Finally, Someone in Congress Is Listening to Our Pleas for Military Budget Cuts

While congressional efforts to reign in military spending face steep odds of passing, growing pushback shows us that a different path is possible.

In this handout released by US Central Command, US Sailors transfer ordnance on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), on February 27, 2026 in the Arabian Sea.
(Photo by US Central Command via Getty Images)

Mike Merryman-Lotze
Jun 11, 2026

Common Dreams

Last week, Democratic Massachusetts Rep. Seth Moulton introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, that would have cut $150 billion from the president’s proposed military budget. While it didn’t pass, 12 members of the House Armed Services Committee voted against advancing the bill, signaling a shift from decades of bipartisan support for unchecked spending on weapons and war.

Now the NDAA goes to the Senate, where resistance to unchecked military spending is also on the rise. The Senate Appropriations Committee has repeatedly delayed action on the NDAA because of disagreements between the parties over top-line numbers. This pushback is even more critical as the war in Iran again escalates. Congress must say no to more war and war funding.

The majority of people in the US don’t want endless wars that line the pockets of military contractors while making life harder for everyone else. If more lawmakers start following the will of their constituents, it could point the way to a brighter and safer future for all.

This year, the military budget soared past $1 trillion dollars, paid for by cuts made to Medicaid, food assistance programs, infrastructure funds, and more. Overall, nearly 72% of all discretionary spending went to pay for the military, homeland security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other related programs. The National Priorities Project estimated that on Tax Day this year, the average taxpayer paid over $4,000 for weapons and war.

A $1 trillion military will not save us from climate change, overdose deaths, or industrial accidents. It won’t even save us from another military.

If President Donald Trump has his way, those numbers will be even higher next year. The presidential budget released this April seeks $1.5 trillion for military spending.

The $500 billion increase exceeds the total combined amounts the US spent in 2025 on public health, education, job training, transportation, agriculture, and vital safety net programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and childcare. And even these massive cuts to lifesaving social programs are not enough to cover the massive proposed military expenditure. Trump’s budget would drive the country further into debt.

The president, the weapons company lobbyists, and most of Congress want us to believe that this money is a generational investment in our security. They want us to believe that there is no price too high for safety. But a $1 trillion investment in weapons won’t keep us safe in the same way that a $1 trillion investment in umbrellas won’t keep us dry in the ocean. The problems we face—in our communities, in the United States, and globally—require solutions that reduce violence rather than compounding it.

Over the past quarter century the US has spent trillions of dollars on wars and militarism, but global and national risks have only increased. The post-9/11 “War on Terror” resulted in up to 5 million direct and indirect deaths, yet the Taliban is back in power in Afghanistan, the destabilization of Iraq directly contributed to the creation of ISIS, and in 2025 there were more violent conflicts between states than any time since WWII.

The Trump administration’s unprovoked war against Iran is just the latest example of the spectacular failures of military force. While the US was able to quickly destroy key Iranian infrastructure, months later they are now in a weaker negotiating position than at the outset. The cost of continued war—both in dollars and lives—is unconscionable.

The US military is the most expensive, lethal, and technologically advanced the world has ever seen, and US military spending is more than 60 times that of Iran. The idea that we can, and should, resource an enormous military prepared to fight both Russia and China simultaneously is preposterous. Continuing to throw trillions of dollars away on weapons that we hope to never use in wars that we can never win makes no sense. Peace, not war, requires generational investments in security. Getting there will require courageous action from our elected officials.

A $1 trillion military will not save us from climate change, overdose deaths, or industrial accidents. It won’t even save us from another military. It is time for a new paradigm. Real generational security comes when people are housed, fed, healthy, and have hope for a better future.

This is not a call to turn inward, but to invest in international cooperation rather than international destruction. Addressing global problems through international investment isn’t a utopian vision. Spending even a fraction of the military budget to address the root causes of poverty and conflict would have a massive domestic and global impact. If the US reduced military spending, other countries would be likely to follow, freeing up global resources to meet human needs.

Internationally, the World Food Program estimates that it would cost $93 billion per year to end world hunger by 2030. Ending extreme global poverty would cost approximately $300 billion per year—a fraction of the US military budget. At home, the child tax credit gave $2,000 per child to all US families with children. That program could be continued with less than half of the increase sought for the military.

There are some signs of hope. Recent war powers votes have received far more support, across party lines, than previous ones. While congressional efforts to reign in military spending face steep odds of passing, growing pushback shows us that a different path is possible. Refusing to rubber stamp a deadly status quo takes courage and resolve. Congress must vote against military spending increases; continue to advocate for spending cuts; and invest in diplomacy, development, human rights, and human needs. That is where real security can be found.


Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


Mike Merryman-Lotze
Mike Merryman-Lotze has worked with the American Friends Service Committee as the Palestine-Israel Program Director since 2010.
Full Bio >

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for PERMANENT ARMS ECOMOMY

Pakistan renews air strikes on Afghanistan, killing dozens


Pakistan on Wednesday launched deadly air strikes on Afghanistan after a period of relative calm following months of fighting at the beginning of the year. Pakistan's government said 26 "militants" were killed while Afghan authorities said at least 12 people, including children, died in provinces near the border.


Issued on: 10/06/2026 - 
By: FRANCE 24

An armed Taliban security personnel walks through a marketplace in Asadabad, Kunar province, Afghanistan, on June 10, 2026. © Wakil Kohsar, AFP

Pakistan has renewed deadly air strikes on neighbouring Afghanistan, officials in both countries said Wednesday, in the worst violence in weeks following a period of relative calm.

Pakistan's government said on Wednesday that 26 "militants" linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group were killed in the attacks.

"In the aftermath of recent terrorist incidents in Pakistan .... precise and calibrated Strikes were carried out along Pakistan Afghanistan border areas on hideouts and safe havens," Pakistan's information minister Attaullah Tarar posted on X.

