrian authorities in 1H received 234 investment applications related to the textile and readywear industries. Isparko, another Turkish apparel maker, is conducting feasibility studies for joint-venture factories with Syrian investors.

Istanbul-based Mikrotx is, meanwhile, spearheading machinery and equipment partnerships to establish new yarn spinning mills in Syria. Also, Turkish suppliers Mersan and Tumkalip are negotiating technical assistance deals to retrofit battered production lines.

In July, the NASTEX trade fair drew more than 300 prospective equipment suppliers and financiers to Syria.