He did not comment on any civilian casualties after Afghan authorities, who have denied Afghanistan is used for militancy, said at least 12 people, including children, were left dead in the strikes.

An AFP journalist saw a house completely destroyed in the southeastern province of Khost, where residents were digging graves to bury those killed in the overnight attack.

Afghanistan's government spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said "11 children, one woman, and one elderly man were killed" in strikes on Khost, Kunar and Paktika provinces.

Islamabad said the strikes came in response to "recent terrorist incidents in Pakistan" and killed 26 militants linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group.

"Precise and calibrated Strikes were carried out along Pakistan Afghanistan border areas on hideouts and safe havens," information minister Attaullah Tarar wrote on X, without commenting on civilian casualties.

The attack in Khost's Spera district killed nine people and wounded 10 others, including children, a provincial official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

In neighbouring Paktika, two residents said a separate attack killed three civilians in Barmal district.

The strike hit a home, and those killed were children, one of the residents said.

The strikes are the deadliest in weeks and follow a period of relative calm at the border after conflict between the two countries erupted in late February.

Residents pay the price as Afghanistan-Pakistan border remains closed

An escalation saw fierce fighting along the frontier and unprecedented Pakistani air strikes on Afghan cities – including the capital Kabul and southern Kandahar, where the supreme leader is based.

At least 372 Afghan civilians were killed and 397 others wounded in that conflict in the first three months of this year, a United Nations report published last month said.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been fraught since the Taliban took power for a second time in 2021.

Security issues have proved a sticking point, especially Pakistan's demand that Afghanistan curb the TTP militant group.

Islamabad accuses the Taliban government of sheltering militants behind a surge in attacks, particularly the TTP, which has waged a violent campaign against Pakistan for years.

Afghan officials deny the charge and counter that Pakistan harbours hostile groups and does not respect its sovereignty.

The border between the neighbours has remained largely closed since a flare-up in violence in October, freezing bilateral trade.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

The Strategic Logic Driving Russia’s Taliban Engagement – Analysis

GENDER APARTHEID IS NOT PART OF IT

Taliban Defense Minister Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid shakes hands with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu during the signing of a military-technical cooperation agreement in Moscow region, May 27, 2026. (Photo: Taliban Defense Ministry)

June 9, 2026 

Observer Research Foundation
By Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash and Shivam Shekhawat

On 21 May, Russia’s Security Council Secretary, Sergey Shoigu, reiterated Moscow’s concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the potential sources of destabilisation in the region. Speaking at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) security meeting, he highlighted the presence of 18,000 to 23,000 militants from more than 20 groups within Afghanistan, the gradual return of militants from Syria to the country, and the production and trade of synthetic drugs in and around Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries. Even as he acknowledged the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate’s efforts in countering these challenges — particularly the presence of militants — he also underscored the limits on the group’s ability to address these threats effectively, necessitating cooperation with the regime.

The Taliban’s removal from Russia’s terrorist list, and its subsequent recognition in July 2025, was an inflexion point for strategic stability in Eurasia, reflecting regional actors’ growing receptiveness to engaging with the Taliban. While there is considerable impetus to progressively strengthen the partnership, Moscow has had to tread cautiously in announcing large-scale infrastructure development projects, owing to the security factors outlined above and the deteriorating relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could potentially alter the threat calculus in the region.

Drivers of the Taliban-Russia Relationship

Moscow’s Taliban strategy is driven by a framework of pragmatic realism. The Taliban’s arrival in 2021 signalled an American retrenchment from the region, and Russia was quick to capitalise on this vacuum by establishing official contacts with the Taliban. Its embassy in Kabul remained operational, and it was the first country to open a business representative office in Kabul after the Taliban’s return. The Taliban’s swift consolidation of power reflected a new reality that states in the region would inevitably have to reckon with. The risk of proliferation of different terror groups inside Afghanistan — now that the US and its allies’ security umbrella had disappeared — raised the prospect of terror threats percolating into Central Asia and eventually making their way into Russia. The bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, for which the ISKP claimed responsibility, was the first sign of this fast-developing risk.


In 2024, the ISKP attacked Crocus City Hall, resulting in more than 140 fatalities. The attack highlighted the group’s ability to undertake transnational strikes. The perpetrators were from Central Asia, which further underscored Russia’s fears about the spillover. In the past year, there has been an uptick in armed incidentsat the Afghan-Tajikistan border, with more than 17 incidents reported in 2025 alone. At a security conference hosted by Moscow (26-29 May), the country’s security chief reiterated concerns about ISKP’s recruitment from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, its preparation for attacks, and its attempts to destabilise Taliban rule within the country, particularly in the north. Furthermore, in 2025, around 2,742 kilograms of drugs were confiscated; the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation has led to an increase in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, increasingly concentrated in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Without the Taliban pursuing a proactive policy of eliminating the terror threat and demonstrating its ability to police its borders, the risks of instability percolating into Central Asia remain high.

Against this backdrop, removing the Taliban from Russia’s terror list emerged as a priority. In 2025, the Russian Supreme Court removed the Taliban from its terror list, suspending the ban on its activities. In the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Taliban an “ally” in the fight against terror. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban government and subsequently accepted the credentials of Afghanistan’s new ambassador to Russia, Gul Hassan Hassan. This pivot towards a “full-fledged partnership” indicated the solidification of Moscow’s policy shift vis-à-vis Afghanistan. While there were reports of Russia’s possible interest in supplying weapons to the Taliban in the fight against ISKP, the two sides recently signed a military-technical agreement on the sidelines of a conference in Moscow, reflecting a shared commitment to containing the potential spillover from the regional security situation.


Pakistan and Afghanistan have been engaged in a crisis since February 2026, with attacks on each other’s military and border infrastructure. The rift is a double-edged sword for Moscow. On one hand, the persisting hostilities have implications for the regional balance of power; on the other, any resolution of fundamental differences — contingent on the Taliban outlawing the TTP — could result in the further fragmentation of the Taliban and the creation of a “new Taliban”. Moreover, this situation would inevitably lead to Afghan and Pakistani cadres defecting to the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, which is banned in Russia. The possibility of this seems remote, as the Taliban have refrained from taking any major action against the group even under immense pressure. Amid Islamabad’s coercive attempts — reflected in strikes and sanctions — Moscow’s interest lies in the cessation of hostilities, and it has also offered to mediate in resolving the crisis. However, its leverage remains limited. The persisting instability across the Durand Line reduces the impetus for implementing transport corridors and critical connectivity linking Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.

The Taliban’s Calculus

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate will complete half a decade in power in 2026. In the past five years, Russia has been the only country to grant de jure recognition to the regime. Notwithstanding the absence of formal recognition, other regional countries, including India, China, the Central Asian Republics, and Iran, have opened channels of communication with the Taliban and expanded pragmatic cooperation.

The rationale for engagement hovers between concerns about the proliferation of militant groups within Afghanistan and doubts about the Taliban’s capability and willingness to control them. For the Islamic Emirate, a major source of legitimacy has been its engagement with other countries. Russia’s support thus lends a veneer of legitimacy to the Taliban, which uses Moscow’s position against sanctions as a counter to the persistence of Western sanctions. The Emirate emphasises the principles of a balanced and economy-oriented foreign policy, with a focus on developing practical cooperation in trade and transit infrastructure, and positions itself as a crucial vector in facilitating regional connectivity. While Moscow is advancing the relationship to fulfil its objectives of ensuring regional security and furthering economic development, Russia’s support lends credence to the Emirate’s legitimisation process.

Economic Engagement as a Pillar of Regional Stability

For Moscow, the rationale for engagement transcends the underlying security threats and carries a degree of urgency around integrating Afghanistan into Eurasian supply chains by strengthening regional connectivity. For the latter to be possible, a stable Afghanistan remains critical. In this context, Russia has called upon regional states to formally recognise the regime. Strategic stability in the region remains a critical discussion point in platforms such as the SCO and the Moscow Format talks. In November 2025, Gul Hassan Hassan met Russia’s representative to the SCO to discuss the prospect of granting Afghanistan observer status in the grouping, with the understanding that Afghanistan’s integration into institutional regional agreements could pave the way for a new regionalism in Eurasia.

During the Russia-Afghanistan business forum last year, five MoUs were concluded in the areas of trade, transportation, and energy exploration, indicative of an appetite for enhanced engagement with the Islamic Emirate. Trade between the two countries currently stands at somewhere between US$300-400 million. Between April and May 2026, delegations from both sides held multiple engagements at the ministerial, ambassadorial, and business-to-business levels. Talks on expanding banking and economic cooperation are also underway.

Much of Russia’s economic engagement with Afghanistan has been routed through Tatarstan, with the region’s trade with Afghanistan reaching US$51 million in the first eleven months of 2025, accounting for ten percent of overall trade between the two countries. Investors from Tatarstan have shown interest in Afghanistan, while the Russian Chamber of Commerce has been exploring opportunities for cooperation in the agriculture, fertilisers, and oil extraction sectors. Projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway (connecting Termez to the Arabian Sea), the Torgundi-Herat-Spin Boldak railway network, the Khaf-Herat railway network, and the Wakhan Corridor highways offer an alternative to Central Asian states’ dependence on Iranian ports for maritime transit.

With growing exasperation over the slow progress on China’s Mes Aynak mine, the Emirate is also looking to diversify its investments. The Taliban’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum has invited Russian firms to invest in Afghanistan’s hydrocarbon projects, with talks of Russian investment in water transfer projects as well. However, despite growing interest, no large-scale projects have been concluded between the two countries.

The Way Forward

The Taliban’s official position refuses to acknowledge the presence of any terror group within the country, with the Emirate’s leaders doubling down on their claimed success in eviscerating the ISKP’s presence inside Afghanistan — asserting that this has compelled the group to regroup in neighbouring Pakistan. While the ISKP has expanded its presence in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, it continues to remain active within Afghanistan. The attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul in January this year is a case in point. Russia’s posture towards the Taliban has shifted in light of the evolving regional security environment, prompting a strategic recalibration across Eurasia. As the Taliban’s consolidation of power exacerbated security risks in the region — with the threat of terror percolating into Central Asia and Russia — a stable Afghanistan came to be seen as being in the interest of all regional actors, as reflected in Moscow’s recent actions. Moving forward, while the two countries will continue to cooperate economically at a moderate level, the focus of the relationship will be on counterterrorism and security-related cooperation, keeping in mind the broader regional security situation.

About the authors:

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


About Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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Trump Is Trying to Shoot His Way Out of US Decline—It Won’t Work

The president wants a 50% increase over last year’s Pentagon budget, to $1.5 trillion; a wiser policy would be to rethink how the US is to co-exist with other nations in what is emerging as a multipolar world.


US President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on March 3, 2026.
(Photo by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/ AFP via Getty Images)

Robert Freeman
Jun 08, 2026

Common Dreams

The US empire is in decline. Compare it today to where it was only 30 years ago, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a “hyperpower,” then, almost inconceivably dominant with no challengers on Earth.

Since then, China has surpassed the US economically. Russia is rated No.1 militarily. The US has to borrow close to $2+ trillion per year (the annual federal budget deficit) just to keep the lights on. Its government based on checks and balances is under assault by a sleazy felon who wants to be king. It is wracked by social divisions that presage civil war.

President Donald Trump’s proposed solution to these problems is to shoot our way out. He wants a 50% increase over last year’s Pentagon budget, to $1.5 trillion. It is stupid in the measure to which it is excessive. It is suicidal to the extent it will degrade our security and our chances of improving national prosperity.

A wiser policy would be to rethink how the US is to co-exist with other nations in what is emerging as a multipolar world. That’s a big rethink. There’s another rethink coming as well: how we run the economy and what it is that actually accounts for national well-being.

The era when the US could dominate, intimidate, and expropriate the rest of the world is over. If it continues to push military power as its primary path forward it will continue to produce catastrophe.

Neither of these “rethinkings”—neither security nor the economy—will be easy. Both will go against existing failed doctrines and the powerful interests that back them. But, without doing this, we face the certainty of continuing national decline.

The highest-level rationale for rejecting a 50% increase in the Pentagon’s budget is that the military simply doesn’t win wars. Sure, it can knock off defenseless, pipsqueak principalities like Grenada, or Serbia, or Libya. But whenever it goes up against a committed adversary, especially one that fights back, it loses.

It lost in Vietnam to a nation of rice farmers that hadn’t even entered the industrial age. It killed more than 3 million Vietnamese, 4 million Southeast Asians when you count Laos and Cambodia. Yet, it lost.

It lost in Iraq, despite Iraq having been bombed for the prior decade, since the first Gulf War in 1991. Even in losing, the US killed more than a million Iraqis and spawned ISIS, one of the most virulent terrorist organizations ever let loose on the world.

It lost in Afghanistan, despite 20 years of trying to win. Afghanistan was a fourth-world country, with the Taliban literally living in caves. The Taliban had only hand-held firearms. No air force. No artillery. No satellite intelligence. The US still managed to lose.

Ukraine isn’t over, yet, but it is lost. Russia has crushed every one of the fabled “wonder weapons” the US has thrown at it. Remember when Trump was going to end the Ukraine war “on Day One”? We’re now past Day 500. It hasn’t ended because Trump is too weak to take the Loss on his watch. But it is lost.

Iran is the most recent—and damaging—case of catastrophic US military failure. It has a military budget one-one hundredth that of the US. Yet, Iran has “humiliated” the US, at least in the words of German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. Neocon heavyweight Robert Kagan recently wrote, “It’s hard to think of a time when the United States suffered a total defeat in a conflict, a setback so decisive that the strategic loss could be neither repaired nor ignored.”

None of these outcomes are equivocal. None are ambiguous. Is that the kind of outfit we want to give a 50% raise to when it can never come close to accomplishing its essential mission? And when it never learns from its repeated failures?

This is one of the major rethinks that will have to be conducted before any thought can be given to giving even one extra dollar to the Pentagon. We need to hear from the leadership what, exactly, is going to change. And we don’t mean fiddling at the margins. We mean at the core of the institution. For example…

US weapons systems are not made to be able to win in battle. They are made to deliver maximum profits to the weapons makers. Consider…

The Patriot missile system is easily baited with low-cost drones into giving away its location and radar signature. “Here I am! Here I am!” It is then a sitting duck for cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, even swarms of the same low-cost drones.

The HIMARS rocket launcher uses common GPS as part of its guidance system. This is easily jammed resulting in missiles sometimes landing kilometers away from their intended targets. Its greatest value might be that every battery reliably drains $20 million from US taxpayers.

The M-1 Abrams tank wears a gigantic “shoot me” sign as soon as it’s spotted by one of the Russian drones that saturate the skies over Ukraine. The phrase “Fish in a barrel” comes to mind.

The bigger problem—bigger than weapons that don’t work—is that the US economy is not set up to support sustained, high intensity warfare. It gave up that capability decades ago, when it decided to de-industrialize so its companies could make more money building their stuff in China.

This is one of the reasons the US, via its proxy, Ukraine, has not been able to defeat Russia: it simply cannot supply the amount of ammunition Ukraine would need to prevail. Russia is firing 5-10 times the amount of artillery Ukraine is, and there’s literally nothing the US can do about it.

It would take decades to rebuild the weapons-focused industrial capacity the US possessed in the 1960s. Given the failure of the larger military enterprise in the US, there is no certainty that, once delivered, it would not be ill-conceived, misdirected, or already obsolete. In fact, given the Pentagon’s track record, the likelihood is that it would be all three.

The deepest problem for the US in grappling with increased Pentagon funding is rooted in its world view.

That was formed in the aftermath of World War II and reinforced following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991. After both events, the US stood astride the world like a colossus, unchallenged in its ability to destroy any other country. Heady stuff but the world doesn’t sit still.

Countries do not acquiesce in their own destruction. They organize themselves to fight back; they collaborate with other countries for collective self-defense; and they employ asymmetric strategies to defeat predators, as Vietnam and Afghanistan did, and as Iran has just done. The US military hasn’t gotten the memo.

The unprovoked Iran debacle has boosted the fortunes of Russia and China, the US’ principal rivals. It has elevated Iran to being the hegemon in the Persian Gulf. That rise is abetted by a quartet of Islamic powers that are tired of US and Israeli bullying: Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. They are forming an “Islamic NATO” to keep the US and Israel out of the Gulf. This is super important.

Since World War II, the Middle East has been one of the most important regions in the world because of its vast oil wealth. A 1945 US State Department memo stated that “Arab oil resources constitute a stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.”

It is the Trump Pentagon, the Pete Hegseth Pentagon, that has destroyed the US’ control of that “greatest material prize in world history.” Actually, it’s even worse than that. By forcing 50% higher oil prices on the rest of the world, the US is draining wealth from every country on Earth. Many of those countries were already economically tenuous. There’s not a one that doesn’t despise the US for the extortion.

Is that an organization to which we want to grant an additional half a trillion dollars a year? Every year? So it can wreak more destruction on US fortunes? Before it rethinks itself and how it can contribute responsibly to US well-being in the world? It’s not even fatuous. It’s insane.

So, if a $1.5 trillion budget for the military is not the solution to the US woes, what is?

The US could more plausibly revive its fortunes in the world by investing the would-be increase in Pentagon spending into the civilian economy, instead.

It should invest in the nation’s people—education—so as to improve the economy’s productivity. It should invest in the nation’s infrastructure to increase the economy’s efficiency. It should invest in scientific research and development to boost innovation. And, it should re-invest in alternative energy to build resilience.

Productivity. Efficiency. Innovation. Resilience. Those are what built the US in the 20th century. They are the real foundations of national well-being. None of them are mysteries as far as how they lead to a better economy and a stronger state. None are conceptually hard to carry out.

Donald Trump is doing exactly the opposite.

He is gutting education, rescinding major infrastructure projects, savaging scientific research, and in all ways possible dismantling alternative energy. Those avenues all go against the essence of Trumpism, which is looting, shifting national resources and wealth to the already wealthy—Trump’s base.

Looting is what Trump’s proposed increase in the Pentagon budget is really all about. It is the Mother of All Trump Grifts. It is 277 times larger than his laughable $1.8 billion Slush Fund. It wants to hide the grift under the quasi-sacrosanct cover of military spending.

But it doesn’t begin to even acknowledge, to say nothing of fix, the deep failings in the military. It actively damages the economy by diverting scarce resources to parasitic looting that inflicts more harm than it heals.

Trump’s proposal improves the fortunes of the already very wealthy, as all things from Trump do. It lards them with $500 billion of unaccountable giveaways every year. It is a payoff to his rich backers and to the military Trump thinks he’s going to need to finish his overthrow of the government when the time comes, in 2028.

The era when the US could dominate, intimidate, and expropriate the rest of the world is over. If it continues to push military power as its primary path forward it will continue to produce catastrophes like Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Iran, all of which have degraded US power, influence, and standing in the world.

Alternatively, it can invest in the economy, in the American people, to create higher growth, income, equality, resilience, and prosperity. Instead of trying to shoot our way out of our self-inflicted decline, we can try to think our way out, earn our way out, work our way out. It’s not certain. Nothing ever is. But it has so much more dignity and likelihood of success about it.


Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


Robert Freeman

Robert Freeman is the Founder and Executive Director of The Global Uplift Project, a leading provider of educational infrastructure for the developing world. He is the author of The Best One Hour History series whose titles include World War I, The Cold War, The Vietnam War, and many others.
Full Bio >

Scholar Says Trump Disaster in Iran Helps Prove That Era of ‘American Empire Is Over’

Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, said US military retrenchment is needed on a global scale.

Brad Reed
Jun 08, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

President Donald Trump’s illegal war with Iran has gone so poorly that it portends the end of the American-led global order, foreign policy scholar Jennifer Kavanagh wrote in an analysis published Monday by The American Conservative.

Despite Trump’s repeated declarations of a total US victory over Iran, Kavanagh wrote that the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed the limits of the American military, which in 2025 had a budget of nearly $1 trillion.

Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, argued that the Iran war has been particularly damaging to US power because it has drained US munitions supplies and has still achieved none of the major objectives Trump outlined at the start of the conflict.

“Some estimates suggest the United States has burned through 1,000 Tomahawk missiles, nearly 50% of its Patriot and THAAD stockpiles, and significant portions of advanced stand-off weapons like PRSM and JASSM missiles,” Kavanagh wrote. “The constraints on US military power created by these shortages will be consequential and enduring.”

In practical terms, Kavanagh said, this means the US simply cannot meet key commitments for the foreseeable future, such as supporting the defense of Taiwan in the case of an attack by China.

Kavanagh emphasized that American policymakers should reduce US military commitments around the world and not cling to a global order that is no longer sustainable.

“The period of US military dominance—and of American empire—is over,” Kavanagh wrote. “The resulting future will be less comfortable for the United States, but its changes are overdue and its challenges manageable. With the right moves today, American retrenchment can leave the United States, and the world, better off.”

This retrenchment, wrote Kavanagh, would refocus American defense strategy solely on defending US territory and “ensuring access to key economic markets.” In practice, this would mean closing military bases and ending deployments in Europe and the Middle East, a “narrowing” of security guarantees to NATO allies, and explicitly stating that it would not defend Taiwan in the face of an attack from China, which Kavanagh said would “reduce the risk of a war with China that at this point the United States is unprepared to fight.”

“These changes in posture and alliance commitments would amount to a massive transformation of American foreign policy,” Kavanagh acknowledged, “but the result would be a sustainable military position, consistent with US capabilities and resources and tailored to protecting US interests.”

There Is No Military Solution to the Middle East’s Political Issues

As difficult as it may be to imagine it now, what will be required is to work toward a regional security framework built on non-aggression, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of all states, and an end to the Israeli occupation and denial of Palestinian rights.


A flag of Iran hangs from a damaged residential building that, according to Iranian authorities, was hit by a strike on March 4 during the US-Israeli military campaign on April 14, 2026 in southeastern Tehran, Iran.
(Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images)

James Zogby
Jun 08, 2026

Common Dreams


Back when the Obama administration was negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran, I asked National Security Council officials, “Why are you expending all of your economic leverage, and political and diplomatic resources on stopping Iran from developing a bomb they don’t have (and even if they did, could never use), while these same resources could be mobilized to pressure Iran to end its meddlesome behaviors that are destabilizing countries across the region?”

Despite this reservation, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was announced, I supported it for three reasons. First, “the nuclear deal” was a negotiated settlement, which is always better than conflict. And despite White House spokespeople saying otherwise, Catherine Ashton, a top British diplomat involved in the negotiations, offered assurances that the deal was only a first step and that Iran’s behaviors would be next on the agenda. My hope was that sane minds would prevail and the initiated process might lead to a regional security compact and framework for peace.

The second reason was the way Republicans were working overtime to sabotage the agreement. It was unconscionable that they invited a foreign leader, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to address a joint session of Congress to urge members of Congress to vote against their own president. That was unacceptable interference in US politics.

The third (and maybe most unexpected) reason was the reaction to the JCPOA inside Iran. In a poll we conducted months after the deal was announced, we found a significant change in Iranian public opinion. Our earlier polls had demonstrated Iranians largely in favor of the regime’s spending money on allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. With the hint of peace, Iranians turned their priorities inward, with declining support for the regime’s foreign involvements. Instead of resources going abroad, Iranians wanted them to be used at home to create employment and opportunity. They also elevated their demands for greater personal freedom and political rights.

A decade after the JCPOA, the Middle East and the Gulf region are in a more precarious place than ever.

When, after Donald Trump’s election, he cancelled the Iran deal and began threatening the regime, we repeated the poll. The results had reverted. When citizens feel their country is being threatened, they tend to be less critical or to “rally around the flag.”

In the ensuing years, amid continuing signs of hostility from all sides—US, Israel, and Iran—the situation has shown no promise of improvement. Despite promising a better agreement, Trump did nothing more than deepen the animosity. The Biden administration was handed the thankless task of bringing a dead deal back to life—a task to which they never appeared to be fully committed. For its part, Iran continued to behave as a bad regional actor, all the while making threats and building its military capabilities.

Left on their own, the Arab Gulf states sought to create stability out of the possibility of chaos with which they were forced to contend. Unlike Iran, which had decided to use its wealth to export its influence and its anti-Western ideology, the Arab Gulf states had taken a different path, focusing on development, tourism, and trade. Their continued prosperity required a stable regional environment. And so, amid the tensions between the US and Israel and Iran, these Arab states made diplomatic and economic overtures to Iran, hoping for a more secure environment in the Gulf. They even hoped that the lure of joint prosperity and security might move the Iranians to join them in pursuing a more stable and prosperous future and convince the Israelis to resolve the longstanding wound of Palestinian dispossession and occupation, fostering conditions for regional peace. There was to be no such luck!

Israel wanted the economic benefits of regional peace but was unwilling to play its part. It intensified its occupation and the repression and strangulation of Palestinians. Then came October 7, and the region exploded. In short order, as Israel was pursuing a genocidal war in Gaza, Iran’s ally in Lebanon became engaged in a fateful and costly exchange with Israel in the north, a miscalculation with devastating consequences. The Israelis launched a deadly bombing campaign killing thousands of Lebanese, including Hezbollah’s leader. Months later, Israel and the US attacked Iran and killed Iran’s spiritual leader. Iran returned fire setting off a broader confrontation.

Negotiations produced what were called “cease fires” during which Palestinian and Lebanese death tolls continued to mount. When, egged on by Israel and Republican neocons, President Trump decided to “finish the job” by defeating the Iranian regime, the conflict took on a new character. Iran intensified its attacks on neighboring Arab Gulf states that housed US bases and closed the Straits of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil and gas supplies and negatively impacting the Gulf region’s economies.

Reading some of the Israeli, Arab, and US press is enough to make one pull out one’s hair. Some Israeli commentators from the far-right (and their American neocon acolytes) remain convinced that all that’s needed is another massive bombing campaign, coupled with yet a few more “targeted assassinations”—as if those tactics, which Israel has used repeatedly, will be any more successful than they’ve been in the past.

Meanwhile, hard-line Arab opinion writers celebrate the “brilliance” of Iranian tactics. It’s hard to see how incurring the enmity of their neighbors and putting their own and the region’s economic futures at risk can be construed as anything but reckless.

The US media is even more confounding, with its apparent addiction to breathlessly and uncritically following the barrage of confusing and contradictory posts coming from the president.

And so, a decade after the JCPOA, the Middle East and the Gulf region are in a more precarious place than ever. Although the situation is far more complicated than a decade ago, and the enmity on all sides so much deeper, the way forward is recognition that piecemeal approaches to the region, playing whack-a-mole, have only made the region less secure.

As difficult as it may be to imagine it now, what will be required is to work toward a regional security framework built on non-aggression, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of all states, and an end to the Israeli occupation and denial of Palestinian rights. This entails the recognition that there are no military solutions to the region’s political issues. In fact, each round of violence only exacerbates existing problems. It’s a tall order requiring leadership that is smart, courageous, and visionary. That may not exist today, but it’s necessary—and it’s the goal toward which we must direct our efforts.


Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


James Zogby
Dr. James J. Zogby is the author of Arab Voices (2010) and the founder and president of the Arab American Institute (AAI), a Washington, D.C.-based organization which serves as the political and policy research arm of the Arab American community. Since 1985, Dr. Zogby and AAI have led Arab American efforts to secure political empowerment in the U.S. Through voter registration, education and mobilization, AAI has moved Arab Americans into the political mainstream. Dr. Zogby has also been personally active in U.S. politics for many years; in 1984 and 1988 he served as Deputy Campaign manager and Senior Advisor to the Jesse Jackson Presidential campaign. In 1988, he led the first ever debate on Palestinian statehood at that year's Democratic convention in Atlanta, GA. In 2000, 2008, and 2016 he served as an advisor to the Gore, Obama, and Sanders presidential campaigns.
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GENDER APARTHEID

Women detained in Afghanistan's Herat in clothing crackdown, eyewitnesses say

Copyright AP Photo

By Gavin Blackburn

Published on 08/06/2026 - EURONEWS

Women nationwide must be completely covered when they leave home, with many wearing a flowing abaya robe along with a Muslim headscarf and a face covering.

Residents in the western Afghan city of Herat told the AFP news agency they had witnessed several women detained by the Taliban government's morality police, in a crackdown over clothing which has drawn criticism from the United Nations.

The UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said on Sunday it was "concerned over multiple arrests and detentions of women in Herat Afghanistan for alleged non-compliance with dress requirements."

Taliban authorities rule according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law and have gradually tightened restrictions on women since returning to power in August 2021.

Women nationwide must be completely covered when they leave home, with many wearing a flowing abaya robe along with a Muslim headscarf and a face covering.

In Herat, residents witnessed women being detained on Saturday for not wearing the body-cloaking chador or burqa. They spoke to AFP on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

"I saw two employees of the ministry, one of whom was carrying a whip, putting two women who were not wearing chadors into a vehicle," said a 23-year-old woman, referring to officials from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (PVPV).

She said those detained were fully covered, including wearing Muslim headscarves.

"Everyone is frightened," she told AFP.

Another woman said she saw PVPV officials stopping vehicles and checking passengers' clothing and saw multiple women being detained and put into vans.

"The majority of those arrested were women who were not wearing chadors," the 27-year-old said.

The PVPV ministry did not comment on women being detained when contacted by AFP.

"There is nothing unusual in Herat," the ministry's information department said.

Afghan women wait to receive food rations distributed by a humanitarian aid group in Kabul, 28 May, 2023 AP Photo

The dress code "is a divine command and an enforced law and we are obligated to implement it," the ministry said.

Since the crackdown was launched, an AFP journalist and multiple residents in Herat said the number of women leaving home had dropped sharply.

A 20-year-old taxi driver said "they're not seen in the city at all."

"We've been told not to transport women without a chador," he said.

One woman described the situation as "unbearable".

"I am genuinely saddened that we don't even have the right to breathe freely," the 33-year-old said. "Life has become very difficult for us."

From Strategic Depth To Strategic Breakdown: The New Afghan-Pakistan Crisis – Analysis

June 6, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Shivam Shekhawat and Maiwand Safi

Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have deteriorated sharply in recent months, with Pakistani missile strikes hitting a university and a residential neighbourhood in Kunar in April — this despite the two sides reaching a consensus at a China-brokered informal meeting in Urumqi not to escalate the situation further. Unlike previous episodes of friction, this phase has escalated into open conflict, signifying a structural rupture in bilateral relations. Since the current phase of fighting began in February, Pakistani forces have launched an ‘open attack‘ on Afghanistan, conducting air and missile strikes deep inside the country, including in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kandahar. The Taliban government in Kabul has also launched retaliatory strikes on Pakistani military bases near the border.

Given the relationship’s historical trajectory, this violent breakdown is striking. For two decades, Pakistan and the Taliban maintained a close alliance. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, many Pakistani leaders, including former Prime Minister Imran Khan, publicly welcomed the development, calling the Taliban a “natural ally” and describing it as a strategic breakthrough — one that broke “…the shackles of slavery.” Yet over the four years since, expectations of strategic alignment have given way to deteriorating relations and open hostility.

The current crisis is rooted in several interlinked factors: a permissive geopolitical environment, a security vacuum, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban’s limited compliance with Pakistan’s long-standing aspiration for “strategic depth,” and the evolving engagement between Afghanistan and India.

Permissive Geopolitical Environment and Security Vacuum

The geopolitical priorities of the major powers have shifted significantly. The United States is preoccupied with the war in Iran and conflicts in the broader Middle East. Russia remains focused on its operations in Ukraine. China’s reluctance to engage in Afghanistan, combined with its desire to avoid alienating its ally Pakistan, has fostered a permissive geopolitical environment. This is further reflected in the failure of any externally mediated talks to produce a sustainable solution. Within this permissive landscape, regional states have been able to pursue military policies with minimal external monitoring, accountability, or criticism.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict must therefore be analysed within a broader geopolitical framework. Pakistan’s ongoing assaults on Afghanistan emerge at a moment when all major powers are focused on crises in the Middle East and Europe, resulting in diminished scrutiny and a lack of accountability for Islamabad, enabling it to strike Afghanistan with impunity.


In contrast to previous episodic conflicts between the two nations, which were brief and quickly contained, the current unchecked escalation reflects the absence of external security assurances and guarantors. This has created a deterrence vacuum that continues to fuel escalation. Under the previous government in Afghanistan, the international diplomatic and military presence imposed meaningful constraints on escalation, producing a degree of controlled volatility. The political transition in Kabul dismantled that security framework, allowing tensions to escalate with far fewer checks.

As a consequence, Pakistan now has the latitude to strike at its own discretion and on its own timeline. It previously hit the Omar drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul on 16 March and targeted Syed Jamaluddin Afghani University in Kunar last month, in both cases without facing any accountability. The absence of effective deterrence has left the current environment without workable de-escalation mechanisms, significantly raising the risk of a protracted and unmanageable conflict.

The TTP and Strategic Depth Dilemma

Islamabad expected that once the Taliban took control of Kabul, they would rein in or even dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A striking paradox has since emerged in Pakistan-Taliban relations: Pakistani officials accuse the Taliban of providing sanctuary, training, and resources to the TTP, which has carried out militant attacks on Pakistani security forces since 2022, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The Taliban rejects these allegations, maintaining that the TTP is an internal Pakistani matter and that Islamabad must address its domestic militancy through political and security means rather than external pressure. The deadlock is further exacerbated by political, tribal, and ideological factors within Afghanistan that constrain Kabul’s ability to respond to Pakistani concerns regarding the TTP.


When the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, many Pakistanis saw it as creating ‘a new bloc’ — paving the way for the realisation of ‘strategic depth‘: the idea that a friendly government in Kabul would provide security leverage against India. However, this vision of ‘strategic depth’ proved shortsighted. The Taliban demonstrated a degree of autonomy that defied Pakistan’s expectations, pursuing a more independent regional approach rather than aligning closely with Islamabad’s strategic interests. They sought to consolidate support across Afghan society, transition into a full-fledged government, and forge ties beyond Pakistan — including with countries such as India.

Additionally, the Durand Line remains a significant point of contention between the two countries, with successive governments — including the current Taliban administration — not having endorsed it as an international border. For Pakistan, it is a matter of national security; for Afghanistan, the Durand Line remains politically and historically contentious. This unresolved dispute perpetuates bilateral tensions and undermines cross-border security cooperation, increasing the risk of conflict and instability in the region.

At the same time, Afghanistan’s re-engagement with India has added a layer of anxiety to Pakistani strategic and security thinking. New Delhi has opened channels of engagement with the Taliban, upgrading its technical mission to a diplomatic mission following Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi’s visit to India on 9 October 2025. High-level official visits, particularly from the Afghan side, have signalled that India intends to retain influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistani officials, including the country’s defence minister, have expressed concern that the Taliban is drifting toward alignment with Indian strategic interests. From Islamabad’s perspective, the prospect of deepening Afghanistan-India ties raises the fear of strategic encirclement.

Pakistan’s Endgame?

Military escalation and open war are unlikely to eradicate the structural causes of the conflict. Airstrikes and missiles will not compel the Taliban to formally recognise the Durand Line. Severing ties with India is also not an option for the Taliban: diversifying foreign relations is a pragmatic necessity, since international recognition and economic assistance require engagement beyond any single partner. The prospect of the TTP’s disbandment appears equally remote, particularly given that the Taliban has already refuted claims that it shelters the group on Afghan soil.

Some analysts argue that Pakistan’s objective is to degrade Afghanistan’s military capability, including equipment left behind after the US withdrawal. Pakistan’s approach appears less oriented toward decisive victory than toward strategic denial. Pakistani airstrikes targeting military infrastructure suggest an intent to weaken Kabul’s security capacity. This posture reflects a longer-term strategic calculation: with a strong India on its eastern border, Islamabad prefers an Afghanistan of limited strategic capacity to its west, in order to avoid strategic encirclement. The Taliban’s recent efforts to consolidate military and economic autonomy appear to have sharpened these anxieties. The conflict may thus be read as an effort to limit Afghanistan’s military infrastructure before it further shifts a regional balance already tilting in India’s favour.

This strategy is not without its costs. It destabilises borderlands, inflames Afghan nationalist sentiment, and deepens regional polarisation in an already war-torn area. It also strains Pakistan’s security and economic resources at a time of considerable vulnerability and internal turmoil, undermining its ability to address pressing domestic challenges. Unless the deeper political, security, and regional drivers are addressed through sustained engagement and confidence-building measures, cycles of tension are likely to persist — limiting the durability of any future truce or ceasefire.

About the authors:

Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Maiwand Safi is a senior PhD scholar at South Asian University, working on the geopolitics of connectivity, with a particular focus on Afghanistan, South Asia, and regional strategic dynamics

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

GENDER APARTHEID & FEMICIDE

Regional Leaders Back Taliban Trade Ties While EU Holds the Line

By Eurasianet - Jun 05, 2026

• Officials from Central and South Asia meeting in Tashkent agreed Afghanistan is central to regional trade routes, with Uzbekistan alone inking roughly $5 billion in Afghan deals since late 2025.
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• Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce chair called for targeted sanctions relief, arguing that non-political private-sector traders bear the brunt of restrictions aimed at the Taliban government.
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• The EU’s Central Asia envoy signaled Brussels has little appetite to ease its stance toward the Taliban, effectively ruling out EU funding for major infrastructure like a trans-Afghan rail corridor.
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Top level officials from Central and South Asia convened in Tashkent on June 4 to discuss regional trade and connectivity under a format known as the Termez Dialogue. Participants were unanimous in seeing a strategic need to weave Afghanistan into regional trade networks, but discussion on specific tactics to achieve that aim did not feature prominently at the gathering.

For Central Asian states, the shortest route to a seaport runs through Afghanistan. But there are broader reasons for deepening engagement with the Taliban leadership, Bakhromjon Aloev, Uzbekistan’s first deputy foreign minister, pointed out. An Afghanistan that is trading vigorously and growing more prosperous can potentially break the country’s nearly half-century-long cycle of violence and “contribute to regional stability,” he stated.

Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states are building trade ties with Afghanistan to the fullest extent possible. For example, Uzbek and Afghan entities have agreed on deals worth roughly $5 billion since the fall of 2025.

Even so, the general lack of international recognition of the Taliban government, coupled with ongoing international sanctions, are hindering Afghanistan’s ability to expand trade and develop road and rail routes to facilitate cross-border commerce.

Afghan Minister of Industry and Commerce Nooruddin Azizi reiterated Kabul’s desire to build up trade volume with neighboring states and develop the country’s logistics capacity. Other Afghan officials in Tashkent quietly lobbied Central and South Asian leaders to advocate on Kabul’s behalf for an easing of international sanctions.

In an interview with Eurasianet, the chairman of Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Investment Syed Karim Hashemy urged a rethinking of sanctions policy against Afghanistan, arguing that private-sector traders who in his words are “non-political” are unfairly impacted by the sanctions imposed because of repressive government policies. Sanctions should be tweaked, he added, to give entrepreneurs more economic leeway to trade with Afghanistan’s neighbors.

Hashemy said that private-sector entrepreneurs are responsible for generating about 70 percent of Afghanistan’s economic activity. “The private sector has never left the country,” he claimed, going on to call for banking restrictions to be altered to enable private-sector, trade-related wire transfers.

Eduards Stirpais, the European Union’s special representative to Central Asia, downplayed any idea that Brussels would substantively alter its stance toward the Taliban government in the foreseeable future, citing “little appetite … to support a regime that is not supporting our [European] values.” That suggests EU financing for large-scale infrastructure projects, such as a trans-Afghan railroad, is unlikely to be forthcoming.

One conference participant, speaking on background, noted that in the eyes of many Central Asian officials, the Taliban government is a more reliable negotiating partner than was the US-backed government that the Islamic militant movement drove from power in 2021. “The Talibs are very tough negotiators, but once they agree on something, they can be counted upon,” the participant said.

The Termez Dialogue is a platform forged by a 2022 United Nations Resolution titled Strengthening connectivity between Central and South Asia. The resolution urges the creation of “accessible and sustainable transport networks … with a view to achieving transport connectivity across Central and South Asia that is economically, socially and environmentally viable and financially sustainable.”

By Eurasianet.org